ROBERT M. CORNEJO When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s ROBERT M. CORNEJO1 Robert M. Cornejo is a major in the US Army and a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. He recently earned an M.A. in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and is currently a student at the Singapore Command and Staff College. lthough Indonesia’s aspirations have been Sukarno’s successor, General Suharto, agreed to inter- largely forgotten today, in the mid-1960s, it national safeguards, thereby effectively ending concerns Asought to acquire and test nuclear weapons. In- that Indonesia might go nuclear. donesian government officials began publicizing their The purpose of this article is to tell the story of intent to acquire an atom bomb shortly after the People’s Indonesia’s nuclear aspirations, study Sukarno’s deci- Republic of China (PRC) exploded its first nuclear de- sion to support nuclear weapons, and identify variables vice in October 1964. By July 1965, Indonesian Presi- that may explain why he professed to seek the bomb. dent Sukarno was publicly vaunting his country’s future The article opens by tracing the evolution of Indonesia’s nuclear status. However, Indonesia did not have the in- nuclear aspirations, from a US Atoms for Peace pro- digenous capability necessary to produce its own nuclear gram of nuclear assistance that began in 1960, to weapon, and as a result, it would have had to secure Sukarno’s declared intention to acquire an atom bomb assistance from an established nuclear weapon state to in 1965. Drawing on both Indonesian and US archival achieve this goal. materials, this article provides further details about In- Speculation on just how Indonesia would acquire the donesian nuclear aspirations than may be found in the bomb centered on the prospect that Indonesia’s leaders existing literature on Indonesian foreign policy.3 would request assistance from the PRC by exploiting Following this history, the article evaluates the na- 2 the newly created Peking-Jakarta Axis. Observers ture and the seriousness of Sukarno’s “proliferation de- feared that Indonesia would ask China to explode an atom cision.”4 It continues by identifying variables that may bomb in Indonesian territorial waters while allowing the explain why Sukarno desired nuclear status for Indone- Sukarno government to take credit for the test. Obvi- sia. The discussion concludes with the suggestion that a ously, Indonesia failed to obtain the bomb from the PRC variety of factors, both external and internal to Indone- or from any other nuclear state. Yet, Sukarno succeeded sia, influenced Sukarno to inform the world that Indo- in making his nuclear aspirations known to the world nesia would become a nuclear weapon state. On balance, before a military coup led to his removal from office. however, the analysis suggests that internal factors— The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2000 31 ROBERT M. CORNEJO especially Sukarno’s concerns about domestic political The arrangement also included nonproliferation provi- stability—played the greater role. The simple fact that sions that prohibited the use of transferred materials for Indonesia talked about the bomb is not widely known weapons or military purposes. Specifically, the agree- by today’s nuclear proliferation specialists. Therefore, a ment stated that “no material...will be used for atomic closer examination of the Indonesian case may be help- weapons or for research on or development of atomic ful in understanding proliferation dynamics, especially weapons.”13 in Asia. A small 250-kilowatt TRIGA-Mark II research reac- tor, purchased from the General Atomics Division of EVOLUTION OF INDONESIA’S NUCLEAR the American firm General Dynamics, became the ASPIRATIONS nucleus of Indonesia’s nuclear program during the early In 1958, Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio 1960s.14 President Sukarno and US Ambassador Howard wrote that his country “does not have atomic weapons P. Jones inaugurated the reactor’s construction at the or nuclear weapons” and “does not have interest in that Bandung Institute of Technology on April 19, 1961.15 direction.”5 Subandrio’s statement accurately repre- The facility conducted Indonesia’s first successful sented the official Indonesian government position on nuclear reaction on October 17, 1964.16 By coincidence, nuclear weapons for the next six years. During this pe- this particular experiment occurred just one day after riod, the Indonesian government created an Institute of China exploded its first atom bomb. Atomic Energy (or LTA, Lembaga Tenaga Atom) to Far from angering the Indonesian government, a sig- 6 supervise nuclear research and develop atomic energy. natory to the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,17 However, the LTA limited its efforts to planning and the Chinese nuclear test on October 16, 1964, was viewed building reactors jointly with the United States and the quite favorably by many top Indonesian officials. Soviet Union to conduct research on peaceful uses of Roeslan Abdulgani, minister of public relations, declared 7 nuclear energy. his government’s view that China’s new nuclear capa- Soviet nuclear assistance did not begin in earnest un- bility “would open the eyes of the West to the fact that til 1965, when construction was started on a research from now on, their encirclement of the peoples of Asia reactor at Gadja Mada Research Center in Yogyakarta. and Africa would be of no avail.”18 Minister for Rev- However, American nuclear assistance to Indonesia enues, Expenditures, and Supervision Hassan praised the originated in June 1960, when the two countries signed Chinese test as “a matter worthy to be hailed not only a five-year, bilateral agreement under the Atoms for by the Chinese people but by the Indonesian people as Peace program. Atoms for Peace was the centerpiece of well.”19 Many other ministers of the Indonesian gov- US nonproliferation strategy from the 1950s through the ernment extended similar congratulations to the PRC 1970s.8 The program’s purpose was to discourage the through the Chinese ambassador in Jakarta. proliferation of nuclear weapons by shifting international Two factors may have contributed to such a surpris- attention from the development of weapons and toward ing response from Indonesian officials: Chinese govern- 9 the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Toward this goal, ment statements about the bomb and Indonesian the program transferred nuclear technology and fissile President Sukarno’s enthusiasm toward the atom. Sev- material from the stockpiles of the nuclear states to the eral times during 1963, the Chinese government made atomic energy programs of the non-nuclear weapon public statements declaring the benefits of nuclear weap- states. ons in socialist hands, once even calling on socialist coun- The Indonesian agreement became effective on Sep- tries to develop nuclear superiority.20 Then immediately tember 21, 1960, and under it the United States pledged after the test, the PRC declared “the mastering of the cooperation in the civilian uses of atomic energy.10 To nuclear weapon by China is a great encouragement to assist in this effort, the United States promised a the revolutionary peoples of the world in their struggles $350,000 grant toward the cost of a research reactor at and a great contribution to the cause of defending world Bandung once the facility was operational.11 Addition- peace.”21 Admittedly, China’s proclamations were made ally, the agreement permitted the US Agency for Inter- in the context of the Sino-Soviet split and before Chi- national Development to send $141,000 to assist nese nuclear strategy had matured. Moreover, Indone- Indonesia in developing its atomic research program.12 sia was not a socialist country and none of the statements 32 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2000 ROBERT M. CORNEJO indicated that China would lend nuclear support to other absence of evidence supporting Hartono’s assertion.26 countries. Nonetheless, Indonesian officials may have In the United States, the New York Times reported been inclined to view favorably the October test because Hartono’s boast as well as reactions from officials in Chinese statements about nuclear weapons appeared to the US Department of State and the US Atomic Energy support, rather than oppose, the bomb in other countries’ Commission who called the claim “absurd” and “im- hands. possible.”27 According to these agencies, “Indonesia did Not until July 1965 would Sukarno publicly declare not have the capability of refining atomic materials for 28 his support for an Indonesian nuclear weapon, but as an explosion or building of a device to set it off.” early as November 1964, the Indonesian president ex- The American assessment was based on the knowl- pressed his support for using newfound atomic knowl- edge that Indonesia’s only nuclear capability was the edge to help Indonesia in a new revolution. Indonesia’s TRIGA-Mark II and that the LTA was plagued by a short- first revolution had been waged against Dutch colonial- age of competent staff.29 Although the reactor at ism during the late 1940s. In the early 1960s, Sukarno Bandung had recently conducted its first successful sought to return Indonesia to revolution, but this time nuclear reaction, the Americans knew that the facility against the forces of colonialism, neocolonialism, and could not be used to build a nuclear weapon. In fact, the imperialism (known as NEOKLIM, Neo-Kolonialis, highly enriched uranium (HEU)-fueled reactor at Kolonialis, dan Imperialisme) that he believed were be- Bandung was suitable only for research and training and, ing sustained by the Western powers in Southeast Asia.22 for two reasons, was not a viable source for fissile mate- Sukarno’s revolutionary fervor pervaded his view of al- rial (either plutonium-239 [Pu-239] or HEU) for a nuclear most all of the important developments within Indone- explosion.30 First, the reactor was not capable of irradi- sia, including the atom.