UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Human Secwity and Canadian Foreign Policy:

Canada's intemationaI Security Dilemma in the New Milleniun

BY

Mollie Royds

A THESIS

SUBMiTTED TO THE FACüLTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIPJ, FULFiLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY,ALBERTA

NOVEMBER, 2000

O Mollie Royds 2000 Natianal Lii Bibiiothéque nationaie ofCanada du Canada uisitions and Acquisitions et 9Bib iographic Services services ôiiiiographiques

The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence aiiowing the excIusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distriiute or seil reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfom, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. h forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substautieIs may be printed or otherwise de ceiie-ci ne doivent êke imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. antorisation. ABSTRACT

Human security, or safety of people hmviolent threats, has been designated by Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foriegn Affairs, as a Canadian secirrity prionty. This prioritization of Canadian foreign policy represents a transition in Canadian security discourse. This thesis argues that the human security agenda is reflective of both international and national security debates about how to define security policy in the complexity of the post-Cold War environment. It outlines how the agenda is pursued and traces its effects on the Canada-US rdationship by evaluating the international campaign to ban landmines, the campaign to create the International Criminal Court and the campaign to create an optional protocol on child soIdiers. Finally, this thesis assesses the implications of the agenda for Canadian foreign policy, Canada-US relations, and international diplomacy. It concludes that within Iimits the hurnan security agenda is an important way of considering Canadian foreign policy. 1am indebted to many peop!: for theu support during the writing of my thesis. h partïcular, thank you to Dr Donaid Barry for his patience and help. Thank you to EUa Wensel for ail of her assistance and th& you to faculty members who were very helpful during the writing process. 1would also like to th& Kari Jobin for allowing me to speak endlessly about human security.

Also, 1 am very gratefid to my Morn and Ken (my printers!), and to rny Dad, Nancy, Tim and other members of rny fimily for their patience and moral support. Finally, thank you to Rob, without whom 1 would never have finished this project. TABLE OF CONTENTS .. Approvai page...... u Abstract...... 111 Acknowledgements...... iv Table of Contents...... v.. List of Acronyrns...... WI

Chapter 1: The Changing international Security Environment ...... 1 Introduction...... 1 Traditional versus Broadened Conceptions of Security...... 3 The Development and Policy Roots of Hurnan Security...... 10 Values vs . interests in international Security...... 13 Canada and the Broadened Secinity Agenda ...... 16

Chapter II: The Etymology of Human Security in Canadian Foreign Policy...... 18 Introduction ...... 18 Broadened Conceptions of Cauadian Security...... 19 The 1994 Foreign Policy Review...... 26 Canada's Human Security Agenda: Ouellet to Axworthy ...... 31 Axworthy's Humm Security Agenda...... 33 Canada's Tools of Human Security...... 38 Conclusion...... 42

Chapter III: Human Security Applied ...... 44 1) The International Campaign to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines...... 45 Introduction...... 45 Bac kground: The International Setting...... 46 The Canadian Campaign: Axworthy to the Rescue...... 49 The United States and the Ottawa Process ...... 53 2) The Creation of the international Criminal Court...... 57 introduction ...... -57 Background: The International Setting...... 58 Canada and the Creation of the Rome Stature...... 60 American Resistance to the ICC ...... 64 Conclusion...... 66 3) The Optional Protocot on Child Soldiers...... 68 Introduction...... 68 Background: The hternahonal Setting...... 70 The US and the Optional Protocol...... 74 Assesment: A "New MultilateraIism"?...... 76

Chapter IV: Summary and Observations...... 81 introduction...... 81 Canada and the Human Security Agenda ...... 82 v Human Security and Canada-US ReIations ...... 91 Htunan Security and international Diplomacy ...... 96 ConcIusio n...... 99 List of Acronyms

AP Mines Anti-Pe?So~elLandmines CBC Canadian Broadcasting Corporation CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CD UN Conferace on Dismament CICC Coalition for an International Criminal Court CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child DFAIT Department of Foreign Mairs and International T'rade DND Department of National Defence G-8 Group of Eight HRW Human Rights Watch ICBL international Campaign to Ban Landmines ICC International Criminal Court ICRC International Committee of Red Cross EC International Law Commission (UN) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental ûrganization NORAD North American Aerospace Defence Agreement OAS Organization of American States PrepCom Prepatory Comrnittee UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program Chapter 1:

The Changing Internationai Secnrity Environment: Broadeoing Security in the Post-Cotd War Era

Introduction:

In the past decade states have been chalIenged by the changing nature of the international system in which the compIexities of gkobalization and transnational issues such as environmental catastrophes, intemational terrorism, and the flow of refugees are no longer overshadowed by Cold War realities. [n order to meet these challenges

Canadian security policy has gone beyond traditional state security concems to focus on the security of the individual, or human securiiy. Hurnan security is a component of

Canadian security policy, alongside other security concerns such as territorial integrity and national sovereignty. It is defined as "safety for people fiom both violent and non- violent threats."' The focus on people and not the state as the object of security (Le. that which is being secured) has caused extensive debate both within Canada and the international community. Some applaud this focus on people since issues that would not traditionally be prominent are now finding their way ont0 the international agenda

However, Foreign Minister Axworthy's personal cornmitment to the human security agenda and the subsequent priotitization of issues in the Department of Foreign Affairs are criticizzd as potentiaily being counter to Canadian interests and the cause of the over- stretch of Canada's limited resources. The agenda also occasionally contradicts the

1 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Human Security: Safety For People in A Changing WorId," (Ottawa: Gavernment of Canada, A@ 1999), p. 5. stated interests of the United States, much to the concern of botb the academic and policy community in canadaZ

This thesis wilI outline the transition in the focus of Canadian security policy and assess the human security agenda It will evaiuate the ability of Canada to generate international support for its agenda. The thesis will particuIarly focus on the United

States given its importance in the world and to Canada as well as its opposition to

Canada's focus on hurnan security. Thus, the thesis will aiso detemine the extent to which the pursuit of Canada's security policy affects its relationship with the United

States, the country that Canada depends on for much of its economic and military security. Finally, this mdy will assess the implications of the human security agenda for international diplomacy, in general.

For the most part, the theory of human security has grown out of policy practice, as there has been little academic attention paid to its theoretical mots. Human security has major implications for the theory of international relations as it challenges many traditionai assumptions, including the primacy of the state in world affairs. While this study will primarily focus on the concept fiom the perspective of the practice of Canadian foreign policy, some discussion of the theory of human security is required. The evolution of the concept within the titerature of intemationai relations and security studies will be discussed first, as a means of demonstrating how human security fits into both broadened security discourse and Canadian security discourse. This will aiso

'Kim Richard Nossai and Denis Staùs are among the many scholars hthave raised ihis ctiticism. See Kim Richard Nod, "Foreign Policy for Wimps," The Ottawa Citiren, (23 Apd 1998) and Denis Stairs, '"ïhe Axwonhy View and its DiIemmas," Policy Options, (Dccember 1999). Snirs, 'The Axworrhy View and its Diiemmas," p. 7, display the inadequacy of current literature and the reliance on policy-related üterature for concrete discussions of human security.

Traditional versus Broadened Conceptions of Security:

During the Cold War security was discussed in inter-state terms, a reflection of the dominance of the 'Realist' school of international relations over the study of security.

The dominant thinking pervading the study of secuity was a focus on "the threat, use and management of military force.'* This focus made the state both the object (Le. that which is being secured) and the subject (Le. the maçon for securing anything) of security and conceaied the role of the individuai in security. The exclusion of the individual in security discourse limited academic understanding of security issues. As Bill

McSweeney argues,

It would be absurd to postulate a subject of sec* other than people ...A is from the human need to protect human values that the term 'security' derives its meaning and that a security poiicy derives its legitimacy and power to mobilize resources. The primacy of the state in the political science tradition has permitted a gap to develop between the rneaning of the term 'security' as applied to individuals and its meaning for the state.'

Yet, Cold War realities assisted in justifying the focus on the state and the exclusion of other factors in international relations. Issues of 'high politics' such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and defence were pre-minent, whiie issues of 'low politics' such as the economy, the environment and human rights were not a major consideration in the security discourse of states.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was the catdyst for fundamental change in the international system. The US was lefi as the only superpower m a complex world which

'Biü McSweeney, Security, Idmtity and Interem: A Sociology of International Relations, (United Kingdom: Cambridge Univenity Press, 1999). p. 32. ibib, p. 33. lacked the level of certainty and discipline previously ensureci by its Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. A wide range of transnational issues heightened international awareness of mutual vulnerabilities. For instance, smdl conflicts proiiferated within and arnong states threatening regional and international security. As well, poverty, famine, terrorism, human rights abuses and many other issues enjoyed more dominant positions in discussions about security at the end of the Cold War than they had had a decade earlier.

The extremely nebulous concept of 'globalization' is also arnong in the vast array of transnational challenges to the international stability. Globalization has been defined in many different ways by researchers with an assortment of agendas. However, for present purposes a simple understanding of the concept is al1 that is needed. Thus, globalization is the force dnving the increasing interc0~ectedXKSSof the intemationd economy, which is mobilized by advances in communications technology, transportation, and knowledge-based industries. The economic force of globalization is coupled with the parallel force of the globalization of civil society, or transnational Non-Govemrnental

Organizations (NGos).~Together with the end of the Cold War, the forces of globalization have assisted in generating calls for a new security discourse.

The more fluid international system that resulted fiom the end of the Cold War has left the field of international relations in a state of flux. From the perspective of the

academic community, there are two contendhg schools of thought about how to conceptualize security in the post-Cold War era. The ilnt involves scholars who

maintain a more traditionai outlook and advocate the centraiity of war and the use of

6 Denis Staùs, "Canada and the Sectlrity Problem: implications as the MiUennium Tunis," Intemutional Journal, LIV, No. 3 (Summer 1999): p. 389. force as the central tools to understanding international secuity. Stephen Walt is widely cited as being representative of this scho01.~He argues that,

The main focus of security studies is easy to identiQ. ..: it is the phenomenon of war. Security studies assumes that confiict between States is always a possibility and that the use of miiitary force has far-reaching effects on states and societies. Accordingly, security studies may bc dehed as the stuày of the threat, use, and control of militasr force?

Walt does acknowledge that there are other threats to states and individuais beyond the threat of war, but he argues that it would be counterproductive to widen the scope of security studies to include these threats. As he states,

Some writes have suggested broadening the p henomema of "security" to include topics such as poverty, AIDS, environmental hazards, dmg abuse, and the like. Such proposals remind us that nonmilitary issues deserve sustained attention from scholarç and policyrnakers, and that military power does not guarantee well- being.. ...Definhg the field in this way would destroy its intellectuaI coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.9

In spite of the concerns of Walt and other scholars about the broadening of security, there have been many advocates of widening or broadening the concept.

Scholars such as Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Ken Booth, Keith buse and Michael Williams are representative of a wide movement advocating the broadening of the concept of security. These authors argue that the increased importance of issues such as the environment and economics and the resulting inabiiity of a militarily

7 Another important debate revolved around the naming of the sub-field of international relations that focused on security. Traditionaiists, such as Walt, argued for 'strategic midies,' which implies a focus on the threat, use and control of military force. 'Security studies', on the other han4 is understood by many to be more inclusive of issues other than military such as the environment and the economy. Where the study of senirity fits into the field of international reiations and the label that shouid be applied to the subject of international security is a discussion beyond the current study. The iabeI 'Seturity studies' wïil be employed for the sake of cianty in the study. 8 Stephen Walt, The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Srudies Quaneriy, 35 2 ( 199 11, p. 2 12. ïhis piece is not Wait's final word on the topic but it served to set the parameters of the debate regarding the broadening of the securîty agenda and is thus the most relevant to thïs stndy. focused iÏamework for security studies to adequately deal with these matters have heightened the need for a more inclusive conception of secunty.IO There are theoretical distinctions between the approaches of each author that are beyond the scope of this study. However, there is a basic body of thought in the support of a widened security agenda in their writing that is pertinent to tfiis study.

Barry Buzan argues that traditional conceptions of international security began to lose their utility in the 1970s and became particularly hadequate in the post-Cold War era. While not offering a specific definition of security, Buzan offers a way of looking at security that moves beyond the more constrained definitions of Stephen Wait and other traditionalists. As Buzan offers,

In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of fieedom fiom threat. When this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. ln seeking security, state and society are sometimes in harmony with each ottier, sometirnes opposed. Its bottom line is about survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantiai range of concerns about the conditions of existence. ' '

Buzan acknowledges that the state is the primary unit of anaiysis in security studies.

However, he also argues that colfectivities otber than the traditional nation-state can face threats, According to Buzan, units such as the nation - or, more specifically, in circumstances where the nation and the state do not neatly coincide - and humankind as a whoIe are other units of anaiysis for the study of security.12 He identifies five major sectors that house the growing number of threats to the security of collectivities: military: political, economic, societd, and environmental. It is important to note that Buzan

Ibid, p. 213. 10 Barry Buzan, People Staies & Fear: An Agenda For International Securiry Shrdies in the Post-Cold War Era. Second Edition (Boulder: Lynne Rimer hbhhers, 199 l), p. 4. " Ibid, p. 18-19. stipdates that each sector exists in a complex network of linkages and not in isolation fiom the others.13

Yet, regardless of the movement that Buzan makes toward a broadened security agenda, his study is weakened by the lack of a definition of security and his failure to establish that a unit other than the state is the referent object of security as he promises at the outset.'' Moreover, he offers Iittie guidance to either practitioners or theorists as to the relevance of bis discussion. As Bill McSweeney articulates, "while opening up new avenues of exploring the complexities and ambiguities inherent in security analysis,

Buzan leaves the boundaries of the concept as he found them in the strategic studies tradition.. ."15

In his 1998 work, Seccirity: A New Frameworkfor Analysis, with OIe Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Buzan elaborates on his argument of a broadened field of security studies. Weaver, de Wilde and Buzan 'place the survivai of collective units and principles - the politics of existentid threat - as the dehgcore of security ~tudies."'~

They make this argument by employing the concept of securitization. The process of

Securitization is a speech act, according to these authors, as it is a collective understanding of 'khat is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat.""

Thus, they base security anaiysis on the poIitics of securitization and conclude that security can be applied to a variety of sectors without losing "the essentiai quality of the

------~ " ibid., p. 19. l3ibid., p. 20. '' McSweeney, Security, Idenrtty and Inmem. pp. 55,6647. " ibib, p. 66. Barry Buzan, OIe Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Seauil: A Nav FrumeworkforAnaijsis. (BouIder. Lynee Rienncr Publishers, 1998), p. 27. " ibib, p. 26. concept."'8 However, while they offer the basis of an expandeci security agenda, a coliectivity of çome sort remains the object of security. The reason why the security of individuals or humankind as a whole is not estabiished as a part of the international security agenda is as foIIows,

individuds or srnalt groups can seldom atablish a wider security legitimacy in their own right. They may speak about security to and hmthemselves, but few will listea. At the system end of the scale, probIems also exist in establishing security legitimacy. For example, attempts have been made to establish al1 of humankind as a security referent-most notably in terms of shared fears of nuclear annihilation during the Cold War but also in the context of environmental fears.19

Significantly, they do not preclude the inclusion individuais or humankind as a security referent for friture analysis as international circumstances evolve. Indeed, they argue that the state will likely hold the tightest link with security but that this should not remain a

Even with the difficulties in establishing the individual as the object of security, there are those advocates of broadened securiry agendas who defend the need for, and existence of, human and individual security. Theorists who subscnïe to the Critical

Security Studies SchooI make arguments similar to those of Waever, de Wilde and

Buzan. They argue that basing security on so-called objective military threats isolates security studies fiom the importance of including other issues and actors. However, unlike Waever, de W~ldeand Buzan who focus on acton and processes, Critical theonsts focus on the 'kholesaie refutation of current power wie~den.'"' By rejecting curent

'' ibid., p. 27. 19 ibid, p. 36. " ibid, p. 37. " ibid., p. 35. parameters of power and poiicy processes they oEer littie guidance for either practitioners or the discipline of secmity studies itseif.

Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams are representative of the school of Critical

Security Studies. They outline how insecurity is experienced beyond the traditional confines of citizens with the state, or the state as the object of security (Le. security comes fiom being a citizen, whereas insecurity results fiom citizens of other states) in their, Critical Security Shtdies: Concepts and Cases. As they argue, viewing security from within a narrow framework, "'obscures the ways in which citizenship is also at the heart of many structures of uisecurity and how security in the contemporary world may be threatened by dynamics far beyond these [traditional] parameters."22 Krause and

Williams note the difficulty in widening the security agenda, particularly the critique that with an unclear limit to the types of issues ciassified as 'threats' to secunty, the utility of the concept will be lost. However, they argue that the debate is a conceptual one and not really about the issues themselves. The ternis of the debate over the issues of widened security are not about "'theu significance for human welfare and survival, but [rather] their relationship to prevaihg conceptual stnictures and anaiytic categories of security studies."* Thus, they claim that current debate over the broadening of security is itself done within the hmework of a narrow conception of security studies. Criticai theorists use this argument to put forward a case for including individuals as the object of security and promote the inclusion of more issues as 'threats' to security, even with the potential theoreticai difficulties.

" Keith buse and Michael C. WÏiiiams, "From Strategy to Security: Faundations of Cntical Security Studies," Critical SemrifyStudies: Concepts and Cares, Keith buse and Michaei C. Williams eds., (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1997, p. 43. " Ibid, p. 35. Obviously much evaluation is still required in the field of security studies, particularly in the face of the changing international environment. The field has been paralyzed by its traditional focus on the sbte and the use of military force. Moreover, scholars who attempt to move beyond these confines often faIl hto the same epistemological trap as the traditionai school and fail to establish a new hework for the broadening of the field. Finally, those that appear to establish a broadened

fbmework, in tum, fail to achieve policy relevance. Thus, to date, the literature of

international security does not pmvide the answers needed for advocates of hurnan security.

The Development and Policy Roots of Human Security

Given the lack of agreement and depth of debate in the academic field of security studies it is hardly surprishg that policy discussions and the subsequent practice of

human security have led the theory. Advocates of human security can be found in many

governments'4 and international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The

United Nations in particular has produced an abundance of literature arguing for the

importance of a broadened security agenda. in 1992 Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced An

Agenda for Peace, in which he outlined the need for a more inclusive concept of

~ecurit~.~~However, many herald the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report

"The human security agenda has kenprimarily associated with 'middle power' counuies such as Canada, Ausualia, and Norway. However, the focus on hMianitarian goals is hding more supporten in the internationd community foiiowing the success of initiatives such as the international ban on anti-persannel landmines. Britain's labour govemment in @& has devetoped a poiicy that is compatible with Canada's human seclIfity üamework. Robm Cook's 'ethical' foreign poiicy pdeledkrworthy's human secinity agenda. Robm Jeffiey Hay, "F'resent at the Creation? Human Securrty and Canadian Foreign Poiicy in the Twenty-Fkt Century," Cmuda Among Nations 1999: A Big League Ployer?, (Canada: Mord University h,1999), p. 225. zs Boums Boutros-Ghali, An Agendafor Peace, mew York: United Nations, 1992). as the first attempt at defining the need and importance of human security in the post-

Cold War era. As the report states:

For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more fiom womes about daily life than fiom the dread of a catacIysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security hmcrime-these are the emerging concerns of human security ali over the ~orld.~~

The report outlines how a new 'development paradigm' that focuses on individual people is needed to combat the uncertainties in the changhg international environment. Yet, as

Robin JeEey Hay points out, The report was carehi to note that human security should not be equated with human development."17 According to this reasoning, opportunities are protected as much as possible for present and future generations, but choices are not widened under the auspices of 'security.'

Significantly, the üN Human DeveIopment Report had roots in discussions relating to development and common secwity issues. EmaRothschild traces these roots of human security to policy discussions surroundhg the ideas of 'common security' of the 1980's and even to the liberal thinking of the enlightenment. As she writes,

The two principal constituents of "human security" or "common security" in the 1990s -the insistence on human rights and the preoccupation with the "internationalization" of politics- were also the preoccupations of late EnIightenment liberalism?8

Indeed, Denis Stairs also points out the compatibility of human security with liberal thinking. As he outiines, "in international politics, as in domestic politics, the ultirnate

United Nations Development Program "An Agenda for the Social Summit," Ovdew of the Human Developmenr Report 1994.

Anothw important basis for human security is in the ideas of 'common security' and policy discussions of the 1980s, particularly in relation to development thinking.

Common Security was defined by the Report of the Palme Commission in 1982 as follows, "states can no longer seek security at each other's expense; it cm oniy be attained through cooperative ~ndertakin~s."~'While this report was focused on security in relation to nuclear weapons, it pointed to the beginnings of a broadened conception of security by discussing the possibiIity of political and economic se~urity.~'The 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987, Olrr

Common Future, popuhrly known as the BnintIand report, aiso highligtited the need for a broadened security agenda This report andyzed the concept of sustainabIe development by looking at the impact of security issues on devetopment and no&simpIy economic gro~th.~~Significantly, environmental issues were included as sec* concerns in the

Bruntland Report. Both reports based their cal1 for a reconceptualization of secwity on the interdependence of states in the intemationd system, particuIarly between the North and South According to Rothschild, it was from within this context of security that broadeued secunty ideas, such as those of human security, becarne part of the security discourse of the 1990s. Yet, though each report served to highlight the "human and non-

'9 Denis Stairs, 'The Axwortby View and its Diiemmas," PoIicy Options (December 1999): p. 9. ju Ibid, p. 9. 3' RothschiId, "What is Security," p. 56. " Ibid, p. 56. military dimension of security," each was weakened by a lack of empirical evidence and clear analysis.

Values vs. Interests in International Security

Added to the empirical critique of the broadened security agenda offered in the ideas of common security and human security is the academic discodort that is often apparent at basing theory on normative ideas. indeed, the roots of hurnan security can also be traced to ideas of the 'liberal peace' as advocated by hanuelKant and more recently by writers such as Michael ~o~le.~~The premise of this theory is that democracies do not go to war against each other and their citizens do not resort to violence. This is based on the logic that in a "functioning democracy, there is less need, rnotivstion, or room for citizens to resort to political vi~lence."~'Advocates of human security argue that it is important to spread democratic values for these reasons. Further, citizens of democratic countries like their foreiga policy to be reflective of their democratic values.

The dangers of bashg foreign policy on values instead of interests have been articulated by a muhitude of authors. However, definhg 'interest' is becoming increasingly difficuIt in the complexities of the curent international environment. Joseph

Nye addresses this issue in his article' Redefzning the National htere~t?~While Nye

focuses specifically on the difficulties the US faces in its ability to define its interests in today's world, his arguments have a wider relevance. Nye accurately accounts for the effects that modem information technology have had on defîning the international

33 Hay, "Resent at the Creaüon?," p. 217. ibid., p. 224. 3s %id,p. 224. agenda These technologies are the means by which masses of information are transmitted around the world. As Nye States, "we could not tum off our tetevision or unplug our computers even if we wanted t~."~'However, he carefutly advocates the use of prudence particularly when dealing with humanitarian issues, which he dictates occupy the "C Iist" in interest rankings behhd the traditional priorities of military and econolnic interests.

Nye conceives of the international system as a "three-dimensional chess game"

(or a three level system)." The bottom level of transnational relations is open to influence by a broad range of actors, while the top two levels of military and economic issues respectively, are infiuenced by the major state powers. Each level does not exist in a vacuum, as relations in one level can tnfiuence relations in the 0ther.3~This cornpiex web of relations creates many challenges for policy-makers, particularly when faced by dernands fiom a diverse array of actors for activism in the reah of human security.

importantly Nye acknowledges that the national interest is 'Yoo important" to leave solely to international strategists.JOHe ailows for the inclusion of values into the de finition of national interest. As he puts it,

In a democracy, the national interest is sirnply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. It is broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can include values such as human rights and democracy, if the public feels that those values are so important to its identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them.. ..A democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a modty-based and an interest-based foreign policy. Moral values are simply intangible interests.

M Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, VOL 78, No. 4 (Juiy/August 1999): pp. 22-35. I7 ibid 38 Joseph S. Nye, 'The Challenge of Sofi Power," TNne VOL 153, No. 7 2î Febniary 1999, p. 30. 39 Ibid Nye, "Redefining the National Interest." Leaders and experts may point out the costs of induiging these values. But if an infUrmed public disagrees, experts canmt deny the legitimacy of public

These observations are extremely important to both practitioners and scholars, as they indicate the relevance of values to the definition of foreign policy. Further, they outline the reasons for including hurnan security in the international security discourse and the definition of national interests, respectively. Certairdy, events in Kosovo indicated to poiicy-makers in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries that the public in their countries were opposed to the ethnic cleansing that President Slobodon Milosevic was carrying out against the ethnic Albanians. This opposition was translated into the promotion of the values of NATO countries through intervention in the Balkans.

Axworthy defended Canadian participation in the NATO carnpaign by citing the threat posed to hurnan security in the region. Washington, on the other hand, emphasized the impact of Kosovo on the stability of the Baikans. This difference was a reflection of the differing perspectives of the two countries. The Clinton administration had emphasized a humanitarian approach to foreign po iicy in its first years of power, but had reverted to a more traditional approach as a result of criticisrn over Somalia, Haiti and

130snia4* Thus, the TJS tried to balance its international security objectives by including non-traditionai considerations but ultirnately had to maintain a more traditional outiook on intemationd security priorities as a consequence of its position and responsibiiities in the world. By contrast, Canada was able to pursue a balanced foreign policy while emphasizing human security.

Failed attempts at pursuing value-based poiicy choices, such as US led UN intervention in Somalia, demonstrate the need for policy pragmatism in spite of the best

'' ibid. intentions of the internationai community, A balance must be found in the definition of national interests whereby values can be accurately accomted for and included. Thus, it is apparent that huma.security has a broad basis in international security discourse, however unresolved it may be.

Canada and the Btoadened Security Agenda

The debate over the broadening of the security agenda has played out in similar form in Canada, which is the central focus of this study. Indeed, Canada's own debate reflects the international debate. in the early 1990s, Canada began to explore the possibility of broadening its security agenda to include non-traditional threats to security in response to international i~n~eratives."~This process will be evaluated in the foilowing

Chapter. The Canadian debate over broadened security mirrors somewhat the diffenng treatment of international security issues by Canada and tbe United States. The US appears to hold a more traditional military-based view of security, as opposed to

Canada's human security agenda. The effects of Canada's differing perspective on the management of the Canada-US relations is thus interesting to explore, particdarly due to the ctoseness of Canada's econornic and military ties to its superpower neighbour and the importance of the US support to the human security agenda internationally.

This topic will be approached as follows. Chapter II wiii address the Canadian govemment's response to the changing intemationai security environment. It wiIt trace the etymotogy of human security in Canada's security discourse. Alsc, the definition of human security will be Merelaborated upon in the context of Canadian foreign policy.

Chapter Di wi1I evaluate how Canada pursues its human security agenda. It wilI focus on

~~ -- -- "Hay, "Present at the Creation," p. 224-25. &id. p. 219. three case studies that are at the core of the Canada's human security agenda: 1) the internationai campaigu to ban anti-personnel land niines; 2) the creation of the

International Criniinal Court; and finally, 3) the protocol to ehinate the use of childrea in combat. The concluding Chapter IV will discuss the implications of the human security for Canada, Canadian-Amencan relations, and for internationai diplomacy. Chapter JI:

The Etymology of Human Security in Canadian Foreign Policy

Historically, Canadian foreign and security policy has been preoccupied with considerations of Canada's dependence on, and hence vulnerability to, the international system. Canadian security policy has aiso been based on ideas that go beyond a narrow or military focus on security, particulariy in the past-Cold War era. As Franklyn Griffith outlines,

Remoteness fiom the scene of warfare, comparative military inability, tension between two founding peoples, and the presence of an adjacent and fnendly but potentiaily overwheiming superpower have ail conspired to prevent Canadians from becoming resolutely attached to a miIitary view of ~ecurity.~

Thus, Canada's perceptions of security are broader than some other states, including the

US. These states remain tied primarily to traditional ideas of security, while acknowledging that other issues do impact the security of states to some degree.

Although not ail acadernics agree on the precise nature of the change, very few deny that to some extent the security agenda has been expanded. Given the chmging international security landscape, there are also very few poiicy-makers who ùo not acknowledge the need for broader policy in the security sphere. This is particularly true in Canadian poiicy circles. Canada's Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, has expounded upon the state of the internationai system on many occasions. His belief is that the end of the Cold War did not bring about a more stable international systern. As he puts it, The end of the Cold War was hailed by many at the time as the beginning of an era of unparaileled peace and prosperity. There was enormous optimism îhat the international community, reIeased ftom the grip of superpower rivalry, would twn its attention to global problems, such as poverty, the environment and population growth. The economic forces unleashed hmthe constraints of centdly planned economies would create new wealth and raise hgstandards in previously captive nations. And indeed, many counûies have derived enormous economic benefits hmthe end of the Cold War. Yet, the income gap between the indusûialized worlds has continued to widen. This trend has been compounded in some couutries by internai codict and state failure. At the same tirne, new security uireats have emerged, including an increase in transnational cime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Armed conflict has taken on a different shape and is often rooted in religious or ethnic discord...... 4s

According to Axworthy, it is in this environment that Canadian policy-makers must define Canada's security priorities and policies. Further, it is within this context that the logic for the human security agenda is f~rrned.~

This chapter will outline how the broadened security agenda found its way into

Canadian thinking. It will trace the etyrnology of human security in Canadian policy fiom the Cold War era until the present. Particular focus will be placed upon the ieadership of the curent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd A~worthy,as it is under his guidance that the agenda has reaIly taken shape. His understanding of human security, the taois with which he pursues the agenda, and the venues in which he prornotn it wiIl be evaluated.

Broadened Conceptions of Canadian Security: From Cold War Realities to Foreign Policy Review

Simiiar to other States, Canada's foreign poticy in the post-World War II era was focused upon the maintenance of international stability. The US and the Soviet Union

U Ftankiyn Gfiths, "Environment and Security in Arctic Waters: A Canadian Perspective," National Securify and Intemational Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic - the Case of the Norrhem Sea Route, INSROP Working Paper, No. 83-1997 (4 My, 1997), p. 121. '.'Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and human security: the need for Ieadership," 4tqxJfwww.dfait- maeci.gc.cdenglish/foreignpIsechmeh~.Also pubLished in IntemationalJouniaI 52 (1997), pp. 183- 196. dominated the international environment The realities of nucIear weapons and the threat of subsequent nuclear war dictated affairs during the Coid War. As a consequence,

Canada had littie flexibility in its foreign policy. The Canadian response to these circumstances became the hallmark of Canadian policy for much of the Cold War period; it was labeled middle power intemationaiism or middlepowerism. As John Hilliker and

Donald Barry state,

The role adopted by Canada in these circumstances was that of a middle power, in order to enhance iis own involvernent in building a more durabLe world order, to reduce the ability of the great powers to dominate the institutions established to assure internationai dility, and to prevent them from staning another war.'?

The practice of Canadian foreign policy was pragrnatic and effective during this perioà, with Canadian dipIomats working with fiil1 knowledge of their limitations to lessen

intemationa1 ten~ions.~'Canada was firmly on the side of the Western through its

membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its participation with

the US in the North Amaican Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement. Thus, Canada

sought to reduce tensions when they arme, but its ties to the Western bloc Iimited its

activities to influencing affairs within the Western alliance, and disputes on the periphery

of East-West relations that threatened to spill-over and involve the US and USSR."'

A priority of much of Canada's foreign policy in this period was its cornmitment

to mdtilateral organizations designed to promote internationai stabiiity. Canada made a

significant contribution, particularly in the UN, where Lester Pearson pIayed a pivotai

role in the creation of the first UN peacekeeping force in the Suez Crisis of 1956. Suez

J6 Ibid 47 John Hiiiiker and Donald Barry, "Choice and Swtegy in Canadian Foreign Poticy: Lessons hmthe Post-War Yean," C'on& Foreign Policy, VOL3, No. 2 (Fail 1995): p. 73. Ibid., p. 74. 49 ibid, p. 74. bolstered Canada's international reputation and crediiility as a addle power and began a tradition of Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. Canada's participation in the UN and its peacekeeping iniriatives were, without exception, Canada's only rnilitary activities outside of NATO and NORAD duing the Cold War period.50 This participation was contingent upon whether resources (Le. troops and equipment) could be spared fiom those designated for NATO and NORAD. As is outlined by David B.

Dewitt, Canadian involvement in 'out-of-area' activities was confineci within the parameters established by the Cold War, specifical1 y an "Amencan definition of strategic imperatives, threats, and risks.'"'

Even within these closely dehed parameters, Canada's commitment to international stability posed a dilemma for its pofcy-makers. Canada did not have unlimited resources to commit to its muitilateral activities. This redity was hstrating for Canadian diplomats who were extremely active in the international comrnunity. They were dependent upon the ability of Canada to deploy its military resources to back up policy initiatives. Constrained by budget cuts and domestic political realities, as well as the proiiferation of issues causing international concarn, Canada's policy agenda became marred by the "cornmitment-capability"dilemma in the 1970s and 1980s.'~ Indeed, not only were concerns raised regarding Canada's abiiity to make a meaningful contribution

David B. Dewitt, "Cooperative Security: A Canadian Approach to the Promotion of Peace and Security m the Post-Cold War EhwCanudian Defence Quarlerfy Vol 23, No. 3 (Spring 1994), p. 1 1. '' ibid. p. 12. " Ottawa has obbeen criticized for ifs inabiiicy to bring its declareci commitments m hewith its capabiiities, a pmblem which the 'cornmitment-capabil gap illumates. This termhology was coined by EU.Bym and is cited in David B. Dewh and David Leyton-Brown eds., Canada's International Secunfy Policy, (Scarborough: Ptentice-Hall Canada, I995), pp. 10- 11, as foilows: "[the] 'commitment- capability'gap, in Byers' tenus. has ken a chmnic probIem for effective and efficient national defeuce planning. It results not only hmthe often incommptlsu~ateinterests between the military on the one hand and other departmena - especiaiiy Finance and the Treasury Board -on the 0thover the allocation of scarce govenunental cesource, but ais0 hmhadequate indepident strategic dysis impedmg the clear development and articulation of Canadian security poiicy." to intemational institutions and practices but ais0 doubt was cast over whether Canada was living up to its promises. This gap between Canada's commitments and its military capabilities anticipated what was to become a continual challenge to practitioners of

Canadian foreign policy. This was particularly evident as international security paradigms widened to include more issues such as issues related to the environment, economics, development and a broad range of social issues, and consequently require a diverse range of responses hmthe international cornmunity.

From the 1970s onward, transnational issues such as the above ones found their way into discussions about security. Détente between the hvo superpowers brought these issues to the fore, as the threat of nuclear annihilation began to decline. However, the end of the Cold War hastened a flood of new ideas regarding international security, as the

international system was no longer fundamentally bipolar in natwe and nuclear detenence was inadequate to deal with its new challenges. The opportunities and challenges to broadening the security discourse were great in the aftermath of the Cold

War. Alternative understandings of security began to surface in policy discussions in this

As was described in the preceding chapter, debate surrounding the expansion of

the security agenda was ptayed out internationally both in the academic and policy-

making communities. Included in this exchange were the United ~ation? and the NGO

corn~nunity~~offering much input into the debate. This influenceci Canadian policy

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail these developments. For a good synopsis of the pt-Cold War security discussions see Dewiît, ''Coopelative Security," pp. 11-13. The UN has discussed human security through such works as the 1994 UN Human Development Report and an eariier discussion regarding the broadened security agenda was m Boums Boums-Ghali's An Agendafir Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992). 55 Human security has been associateci with a variety of different of NGOs. For example, the Intemational Cornmittee of the Red Cross, has the security of people at the core of its mission. ûther institutions, such discussions, as Canadian policy is often formed in reaction to its external environment and not solely in response to domestic imperatives and policy discussion. As Franklyn

Griffiths argues,

In the Canadian case we are better served by a mode of analysis which examines the content of the policy process in terms of change in the relationship among competing international security perspectives, as distinct kom the evolution of a single iine of thought among decision-makers, analysts, and the attentive pubric over the years.s6

The influence of the extemal discussions on the concept of security is important to keep in mind when considering the Canadian case. Hence, Canada's transition in its foreign and security policy did not take place in a vacuum.

In Canadian policy circles cooperative security was one of the ktsubstantive policy manifestations of ideas regarding broadened security in the post-Cold War era.

While Canada's security policy had always been pmued on a cooperative bais, the concept of cooperative security was envisaged as a practical starting point for rnultilateral cooperation of a different kind in international security. The concept was never an established pnority in Canada's security rhetoric and therefore was never refined enough to fit any working definition. However, it embodied both multilateralism and a widened

framework for security that focused on the state but included non-state actors." This

multilateralism was complemented by a flexible and functional approach, which

as the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C. devote resources to researching the impiications of human security. Gciaths, p. 121. Charles-Philippe David and Stéphane Roussel, "Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and international SecUnty after the Cold War," The Rmericun Review of Camdim Studies, (Spring and Summer 1998), p. 144. enmuraged regionai confidence building?* As Serrctary of State for Extemai Anairs be

Clark stated,

Security has ceased to be something to be achieved unilaterally. Security has ceased to be something to be attained through military means aione. Security has become multidirnensional and it has become CO-operative.In a world where poverty and underdevelopment pIague most of the planet, the developed world cannot pretend to be secure simply because it done is prosperous. in an era of nuclear and chernical weapons, of bailistic missiles, of temrism, of interdependent markets and economies, of diseases, the development of prospenty throughout the world is not a question of charity but of security.. ... 59

Clark further articulated that what were once economic or humanitarian actions were now

"security imperatives.'m Beyond its inclusiveness of issues and actors, what made cooperative security compelling was that it attempted to address the consensus among policy-makers that the security approaches of the CoId War, as well as newer ideas related to global comrnon security, were inadequate and irnpractical to the maintenance of internationai ~tability.~'

As was illustrated in Chapter I, common security was viewed by many as flawed by the nature of its inclusiveness. The inciusiveness of the concept left it with little theoretical or practicai value. However, this critique did not prevent many academics and practitioners fiom arguing its rnerits. ïhe concept of common semrity found its way into

Canadian secunty discourse in the early 1990's largely through Canada 71: Canada and

Common Sentris, in the Twenry-Firsr Cenmry, a report by the Canada 21 ~ouncil.~~The

- - -- 5s Extemal Affairs and intemational Trade Canada, Notes for a Speech by the Secrerary of Starefor Erremal Afairs. the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 45* Session of the United Nations General hsembly, 90155, New York, September 26,1990. 59 bid. bO fiid. 61 Dewitt, "Cooperative Securïty," p. 13. Canada 21 Councii, Cima& 21: COnaàa and Conmion Security m the Twenty-First Century,(Toronto: Centre for International Studies, 1994). Inchideci in the Comcii were Ivan L. Head, Thomas S. Axworthy, Maurice F. Strong, SyIvia Ostry and many other academics and interested Canadians hmthe business and poiicy communities. Canada 21 Council was formed with the knowledge that the recently elected Liberal government had made the promise of 'dernocratizing' foreign policy in Canada and would undertake extensive reviews of Canada's foreign and defence policies, The council's purpose was to influence government and to stimulate policy discussion that would affect the outcome of the forthcoming govemment white papers on defence and foreign poli~y.63At the center of the Canada 21 report is the basic idea that "in ail aspects our security is common.'" Unlike, cooperative secwity, which places priocity on confidence-building and fimctional cooperation, common security focuses on the

"interconnected military, economic, environmental, and other transboundary processes which serve to obliterate the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.'"' The logic was that by including ail of these policies as part of security discourse, their inteK0~eCtedIUswouid become cîear.

The Canada 2I Report did indeed serve to set the agenda for the Liberal govemment's 1994 review of Canada's foreign and defence policy review by providing a more diverse and broadened Gamework for ~ecurit-.~~Yet, its overall impact on the substance of the two review processes is less clear.6' indeed, the impact of either cooperative or common securîty in Canadian policy, beyond opening up discussion of expanding the concept of security, is not evident. As Franklyn Griffiths writes, "as of mid-1994, Canadian thinking about security was very much in flux.'"

63 Denis Stairs, The Public Poiitics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," Cmadian Foreign Poiicy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 94. 61 Janice Gros Stein, "Canada 21: A Moment and a Model" Camdian Foreign Poiicy, VOL 2, NO. 1 (Spring 1994): p. 10. 65 Griffiths, uEnvironmentand Securïty," p. 1 16. "6 Stafrs, The Public Poiitics," p. 1 13. "7 For an overall assessment of the review process see Denis Stairs The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Poticy Reviews." " Gnffiths, p. 117. The 1994 Foreign Poiicy Review

The Canada 21 Report was an integral part of the Non-Governmental Orgauization

(NGO) participation in the 1994 foreign policy review process, but there were other leveb of comultation with the public. 69 At the forefiont was the National Forum on

Canada's International Relations, created by the Liberai governrnent to fulfill its ekctoral promise to democratize foreign policy. As the 1993 Liberai Party document stated, "an independent foreign policy requires not only strong leadership but a capacity to listen to and reflect on the needs and concerns of those being led."70 The Policy Staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade had primary responsibility for the organization of fie 1994 National Forum. However, it was CO-chairedby Janice

Stein, a participant in the Canada 21 Repori, and Pierre Pettigrew. Stein and Pettigrew were ultirnately responsible for writing the fuial report."

Stein and Pettigrew's report emphasized the changed nature of the international system and the need for "forward-looking choices that maximize Canada's capacity to be effective."'* integral to this was the prioritizing of choices. Of significance to this study is that human securify was included among the priorities identifiai by the Fonun.

According to Stein and Pettigrew, "human security includes human rights, economic prosperity, enviromentally sustainable development, and good govemance."73 The

Fonun argued that adapting Canada's policies to include the imperatives of human

64 The Canadian Council for hternatioaal Cooperation and the Conference of Defence Associations are among the other NGOs that played a mie in the foreign and defence poticy reviews. ttberal Party, "Democratization of Foreign Policy," Foreign Polis, Handbook (Ottawa: Libcral Party of Canada, May 1993). '' The report fimm the Nationai Forum can be fomd in Pieire S. Pettigrew and Janice Grass Stein, Co- Chairs of the National Forum, "Report of the Nationai Forum on Canada's international Relations," Canadian Foreign Policy. Vol. 2, No. 1. (Spring 1994), pp. 163-175- " Ibid., p. 164. Ibid, p. 167. securïty and otha pnoritiw is a part of "the management of our cornmon f~hire."'~

While the jargon of cooperative and common security appear to have fallen by the wayside in the deiiberaîions of the forum, it is important to note that human seceis compatible with both concepts. It includes the cooperative ideas of cooperative security and the inclusiveness of common security. Overall, the results of the forum were kss than substantive and had only limited effect on govemment policy. As Denis Stairs

Given the diversity of the participants, the open-ended character of the agenda, the reluctance of the Government to guide the substance of the discussions, and the shortness of the time available, the deliberations were bound to be an uneasy mixture of the eclectic and the general, and this ultimately resulted in a report that was highty selective and broadly framed."

However, the reinforcement of a broader conception of security by the Forum continued to be reflected throughout the review process, as did the concept of human security.

in the 1994 report made by the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian

Foreign Policy, established by the Liberal Government to undertake the foreign policy review, there was a general acceptance of a broadened security agenda. According to the report, the increasingly complex international system challenges the effectiveness of

Canada's policies and requires responses that take both rnilitary and non-military factors into a~count.'~Hence, the cornmittee concluded that, "it is clear that rapidly emerging giobai problems such as population, poverty, pollution, and weapons proliferation constitute growing threats to Canada's se~urity."~Also emphasized in the report was the

'' ibid, p. 167. 75 Stairs. p. 102. 76 Canada k Foreign Policy Principles and Priorifiesfor the Future - Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadiun Foreign Policy, (Ottawa: CdCommunications Gmup - Publishmg, Public Works and Govemmait Services Cana& for the Speaker of the Housc of Commans, 19941, p. 11. [bid, p. 11. importance of human smuity, as dehed by the National FON~." However, in spite of this consensus on widening the concept of security, the committee was careful to note the potential dangers of putting too many issues into the "secunty basket." For a country with Canada's limited capabilities, such an action would limit its effectiveness and its ability to utilize other policy choices to meet the growing number of issues facing the international cornrnunity. By making security too inclusive, Canada could further widen the pre-existing "cornmitment-capability" gap in its foreign and security policy.

importantly, the report dso touched on the dangers of arguing about labels:

Pt wouid] not be helpful to argue about labels such as coliective, cooperative, and common security, The task is collective - al1 States to agree to renounce the use or threat of force among themselves and to assist any member under attack. The methods must be cooperative - seeking through muItilatera1 methods to work witk others, not against them. And the results should be shared in common - security as one dimension of the "global comrn~ns.'~~

Thus, the report sought to emphasize how these competing notions of security complemented each other and consequently to eliminate some of the divisions in the academic and policy-making community on the issue. With ail of these factors in rnind, the cornmittee recommended attaching Canadian security to a broader concept of security and the reorganization of appropriate govemment cornmittees to handie the needs of this broadened agenda. This reorganization would give Parliament more Say in the formulation of foreign policy pnorities and further democratize the foreign policy process.

The Goverment's f 995 response to the report and the subsequent 1995 Foreign

Policy White Paper, Canada in the World, embraced the cd1 for a broadened security

78 ibid, p. 11. " ibid., p. 12. agendam The Gavemeut Response agreed that there was a need for a more inclusive flamework for secwity by saying,

In addition to taking into account traditionai rnilitary threats, securiiy policy mut inciude recognition of threats to stability, democracy and sustainable development as well the threats posed by such factors as envkoamental degradation, overpo ulation, involuntary popdation movements and organized international crime. 8

Significantly, the Government also announced the creation of a Global Issues Bureau within the Department of Foreign Affairs committed to dealing with issues such as the environment, population growth, international crime, and other issues encompassed in the wider 'non-military' security agenda This action would have the effect of institutionalizing the agenda within the bureaucracy of the Department of Foreign AJfairs and international Trade (DFMT). Similarly, the 1994 White Paper on Defence articulated its focus on a broadened security agenda." However, it left out any specific mention of human security and sirnply made broad statements about the cornplexity of the international systern and the subsequent challenges faced by the Canadian c or ces."

in spite of iis results, the purpose of the review shouid no&be forgotten. While the renew engaged in important discussion regardhg broadened security, it ais0 served a very important politicai purpose. It dowed the newly formeci Liberal government to appear responsive to the popdation on important matters of foreign policy. Sipificantly, the review aiso ailowed the LiberaI Government to appear to break away hmthe foreign

'O Canada in the World: Govemmenr Siarement, (Ottawa: Canada Communication Gmup - niblislting, Public Works and Govemment Services Canada for the Dcparemcnt of Foreign Main and Lternatid Trade, 1995). 8 1 Gomment Respolise ro the Recommendutiom of the Special Joint ParIiamenr.y Cornmirtee Rmkving Canadian Foreign PuIicy, Febniary 1995, p. 8. " Deparment of Nationai Defence, The 1994 Defence White Paper," httpi/llwww.dndca/whitepaper.gc.ca. policy practica of Brian Mulroney's govement, " even though many of the policy discussions regarding cooperative security began during Joe Clark's tenure as Secretary of State for External Affairs. While in the position of the Officiai Opposition, the Liberal

Party had attacked what it saw as the Mdroney goveniment's excessive military

spending and overly American-focuçed foreign poli~y?5It was thus important to

establish and irnplement the review pmcess to serve the above political purposes. The dose attachment to the broader agenda would corne later, with Lloyd Axworthy as

foreign minister.

The Government's statement on foreign policy, Canada in the World was the product of the foreign poiicy review pro~ess.8~Wble it reaatimied the need for Canada to attach itself to a broader concept of security, the exact parameters of the concept were

1eA ambiguous.%' According to Canada in the World, a conception of security that

required more attention is human sectirity. The main thmt behind this idea was that

Canada is not immune to the globai threats posed by environmental, demographic, heaith

and development issues. The potentid harm that these threats posed to Canadians said

the report, "demand a broadening of the focus of security policy fiom its narrow

orientation of managing state-to-state relationships, to one that recognize the importance

" The fact that the Defence White Paper was produced severai months before the foreign policy White Paper suggests that there was linle coordination benveen the two processes and it is therefore not surprishg that there is no mention of human security m the Deface White Paper. & Heather Smith, "Seeking Certainty and Fmdmg None: Reflections on the 1994 Canadian Foreign Poiicy Review," Canadian Foreign Policy, (Wiiter l992l93), pp. 12 1- 122. 85 The canceiiation of the heiicopter program to replace the navy's aging Sea King heiicopters by the Liberals afkr gaining power is a prominent example of the priority level given to military spending by the Chrétien govement 86 Canada in the World: Governmenr Smrement, (ûttawa: Canada Comrmmication Group - PubIishing, Public Works and Govemment Services Canada for the Deparmient of Foreign Affain and international Trade, 1995). The Poiicy Staff at DFAïï wrote this statement m conjunction with the Goveramait response to the review. a? Griffith, "Environment and Security," p. 119. Canada in the World., p. 25. of the individual and society for our shared ~ecurity.''~ The human smurity fiamework was both common and cooperative by nature; and its inclusion in policy discourse conûiiuted Merto the complex discussion of the nature of Canadian security in the post-Cold War era.

Consequently, the human security agenda in Canada had its roots both at the international and the domestic Ievel. It was seen as cotlective, common, cooperative and human, ieaving Canadian security discourse without any real guidance. However, the

Human Secure agenda gained primacy in an unprecedented fashion in the aftemath of the review. This began with Foreign Minister André Ouellet but fomd most support kmLloyd Axworthy, his successot. The dominance of this concept haled to much debate and discussion at both the academic and the policy-making level as to what exactly hurnan security is and what it means for Canadian poiicy and international security, in general.

Canada's Human Security Agenda: Oueiiet to Axworthy

LIoyd Axworthy served as the foreign policy critic for the LiberaI Party white it was the officia1 opposition in Parliament when Mulroney's Conservative govemment was in power. He was also the author of much of the Liberal Party's foreign policy pIatfonn prior to the 1993 election. Many of the ideas that wodd Iater be incorporated Uito the human security agenda were present in the Liberal Red Book, Foreign Poiicy

andb book.* Axworthy's focus on demacracy, human ri@ and devetopment assistance was consistent with the goals of human security. merviews of Axworthy were prevdent throughout the policy platfonn, as Kim Nossal puts it,

* ibid., p. 25. Liberal Party of Canada, Foreign Pole Hrurdbook. Under a Liberal government, Canada would cease to be merely a camp follower of the United States, but would play a leadership role in internationd politics. Priority would be given to the goals of democracy, human rights, and development assistance. Such views reflected not only Axworthy's deep anti- Americanism expressed openly during his years as both Liberal trade critic under Turner and extemai aff'airç critic under Chrétien-but also bis economic nationali~m.~' kworthy's views on the closeness of Canada to the United States are significant, as they were an early articulation of the stance that he would take later as foreign minister. As will be made evident in the next two chapters, Axworthy no longer views the US as essentiai to achieving Canada's foreign policy objectives. Indeed, in many cases he directly contradicts stated Arnencan policy prionties.

Despite hworthy's inîluence on the Liberai platform and the assumption of many that he would be appointed to the Foreign Affak portfolio upon a Liberal election victory, he would have to wait until 1996 for the post. Instead, André Ouellet was given the cabinet position and Axworthy was made Minister of Human Resources Development

and Western Econornic ~iversification.~'In comparison to Axworthy, Ouellet's

commitment to the foreign aflairs portfolio was limited. Yet, the implementation of the

results of Canada's foreign policy review and the human securïv agenda began under his

leadership of the department. For instance, the Global Issues Bureau was established

within DFAIT in this period. This office was designed to deai with the non-traditionai

threats to security, such as the environment and health issues.93 Ouellet's support of

'' Kim Richard Nossai, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, Third Edition, (Scarbamugh: Prentice- Hal1 Canada hc., 1997), p. 188. The appomment of Oueiiet was largely made for political reasons, as the Liberal Goverment needed a Grancophone in a senior cabinet post prior to the referwdum. See Ibid., p. 189. 93 Eiay, "Present at the Creation," p. 220. Aiso sec David Maloue, 'The Global Issues Biz: What Gives?" Canadu Among Nations 1999:A Big Leugue Player? (Canada: Mord University Ress, 1999). hurnan security was most evident in Canada's efforts to ban landmines, as will be illustrated in Chapter iIi.

Thus, there was an influx of ideas and poiicy discussion regarding the expansion of the security agenda to include non-traditionai threats to security during Ouellet's tirne as Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, the reai momentum for the institutionalization of the human security agenda came with Axworthy. As Robin Hay argues, 'Taking the governent statement on foreign poiicy as his departure, Axworthy began to shape, articulate, and advance the idea of hurnan security like no one else in or out of government."94 Hence, it is under Axworthy that the kst concrete attempts to define human security and its implications for Canada and the international comrnunity are found.

Axworthy's Human Security Agenda

Axworthy has argued that there are three major trends that require the re- evaluation of the way in which security is viewed in the post-Cold War em Fint, he has observeci that international conflict is no longer conlined to the inter-date arena but is prevalent within states, posing great risks to civilians. Second, transnational threats, such as environmental catastrophes, have global mots and consequences. indeed, the processes associateci with globalization, including increased internationai trade, have made state borders more permeable to transnational threats. And third, states are no longer able to cope with the emergence of transnational violence, particularly the spread of organized crime and drug trafficking. 95 These changes have created a new agenda, which in tum needs a new policy appruach.

Axworthy argues that a new agenda is achieved through focusing on human security. He bases this argument on the observation that threats to security embodied in

the three trends outlined above effect the vast rnajority of the world's population. Thus,

the insecurify of people has ùrcreased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Tt is in

the context of a changed international system that the need for human securis, aises.

Human security has been defined by Axworthy in a variety of different forums and

refined repeatedly in attempts to clarifi the meaning of the term, An earIy definition of

the tem is as foHows,

Human security is much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fiindamentai human rights. The concept of human secufity recognizes the complexity of the human environment and accepts that the forces infIuencing human security are interrelatai and mutualIy reinforcing. At a minimum, human security requires that basic ne& are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained econornic development, human nghts and fundamental fkedorns, the mIe of law, good govemance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to gIobaI peace as arms controt and disarmament. Tt recognizes the links behveen environmental degradation, popuIation growth, ethnic conflicts, and migration. Findly, it concludes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until human security is guara~teed?~

The focus is on the importance of creating an environment that is secure for the

individual. This depends Iargely on the stabiIity of the state and the protection fiom

transnational threats. It also includes a focus on the importance of economic

95 These views are aaicuIated in the various statements and speeches available on DFAIT's website at 4ttp~I~.dfait-ma~~cEca>.See m particuiar, Lloyd Axwarthy, "Betwcen Globhtioo and MuItipoIarity: the Case for a Globai, Humane Canadian Foreign Poiicy," ~ This artick is one of the eariier articuiations of Axworthy's human security agenda A later example is "Notes for a.Aà&ess by the Honourable LIoyd Axworthy Mirister of Foreign Affairs to the Nationai Fomm: Canada on the United Nations Security CouncilI999- 2000," (January 22,1999) ~ deveIopment and the basic needs of humans. Yet, beyond a few basic statements on the need for human secwity, this definition was too arnbiguous to give rneaningful guidance to Canadian policy.

Over tirne, however, Axworthy's human security agenda has been reîïned. This was an effort to operationaiize the concept. It was aiso an important step in setting the parameters of the agenda to maintain the utility of human security. The concept of human security is perhaps most clearly articulated in DFAIT's 1999 concept paper,

Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing ~orld.~'While the paper acknowtedged the mots of human security in reports such as the 1994 UNDP Human

Development Report, it criticizes the UNDP7sdefinition for being too wide in scope and consequently unmanageable in policy tems. It also points out that the UNDP failed to take into account the insecurity that results fiom violent c~nflict.~'This is hardly surprising given that the UNDP is devoted to highlighting issues related to development and underdevelopment. However, the distinction between the üNDP's concept of human security and that of DFAIT's is important. As will be indicated below, DFAiT has begun to focus prirnarily on the "human costs of violent conflict" in its human security agendaw As defïned in the concept paper and other DFAIT documents, human secwity is centered on the importance of keeping people safe fiom threats, both violent and non- violent:

It is a condition or state of being characterized by &dom fiom pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives. From a foreign poiicy

% Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Securjr: the Need for Leadership,"

The paper Mercomment5 on the action mandateci by the human security agenda It focuses not only on humanitarian action, but dso on the need to address root causes of insecurity for humans and the risks posed to humans by many transnational issues. It also argues that the absence of human security can hinder the development of states. Yet, it acknowledges that there are dangers in applying hurnan se~urityto too many issues.

Thus, the focai point of hurnan sec& in terms of Canadian foreign policy is on limiting the effects of violent confiict on the security of people. This has assisted in narrowing the concept to make a usehl contribution to policy.

With this understanding of the concept of human security, DFAIT has established a hework for its irnplementation. DFAIT argues that this ûamework will assist in limiting the issues that the agenda incorporates and that it will translate into diaiogue with other states on the human security agenda. Canada's Eramework incorporates eighteen issues into three clusters. They are as folIows:

Cluster #1 Public Safety: 1) Transnational Orgar *zedCrime 2) Iilicit Dmgs 3) Terrorism 4) Smail Arms 5) Corruption and Transparency 6) Security Sector Reform

Cluster #2 Humanitarian Action: 7) Landmines 8) Children and Armed Conflict 9) Protection of Civirians 1O) Humanitarian Intervention 11) Intemationai CrinidCourt

Cluster #3 Conflict Resolation: 12) Co4perative Conflict Prevention 13) Freedorn of Opinion and Expression 14) Human Rights Field Operations 15) Police in Peace Support Operations 16) Strengthening Peacekeeping Capacity 17) Targeted Sanctions 18) Post-Confiict ~eacebuildin~'~'

The cIusters reflect the distinctiveness of the issues that fall under the umbrella of human security and ako Canada's focus on violent threats. The separation of issues into groups is a result of the complexity of the issues themselves. These groupings ailow for the possibility of substantive discussion regarding the utility of the concept of human sec* by providing a ciear fkarnework. They limit the amount of issues to be included under the human security urnbrella and ailow for engagement with countries that do not necessarily share the same priontization of issues in their understanding of human recdty.lo2 For instance, some corntries such as Japan focus soIely on economic issues, while others focus on non-violent threats as opposed to violent threats. This framework assists govemments by highiiphting issues where there is room for cooperation. In the case of

Japan, Canada has worked closely with the Japanese govemment on the issues of smdl msand children in combat.lo3 Further discussion about the specific issues in these clusters will be Ieft to the case studies in Chapter III. However, the tooIs that Canada

'O' idonnation presented by Mr. Chris Cushing, Deparment of Foreign Affairs and Intemational Tmde, at the University of Maaitoba Political Studies Students' Conference, "C2.K: Canada's External Rehtions into the 21' cent&," (Febniary 4,2000). '" &id. uses to promote its human secunty agenda are important to the current study and will be assessed next.

Canada's Tools of Hnman Secnrity

Axworthy interprets the changing nature and complexity of the international system as a reason for Canada to take an activist stance in pursuit of its human security agenda It is Canada's vulnerability to the international system that justifies this need for activism. According to Axworthy, it is on the comrnitment to the international system that "Canada's very survival de pend^."'^ He uses the human security agenda and activist approach to the international system to offset Canada's dependence on the international system. He argues that Canada is well suited to this activist role due to its qualities of middlepowerim, such as its international experience in peacekeeping missions and other related multilateral activities. These activities enhance Canada's reputation in the international community and enable it to take on a leadership role.lo5

However, the application of human security intemationally is contingent upon several factors, particularly the acceptance of the agenda by other States. Axworthy has highlighted the tools that Canada uses to advocate its human security agenda. One of the primary tools embodied in Axworthy's activist approach is the notion ofsofipower.

Joseph S. Nye first articulated this concept in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of

American Power. He defines soft power as the 'the ability to achieve desired outcornes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow or getting them to agree to noms and institutions that produce the

Io4 Lloyd Axworthy, "Between Globaüzation and Muitipohity: the Case for a Globai, Humane Canadian Foreign Policy," ~hnpJ/~.dfait-maeci.g~~ca/englishlfo~.Also published in Revue ~hrdesmternafionales, Vo128, No. 1 (March 1997). las hi& dwired beha~iour.'"~Thus, sofk power is realIy about the ability to convince others of the appeal of an idea. This differs hmhard power, or more traditionai military and economic resources, which are often used to convince others to do what they would not otherwise do througù threats or re~ards.'~'However, this clifference is reaiiy one of degree, as soft power rests on attraction to ideas or cu1tw-e to motivate others to do what they wouId otherwise not do. It is important to note that Nye's centra1 conclusion is that it is the abiIity of the United States to mobilize the resources of both hard and sofi power that make it "bound to iead."

Axwortby has applied soft power in the Canadian context. Axworthy's definition ofsojpower extends Nye's definition, by asserting that soft power "blurs or even counters the perception of traditional power assets such as mititary force, economic might, resources and populations."'08 Accordkg to Axwocthy, sofi power is a tool that

Canada cm use to provide leadership in the international community in specific issue areas. He asserts that this was particuIarly evident during the campaign to ban landmines, as will be made evident in the case study below.

Canada's sofi power is exercised through networking and coalition building, and its ability to exploit modern information technologies, such as the intemet, ParticuIarly important is the formation of coalitions of 'iike-minded' States to deal with a single issue or group of retated issues. Critics of Canadian soft power argue that without hard power resources to back up Canada's solt power, Canada wiii lose its credibility. In other words, Canada needs more than ideas to get what it wants in the international

IC6 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead- The Citmging Nature of Arnericmi Power, (New York: Basic Books hc., 1990). Also artidted m Joseph S. Nye ad WhA. Owens, "Amerka's riiformation Edge," Foreign Affaks, VOL 75, No. 2, (MarchlApd I996), p. 21. c~mmunit~.'~Axworthy has dropped the soft power jargon hmuse in recent rnonths, possibly in reaction to the influx of critiques."' However, soft power is still relevant to the discussion of Axworthy's agenda as the ideas at the core of sofi power resonate throughout his speeches and internationai activities. They also inforrned many of his policy choices in bis first two years as Foreign minister.

Axworthy argues that there are other 'new' tools that Canada can utilize to enhance its leadership in issues reiated to the human security agenda He advocates working closely with non-state actors, such as NGOs and private corporations, as they cm play an effective dein the international negotiations. He argues that NGOs have carned "a pIace at the table."I '' Accordmg to Axworthy, taken together with other changes, îhe above tools are indicative of a 'new multilateralim' in international relations. As he States, "dnven by global change, new forms of multilateralism are emerging, with new concepts, new twls, new actors, and even new institution^.""^

Chapter iE wiIl outline how the tools, actors, concepts and institutions of the 'new multilateralism' took shape in a meaningfùl fashion during the campaigri to ban landmines.

Finally, alongside the issues and tools used to promotc- hunan security, the forums where Axworthy promotes his agenda are important. For, international ior Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Power and Interdependence in the Idonnation Age," Foreign Afain, (ScptcmbdOctober 1998).,p. 4. 108 Axworhy, "Cm&and Human Se~ty,"p. 6. la9 Nosai, "Foreign Policy for Wqs,"The Otrawa Cirizen, 23 Aprïl, 1988. Il0 See for instance, Kim RicWNossal, "Foreign Poky for WÏs," and Fen Oder Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpir Diplomacy: A Critical Assessrnent of the Axworthy Doctrine," Intmationat Jomal, (Summer 1998). pp. 379-406. II1Lloyd Axworthy. "tessons hmthe Ottawa Process," C'dian Foreign Policy. VOL 5, No. 2 (Spring 1998), p. 2. LI2 Lloyd Axworthy, 'Towards a New Multilateralism," To WaIk fithout Fem~The Global Movemmr io Ban Landmines, tds. Maxwell A. Camcron, Rcbert J. Lawson, and Brian W. TomIin (Toronto: Mord Univemty h,1998). pp. 448. acceptance is crucial to the successfid implernentation of the agenda Canada has pursued the human secirrity agenda in traditionai multilateral forums such as the UN.

This has been particuiarly evident in the past two years during Canada's membership on the Security Councii. Axworthy stated early that one of Canada's primary goals wouid be the promotion of the human security agenda within the Security ~ouncil."' However, other multilateral forums have aiso been important to Canada's agenda, such as the

Group of 8 (GS), where Canada has worked to highhght human security concerns to its member states. Regionally, Canada has also advocated hurnan security in the

ûrganization of American States (OAS), the Commonwealth and La Francophonie.

Most success in the promotion of human security has corne through activity outside of these established venues of international cooperation. The carnpaign to ban

landmines is one exarnple where a coalition of 'like-minded' states was fonned outside

traditional forums. Canada entered into its most extensive human security partnership

with Norway in the Lysaen Dedaration in May 1998. The goal of this partnership was to

work to promote human security issues internationally, on such issues as srnail arms

proliferation, the creation of an internationai Criminal Court and children in combat.

Together Canada and Norway have aiso worked to forrn a more extensive partnership

with other like-minded countries, referred to as the "human security network."""

ministeriai meeting was held in May 20, 1998 to discuss ways of promoting an

international human security agenda"' Significantly both UN representatives and

several NGOs were invited to participate in a portion of uiis meeting. The counûies

113 See DFAIT, "Notes for an Address by the nie Houourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Anairs to the Société Des Relations Internationales De Quebec: Human Senirity and Canada's Security Councii Agenda," (Febniary 5, I999), Available at ch~JIwww.dfait-maecigc.cax attending were Canada, Norway, Austria, C'hile, Ireland, Jordan, the NetherIands,

Sluvenia, SwitzerIand, Thailand, and South Afica as an observer. South Afnca participateci as an observer rather than as an official member of the network as it feared losing cfedzbility ia Afiican regional organizations hmtoo close an association with the

Iargeiy western group of countrie~."~

There are differences in the approaches of these countries to many human security issues, stemmhg from different national circumstances. For instance, South Africa focuses largely on issues related to development and the connection between poverty and conflict. However, the human security network provides an important forum for dialogue between its member countries and others. It is an important organization demonsmting a

1eveI of international acceptance for its agenda.

Conclusion

The human security agenda has its mots in the international debates regarding a widened security agenda. Within Canada this is reflected in the evolution of security discourse from notions such as cooperative and conunon security. It is also representative of the traditional imperatives of middlepowerism, as Canada seeks to offset and balance its dependence upon the international system. hnportantly, Oueilet's

poky initiatives illustrate that the human security agenda is more thm the personal

madeof Minister Axworthy, as is the perception that is often given by many of

111 This group was iniîiaiiy referred to as the Humanitarian 8 or H-8. However, this label has hem dtupped hmuse and the numbers of the group expmded. Il5 Il6 CanMentiaI source. Axworthy's critics."' Yet, Axworthy has providecl the substance and the momentturn to the poticy that could lend to its longevity in Canadian foreign poiicy doctrine.

It is now the task of this study to look at the implementation of the agenda and assess its implications for Canadian foreign poiicy, Canada-US relations, and the international environment. Case studies will demonstrate the core issues related to the human security agenda, in terms of substance and approach. They will establish the basis for discussing the implications of the human security agenda in the ha1chapter.

117 Hay, p. î20. Chapter III:

Human Secarity Applied

So far this study has discussed the international debate surroundin the concept of security, the etymology of human security, and the human security agenda in the Canadian context. However, littie has been said about the human security agenda in terms of issues. Chapter IE introduced the ttiree clusters and eighteen issues that

DFAJT uses as a framework for its agenda. To evaluate a11 eighteen would be beyond the scope of this present study. Therefore, three issues have been chosen as a means of evaluating the practice of human security:

1) The Anti-Personnel Landmines Ban

2) The Creation of the international Criminal Court

3) The Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers

These issues have been priorities for DFAIT since its adoption of the human secuity agenda and are consequently the most prominent examples of Canada's human security policy practices.

As indicated in Chapter 1, particular attention will be paid to the potential impact of the cases on the Canada-US relationship. For, as has been inferred, Lloyd Axworthy has been criticised for being less concemeci with the interests of the US than his predecessors. Axworthy's behaviour is significant given the importance of the US, the world's remahhg superpower, to the success of international human security policies.

Moreover, the US is important to Canada's interem. Two-way trade between Canada and the US totailed $397 biiiion (US dollars) in 1998, making it by far Canada's largest trading partner.'18 There are also other historic ties between Canada and the US in terms of culture and Canada's increasingly dependent military position. Thus, by virtue of its geographic Location, its power and position in the world, and its importance to Canada, the US is the foremost concern of Canadian foreign policy. Challenging US policies couid have a profound impact on Canadian interests and the success of Axworthy's policy agenda.

To demonstrate how Canada pursues its hurnan security agenda, each section wilI discuss Canada's role in the specific issue campaign and the tools of diplomacy that it used to influence the process. Each section will also outline the degree of support that

Canada's human secuity agenda has received kom other States, particularly the US.

Finally, this Chapter will discuss whether or not the cases are representative of a 'new muItilateralism.' This final section will serve as a preliminary basis for Chapter IV's concluding assessrnent of the human security agenda and its implications for Canadian foreign policy, Canada-US relations and international diplomacy.

1) The International Campaign to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines

Introduction

The International Campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines (AP mines) becarne hown as the Ottawa Process as a consequence of the leadership role played by Canada.

Canada's leadership initiative had the dual effect of providing the rnomentum to complete a comprehensive ban and avoiding the stagnation of the international bureaucratie

Se& bttpJ/www.canadianembassyassyotg>for additional trade figures. processes of the UN. The "Ottawa p on vent ion"^'^ was signeci 18 September 1997; it had been completed in fourteen months and was the combined effort of a 'core-group' of

States and NGOs. It was estabfished without the support of many coutries, including the

US, Russia and China, who are among the biggest producers of AP mines. It was also completed in an ad hoc forum outside of the traditional UN Conference on Disannament

(CD). These factors made the Ottawa Procas a unique circumstance in ment international diplomacy. It was even haiIed by Axworthy as the foundation of a "new rnultilateralism," as wiii be i~ustrated.'~~

Background: The International Setting

Although the Ottawa Fkocess was completed in a fourteen-month period, the movement to ban landmines had its mots in decades of efforts by NGOs and state representatives. NGO activity on the issue preceded any concentrated efforts by state representatives. NGOs were primariiy focused on the humanitarian costs of landmines, viewing these as outweighing the rnilitary utility of AP mines.121For instance, in the early 1970s the international Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)put pressure on govemments to recognize the civilian costs of [and mines. Growing concern about the humanitarian consequences of certain kinds of weapons as a result of the Vietnam War, was an important impetus for this activity.'" NGO activities consequently laid rnuch of

Il9Convention On The Prohibition Of The Use, Stockpiling, Production And Transfer Of Anti-Perso~el Mines And On Their Destruction. Iri Lloyd Aworthy, "Towiuds a New Mul&tedhq" p. 448-459. "' See for instance, Robert G. Gard, Jr. The Miiitary Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines," To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, cds. Maxwell A. Camerou, Robert J. Lawsoa, and Brïan W. Tomlin (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 136-154. Gard argues that AP mines cause "disproportionate civilian casualties and unnecessary dering." "Jody Williams and Stephen Goose, "Ihe International Campaign to Ban Landmines," To Wafk Without Fear: The International Campa@ ro Ban Landmines, eùs- Maxwell ACameron, Robert S. Lawsou, and Brïau W. Tomlin (Toronto: Oxford University Prrss, L998)., p. 21. the foudation for state initiatives on the issue by providing education on the humanitarian impact of landmines.

For the most part, state activity on the landmines issue was at the UN level, primarily through the negotiation of the 1977 Convention on Certain Conventionai

Weapons (ccw).'~ The purpose of the CCW was to negotiate additions to the 1949

Geneva Convention, which had dictated that the use of AP mines should be restricted by internationa1 Iaw. Howevtr, the CCW's restrictions on the use of AP mines did not reduce the devastation caused to civilians by AP mines.124This weakness prompted cails

for a total ban on landmines from the NGO conununity. Yet, the arduous nature of consensus-based intemationai processes detemiined that it would take years before progress couId be made.

In 1991, the Vietnam Veterans of Amerka Fondation and Medico International were the first to launch a campaign to join forces with other NGUs calling for a total ban on AP mines. They were joined by Handicap htemationd, Human Rights Watch, the

Mine Advisory Group, and Physicians for Human Rights, forming the international

Campaign ta Ban Land-Mines (KBL).'''

The ICBL was made up of approximately 1200 NGûs at the tocai, national,

regiond and international levels. Significantiy, the ICBL lacked any real centrai

organizatiun. Given this lack of organization and the size and diversity of organizations

Robm Lawson, "The Ottawa Process: Fast-Tmk Diplomacy and the International Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Mmes," CanhAmong Nations: Leadership and Diulague, p. 83. '3 %id,p. 83. Robert La-n's acmunt details how the AP mine is an inexpensive and easily deployable weapon with extremeIy high civilian casuaIties. Also set MaxweU A. C-n, RohJ. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlki, ToWaik Without Fear,'' To Palk CYithout Fear The Global Movement ta Ban Landmines, eds. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert L Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (Toronto: Oxford Uoiversity Press, 19981, pp. 1-17. Lamon, The Ottawa Rocess: Fast-Track," p. 83. united in the ICBL, ineffectiveness would be expected. However, this was far hmtme during the Ottawa Process. As Jody Williams and Stephen Goose idenûfy,

A major strength of the ICBL was its ability to cut across disciplines to bring together a diverse array of NGûs to work towards a single goal. While united behind the cal1 for a ban, this vast and diverse coalition has been tremendously flexible in its day-to-day work. Operating without a 'secretariaty-nocentral office or bureaucracy-member organizations were free to pursue the achievement of the campaign's goals as best fit their own mandate.'26

This unity of the NGOs in terrns of their objectives, as weii as their commitment to

communicate and exchange information with each other and members of govemment, the

public and the media, were intepl factors in achievhg support for a total AP mine ban.''7 Notwithstanding this commitment by the NGO community, state involvement

and acceptance of the ideas behind a ban was necessary for the achievement of the ban.

Significantly, the US announced a moratorium on the export of AP mines in

October of 1992. This was an important step towards restricting the trade in AP mines.

Furthemore, in 1994 President Bill Clinton announced the need for an international

agreement to elirninate AP mines.12' Galvanized by the US announcement, there was an

increase in NGO and state activity pnor to the f 995 review of the CCW Landmines

Protocol. During the review, the ICBL and the lCRC implernented media campaigns in

favour of a total ban on AP mines. Yet, despite the gmwing support of a ban, the CCW

review accomplished only incremental irnprovements to international law and no ban on

the use of AP mines.'29 indeed, as will be discussed below, it was the acknowledgement

that there was Little chance of achieving a total ban of AP mines in the CCW that led

'% Wiams and Goose, " The International Campaigu," p. 22. 'T Ibid, p. U. 128 Beth A. Fischer, The United States and the Ottawa Pmccss," Canadion Foreign Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Sprïng 1998): p. 51. 129 Lawsou, The Ottawa Rocess: Fast-Rack" p. M. some states to seek a solution outside of the parameters of established international

The Canadian Campaign: Aarworthy to the Rescue?

Events in Canada were a reflection of the international activity on the issue of AP mines. Canadian state activity on AP mines began in eamest under the leadership of

Foreign Minister André Ouellet. In 1995 Ouellet pressured the Department of National

Defence @ND) to change Canada's policy and stop the use of AP mines in military operations. Brian Tomlin descnies Ouellet's motivation to advocate change as follows:

OueIletYsawareness of the mines issue came largely hmhis ministerial responsibility for Canadian development assistance, some of which was allocated for de-mining operations in mine-affected regions of the world. Ouellet was stnick by the fiitility of spending money for de-mining at the same time that new weapons were being deployed amund the wor~d.'~~

However, the Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, was far from supportive of

Ouellet's position. Collenette and his officials argued that until an effective alternative to

AP mines was found, Canada should not support a ban.13' They were unwilling to lose the potentid use of AP mines in Canada's defence arsenal. A complex sequence of events and inter-departmental bargainhg followed. It ended with an agreement between

DFAIT and DND officials to support an export moratorium on AP mines. However, this did not meet the expectations of Ouellet, as Tomlin observes,

White the export moratorium may have satisfied DFAIT bureaucrats, it did not go Far enough for their Minister. If Collenette was inclined to follow the poIicy advice offered by his bureaucrats, Ouellet was much more of a fiee spirit. He was not ahid to set the cat among the pigeons in pursuit of his goais, and this he did on November 9 [1995] when he opined to a CBC reporter that Canada should

130 Brian W. Tamiin, "On a Fast-Track to a Ban: The Canadian Policy Process," Canudiun Fore@ Poiicy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1998): p. 8. 13' Ibid, p. 8. destroy its stockpile of landmines and declare a total ban on the production, export and use of the weapons.'"

Oueliet's actions eventually led to Canada's policy advocating a total ban on the use, stockpiling and export of AP mines and a proactive stance on the issue intemationally.

Ouellet's above statement to CBC gave major momentum to supporters of a total ban on AP mines. DFAIT officiais were motivated by the fact that their minister was willing to counter DND and change policy. Canadian NGOs also capitaiized on Ouellet's statement and began a major carnpaign of their own to pressure the government for an officiai poiicy change.'.'-' indeed, events took on a life of their own and Collenette was

forced into agreeing to support a total ban on the stockpiling, export, production and use of AP mines in late 1995.'~~Yet, Ouellet's cornmitment to poiicy innovation was limited and his tenure as foreign affairs rninister was soon to end.

In January 1996 Lloyd Axworthy replaced Ouellet as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His appointment gave new momentum to the issue since Axworthy was weil known for

his commitment to poiicy reform and innovation (as weIl as his ability to quickly lose

interest in projects) fiom his previous portfolio as Minister of Human Resource

~evelo~ment.'~'Building on Ouellet's foundation, Axworthy quickly promoted the issue

of AP mines to a Canadian foreign policy priority.''6 He was assisted in this decision by

"'Ibid., p. 9. 133 Mines Action Canada (MAC)was the Canadian coalition of NGOs campaigning for a total ban of AP mines. ïheir activities mcluded letter writing campaigns and mcreasùig media awareness of Canadian policj on landmines. They exploited the disagreement between DFAïï and DND on Canada's poiicy on landmines. See Vaierie Warmington and Celina Tuttle, 'The Canadian Campaign," To Walk Withour Fear- The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, &. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, ard Brian W. Tomliq (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 53-54. IWTomlin, "On a Fast-Track," p. IO. '" For a good discussion of Axwoahy as a reformer in Human Resource DeveIopment see Edward Greenspon and Anthony Wiion-Smith, Double Viion: The Inside Story of the Liberah in Poiver, (Toronto: Doubtcday Canada Ltd, 1996). Tomlin, "On a Fast-Trackn p. 11. depirrtmenl policy advisors who were committed to the issue.13' He Meridentified the skius that could be utilized to achieve an AP mines ban, focusing on the persuasive tools of soft power and the prominent deof NGOs. According to Axworthy, the ability to mobiiize opinion was pivotal to the achievement of a treaty."'

However, even with the new iife in the Canadian campaign the international agenda continued on the same course as it had before. The results of the 1996 CCW review were minimal at best and little contribution was made to achieving international consensus on the eiimination of AP mines. Canadian officiais met with NGO representatives and other pro-ban states at the CCW review to discuss other potential means of achieving a ban.I3' Countries such as Sweden, Belgiurn and Italy had been active proponents of banning landmines since the early 1990's. The agreed upon result of ths meeting was the announcement of 'Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel

Mines," a conference to be hosted by the Canadian goverment in Ottawa in October

1996. Subsequently, Canada would take the lead in international activity on the issue.

Fi@ participants and twenty-four observer states along with international organizations and NGOs attended the Ottawa conference. The participants contributed to an "Agenda for Action on AP Mines," which iisted activities to achieve the political will needed for a ban. The participants also achowledged that the 'cornmon denominator politics' that characterized the UN disannament regime wouid not be conducive to a successful treaty. In bis closing speech Axworthy invited al1 of the participants to work

'" ibid, p. 11. Michael Pearson, OueUet's Senior Policy Advisor, who remained in the position for Axworthy, encouraged this. 138 Lloyd Axworthy and Sarah Taylor, "A Ban for AU Seasons: The Landmines Convention and its iqiications for Canadian Diplomacy," Canadian Foreign Policy VOL Liü, No. 2 (Spring 1998): p. 193. Lawson, 'The Ottawa Process: Fast-Track," p. 84. with Canada to create a treaty banning landmines by December 1997.'~Consequently, he developed the goai of the Ottawa Process, as the campaign soon came to be hown, a treaty banning the use, production transfer, and stockpiling of AP mines to be completed in a one-year period.

From the start, Axworthy focused on the key role that NGOs had been playing in the campaign to ban landmines and he enswed their continued participation. Indeed,

Axworthy, recognizing the importance of their role, ensured that these =tors essentially had a 'seat at the table.' The NGOs hosted a variety of regional conferences to generate interest and support.lJ' They also provided governments with expert information on the devastation of mines and methods of clearance and put pressure on individud governrnents to endorse the ban. As well, they used the media and modem foms of communication technology to keep the Ottawa Process focused and on course.

nestate participants in the Ottawa Process also had unique characteristics. The core-group of states that led the treaty campaign seemed unldcely leaders given their relative weakness to the major powers in the international community.'" This core group of 'iike-rninded' states consisted of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Lreland,

Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South Ahca and Switzerland. These states worked together with the NGO groups, particularly the ICBL, to draft and negotiate a convention. It is noteworthy that noue of the major powers, inducihg the biggest producers of AP mines, participated in this group. They were suspicious of the unconventionai nature of the Ottawa Process, particuiarly the ad hoc nature of the forum

IM Ibid, p. 85. '*' Axworthy and Taylor, "A Ban for Aii Seasons," p. 195. '" MichaeI Dolan and Chris Hunt, "Negotiating m the ûttawa Process," Canadiun Foreign Policy Vol 5, No. 3 (Spring 1998): p. 26. and the role-played by non-state actors. However, as Robert Lawson observes, Canadian officiais and others were aware of the need to "clearly identifL pro-ban states and the equaily important objective of maintainhg a degree of politicai engagement with more skepticai members of the international comm~nit~."'~~It was thought that a tmty banning landmines that did not have the support of the major powers wouId have questionable utiiity.

The United States and the Ottawa Process

Although France and Britain eventuaiiy joined the coalition in favour of the

landmines treaty, the US, Russia and China continued to oppose the treaty. The US was particularly signi ficant in this respect because of its initial leadership on the AP Mines

issue. Ironicaily, the same NGOs that would censure the US during the Ottawa hocess

had praised its record in the pas.

The US was opposed to the idea of negotiating a treaty outside the conventional

forum of the UN.'# hstead, it favoured the negotiation of a treaty witfün the LN

Conference on Disarmament (CD) in ~eneva'" France and Great Britain initially

supported Washington, as this venue tended to be consensus-based and provided these

States with a veto power.'46 In Novernber 1996, the US introduced a UN resolution

Lawson, "The Onawa Pmcess: Fast-Track," p. 84. '+

US officially annouoced that it wodd not be a part of the Ottawa Fkocess signifjmg that it would instead pursue a ban withùi the CD forum.

Yet, the US's wish to pursue a ban in the CD was not tülfilled. As Mary

Wareham puts it, "the political dlwas not to be found in the CD-and even if it had been, pro-Ottawa nations were determined to block any attempt to undercut the bue ban movemer~t."'~~Thus, US officials continued to negotiate 'behind the scenes' with the pro-ban coalition pursuhg the Ottawa ~rocess."~Washington's reservations to the treaty were as follows: it wanted a guarantee that it would not have to commit to the removal of landmines fiom Korea; a delay in the entry into force of the treaty; a strengthened verification regime; and a clause that specified that countries could withdraw hmthe treaty if their national interests were threatened. Washington aiso objected to the definition of AP Mines used in the dr& Ottawa Process treaty as it did not exempt so- calted "Smart Mines," (mines that could be programmed to explode within a certain time period), hmthe ban.'*'

The pro-ban coalition was angered by the US's attempt to influence the process through the attachment of conditions to the draft treaty.'" This dmft treaty was the resdt of fourteen months of intense negotiations in various levels of global and regionai meetings. The US was an observer at these negotiations. During this the, Canadian

147 Mary Wareham, "Rhetoric and Policy ReIations in the United States," To Walk Wirhout Fear: fie Global Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmmes. " eds. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brïan W. Tomlin (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998). p. 227. '" Ibid., p. 228. '49 Wareham, "'Rktoricand Poiicy," p. 228. 'safiid. officials had mistakenly believed that NGO-generated public pressure would cause the

US to change its policy. However, they realized too late that the above strategic concenis would prevent the US hmsignulg the treaty. President Clinton and Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright wanted to sign the treaty but the Pentagon was opposed to a ban of

AP mines. The Pentagon's influence and power to affect this issue was evident throughout the Ottawa Process. In June 1997, before the Ottawa Convention was signed, every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ail of the regionai Commanders-in-Chief released a letter opposing &partisan ban legislation introduced in Congress by supporters of a landmines ban. This fetter was dubbed the '64 Star' letter in reference to the sixteen four-star generals and a~lrnirals.'~~

Ottawa made efforts to engage the US and convince it to sign the Ottawa

Convention in the final days of the campaign. However, any attempt by pro-ban States to compromise with the US resuIted in public censure by the NGOs. Prime Minister

Chrétien and Lloyd Axworthy were criticized by the ICBL for attempting to engage the

US and bring them on board. interestingiy, in a speech given to the University of

Calgary in February 2000, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre praised Axworthy's attempts to defend the position of the US to the supporters of the Ottawa ~rocess."~ indeed, it was not until after the Ottawa Process that Canadian officials realized how bruising a fight the landmines issue had been within the US administration.'"

in the end, the state-NGO coalition was unmoved by the US and firmly committed to the idea of an unmbiguous ban of AP Mines. in essence, the US'S attempt

15 1 The Ausirian delegation suppiied a draft tcxt of the tnaty that was CO serve as the template for the eventuai Ottawa Convention. Warcham, "Rhctoric and PoLicy>.1p. 230. to influence the process strengthened the coalition's resolve and the treaty was signed without the support of the US, China and Russia The US, in particular, would have lent

legitimacy and power to the treaty.

Interestingly, the US administration has continued to create policies that are in the spirit of the Ottawa Convention. For instance, in the aftennath of the Ottawa Process, the

US appointed a Special Representative for Global Humanitarian Demining and promised

to increase fiinding for its demining programs. Abright also announced President

Clinton's ''Deminhg 20 10" project. This project is aimed at raising financial support for demining, from both the private and public sector. indeed, Aibright still holds that alleviating harm to civilians from land mines as a centrai priority of US foreign policy

today. In a February 2000 statement before the House of Representatives international

Relations Cornmittee outlining the US'S foreign policy priorities for 2000, she said as

foilows:

We will remain leaders in the international effort to prevent hmto civilians from anti-personnel landmines. Through the President's "Demining 20 10" initiative, we are working with officia1 and nongovemmental organizations everywhere to detect, map, mark and destroy mines; increase mine awareness; improve mine detection technokogy; and care for the victirns of mines.'55

The US administration thus opposes landmines on humanitarian grounds, but any pro-

active policy has been in the domain of mine clearance and the continuance of its export

moratorium.

The US security community wiU likeIy continue to oppose US support of a

landmines ban. The Pentagon's opposition has prevented the US hmadopting the

pppp---pp----- ~ 'nDr. John Hamre, Depoty Secretlry of Dcfcnce, Statement made at thc University of Calgary, (February 18,2000). Confidential source. Ottawa Convention. However, it is likely that once a more humane altemative to lil~ldmlliesis available that wiU meet the US'S strategic concerns, the US will adopt ban the use of landmines and destroy its st~ck~iles.'~~Certainly, a normative chatehas been created in which the use of landmines is seen as abhorrent and the US does not appreciate the level of international censure that it has received on this issue.

2) The Creation of the International Criminal Court Introduction

As the first section on landmines documented, the international community is

Ulcreasingly aware of, and thus supportive of, the need for intervention justified on humanitarian grounds. By the same token, NATO's intervention in Kosovo was the result of the international community's fears of repetition of the genocide that had occurred several years earlier in Bosnia and Rwanda. The creation of international human rights laws and the international Criminal Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and

Rwanda demonstrate the growing consensus that genocide is a crime under international

Iaw. More importantiy, these tnaunais demonstrate that steps will be taken by the international community to ensure that these crimes will be punished. Until recently there was no permanent forum to address such issues. The UN on an ad hoc basis mandated the û-ibunds, mentioned above. However, on 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted caIling for the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome

Stature was the result of the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the

155 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "âmerica and the World in the Twenty-Fit Century," Sraremenr before rhe House Inteniationaf Relations Comminee, 16 Febniary 2000, Washington D.C. Avadable at

Supporters of creating an ICC argued that a permanent criminal court with

international jurisdiction was needed to protect the rights of people. Canada was at the

forefront of efforts to create the ICC. According to Axworthy,

The reverse side of human security is human responsibility. Those who commit the most heinous crimes in thes of conflict must be held accountable for their actions. This is crucial to rebuilding peace in societies shattered by war. Without justice there is no reconciliation, and without reconciliation there is no lasting peace. 157

Thus, Axworthy saw the ICC as an important means for the institutionalization of the

human security agenda

Background: The International Setting

There have been calls for an internationai criminal court since the end of World

War 1. The Nazi war tribunal at the end of World War II in Nuremberg further

galvanized support for the creation of a permanent international court. On December 9,

1948 the iJN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Genocide Convention incfuded a passage that

called for criminals to be tried "by such international pend tribunals as may have j~risdiction."'~~in conjunction with the convention, members of the General Assembly

requested that the UN International Law Commission (ILC) study the creation of a

permanent intemational crimina1 court. Zn spite of this activity, the international

blame the Pentagon for the lack of progress claimïug that it is "reluctant and unaithusiastic." See ~htt~~/~.h~.o~~~e5d2000/o4/v~-land~es.h~. In Lloyd Axworthy, 'The New DipIomacy: The UN, ïhe international Criminai Court and the Human Secunty Agenda," Notesfor an Address by the fionourable Lloyd zixwonky Minister of Foreign Affairs to a Conferenceon UNRefonnat the Kennedv Schooi. Harvard L'nNersitv. 25 Aod. 1998. community was dleto agree upon the establishment of such a court. The tensions of the Cold War and general unwillingness weaken the principIe of state sovereignty by giving legal jurisdiction to an international body, prevented its creation.

As a resuIt of the tack of support for the creation of a permanent court, the UN and the ILC (on which Canada served as a member) engaged in an incrementai process of establishing the bais for the ICC. included in this activity was the adoption of the

Universal Dedaration of Human Rights in 1948, which iisted buman rights and

fundamentai fieedoms.

The UN General Assembly requested that the ILC consider creating a Dr&

Statute for an ICC at the end of the Cold War. Transnational issues such as international drug trafficking and the proliferation of intra- and inter-state conflicts throughout the world motivated the international political will to create an ICC that did not exist during

the Cold War. The international community's awareness of the effects of war on

civilians has ûansiated into widespread support for the creation of a permanent

international court. Many atrocities are occurring within states and not simply as a result

of conflict between states. Events in Rwanda and Yugoslavia are demonstrative of this

reality. The nature of these crimes is important, as international law dictates that

international disputes should be settled peacefuily and that the threat or use of force is

prohibited. Current international law provides Meor no justification for action wit.

state~.'~~Moreover, as Andy Knight argues, "one of the gIaring deficiencies in

international law [is] the absence of a satisfactory means for adopting, applying, and

Is9 adP. Rubul, "Chaiienging the Conventional Wiom: Another View of the Iateraatiod CRmmal Court," Journal of International Aflmh,VOL 52, No. 2 (Spring 1999): p. 1 (web edition). enforcing IegaI nom."'" A permanent international court was comequently seen as a necessary step to overcoming these problms.

Canada and the Creation of the Rome Statute

The ICC establishes pennanently an international venue where violators of international law can be brought to justice. Like the landmines case, supporters of the

ICC wanted an effective and clear agreement on a court that was not created through lowest comrnon denominator politics and negotiation.16' There was much state suppon for the [CC; this was represented in the coalition of more than sixty 'like-minded' states fiom every region of the ~orld.'~~Canada, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, New

Zealand and many Caribbean states were among the most enthusiastic advocates of the court. Only two democracies failed to support the ICC adopted at the Rome Conference, the US and Israel. They argued that the proposed ICC's jurisdiction was too far-reaching and that the UN Security Council should be in control of the court's activities. However, the US participated in the negotiations and publicly supported the ICC during the four- year period of intensive negotiations preceding the Rome Conference.

There was also widespread NGO involvement, particularly through the NGO

Coalition for an International Criminai Court (CICC). Similar to the ICBL, the CICC's membership spanned the international, regional, and sub-regional levels. The CICC engaged in an effective advocacy campaign providing and facilitating the tramfer of expert information to other NGOs, goverurnent and UN representatives, as well as

'* W. Andy Knigh~"Sofi Power and Mord Suasion m EstabIishing the International CrimSiaI Court: Canadian Contributions," Erhics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy, Rosalind irwin cd (Vancouver: üBC Press, Forthcoming), p. 185. 161 Axworthy, 'The New Diplomacy: ïhe UN," p. 4. 16' Human Rights Watch, Speciai Campaigns and issues: International Criminai Court," HRW Worid Report 1999. ~http~I~h.orglworldrqort99lspecial/icch~~ publicizing the issue and events to the maspublic.'63 Another important dethat NGOs played was tbrough sponsoring conferences that were vaiuable exchanges between

NGOs, IGOs and government representatives. As one NGO claims, these conferences

"became valuable training sessionç on the substantive issues raised by the draft te~t."'~~

The conferences also played an important deat the regionai Ievel, increasing awareness of the ICC negotiations and fostering cornmitment to its creation, particularly in Afnca

and Asia Canada supported the role of NGOs, even including NGOs such as the Red

Cross in its delegation to Rome. Moreover, Ottawa provided hancial support to developing countries and NGOs to allow them to participate in the Rome Conference.

While the details of the ICC and the complexities of its negotiations are beyond

the scope of this study, some discussion is merited to place Canadian and Amencan

policy on the ICC in context. in December 1995, the üN General Assembly established

a Preparatory Cornmittee (PrepCom) to work on the text of an [CC statute to be presented

to the convention of the plenipotentiaries. There were six PrepCom meetings between

1996 and 1998 to draft the statute. The two-year period in which the text was established

was tumuItuous. Controversy existed over issues ranghg hmthe control of the Security

Council over the ICC to the scope of the crimes over which the ICC would have jurisdiction. These differences even spIit the permanent members of the UN Security

Council, with the United Kingdom backing proposais to limit the control of the Security

Council in late 1997.'65 The UK's decision was of great significance, as Human Rights

Watch describes, "this break created new strategk possibilities that bore fruit at the Rome

For information on the NGO coalition for an mteniatiod crimmal court (CICC) see the3 home page

Canada played an important role in the negotiating process leading up to the

Rome Stature of the International Criminal Court. This included working with the "like-

minded group" of states and NGOs to keep the ICC negotiations on track. A core group

of states including Canada, Australia, South Afnca, Costa Rica and other middle powers,

were very active in their pursuit of the ICC statute. Significantly, this group was aiso

comprised of rnany of the same govermnents and non-state actors that had been involved

in the Ottawa Process, Merentrenching the alliance of these states and NGOs on

human security issues. Canada also served as a member of the LC and on the PrepCom,

playing an influentid role in both gro~~s.'~'Thus, while Axworthy established the ICC

as a core objective of the human security agenda during his first months as foreign

minister, Canada had been closely involved in the process Erom the outset, particularly

within the iLC.

Canada's interest in the ICC was twofold: the ability to bring to justice the most

serious offenders of international humanitarian law, on the one hand, and the protection

of civilians, on the other. The human security agenda requires institutions such as the

ICC ro ensure its implementation and importance to the international comrnunity.

Axworthy outhed wbat Canada saw as the essential elernents of an independent and

effective ICC that is "Worth ha~in~."'~~in surnmary, they were:

lb5 CICC, 'Tieiine for the Formation of the intemationai Criminal Court," 146 Human Rights Watch, "Special Carnpaigns," p. 2. '" Knight, "Sofi Power and Moral Suasion," pp. 194-195. '" DFAIT, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Miter of Foreign AEah to the DipIomatic Coderence to Estabüsh An Intemationai Criminal Court," 15 Jtme 1998,4.Utp-J/m.dfait- rnaeci.gc.ca/engli... wslstatements/98~state/98-045ehtm>. The ICC should have jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ICC shouid be independent and impartial. The UN Security Council should play a role in referring matters to the ICC, but not be able to exert any influence that would prevent the ICC hmbeing effective. Similar to humanitanan monitoring bodies, the UN should fund the ICC. An independent and professional prosecutor that acts ex oficio is a necessary part of the ICC. The court shouid focus not ody on reconciliation and peacebuilding but rather, on the needs of victims. These victims are increasingly women and children. In this regard, the ICC should be sensitive to gender issues and the fact that sexual violence is a war crime and a crime against humanity. The court should also seek to prosecute those who recmit children for combat roles. Finally, the ICC should have jurisdiction over conflicts within states as well as conflicts between states.

The UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Creation of an ICC convened in Rome on 15 July 1998 with the htent of adopting the ICC tat tu te.'^' The draft statute produced by the PrepCom was largely reflective of the above Canadian objectives as a result of the initiative taken by Canada and the like-rninded group of states. However, there was a great diversity of interests to accomodate in the negotiations.

States were split into groups or coalitions on issues relating to the statute. The best organized remained the 'Iike-minded group,' which continued to push for a strong and independent court.'70 Other aates such as Mexico, Egypt and hdia were insistent on the inclusion of nuclear weapons as weapons prohrbited by the statute of the ICC. The permanent members of the Secwity Council wanted to ensue the exclusion of nuclear weapons hmthe weapons prohibited by the statute and guarantee a strong role for the

'* It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the negotiaaon process at the Rome Conférence. For a good discussion of the negotiations set Philippe kchand John T. Hohes, 'The Rome Conferencc on Negotiating an international Criminal Courî." American Journal of intemationat Law, Vol. 93:12, No. I (January 1999): pp. 2-12. Kirsch chaired tbe Codrteeof the Whole at the conference and HoImcs served on Canada's deiegation. Thus, they offer an msiders perspective of the negotiations themselves. ibid., p. 4. Council in the KC. The UK was the exception on the latter point. However, beyond these trends there was no clear pattern to the diversity of interests represented in ~ome."'

Other issues threatening the success of the negotiations revolved around the definition of certain terms.'" For instance, some countries advocated the inclusion of riots and other internai matters in the definition of aggression, while others opposed such an inclusive definition. Consequently, a great deal of tirne was vent on defining terms suit ab^^.'^^ There were dso fears that the ICC would have too much mach and consequently it would become a fonun for political agendas. The US, in particular, was afiïaid of giving the court too much power and jurisdiction.

American Resistance to the ICC

The US initially favoured the creation of the court with both President Clinton and Secretary of State AIbright claiming that it was an important goal of Arnerican foreign poli~y.'7JHowever, when the statute for the ICC was adopted in Rome on the 17

July 1998, the US again found itseifon the sidelines. Similar to the Ottawa Process, US positions were countered by a group of 'like-rninded' states, including Canada, and

NGOs. Nevertheless, the US had serious reservations about the ICC and what it would mean for US national security.

The US wanted to retain some control of the ICC through the Security Council and not be subjected to a court with political motivations. 175 Washington argued for this on the grounds that the US military was by far the most active in the world and would

If1 ibid., p. 4. '" ibid, p. 4. Knight, "Sofi Power and Moral Suasion," p. 195 17' 17' Ruth Wedgwood, "Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (NovIDec 1998): p. 1 (web edition). David J. Scheffer, "Tlie United States and the InternationaI Ccimbd Cowt," Amencan Journal of Intemanonal h,Vol. 93:12, No. 1 (January 1999): p. 15. consequdy be a target of po titïcaily rnotivated complaints, The US was not opposed to giving jurisdiction to the ICC for intemal conflict, nor was it opposed to including violence agaiast women as a war crime. However, what the US wanted was greater specificity in definitions of the 'elements of crimes' to give guidance to the ICC

Of primary concem to the US was the possibility that Amencan soldiers would be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. This was particularly important if the action was politically motivated. However, the US also wanted to be exempt hmaccouatability to the court in acknowledgement that it was an 'indispensable nation."" Significantiy,

Canada, the United Kingdom and Gennany, major dies of the US, al1 opposed

Washington's position on this is~ue."~The Clinton Administration may have been appeased by compromise proposais, but Congress was another story. This division was significant, as Congres could hold up ratification of the treaty for years and embarras the administration. In this regard, Senator Jesse Hehs, Chair of the US Foreign

ReIations Committee, wrote in March 1998 that tbe ICC Statute would be "dead on anivai" in the Senate, without US control over the Kistorically, Congress has been reluctant to cede control of US sovereignty to international bodies and this case was no exception.

Despite efforts made to satisQ the Amencan delegation by Canada and other

States, inc1udhg ensuring due process protections and the protection of national security information, the US was not satisfied with the Rome Statute. As David Scheffer argues,

'" Scheffer, The United States," p. 17. '" KnighS "Sofl Power and Moral Suasion," p. 200. ln Ibid., p. 200. CiCC, Timeiine." Yhe US delegation was not prepared at any tirne during the Rome Confice to accept a treaty text that represented a political compromise on fundamental issues of intemational criminal law and international peace and sec~rit~."'~~FoUowing hmthis, one of the foremost concerns of the US was that states that were not parties to the ICC Statute-such as itself-would be subjected to its jurisdiction. According to the US, the tmsof Article

12, which outline the jurisdiction of the ICC, could "render nonsensical the acnial functioning of the ICC."'~' Washington was clearly not satisfied by what it saw as an institution premised on ambiguity. Thus, it is doubtful that the US will sign the ICC

Statute in the near future, particularly since the statute is not renegotiable for the first seven yem and it is not possible to opt-out of parts of S~~OUSc~ncern.'~'

Conclusion

The Rome Stature was the result of compromise and certainiy did not satisfj hIly any of the member states. Areas of contention that were not hlIy resolved to the complete satisfaction of some included the failure to prohibit nuclear weapons and the statute's treatment of intemal confiict. Intemal conflicts were placed under the jurisdiction of the ICC, but with the provision that "intemal disturbances and tensions, such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence do not constitute arrned confîi~ts."'~~Yet the inclusion of intemal confiicts was of utmost imporîance, as the need to prosecute violators of human rights in intemal conflicts has increased. Without this type of jurisdiction the relevance of the ICC would have been called into question.LBJ

" Scheffer, "The Lrnited States," p 17. la'Ibid, p 18. la'Wedgwood, "Fiddling m Rome," p.4. 183 Kirsch and Holmes, "The Rome Conference," p. II. IU Human Rights Watch, "Speciai Campaigus," p. 2. Despite some misgivings, the statute received mass support at the conference.

Even though its mernbers had some reservatious, the 'like-minded group' led the campaign to convince others to sign the statute.IS5 For the most part, the interests of

Canada were met in the Rome Stature. In particular, Axworthy praised the ICC Statute's

focus on women and children by detailing rape and the recruitment of child soldiers as

war

Thus, while the statute is oot perfect, it is the beginnings of an important

international body that wilI aid in addressing the need for a court to try violators of

human rights in situations where national govemments are not able. As Douglass Cassell

pub it:

The ICC agreed to in Rome is intended to prosecute ''the most serious crimes of international concern," in cases where national authorities are unable or unwilling to do so. It will be located in The Hague. It will have an independent prosecutor and 18 judges, three of whom will sit full-time, with the others on cali as needed. The ICC will be governeci by states parties to the treaty, and not directly by the UN. Its funding will corne fiom states parties, possibty supplemented by the UN, especiaily for crimes referred to the ICC by the Security ~ouncil.'~'

Furthemore, the ICC will have jurisdiction over genocide, serious war crimes and crimes

against hwnanity.188 It will bring individuals rather than states to justice under

international law. This is an important international development.

The effectiveness of the treaty and a more inclusive discussion of its provisions

are best left to practitioners of international law. The PrepCom wili continue to

supplement the statute and address the concems of states. While one hundred and sixty

'85 Kirsch and Holmes, "The Rome Coderence," p. 4. 186 DFAIT, "Canadian Objectives met in Agreement on Intemational Criminal Cou" 17 July 1998

Canada ratified the ICC Statute on 7 July 2000. This followed its 10 December

1999 announcement of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, allowing

Canada to irnplement the statute.lS9 Canada iürther announced a $50 000 contribution to the CICC for their global carnpaign to educace and promote the ratification of the ICC

Statute. Alongside this was a contribution of $60 000 to a joint project of the

International Centre for Criminal Law Refonn and Criminai Justice Policy and the

International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. This project supports the development of tools to aid countries in efforts to rat@ and implement the ICC.

3) The Optional Protocol on ChiId Soldien

Introduction

The third case study that will be dealt with here is the recent consensus on the

Optional hotocol on the Involvement of Childm in Armed Conflict. The accord is an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. ''O Among other things, it seeks to change the minimum recruitment age for the amed forces to eighteen and to eliminate the global problems faced by chiIdren in combat. Like the two previous case studies, Canada has taken a leadership deon the issue of Child Soldiers. The issue fits within the human security paradigm, as children are often the victirns of conîlict in

Ia9 DFAIT, "Canada Introduces New Act to Impiement Inteniational Criminai Cour&" 10 December 1999

As Axworthy argues, '%e recniitment or outright abduction of cbildren to serve as soldiers, labourers, or sexuai slaves creates a problem that, like AP mines, has devastating effects long aerthe war is ove^"'^'

This case represented yet another division between Canada and the US on a human security issue. However, the media coverage and attention that this issue has received is on a lesser level than the Ottawa Process and the ICC. Consequently, there is

little written on the topic. Like the ICC case, it is aiso an ongoing issue, as the protocol

requises ten countries to ratify it before it cornes into force. It was opened for signature at

the UN on 6 June 2000.

This section will outline and evaiuate internationai developments on the issue of

Child Soldiers, sornething that is lacking in existing literature. What differentiates this

case study hmthe others discussed in this Chapter is that the US recently agreed to

support the optional protocol. This was surprising since the US was opposed to the

protocol for much of the campaign and its position appeared unlikely to change. The

protocol was the result of years of negotiation as well as some compromise by the parties.

Canada formed a coalition in September 1999 with other states that were in favour of

raising the minimum age for recniitment into countries' armed forces to eighteen. This

codition of 'like-minded' states was labeled the 'Friends of the Optional Protocol group,'

and inchded many of the same middle power states that had formed the core group of

states in the AP mines and the ICC campaigns, including Austria and Norway. These

states worked together with NGOs toward the adoption of this standard.

19' Axworthy, Towards a New Muitilatedim," p. 454. Background: The International Setting

The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Chiid (CRC) was a significant step toward creating an international standard that emphasizes International responsibility for children. The reasons for giving priority to children through the creation of the CRC are heefold according to Nigel Fisher. First, LbchiIdrenare the most vuinerable group in society. The extent to which priority is given to the rights and weiibeing of children, whether in domestic or foreign policy, is an excellent rneasure of a society's commitment to human rights and human deveIopment in general."'g2 Second, the care and devetopment of children in theis early stages is critical and potentiaILy can have either a negative or positive impact upon a range of social issues. Third, giving priority to children's rights and wellbeing will assist in the achievement of poverty-reduction and sustainable de~eto~ment.'~~

However, in spite of the intentions of the intemationai conununity, war (boa inter- and intra-state) has had a significant impact on the welibeing of chikiren. This is,

in part, thougfit to be due to Article 38 of the CRC, which allows for the recruitment of

"persons who have attained the age of fifieen years."'94 This understanding has prompted

an international campaign to protect children in war-tom areas, as weI1 as to prevent their

recruiûnent into combat positions, as is happening in many parts of the world. Mr. Olara

Otunnu, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-Gend for Children and Amed

Conflict, recentiy detailed the plight of children in armed confiict to the UN Security

Council. As he stated:

IPLNigel Fisher, "Childm m Annd Conflict and Canada's Foreign Poticy Agenda," Cmiadion Foreign Poiicy VOL 6, No. 1 (Faü 1998): p. to6. 19' 19' iùid '%The CRC is avaiiable at httpJ/www.uu.org/. In the course of the htdecade.. .more than 2 million chüdren have been killed in situations of confiict, more than 1 million have been orphaned, more than 6 million have been permanently or seriously injured, 12 million have been made homeless and more than 10 miiiion are estimated to be suffering hmgrave psychological and emotional trauma But even as we spic now, more than 300 000 children in over 30 codict situations in the world are senring as child soldiers.. ..These are the reasons why we must especially focus on the particularly Milnerable situations of chi~dren.'~~

Acknowledgement of grim numbers such as these, mobilized Canada, other States,

NGOs, and the public to work towards a solution to the problem of Child Soldiers.

There have been a number of advocacy efforts to educate governments and the public about Child Soldiers. This has been the primary role of the UN Special

Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, mentioned above. The position of UN Special Representative for this issue was created as a result of

Graça Machel's 1996 Reporr on the Impact of Armed Conflict on ~hi1dren.l~~Ln her report, Machel made niae other recommendations. Significantly, she recommended that an international campaign be taunched to dr& at Optionai Protocol to the CRC. Her recommendations have been at the heart of the current internationai campaign.

NGO efforts were an integral factor in galvanizing support and providing education on the issue of Child Soldiers. The internationa1 Coalition to Stop the Use of

Child Soldiers was at the forefiont of this effort. The coalition is made up of over thkty national campaigns. It is chaired by Human Rights Watch (HRW), which descnied the efforts of the coalition as foiiows,

Through media and public education campaigns, the publication of new research, partnerships with sympathetic govemments, and advocacy within regional and international fora the coalition helped place the global abuse of children as

195 United Nations, Siarement by Mr, OIam ûtunnu. Sperial Representarive of the Secrermy-General for Children and Armed Conflict delwed àumg the open briefing (United Nations document S/IJV3977) ~ttp~lwwwttpurLint/c~tmVolunnU.htm>* 1 The full tea of îhe npon is avaîiable at

Like the two previous case studies, a series of regionai state conferences in &ca, Latin

America and Europe were crucial to this campaign. These conferences took place during

1999, when the campaign gained its most significant momentum. They provided educationai and promotional platforms, where govemrnent policy-makers, NGOs, and other relevant actors met in a cornmon forum and discussed issues relating to childm in connicts.

Govenunent representatives, supportive of the international NGO coalition, provided fuiancial support to the coalition and encouraged its efforts. Canada was the first state to provide hding to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Chiid Soldiers.

Axworthy had highlighted the issue of Child Soldiers as one of the core objectives of

Canada's human security agenda, following on earlier work by the Department of Foreign

Affairs. Hence, like the Ottawa Process and the ICC campaign, Canada worked with

NGO representatives who were important to generating publicity and mobilizing public opinion through their educational carnpaigns. Ottawa also encouraged the International

Red Cross to include the issue as one of its priorities.198 Axworthy recognized that govemments needed to work with ''NGOs and local populations to reintegrate child victirns and child soldiers alike, by means of educational projects, disarmament, reunification programs, sports and skills training."'" This government-NGO co-

197 Human Righrs Watch, "Chiid Soldiers," HR W World Report 2000, . "m, "Notes for an Address ....Children's Rights in the New Millenitan." 199 DFAïï, Notesfor an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy Minfiter ofForeign Affairs to ihe Confirence on Children 3 Rightr in the New Millenium, Montreal Quebec, 24 November 1999

Beyond recognition of the depth of the issue, the campaign focused on strengthening the international legal instruments relating to chiidren in combat. For

instance, a central part of the ICC Statute was its prohibition of the recmitment of Child

Soldiers, which was a major achevernent for advocates of the campaign. However, the primax-y objective was the creation of an optionai protocol to the CRC. A UN working group was estabtished by the Commission on Hurnan Rights in 1994 to draft the optional protocol on the involvement of children in armed ~onflict.'~

Agreement on the optional protocol was difficdt to achieve due to differences

over the minimum recruitment age and other related issues. The fundamental issues of

disagreement on the optiond protocol were as follows:

- the minimum age for participation in hostiiities; - the level of commitment to be undertaken by governments to prevent under- age participation in hostilities; - the minimum age for recruitment into government armed forces, and whether any distinction in this should be made between compulsory and voluntary recmitment; - whether military SChools andfor training shouId be prohibited; - how to address recntitment and use of children by non-state actordarmed gro~~s.~~*

Key to the disagreement over these issues was the US, which was against changing the

minimum recniitment age to eighteen. However, Canada and other 'like-minded' States

continued to push for the protocol inviting, yet again, the hstmtion of Washington and

the potential for an international agreement without US support.

Briefing Paperfir the UN Worhg Group on the Dr@ Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, 110-21 January 2000. Avaiiable at The US and the Optional Protocoi

The US feared being isolated on this issue like it bad been in the Ottawa Process.

Canada's leadership in the campaign frustrated the US, as the White House was not willing to oppose the Pentagon on this issue. The Child Soldiers issue differed hmthe

Ottawa Process where the Clinton administration was in favour of the treaty, in principle, while the Pentagon opposed it. Lndeed, the Chton Administration was also an advocate of the ICC, albeit with major reservations. Hence, it was significant that Canada found no allies in the State Department on the Child Sotdiers issue.'02 US recruitment policy accepts seventeen-year olds as voluntary recniits, but onIy with parental permission. The

US fought to preserve this standard and seemed unwilling to compromise. It was particularly Fnistrated by the perception that the campaign appeared to be focused on changing US standards and not on the recruitment of minors as young as eight or nine in civil wars throughout the developing world. Washington thought that focusing on eighteen as the recruitment age defeated the purpose of the pmtocol.

However, the state-NGO coalition in favour of "straight eighteen" as the

minimum recniitrnent age argued against US concerns. They pointed to Department of

Defense statistics demonstrating that Iess than 3000 of the 1.3 million members of the

armed forces were under the age of eighteen. 'O3 According to these statistics, recmiting

under the age of eighteen could hardly be argued to be a national security pnority. Yet,

the US remained firm in its objections. WhiIe thewas public support for the change of

policy, the campaign was ffar less organized and influential than the Ottawa Process and

the ICC campaign. This weakened the attempts of the Be-minded States and the NGOs

"'Confidential Source to push the US into agreeing to the protocoi with its stipulation of "straight eighteen" as the minimum recruitment age. The US did not appreciate the position that it was placed in by Ottawa and Axworthy's human sec* agenda In the fdof 1999, relations between the two countries on the issue were tense. indeed, many Canadian officials

feared that Canada was losing crediiility in the US and that this would spi11 over and

affect its overall defence re~ationshi~?

Yet, while the US found itseIf again running counter to a 'like-minded* coalition

of states led by Canada and an NGO campaign, the effect of the campaign had somewhat

different consequences than the Ottawa Process and the ICC campaign. The efforts of

the NGO activity and the diplomacy of the like-minded states were successful in

achieving US agreement to the optional protocol in January 2000. However, the wording

of the protocol suggests some flexibility, as it aItows for recruirment but not deplopent

before the age of eighteen?05 This wording is demonstrative of a compromise between

the US and the state-NGO coalition on the issue.

Washington's agreement was significant given the US'S record with issues related

to human security. Thus, the US recognked the dangers of continuing to be isolated by

the human security network and other liice-niinded states, dong with NGO actors, in their

international human security initiatives. However, a perhaps more important observation

is that Canada and its allies, in tum, are recognkkg the importance of US support to thek

initiatives. in the case of Canada, this newfound pragmatisrn was the result of pressure

'O3 HRW, "United States Jcopardizcs Global Ban on Child Soldiers: 98% of U.S. Public Supports Minimum Combat Age of Eightm," 7 January 2000,

Since agreement on the optional protocol, Canada and its NGO and state allies have sponsored regional conferences on issues related to children in combat, in April

2000, Canada and Ghana CO-hostedthe West African conference on War Affécted

Children in Accra, Ghana. This conference was aimed at educating governments and the public and prornoting activities to deal with the impact of conflict on children in a region that is afkted by violence. Significantiy, Canada ratified the optiond protocoi on 7 July

2000, dong with the ICC Statute. Further, Canada hosted an international Conference on

War Affected ChiIdren in Septernber 2000. This conference was the setting for the first miniserial ievel discussions on the issue of children in combat. DFAIT's objective for the conference was the formulation of "an international plan of action to address the growing problern of children affected by armed ~onflict."~~~Thus, Werpmgress is expected on this issue and it wilI remah a priority for Canada's human security agenda.

Assessment: A 'New Multiiateralismn?

As a consequeme of its success, Axworthy argued that the Ottawa process represented of a "hewrndtilateraiism" and that other Liuman security initiatives including the campaigns for an Intemationai Criminai Court and the atioiition of the use of children in combat continue to support this contention. As he stated, '1 believe that the carnpaign to ban landmines not only produced a significant victory in intemationai disarmament, lanuary, 2000, p.199. An unedited copy of the optionai protoc01 is aiso available at

included in these changes were issues such as those related to human security and 'new' tools such as public diplomacy, or the public practice of international diplomacy, allowing media, NGOs and citizens access to the details of negotiations. Also

included were new actors such as NGOs as participants in these negotiations, and new

forums and institutions for international activity. hdeed, the landmines campaigu was a

unique event in international relations, entering new territory at most stages of the negotiations. However, did it change the boundaries of international relations and

Canadian foreign policy, and has this change continued?

To argue that the above is tnre would be to over-emphasize the accornplishments

of al1 three initiatives outIined in this chapter. in the case of the AP mines ban, the US

was not able to sway the participants of the Ottawa Process and have its own way in the

negotiations, but the Ottawa Convention was aiso signed without its support. This was a

clear blow to the confidence of the state-NGO coalition whose intense focus on the US

could only mean that US support was a central goal of the public carnpaign. However,

the fact that the US was not able to negotiate effectively in the face of many of the tools

of the "new multilateralism," particularly the involvement of NGûs and the intense use

of international public opinion, was important. This potentiai weakness of American

diplomacy lefi open the possibility that other issues could be pursued without US support

in the future. The only question that remained was whether or not the US would let itself

be marginalized by simijar circumstances again.

20' DFAi'ï, "Catlilda SipOptionai PMtocol on hvoIvement of Children in Armed Connict," News Releuse No. 139 (June 6,2000). ma Axwortby, '"ïowards a New MultiIatetalis~~~"p. 448. In the ICC case, the US again had problems with the NGO-state coalition, much to its Eutration, As Ruth Wedgwood argued, coutries built on this momentum and became almost indifferent to the US's interests; they appeared ready to "abandon

~merica.~~~This was disturbing for hmican diplomats, particularly since even the

UK, its Security Council partner, worked against the US to achieve European leadership in foreign policy issues in the ICC negotiations.2t0 Certainly, the US'S diplomatic effectiveness and relevance was cailed into question by these initiatives. Ultimately, however, the US was not pressureci into signing the Rome Statute.

The effectiveness of these human secuity initiatives is at risk without the US's support. By nature of its power and position in the world the US offers a valuable level of support for international agreements. The AP mines treaty, however, appears to counter this claim, as it has assisted in the creation of a normative climate against the use of landmines. The fact that US policy is mostIy in synch with the treaty seems to conhrm this argument. Yet, the ICC case gives support to the continued importance of the US.

Implementing the jurisdiction and ensuring the effectiveness of the ICC without US support will be a challenge for members of the international cornrnunity.

Acknowledgement of the importance of the US was apparent during negotiations with Washington over the minimum recniitment age in the optionai protocol on chiId soldiers. Hm,a concertai effort was made to engage the US and ensure its support.

While at first Canada appeared willing to move without the US like it had in the Ottawa process, pragmatism prevailed and Axworthy found the means with which to compromise. This was assisted by the fact that the Prime Minister placed pressure upon

?09 Wedgwood, "Fiddiing in Rome," p. 3. rio fiid. Axworthy to compromise with the US?" However, before taking this point too far, it is important to note the apparent distinctions in the Chifd Soldiers case hmthe other two dealt with in this chapter. Alongside growing Canadian concem over the possible consequemes of conhuing to be on opposite sides to the US on human security issues, there was dso not as mucti publicity surrounduig tbis issue as a result of a weaker NGO movement. The parties consequently managed to meet with the US and find areas of common ground, The resuIt was some apparent compromise by both sides. As well, the issue of child soldiers bears little resemblance to a national security priority for the US.

Thus, it did not involve the same level of saaifice for the US as the ICC Statute and lacked the scope and public recognition of the Ottawa Process.

It appears that Axworîhy's approach is a result ofthe traditional impulses of rniddlepowerism to offset Canada's dependence upon the international system. Threats to human security pose a risk to international stabiiity. Axworthy utilizes tools such as non-state actors, information technology and works to influence events and promote the human security agenda. Canada is able to do this by relying on its 'soft power' or power of persuasion. However, none of this is 'new' as is advocated by Axworthy. Canada has dways relied on its soft power. What is new is the stated emphasis of sofl power as a policy tool and the precedence given to tools such as public dipIomacy and the involvement of NGOs.

Yet, as made apparent in this Chapter, these tooIs and the substance of the agenda work with effectiveness in certain cases but not so much in others. The Washington Post has criticized Axworthy for bis anti-American stance, ''Lloyd Axworthy, it seems, doesn't understand that Canada's foreigu niinister is supposed to walk softIy and carry a

"' Confidentid source. littie stick'"'2 This statement seems stightly unfair given that Axworthy has been somewhat successfd in achieving many of the stated objectives of Canada's human

security agenda He pursues the agenda in every availabie forum, using any platform to promote human security issues. It is aIso apparent that he is realizing the need for the

support of the US and the other major powers to ensure the longevity of the human

security agenda. The inclusion of humanitarian goais in the foreign policies of the US

and Great Britain and the growing precedence and awareness intemationally of human

security indicates that there will be continueci locus on issues related to the agenda,

beyond Canadian foreign policy initiatives.

"'Steven Pearistein, "Canada's New Agt of Diplomcy: Foreign Ministcr Unahid to Give Americans Occasionai Poke m the Eye," Washington Pm,13 Fcbruary 1999, A13. Chapter IV:

Sommary and Observations

Introduction

This thesis set out to evaluate the concept and practice of human security fiom the perspective of Canadian Foreign policy. Chapter 1of this thesis defined and discussed the concept of human security. Chapter II argued that the human security agenda is, in part, based in the evolution of Canada's broadened security agenda and its traditional behaviour of middlepowerism (i.e. how Canada underîakes to offset its dependence upon, and hence vulnerability to, the international system). Chapter IZI demonstrated how the hman security agenda has been pursued vigorously as the mission of the Foreign

Minister Lloyd Axworthy. In negotiations of the treaty banning landmines, the international Criminai Coun Statute, and the Optional Protocol on Children in Combat,

Axworthy added a new sense of purpose to existing international carnpaigns. He argued that Canada's attributes combined wi& the more fluid international system made it well suited for a leadership role in the international system on human security issues. Yet, elements of Canada's approach to the human secuxity agenda appear to depart sornewhat hmthe traditional practice of middlepowerism, most notably the practice of public diplomacy and the willingness to work without the approval of the US. This was prevalent in two of the three case studies discussed in the preceding chapter. An evaiuation of the implications of the concept and approach of human security for Canada, the Canada-US rdationship and for the international diptornacy is the final task of this study.

Canada and the Human Security Agenda: Implications for the Future

As Chapters 1and 11 outiined, the human security agenda has met with criticism

fiom many of the leading scholars of Canadian foreign policy. In various forums, Denis

Stairs, Kim Richard Nossal, Feu Osier Hampson, Dean Oliver, and others have been critical of both the content and style of Canada's current foreign policy.2'3 Their

arguments have varied, but they have two basic criticisms in comrnon that are relevant to

the present discussion. First, they argue that the human security agenda is based not so

much on interests as it is on vaiues, or what Denis Stairs labels, "a simple act of collective compassion.""' Second, they argue that Canada's internationci1 reputation is at

risk if Ottawa continues to pursue a poorly defuied foreign policy based on ideas of 'soft

power' that its capabif ties cannot sustain.

Canadian foreign policy has attempted to corne to tenns with the changing

international order and to define its interests and policy objectives. This has become

increasingly difficult due to fundamental systemic changes and the creation of advanced

communication technologies, such as the Intemet and the news media that transmit global

realities to the international public. This is particularly tnie since many of the issues

facing the international community transcend national boundaries and blur those iines.

"3 There has been a very active debate in the lirerature, aithough rnost of it has been criticai of Axworthy. See for instance, Fen Oder Harnpson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pdpit DipIomacy: A Criticai &essrnent of the Axworthy Doctrine," Inremarional Jod,(Summa 1996):pp. 379-406. Kim Richard Nossai, "Foreign Poiicy for Wimps," île Otrawa Citizen, 23 Aprii, 1998. Denis Seiirs, "Canada and the Security ProbIem," International Jownal, iiV,No. 3 (Summer 1999): pp. 386-403. Stairs, "Canada and the Security Roblem," p. 343. As Joseph Nye, in his discussion of defining US interests in the current international environment, argues,

If we did not live in the information age, the [traditional] strategy for prioritizing America's national interests might suffice. But the reality is that non-vital crises Uce Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo continue to force their way to the foreground because of their abiiity to command massive media attention. Such crises raise moral concem that the American people consistently include in their iist of foreign poiicy interests. Poiicy experts may deplore such sympathies, but they are a democratic reaIity?Is

Whiie Nye writes f?om the Arnerican perspective, his arguments relate to a dilemma

faced by poiicy-makers intemationally: how to reconcile issues that are related to vaiues with what shodd be interest-based Foreign policy imperatives.

Until recently Canadian values and interests were hard to differentiate. As Denis

Stairs argued, Canadians thought that policy-makers were acting in favow of their values but, in fact, they were Canadian inter est^.*^^ This was a result of the Cold War where

Canadian policies pursuing the alleviation of superpower tensions, the promotion of

democracy, and the prevention of nuclear proliferation neatly incorporated both Canadian

values and interests. Yet, this relationship is less clear in the current international

climate. Some scholars argue that Canada attempts to export its values through its human

security agendaa7 Stairs argues this by pointing to the universaiist premise of

Axworthy's positi~n.~'~He argues that it is implicit in Axworthy's statements that he

expects al1 States to live up to the requirements of the human security agenda, whether or

not they subscribe to the iiberal tradition. Similady, Dean Oliver contends that value-

"5 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefiningthe Natiod Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No.4 (JulylAugust 1999): p. 6 (web cdition). =16 Denis Stairs in Keynote Address delivered at University of Manitoba Political Studies Student Confmncc, Febniary 2000. '"Dean Oiiver, Remarks hmthe University of Manitoba Political Studies Student Conference, Febmq 2000. Denis Stain argned this as weii m his remarks at the conference. zL"tairs, The Axwonhy View, p. 9. based images, such as those projected by Canada's curent foreign poiicy, demonstrate the distance between Canadian values and inter est^.^'^

There is something to the above argument but another likelihood is that these value-based images demonstrate how difficdt it is to define 'interests,' as Nye argues.

The complex environment in which policy-makers must operate compounds this difficulty. This environment is riddled with transnationd interest groups armed with the capabilities of the 'new rnultilateralism.' These actors use public opinion, information technologies and other tools to gain greater access to govenunent decision-makers and attempt to shape the international agenda Consequently they help transmit the images of threats to human security fkom across the globe to Canadian citizens. Nye's conclusion that in a democracy values and interests are the same is important here. This justifies the inclusion of human security issues in the national interest priorities of Canada.

Also important to the inchsion of human security as a priority of Canada's security poiicy is the threat to international security posed by human security issues. The proliferation of mal1 arms, transnational crime, poverty, disease, environmental disasters, the use of chikiren in combat and other issues are threats to international stability and, by consequence, Canadian security. As Stairs outlines,

al1 these ills and others Iike them are just as surely threats to the security of ordinary human beings as are the predatioos of war itself.. ..The community of sovereign States is therefore obiigated to give them the same measure of sober attention that it gives to the maintenance of international peace and security as traditionally ~nderstood.~

Canadian poiicy attempts offset its dependence on and vulnerability to the international

system. The human security initiatives that it undertalces internationally and the style that

"9 Oiiver, Remarks ftom the University of Manitoba it uses to pursue its goals are indicative of this broad objective. However, with the vast array of issues included in the human security agenda, -tes are unable to counter al1 of them effectively. This is a particular concern for Canada The need to prioritise issues and ensure that the resources exist to sustain poficy initiatives is imperative to ensuring the international credibility of Canadian policy.

There has been a proliferation of newspaper articles and editoriais dedicated criticizing Axworthy's human security agenda and the importance that he places on soft power. The op-ed piece that has had the most mileage is that of Kim Nossal. In bis aptly titled piece, ''Foreign Policy for Whps," Nossal argued that,

[Soft power] encourages the view that al1 Canada needs in world politics is a few good ideas that will get others to want what we want. It also encourages the view that we can do foreign policy on the cheap. Mer dl, if soft power is the order of the day, who needs the expensive tools of traditional hard power - highly skilled diplomats, an honourabie development program, war ready armed forces, and long-reaching intelligence se~ces?~'

Consequently, in an era of budget cuts there is a risk of creating the perception that the tools of 'hard power' are no Longer required. Canadian foreign policy initiatives requise hard power resources, such as defence capabihties, to reinforce Canadian so£t power.

The 'cornmitment-capability' gap is a major concern for Canada and its allies.

Canada has commitments to NATO and NORAD and it has been criticised for not living up to them. in the Cold War, Canadian officiais used Canada's forces and equipment more for a 'seat at the tabie' than for use in the type of conventional war that they were structured. " However, in the post-Cold War era, Canada has security interests that it needs actively to address. According to Joe! Sokoisky, ''this includes Foreign Minister

Stairs, TheAxworthy View," p. 9. Nos* "Foreign Policy for Wimps? Lloyd Axworthy's concept of human security."" This need for Canadian troops is demonstrateci by the fact that Canada is involved in more peacekeeping missions than ever bef01-e.~~~This involvement is hampered by cut backs in the number of troops in the

Canadian Forces. In the fa11 of 1999, the US and other NATO members repeatedly chastised Canada for letting its budget cuts effect its ability to perform its duties. As the

Wmhington Post observed,

At US$6.2 billion annuaily, Canadian defense spending, as a share of economic output, is now lower than any other NATO country except Luxembourg. And a recent internai review found that the Canadian miiitary could tùlfill oniy half its NATO-assigned tasks in the case of an dl-out ~ar.~'

Canada's embarrassing performance in East Timor in September served to highlight

concems regarding Canada's peacekeeping capabilities. Ottawa was unable to deploy

troops to the region in a timeiy rnanner and technical problems kept its transport pianes

on the ground. This caused one critic of Canada's defence policy to state, ''they are over-

stretched every~here.~~

The need for hard power to support sofl power is al1 too apparent in the

intemationai system. NATO air strikes in Yugosiavia are only one example of the need

for military solutions for humanitarian aims. In this instance Canada played a significant

rcle in contribuhg to the NATO campaign. indeed, Axworthy himself has repeatedly

denied that the logical consequence of his soft power agenda is the eciipse of hard power.

. -. . -. - . -n7 Joel J. Sokolsky, "Between Burden Sharing and 'Window Washing': Canadian-American Defense Relations 'OVM There,'" Remarkr prepared for The Bienniai Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United Stutest 17-21 November 1999, Pimburgh, PA, p. 3. ibid., p. 3. Kathieen Kenna, "Defence Spendmg hadequate, Canada Told: Obligations to NATO Diffidt to FuifiII," Toronto Star, 19 November 1999. A14. "Steven PearIstein, "Peacekeepers: Military Budget hi& Constrajnts on Canadians," The Wahingron Post, 26 Sept& 1999, AS. David Rudd, executive direaor of the Canadian Instinite for Strategic Studies, cited in ibid As he stated, "soft power never meant wimp power."27 In an apparent shift in thinking, he acknowledged that hard power resources are needed to back up soft power. Thus, it is important to find a baiance between the capabiiities and expectations brought about by the human security agenda.

Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that many aspects of the human security agenda do not require the type of resource cornrnitments that Nossal is referring to in his above critique. Indeed, as Andy Knight argues, there is no evidence to suggest that the hurnan security agenda is 'Yoreign policy on the cheap'"' The ICC,the treaty banning landmines, and the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers, dl support this. While each requires a diverse range of commitments fiom Canada in terms of money, personnel and equipment, these cornrnitments are hardly worth the level of criticism that has been offered up by the academic community. The impact of these initiatives is most evident in the landmines case, where landmine clearance operations have been very successhl in creating a safe environment for war-tom societies to rebuild. Of course, other hurnan security issues carry with them much greater resource challenges that mut be taken into consideration when forming policy. Working with other states to refine the human security agenda, however, will go a long way toward ensuring îhe most effective policy agenda

Axworthy has dropped the jargon of 'soft power' hmhis statements and speeches. This is most likely in recognition of the criticism sunoundhg its use. Yet, the notions mderpinning 'soft power' still resonate throughout Axworthy's human security policies. Tbis was evident in the hurnan security case studies exdedin this study. in

127 Stephen Handelman, "Bombeci in the Baikaus Lloyd Asworthy's foreign pLcy may have beea taken out m the war," Tune, Vol. 153, No. 15, 19 Apd 1999, p. 33. al1 three cases, middle power states that are not known as leaders in the international community and that lack the tools of hard power worked with NGOs to persuade others of the merits of their cause. These states entrenched their co-operation within the human security network and offset their individual Iirnitations by working together. They necessarily used persuasion rather than coercion to make their case, as soft power implies. Through their efforts they have begun to achieve a balance between the rhetonc of the human security agenda and its implementation. Continued international efforts to eliminate landmines, stop the recruitment of children in combat, and establish the

International Criminal Court demonstrate that the agenda is more than policy rhetoric.

Canadian policy is reflective of this movement toward a balanced policy framework, where there is also an acknowledgement that not al1 human security initiatives require substantial hard power resources. Following hmthis, al1 three cases studied here were successful in varying degrees in tenns of what was achieved.

Another related elernent of the criticisms of human security relates to the concept itself rather than to the style of diptomacy used to pursue it, Many scholars argue that human security is not defined well enough to guide foreign policy. indeed, scholars such as Nossal, Oliver, and Hampson ail contend this. Significantly this claim is also made by scholars who are more sympathetic to Axworthy and to his policy agenda, such as

Barbara Arneil and Robin JefEey ~a~.~However, it is important to make the distinction between defining what human security is and how it can be used as a policy guide. More attention shouid be piaced on the latter to determine both its limitations and its strengths for policy. The definition of human security itçelfand its evolution are clear,

Knight, "Soft Power and Mord Suasion," p. 204. 219 See Hay, "Present at the Creation?" and Owens and Arneii, "The Human Security Paradigrn Shift" the current focus on the sources and prevention of violent conflict siguificantly nmws the scope of the concept and its definition. Thus, more attention should be placed on the whether or not the focus on human secwity and its corresponding clusters of issues are appropriate for Canada than on any diqueof human secwity as a 'slogan.'w

Movement toward discovering what human security lends to Canadian foreign policy is evident in a recent Senate report entitled, The New NATO and the Evolution of

Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada. In this report the Standing Senate Committee

on Foreign AffairS analyses NATO's so-cdled 'humanitarian' initiative in Kosovo and

argues as follows, ''The reality is that human security remains a rather vague and ill-

defined guide to a~tion."~'The Senate Report critiques both the meaning and

application of human security. However, this paper argues that the meaning is

reasonabry well established. By focusing more on its application, the relevance and

utility of human security for Canadian foreign policy will be established more clearly.

This will allow for appropriate consideration of the Senate's other, very real criticism,

which is that, "many people seem to believe that adopting a human security

approach.. somehow makes the difficult issues go away."*' Human security focuses on

a range of complex issues. These issues require a wide scope of policy activity and CO-

operation and often achieve intangible resdts. Thus, creating the false impression that

m US Dcputy Secrctary of Defense John Hamrc made tbis critique at the University of Calgary in February 2000. ~e-contendedthat hum= security or "human diplomacy," as he misquoted, was more of a slogan than a policy. hterestingly he focussed on the nced for many of the activities related to human secrnity m his speech, such as the need to rebuild civil society and the mstinrtions of the smte in peacekeepmg ope-rations. There seems to be a lot of cornmon grotmd between the US and Canada on these issues. US reluctance most likely cornes from its discornfort with working with in muitilateral situations whcre it is not treated with the deference of being the ody remaining nrperpowerweT ?3' Standing Senate Committee on Foreign A&n, "Ine New NATO and the Evolution of Peacekeepùig: implications for Canada," Report of the Standing Senure Cbmminee on Foreign (Ottawa:Canada Communications Group, April2000). p. 56. ibid., p. 56. human security dlbring quick solutions to confiict situations and humanitarian issues is dangerous to the credibility of Canadian foreign policy. For, regardless of the persuasiveness of the different approach, the issues facing the international community remain complex.

Meaningfd policy discussion is needed to £ind the best role for the intemationai community in situations where violent confiict threatem human security. This is not to

Say that there should not be debate regarding the definition of human security. It is

simply to argue that this debate should be channelled in more productive ways. Analysis

of some of the institutions and intemationai efforts related to hurnan security, like this

study, are important since Axworthy's atternpts to refine the definition of the concept

have barely sparked any new interest in either the academic comrnunity or the media

Mead, the public has been inundated with editorials and opinion pieces regurgitating the

same arguments of Axworthy's 'soft' policies and misguided international behaviour.

Human security is Canada's attempt to redefine its approach to the international

system and respond to an emerging agenda However, Axworthy must be careful to

avoid moral stands that give the impression that Canada is somehow 'better' than the test

of the world. Establishing meaninfil policy initiatives and working with other States

and NGOs on the ground in complex situations will go a long way toward establishing a

credible international agenda The initiatives outlined in the three case studies

encompass a number of activities designed to coniribute to lasting peace in regions tom

by confiict and violence.

The longevity of Canada's human secrrrity agenda and its entrenchrnent in

governrnent policy will play an important role in it. success. It is doubtfiil that future rninisters will pursue the human security agenda as vigorously as Axworthy, as they wiII most likely want to make their own personal mark on Canadian foreign policy. But it is also unlikely that DFAïI' will divest itselfof its human security agenda completely after

Axworthy. The continuing role of bureaucrats in the shaping of the policy will be an important force in its longevity and ~istinitionalisation.U)The fact that the agenda had its roots in Canadian poiicy prior to Axworthy is ais0 indicative of a more widespread appeai for the agenda in the department.

Human Security and Canada-US Relations

Acceptance of the agenda by other states is no less crucial to the successful implementation of hurnan security. Support for the agenda adds to the credibility of

Canada because it cannot pursue the agenda done. An international consensus on hurnan security is needed, as is pointed out by the Senate's recent Hence, Canada has attempted to entrench the human security agenda through CO-operationwith like-minded states in the human security network. These states continue to meet to discuss the promotion of human security in the international comrnunity. However, they do not always have the support of the major powers, most notably the US. This is imporbnt since, as Stairs puts it, "coalitions of the willing work best when they include the greater powen."13' Of principal concern to Canada is the support of the US because of the importance of the US to the international system as the oniy remaining superpower and because oFthe importance of bilaterd Canada-US relations to Canada.

Regardless of the occurrence of biIaterai disputes on a wide range of issues, the

Canada-US relationship has always been strong. hdeed, it is one of the closest

"Hay, "Resent at the Creation?," p. 220. "Standing Cornmittee on Foreign Atfairs, 'The New NATO," p. 56. relationships between two sovereign States in the world. However, recent events have caused many to wonder about the continued strength of bilateral ties. indeed, there is worry among Canadian officiais that Canada will take its relationship with the US for granted and permanently damage its ties with the country on which it is so dependent, pareicularly in areas related to defen~e.~~~This is important, as there is no longer the

strategic imperative for CO-operationthat existed in the Cold War. In the landmines case,

the international Criminal Court case, and initially in the optional protocol on child

soldiers, Canada seemed ail too willing to work with other countries and groups against

the expressed interests of the US. The precedent that is set by this type of behaviour is

seemingly dangerous in today's international environment, where Canada is so highly dependent on its neighbour for trade and defence.

The parameters of this debate are interesting, as they seem to be reminiscent of

the sarne debates that have occurred within the Canadian foreign policy comunity since

the end of w.w.II."' How to pursue a foreign policy independent from the US while not jeopardising the relationship has been a core diiernma for Canadian policy-makers. This

dationship to earlier debates is important to keep in mind so as not to get too swept up in

the rhetoric of critics of Axworthy's foreign policy. Canada engaged in careful

negotiations with the US in al1 three case studies with different results. Ottawa and other

countries tried to compromise with the US on certain aspects of the ICC Statute but was

not willing to sacrifice the effectiveness of the court to appease US concems. In the

Ottawa Process, Canada found itselfthe public target of its NGO dies when it tried to

Stain, 'The Axworthy View." p. 12 'M Coon&ntia[ source. Many authon have written about the challenges to defïning Canadian foreign policy mdependentIy of the US. A good piece on the topic is Denis Stairs, "Change in the Management of Canada-US Relations m gain US support for the treaty. By contrast, Canada was able to compromise with the US on the Optional Protocol on children in combat, since there was not the same degree of publieity and organisation directed at the iss~e.~'Although it mut be acknowledged that the extra pressure piaced on Axworthy by the Prime Minister played a Iarge role in achieving the latter.

Also, Canada's participation in the 1999 NATO air strikes over Yugoslavia was indicative of Canada's cornmitment both to the US and NATO. It demonstrated to the critics that traditional alliances still counted for Axworthy who fully supported the strikes. This put many in the State Department at ease, as one governrnent official illuçtrated by stating, "there's no space behveen us."239 President Clinton's visit to

Ottawa in October 1999 Merserved to illustrate that relations between the hvo countries were in good shape. As the New York Times commented, "reporters [were] hard pressed to find controversy in a relationship that Amecicans take for granted - the world's Iargest trading relationship crossing the world's longest undefended border.*12*

Significantiy, the President's visit and its surrounding commentary were primarily focused on trade issues illustrating the importance of trade to Canada-US relations. This is a recegobservation which sparks the comment that trade is the 'real' Canadian foreign policy. This observation is important to the present analysis as the issues discussed in the preceding Chapter are not indicative of vital interests to the US or

Canada This is not to Say that the US was unconcemed by Canada's initiatives; on the the Post-CoId War Era," Toward a North Ammican Community? Canada. the United States and Mexico. DonaId Barry ed. (Boulder Westview Press, 1995)' pp. 57-68. One Canadian official notes that there was not even one editorial wcitten on the issue- Confldential MUfCe. Quoted in Stephen Handeiman, "Bombed ia the Balkans: Lloyd Axworthy's foreign poücy may have been taken out m the war." Time Magazine, 19 A@ 1999, p. 33. contrary it was very concerned However, in an issue thai is Iabelled a vital interest, it is doubtfid îhat Canada would expect to take such a public stance successfuiiy in opposition to the US without ramifications. indeed, there have been efforts made by Canada to work with the US on many issues of concem to the Canada-US defence relationship. For instance, the North Amencan Aerospace Defence Agreement (NûRAD)was recently extended for five years.24' Canada wauid not have jeopardised the extension of this

agreement. Atso, its attempts to influence US nuciear policy- for instance, Canada's

attempt to initiate reform of NATO's nuclear weapons policies - have not achieved any

redts. In any event, were Axworthy to oppose the US on too many issues, it is apparent that pressure hmthe Prime Minister will be, and indeed has been in the case of chiId

soIdiers, used to engage the US in a more productive

While there is much at stake for Canada in the Canada-US relationship, Canada

ha aIways attempted to pursue a 'made in Canada' foreign policy that is independent of

the US. The approach must remain ptagmatic and policy-makers rnust also be reminded

of the importance of the relationship to Canada Axworthy naw redises the parameters

within which Canada cmoperate successfîdy and apply its human securîty agenda. ïhe

ment agreement with the US on the ûptional Pmtocol on child soldiers is demonstrative

of this. While it was not Axworthy's initial inclination, this betiaviour appears to be a

positive development for Canadian foreign policy and is one that shouId be continued.

Wbether it occurred because of, or in spite of, Axworthy mains to be seen.

"O James Brooke, "Clinton Visit Shows Wannth of Canadian Ties," The New York Times. 9 October 1999, AS. "' DFAIT, "Canada and the United States to Extend Defence Agreement," Nervs Release, No. 152, i6 lune, 2000. "conficienriai source. Canada's foreign poiicy is constrained by the internationai system. Hence, it is important to recall Nye's analogy of the international system. He conceives of the world as a "three dimensional chess game," with transnational issues occupying the bottom board and miiitary and economic issues on the hrst and second boards, respectively. Nye further argues that international politics is played hmdl three Ievels, vertically, horizontally, and at the same tirne. Based on this analogy, Nye cautions Axworthy to rernember that opposing and imtating the US on one Ievet could spi11 over to relations on the others.

While the potential for spill-over between the levels is important to remember, it is the third, transnational level, that opens up opportunities for a country such as Canada to take a leadership role in the international systern.'" Canada mut therefore learn to negotiate its way through the three levels outlined by Nye. in doing so, Oaawa should evduate what course is the best way to maximise Canadian interests. It is doubtful that continually working without the US is the best course. However, Canada has shown that it is willing to engage the US Ui its human security agenda and action in Kosovo indicates that Canada still works alongside the US in miIitary initiatives, the important 'top board' of the international system. While it is likely that Axworthy was affected somewhat by their criticisms, it appears that his critics were too quick to judge the effects of his agenda on Canada's security interests.'" Axworthy appears to be pursuing a more pragmatic approach to human security, fitting it within the needs of middlepowerism.

"This viewpomt is articulated throughout Axworihy's speeches. See for instance, Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security the Need for Leadership," pp. 1-2 Ideas similar to this argument are articulatpd m Moiiie Royds, "Middlepowerimi in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of Axworihy's Security Poticy," Journal of Militmy md Smtegk Smdies, (Sprhg 2000), ~h~J/~.st~atuetudgary.ca/joUIIInY>. The management of Canada's relationship witù the US is of great importance to

Canadian foreign policy, particdarly in tenns of trade and defence. The fuil effects of the human security agenda on this reIationship are not apparent. Yet, it appears that both countries need to find a way to work together. The US is realising that Canada is not the

only actor driving the agenda Other countries and NGOs are actively promoting a

human security approach to international politics. However, for Canada, more attention

needs to be paid to the state of its relationship wiîh the US, while balancing the

complexities of the international system.

Human Security and International Diplomacy

The final task of this study is to drôw some conclusions regarding the implications

of the human security agenda for international diplomacy. According to Axworthy, a

'new multilateralisrn' is inherent in the human security agenda The Anti-Personnel

mines ban, International Criminal Court negotiations and Optional Protocol on the use of

children in combat al1 highlight the use of diplornatic methods that go beyond traditional

diplomacy (Le. negotiations between professionai dipiomats out of the public eye). The

persuasive tactics of sofl power were a natural choice for the middle power States that

were at the forefiont of these campaigns, as they did not have the coercive means of the

major powers to draw upon. [ncluded in the 'new multilateralisrn' are the involvement of

non-state actors, new ad hoc forums for discussion, public forms ofdiplomacy, and

finally, the use of modern communication techo1ogies such as the Internet.

As the AP mines case suggests, the 'new multilateraiism' is not that new. While

the focus on the different aspects of the 'new muItilateraiism' as recognized policy tools

and the degree to which they are caiied upon is new, most of the individuai tools themselves are not novel. For instance, NGOs have been included in international

diplomacy for decades, particularly in environmental issues. Yet, they did not previously

contniute to security matters, as they did in the AP mines, ICC and optionai protocoi

negotiations. In these latter issues NGOs played important deseducating governments

and the public and driving the individual issue campaigus.

in spite of the cases examined in Chapter Di, the professional diplomat and foms

of traditional diplomacy remain predominant in trade and security issues. It is unlikely

that states will voluntarily relinquish their role in international relations to non-state

actors. While NGOs were an asset in the sense that they appealed to different audiences

and were able to utilise their public relations skills to great effect in al1 three cases, the

interests of states and NGOs do not always coincide. For instance, Canadian officiais and

NGOs on occasion have found themselves on opposite sides of issues in international

trade and environment negotiations. As well, NGOs have the ability to ensure that they

are actors to be reckoned with, even in issue areas that they are not included in and where

states dominate. For instance, in the 1999 World Trade Organization negotiations in

Seattle, Washington, NGOs and rnembers of the generai public managed to severely

impede the ability of state representatives to negotiate by demonstrating and rioting

outside of the fonun for negotiations. Indeed, the power of NGOs was aiso demonstrated

during the Ottawa Process when Axworthy's NGO allies turned on him after he

attempted to bring the US on board. It is doubtfuI that states will overcome their

suspiciousness of the open diplomacy that is entailed by oon-state actor participation and

they will consequently continue to dominate in global &airs, However, it is Likely that

many forums will be widened to include non-state actors m some capacity as they have demonstrateci their ability to inauence international diplomacy in both positive and negative ways.

Simila-to NGO involvement in international politics, public diplornacy is employed by the 'new rnultilateralisrn' in an unprecedented fashion. In the past negotiators did not see public diplomacy as a useful tool as public involvement limited their effectiveness. Combined with modem technology, public diplomacy is viewed as a more effective tool than traditionai diplomacy in the curent international clirnate, parficularly in relation to human security issues. The intemet is an important resource for

States and non-state actors, the benefits of which are still being discovered. DF.QIT's web-site and its National Forums and Roundtable discussions are used to educate and promote its human security agenda to the mass public. However, publicity cm be dangerous as it can bitthe flexibility of policy like it did for Canada in the AP mines case. By contrast, in the ûptional Protocol on Child Soldiers the lack of media attention aikowed more room to manoeuvre. Thus, Axworthy overstates the significance of public diplomacy to the 'new multilateralism.' This suggests that public diplomacy is not a perfect tool for practitioners of foreign policy.

Finally, the 'new muItilateralism7impiies that traditional forums, such as the UN, are not the sole armas of international diplomacy. The Ottawa Process was indicative of this. Yet, both the Optional Protocol and the ICC were negotiated within the UN friunework. As welI, Axworthy repeatedly assures his audiences of the need to strengthen and reform the UN system. Hence, while new fortmis are now an option, they wiU remain an option to be considered der established forums have failed to produce positive results and the nght combination of events appears to jwdfy the creation of new venues.

The 'new multilateralism' inherent in the human sec* agenda is representative of many opportunities for states such as Canada and other actors to influence the international agenda. The human secinity agenda has enhanced the ability of states to work with non-state actors and to incorporate a diverse range of toois, such as public diplomacy, in their policy approaches. However, these tools ate not new per se and they have not made traditional tools of diplomacy redundant. State-to-state relations will continue to dominate world affairs, but they will take place in a complex environment with other actors to consider on occasion. Finally, the drawbacks of the policy style used in human security initiatives need to be kept in mind, as there are limitations to the utility of including NGOs and dangers in generating too much pubticity. Consequently, the benefits of the approach need to be carefully weighed against the drawbacks. It is unlikely that the 'new multitateralism' will be the predominant approach in the top two levels of Nye's 'three level game' of international politics. RealPolitik continues to dominate at these levels.

Conclusion

The insecurity of people has increased around the globe. increasingly states are unable to cope with the pressures of emerging threats to security and indeed they are oflen the source of insecurity. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy interprets this enviionment as a reason for Canada to join with other actors and take a leadership dein promoting a hurnan security agenda. He argues hat Canada has particular aitributes that enhance its role in promoting human security. Axworthy has artempted to rehe the concept through various publications, participation in forums and conferences, and through its application. This study has shown that it is important that Canada does not mate unredistic expectations and merwiden its 'commitment-capability gap' by over-committing its resources in the pursuit of its human security agenda, It has dso shown that it is important for Ottawa to hdinnovative solutions to issues related to human security as the agenda is important to both Canadian values and interests, in terms of Canada's need to offset its dependence on the international systern, The widespread popularity in Canada and in many parts of the world of the Ottawa Convention banning landmines is demonstrative of this importance. The ICC and the Optionai Protoc01

Merdemonstrate that more work is needed to build support for reforms to international regirnes, such as the UN, to provide effective forums for international initiatives.

This study has sought to provide an analysis of Canada's hurnan secunfy agenda

It has outlied Canada's human security agenda by tracing its roots in the international system and within Canadian policy discussions. Further, it has evaluated three important case studies of Canada's agenda and discussed the implications of the agenda for Canada, the Canada-US relationship and for international diplomacy. This analysis suggests that cntics of the hurnan security agenda have not let the agenda take shape before making their critiques. The debate has been negatively focused with !Me attention paid to the potential importance and utility of the agenda The mots of human security are deeper than is given credit for. Axworthy's focus on the effects of violent conflict on humans serves to rehe the concept to a more manageable level. Certainly more analysis is needed of its application and what it means for the practice of foreign policy. The three case studies chosen here from DFAIT's clusters of human security issues are an important nrst step. The case studies examined here illustrate that human security and the 'new multilateralism' are viable options in today's international climate. in each case

Canada worked with the human security network and other like-minded states and NGOs to achieve its goals.

While the study takes a generally positive view of the pvxuit of human security, tbere are several points that hworthy and future foreign rninisters need to address. First and foremost, Canada must carefully weigh its values and interests to ensure that the agenda it pursues encompasses both without putting Canadian credibility at risk. Second,

Canada needs to engage the US to achieve US support and accept that the hurnan security agenda can affect the Canada-US relationship. Finally, Canada needs to work within the realities of the international system and establish realistic policy choices that match its capabilities, both hard and soi?. Working with other states dong with the pragmatic application of the tools inherent in the 'new multilateralism' is important to this last consideration.

The hurnan security agenda as presented here has the potential for success as long as it does not encourage unrealistic expectations. It is a new and important way of considering foreign policy, Canada's foreign poky in the new millennium needs to incorporate the pragrnatic traditions of niiddepowerism while adapting its approach to meet new challenges. Its success or failure wilI depend on the ability to find a role for

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