Appendix 1: Chronology of German- focused Events, 1939–1941 ‘FH’ in the following text refers to the diary entries of General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff, Army High Command (OKH), from August 1938 to September 1942, responsible for directing a force in June 1941 of 5 million officers and men. It is striking that as British anxiety about Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Britain, grew in September, German commanders including Halder were increasingly focusing on planning for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia (from Halder, [1962–4] (1988), The Halder War Diary 1939–1942, pp. 155–310). ‘AB’ in the following entries (italicised) refers to Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Commander-in-Chief British Home Forces, from 19 July 1940, and Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) from December 1941. It is evident that despite a range of intelligence suggesting Operation Sea Lion was winding down, Alanbrooke remained anxious about the threat into 1941 (from Alanbrooke, 2002, War Diaries 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, pp. 90–132). 23 August 1939 The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed. 1 September Hitler invaded Poland. 17 September Stalin invaded Poland. 15 October German naval study set out the argument for an economic war against Britain, principally by sea blockade and siege; this was formalised in Hitler’s War Directive No. 9. 15 November Admiral Raeder directed his staff to examine the prospects for an invasion of Britain, this being the earliest recorded date of consideration given to the issue. 1 December General Jodl, Chief of German Army Operations, asked for an Army response to the German Navy’s paper on the prospects for an invasion of Britain; Goering, head of the Luftwaffe, similarly directed that a staff officer respond to the Army paper, but also confirmed his doubts about the feasibility of a landing; the Navy and Army papers became linked as Studie Nordwest. 9 April 1940 Hitler invaded Norway and Denmark. 10 May Hitler launched his Blitzkrieg on France and the Low Countries. 21 May Private discussion between Hitler and Admiral Raeder about the prospects for an invasion of Britain at a ‘future time’, and the Army’s likely requirements for the transport of its landing divisions. 24 May Hitler’s subsequently disputed ‘Halt Order’ stopped his tanks from crushing the encircled British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk. 27 May Dunkirk evacuation began, air cover provided by home-based fighter squadrons including Spitfires; German naval review of 229 230 Appendix 1 Studie Nordwest, and a new Studie England undertaken that consid- ered the question of invasion, the latter influenced by the former assessment in terms of feasibility – command of the air over inva- sion beaches identified as essential at this early stage. 2 June During a visit to Army Group A HQ, Hitler told Field-Marshal von Rundstedt of his interest in attacking Russia now that Britain might be ready for peace. 3 June British completion of Dunkirk evacuation. 4 June Small exploratory Luftwaffe raids tested the RAF defences. 15 June [FH] A Fuehrer directive confirmed plans to reduce army ground forces to 120 divisions as their role has been fulfilled with the fall of France: army and navy continuing the war. 18 June Growing Luftwaffe attacks against Britain. [FH] Noted that in the event of a Soviet counter-attack during the German invasion, everything should be used to blunt this. 22 June France signed the Armistice. German historian Karl Klee gives the period from the end of the fight- ing in France to 7 August, as the initial contact phase of the Battle of Britain, comprising Luftwaffe fighter sweeps against England. [FH] Conference with senior officers discussed army regrouping requirements including coastal defence, and a consideration as to whether Britain would carry on fighting. 25 June Albert Speer noted on this date that Hitler was talking about his plans for an attack on Russia. 26 June Transfer of the 18th Army ordered, to reinforce the defences to the east, most of its 15 divisions in place by the end of July. In tandem with this instruction Halder also discussed with 18th Army’s com- mander, and its Chief-of-Staff, Major-General Marcks, ‘Deployment Instructions for Eighteenth Army’. In substance this represented the first plan for a Soviet invasion (which in fact therefore existed before 26 June 1940). 30 June First evidence of official OKH thinking on the prospects for inva- sion of Britain; Jodl discussed the issues with Hitler. [FH] Hitler reported as noting in his conference that Britain needed one final blow before she gave in, so that German attention could shift to the east. 1 July [FH] Conference with Schniewind, Naval Operations Staff, about basis of warfare against England identified air superiority, smooth water, fog from mid-October, jump-off bases, and transport for 100,000 men in one wave, Luftwaffe as airborne artillery and beach defences as key considerations. Von Leeb, Ordnance Office noted that ‘[H]e was told all along that invasion of England was not being considered’. 2 July [AB] Very anxious about an invasion threat and lack of British preparedness. Appendix 1 231 3 July French Fleet disabled by the Royal Navy at Mers-El-Kebir, Oran; German Army conference headed by Halder discussed details for a possible invasion of Britain; also on this date, Halder issued instructions to the OKH Chief of Operations to consider opera- tional issues arising from an invasion of Russia. [FH] Britain and the east are the focus now he notes. Discussion with General Von Greiffenberg-Buhle about operations against England: weather and air superiority the key factors. 4 July [FH] Discussion with General Stapf about air plans for the destruc- tion of the RAF and its supporting installations, with a secondary objective the enemy fleet; discussion considers RAF’s effective early- warning system, and the Luftwaffe’s current strength and tactics. 5 July [FH] Under the heading ‘England’, five points considered with Stapf and Buhle including locations for seaborne and airborne landing jump-off points, airborne unit availability and nature, getting armour across the Channel, and amphibious tanks. 11 July [FH] Discussion with Stapf considered ‘Invasion of England’ including airborne troops, transport planes, cargo gliders, and that the British bomber force has parity with the Luftwaffe. The RAF policy of moving bombers to and from dispersal areas makes it hard to destroy them he records. Fourteen to twenty-eight days needed to smash the RAF. Discussion with Von Greiffenberg-Buhle focused on map-planning for the invasion of Britain, and German force dispositions. 12 July Jodl completed his Löwe study for OKW concerning the invasion plan for Britain; this substantially informed the content of Hitler’s War Directive No. 16. [AB] Notes that invasion was threatened to be on this day. 13 July Hitler sanctioned the Army plan for Sea Lion. [FH] Report to Fuehrer on invasion of Britain noted that a range of technical issues are considered: British army strength, disposition, tactics; German invasion planning and preparations; time sched- ules. [FH] Confirms that orders issued for invasion planning; and Hitler puzzled by Britain’s refusal to give in. [AB] No signs of an attack as yet. 16 July Hitler’s War Directive No. 16, the invasion of England, set out qual- ifying conditions with preparations to begin 15 August; German planning ongoing, but scepticism from the Navy and Luftwaffe. Oberst Josef ‘Beppo’ Schmid delivered his intelligence assess- ment of the RAF, seriously under-estimating Fighter Command’s capability. 19 July Hitler’s ‘appeal to reason’ speech made to the Reichstag, offering to reach a peaceful end to the war with Britain – quickly rejected by the BBC. [FH] ‘Directive No. 16 has come in.’ Remainder of entry enumerates eight points discussed in conference with ObdH concerning invasion plans. 232 Appendix 1 [Field Marshal Alanbrooke appointed C-in-C of British Home Forces.] 21 July At the Fuehrer conference a Russian invasion was discussed, with an initial assessment offered to Hitler on timescale, requisite divi- sions and objectives. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch (Commander- in-Chief of the Army) directed to begin planning for the Soviet invasion. 22 July OKH furnished Hitler with a preliminary survey on the prospects for invading Russia. [FH] Hitler had noted that Britain was relying upon American aid and Russian support in order to keep fight- ing. Conference discussion about the invasion of Britain notes Hitler’s view that a Channel crossing would be hazardous, and a last resort. The twenty-fifth of August noted as possible invasion date, depending on report from Raeder. Conference then turned to planning for Russian invasion. 26 July [FH] Meeting to review intelligence relating to a Russian opera- tion; then, meeting to discuss technical issues concerning invasion vessels, barges, means of propulsion, dealing with tides and horses. 28 July Hitler gave General Fromm orders for the reorganisation of the German armaments programme, the army to be increased to a total of 180 divisions by the following spring. [FH] Noted that Naval Operations Staff memo about landing points and crossing times had upset invasion planning, the previous plans wholly unworkable. 29 July Following the 21 July conference Halder consulted with OKH officers, and Marcks began a special staff study for the invasion of Russia. Jodl confirmed Hitler’s decision to invade Russia to mili- tary planners working under Colonel Warlimont – the planners were told that Sea Lion preparations were to continue, in addition to work on attacking Russia. [FH] Detailed invasion discussions following naval memo. 30 July [FH] Notes earliest invasion jump-off date is 20–6 September based on navy estimate; Luftwaffe is not focusing on operations to sup- port a landing; Royal Navy cannot be prevented from attacking invasion fleet; value of aircraft against naval craft is exaggerated; serious doubts noted about likelihood of launching invasion because of naval shortcomings.