The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy ------Gábor Gábor of of in in B Affe Oros E the the Arly Modern P Hi
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--------- --------- LOSOPHY There is no need to argue for the relevance of affectivity in HI early modern philosophy. When doing research and concep- P (eds) tualizing affectivity in this period, we hope to attain a basic H interpretive framework for philosophy in general, one that is T independent of and cutting across such unfruitful divisions as the time-honored interpretive distinction between “rationalists” N TÓ and “empiricists”, which we consider untenable when applied to VÁ T 17th-century thinkers. S I Y MODERN Y MODERN Our volume consists of papers based on the contributions RL to the First Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, VÉR A LI held on 14–15 October 2016 at Eötvös Loránd University, E O . Budapest. When composing this volume, our aim was not I to present a systematic survey of affectivity in early mod- A L Y IN ern philosophy. Rather, our more modest goal was to foster A T Z I S collaboration among researchers working in different coun- T tries and different traditions. Many of the papers published IV here are already in implicit or explicit dialogue with others. ct JUDI We hope that they will generate more of an exchange of ide- . as in the broader field of early modern scholarship. OROS B F AFFE O T GÁBOR EP THE CONCEPT C BTK OF AFFEctIVITY in Early Modern ISBN 978-963-284-820-4 THE CON Philosophy GÁBOR BOROS . JUDIT SZALAI . OLIVÉR ISTVÁN TÓTH (eds) boros_borito.indd 1 2017.10.20. 11:48:40 --------- --------- The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy Gábor Boros – Judit Szalai – Olivér István Tóth (eds) The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy budapest • 2017 © Authors, 2017 © Editors, 2017 ISBN 978-963-284-820-4 [online] www.eotvoskiado.hu Executive Publisher: The Dean of the Faculty of Humanities of Eötvös Loránd University Cover: Ildikó Csele Kmotrik Layout: Manzana Bt. Table of contents Introduction . 7 I Ádám Smrcz: A Neo-Stoic Theory of Natural and Unnatural Affections . 11 II Maximillian Kiener: The Compulsion to Believe Something: On Affectivity of Indubitable, Clear and Distinct Perceptions in Descartes .............................................. 24 III Jan Forsman: Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reason for Doubt ............................ 38 IV Hanna Vandenbussche: Descartes and Pascal on Imagining Love and Imaginary Love ........................................ 59 V Judit Szalai: Medicine, Emotion Management and Mind-Body Interaction in the Later Descartes and Early Cartesianism . 75 VI Davide Monaco: A New Account of the Objective-Formal Distinction in Spinoza’s Parallelism Theory . 89 VII Filip Buyse: A New Reading of Spinoza’s Letter 32 to Oldenburg: Spinoza and the Agreement between Bodies in the Universe ......... 104 VIII Keith Green: Spinoza on Reflexive Affects and the Imitation of Affects ................................................ 124 IX Gábor Boros: Life as Death in Spinoza . 142 X Olivér István Tóth: Is Spinoza’s Theory of Finite Mind Coherent? – Death, Affectivity and Epistemology in the Ethics . 159 XI Brian Glenney: Spinoza on Passionate Misperception . 174 XII Christopher Davidson: An Affective Aesthetics in Spinoza and Its Political Implications ....................................... 185 XIII Zsolt Bagi: Emancipation of the Body in Spinoza’s Political Philosophy. The Affective Integration .................................... 207 XIV Dávid Bartha: The Human Passions and the Purely Active Will of God: An Introduction to Berkeley’s Theory of Emotion ................. 221 XV Dan O’Brien: Hume, Sympathy and Belief . 240 XVI Hans D. Muller: Hume on Sympathy, Pity and Impartiality ......... 257 XVII Csaba Olay: Alienation in Rousseau . 271 Contributors ..................................................... 284 Index of Names ................................................... 288 Gábor Boros – Judit Szalai – Olivér István Tóth Introduction There is scarcely any need to argue for the relevance of the concept of affectivity in early modern philosophy. Theories of emotion in this period have been one of the focal topics our research group, centered around Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest (ELTE), has in- vestigated in the past decades. The research group has taken several forms in the past and is now supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (Hungary) in the frame of a research project on theories of emotions (K120375, “Self-Interpretation, Emotions, Narrativity”) and a research project on Descartes (K125012, “The Cartesian Mind between Cognition and Extension”). We work on various areas within early modern philosophy, with minimally one shared goal: deconstructing the time-honored interpretive distinction between “rationalists” and “empiricists”, which we consider untenable when ap- plied to 17th-century thinkers. Conceptualizing affectivity in this period provides us with an interpretive frame independent of and cutting across such unfruitful divisions. This was the main motivation behind our decision to commence the series of Budapest Seminars in Early Modern Philosophy with the topic of affectivity, inviting prospective participants to reinforce or to reject our conviction concerning the fruitfulness of this basic concept. In our view, the participants’ general response to this concealed expectation was illumi- natingly positive. We are proudly presenting the volume composed of papers based on the contributions presented at the conference. Besides NRDIO, we are grateful to Eötvös University, Budapest for supporting both the event (held in October 2016 at ELTE) and the preparation of the present volume. Special thanks to the Philosophy Department of the National Association of PhD Students for their support of the seminar. The aim of this volume is not to present a systematic survey of affectivity in early mod- ern philosophy, but rather to foster collaboration among researchers working in different countries and different traditions. Many of the papers published here are already in implicit or explicit dialogue with others. We hope that they will generate more exchange of ideas in the broader early modern scholarship. Introduction 7 Ádám Smrcz discusses the influence of Stoic authors on Justus Lipsius’ philosophy in general, and on his theory of affections in particular. He presents the intricacies of Lipsius’ attempt to Christianize this ancient philosophical school in a way that was adjusted both to his ever-changing religious affiliations and to the rigor of philosophical reasoning. Lipsius’ solution was distinguishing natural and unnatural affections and combatting an emerging prejudice concerning Stoic ethics. Kiener and Forsman both discuss Descartes’ concept of dubitability and indubitability. Maximillian Kiener takes a fresh look at the age-old problem of the Cartesian circle in Descartes’ Meditations. In his view, while most commentators have considered certainty, dubitability and compulsion to believe as psychological phenomena, they should rather be treated as epistemic concepts that might have bearings on psychological notions such as emotions and affectivity. Thus, he urges us to revise our understanding of early modern affectivity from an epistemic point of view. He also presents a new interpretation of the indubitability of clear and distinct ideas. Jan Forsman defends an indirect doxatic vol- untarist reading of Descartes against direct doxatic voluntarist interpretations. He argues that on Descartes’ view we are not capable of rejecting, accepting or suspending judgments based on our volitions; rather, our free will can choose to focus on particular reasons for forming a judgment. This view allows Forsman not to attribute to Descartes the seemingly counter-intuitive view that we can willfully doubt logical truths and accept judgments against all reasons. Hanna Vandenbussche compares Descartes’ and Pascal’s discussions of love. She shows that while both distinguished imaginary love from intellectual love, they had dif- ferent views on the role of the imagination. For Descartes it is one faculty of the soul, while for Pascal it is a source of moral corruption. Still, both saw imagination as a source of distortion, and especially as a source of a distorted image of oneself. Surprisingly, this does not prevent them from including the imagination in their accounts of the love of God. Judit Szalai focuses on the philosophical and physical descriptions of the operation of the emotions in the later Descartes and early Cartesians. She argues that contrary to the current mainstream interpretation, Descartes’ correspondence with Elizabeth does not represent a break within the Cartesian corpus, but rather shows one aspect of his theory more prominently. She then presents the way in which Descartes’ philosophical and physi- cal views map onto the medical practice of the 17th-century. Davide Monaco provides a new interpretation of the formal-objective distinction in Spinoza. By tracing back the history of the distinction to the Timaeus via Descartes and Suarez, he argues that Spinoza in his mature works does not simply accept the Scholastic or Cartesian version of the distinction. He argues that Spinoza’s parallelism doctrine implies the replacement of the objective being of ideas with the formal being of ideas, thus turning the formal-objective distinction into a formal-formal distinction. Both Buyse and Green discuss the consequences of Spinoza’s conatus doctrine for his theory of affects.Filip Buyse focuses on Spinoza’s Letter 32 to Oldenburg, in which he an- swers