january 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 1

The Pakistan Army and its U.S. military, chose to first train the rise of Talibanization inside Pakistan. FC. As for its regular forces, Pakistan It has escalated to the point where Role in FATA decided to provide battle inoculation today Islamist militants are taking in what it calls Low Intensity Conflict the battle to the heart of Pakistan’s By Shuja Nawaz (LIC), rather than in COIN operations.2 capital, Islamabad, and even targeting According to the former director general the army’s soft targets in different for the first time since independence in of military operations of the Pakistan “cantonments” or military reservations. 1947, Pakistan has sent its army into the Army, the difference between the two is Pakistan measures its costs not only Federally Administered Tribal Areas that LIC demands no more than a “well in the movement of troops and loss of (FATA), the largely ungoverned region trained infantry soldier,” whereas COIN public support for its actions, but also that lies between its North-West Frontier operations require indoctrination of in the deaths of more than 1,300 soldiers Province (NWFP) and Afghanistan. both soldiers and officers—in addition since the army moved into FATA and the Since the invasion of Afghanistan in to civil-military collaboration—to win adjoining areas in the NWFP; moreover, 2001, the United States and its NATO over the general population and isolate since 2001 tens of thousands of civilians allies have been pressing Pakistan to the insurgents.3 have been killed or wounded due to the do more to stop the Afghan Taliban and Afghanistan-spawned militancy. al-Qa`ida from seeking sanctuary in The situation on the border area has FATA and the northern reaches of the grown more precarious over time. A Military Solution NWFP. Furthermore, since 2001 the Following escalating attacks by In Pakistan, there is no national United States has provided more than Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan, consensus over how to proceed in $10 billion in financial assistance to the United States sent in aerial drones FATA, or on what type of society the Pakistan to offset the costs of moving to attack selected Taliban and other country should accept as a whole. As a troops into the region. Out of this sum, militant targets inside FATA. The U.S. result, once Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan approximately $7 billion has been in the strikes have grown in intensity. On (TTP) began organizing itself and linked 1 form of Coalition Support Funds. Yet, September 3, 2008, the United States up with malcontents across FATA and the lack of a uniform vision on the part also launched an incursion with Special in the adjoining frontier regions—as of both the United States and Pakistan Operations Forces near Angoor Adda in well as in Swat, Dir and Chitral—the on what constitutes adequate counter- South Waziristan Agency and attacked Pakistan government’s only possible insurgency measures has been the a suspected militant hideout inside response was to send in the army. For source of some discord. Pakistani territory. Although Pakistan the first time since independence, the has protested each incursion, the drone army moved into FATA in force.6 The Despite Pakistan’s complaints that the attacks have continued, and the first equivalent of six infantry divisions were United States has not provided adequate ever attack inside the settled areas deployed over time to FATA and Swat, equipment and weapons support, a key of Pakistan occurred on November some having moved from their positions factor hindering Pakistan’s ability to 19, 2008 near Bannu in the NWFP.4 along the Indo-Pakistan border where fight insurgents has been its own forces’ Although agreement was reached they represented Pakistan’s strike force lack of training and indoctrination between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and against any Indian attack. Largely a necessary for fighting an insurgency the United States to set up coordination conventional army, it was trained and within its own borders. Still clinging to mechanisms in the border region, the equipped for regular warfare against its self image as a conventional army, United States alleges that Pakistan has other similar forces, not against Pakistan’s military has not fully nor not done enough to counter militancy.5 insurgent guerrilla units. speedily accepted the need to change to Counter-Insurgency (COIN) doctrine. Initially, a perception emerged inside The locally deployed Frontier Corps— This article will provide a better Pakistan that it was being forced to a largely peacetime militia that had understanding of why the Pakistani fight America’s war solely to aid U.S. lost its efficacy over the years through government was forced to send its efforts in Afghanistan. Since the U.S. neglect, lack of training, and failure military into the tribal regions, the invasion of Afghanistan, however, the to upgrade arms and systems—was changing tactics used in the fight against level of militancy inside Pakistan itself not able to aggressively patrol or fight the insurgents, and what steps are has increased significantly. The 2001 the well-armed and trained militants. necessary to create a lasting solution. invasion and its aftermath caused the Moreover, the FC was composed of local tribes and commanded by officers from An Escalating Problem 2 Personal interview, Major General Ahmed Shuja Pa- the Pakistan Army, the latter of whom The United States offered to help sha, Director General Military Operations, Pakistan had little knowledge of the people and Pakistan retrain and re-equip the Army, August 2008. the terrain. The courses in mountain Frontier Corps (FC) and the regular 3 Ibid. warfare geared to fighting in the border army. Pakistan, not wanting to be 4 “First US Drone Attack Outside FATA: Major Qaeda region with Afghanistan that were once perceived as too closely tied to the Man Among 6 Killed in Missile Strike,” Daily Times, No- a regular part of training for British vember 20, 2008. Indian Army officers and even in post- 1 “Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over 5 Such accusations generally state that elements of Paki- independence Pakistan are no longer key Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support stan’s Inter-Services Intelligence continue to ignore the Funds,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, Com- activities of the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan, if not actu- 6 In 1960, the army went into Bajaur briefly to repel an bating Terrorism GAO-08-806, June 2008. ally assist militants in their missions inside Afghanistan. alleged Afghan incursion. january 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 1 training elements in today’s Pakistan Operation Mountain Viper, a name that support of the FC for patrolling and Army. Moreover, many officers were failed to inspire participants or locals fighting the “foreigners.” The militants assigned to the FC from the regular in a fight against Islamist militants. As were told to leave the area or risk being army rather than volunteering for it, a result, the new commander of troops killed and their property destroyed.11 as had been the practice in the past. in Swat, Major General Nasser Janjua, Following a major principle of COIN, Therefore, in effect, the FC received the commanding the 17th Infantry Division the authorities tried to isolate the dregs of the officer corps. Unlike in the from Kharian near the Kashmir border, militants from the general population Pakistan Army, the commanders of the launched a fresh operation on November in Bajaur. Rather than accomplishing individual wings of the FC were only 13, 2007 named Rah-e-Haq. The this by providing security to the general majors, not lieutenant-colonels.7 There purpose of the operation was to wrest population in the towns, authorities was little incentive for officers to excel the Islamic ground from the insurgents asked locals to evacuate the Bajaur during their short rotation to the FC, and by claiming to act in the name of the areas where militants were suspected no locals could hope to rise to the officer true faith. The operation ended in mid- to be hiding, creating a huge flow of ranks in the Corps because they had to January 2008. Recognizing the need refugees. Ground troops and aircraft enlist in the regular army to become to “reduce civilian casualties, since we then proceeded to heavily bombard the officers. Nevertheless, the number of are operating inside our own territory area to destroy suspected areas where officers commissioned into the Pakistan against our own people,”9 Janjua the militants took shelter.12 Army from FATA rose from 63 in the attempted to isolate the insurgents and 18-year period of 1970-1989 to 147 in to cordon and search areas repeatedly Although there has been some initial the 15-year period of 1990-2005. Even to draw them out for elimination. At success in the military operations, the number of soldiers recruited by the the same time, medical aid and food by themselves they are not likely to Pakistan Army from FATA has grown, supplies were delivered to the people take hold. Civilian efforts, especially with some 2,255 recruited in the decade in the affected areas. Initially, Janjua on the political and economic fronts, of 1996-2006, compared with only 75 maintains that he allowed the insurgents will be needed to make civil-military in 1991-1995.8 Although the numbers to “escape” into the northernmost collaboration effective in the long run. are still small, there has been a steady Piochar Valley, giving them a false increase in recruits. sense of security and letting them Producing a Lasting Solution establish fixed positions for training. Both the FC and the army operated in The poor training and morale of the Whether this is an ex post rationalization FATA and the Swat and Malakand FC showed in its encounters with the for the army’s shortcoming at that stage sectors with severe handicaps. They were militants. The troops proved unable or is hard to prove. Nevertheless, by the poorly trained for counter-insurgency unwilling to fight their fellow tribesmen. end of August and early September warfare and did not have the proper The regular army, appearing for the 2008, he had identified and attacked equipment for the highly mobile war first time inside FATA, was seen as an the new targets, causing heavy damage against militants who engage in surprise “alien” force. Even today, many of its and forcing the militants to seek help attacks and disappear before troops officers still consider it as such. Largely from others in Dir District and Bajaur can reach the affected areas or military Punjabi (60% or more), the army lacked Agency. posts. The lack of attack and troop- the ability to converse with the locals lifting helicopters limited the ability and had to rely on interpreters. Meanwhile, the FC in Bajaur mounted of the Pakistani forces to react with an intensive campaign in August 2008 alacrity to seemingly random and widely Changing Tactics against the militants in that area and distant insurgent attacks. Although The fight against the militants forced the found significant support from local the United States promised Cobra army to change its tactics, using religious tribes, including the Salarzai tribe, helicopters, not all of the helicopters symbolism to garner local support and the dominant tribe in Bajaur that had been delivered by the end of the to encourage local tribesmen to rise wanted to reassert their status against summer of 2008. The Pakistan Army’s against the militants and thus isolate the Taliban. Their leader, Malik Zeb smaller and unarmored Bell helicopters them. Gradually, it adjusted to the fight Salarzai, promised to bring their own cannot operate at the altitude required by using classic counter-insurgency armed militia, known as a lashkar,10 in in the mountains of Malakand and Swat, tactics by cordoning, clearing and especially during hot days. Moreover, holding areas, while trying to limit 9 Personal interview, Major General Nasser Janjua, Au- the solitary heli-lift squadron supplied civilian collateral damage. Two major gust 2008. and supported by the United States at operations illustrate these changes. 10 The use of lashkars is not new in FATA. Such groups Tarbela cannot adequately cover the have always been used to assist the administration in wide arc of militancy in the region from In Swat District of the NWFP, the first ensuring peace and order. In the current war against South Waziristan to Dir and Swat. operation by the regular army was named militants, lashkars have taken on special importance since they represent the spontaneous upwelling of un- The Pakistan Army, for its part, has 7 This has now changed. All Frontier Corps wings are happiness with the activities of the militants, primed to begun some preparatory training of now commanded by lieutenant-colonels. some extent with official financial incentives. Neverthe- 8 Data obtained by the author from General Headquar- less, there is a latent danger in training and arming local 11 Quoted in Anwarullah Khan, “Crackdown on Mili- ters, Pakistan Army for the book Shuja Nawaz, Crossed warlords, who may well become future challengers of the tants by Tribal Volunteers,” Dawn, October 6, 2008. Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford: government’s writ or a conduit of arms or information 12 The danger of such practices is that they could alienate Oxford University Press, 2008). for the militants. the evacuees. january 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 1 units being deployed to FATA and Swat with a three-phase program that gradually indoctrinates, acclimatizes, and trains troops under live fire before sending them into battle against the insurgents. In general, however, the army has been “learning by doing,” and standard operational procedures change with changes in commanders at all levels.

Most critically, an underlying issue that affects military operations is the importance over the mid- and long-term to create political context and structures in FATA that create more space for the military and the paramilitary to act legitimately. In other words, the government, by setting national policy publicly, must give the military the legitimacy to act on its behalf in the context of the strategic interests of the country.13 Without clarity on those strategic interests, the military solution can only be temporary and perhaps even counter-productive. Troops, training, and equipment are one part of a two- part approach to counter-insurgency. The other, more important part is political governance, without which military actions will fail to gain traction or produce a lasting solution.

Shuja Nawaz, a former Pakistani journalist and international civil servant, is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press, 2008). He is a political analyst, who speaks and writes for U.S. and international media and at major think- tanks. As of January 2009, Mr. Nawaz became the first Director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, D.C. This article is derived from “FATA: A Most Dangerous Place” released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in January 2009.

13 Personal interview, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, August 2008.