UnITEd States InSTITUTE oF PEAcE www.usip.org SPEcIAL REPoRT 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPO R T Hassan Abbas An effective police force is critical to countering insurgency. In Pakistan, an understaffed and underequipped police force is increasingly called on to manage rising insecurity and militant violence. This report evaluates the obstacles to upgrading the existing police system and recommends traditional and Reforming Pakistan‘s innovative reform options, including major restructuring of the total civilian law enforcement infrastructure, without which the police force cannot be effectively improved. Because Pakistan’s police capacity has direct implications for the country’s ability Police and Law to tackle terrorism, the United States and its allies would realize counterterrorism dividends by helping law enforcement efforts through modern training and technical assistance. Enforcement Professor Hassan Abbas holds the Quaid-i-Azam Chair at the South Asia Institute of Columbia University and is a Infrastructure senior adviser at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. His previous papers on the subject of police reforms in Pakistan were published by the Institute for Social Policy Is It Too Flawed to Fix? and Understanding and the Brookings Institution (both in Washington, D.C.) in 2009. He is also a Bernard Schwartz Fellow at the Asia Society, New York, where he is director of the Pakistan Study Group, which is developing “Pakistan 2020: Summary A Vision for a Better Future and a Roadmap for Getting There.” • An efficient, well-functioning police service is critical to counterinsurgency as well as counter- © 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. terrorism efforts in Pakistan, now and in the future. At the same time, the police force All rights reserved. must also address rising crime rates and a deteriorating law-and-order situation, among many other tasks. SPECI A L REPO R T 266 FEB R U ar Y 2011 • The capacity of the Pakistan Police Service to deliver on all these fronts is severely dimin- CONTENT S ished by political manipulation, the lack of forensic services, inadequate training and equipment, corruption, and weaknesses in the judicial sphere. Disconnect and lack of Current Challenges 2 coordination between numerous kinds of policing and intelligence organizations are major An Opportunity 3 hurdles on the path leading to collective strategizing. Law Enforcement Organizations in Pakistan 4 • Upgrading the existing police system as the central law enforcement institution in the Reasons for Weakness of Law Enforcement country cannot occur in isolation, however. Instead, it must be part of an overarching Infrastructure 5 restructuring of the total law enforcement infrastructure, including a reform of the criminal Counterterrorism Capacity and Interinstitutional justice system and the stripping of politically motivated amendments from the Police Act Complexities 10 of 2002. Both traditional and innovative reforms would be expected to bear fruit in this Recommendations for Reform 12 arena. With a high degree of public consensus on the need for far-reaching law enforce- ment reforms in Pakistan, there is political space to make tough, reform-oriented choices. Pro-reform circles within police are also gaining strength. ABOUT THE IN S TITUTE Table 1. Total Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, 2006–09 The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, Total Annual No. No. nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Year attacks increase (%) killed injured Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 2006 675 159 907 1,543 promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 2007 1,503 129 3,448 5,353 management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital world- 2008 2,577 43 7,997 9,670 wide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 2009 3,816 48 12,632 12,815 knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones around the globe. Source: Pakistan Security Report 2009 (Islamabad: Pak Institute of Peace Studies, 2010). BO ar D O F DI R ECTO rs J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor • The United States and its allies, especially the EU countries, would reap major dividends of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, from an upgraded police service that has as one of its mandates the interdiction of D.C. • Anne H. cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American militants’ efforts to disrupt U.S. interests and security. However, donor aid in the form of University, Washington, D.C. • chester A. crocker, James R. financial and technical support should be coordinated and targeted toward improved police Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign services, rather than earmarked only for counterinsurgency efforts. Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen d. Krasner, current challenges Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stan- For many years, Pakistan has been engaged in battling a hydra-headed insurgency in the ford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy Van Rest, Executive (KPP, formerly known as North-West Frontier Province). An expanding terrorist campaign Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washing- targeting Pakistan’s major cities is inextricably linked to this insurgency. The growing num- ton, D.C. • nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leader- 1 ship Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. ber of suicide attacks across Pakistan underscores the dangerous nature of the crisis. From 2002 to 2005, the total number of suicide attacks in Pakistan was fifteen, while over the ME M BERS EX OFFICI O next four years (i.e., the 2006–09 period), the number rose to around two hundred. The sta- Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for tistics on the numbers killed or injured are astounding if all terrorist attacks and consequent Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James n. Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy • casualties are included (table 1). Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, Pakistan has suffered more than 30,000 casualties in the war on terror so far.2 This National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, trend continues: around 2,250 civilians and security personnel lost their lives in 2010 alone President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) at the hands of terrorists.3 While those under fire are chiefly religious leaders challenging extremists, politicians associated with progressive political parties, and innocent civilians, the police are increasingly being targeted as a symbol of the state. Terrorists understand well that the military and the police are their most important enemies. The changing tactics and targets of the various terrorist groups operating in the country pose a formidable challenge to a police force with limited resources, poor training, and inadequate equipment. Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement structure has failed to develop any systematic and advanced counterterrorism strategy owing to the lack of modern inves- tigative tools, requisite skills, and incentives. For the same reasons, it is no surprise that the rate of crimes not associated with terrorism has also jumped in recent years. Law-and-order duties and VIP protection responsibilities consume a significant chunk of police resources.4 The lack of forensic support further diminishes police effectiveness and capacity to deliver. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily Corruption, nepotism, and political manipulation are rampant; they damage police integrity, reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, credibility, and public image. An additional impediment to criminal law enforcement is the which does not advocate specific policy positions. ineptitude of Pakistan’s judicial sector. To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, Police capacity is critical for tackling terrorism and controlling insurgency-infested areas. e-mail: [email protected] A growing body of empirical research has established that law enforcement, not military force, is the most effective tool for this task.5 As Christine Fair of Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service aptly observes, “A police-led effort would be bet- ter than one led by the army, as the history of successful insurgency movements in disparate 2 theatres across the globe shows.”6 A RAND Corporation study titled How Terrorist Groups End also provides evidence that effective police and intelligence work, rather than the use of military force, delivers better counterterrorism results.7 Douglas P. Lackey in a counterter- rorism article goes a step further when he argues, “The killing of civilians by terrorists is not war, but murder, so the social genre of terrorism is crime, and terrorists should be classified as criminals,” and from this premise he rightly deduces, “If terrorists are criminals, their natural antagonists are the police.”8 As he points out, most of the activities considered vital for any counterterrorism effort fall within the scope of standard police activity, including the forensic analysis of