HSBA sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 21 October 2012
My neighbour, my enemy Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei
outh Sudan has faced many Inter-tribal conflict in Jonglei state (UNMISS) received early warnings internal security challenges has escalated and grown increas- of an imminent Lou Nuer attack, but Ssince gaining independence in ingly violent since 2009. Attacks they were unable to take adequate July 2011, but one of the deadliest and are ethnically driven and aim not preventive measures. most complex has been inter-tribal vio- only to loot cattle, but also to kill The current SPLA-led civilian dis- lence, mainly involving the Lou Nuer, and abduct women and children armament campaign, which has Murle, and Dinka in Jonglei state. and destroy homes and communal yielded more than 11,000 weapons, Conflict between neighbouring tribes facilities. has helped prevent further large- escalated in 2009 and has become The Lou Nuer attacks in Pibor scale attacks but does not address increasingly violent. county in December 2011 and the root causes of the conflict. Tribal conflict in Jonglei is not a new January 2012 were the deadliest Soldiers conducting the campaign phenomenon, but a series of attacks inter-tribal clashes since a 1991 have committed rapes, torture, and and counterattacks in 2009, primarily Nuer attack on the state capital, killings—mostly against Murle between the Lou Nuer and the Murle, Bor. The size of the attacking Lou communities—deepening Murle has drawn the attention of the inter- Nuer force, numbering up to 8,000 distrust of the SPLA. national community. Underlying causes fighters, was unprecedented. David Yau Yau’s rebellion in Pibor include persistent lack of services, The emergence of rebel militias in county, which re-emerged in mid- increased competition over natural Jonglei state in 2010, notably the 2012, has capitalized on disaffection resources, and the erosion of traditional groups led by George Athor and among Murle communities. leadership structures and the unspoken David Yau Yau, has provided a rules of cattle raiding. Local- and steady supply of small arms and national-level politicians have manip- ammunition to tribal groups. A Inter-tribal violence in ulated the conflict for personal and significant number of the weapons Jonglei political gain, while Jonglei-based supplied originate from Sudan militia groups have provided weapons Armed Forces (SAF) stocks, though Violence trends 2009–11 to tribal fighters to further their own the Sudan People’s Liberation Army In 2009, South Sudan experienced its agendas. The Government of South (SPLA) has, both systematically and worst internal violence since the Sudan’s (GoSS) efforts to address this on an individual basis, supplied Comprehensive Peace Agreement complex of factors will be an important arms and ammunition to Jonglei (CPA) was signed in 2005, when some test of its ability to provide meaning- communities. 2,500 people were killed, and more than ful public security and to govern a The economic and political mar- 350,000 were displaced by inter-tribal diverse population. ginalization of the Lou Nuer and conflict. Almost half of those displaced This Issue Brief reviews the root Murle, the erosion of traditional or killed were from Jonglei state.1 causes and impacts of inter-tribal leadership, increased competition The most intense conflicts occurred violence in Jonglei between the Lou over land and resources, and politi- between the Lou Nuer and Dinka, the Nuer and Murle since 2009, with a cal exploitation have exacerbated Lou Nuer and Murle, and Lou Nuer special focus on attacks by the Lou traditional inter-tribal rivalries. The and Jikany Nuer.2 The period was Nuer throughout Pibor county in Murle are particularly marginalized, marked by an increase in the intensity December 2011 and January 2012. It both politically and socially. and frequency of attacks and a shift in assesses efforts by policymakers, In late November and early Decem- targeting tactics. Whereas raiders once church leaders, and others to address ber 2011, the GoSS and the United focused solely on capturing cattle, the problem. Key findings include: Nations Mission in South Sudan attacks became ethnically driven: in
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 Map. Jonglei state, South Sudan International z Tonga l Gha al Malakal boundary r a New Fangak ah B Juaibor U P P E R N I L E State boundary Bentiu Atar County boundary Old Fangak Canal State capital Fangak (Khor Fulus) Main roads
Nyirol 50km UNITY Nyirol Mogok
Waat Adok Ayod Mwot Tot Walgak Wanding S Pieri h
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a l Akobo
Akobo Ako ETHIOPIA Duk Fadiat J bo ong Uror A We ta n r z Duk l P ei C
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o a r nal JONGLEI m B aa Pochala ah Kongor an (W r N Ajwara h a it l J e e N be Likuangole ile l Twic East ) Pochalla Rumbek Pibor LAKES Bor South Gumuruk Bilait Churi K e Padak/Baidit n g e SOUTSOUTHH SSUDAN U D A N n a ll Bor ti Pibor Lo Boma
WESTERN EQUATORIA CENTRAL EQUATORIA EASTERN EQUATORIA
addition to looting cattle, attackers the Murle attacked the town of Pieri, in Lou Nuer attacks, December 2011– began targeting entire villages, killing Uror county, killing at least 750 people, January 2012 not only men of fighting age but also injuring almost 1,000, abducting dozens women, children, and the elderly, and of women and children, and, according By early December, large numbers of destroying their homes. Attackers also to local witnesses, looting 38,000 cattle.7 Lou Nuer youths were mobilizing across began targeting state and international The Murle mobilized hundreds of northern Jonglei, while press releases NGO facilities such as schools and fighters for this attack,8 a departure from a small segment of the Lou Nuer medical clinics. A Lou Nuer attack on from their usual reliance on 25–30 diaspora began flooding the Internet, 10 Likuangole between 5 and 8 March 2009, people. The fighters were armed with threatening the Murle. Youths from in which around 450 mainly women new Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles Akobo, Nyirol, and Uror counties and children were killed, is regarded as and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), gathered in Pulbura, a village near the start of the current era of violence.3 many believed to have been supplied Pieri, where Dak Kueth, an influential In 2010, inter-tribal violence sub- by Yau Yau (see Box 1).9 Lou Nuer spiritual leader, blessed sided, returning to customary levels of In response to the August raid, the them.11 Some reports said the fighters cattle raiding due in part to compara- Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), were part of a reconstituted ‘white tively high food production. But, at with President Salva Kiir’s blessing, army’,12 but most locals in Lou Nuer © MAPgra x 2012 the same time, the emergence of rebel began talks to end the conflict and areas referred to the fighters as Bunam movements in the greater Upper Nile negotiate the return of abductees and (‘youths’ in Nuer)13. At least half the region brought vast numbers of weap- cattle from both communities. Neither fighters were armed with Kalashnikov- ons to Jonglei, often from Sudan.4 side committed wholeheartedly to pattern assault rifles while the rest A new cycle of violence began in Feb- the process. During the last months of carried machetes and sticks. A few ruary 2011, when the Murle attacked 2011, Lou Nuer youths were accumu- youths carried RPGs and PKM machine Thiam payam,5 killing three Lou Nuer lating small arms and ammunition guns. Observers said many of the attack- chiefs. In retaliation, the Lou Nuer and organizing across various payams ers wore an assortment of South Sudan attacked villages throughout Pibor in preparation for a large-scale attack. military and security uniforms.14 county in April, and then again in June, Fighting ultimately resumed in late On 23 December, eight columns of killing about 600 people.6 On 18 August, December 2011. up to 8,000 Lou Nuer were spotted by
2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 21 October 2012 Table 1 Major clashes between Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei, 2009–12
Date Attacking tribe Location of attack15 Deaths (approximate) Cattle stolen (approximate)16
January 2009 Murle Akobo county 300 (Lou Nuer) Unknown
5–8 March 2009 Lou Nuer Likuangole, Pibor county 450 (Murle) 600
18 April 2009 Murle Akobo county 250 (Lou Nuer) Unknown
6 February 2011 Murle Uror county 817 (Lou Nuer) 1,000
18–24 April 2011 Lou Nuer Likuangole, Pibor county 200 (Murle) (138,000)
15–24 June 2011 Lou Nuer Gumuruk and Likuangole, 400 (Murle) (398,000) Pibor county
18 August 2011 Murle Pieri, Uror county 750 (Lou Nuer) 38,000
23 December 2011– Lou Nuer Likuangole and Pibor, 1,000 (Murle) 100,000 9 January 2012 Pibor county
27 December– Murle Akobo, Nyirol, and 276 (Lou Nuer and Bor 60,000 4 February 201218 Uror counties Dinka)19
2 March 2012 Murle Nyirol county 15 (Lou Nuer) 15,00020
9–11 March 2012 Murle Ethiopia 225 (Lou Nuer) 20,000 (near Wanding payam)21
Sources: UN and media reports; interviews with UNMISS; interviews with national, state, and payam officials.
UN aerial surveillance marching along and children,27 making this incident the facilities. In Likuangole, the Lou Nuer the Nanaam river, about 30 km north of deadliest inter-tribal attack since the burned down some 90 tukuls, and ran- Likuangole in Pibor county.22 UNMISS Nuer attack on Bor in 1991 in which sacked and burned a municipal build- sent reinforcements in late December, more than 2,000 people were killed.28 ing, school, and a farmers’ association and flew GoSS Vice President Riek Research conducted for this Issue Brief office. In Pibor, UNMISS troops and the Machar to Pibor and Likuangole on indicated that hundreds of people SPLA successfully limited the destruc- 28 and 29 December to urge the armed were injured in Pibor, dozens of women tion to the edges of town by position- youths to turn back. They refused, and children were abducted, more than ing themselves in trenches. However, and continued to move through Pibor 100,000 people were displaced, and up the attackers looted the Anglican church county, attacking more than 21 Murle to 100,000 cattle were stolen.29 and burned a Médecins Sans Frontières settlements through the first week of The attackers also razed entire (MSF) clinic, which were situated just January.23 Afterwards, the Lou Nuer villages and looted and vandalized beyond the perimeter of the town.30 returned along the Nanaam river to Akobo county, where the stolen cattle were distributed among county leaders.24 Immediately following the Lou Nuer’s departure from the area, the Pibor County Commissioner, Joshua Konyi, compiled a list of 3,141 killed.25 After initial UNMISS reports suggested no more than 100 had died, Hilde Johnson, UN special representative to the secretary-general, ordered a sepa- rate body count. UN monitors estab- lished 623 deaths this way26 but were unable to reach all of the affected areas and arrived in some areas days or weeks after the events. Based on the separate investigations, a conservative estimate would put the number of deaths at around 1,000 mostly Murle women Murle school vandalized by Lou Nuer fighters, Likuangole, Pibor county, December 2011. © Judith McCallum
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 3 Box 1 Sources of small arms and ammunition
Pre-2010 civilians fled from the town and all NGOs, including MSF, evacuated.39 The During the second civil war (1983–2005), weapons flowed into Jonglei in large SPLA alleges that Khartoum has, on more than one occasion, delivered weap- numbers to both northern-backed militias—most notably Ismail Konyi’s Murle ons by air to Yau Yau’s forces on the ground.40 On 22 September, UNMISS said it militia in Pibor—and various SPLA breakaway factions, including the Lou Nuer spotted an undocumented fixed wing aircraft dropping seven to eight packages white army. By 2012, many of these weapons had moved beyond Jonglei or had a few kilometres from its base in Likuangole.41 Since Yau Yau and his forces been collected during civilian disarmament programmes. However, following travelled to Jonglei on foot during the rainy season, their only option for resupply uncoordinated and incomplete civilian disarmament exercises in 2005 and is by air. 2006, communities were able to rearm by looting stocks of collected weapons SPLA/GoSS in Jonglei as well as armouries in neighbouring Upper Nile state that housed The SPLA is a constant, yet less significant, source of arms and ammunition. In Joint Integrated Unit weapons.31 2010 and 2011, the SPLA under the command of the Jonglei state governor, Koul Southern rebel militia Manyang, supplied arms and ammunition to local youths, both systematically The emergence of Jonglei-based militias in May 2010 brought a new influx of and on an ad hoc basis with individual soldiers supporting fellow tribesmen. At weapons into the state. Athor and Yau Yau, both defeated in state-wide elec- the height of Yau Yau’s rebellion, the SPLA—with the endorsement of the local tions, formed separate yet cooperative rebel forces in Ayod, Fangak, and Piji government—formed a paramilitary force called the ‘SPLA Youth’, comprising counties (Athor) and Pibor county (Yau Yau). With backing from Khartoum and, untrained Murle youths, to counter Yau Yau. At the same time, the SPLA was according to some accounts, Eritrea, Athor built up an arsenal that exceeded able to successfully defend itself against Athor’s militia with support from local his available manpower.32 He not only acted as a conduit for arms deliveries to Nuer youths, whom it armed.42 Yau Yau, he persuaded local Nuer youths to join his force in exchange for weap- There are also reports, from Lou Nuer areas, of SPLA soldiers exchanging ons. However, this strategy often backfired. In May 2011, he armed more than ammunition for food or liquor at markets.43 Lou Nuer youths can easily purchase 1,000 youths with 1,500 Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles, 27 PKM-type machine ammunition from shopkeepers in the market. Some of the ammunition used by guns, and about 90,000 rounds of ammunition. The youths ultimately did not the Lou Nuer in attacks against the Murle in Pibor matches a variety used often follow Athor’s orders to attack the SPLA in their native counties, but used their by the SPLA—suggesting either a link in supply or a common source.44 Sources new weapons to attack the Murle in June and July 2011.33 say individual SPLA soldiers stationed in Boma have been seen selling ammuni- Athor continued to supply Lou Nuer youths with weapons but they had to tion to Murle civilians.45 pay with valuable cattle.34 Photographs of the Lou Nuer after the Murle attack Local traders on Pieri in August 2011 showed they had the same new Type 56-1 (copy of the Many communities throughout Jonglei rely on local traders for weapons. Traders AKS-47) assault rifles and PKM-type machine guns that the Small Arms Survey ferry small arms and ammunition from other states within South Sudan as well observed in Athor’s stocks in April 2011. Images of Lou Nuer youths returning to as its neighbours, most notably Ethiopia, across Jonglei’s borders to town centres. Akobo, after their attack on Pibor county in December and January, showed the According to local chiefs in Pibor, these weapons and ammunition are usually same new rifles (see photos). The headstamps on some of the ammunition fired paid for in cash.46 by the Lou Nuer in Likuangole matched those previously identified by the Small On 5 September 2012, members of South Sudan’s Criminal Investigation Arms Survey in Athor’s stocks. Department, who were working with police, clashed with arms smugglers on the Yau Yau’s role in supplying tribal groups is less well understood. Some claim road from Juba to Bor. The police captured several assault rifles and hundreds of he armed some of the Murle fighters who attacked Uror county in August 2011,35 rounds of ammunition. The operation was based on information that arms dealers but the Small Arms Survey has been unable to independently verify this. Since were routinely transporting arms and ammunition from Juba into Jonglei.47 Athor’s death in late December 2011, and Yau Yau’s defection to the SPLA in April 2011,36 it is unclear whether—and from where—additional small arms and Prices of arms and ammunition ammunition may be arriving. Whatever the source, small arms and ammunition are inexpensive and easy to Yau Yau once again took up arms against the Juba government in April buy or barter for in Jonglei. In Lou Nuer areas, an old Kalashnikov-pattern assault 2012 with an estimated 3,000 fighters.37 Yau Yau has exploited Murle contempt rifle costs two or three cows, and a new one goes for three or four cows. PKM- for the SPLA’s civilian disarmament practices in Pibor county (see below). type machine guns cost 10 cows. Ammunition typically sells for 3–5 South Suda- Since 22 August 2012, his forces have struck SPLA installations several times nese Pounds (SSP) per cartridge, the equivalent of about USD 0.75–1.00. One cow in Likuangole payam, Gumuruk, and the surrounding area of Pibor, killing at can be worth 200–500 rounds, depending on the size of the cow.48 In Murle areas least 100 soldiers.38 Yau Yau’s threat has forced communities to flee. After a prices are similar. A Kalashnikov goes for SSP 2,000–3,000, or three to four cows, September warning from Yau Yau that an attack on Pibor town was imminent, and usually comes with a fully loaded magazine.49
Lou Nuer fighters carrying new Chinese manufactured Type 56-1 assault rifles in Pieri following the Murle attack in August 2011. George Athor is believed to have A Lou Nuer youth carrying an identical rifle in Akobo following the attacks in Pibor supplied these rifles. county in January 2012.
4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 21 October 2012 The Lou Nuer force was the largest centuries, but it is only within the last political brinkmanship are also drivers documented in the post-CPA period. few decades that raiding has become of conflict. This section reviews some The delay between the Murle attack more lethal. Traditionally, rustling was of the most significant underlying on Pieri in August and the retaliation aimed solely at the theft of cattle, but causes of Murle–Lou Nuer conflict. in December enabled the Lou Nuer to today it often involves direct assaults assemble strong leaders and to recruit on cattle-owning communities. Bride price thousands of youths who had returned The increasing role of firearms in home for the Christmas holiday.50 the recent violence is an important After the civil war, young and middle- The level of violence also exceeded factor in the escalation, as well as the aged men returned to their villages customary norms for inter-tribal fight- dynamics of tribal power relations.54 with no work prospects. Still bearing ing. UN observers noted that some The power associated with owning their guns, men turned their attention victims who had been shot and and using firearms has undermined to the already established rivalries with killed had also been severely beaten the influence elders and chiefs once neighbouring tribes. During the war, and in some cases raped.51 Although exercised over youths. With the ero- military success generated pride and this level of brutality existed during sion of traditional leadership, viable social stature, but once the peace agree- the civil war, cattle raids between conflict mitigation mechanisms, tradi- ment was signed in 2005, men looked tribes tended to focus on stealing live- tionally managed by community elders, to increase their herds and marry. stock, killing herders, and abducting have also dwindled. Increased profit- By 2008, men made up more than women and children. It is not clear eering from the sale of livestock and half the population in Jonglei.55 The exactly what caused the increased brutality. But residual anger over the Box 2 How the Murle and Lou Nuer attack: different tactics, similar results killing of three Lou Nuer chiefs, mounting frustration and deprivation Due to many socio-cultural factors, the Lou Nuer and Murle employ drastically different cattle raiding tactics. among communities, and aggressive The Lou Nuer youths are larger, more powerful, and better organized than the Murle, but the Murle have their own unique and equally effective strategies. anti-Murle rhetoric on the part of the diaspora and government officials, Murle fuelled the flames. Murle society does not have a formal hierarchical leadership structure, but is broken up into generational Before the Lou Nuer attackers got age-sets. Males join an age-set in their late teens when they are single, and stay within that age-set for life. As they build a family and acquire livestock, their roles within the age-set change. A new age-set home in mid-January, Murle youths forms about once every 10 years, and will rise and fall in prominence depending on its strength and raiding from the Nanaam and Likuangole abilities. Cattle raids are usually conducted by a specific age-set from a particular payam or village.56 Two areas began daily retaliatory raids age-sets from the Nanaam and Likuangole areas are currently conducting most of the raids: the ruling against Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka age-set is the Bototnya, made up of young men in their prime (aged 20–30); the Titi is composed of men 57 communities from 27 December until aged 30–40 years. The Murle are known for their exceptional fighting skills, resilience in harsh conditions, and ability to 4 February. There were 44 incidents in loot large numbers of cattle with only a few men. Murle typically travel in small numbers, making them which 276 people were killed and at difficult to detect. The delineation of age-sets, comprising various leaders across locations, makes small- least 60,000 cattle stolen.52 Two months scale raiding possible. Once they reach their target, they strike quickly. Murle youths attack in small, single- after the Lou Nuer attacks, the Murle file mobile units, and often use hit-and-run, guerrilla-style techniques.58 Traditionally, red chiefs—clan leaders carried out their largest attack between who can connect with spirits—governed cattle raiding. Today, Murle youths will seek blessings from the 9 and 11 March. Fighters crossed into nearest red chief, who will then often take a portion of the looted cattle. If there is no red chief in the area, the youths will proceed without a blessing.59 Ethiopia to attack Lou Nuer cattle herders who had migrated just north Lou Nuer of Wanding payam. At least 225 people The Lou Nuer hierarchy traditionally centred on a spiritual leader or prophet. The first and most powerful Nuer prophet was Ngundeng Bong (c. 1845–1906). Contemporary spiritual and military Nuer leaders have all were killed, and 100 injured.53 Box 2 claimed to be affiliated directly or indirectly with Ngundeng, hoping to benefit from his legendary charisma describes the differing tactics of the Murle and power. A powerful and controversial spiritual leader named Dak Kueth60 is believed to have partly and Lou Nuer in conducting attacks. instigated the Lou Nuer attack on Pibor in December 2011.61 But while Dak Kueth may have encouraged the Lou Nuer to attack the Murle, he is not their leader, and he has become less influential since the SPLA began hunting him. Today, the youths’ leadership structure exists independently from any one spiritual Root causes of inter tribal leader. Lou Nuer leadership is organized first by county and then by patrilineal chiefs, sub-chiefs, and - headmen at the payam level.62 conflict in Jonglei state Unlike the Murle, the Lou Nuer’s command structure is well defined and headed by a leader and a deputy from each of the three counties—Akobo, Nyirol, and Uror—selected by residents. From among those Jonglei has been the site of tribal con- six, a paramount leader is chosen to lead all three counties.63 Bor Doang Leeh of Uror county was elected flict since the civil war and earlier. leader in August 2011 and he supervised the Lou Nuer attacks in December 2011 and January 2012. Tribes clash over territorial control and The Lou Nuer rarely attack their neighbours, but they will attack in large numbers in a highly organized access to grazing lands for cattle—the fashion once they have decided to retaliate. Before the December attacks, commanders from each county primary source of wealth and the mobilized youths from their respective areas and assembled in Pulbura and south of Akobo before marching 64 dowry for marriages among pastoral towards Pibor. The force walked in eight columns, separated by two hours’ walking distance. The attack- ers purchased nine Thuraya satellite phones.65 At times during the attack, columns broke up into different communities in South Sudan. The areas to maximize coverage. practice of cattle raiding dates back
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 5 tradition of polygamy, under which to trade. After the Lou Nuer attack on Nevertheless, the Murle represent a men are permitted to have multiple Pibor, for instance, thousands of stolen significant proportion of the state pop- wives, and the scarcity of marriage- cattle were distributed to families across ulation. Unlike the Dinka and Nuer, able women pushed up bride prices, three counties, but a large number were who are well represented in state and paid in heads of cattle. In the past men also sold to traders in Ethiopia, or in national government, the Murle fill very married in their 20s and 30s and would some cases were traded for weapons few seats. Only one Murle, Ismail Konyi, typically have three or four wives. Today, and ammunition.71 holds a senior government position. in conjunction with an increased rate of Almost all Jonglei communities cattle theft, men are marrying younger Marginalization portray themselves as victims, citing and taking more wives.66 continuous threats from neighbouring Infrastructure in Jonglei is under tribes. But, with better access to com- developed, even by South Sudan’s munication networks, political office, Competition over resources and standards. The lack of roads makes and education, the Dinka and Nuer commerce and travel difficult and economic interests are better able to express their version costly, and means services are poor in of this narrative than the Murle, who Competition over grazing lands has the most isolated areas.72 Outside of have little access to technology and been a part of inter-tribal relations for the Dinka-dominated state capital, Bor, social networks. It is not uncommon decades. Traditionally, tribes knew there are few schools, and none beyond to hear non-Murle South Sudanese precisely when and where they would primary level. Health services are also speak in negative terms about the Murle. encounter neighbouring tribes when scarce, and in many cases are limited For example, some high-ranking, Pibor- migrating with their livestock, and had to clinics run by NGOs such as MSF based SPLA officials said the conflict developed mechanisms to mitigate and the International Medical Corps. was solely the fault of the Murle, whom conflict over shared resources such The Lou Nuer and Murle are almost they described as a ‘backward, cattle- as water and pastureland. Over time, never involved in official state and local raiding people’ with no desire to work.76 however, climate change reduced the affairs beyond payam-level adminis- Murle are rarely seen in Jonglei’s number of accessible water points and trators and commissioners. They do capital, Bor, for fear of being beaten or other vital resources, forcing pastoral- not interact with the members of par- killed. In 2007, four Murle were shot ist communities to travel further into liament (MPs) representing their areas. dead in the MSF hospital while awaiting neighbouring tribal areas for suste- MPs, who have access to constituency treatment. On the same day, three other nance.67 Jonglei state is no exception development funds, rarely interact with Murle were killed in Bor.77 Neither to this phenomenon. There is also a the two communities. Despite high-level incident was ever investigated. In May reported trend in inequality of cattle representation in the national govern- 2012, three Murle were killed on the holdings among tribes, which has led ment, Lou Nuer youths express the outskirts of Bor while they were trav- to the further degradation of particu- same frustrations as their Murle counter- elling with a delegation to attend the lar pasturelands due to overgrazing.68 parts—that government is inaccessible President’s Peace Conference. The The GoSS Land Committee could play and does not address their basic needs.73 Dinka Bor, the majority of the town’s a role in addressing conflict over land Moreover, adequate state security is population, say the Murle’s actions and resources but remains underfunded lacking throughout most of the state. have made them unwelcome. Dinka and understaffed to date. The South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and Nuer communities still resent the The agro-pastoralist economy in does not have enough personnel to Murle because during the civil war the South Sudan is primarily cattle-based. defend against armed youths. It also Murle community divided its support In 2009, the Food and Agricultural has no capacity to enforce the rule of between the SPLA and Khartoum.78 Association estimated that South Sudan law and cannot—and to some extent Although recent inter-tribal violence had at least 11.7 million cattle worth simply will not—arrest perpetrators. in Jonglei has mainly involved the Lou about USD 2.4 billion.69 Although this As a result, youths can arm themselves Nuer and Murle communities, many figure has not been disaggregated by and attack with impunity. believe the Dinka Bor have played an state, experts estimate that Jonglei is Of the three dominant tribes in indirect role.79 The Murle, in particu- home to some 1.5 million cattle.70 Since Jonglei state, the Murle are the most lar, believe the Dinka Bor community, the end of the civil war, businessmen politically, economically, and socially which dominates the Jonglei govern- and politicians have increasingly prof- marginalized. While Bor South (pre- ment, has encouraged the violence ited from the sale and theft of cattle, dominantly Dinka) and Uror (pre- between the Lou Nuer and Murle for and sometimes instigate cattle raids dominantly Nuer) counties had 221,106 its own geographical and political gain.80 between communities. Youths are and 178,519 inhabitants respectively This claim is difficult to verify, but the hired not only to look after the family according to the 2008 census, Pibor perception is an important element in herd, but also to care for the stocks of county (predominantly Murle) has a Murle–Lou Nuer–Dinka relations. wealthy elites, who are based in large total population of 148,475.74 However, towns or outside the country. Whereas international experts and Murle officials families have an interest in increasing present during the census say that a Abduction of women and children herd size to cover bride prices for male number of areas within Pibor county Child abduction is prevalent through- youths, businessmen use their herds were ignored during the count.75 out South Sudan, yet most non-Murle
6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 21 October 2012 South Sudanese describe it as a ‘Murle gate raids to enlarge their stocks, but Some observers said the SCC had failed problem’.81 There is, however, no evi- it is conceivable that they would sup- while others argued the Lou Nuer dence to suggest that abduction is port retaliatory attacks if rival tribes always intended to retaliate if their more prevalent among the Murle. In stole their cattle.87 demands were not met.92 fact, the origins of child abduction The government’s response to the date back centuries to when the Dinka December 2011 attack on Pibor largely would sell children born out of wedlock Responses usurped the SCC’s leadership, and the to the Murle. Murle have willingly Sudan Council of Churches council has since taken a back seat. In continued to raise additional children January 2012, the SCC unveiled a ‘Peace due to their comparatively small pop- The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) from the Roots’ campaign that Catholic ulation and low fertility rates, blamed has played a significant role in conflict Relief Services (CRS) is implementing on a syphilis epidemic in the 1950s resolution in South Sudan since the throughout Jonglei. The aim is to net- and 1960s. The World Health Organi- coalition of Christian denominations work communities at the village level zation eventually helped subdue the was established in 1965. Following the to create an early warning and media- syphilis outbreak,82 and health experts attacks in 2011, culminating with the tion mechanism to prevent conflict. As say fertility rates among Murle women Murle assault on Pieri in August, local of September, the SCC had lost much are normal.83 But many South Sudanese and national leaders called on the support, but if strengthened through still believe the Murle to be sterile, and government to initiate a peace process. partnerships like the one with CRS, the primary perpetrators of abductions. However, both communities rejected a it could be a viable broker for peace For their part, the Murle say the government-led negotiation and said once again. Dinka routinely sell their children to they would only accept the SCC, which they viewed as an impartial mediator.88 the Murle for cattle, then demand the Initial SPLA response return of the children, claiming they At the end of August 2011, the were abducted.84 As violence has inten- SCC formed a mediation committee Although the GoSS and SPLA had sified, abduction has expanded to under the leadership of Anglican advance knowledge of an imminent include women. Abduction of children Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul Yak, a Lou Nuer strike in December, and and women by both the Murle and Lou Dinka Twic.89 Both communities, but received repeated warnings from Nuer has become so common that one in particular the Murle, felt Archbishop UNMISS, the government did little to cannot isolate a single perpetrating Deng’s appointment was political and protect communities in Pibor county. tribe. It is an extremely emotive issue that he was biased in favour of the The SPLA soldiers in Likuangole and for both communities, and is often a Dinka. Between August and December, Pibor, numbering about 400 and 550 catalyst for retaliatory raids. the SCC held consultations with all respectively, stayed in their barracks, communities to hear grievances and seemingly defenceless against the more design a framework for peace. The numerous Lou Nuer militia. The SPLA Politicization of the conflict Lou Nuer community set a deadline force in Pibor offered refuge to some As inter-tribal violence surged after of 1 December for action to prevent civilians but video footage from the 2009, and economic and socio-political further raids and for the return of their day of the attack shows the SPLA conditions remained poor, demands stolen cattle and women and children. watching as Lou Nuer burned and for political change grew. Before the They made it clear that, if the disputes looted homes just beyond the perimeter 2010 elections, politicians—at local, were not resolved by then, they would of their barracks.93 Further, the SPLA state, and national levels—capitalized respond violently.90 documented the defection of 11 Lou on tribal grievances by exploiting The process was blocked from the Nuer soldiers who fought in support tribal rivalries to gain votes. In some start because the Lou Nuer and Murle of their tribesmen.94 Likewise, during cases, local government officials have communities did not totally commit the Lou Nuer attack on Pibor county in either been complicit in, or turned a and could not agree where to hold a June 2011, the SPLA refused to inter- blind eye to, inter-tribal attacks.85 peace conference. The SCC proposed vene even when the Lou Nuer were During the Lou Nuer attack on the a neutral area, such as Juba or Rumbek, positioned only a few kilometres from Murle in December 2011, for instance, but the Lou Nuer insisted the confer- the SPLA’s barracks. As a result, ten- one of the Thuraya satellite phones used ence be held in Waat, centrally located sions and distrust began to run high by the Lou Nuer was traced back to an in Nuer territory.91 between the local Murle community Uror county administrative officer.86 When no agreement was reached and the Pibor-based SPLA, which the It is clear that local and national and the Lou Nuer’s December deadline Pibor county commissioner says is politicians have vested interests in the passed, their youths began to mobilize. three-quarters Lou Nuer and Dinka.95 cattle stocks raided by one tribe or The SCC called off a peace conference While the Lou Nuer youths another. Politicians still maintain a set for 12 December when they received advanced on Pibor, Jonglei Governor good portion of their wealth in cattle. reports of an imminent Lou Nuer attack. Kuol Manyang reshuffled the county The youths involved in raiding are At this point, the SCC, UNMISS, and commissioners, replacing all but two. often employed by politicians to look the GoSS were all communicating with The SPLA commander of Pibor, Joshua after and expand their herds. It is un- one another but did not have a mech- Konyi (a Murle), was relieved and certain to what extent politicians insti- anism for a synchronized response. appointed commissioner. Brigadier
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 7 Peter Ruei (a Jikany Nuer) was brought become coercive (forcible). But, accord- level peace committee to complement in to replace him as commander on ing to interviews with Jonglei officials the civilian disarmament programme 25 December. Some Murle believe and an SPLA commander, the campaign and to continue the consultative work Konyi was relieved of his duties for was forcible from the beginning.100 started under the SCC. The government fear he would have instructed his sol- The SPLA mobilized large numbers provided the committee—known as diers to repel the attackers. As commis- of soldiers and SSPS members from the Presidential Committee for Peace, sioner, however, he could not give inside and outside Jonglei to conduct a Reconciliation, and Tolerance in Jon- orders to the SPLA. He had to be evac- search-and-seize campaign. Following glei—with eight vehicles to reach all uated before the Lou Nuer reached the outbreak of conflict in Jonglei, the affected communities. Once again, Pibor town. the SPLA deployed more than 12,000 Archbishop Deng was appointed to It was not until 31 December, after soldiers there from the 2nd and 8th lead the process. Vice President Riek returning to Juba from holiday, that Divisions and from general head- Machar launched the committee with President Salva Kiir sent 3,400 SPLA quarters in Juba, and supplied 169 a three-day meeting on 2 April after infantry and 800 SSPS from Bor to vehicles.101 This mass mobilization a two-week tour of Jonglei, where he Pibor and Gumuruk.96 The response was unprecedented and allowed the met community leaders in 11 coun- ultimately came too late, and the SPLA to conduct disarmament in a ties.105 On 25 April, the committee president only authorized the SPLA much more coordinated way. Unlike began simultaneous, four-day ‘mini- to fire in self-defence. SPLA and previous exercises, which often dis- peace conferences’ in Bor, Ayod, UNMISS soldiers fired briefly on Lou armed only a single area at a time, the Pibor, and Waat.106 Between 1 and 5 Nuer attackers during an assault on SPLA began simultaneously disarm- May, representatives from all counties the SPLA barracks in Pibor, where ing all communities in Jonglei state. gathered in Bor for the ‘All Jonglei almost 100 Murle were taking refuge. As of September 2012, the SPLA Peace Conference’ to agree on a reso- In March, Kiir signed a presidential had collected more than 11,000 fire- lution and to adopt recommenda- order to establish the Investigation arms from throughout Jonglei, only a tions. Beginning with Pibor county Committee into the Jonglei State Crisis, small fraction of weapons circulating on 11 May, a group of six paramount but as of September no committee in the state.102 chiefs—one from each of Jonglei’s members had been sworn in.97 Of the roughly 11,000 weapons col- tribes—was tasked with visiting and lected, about 4,000 were seized from disseminating the resolution in all 11 counties. Civilian disarmament state security force depots in Bor because there was suspicion that SSPS The resolution outlines broad strat- Officially, the GoSS has prioritized the personnel were holding civilian-owned egies for reducing inter-communal problem of cattle raiding and inter-tribal firearms in their stores. The SPLA has violence, abduction, livestock theft, violence since the signing of the CPA, reportedly returned all the state-issued and disputes over common grazing but it has had almost no success in firearms to the security forces, but the areas, but it does not detail how these tackling the issue. In fact, the govern- seizures were a serious embarrassment measures might be put into practice. ment response on the ground is much to an already discredited police force.103 The resolution embraces the civilian the same as it was in 2006: when vio- Most of the remaining weapons that disarmament programme, and ‘appre- lence flares, the SPLA are sent in to were collected were not seized from ciates the positive role of the Sudan conduct ad hoc civilian disarmament potential attackers, who fled with People’s Liberation Army for the campaigns. In the best of cases, these their weapons, but rather from house- increased security and protection exercises create a buffer between epi- holds possessing arms for self-defence. and for its responsible conduct dur- sodes of violence. In the worst cases, Moreover, the weapons that continue ing the disarmament campaign’.107 they contribute to increased violence, to flow into Jonglei to Yau Yau’s forces Critics say this support will discourage both between tribes and between the have prompted Lou Nuer youths to the Murle community from support- SPLA and communities.98 Since 2005, begin arming to protect against newly ing and ultimately implementing the there have been at least five distinct armed Murle.104 As in years past, the resolution.108 civilian disarmament programmes in cycle of disarmament and rearmament The peace committee’s ability to Jonglei but they have yet to show any persists. In many areas, especially in engage politicians, local leaders, and durable effectiveness.99 Lou Nuer areas, the campaign has been communities in Jonglei may have After the Lou Nuer attacks through- carried out peacefully, with the SPLA helped avert further attacks, but like out Pibor county in December 2011 employing local chiefs and youth lead- the SCC process, the committee in- and January 2012, the government ers to collect firearms, but there have volved only elders and community threatened a renewed round of disarma- been numerous reports of violence, leaders, neglecting the youth who ment. On 12 March, the SPLA, with abuse, and theft by the SPLA in Murle are, in most cases, responsible for the minimal support from the SSPS, began communities (see Box 3). attacks. The committee’s blanket sup- a civilian disarmament campaign port for civilian disarmament also throughout the state called ‘Operation alienated many community members Restore Peace’. The army announced The Presidential Committee who fled the campaign’s violent and that the campaign would be voluntary After the violence in Pibor, President coercive tactics. Whether the process’s until 30 April, after which it would Kiir established a 23-member, high- efforts and resolutions trickle down to
8 Sudan Issue Brief Number 21 October 2012 127 Box 3 Civilian disarmament: a new source of conflict? Pibor, but due to a limited number of helicopters, UNMISS was only able Despite some improvements compared to previous SPLA campaigns, and a sizable reduction in inter-tribal to deploy about 50 per cent of its troops. raids and attacks during the operation, the most recent disarmament exercise has been marred by familiar UNMISS mobilized four platoons128 problems. As soon as the government announced its intention to disarm communities in Jonglei, Lou Nuer in Likuangole, four in Bor, two in and Murle youths fled into the bush and into Ethiopia to hide their weapons. On 26 March, Minister of Defence Gumuruk, three platoons and three Lt. Gen. Nhial Deng Nhial and SPLA Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. James Hoth Mai travelled to Addis Ababa to request assistance in securing the border against further flight.109 As of September, Ethiopian forces had armoured personnel carriers in Pibor, conducted small-scale operations to push armed youths back across the frontier, but nothing has been and one platoon north of Walgak, for done to return the youths to Jonglei. It was expected they might begin returning once the rains started, a total of around 500 soldiers.129 But by but as of September—well into Jonglei’s rainy season—Murle youths were still fleeing into the bush.110 the time they reached Pibor, most of the There have been widespread reports of abuse, theft, harassment and intimidation, and the killing, torture, inhabitants had fled from Likuangole and rape of Murle by soldiers and officers.111 The first incident to cause outcry throughout the Murle commu- and Pibor because UNMISS had told nity occurred in late March in the Muruwa Hills between Pibor and Boma when the SPLA shot and injured a prominent Murle chief. Many other incidents have been reported around the Ngantoroch camp in Pibor, where them that, even with its presence, it the disarmament troops are based.112 In June, about 500 auxiliary SSPS officers stationed just outside Pibor would not be able to protect them. were recalled to Bor for additional training. Members of this group reportedly carried out rapes, physical After the fighting, UNMISS airlifted assaults, and looting while stationed near Pibor, and in Likuangole as they were returning to Bor. Following out about 300 civilians, mostly from 113 these reports, the government withdrew all auxiliary police officers from the civilian disarmament programme. the town of Pibor.130 The SPLA has been accused of violations in other parts of Pibor county, both inside and outside major Since the last wave of violence, towns. An August Human Rights Watch report, based on research carried out in July, accused the SPLA of shooting, beating, raping, and torturing civilians.114 Amnesty International documented similar SPLA mis- UNMISS has supported the civilian conduct in a report the following month.115 The majority of the forces carrying out the disarmament are disarmament campaign, for example Dinka and Nuer, and there have been numerous reports of soldiers taking revenge on Murle civilians for the by transporting government officials Pieri attacks. Some Murle were asked, as they relinquished their weapons, whether they took part in that through Jonglei. It also set up Inte- attack. SPLA soldiers reportedly beat and torture children regularly to find out the locations of weapons. grated Monitoring Teams—consisting In some cases, they submerge their heads in water, strangle them, and burn them with wax. There have of representatives from various UN been widespread reports of girls as young as 13 and women as old as 60 being raped. In Likuangole, in particular, women have been systematically brought to SPLA barracks where they have been beaten and departments—to move between Lou raped.116 On 16 August, a citizen of Likuangole shot and killed an SPLA officer, sparking a retaliatory attack Nuer and Murle areas, and to assist the in which six civilians were killed. Jonglei authorities have linked the attack to Yau Yau’s rebellion, and have government with transport. However, launched counter-insurgency actions against suspected Yau Yau sympathizers in Likuangole.117 Further alleged residents in Jonglei say the teams only Yau Yau attacks in August and September have given the SPLA a justification for even more heavy-handed reach areas accessible by helicopter, interrogation tactics when dealing with suspected Yau Yau sympathizers. and do not stay on the ground for more From mid-March to 31 August 2012, MSF’s standard data reporting from clinics in Pibor, Likuangole, and 131 Gumuruk shows that MSF treated 96 patients with violent trauma or sexual violence injuries, all of whom than two hours. Between March and attributed their injuries to the disarmament campaign. More than half of these cases occurred in August September, UNMISS only commented alone. Three of the patients died as a result of their injuries. Among these patients were 17 survivors of publicly on the SPLA’s disarmament rape and eight victims of attempted rape. These figures only reflect the patients that came to MSF to seek tactics once, despite apparent human 118 treatment. UNMISS said on 24 August that between 15 and 20 August there was one killing, 27 allegations rights violations. It has declined to of torture, 12 rapes, six attempted rapes, and eight abductions.119 make its human rights monitoring Exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation, SPLA officers reportedly have stolen cattle and food aid that was delivered to communities after the December and January attacks.120 public. Likewise, UNMISS has failed At the outset of the disarmament campaign, the SPLA established five military courts—one in each of to carry out its mandate to protect its five sectors121—to hear cases of soldier misconduct, but only certain crimes—primarily rape—have been civilians in the face of widespread brought to court, and only dealt with cursorily.122 Although the SPLA sentenced 30 soldiers between March SPLA abuses, and has not sufficiently and August for failing to adhere to military rules, according to the SPLA’s commander for disarmament, taken up the matter with the SPLM or General Kuol Diem Kuol,123 the misconduct seems to be getting worse. In some instances, SPLA soldiers have beaten and detained civilians trying to bring violations to their attention. As a result, many Murle SPLA leadership in Juba. have stopped reporting soldier misconduct.124 UNMISS is developing an early In Lou Nuer areas, attitudes towards the disarmament campaign are more positive. The SPLA has warning mechanism, in partnership been credited with returning cattle and has provided escorts to farmers who were afraid to leave their with CRS, to respond more effectively villages to cultivate. The Murle, on the other hand, report that the SPLA have offered little or no protec- to early signs of conflict, but as of tion, and in some cases have stolen their farming tools. For many Murle, the principal enemy is no longer September nothing had been formal- the Lou Nuer but the SPLA.125 ized within the mission.132 the youths and their leaders remains UNMISS to be seen. Since June, the committee In early December 2011, UNMISS re- Conclusion has paid visits to Jonglei only on an ceived intelligence that the Lou Nuer Inter-tribal violence, in particular the ad hoc basis. In the meantime, the were mobilizing for what looked like conflict between the Lou Nuer and government has tasked the SCC with a large-scale attack. UNMISS deployed Murle in Jonglei, is one of South Sudan’s engaging local church groups to mon- one helicopter and one fixed wing plane most pressing internal security and itor communities and to form partner- to conduct daily reconnaissance flights governance challenges. Over the past ships with civil society and donors to over the area and follow the youths’ three years, the violence has escalated, bring services and development assist- movements. It also deployed addi- and interventions to date have not ance to Jonglei state.126 tional platoons to towns throughout reduced mutual animosity. The SPLA’s
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 9 initial response to the largest wave of disenfranchised youths, and road con- 12 The ‘white army’ was established in the Lou Nuer violence in late 2011 and struction initiatives are needed to open early 1990s when the Nasir-based faction of the SPLA, led by Riek Machar, split early 2012 may have prevented further remote areas to traders, services, and from the Torit-based mainstream SPLA, escalation, but the tribes remain bitter security providers. The government’s led by John Garang. It functioned as a enemies, and the Murle, in particular, Land Committee is a promising initia- local force to protect communities and have grown more resentful of the army tive but needs support to design innova- their herds, but often attacked Garang’s SPLA. At various times it received arms and government. As of late September tive strategies for managing communal from both SAF and the SPLA. See Young 2012, conflict resolution initiatives areas and increasing access to water (2007). appear to have largely stalled. through catchment systems and other 13 Interview with Jonglei expert with close The army’s longer-term strategy projects. The international community ties to the Lou Nuer and Murle, Nairobi, 7 April 2012. continues to focus on forcible civilian can only achieve this with a better 14 Interview with UN and NGO representa- disarmament, which has formed the understanding of the cattle economy, tives and civilians, Juba, Bor, and Pibor, backbone of its response to tribal vio- the powerbrokers in Juba and Bor, and February–March 2012. 15 Locations are approximate. In all cases, lence in Jonglei and elsewhere since the politics surrounding land distri- attackers entered towns and moved 2006. The SPLA’s extreme tactics aside, bution and sale. through the environs. previous experience has shown that Incentivizing peace is a long-term 16 Figures in parentheses were obtained from communities are reluctant to relinquish project that requires many elements— a single source; all others reflect informa- tion from at least two—and often three— their weapons in the absence of adequate economic resources, political will, sources. security provisions. In any case, the guns expertise, creativity, transparency— 17 Three of the eight killed were chiefs. collected tend to be personal household and a wide range of actors working 18 The UN recorded 44 Murle attacks during guns rather than the weapons used by towards common goals. Unfortunately, this period (UNMISS, 2012b). 19 The vast majority of those killed were attacking youths. the current piecemeal, ad hoc efforts Lou Nuer. Violence will continue to erupt will not heal wounds or establish the 20 The local government provided vehicles until the conditions that give rise to conditions that would make conflict a to the Lou Nuer, who recovered the cattle the conflict are addressed transparently. thing of the past in Jonglei. within a few days. 21 The attack took place in Romieri, Ethiopia, But these factors are extremely complex, across the river from Wanding payam, and the GoSS has not demonstrated the Jonglei. capacity, or political will, to publicly Notes 22 Interview with UNMISS official, Juba, 7 February 2012. address them in a productive manner. This Issue Brief was written by HSBA 23 UNMISS (2012a, p.12). The marginalization and suppression Project Coordinator, Jonah Leff, based on 24 Interview with Jonglei expert with close of tribal communities in Jonglei is fun- fieldwork conducted in South Sudan from ties to the Lou Nuer and Murle, Nairobi, damentally a problem of governance 7 April 2012. February to October 2012. 25 Of this total, 2,182 were reportedly that only the GoSS can reverse. Yet women and children. Interview with Pibor doing so would almost certainly mean 1 UNOCHA (2009a); ICG (2009, p. 1). County Commissioner Konyi, Pibor, upsetting vested interests and power 2 See ICG (2009) and Mc Evoy and LeBrun 8 February 2012. balances in Bor and Juba. (2010, pp. 22–27). 26 This figure is based on first-hand accounts 3 MSF (2009, p. 15). from UNMISS staff who saw bodies or Strengthening official administra- 4 Small Arms Survey (2011, pp. 4–8). graves, and on interviews with victims’ tion in Jonglei could be an important 5 A payam is an administrative unit below families. UNMISS recorded an additional first step towards demonstrating a the county level. 294 non-family deaths through interviews, willingness to meet the needs of tribal 6 Interviews with Pibor county payam but was unable to rule out possible dupli- administrator and UNMISS personnel, cations. More than 370 people were miss- communities, and youths, who are often Pibor and Juba, February 2012. ing. UNMISS (2012a, p. 12). the aggressors. Outside Bor, officials 7 Interviews with UNMISS officials, Juba, 27 This is a conservative estimate based on are found only in poorly funded county February 2012. a range reported by UNMISS and the commissioner offices. Empowering 8 Because it was a revenge attack, the Murle Pibor County Commissioner Konyi. mobilized fighters of all ages rather than 28 ICG (2009, p. 3). these institutions would enable local just young men, as is customary. 29 Interviews with government officials, administrators to take ownership of 9 Interviews with international experts and NGOs, and UNMISS representatives, development at the county level, and Jonglei officials, Juba and Bor, February– Juba and Pibor, February–March 2012. March 2012. 30 UNMISS (2012a, pp. 15–18). open space for dialogue and partner- 10 In early 2012, international media outlets 31 Interviews with UNMISS and GoSS offi- ships with civil society institutions and quoted a series of press releases from cials, Juba, February–March 2012. traditional authorities. Ideally, in the groups claiming to represent the Lou 32 Small Arms Survey (2011, pp. 5–7). absence of the SSPS, local community Nuer diaspora in Australia, Canada, and 33 Small Arms Survey (2011, p. 9). the US, claiming links to the white army 34 Athor charged two or three cows for security cells would eventually sup- in Jonglei. Lou Nuer youths and leaders one Kalashnikov-pattern rifle. Interview plement these offices—perhaps with in Jonglei said they were unaware of any with Jonglei expert close to the Lou Nuer, a mandate to participate in or lead diaspora activities or support. The Lou Nairobi, 7 April 2012. civilian disarmament should security Nuer Community, a grassroots organiza- 35 Interviews with international security ex- tion based in the US, also distanced itself perts, Juba and Bor, February–March 2012. conditions allow. from the press releases, claiming they were 36 As of September 2012, at least 1,500 of At the same time, international the work of a handful of individuals seek- Athor’s fighters are awaiting integration assistance could address some of ing to exploit the conflict to undermine at an assembly point outside Bor. In April, the underlying economic conditions. Salva Kiir’s government. Yau Yau defected to Khartoum and was 11 Interview with Jonglei expert with close appointed Jonglei commander by the Job creation programmes are vital to ties to the Lou Nuer and Murle, Nairobi, South Sudan Liberation Army and South provide alternative livelihoods for 7 April 2012. Sudan Democratic Army.
10 Sudan Issue Brief Number 21 October 2012 37 Phone interview with UNMISS official, 71 Interviews with international experts close 102 Interview with the governor of Jonglei state, 28 August 2012. to the Lou Nuer, Bor, Juba, and Pibor, Koul Manyang, Bor, 26 September 2012. 38 The exact number of casualties is uncon- February–March 2012. 103 Since security forces within the Ministry firmed. Interview with UNMISS official, 72 The cost of building roads in Jonglei is of the Interior do not yet have a record- Juba, 28 September 2012. prohibitive due to the composition of keeping system for their inventory, it is 39 Bloomberg (2012). much of its soil. unclear how the SPLA was able to disag- 40 Interviews with SPLA officials, Juba and 73 Interviews with Lou Nuer and Murle gregate between civilian and state-owned Bor, September 2012. leaders and international experts, Juba firearms. Interviews with SPLA officials, 41 Interview with UNMISS official, Juba, and Pibor, February–March 2012. Bor, March 2012. 28 September 2012. 74 SSCCSE (2009, p.3). The Murle population 104 Interviews with international experts and 42 Interviews with international experts and of Pibor county is estimated at 100,000– Jonglei residents, Juba and Bor, Septem- Jonglei officials, Juba and Bor, February– 120,000. ber 2012. March 2012. 75 Interviews with international experts and 105 Sudan Tribune (2012a). 43 Interview with Jonglei expert close to the Murle officials, Pibor and Juba, February– 126 Sudan Tribune (2012b). Lou Nuer, Nairobi, 7 April 2012. March 2012. 107 Republic of South Sudan (2012). 44 Small Arms Survey (2012). 76 Interview with senior SPLA officials, Pibor, 108 Phone interviews with Murle and inter- 45 Interviews with international experts and 14 February 2012. national experts, September 2012. Jonglei officials, Juba and Bor, February– 77 MSF (2007); UNOCHA (2007). 109 Interview with Lt. Gen. Kuol Diem March 2012. 78 Interviews with South Sudanese and inter- Kuol, commander for disarmament, Bor, 46 Interviews with locals in Pibor and Jonglei national experts on Jonglei, Bor, Juba, Pibor, 29 March 2012. experts, Juba and Pibor, February–March and Nairobi, February–September 2012. 110 Interviews with Jonglei experts, Juba, 2012. 79 Interviews with locals, Pibor county, June 2012. 47 Citizen (2012). February 2012. 111 Interview with international expert, Juba, 48 Interview with Jonglei expert close to the 80 Interviews with Jonglei experts and local 13 June 2012. In June, international observ- Lou Nuer, Nairobi, 7 April 2012. community members, Bor, Juba, Pibor, ers interviewed a group of 50 villagers 49 Interview with Murle red chiefs (clan lead- February–March 2012. who said the SPLA had beaten about 100 ers), Pibor, 9 February 2012. 81 Interviews with South Sudanese and inter- men with sticks to get information on guns. 50 Interview with UN and NGO representa- national experts, Juba and Bor, February– The men were later brought to a nearby tives and civilians, Juba, Bor, and Pibor, March 2012. SPLA base where they were kept for up February and March 2012. 82 Interview with Jonglei expert, Nairobi, to three days. Eight of the men were sub- 51 Interviews with UNMISS officials, Juba, 3 February 2012. jected to waterboarding. The villagers February–March 2012. 83 Interview with health experts, Pibor, also reported that up to 20 children had 52 UNMISS (2012a, p. 20). 9 February 2012; Rolandsen and Breidlid been mistreated by the SPLA. In March, 53 Interview with UNMISS official, Juba, (2012). two SPLA soldiers raped two women in 27 March 2012; Business Week (2012). 84 Interviews with and Murle leaders and Bor county. The soldiers were apprehended 54 Hutchinson and Jok (2002, p. 98). international experts, Juba and Pibor, and sent to the military court. 55 SSCCSE (2009, p. 7). According to the 2008 February–March 2012. 112 Interviews with international NGO and census, there were 734,327 males and 85 Interviews with international experts UN officials and civilians in Jonglei, 624,275 females in Jonglei state. and South Sudan government officials, March–June 2012. 56 Arensen (2012). Bor, Juba, and Pibor, February–March 113 Interview with international experts, Juba, 57 Interview with Jonglei Murle expert, 2012. June 2012. Nairobi, 5 April 2012. There are at least 86 Interview with an international expert 114 HRW (2012). 10 other older age-sets that do not take close to the Lou Nuer, Nairobi, 7 April 2012. 115 AI (2012). part in age-set activities. 87 Interviews with government officials and 116 Phone interviews with international ex- 58 Interviews with international Murle ex- international pastoralist experts, Juba, perts and local Murle leaders, June–July perts and Jonglei officials, Juba and Bor, February–March 2012. 2012. February–March 2012. 88 Interview with UNMISS official close to 117 Phone interview with UNMISS official, 59 Interviews with Murle leaders, Pibor, the peace process, Juba, 7 February 2012. 3 September 2012. February 2012. 89 Because of Deng’s Dinka affiliation, many 118 MSF data reporting sheet, 5 September 2012. 60 As of September 2012, Dak Kueth was did not feel he was impartial. 119 UNMISS (2012b). believed to be moving between Ethiopia 90 Interview with Rev. Mark Akec Cien, 120 Phone interviews with international ex- and Upper Nile state with a small number acting general secretary, SCC, Juba, perts and local Murle leaders, June–July of followers. 3 April 2012. 2012. 61 Dak Kueth rose to prominence a few 91 Interview with Rev. Mark Akec Cien, acting 121 For purposes of disarmament, the SPLA years ago, and became connected to general secretary, SCC, Juba, 3 April 2012. broke Jonglei into five sectors: Boma, the Ngundeng lineage when he married 92 Interviews with security experts, Juba and Pibor, Waat, Bor, and Ayod. the former prophet’s great-great grand- Bor, February–March 2012. 122 Interview with Lt. Gen. Kuol Diem daughter. 93 Private video viewed by the author on Kuol, commander for disarmament, Bor, 62 Interviews with Lou Nuer experts, Juba 7 February 2012. 29 March 2012. and Nairobi, February–April 2012. 94 Interview with SPLA spokesman Col. 123 Phone interview with UNMISS official, 63 The Uror county commander is Bor Doang, Philip Aguer, Juba, 26 March 2012. 9 September 2012. and his deputy is Gatloy Chuol; the Nyirol 95 Interview with Pibor County Commis- 124 Phone interviews with Jonglei experts, county commander is Wie Bol, and his sioner Joshua Konyi, Pibor, 8 February 2012. July 2012. deputy is Deng Wengluat; and the Akobo 96 UNMISS (2012a, p. 27). 125 Phone interviews with international county commander is Bol Chol, and his 97 UNMISS (2012a, p. iiii). experts and local Murle leaders, June– deputy is Gok Nakhok. 98 See O’Brien (2009); Small Arms Survey July 2012. 64 UNMISS (2012a, p. 15). (2006). 126 Interview with Rev. Mark Akec Cien, acting 65 Interview with Lou Nuer expert, Nairobi, 99 Small Arms Survey (2006, p. 4). The 2006 general secretary, SCC, Juba, 14 June 2012. 7 April 2012. civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei 127 UNMISS (2012a, p. 14). 66 Interviews with South Sudanese and state resulted in an estimated 1,200 ‘white 128 A platoon consists of 32 soldiers. pastoralist experts, Juba, February– army’ and 400 SPLA deaths. The UN said 129 UNMISS (2012a, p. 14). March 2012. 3,300 weapons were collected, roughly two 130 Interviews with UNMISS officials, Juba, 67 Small Arms Survey (2007, p. 2); UNOCHA weapons for every person killed. February–March 2012. (2009b, p. 1). 100 Interviews with Jonglei officials and an 131 Phone interviews with international ex- 68 Phone interview with Jonglei expert, SPLA commander, Bor, 30 March 2012. perts close to the Lou Nuer and Murle, 6 July 2012. 101 Interview with Lt. Gen. Kuol Diem June 2012. 69 Internal UN document. Kuol, commander for disarmament, Bor, 132 Interview with UNMISS official, Juba, 70 Rands and LeRiche (2012, p. 6). 29 March 2012. 11 June 2012.
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 11 MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières). 2007. ‘Patients —. 2011. Reaching for the Gun: Arms Flows and Bibliography and Family Members Killed Inside MSF Holdings in South Sudan. HSBA Issue Brief AI (Amnesty International). 2012. ‘South Sudan: Compound.’ 29 November. No. 19. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. April. Strengthen Human Rights and Account- —. 2009. ‘Facing up to Reality: Health Crisis —.2012. White Army arms and ammunition. ability Mechanisms: Human Rights Council: Deepens as Violence Escalates.’ December. HSBA Facts and Figures. Geneva: Small Establish an Independent Expert Mandate.’ O’Brien, Adam. 2009. Shots in the Dark: The Arms Survey. 22 March.
HSBA project summary at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the UK Govern- The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) ment Global Conflict Prevention Pool. Additional support for Sudan/South Sudan is a multi-year project has previously been provided by the Danish Demining HSBA administered by the Small Arms Survey. It was Group and the National Endowment for Democracy. developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of international and Sudanese partners. Through the Credits active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical Series editor: Emile LeBrun research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, ([email protected]) including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration Copy editor: Clar Ni Chonghaile programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, Cartographer: Jillie Luff, MAPgrafix(jluff @mapgrafix.com) as well as security sector reform and arms control inter- Design and layout: Richard Jones ([email protected]) ventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity. Issue Briefs are designed to provide timely periodic snap- shots of baseline information in a reader-friendly format. The Contact details HSBA also generates a series of longer and more detailed For more information or to provide feedback, contact Working Papers. All publications are available in English and Jonah Leff, HSBA Project Coordinator, at Arabic at www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. We also produce [email protected] monthly ‘Facts and Figures’ reports on key security issues Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment at
12 Sudan IssueIssue Brief Brief Number Number 6 21 April October 2007 2012