The Air Superiority Fighter and Defense Transformation Why DOD Requirements Demand the F/A-22 Raptor
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AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY The Air Superiority Fighter and Defense Transformation Why DOD Requirements Demand the F/A-22 Raptor DEVIN L. CATE Lieutenant Colonel, USAF Air War College Maxwell Paper No. 30 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama June 2003 Air University Donald A. Lamontagne, Lt Gen, Commander Air War College Bentley B. Rayburn, Maj Gen, Commandant A. J. Torres, PhD, Dean Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Series Editor Joseph F. Cheney, Col, Essay Advisor Air University Press Shirley B. Laseter, DPA, Director Thomas Lobenstein, Content Editor Sherry C. Terrell, Copy Editor Mary Ferguson, Prepress Production Daniel Armstrong, Cover Design Please send inquiries or comments to Editor The Maxwell Papers Air War College 325 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1401 Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 Tel: (334) 953-7074 Fax: (334) 953-1988 E-mail: [email protected] This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are avail- able electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil. Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air Uni- versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii Foreword In this paper, Lt Col Devin L. Cate tackles the question of whether an air superiority fighter is relevant to warfare in the twenty-first century. Critics of the F/A-22, the US Air Force’s next generation air superiority fighter, have identi- fied it as a cold war relic—unjustifiably expensive and out of step with the Department of Defense (DOD) transformation. Colonel Cate argues that the six operational goals of the DOD transformation, as defined in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) of 2001, actually demand a highly ca- pable air superiority fighter. He shows how achieving these transformational operational goals requires performance of the four offensive counterair functions of surface attack, fighter sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), as well as defensive counterair. He demonstrates that only an air superiority fighter can efficiently and effec- tively satisfy all these functions. Colonel Cate then identifies the operational requirements for an air superiority fighter to adequately contribute to the operational goals of the transformation. These requirements are superlative air-to-air and air-to-ground performance, survivability against modern air defense systems, and a ca- pable sensor suite that allows the fighter to be a sensor- shooter and participate in the joint data network. Finally, Colonel Cate assesses the leading candidates for a twenty- first century fighter—the F-15C/E, F/A-22, F-35A, uninhab- ited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), and the common aero- space vehicle (CAV)—against these requirements. The proliferation of advanced air defense capabilities during the next few years will seriously challenge the suitability of the aging F-15C/E as an air superiority fighter. He notes that while the UCAV holds long-term promise an air superiority platform, we still have much to do in developing its capabil- ity and the doctrine, tactics, and training to employ the UCAV in the air-to-air mission, especially against manned air-to-air threats in close engagements. Consequently, Colonel Cate concludes the F/A-22 is the only fighter that will meet all the requirements for a transformational air su- periority fighter by 2007. iii This paper provides rich material for discussion not only about the role of the air superiority fighter in the twenty-first century but also concerning the nature of defense transfor- mation itself. As with all Maxwell Papers, we encourage dis- cussion and debate of Colonel Cate’s important paper. BENTLEY B. RAYBURN Major General, USAF Commandant, Air War College iv About the Author Lt Col Devin L. Cate is a student at the Air War College located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He has served tours as a physicist, flight test engineer, and staff officer on the Air Force Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staffs. He has participated in a diverse number of research, development, test, and engineering ef- forts, including the ground-based laser space segment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the F-117A Nighthawk. Colonel Cate led the Air Force’s Red Teams for counter-precision-guided munitions and directed-energy programs, including the airborne laser. At OSD, he served as the program director for the national low-observable (LO) and counter low-observable (CLO) programs, author- ing Department of Defense policy for management of the LO and CLO programs, including export policy. Colonel Cate’s awards include the R. L. Jones Award for being the top engineer graduate of the US Air Force Test Pilot School. He is a distinguished graduate of the Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. Colonel Cate holds a bachelor of science degree in physics from the US Air Force Academy and, as a recipient of the Boeing Fel- lowship, he also earned a master of science degree in aero- nautics and astronautics from the University of Washing- ton. Additionally, Colonel Cate has published papers on laser optics, adaptive control, and prototyping. v The Air Superiority Fighter and Defense Transformation Why DOD Requirements Demand the F/A-22 Raptor The end of the cold war and the beginnings of a transfor- mation of this country’s national defense forces have led some to question the need for a new air superiority fighter, specifically challenging the continuation of the F/A-22 pro- gram.1 The requirement for air superiority has been an ac- cepted tenet of US doctrine since the War Department pub- lished Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, in 1943.2 Given the recent changes to the strate- gic environment that underpin the current transformation of Department of Defense (DOD), is there still a need for the tra- ditional air superiority fighter? A careful reading of the opera- tional goals of the transformation of DOD as codified in Qua- drennial Defense Review (QDR)-01 demonstrates that this transformation cannot be accomplished without a new air superiority fighter. This new fighter must exhibit dominance in air-to-air engagements, have significant air-to-ground ca- pability, survive against a sophisticated surface-to-air mis- sile (SAM) threat, and serve as sensor and shooter in the joint data network (JDN). The options for fielding a new air supe- riority fighter include an upgraded F-15C/E, the F/A-22, the F-35A, the uninhabited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), and the common aerospace vehicle (CAV). Only the F/A-22 can meet the emerging needs of the air superiority task in the coming decades. In the longer term, other options hold some promise. Air Superiority Defined Air superiority and its enabling complement, counterair operations, are defined in joint doctrine. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines air superiority as “that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its re- lated land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place with- out prohibitive interference by the opposing force.”3 Counter- 1 2 AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER air “integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch.”4 Air superiority, then, is the degree to which a force has attained freedom to conduct joint operations by dominating the air. Counterair operations are the means of achieving air superiority. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.1, Counterair Operations, describes air superiority as a core competency of the United States Air Force (USAF) and asserts that it “is normally the first priority of US forces whenever the enemy possesses air and missile assets capable of threatening friendly forces or inhibiting their ability to use the air and space medium to apply force.”5 According to AFDD 2-1.1, “any action taken to achieve the effect of dominance above the Earth’s surface yet within the atmosphere fits into counterair operations.”6 AFDD 2-1.1 maintains that counter- air operations not only include air attack but also infor- mation attack, surface attack, or space-based attack—as long as the effect is air superiority.7 There are two types of counterair operations: offensive and defensive. Offensive counterair (OCA) operations de- stroy, disrupt, or degrade enemy air and missile threats, with the goal of defeating these threats at their origin. OCA reduces the enemy air threat and frees friendly forces to use airspace for their own purposes, including other air operations.8 Defensive counterair (DCA) is defense of friendly forces from enemy air and missile attacks. The spectrum of DCA ranges from active air defense designed to destroy incoming air and missile threats to passive measures intended to reduce the effectiveness of these threats.9 Because the focus here is the air superiority fighter, the discussion that follows concentrates on its roles in OCA and DCA. The primary reference is to AFDD 2-1.1 for OCA and DCA discussions since it is more de- tailed and recent than JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Counter- ing Air