Markets, Conflict, and Incumbent Tenure: Evidence From Turkey's Kurdish Insurgency Emine Deniz ∗ February 3, 2020 ∗Harris School of Publicy Policy, The University of Chicago (
[email protected]). I am grateful to Shanker Satyanath for his unwavering support throughout this project. I would like to thank Micha¨elAklin, Eric Arias, Antonella Bandiera, Kara Ross Camarena, Maria Carreri, Oeindrila Dube, Anna Getmansky, Michael Gilligan, Luis Martinez, Erzen Oncel,¨ Pablo Querebin, Cyrus Sami, Edoardo Teso, and Austin Wright for helpful discussions and insightful comments. The author thanks the discussants and seminar participants at the Workshop on the Political Economy of Turkey at LSE, Ozye˘ginUniversity,¨ Sabancı University and Bo˘gazi¸ciUniversity. Finally, Deniz Akku¸sand the analysts at the Kare Investment and Securities, Inc., were very generous with their time and resources providing the financial markets data. Alyssa Eldridge provided incredible editorial assistance.All errors belong to the author. Abstract Unexpected outbreaks of civil conflict may either strengthen or weaken the like- lihood of an incumbent remaining in office. In the absence of an actual turnover in office, or immediate public opinion surveys, scholars of conflict are at a loss to tell whether such episodes of conflict strengthen or weaken an incumbent's hold on power. In this paper, I address this question with a novel approach: studying the stock market performances of the firms inside and outside of the incumbent's network to infer the effect of an exogenous conflict episode on the incumbent's survival probability. I hypothesize that the abnormal returns of firms connected with the incumbent provide valuable information about the incumbent's hold on power: positive abnormal returns indicate stronger incumbent power, while neg- ative abnormal returns indicate weaker incumbent power.