Issue Brief # 230 August 2013

Innovative Research | Independent Analysis | Informed Opinion

Pakistan’s Internal Security Challenges Will The Military Cope?

Brig (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident), CSIS

The greatest challenge that the new despite the army’s counter-insurgency Pakistan government faces is on the campaign and appears capable of national security front. The inability of the breaking out of its stronghold to Pakistan army to meet internal security neighbouring areas. Only concerted army challenges effectively is a particularly operations launched with single- worrying factor. Fissiparous tendencies in mindedness of purpose can stop the TTP Balochistan and the restive Gilgit-Baltistan juggernaut. Northern Areas are a perpetual security nightmare. Karachi remains a tinderbox Over the last decade, the deteriorating that is ready to explode. The Al Qaeda has internal security environment has gradually gradually made inroads into Pakistani morphed into Pakistan’s foremost national terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e- security threat. The Pakistan army and its Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Harkat-ul-Jihad Al-Islami (HuJI), Tehreek-e- Intelligence (ISI) Directorate gained Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and considerable experience in aiding, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and while it is abetting and fuelling insurgencies and still far from forming an umbrella terrorism in Afghanistan during the Soviet organisation encompassing all of them, it is occupation in the 1980s and in Jammu and moving perceptibly in that direction. Kashmir (J&K) and other parts of India since 1988-89. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has consolidated its position in North Waziristan Having concentrated solely on preparing for a conventional war with India, the army had no worthwhile experience in fighting Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) is former Director, insurgencies successfully and has Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. At expectedly failed to deliver, particularly in present, he is Adjunct Fellow, Centre for Strategic ground operations in the picturesque Swat and International Studies, Washington, D.C Valley. Views expressed are author’s own.

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I insurgency operations due to Counter-insurgency Campaign: apprehensions that fighting fellow Muslims Challenges Galore would be demotivating in the long run. Many soldiers, including officers, are known As the Pakistan army’s previous operational to have refused to fight fellow Muslims. expertise lay in creating and fuelling Several cases of fratricide have been insurgencies and not in fighting them, it reported. Questions are now being raised failed to sense that it was creating a about the army’s lack of professionalism in Frankenstein monster at home by counter-insurgency operations and its encouraging fundamentalist terrorism withering internal cohesion. General abroad and failed to fight the scourge Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the COAS, was effectively for almost 10 years. Large parts asked some hard questions by junior of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA have officers when he went around the country been under Taliban control for many years. to pacify agitated officers after the US The challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty in Navy SEALS had taken out Osama bin Swat and Buner was addressed with brute Laden in a spectacular operation. force only after the Taliban appeared to be on a triumphant march to Islamabad. The army’s convoys have been repeatedly The insurgency in South Waziristan was ambushed; it has faced numerous terrorist tackled on a war footing after years of strikes in the shape of suicide attacks and procrastination, but the writ of the Tehrik-e- bombings; many of its personnel Taliban Pakistan (TTP) still runs in North (especially Pushtun soldiers) have deserted Waziristan. The civilian administration as they do not wish to fight fellow continues to place its trust in the false hope tribesmen; and, many soldiers have been that it can sign durable peace deals with captured by the militants in humiliating the Taliban – a tactic that has failed in the circumstances. While some of these past. soldiers were later released by the militants for a large ransom, some others were killed. The army has been facing many difficulties Soldiers are routinely overstaying leave or in conducting effective counter-insurgency going AWOL (absent without leave) and operations even though it has deployed even regular army battalions have seen more than 150,000 soldiers in the Khyber- their morale dip to worryingly low levels. Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA, and has suffered There have been some reports of soldiers over 15,700 casualties, including over 5,000 disobeying the orders issued by their dead since 2008. Total casualties including superior officers. Complicating the issue civilians number almost 50,000 since 2001. further is the fact that the army has been Casualties in Operation Al Mizan were gradually Islamised since General Zia ul particularly high. Special Forces units of the Haq’s days and the early converts to the Pakistan army, the elite SSG, are also Jihadi way of life are now coming into directly engaged in fighting the militants. positions of command. The only conclusion Sometimes the army is seen to be unwilling that can be drawn is that a once proud to conduct high-intensity counter- professional army appears to be headed inexorably downhill.

The Pakistan army has been forced by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), headed for The army has been facing many difficulties in many years by the late Baitullah Mehsud, conducting effective counter-insurgency to wage a three-front "war": against the TTP operations even though it has deployed more and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in South Waziristan; against the anti- than 150,000 soldiers in the Khyber- Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in the sensitive Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA, and has suffered over Darra Adam Khel-Kohat area of Khyber- 15,700 casualties, including over 5,000 dead Pakhtoonkhwa and the Shia-dominated Kurram Agency of FATA; and, against the since 2008. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi

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(TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah, and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in the Swat Valley of the NWFP. The TTP’s cadre base is over 20,000 tribesmen and Mehsud ... the army has been gradually Islamised since commands about 5,000 fighters. Mangal General Zia ul Haq’s days and the early converts Bagh Afridi leads Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), a to the Jihadi way of life are now coming into militant group that has refrained from joining the TTP and is independently active positions of command. The only conclusion that up to the outskirts of Peshawar. Meanwhile, can be drawn is that a once proud professional radical extremism is gaining ground in army appears to be headed inexorably downhill. Pakistan and the scourge of creeping Talibanisation has reached southern Punjab.

On September 5, 2006, the Government of II Pakistan had signed a “peace accord” Military & The Taliban: Failed Peace with the tribal leaders of Waziristan (and Talks probably the Taliban as well, though the government denies this) in the North Waziristan town of Miranshah. The salient Though it has flirted with peace deals with points of this rather surprising agreement the militants, the army finds it impossible to included the following: meet the demands of the TTP and the TNSM. According to the late B. Raman, a • The Government agrees to stop air noted counter-terrorism expert, these and ground attacks against militants in include the suspension of all military Waziristan. operations in the tribal areas; the withdrawal of army posts from the FATA; • Militants are to cease cross-border the release of all tribals arrested under the movement into and out of Afghanistan. Anti-Terrorism Act; the release of Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi and tribal students • Foreigners (understood to mean arrested during the commando action in foreign jihadists) in North Waziristan will the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007; have to leave Pakistan but "those who and, enforcement of the Sharia in the tribal cannot leave will be allowed to live areas. peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement". Stung to the quick by a series of Taliban successes in “liberating” tribal areas and • Area check-points and border under pressure from the Americans to patrols will be manned by a tribal force. deliver in the “war on terror”, in the initial Pakistan army forces will withdraw from stages the Pakistan army employed control points. massive firepower to stem the rot. Helicopter gunships and heavy artillery • No parallel administration will be were freely used to destroy suspected established in the area. The law of the terrorist hideouts. This heavy-handed Government shall remain in force. firepower-based approach without simultaneous infantry operations failed to • The Government agrees to follow dislodge the militants but caused large- local customs and traditions in resolving scale collateral damage and served to issues. alienate the tribal population even further. Major reverses led to panic reactions • Tribal leaders will ensure that no one including the hurried negotiation of attacks law enforcement personnel or “peace accords” that were invariably damages state property. broken by the militants. • Tribesmen will not carry heavy

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weapons. Small arms are allowed. of Taliban-al Qaeda insurgency in the NWFP and FATA. The government and the • Militants will not enter agencies army were groping in the dark and hoping adjacent to this agency (the agency of that something would work out. North Waziristan). Frontier Corps • Both sides will return any captured weapons, vehicles, and communication The far less capable and less well-trained devices. and equipped Interior Ministry paramilitary force, the Frontier Corps, is being • The Government will release employed in direct fighting in the captured militants and will not arrest them Waziristan agencies. However, it has failed again. to cope with the better armed and better motivated Taliban militants. Perhaps the • The Government will pay use of the Frontier Corps instead of the compensation for property damaged and Pakistan army made political as well deaths of innocent civilians in the area. military sense to the Pakistan GHQ. The Frontier Corps, which numbers about The terms of the Miranshah peace accord 60,000 men, is manned almost completely were humiliating for a proud professional by Pushtuns who are naturally trained for force to swallow. The accord is reported to mountain warfare, have far better have led to the payment of large amounts knowledge of the terrain in FATA than the of money for “damaged property” – sums army and have cultural affiliations with the that went indirectly to the militants. The US people residing there. The officers of the and its NATO allies were taken completely Frontier Corps are usually taken from the by surprise by the accord that allowed the Pushtun cadre of Pakistani armed forces, militants to make peace with the Pakistan which is also an advantage. army and gave them the freedom to use the NWFP and FATA areas close to the Raised by the government of the British Raj Afghan border as safe havens to attack in the late 19th century, the Frontier Corps the US and NATO forces. The militants soon maintains control over the tribes in the broke the cease-fire as well as the peace FATA. It has always been responsible for accord. Other similar peace agreements manning the Pak-Afghan border along the were also signed. In October 2007, the Durand Line. The Pakistan army has put in Pakistan Government entered into a considerable effort to train the Frontier peace agreement with the terrorists in the Corps for counter-insurgency warfare with Swat Valley as militancy there was spinning technical and material support from the out of control. This accord too did not last United States. As the terrain is mostly long. All these accords clearly showed that mountainous, it is felt that lightly-armed the Pakistan army and the Musharraf-led Frontier Corps infantrymen can conduct government of the day had no clear operations effectively. In the long run, strategy to counter the growing menace better trained and more suitably equipped Frontier Corps troops, combined with administrative and economic reforms, might well provide the answer to the problem of militancy in FATA.

The Frontier Corps, is being employed in direct fighting in the Waziristan agencies. However, it III Army Deployments and Experience has failed to cope with the better armed and Gained better motivated Taliban militants. As far as the regular army is concerned, it has moved several combat formations

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from the Corps facing India across the LoC and the international border in Jammu The senior leadership of the Pakistan army has so and Kashmir to the northwest, besides troops from the two western Corps at far been employing a heavy-handed approach to Peshawar and Quetta. Three brigades of put down rumblings of discontent in Balochistan 11 Corps based at Peshawar and two and the Northern Areas in the past. It has failed brigades of the Quetta-based 12 Corps are reported to have been moved to to understand that artillery barrages and Pakistan’s western border with helicopter and air force bombings of civilian Afghanistan. One brigade each has been villages and towns are inherently deployed in the northwest from 30 Corps counterproductive. at Gujranwala and 31 Corps at Bahawalpur. The internal crisis is considered so grave that even the Strike Corps have not been spared and a total hand-held battlefield surveillance radars of about nine brigades have been re- and other sensors. Its movements are located to the west, though not all of these ponderous and easy for the militants to have been rushed headlong into counter- spot as its columns follow the beaten track insurgency operations. These include two while the militants know every nook and brigades from the Kharian-based 17 cranny of the terrain over which they Infantry Division of 1 Corps, Pakistan’s army operate. Reserve North. However, this massive re- deployment at the risk of depleting Many of the army’s God fearing soldiers combat strength on the eastern border are not convinced that going after their with India has not really fetched the fellow Muslims, even if they are anti- desired dividends. When fighting national militants, is a justifiable approach. formations are pulled out from their Deep down in their hearts, many of them operational roles and their primary areas of would much rather fight the US and NATO responsibility, to be employed for troops whom they see as occupiers and secondary tasks, the expectation is always violators of their land, their faith and their that their absence will be for a limited culture. The army leadership has failed to duration and that they will be employed address this emotive issue with any degree only to launch surgical strikes that will be of success. Clearly, at present the army followed by quick extrication. On the lacks the capacity to fight the insurgents contrary, these formations are getting effectively in the NWFP and FATA. It is also sucked deeper into a worsening quagmire completely out of synch with the on the western border. aspirations of the tribal people inhabiting these areas and is unable to win the battle While the Pakistan army has conducted a of hearts of minds that is crucial to gaining number of successful operations in the popular support. While a few of the tribal NWFP and FATA areas, it has not been chieftains are neutral in the fight between consistent in its efforts and has failed to the army and the militants, most of them gain the upper hand. For example, the encourage their people to provide shelter success at Bajaur in end-September 2008 and succour to the militants. came after several months of poor results in lackadaisical operations. The tactics, The senior leadership of the Pakistan army techniques and procedures adopted by has so far been employing a heavy- the Pakistan army have not yielded results handed approach to put down rumblings that are commensurate with the effort put of discontent in Balochistan and the in. The army’s intelligence network is Northern Areas in the past. It has failed to virtually non-existent as humint sources are understand that artillery barrages and proving difficult to cultivate. Its ability to helicopter and air force bombings of undertake operations at night and in civilian villages and towns are inherently conditions of poor visibility is rather limited counterproductive. The field commanders as it lacks suitable night vision devices, must be taught to discriminate between

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innocent civilians and armed combatants number of militants… Considering that the and must demonstrate concern for senior "others" have more or less abdicated their citizens, women and children instead of responsibility (refusing to take "ownership" treating them with disdain. Success will in today's terminology), the army – after come only when the army begins to close some initial hiccups – has not done too in with the militants and clears them from badly. Indeed, its ability is not limitless.” key areas systematically while ensuring that sufficient combat units are left behind to Another senior retired officer, who prefers prevent the militants from taking over the to remain anonymous, echoes similar cleared territory again. One method that views: “The army's capability… has can be adopted is to establish an improved significantly during the last interlinked grid of company-sized ‘posts’ to decade. A lot of valuable experience has dominate given areas, conduct patrolling been gained after conducting a number and strike operations based on hard of large-scale operations. Aspects of 'will' intelligence and, simultaneously, enable and 'morale' are however equally crucial… the civil administration to execute Remaining embroiled indefinitely in an development projects and run schools, insecure environment, and sustaining hospitals, a postal service and banks. And, casualties without undertaking focused army or para-military columns must be time-bound operations is not good for physically deployed to ensure rear area morale. This factor is being mitigated security and keep the arteries open for through frequent rotation of units… The supplies and reinforcements. All this is, of army has been conducting operations at course, infinitely more difficult than lobbing the tactical and operational levels, but 500 kg bombs from the air combined with there has been a state of drift at the artillery barrages. national level. It relates to the nation's inability to develop a common Lack of Integrated Approach to Counter- understanding on the nature of problem, insurgency to correctly understand the contributory internal and external dynamics, to craft a The leadership of the Pakistan army is wholesome strategy and have the political perturbed that a comprehensive effort is will to implement it. If this is achieved, the not being made at the national level to army will willingly and perhaps effectively fight insurgency in the restive north-western play its role. So, it is not the army's ability, areas. According to Lt Gen Asad Durrani, rather the national integrated effort and former DG ISI, “The army, employed on a political will that has been floundering. This number of IS/COIN duties, is more or less on is a complex problem, needing many its own. The part to be played by the elements of national power to play a political leadership and to an extent by the cohesive and sustained role...” civil administration – vital to the entire effort – is mostly missing. In Swat and Waziristan During his election campaign, Prime for example, the army is still stuck with Minister Nawaz Sharif had promised peace rehabilitation, reconstruction, and a large talks with insurgent groups like the TTP. However, perhaps after consultations with the leadership of the Pakistan army, he appears to be backing off. "Of course we want to try talks but they are a far off possibility," said a government official The Karzai government is seen as an obstacle to recently. "There is so much ground work the realisation of Pakistan army’s key objectives that needs to be done. And when you are in Afghanistan due to its steady rejection of dealing with a group as diverse and Pakistan’s overtures, including the use of its good internally divided as the Pakistani Taliban, then you can never be sure that every sub- offices for reconciliation negotiations with the group would honour talks." (Maria Taliban. Golovnina and Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “Despite promises to talk, new Pakistan PM

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gets tough on insurgents” Reuters, July 23, 2013.) At present the Pakistan army falls short of being truly combat worthy for the nature of sub- IV conventional warfare that circumstances have Challenges from Afghanistan forced it to wage in the NWFP and FATA. It needs to address the doctrinal, structural and The fallout of the draw-down of the US-led NATO-ISAF forces by the end of 2014, will organisational issues that are hampering its pose the most complex challenge to the efforts. new government and the Pakistan army as it is an external security threat with internal security linkages. The security vacuum that will be created by the departure of foreign There are approximately 2.0 million Afghan troops from Afghan soil is likely to lead to refugees in Pakistan today. Most of them Taliban resurgence that the Afghan are Pushtoons. Besides being an economic National Security Forces (ANSF – army plus burden, they are seen as a national the police) will be incapable of stemming. security threat as the Afghan government The Karzai government is seen as an does not recognise the Durand Line as the obstacle to the realisation of Pakistan boundary with Pakistan. Though the army’s key objectives in Afghanistan due Pushtoons in Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa are to its steady rejection of Pakistan’s fairly well integrated with the national overtures, including the use of its good mainstream, separatist tendencies can offices for reconciliation negotiations with come to the fore again. If the post-2014 the Taliban. India’s commitment to a security situation deteriorates into a civil strong and stable Afghanistan and its US$ 2 war four to five years later – a probability billion investment in the country’s that cannot be ruled out – Pakistan will be reconstruction are a cause for concern in deluged with hundreds of thousands of Pakistan, particularly among the security additional refugees, further exacerbating agencies. The army resents Afghan calls for the problem. Pakistan is hesitant to back military aid from India due to fears of Mullah Omar’s Taliban fully because it is military encirclement – even though the unsure of getting its unfettered support if Pakistan army appears to have realised the Taliban comes back to power the folly of seeking ‘strategic depth’ in sometime in the future. Afghanistan in military terms. To counter According to Ahmed Rashid, a the perceived attempts at encirclement, perceptive observer of the developments the Pakistan army and the ISI have begun in the Af-Pak region, it is necessary “to to reach out to members of the erstwhile ensure that Pakistan, which gives sanctuary Northern Alliance. to the Taliban leadership, cooperates Another bone of contention is Pakistan’s rather than sabotages the transition and accusation that insurgent groups like the the peace process, and allows the Taliban TNSM of Mullah Fazlullah, are operating out to hold talks with Kabul on their own terms of secure bases in Afghanistan. At present rather than on terms that Pakistan may the Pakistan army lacks the capacity to impose.” The Army is unlikely to give up its fight these groups across the Durand Line. quest to attempt to exercise full control However, it may have no option but to over a Taliban-dominated Afghan attempt to do so in case these groups step government. up their attacks post-2014 and the Afghan Anatol Lieven of King’s College, London, government is powerless to stop them. has written: Pakistan’s Afghan policy today Such a scenario could even lead to state- is essentially an attempt to reconcile the on-state conflict in the worst case. following perceptions and imperatives Anatol Lieven, “Afghanistan: What Pakistan

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Wants”, New York Review of Books, July 14, purely political solution to an insurgency. A 2013, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/ successful counter-insurgency strategy is a nyrblog/2013/jul/15/Afghanistan-what- dynamic but balanced mixture of pakistan-wants/): aggressive offensive operations conducted with a humane touch and • The need to appease Pakistani socio-economic development. Political Pashtun opinion and prevent more negotiations to address the core issues of Pashtuns joining the Islamist revolt within alienation of the population and other Pakistan; political demands must also be conducted with the local leadership simultaneously. • The fear that if the Afghan Taliban The tribal culture prevailing in the NWFP come to full power, they will support the and FATA, with its fierce ethnic loyalties Pakistani Taliban and try to recreate the and its diffused leadership, makes the task old Afghan dream of recovering the of the army and the government more Pashtun areas of Pakistan, but this time led difficult. The need to follow an integrated by the Taliban and under the banner of approach at the national level is jihad; unquestionable. The management of governance, development and security • The belief that the Taliban are by far must proceed along parallel lines if the the most powerful force among Afghan root causes of insurgency are to be Pashtuns; successfully addressed in the long-term.

• The belief that Pakistan needs At present the Pakistan army falls short of powerful allies within Afghanistan to being truly combat worthy for the nature of combat Indian influence and that the sub-conventional warfare that Afghan Taliban and their allies in the circumstances have forced it to wage in Haqqani network and Gulbuddin the NWFP and FATA. It needs to address Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami are the only ones the doctrinal, structural and organisational available; issues that are hampering its efforts. Shortcomings in morale and motivation • The assumption that sooner or later also need to be overcome as these form the present US-backed state and army in the bedrock of counter-insurgency Afghanistan will break down, most operations along with tactics, techniques probably along ethnic lines; and procedures.

• Pakistan’s economic dependence The army would do well to understand, on the USA and on the World Bank and analyse and learn from the counter- IMF; insurgency doctrine that the Indian army has so successfully followed for 20 years in  Pakistan’s strategic dependence on Jammu and Kashmir and over half a China, which regards Pakistan as an century in India’s north-eastern region. On important ally, but which has also its part, the Indian army must also study the acquired potentially very large counter-insurgency campaign of the economic assets of its own in Pakistan army and learn the right lessons so Afghanistan, and which certainly does as to carefully avoid the hazards and not favour Islamist extremism. pitfalls that the Pakistan army has V encountered as insurgencies and terrorism Conclusion are not going to end quickly in Southern Asia. There can never be a purely military or a

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