Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: an Agenda for Intervention
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Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention Michael W. Manulak Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada 2011 Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Manulak, Michael W., 1983- Canada and the Kosovo crisis : an agenda for intervention / Michael W. Manulak. (Martello papers, ISSN 1183-3661 ; 36) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-55339-245-3 1. Kosovo War, 1998-1999—Participation, Canadian. 2. Canada— Military policy. I. Queen’s University (Kingston, Ont.). Centre for International Relations II. Title. III. Series: Martello papers ; 36 DR2087.6.F652C3 2010 949.7103 C2010-907064-X © Copyright 2011 Martello Paper Series Queen’s University’s Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of monographs, the Martello Papers. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues in foreign and defence policy, and in the study of international peace and security. How governments make decisions in times of crisis is a topic which has long fascinated both theorists and practitioners of international politics. Michael Manulak’s study of the Canadian government’s decision to take part in NATO’s use of force against Serbia in the spring of 1999 deploys a novel social-scientific method to dissect the process whereby that decision was made. In that respect this paper descends from a long line of inquiry going back to the 1960s and the complex flow-charts designed by “scientific” students of foreign policy. But the model deployed here has a more flesh- and-blood quality to it than those early works. Problem, policy and poli- tics – the three “streams” that converge to produce the decision – capture ideas and forces instantly recognizable to any student of government, and frame a narrative populated by real people who have – and make – real choices all along the way. Canada’s participation in the seventy-eight day air war against Serbia was framed as a humanitarian intervention prompted by Belgrade’s suppression of Kosovo’s Albanian majority but, as Manulak points out, its unprecedented decision to support a multilateral NATO mission in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate was driven by a variety of factors about which those involved and those who observed continue to differ. The bold claim driving this study is to provide a fuller and more persuasive account of vi Michael W. Manulak those events than we have heretofore had, in a form that is both concise and theoretically sophisticated. We are, as always, grateful to the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Centre to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and international security. As is the case with all Martello Papers, the views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre or any of its supporting agencies. Charles C. Pentland Director, QCIR October 2010 Contents List of Acronyms ..................................................................................... ix INTRODUCTION: CANADA’S KOSOVO CRISIS ................................ 1 Literature Review ................................................................................. 2 Argumentation, Methodology, and Research ....................................... 6 Background to a Crisis .......................................................................... 9 1. THE PROBLEM STREAM .................................................................17 1.1 The Problem Stream in Agenda Setting ....................................17 1.2 Indicators and Feedback in the Problem Stream .......................18 1.3 Focusing Events, Crises, and Symbols ..................................... 22 1.4 Problem Definition and the Kosovo Crisis ............................... 24 1.5 Budgets and the Kosovo Crisis ................................................. 26 1.6 Conclusion ................................................................................ 26 2. THE POLICY STREAM AND THE SPECIFICATION OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES ......................................................... 29 2.1 The Policy Stream in the Multiple Streams Model .................. 29 2.2 The Canadian Foreign Policy Community and the Specification of Alternatives ................................................31 2.3 Recombination, Criteria for Survival and an Emerging Consensus ................................................................................. 37 2.4 Conclusion ................................................................................ 40 viii Michael W. Manulak 3. THE POLITICS STREAM ..................................................................43 3.1 The Politics Stream within the Multiple Streams Model ..........43 3.2 The Canadian National Mood ...................................................45 3.3 Organized Political Forces ........................................................ 50 3.4 Government in the Political Stream...........................................51 3.5 Consensus Building and the Bandwagon Effect in the Politics Stream .....................................................................53 3.6 Conclusion ................................................................................ 54 4. POLICY WINDOWS, ENTREPRENEURS AND CHANGE ...........55 4.1 Policy Windows, Entrepreneurs, and Stream Couplings in the Multiple Streams Model ..................................................55 4.2 The Opening of a Policy Window in January 1999 ...................57 4.3 The Policy Entrepreneur and a Coupling of the Streams ......... 58 4.4 The Kosovo Intervention and the Canadian Decision Agenda ...................................................................................... 62 4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................ 63 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 65 Notes ....................................................................................................... 69 Bibliography .............................................................................................81 About the Author .................................................................................... 89 List of Acronyms ACTORD NATO Activation Order CF Canadian Forces CIIA Canadian Institute of International Affairs DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade DND Department of National Defence FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia HRW Human Rights Watch ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia KLA Kosovo Liberation Army KVM Kosovo Verification Mission LDK Democratic League of Kosovo MUP Serbian Ministry of the Interior Special Police NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization PGM Precision-Guided Munitions UNAC United Nations Association- Canada UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees VJ Yugoslavian Army Introduction: Canada’s Kosovo Crisis On 24 March 1999 four Canadian CF-18 Hornets thundered toward their targets in the south Serbian province of Kosovo. The mission marked the first wave of a robust humanitarian intervention that would last 78 days. In Ottawa, officials from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and Department of National Defence (DND) worked late into the night to prepare their communication strategy for the most vigorous Canadian Forces combat deployment since the 1950 Korean War. The Canadian decision to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion (NATO) intervention represented a striking shift in Canadian foreign policy. Although Canada had supported interventions in Somalia (1992) and Zaire (1996), those missions were primarily aimed at securing civilian access to emergency assistance in countries that exercised only nominal sovereignty. In Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-1994) and Haiti (1994) the Cana- dian government approached military intervention with great reluctance. In the Kosovo case, the Canadian government supported a forceful imposition of NATO’s will on a sovereign country that did not welcome interference in its affairs. The operation was conducted without the benefit of a United Nations Security Council resolution and marked an important evolution in NATO’s mandate. As a result, the Canadian decision to participate in Operation Allied Force represented a clear and controversial point of Ca- nadian policy change. This study of Canada’s Kosovo policy will focus on the pre-decision stages of the policy process to gain an appreciation of the forces that precipitated this change. The analysis will use John W. Kingdon’s multiple-streams model, outlined in his 1984 book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.1 2 Michael W. Manulak The introductory section of the paper will describe the scholarly literature on Canadian policy toward the Kosovo crisis and note some of its limita- tions. It will then discuss the paper’s methodology and argumentation, including a short summary of its findings. The introduction will conclude with background on the Kosovo conflict as well as the Canadian policy approach to these events. Literature Review The literature on the Canadian part in Kosovo conflict management is limited to sundry journal articles and book chapters. The interpretations