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Challenges at theChallenges Intersection Research Paper Caroline Baylon International Security | December 2014 of Cyber Security and Challenges at the Space Security: Country and International Institution Perspectives Intersection of Cyber Security and Space Security Country and International Institution Perspectives Caroline Baylon Caroline Chatham House Contents Summary 2 Preface 4 Overview: Common Challenges in Cyber Security and 7 Space Security – Contributing to an Escalatory Cycle of Militarization? Part I: Country Perspectives China’s Information and Space Security Policies 16 France’s Cyber and Space Security Policies 19 India’s Cyber and Space Security Policies 22 Italy’s Cyber and Space Security Policies 26 Japan’s Cyber and Space Security Policies 29 Russia’s Information Security Policy 31 The United Kingdom’s Cyber and Space Security Policies 35 The United States’ Space Security Policy: 38 Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Part II: Perspectives from International Institutions An EU View: Comparisons and Establishing Norms in 42 the Cyber and Space Domains An OECD View: The Growing Risks of Satellite 44 Signal Interference The UN Structure: The Intersection of Cyber Security 46 and Outer Space Security Acronyms 49 About the Authors 50 Acknowledgments 51 1 | Chatham House Challenges at the Intersection of Cyber Security and Space Security: Country and International Institution Perspectives Summary This research paper is part of Chatham House’s Project on Cyber Security and Space Security, a multi- year research project within the International Security Department examining the security challenges at the intersection of cyber security and space security. The paper aims to identify and raise awareness of the challenges common to both domains through a compilation of articles by cyber security experts and space security experts that assess each field and consider the linkages between the two. Part I is made up of a series of country studies in which experts from eight countries (China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), drawn from think tanks, academia and industry, set out their views on their country’s cyber security and space security policies. Part II presents international institution perspectives, with contributors from three major bodies (the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the UN) providing high-level assessments of challenges at the intersection of cyber security and space security. Among the major security challenges described in the papers that are common to both the cyber and space domains – and all linked to a growing militarization in both sectors – are: • An ‘escalatory cycle’ of militarization in the cyber and space fields, prompted by the increasing militarization of a small number of states: The militarization of both the cyber and space sectors appears in part attributable to a small number of states’ increasingly militarized actions in these (and other) domains. Other states, responding to a ‘perceived threat’, are thus more likely to ramp up the military aspects of their own cyber and space programmes. This, in turn, prompts an even greater number of states to militarize. • Lack or inadequacy of national policy documents in the cyber and space realms: The lack or inadequacy of national policy documents in the cyber and space spheres creates opacity concerning state objectives, which in turn fosters ‘ambiguity of intent’ surrounding state actions and renders states more likely to construe other states’ actions as offensive. The absence of such documents also hinders dialogue, reducing prospects for international cooperation. • Lack or insufficiency of internationally agreed definitions of key terminology in the cyber and space domains: Given that robust definitions are fundamental to the establishment of enduring treaties, the lack or insufficiency of internationally agreed definitions of key cyber security and space security terminology impedes the development of multilateral arms control agreements. It also hinders international cooperation. • A blurring line between ‘non-military’ and ‘military’ roles in the cyber and space sectors – including a rise in dual-use technologies: The distinction between ‘non-military’ and ‘military’ roles is increasingly blurred in the cyber and space arenas, with many technologies being dual- use. This makes it more difficult to define key terminology (especially that involving warfare), contributing to the lack or inadequacy of internationally agreed definitions. Dual-use technologies also mean that banning certain technologies outright and implementing adequate measures to verify compliance are often unfeasible, leading to difficulties in reaching multilateral arms control agreements. Furthermore, dual-use technologies make it more difficult to ascertain whether a country is developing a military programme in addition to its civilian activities. 2 | Chatham House Challenges at the Intersection of Cyber Security and Space Security: Country and International Institution Perspectives • A blurring line between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ actions in the cyber and space fields – or a shifting line to permit increasingly ‘offensive’ activities under the justification of ‘defensive’ activities: The norms of acceptable behaviour in cyber and space are shifting towards the ‘offensive’ end of the spectrum, permitting increasingly offensive activities under the guise of ‘defensive’ ones. • Asymmetric threats in the cyber and space domains – i.e. ‘offence is easier and cheaper than defence’: The cyber and space fields both face asymmetric threats. This contributes to the increasingly blurred line between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ activities in cyber and space. Technologically, offence is easier and more cost-effective than defence. Geopolitically, the consequence is that highly advanced countries are particularly vulnerable to attack from less developed states (as well as from terrorist groups and other actors). Devising a flowchart In identifying and analysing some of the common challenges in the cyber and space domains, the submissions to this paper point to the existence of an escalatory cycle of militarization in both domains, apparently driven by a set of common factors. The paper examines the interactions of these factors, and presents a flowchart that depicts how they relate to one another and to the escalatory cycle. 3 | Chatham House Challenges at the Intersection of Cyber Security and Space Security: Country and International Institution Perspectives Preface Dr Patricia Lewis, Caroline Baylon This research paper is part of Chatham House’s Project on Cyber Security and Space Security, a multi- year research project within the International Security Department that is focused on examining the security challenges at the intersection of cyber security and space security. Launched in 2013, the research project has three principal objectives: Objective 1: Identifying and analysing the challenges common to both the cyber security and space security domains. The cyberspace and outer space domains have a number of security challenges in common. For example, both are undergoing growing militarization; both are mired in some measure of deadlock regarding the potential for international treaties; and both are susceptible to asymmetric threats. The research project aims to identify and analyse these shared challenges, developing a greater understanding of their complex interrelationships. Its objectives also include suggesting and evaluating potential solutions that might be applicable to both domains. Objective 2: Identifying and analysing cyber threats to satellites and other space assets. The cyber and space sectors are growing progressively interconnected and interdependent. The research project aims to identify and analyse the cyber threats to satellites and other space assets. Satellites, ground stations and other space assets rely increasingly on the internet and other cyber networks for their functions, which renders them vulnerable to cyber attack. For example, hackers could use internet- enabled remote configuration features to take control of a space system, resulting in anomalous behaviour or even catastrophic failure of a satellite. Conversely, the internet and other internet- enabled critical infrastructure rely increasingly on satellites and other space assets for information and other operations, making them more attractive targets for cyber attack. For example, hackers might intercept data or disrupt internet communications from telecommunications satellites, or else jam and spoof signals from GPS satellites, taking down mobile phone networks, the power grid or other critical infrastructure dependent on them. Objective 3: Promoting communication between cyber and space experts. There is currently limited communication between experts in the cyber security and the space security communities, with many not being aware of the importance of sharing information and experience across domains. The research project aims to facilitate communication and knowledge transfer between cyber and space experts as well as their respective communities. The project also involves a series of seminars and publications aimed at bringing together experts from both the cyber security and the space security communities to examine the connections between the two fields. A first seminar, titled ‘Making the Connection: The Future of Cyber and Space’, was held in January 2013 at Chatham House, and

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