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ABORTION, SENTIENCE and MORAL STANDING: a Neurophilosophical Appraisal

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ABORTION, SENTIENCE AND MORAL STANDING: A Neurophilosophical Appraisal Louis-Jacques VAN BOGAERT Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Stell enbosch Promotor: Professor Paul Cilliers 2002 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za DECLARATION I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree. Signature: Date: 01 October, 2002 , . Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za ABSTRACT Moral theories on abortion are often regarded as mutually exclusive. On the one hand, pro-life advocates maintain that abortion is always morally wrong, for life is sacred from its very beginning. On the other hand, the extreme liberal view advocated by the absolute pro-ehoieers claims that the unborn is not a person and has no moral standing. On this view there is no conflict of rights; women have the right to dispose of their body as they wish. Therefore, killing a non-person is always permissible. In between the two extreme views, some moral philosophers argue that a 'pre-sentient' embryo or fetus cannot be harmed because it lacks the ability to feel pain or pleasure, for it is 'sentience' that endows a living entity (human and non-human) with moral considerability. Therefore, abortion of a pre-sentient embryo or fetus is permissible. Neurophilosophy rests a philosophical conclusion on neurological premises. In other words, to be tenable sentientism - the claim that sentience endows an entity with moral standing - needs robust neurobiological evidence. The question is, then: What is the basic neuroanatomical and neurophysiological apparatus required to be sentient? The answer to that question requires a fair understanding of the evolution, anatomy and function of the brain. The exploration thereof shows quite convincingly that the advocates of sentientism do not provide convincing arguments to root their theory in neurobiological facts. Their claims rest rather on emotions and on behaviours that look like a reaction to pain. The other shortcoming of sentientism is that it fails to distinguish pain from suffering, and that as a utilitarian moral theory it considers only the alleged pain of the aborted sentient fetus and disregards the pregnant woman's pain and suffering. And, finally, sentientism leaves out of our moral consideration living and non-living entities that deserve moral respect. The main thrust of the dissertation is that the argument of sentience as its advocates present it has no neurophilosophical grounds. Therefore, the argument from sentience is not a convincing argument in favour or against abortion. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za OPSOMMING Morele teorieë wat handeloor aborsie word dikwels as wedersyds uitsluitend beskou. "Pro-life" kampvegters hou oor die algemeen vol dat aborsie onder alle omstandighede moreel veroordeelbaar is, omdat die lewe van meet af heilig is. Daarteenoor hou die ekstreem-liberale oogpunt, wat deur "Pro-choice" voorstaanders ingeneem word, vol dat die ongeborene nie 'n persson is nie, en as sulks geen morele status het nie. Volgens hierdie standpunt is daar geen konflik van regte hier ter sprake nie; vroue het uitsluitelike beskikkingsreg oor hulle eie liggame. Dus is dit toelaatbaar om onder hierdie omstandighede 'n "nie-persoon" om die lewe te bring. Tussen hierdie twee ekstreme standpunte argumenteer party morele filosowe dat die voor- bewuste embrio of fetus nie skade berokken kan word nie, omdat dit nie oor die vermoë beskik om pyn of plesier te voel nie. Dit is juis bewussyn en die vermoë om waar te neem wat morele status aan 'n entiteit (hetsy menslik of nie-menslik) verleen. Dus is dit toelaatbaar om 'n voorbewustw embrio of fetus te aborteer. Neurofilosofie basseer filosofiese gevolgtrekkinge op neurolgiese beginsels. Met andere woorde, so 'n standpunt sal eis dat 'n argument oor bewustheid op betroubare neurologiese feite gebasseer word, om sodoende met sekerheid morele status, al dan nie, aan de fetus of embrio toe te ken. Die vraag is dan: Wat is die basiese neuro- anatomiese en neurofiologiese apparatuur waaroor 'n entiteit moet beskik om as bewus beskou te word? Die antwoord op hierdie vraag vereis dan ook 'n redelik grondige kennis van die evolusie, anatomie en funksie van die brein. Wanneer die vraagstuk van naderby beskou word, word dit duidelik dat voorstaanders van die bewustheids-argument oor die algemeen nie hulle standpunte op oortuigende, neurologiese feite berus nie. Hulle beweringe rus dan eerder op emosie en op waargenome optredes wat voorkom asof dit 'n reaksie op pyn is. Nog 'n tekortkoming van die bewustheids-argument is dat dit nie 'n onderskeid tref tussen die konsep van pyn en die van leiding nie, en dat dit as 'n utilitaristiese morele teorie slegs die beweerde pyn van die ge-aborteerde fetus in ag neem en nie die leiding van die swanger vrouw nie. Ten slotte neem die bewustheids-argument ook nie morele status van lewende en nie-lewende entiete, wat geregtig is op morele respek, in ag nie. Die hoof uitgangspunt van hierdie dissertasie is dan dat die bewustheids-argument, soos wat dit tans deur voorstanders daarvan voorgehou word, nie neurofilosfies begrond kan word nie. Dus is die argument vanuit 'n bewustheids-standpunt nie 'n oortuigende argument hetsy vir of teen aborsie nie. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za Dedication To Donna All our sorrow is real, but the atoms of which we are made are indifferent George Santayana The word 'pain' has its etymological home in 'poena' or 'punishment' Elaine Scarry Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za Contents Abstract Opsomming 1. Introduction p. 1-8 2. Approaching the complexity of the abortion debate p.9-32 3. Four moral philosophers on alleged brain function p.33-51 4. Approaching the complexity of the brain p.52-71 5. The birth of the brain p.72-92 6. Three moral philosophers on sentience p.93-115 7. Utilitarianism and moral theory on sentience revisited p. 116-137 8. Poststructural neurophilosophy p. 138-159 9. Afterword p. 160-166 Notes p. 167-196 Appendices p. 197-207 Bibliography p.208-220 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za 1 1 Introduction Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through its unsharability, and it ensures its unsharability through its resistance to language ... The human attempt to reverse the de- objectifying work of pain by forcing pain itself into avenues of objectification is a project laden with practical and ethical consequences. Elaine Scarry (1985: 4, 6) The ethical dilemma of abortion hinges on two main issues: the moral standing of the unborn, and women's right to self-determination. Therefore, most moral theories on abortion usually take a stance only on either of the two. Pro-life advocates have a general tendency to dwell on the moral standing of the unborn. Said moral standing is claimed to result from the possession of personhood (actual or potential), or from the claim that a God-given soul inhabits the unborn from the time of conception. In either case, this moral standing ascribes an inalienable right to life. Pro-choice activists are more prone to insist on women's rights. The debate, then, is more about conflicting rights, personal character, embodiment, and situatedness. On these views, the moral standing of the unborn takes a backseat. These are extreme positions on abortion. In reality, however, very few people do actually go along with a die-hard, rigid, dogmatic pro-choice or pro-life stance. The former would sound repulsive and at odds with common-sense morality, and the latter would appear too intolerant (e.g., in the case of rape). The spectrum between the two antipodean positions comprises a series of "softer" views that make allowance for exceptions. One of these intermediate stances is the claim that sentience - the capacity to feel pain and pleasure - is the criterion of moral standing. A sentient entity has moral standing; a non-sentient or a pre-sentient (that has not yet acquired the capacity to feel) being has no moral considerability. In the context of moral standing of a sentient being, the main emphasis is placed on the sentient being's interest/right not to be inflicted pain. Opinions diverge whether it stops there, or whether sentience also ascribes a right to life. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za 2 The abortion issue is very sensitive and often extremely emotional. The legalisation of abortion has, in many countries, been received with mixed feelings. Matters of life and death capture the public's attention and stir up its emotions, often in opposite directions. The current debates on physician-assisted suicide are another testimony illustrating the potential conflict of opinions and emotions. We cannot escape from having emotions, but this should not preclude a careful analysis of the arguments pro or con an ethical dilemma. This is the scope of this essay. The thesis I wish to defend is that the argument from sentience, as its advocates present it, is not a convincing criterion for the ascription of moral standing. The arguments underpinning my position are the following: 1) the concept of sentience used by utilitarians in the sense of the ability to sense or to perceive a stimulus that produces pain or pleasure does not do justice to the concept of the ability to suffer, which needs no physical injury but the faculty of introspection, of self-consciousness; 2) mere sentience is possible with a coarse neural equipment (e.g., nonhuman sentient animals, and perhaps human embryos or early fetuses), whereas suffering requires a much more elaborate nervous system (e.g. the paradigm person, and perhaps apes and cetaceans); and 3) first and foremost, premises 1) and 2) must rest on neuroscientifically convincing evidence.
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