Personhood and Moral Status in Marginal Cases Of
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ON THE MARGINS: PERSONHOOD AND MORAL STATUS IN MARGINAL CASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS by HELEN RYLAND A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy School of Philosophy, Theology, and Religion College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham June 2020 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT Most philosophical accounts of human rights accept that all persons have human rights. Typically, ‘personhood’ is understood as unitary and binary. It is unitary because there is generally supposed to be a single threshold property required for personhood (e.g. agency, rationality, etc.). It is binary because it is all-or-nothing: you are either a person or you are not. A difficulty with binary views is that there will typically be subjects, like children and those with dementia, who do not meet the threshold, and so who are not persons with human rights, on these accounts. It is consequently unclear how we ought to treat these subjects. This is the problem of marginal cases. I argue that we cannot resolve the problem of marginal cases if we accept a unitary, binary view of personhood. Instead, I develop a new non-binary personhood account of human rights, and defend two main claims. First, there are many, scalar properties, the having of which are conducive to personhood. Second, different subjects have different human rights depending on which of these properties they have, and what threats apply to them. On my view, and contra most existing accounts, most marginal cases have some degree of personhood and are entitled to some human rights. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This PhD was funded by an AHRC Midlands3Cities (M3C) Doctoral Training Partnership Studentship, and I would like to thank M3C for their generous funding. I would also like to thank the following individuals for their support throughout this thesis, and for making my PhD experience positive and enjoyable. If I have inadvertently missed anyone out, please accept my apologies! My supervisors. I have been phenomenally lucky to have had an exceptional supervisory team for this PhD: Jussi Suikkanen, Heather Widdows, and Jeremy Williams. I am grateful to all of them for their insight and support, and for helping me to become both a better researcher and a more confident person. As my lead supervisor, Jussi has approached our supervisions with care, patience, and kindness. He has consistently encouraged me to develop my thinking and believe in my own abilities, and has trusted me to take unusual and creative approaches to this thesis (and my wider philosophical work). His thoughtful feedback has also helped to make this thesis clearer and stronger, and I am indebted to him for the time and thought that he has put into his comments. I am also thankful to my co-supervisors, Heather and Jeremy. Both of them read a final draft of the entire thesis during the Covid-19 pandemic. I am very grateful to them for taking the time to do this, and for their detailed, insightful comments, which were of great help during the editing process. Further, I thank both of them for their guidance and encouragement throughout my PhD. I also thank Heather and my SWIP mentor, Clare Chambers, for mentoring me, and for offering invaluable advice on how to navigate academic philosophy as a woman in a predominantly male discipline. Philosophy staff at Birmingham. The philosophy staff (past and present) at Birmingham have always made me feel welcome and valued. I would particularly like to thank the following staff members for their support and guidance, and for numerous discussions about philosophy and my thesis: Will Davies, Nikk Effingham, Nick Jones, Herjeet Marway, Jonathan Parry, Angie Pepper, Maja Spener, Scott Sturgeon, Henry Taylor, and Al Wilson. Philosophy postgrads at Birmingham. I would like to thank my fellow postgrads (past and present) for their helpful comments at various work-in-progress postgraduate seminars, and for their general encouragement and friendship. Thanks to Matilde Aliffi, Victoria Bailey Galvao, Federico Bongiorno, Lauren Blackwood, Amy Conkerton-Darby, Thomas Davies, Casey Elliot, Jaz Gharu, Noelia Iranzo Ribera, Eugenia Lancelotta, Kate MacKay, Ciaran McKee, Alex Miller Tate, Valeria Motta, John Murphy, John J. Parry, Michael Roberts, Will Sharp, Perri Sriwannawit, and Kash Sunghutee. I am particularly indebted to my philosophy little sister, Em Walsh, who has read numerous draft chapters, and sent messages of support and encouragement. I am thankful for her thoughtfulness and friendship, and for her sarcastic sense of humour. I also thank James MacLaren who, alongside being a fellow postgraduate student, was my AS level philosophy teacher. His lessons and his encouragement inspired me to pursue philosophy, and he should be held at least partly responsible for everything that I’ve inflicted on philosophy since then. Further, I am grateful to my fellow co-organisers of the Birmingham branches of Women* In Philosophy and Minorities and Philosophy UK (MAP UK). I am sure that they will continue to work hard to make the department, and academic philosophy as a whole, a more inclusive and welcoming environment. Non-philosophy staff at Birmingham. I have greatly benefitted from discussions with members of non-philosophy staff at Birmingham. Sylvie Delacroix, Aaron Sloman, and Karen Yeung were all kind enough to spend time discussing AI and robots with me. I also thank Karen for employing me as a research assistant, and for her continued support and interest in my work. Non-philosophy students at Birmingham. I am indebted to the following postgrads for their friendship and support, and for discussing thesis topics with me: Sarasvathi Arulampalam, Justyna Hofmanová, Shannon Oates, Dave Pollard, Amy Smith, and Nichola Tonks. Non-Birmingham postgrads. I would like to thank Freya Ernsting, and Daniel Harris for our chats on AI, robots, and technology. I also thank Helen Waite for our initial chats on cyborgs, and for her friendship and encouragement. Long suffering friends. I am exceedingly grateful to have a strong group of close friends outside of philosophy, who have supported and encouraged me throughout my degrees. They have been exemplary friends, confidants, and cheerleaders, and I am thankful to each of them for simply being their amazing, caring selves. Thanks to Emily Brooks, Yu- Tai Cheung, Katie Cornish, Laura Cure, Judith Dray, Rosie O’Hagan, Shaunagh Sutter, and Ed Watts. Even longer suffering family. I thank my family for their support and encouragement, which is too numerous to list in this acknowledgement section. Thanks to my father, John Ryland, and my brothers, Adam and Ben Ryland, for their patience, interest in my thesis, and for putting up with me. Special thanks go to my mother, Stella Ryland, who has provided cake and distractions when I have been stressed, offered sage advice and guidance, and gamely read drafts of every single thesis chapter. She now also knows this thesis well enough to do a viva on it (but has assured me that she will not crash my viva in order to test that theory). TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 PART ONE: BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS ............................................... 10 CHAPTER ONE. ESTABLISHING FOUNDATIONS: A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ......................................................................................................................... 11 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 11 1.1 Hohfeld’s analysis of rights ........................................................................... 11 1.2 Distinguishing structural features of human rights .................................... 16 1.3 Human rights as moral rights to which legal rights ought to correspond 21 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 34 CHAPTER TWO. PERSONHOOD: AN INTRODUCTION .................................. 36 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 36 2.1 Defining ‘personhood’ ................................................................................... 37 2.2 The moral significance of personhood ......................................................... 51 2.3 Personhood and the marginal cases ............................................................. 57 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 63 PART TWO: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF CURRENT BINARY RESPONSES TO THE MARGINAL CASES ........................................................... 65 CHAPTER THREE. BINARY PERSONHOOD AND THE EXCLUSION OF MARGINAL CASES ...................................................................................................