Lithuanian Recognition , the M a I a State Depart Ent in a Communic T on Dated Ugust 23, 1920 , to Hon

CONTENTS

Map of Lithuania and the B al tic States Introduction

f M do o of . Letter o cA , Cotton and Franklin to Secretary State Colby Memorandum to Secretary of State in behalf of Recognition of McAdoo k Lithuania from , Cotton and Fran lin Note extending recognition to Lithuania by Great Britain Note extending recognition to Lithuania by France Note extending recognition to Lithuania by Finland Note extending recognition to Lithuania by Latvia Note extending recognition to Lithuania by Norway Note extending recognition to Lithuania by Poland Note extending recognition to Lithuania by Sweden Note extending recognition to Lithuania by Argentina Note extending recognition to Lithuania by Mexico Recognition of Lithuania by Russia

Hon M cAd oo Letter of . William G . to Secretary of State Hughes . Economic Basis for Lithuania ’ s Claim to Independence

Lithuania , the United States and the League of Nations . By Herbert Adams Gibbons f H o on . . of Plea Walter M Chandler for Recognition Lithuania , L a tavia an d Esthonia

778 937 MAP OF LITHUANIA AND THE BALTIC STATES

The map on the opposite page has been prepared by the Lithuanian

Information Bureau from the most recent data available .

The solid black lines represent the boundary agreements reached by treaties with Soviet Russia and correspond practically with the

o . ethnographic limits f the Lithuanian , Lettish and Esthonian peoples

The heavy broken line shows the eastern boundary of Poland as “ ﬁxed by the Sn reme Council of the Allies— the so-called Curzon Polk line — which a so approximates the ethnographic boundary of Poland th on e east . With this should be compared the new eastern bounda ’ o n w 1 f Poland established by Pola d s Treat with Soviet Russia , hic “ ’y of leaves a Polish corridor, or panhandle extending for hundreds miles beyond ethnographic Poland and completely separating Lithuania s from Iiu sia .

The break in the solid black line on the southern boundary of L ithuania indicates for i of the only region where , a d stance about -ﬁv twenty e miles , ethnographic Poland and ethnographic Lithuania are in direct contact . The boundary here remains to be settled by nego ti on a ti between Poland and Lithuania .

The Memel stri bounded on the south by the River Niemen (Nemunas) and on e north and east by the old German frontier (in dica ted by a light broken line) was separated from Germany by the of Treaty Versailles . It is expected to o to Lithuania , ultimately, but Fr n n is at present administered under e c military occupation . It co ’ — ] tains Lithuania s only seaport Meme .

I n the spelling of names the Lithuan ian language has been pre i ferred , but for certa n important places , whose Lithuanian names are A unknown to the merican reader, the familiar spelling has been given , e . ] . g , Kovno , Meme , Reval , etc . The li ht broken lines in Lithuania and surrounding territory indi cate boun aries of former Russian provinces . R e r e ne u c e

' L iﬂwa ma m L a fD/a n a nd [are a /a n b ot/ ”aton e :

ﬂa sk / w Po/w /r bou n d a ry a rva c arat /l a b e l y S a V/ e f Pb/iJ/r e ﬁ P e a ce Tr e y .

a r e a s PS KOV [L A N /( A

G U L F

INTRODUCTION In this little book the Lithuanian Information Bureau has assembled the opinions and arguments of some prominent Americans on the ques tion of recognition of Lithuania and the Baltic States .

3 3

McAd oo The letters and brief of H on . William G . were submitted

1 Mr . to the State Department during the winter and spring of 192 . McAd oo deals with the Lithuani an case as a lawyer and statesman presenting the arguments for recognition in systematic and formal fash f the um ion . Readers o legal training will appreciate straightforward , sentimenta l logic of his presentation .

3 ?

A - on n Dr. Herbert dams Gibbons , well known as a writer i terna ti n al atfa s o ir , presents the situation of Lithuania and the Baltic States as fraught with dangers to world peace so long as the status of these out countries remains unsettled . He points the inconsistency and weak ness of the policy of the United States Government toward Li thuania under the Wilson Administration and appeals to the Anglo - Saxon “ ” of instinct fair play to give the Baltic Republics a chance .

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. the Hon . Walter M Chandler, Member of Congress from City of

New York , speaks as a warm friend of the Baltic States , acquainted by wo personal observation , during t visits to these countries , with their people , their governments and their economic situation . He also sets forth as a trained advocate the legal and political arguments for the of recognition Lithuania , Latvia and Esthonia , which he has laid be the fore Department of State . His treatment of the subject is compre he nsiv e , lucid and forcible .

’ A memorandum on the economic bases of Lithuania s claim for recognition , prepared by the Lithuanian Information Bureau , has been

n of . cA oo . h m included in the booklet , followi g the brief Mr M d T is me or ndum r i a has also been presented to the State Depa tment . It a ms

h i t c - to prove t at L thuania is en irely capable of e onomic self support , that she is in fact relatively prosperous , being an agricultural country which has shown wonderful powers of recuperation from the devasta of of 0 tions war, as indicated by her production cr ps and live stock , and that she needs only a secure political status in order to develop a thrifty and prosperous trade .

3 ?

The reader should note that the political Situation has changed . i both in Europe and the Un ted States , since portions of this book were of of l ebis written . The League Nations has abandoned the scheme a p ’ o f cite to determine the fate Vilna , Lithuania s capital , and this ques of tion , as well as other matters dispute between Lithuania and Poland , - m are being discussed by a Lithuanian Polish Com ission at Brussels , The at the moment when this booklet goes to the press . settlement o f r o the German reparations question , the prospect of immediate est ra of tion direct relations between Germany and the United States , through of of the establishment deﬁnite peace , the renewed participation the of A United States in the deliberations of the Supreme Council the llies , all point toward increased stability in international relations . Some plan of concerted action between America and Europe towar d the Baltic

States must soon be reached . Latvia and Esthonia have already been A recognized d e jure by the llies , and Lithuania has received the promise of like reco gnition in the immediate future . It is not believed that the ff United States can afford to take a radically di erent standpoint . Recog nition t of the independence of Li huania , Latvia and Esthonia must surely come , but it will come more quickly and be therefore the more valuable if friends of these young republics— and we are conﬁdent that this means all fair-minded and informed Americans— will take an active interest in the matter and urge recognition upon the Government o f the United States by every proper means .

A A N O A O A LITHU NI N I F RM TI N BURE U .

30 1921 Washington , May , . LETTER TO HONORAB LE B AINB RIDGE COLB Y,

SECRETARY OF STATE , FROM M cADOO, COTTON AND FRANKLIN

Re :Recognition o f Lithuanian Indepe nde nce

U 1 1 1. FEB R ARY 5 , 92 DE AR SIB In submitting herewith a separate memorandum on behalf of the o f s Lithuanian Government in support recognition by the United State , we respectfully invite your particular attention to the more important considerations applicabl e to the situation .

rad tiona c of n ted Sta te s T i l Poli y U i . The United States Government is tradi tionally sympathetic wi th of the national aspirations dependent peoples , a policy which has been emphasized by th e expressions of the President during the late of o n 1 18 war . In the words President Wilson , uttered February 1 , 19

l - i Se f determ nation is not a mere phrase . It is an imper a tive principl e of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore r at their peril . Every territorial settlement involved in this w a must be made in the interest and for the beneﬁt o f the populace t of or concerned , and not as a par any mere adjustment com ” promise of claims among rival states .

Our Ru ssian Po licy .

Apparently the main reason for the fail ure of this Government to apply these principles in favor of the recognition of Lithuani a is con “ ” taine d in the statement of our Russian p olicy as announced in the Av ezzana A 10 1920 f o n Note of ugust , , and as rea ﬁrmed in the Note A f A of rmenia to Paul Hymans , President o the ssembly the League of

1921. Nations , dated January 22, This policy is against the dismember “ m of th ol ent Russia , without the consent of e d Russia. restored free ” and united . 2

As the n of directly applied to questio Lithuanian recognition , the m a i A State Depart ent in a communic t on dated ugust 23, 1920 , to Hon . Vil eisis of A Jonas , Representative Lithuania in merica , stated

Russia— the Russia of 1917— must herself be a party to ” of any readjustment her frontiers .

of The desirability of securing the consent , if possible , free and independent Russia to the readjustments of her former frontiers may

o . t be c nceded We ﬁrmly urge , however, hat our hope for the restoration of a free Russia in the indeﬁni te future should not be set up as an of - obstacle to the national aspirations independent non Russian peoples . To insist on the sta tus quo until Russia shall emerge from her troubles would result l n visiting upon the non — Russian border nations the mis

fortunes now attendant upon the great Russian nation .

L t uan ans nt re tin o s i h i E i ly Dis c t fr m Russia n . In our natural reluctance to allow any selﬁsh advantage to be taken of of present chaotic conditions in Russia , to the prejudice the Russian

people, the signiﬁcant fact should no t be forgotten that the Lithuanian ar e people in every way, by race , language , and religion , distinct from i the Russian people , and have never w llingly submitted to Russian

rule in the past , nor will they willingly submit in the future . Prior to the Nineteenth Century Lithuania ﬂourished as a free and independent to of nation , and was forcibly annexed Russia at the close the Eighteenth o Century through the right of conquest alone . In spite f the most pro n unce d to o oppression , the Lithuanian people were able preserve their of independence thought , religion , and custom , never ceasing to look “ to an d forward the day when Lithuania , herself restored , free united , th would again take her place among e nations of the world . Several n s on 16 1918 u successful uprising took place , and ﬁnally February , ,

al most exactly three years ago , Lithuania proclaimed herself free and of independent of all existing ties with other foreign powers , including, i course . former Russian dominion . Since that date she has ma ntained c a democratic form of government with increasing vigor, suc essfully r 12 1920 resisting the forces of the Soviet Gove nment , until on July , , f w as S a treaty o peace concluded , in which the oviet Government formally renounced all Russian claims to former sovereignty over the

Lithuanian people .

i O the r Na tions Ha ve Recogniz ed L thua nia .

The independent Government o f Lithuania has been recognized de facto by the other great nations of the world . The United States

o A an d . As has joined them in the recognition f rmenia , Poland Finland 3

no d to those three nations , but t as to Lithuania , this Country has a mitted that our policy against the dismemberment of Ru ssia should not in all

fairness be applied .

N on- o n t on e R rec g i i Doe s Not H lp ussian Peop le . While the present misfortunes of the Russian people are to be de l or ed p , it must nevertheless be remembered that the failure to recognize of f the independence Lithuania has the effect , not o assisting the Russian fo r people , but of throwing the Lithuanian people back into Russia ,

the present at least , under Soviet control . This Government has con sistently held to the belief that the Soviet Government must and will An f off be overthrown . y e forts by separate groups to throw Soviet rule

should , therefore, be encouraged . Lithuania has taken an important r to step in this direction , and should be given eve y encouragement m o f maintain her existing democra tic for Government , rather than of relegated to her former condition as part Russia , with consequent

oppression from the only ruling power in Russia today . the our There are other considerations , apart from question of ’ of fo r n Russian policy, in support Lithuania s claim recog ition , which

are treated in our separate memorandum . Without attempting here to i t o f d scuss them all , we respec fully invite attention to two the more r impo tant existing problems , which recognition of Lithuania by the

United States will tend greatly to simplify .

1 . THE POLISH SITUATION .

The presence of Polish troops o n Lithuanian soil constitutes a grave of menace to the peace o f Central Europe . By the terms her Peace of Treaty with Lithuania , Soviet Russia agreed to respect the neutrality

Lithuanian territory so long as other nations similarly respected it . The of 0 0 presence Polish tr ps on Lithuanian soil is a violation of this Treaty , involving the danger of an invasion of Lithuania by Russian troops

which are already massed on the Lithuanian frontier for that purpose . Lithuania must be considered either as an independent nation or as o f part of Russia ; no middle ground is possible . If she is part Russia ,

Poland being at war with Russia , logically must be conceded the right to i h ff a nvade her territory . T is in turn a ords Russia the justiﬁc tion for a counter-invasion of Lithuania against the Poles The da nger of such a gen eral embroilment of these nations cannot be too strongly empha sized . Even if a Peace Treaty should be signed at Riga , between Poland and Russia (which seems unlikely) Poland might still have to invade

Lithuanian territory for strategic reasons . Reco n t on Wou re ve nt W g i i ld P ar .

If Lithuania should be recognized by the United States , as an inde

pendent Nation , with consequent admission into the League of Nations r and guarantees of territorial integ ity, Poland would be obliged to with 0 0 w draw her tr ps and could , from her o n standpoint, safely afford to

do so . Russia would then have no claim that Lithuania w as allowing 0 0 f hostile tr ps upon her soil , the danger o Russian invasion would be

largely averted , and in all likelihood a solution of this grave problem

would thus be found .

2 . THE PROPOSED PLEBISCITE.

The League of Nations is planning to hold a plebiscite in important

localities in the eastern and southeastern portions of Lithuania , to determine whether these localities prefer to attach themselves to Poland o r Lithua to ma . It is obvious that the question cannot be fairly pre sented without the recognition of Lithuan ia o n an equal footing with As now the Poland . the situation stands , the question to be put to voters “ ff r would be in e ect , do you prefer to belong to a f ee and independent t Poland or to attach yourselves to Lithuania , to be held in rust for ” no of ? t Russia , with guarantee independence The grave injus ice to n Lithuania o f a plebiscite o these terms is clear . Undoubtedly many of districts ordinarily sympathetic with and even part Lithuania , would choose independence as Poles rather than serfdom as Russians under the

present Soviet control .

' Russia s Rights Should N o t Prejudice Lithuania s.

The problems presented by the readjustment of the Russian frontiers no are concededly difficult of soluti on . We have desire to allow selﬁsh ’ advantage to be taken o f Russia s present unfortunate condition . On a the other hand , it is respectfully urged th t this chaotic state should no t prevent the recognition of the just claims of independent non the of Russian peoples , especially where consequence withholding recognition involves the subjection of such peoples to Soviet rule and where extending recognition offers the only rational solution of many problems involved in the Baltic situation .

Third Annive rsa ry of Lithua nian Inde p ende nce .

O 16 19 1 i t of n February , 2 , w ll occur the hird anniversary the Proc l amation of Independence by Lithuania . During this time its govern of o ment has maintained itself, in the face most unfavorable conditi ns ,

with increasing control and power . This anniversary would seem to 5

for afford a suitable occasion the United States to express , in the i of n w tang ble form recog ition , its sympathy ith the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people for independence .

Yours respectfully, M cA TT K noo, CO ON FRAN LIN .

Hon . Bainbridge Colby,

Secretary of State ,

Washington , D . C . MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN B EHALF OF RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE

From M cAdoo , Cotton and Franklin

1 19 1 Supplementing the memorandum dated January 5, 2 , submitted A o n by us to Hon . Norman H . Davis , cting Secretary of State, that date , we are setting forth below some o f the more important considerations which apply to the claim of the Lithuanian Government for recognition by the United States .

A I . SYMP THY OF THE U N ITED STATES WITH NATIONAL AS RA NS N N PI TIO OF DEPE DE T PEOPLES .

This principl e was expressed at an early date in the history of o u r p ol itical relations by S ecretar v of State Buchanan as follows

The Government of the United States has from its origin alwa s recognized d e facto governments as soon as the have ” ind e n clear manifested their ability to maintain their p e ence . o f ( See oore , Digest International Law , page

This policy has been stated on numerous occasions by President w Wilson since the outbreak of the World War . The follo ing declara 1 1918 of tion on February 1 , , is typical many others

- Self determination is n o t a mere phrase . It is an imper ative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth

ignore at their peril . Every territorial settlement involved in tli is war must be made in the interest and for the beneﬁt of the of populations concerned , and not as a part any mere adjust ” ment of compromise of claims among rival states . These principles have been directly applied in expressions toward Lithuania by Secretary of State Lansing in a communication to the O 15 1919 Lithuanian National Council , dated ctober ,

The Government o f the United States is traditionally sympathetic with the national aspirations of independent ” peoples .

Unless these principles must be considered to be modiﬁed by our ” Russian policy , the claims of Lithuania would seem to properly fal l

- within the principles of self determination . II . SUMMARY OF OUR RUSSIAN POLIC Y . 6 19 9 On May 2 , 1 , a note was sent to Admiral Kolchak signed by O S Clemenceau , Lloyd George , rlando , President Wilson and aionji , setting forth the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers toward to Russia . In this note the policy was declared formally restore order within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume co ntrol of their o ff wn a airs , and to restore order along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian state with its neighbors through the arbitration of the League of Nations . Feeling convinced that these ends could not be attained by dealing with the Soviet Government , they set forth certain conditions which they would expect Admiral Kolchak to observe if he should prove sufﬁciently A powerful to dominate conditions in Russia . mong these conditions the following were stated :

Fourth] That the independence o f Finland and Poland be reco gnize and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement they will be referred to the ar bitration of the

League of Nations .

Fifthly : That if solution of the relations between the d e a t of f c o Governments Esthonia , Latvia , Lithuania and the

Caucasian and Transcaucasian territories , and Russia , is not w speedily restored by agreement , the settlement ill be made co - o era tion of in consultation and with the Lea e Nations , and that until such sett emen t is made the ov ernment of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and to conﬁrm the relations which may exist between the d e fa cto Al l ied an d Ass ia ted r governments and the oc gove nments .

Sixthly : That the right of the Peace Conference to deter mine the future of the Roumanian part of Bessarabia be ” recognized .

’ S r a c ecreta y L nsing s Po li y .

The next statement of importance as applied to the status of L ithu~ ania is co ntained in a communication to . the Lithuanian National Council Vinika . . s, i , n . R i represented by M J Cha rman sig ed by Hon obert Lans ng, O 1 1919 5 , . i dated ctober In this communicat on , Secretary Lansing, answering the letters o f the Lithuanian National Council on the subject of of the provisional recognition Lithuania , stated :

The uestion of the future status of Lithuania has been

111 c . As o u the given care onsideration y are aware , Government of the United States is traditionally sym athetic with the of i eo l es. nat onal aspirations dependent p n the other hand , it has been thought unwise and umair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of orderly constitutional government in of Russia the principle Russian unity as a whole . 8

Secretary Lansing then referred to the note to Admiral Kolchak mentioned above and stated

It is believed that this arrangement assures the antono of mous development Lithuania , together with the other nation al ities com rised within the former Russian empire , and wisely refers to a uture adjustment the determination of the relations which shall exist between them and the new Russian Govern ” ment .

’ Secreta o o ry C lby s P licy .

The next communication of importance on the question is the so- Av ezzana of A 10 19 0 called note Secretary Colby, dated ugust , 2 . This note declared that the policy of the United States was against the recog

‘ nition of the Bolshevist regime and a settlement of the Russian problem “ ” upon the basis of a dismemberment of Russia . The Secretar y after referring to the sincere friendship of the Government of the United States

- for the great Russian nation struggling for self government , expressed the conﬁdence of the United States that

“ restored , free and united , Russia will again take a leadin g i i lace in the world , join ng w th the other free nations in u ” p polding peace and orderly protection . The Secretary then stated

Until that time shall arrive , the United States feels that ’ friendshi and honor re uir e that Russia s interests must be p b generous y protected , an that as far as possi le all decisions f o vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its

sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian empire, i o f be held in abeyance . By this feel n friendship and honor able obligation to the great nation wgose brave and heroic self sacriﬁce contributed so much to the successful determination of of the war , the Government the United States was guided in 15 1919 its reply to the Lithuanian National Council on October , , and in its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as

separate nations independent of Russia . The same spirit was 1920 manifested in the note of this Government of March 24, , in which it was stated with reference to certain proposed settle ‘ ments in the Near East that no fi n al decision should or can ’ of be made without the consent Russia .

’ Acting Sec reta ry .Davis Sta te ment . A 23 1920 The ﬁnal communication of importance is dated ugust , ,

i A of . from Hon . Norman H . Dav s , cting Secretary State , to Hon Jonas Vil eisis s . In this communication Secretary Davi stated that the Depart ment saw no reason to modify its policy with respect to withholding The c a : recognition from Lithuania . ommunic tion then stated

' presents an impasse , if our policy as then stated is to be continued

without modiﬁcation .

ea P ce With Russia .

2 The te ms o the P ea e T ea t between L ithuan an ie ( ) r f c r y ia d S ov t Russia , n l ud ed Jul 12 1920 have no w be e kn wn co c y , , com o . Details of this treaty had not been received in this country at the of the l isis of A 19 . Vi e time communication to Mr ugust 23, 20 . By the terms of that treaty Soviet Russia has completely recognized the inde endence of p Lithuania and renounced al l claims to former sovereignty . It may well be logically that as the United States has not recognized the B ol shevic no t regime , it is concluded by the provisions of this treaty . i Conceding the log c of this situation , it nevertheless is undeniable that the only authoritative government in Russia has completely renounced

all claims to Lithuania . The importance of this action , insofar as the of rights Lithuania are deﬁned thereby, should be carefully weighed independently of the refusal of the United States to recognize the Soviet o f Government Russia .

dm u Lithuania N ot A itted to Lea g e .

h L i e i (3) T e eague of N a t ons has refused memb rsh p to L ithuania .

The request of Lithuania for admission to the League of Nations was refused last autumn primarily because the United States had not f A o t recognized the independence o Lithuania . lthough this c un ry is b of of not at present a mem er the League Nations , there can be no doubt that the League is unwilling to take any action opposed to our expressed policies and the League in its rejection of Lithuan ia as a member laid great stress upon the refusal of the United States to recognize its inde

p end ence . It is sufﬁcient merely to state this circumstance , the impor

tance of which to Lithuanian aspirations is evident .

’ Ze lig owski s Seizure of Vilna .

n (4) The P ol ish situatio .

The details of the grave problem presented by the presence o f Polish troops on Lithuanian soil are too well known to require extended dis cussion of Lithu . The entire region around Vilna , the former capital

ania , has been occupied by Polish troops under the command of

Zel i for , gowski. While Poland has disavowed responsibility his actions it is nevertheless a recognized fact that Polan d is supplying him with f fresh troops and materials o war , and that in adopting these measures A of she is acting largely for her own protection against Russia . state 11

war still exists between Poland an d Russia , and Lithuania is in the “ ’ ” unfortunate position geographically of the national no man s land the between the warring countries . Under present attitude of the United

States , Lithuanian territory must be regarded as held in trust for Russia and Poland is therefore logically within her rights in occupying L ithu m ania (Russian) territory. The situation is further complicated by the provisions in the treaty between Lithuania and Russia to the effect that Russia is only bound to respect the neutrality of Lithuania so long as r A troops hostile to Russia simila ly respect it . ccordingly, the presence of Polish troops on Lithuanian territory ip so facto constitutes a violation ’ of Lithuania s treaty wi th Russia and gives Russia the right to undertake similar invasion . This is not merely a bogie dangled by Lithuania before own the eyes of the world to hasten its recognition . The presence of large forces of Russian troops massed upon the Lithuanian border and the probability of an invasion of Lithuania against Poland by these troops has been reported in detail recently in the public press . The whole situation presents a grave danger which it is distinctly to the Th interests of the world at l arge should be unraveled . e solution can be found as a logica l consequence of the recognition by the United States c of Lithuania . If this recognition were granted with onsequent admis of t sion to membership in the League Nations , Li huanian independence would immediately become a safeguard to Poland against Russia . Poland would then not have the excuse that Lithuania is part of Russia and subject to invasion . Upon the withdrawal of the Polish troops from Lithuania the danger of invasion from Russia would no longer exist . The Russian authorities have strongly asserted that they will t respect the trea y with Lithuania so long as other nations respect it, and there would be no justiﬁcation under the treaty for the invasion of

Lithuania by Russia when the Polish troops are withdrawn .

No te to M . Hymans.

n of Moreover, recog ition Lithuania would not seem to be incon o t i t sistent with the expressions c n ained n the recent note o Paul Hymans , A of of President of the ssembly the League Nations , dated January 22 , 1921 A , with respect to the mandate of rmenia In this note , H on . Norman

H . Davis , speaking for the President, said The unrest and instabili along the border are caused by mutual ?be bitter and distrust . struggling new nationalities which were formerly art of the Russian empire are afraid to o f disarm and return to t e works peace , because they distrust

the Bolsheviki and fear new aggression . The Soviets contend that zhey are afraid to demobilize because they fear new a ttacI 12

The note then urges the Associated Powers to give no encouragement for the invasion of Russian territory by such border states . In this note “ attention also is called to the recent tragical events on the Polish ” front .

Po lish Invasio n ofLithuania . There is certainly no disposition on the part of Lithuania to under an of take invasion Russia . On the contrary, this action has been ex pressly negatived by the treaty of pea ce between the two nations con cluded last July. It is the presence of Polish troops under General Zeligow ski on Lithuanian territory which is largely responsible for the a N t gr ve problem presented by the Baltic situation . o only would the danger of the invasion of Russia by Poland be obviated by the recog nition o f S th Lithuania by the United tates , but also e consequent danger of invasion of Lithuania by Russia would disappear with the withdrawal

of . to the Polish troops The guaranty Russia as expressed in the note , “ ” You i can have peace if you want it, can , it is subm tted, best be made by the recognition of Lithuania with the co nsequent withdrawal of n Polish troops from Lithuania (Russian) territory . This would not ’ only remove Russia s reason to fear hostilities with Poland , but also ’ hostil i Russia s excuse for invading Lithuania . If there are thereafter “ ties , in the language of this note the responsibility would then be clearly ” placed . Even if the negotiations between Poland and Soviet Russia at Riga should result in a treaty of peace (which acc ording to the latest advices seems unlikely) , the situation would not be greatly altered . The Soviet authorities have repeatedly declared that if they are obliged to sign the Riga treaty, it will be regarded as founded on coercion and will be nulliﬁed as soon as their forces have had an opportunity to be

~ strengthened and co ordinated .

Polish C orridor Into Russia .

r Mo eover, in any event, the status of Lithuania cannot be settled in this way . The territory to be accorded to Poland under this treaty consists of a narrow strip extending northward to the River Dvina ; to of of the westward this strip lies the territory Lithuania . Poland , for strategic reasons , would in all likelihood be obliged to o ccupy this terri tory, if Lithuania is not recognized as an independent nation . Soviet i of un Russia , wh ch has guaranteed the neutrality Lithuania , would doubtedly regard the presence of Polish troops on Lithuanian soil as a of violation this neutrality , causing the same dangers of unrest and x instability as e ist at present . 13

Ple biscite in Vilna District.

i . (5) The p roposed pl ebiscite und e r the auspices ofthe L eague ofN at ons This situation was discussed in a memorandum submitted by the

Representative of Lithuania to the Department of State, dated December the im 21, 1920 . The importance of a fair decision by voters in this portant locality of Vilna is apparent . It must be conceded that a fair decision cannot be had until the independence o f Lithuania is recog n ize d . The voters should not be asked to decide whether they prefer to attach themselves to Poland with consequent guaranties of inde p end ence or whether they prefer to be held in trust for Russia with no of guaranties of futur e independence . The result such a proposition would undoubtedly be that Poland would obtain a large and important ar ea o f land which is concededly Lithuanian both ethnologically and in sympathy .

Lithuania Resists Bo lshevism.

ie ati o L ithuan ia (6) D anger of so v tiz on f . There can be no doubt as to the importance of national recognition as A Az an an tidote to soviet propaganda . The countries of rmenia and er baijan have al ready become entirely sovietized . This result is aecom plished through soviet propaganda which is conducted along the follow “ ing lines : Soviet Russia is ﬁghting against the world to sovietize the world ; failure on the part of the United States to extend recognition in dicates a complete lack of sympathy with the national aspirations of the peoples formerly under Russian rule ; therefore it is better for such peo ples to throw in their lot with Soviet Russia which will guarantee auton o my and recognize their independence , provided a soviet form of govern ” ment is adopted . So far Lithuania has resisted this propaganda and is l so of ikely to continue to do , but in view the extreme importance of Lithuan ia geographically as a barrier against Bolshevism between Soviet Russia and Central Europe any danger of the sovietization of Lithuania is an important consideration an d should be counteracted by all possible t s me hod .

OUR N IV. POLICY A S TO R USS I A AS A NOUNCED I N THE AVEZZANA NOTE IS NO B AR TO THE REC OGNITION

OF LITHUANIA.

h - n (a) It must be conceded that Lit uanians are a non Russia people . Our policy against the di smemberment of Russia should not be applied as against a people which were identiﬁed with Russia only through the f i superior power o oppression . Lithuan a in the eighteenth century and 14

n — earlier , was a great independent ation , the powerful Lithuanian ic — w as Polish Republ , which conquered by Russia and partitioned b e A tween the three neighboring powers , Russia , Prussia and ustria, the of the greater part territory going to Russia . Lithuania has never will in l g y submitted to Russian rule . The religion of Lithuania is Roman

Catholic . Its people are not Slavs but are ethnologically distinct . Even w i of the 191 ith the ava lability the presence of Russia of 7, it is submitted that our policy would not require Lithuania to continue to submit to A 23 Russian rule . In the communication of ugust , it is stated that Lithuanians are a non-Russian people and it is submitted that our policy against dismemberment of Russia should not be applied against non - a people which is concededly Russian .

Reco n t on g i i a B ar to Bo lshevism.

(b) The underlying sentiment of the Avezz ana note recognizes the hope that the people comprised within Russian territory will throw off on the yoke of Bolshevism . This can never be accomplished at e time on the of by concerted action part such people . It must take pla ce gradually here and there throughout Russia by setting up democratic forms of government with sufficient force to maintain themselves in opposition to the Soviet Government . In this way the Russian people o will gradually be enabled t repudiate the Soviet Government . It is precisely this action which Lithuania has taken . It has set up a demo cratic form of government which proposes to defend itself against en the croachment by Soviet Russia . It has in fact by arrangement with Soviet Government forced the latter to recognize its freedom and re nounce claims of sovereignty. Its recognition by the United States would not only be in line with the hostile attitude of this country towards Soviet Russia but would also be a source of much encouragement to ol sh i other groups of people seeking to throw off B ev c rule .

N N R C N Z B Y THE R R A V. LITHUA IA HAS BEE E OG I ED OTHE G E T R POWERS AS A DE FAC T0 GOVE NMENT. i While this circumstance is not controll ng upon the United States , it should be given due consideration in determining the d e facto exist f d e a t ence o Lithuania . That its independence exists f c o to an extent im which would justify recognition must be conceded . It is likewise portant that other powers have seen ﬁt to recognize this independence . For the information of the Department there are attached to this mem or andum translations of the notes extending recognition to Lithuania of 1 i 2 3 by the respective governments ( ) Great Brita n , ( ) France, ( ) 5 6 7 8 Finland , (4) Latv ia , ( ) Norway, ( ) Poland , ( ) Sweden , and ( ) Soviet

i . Russia . L thuania has also been recognized by Italy 15

Reco n t o m g i i n Would Se ttle Ba ltic Proble .

In this memorandum there has been no attempt to discuss the ethnology of the Lithuanian people nor other facts connected with the

location , resources, population , etc. , of the country. These conditions have been fully explained in previous memoranda submitted to the

Department and their discussion here would serve no useful purpose . This memorandum is submitted in the earnest conviction that the reco g nition of Lithuania by the United States should be accorded not only because such recognition would be well deserved by this independent and democratic people but also because it seems to present a real solu tion of many of the perplexing problems presented by the Baltic situation

generally.

Respectfully submitted , AD C oi 'roN K MC OO , FRAN LIN , 120 Broadway, New York City .

15 1921 Dated February , . 16

COPY OF NOTE EXTENDING RE COGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY GREAT BRITAIN

U S 25 1919. KA NA , September ,

I have the honor to inform you that I have received a telegram A ai of from the Secretary of Foreign ff rs , by way Riga , stating that the Government of His Majesty o f Great Britain has communicated to the Lithuanian Representatives that he is ready to recognize the Provisional Government of Lithuania as an independent state d e facto on the same basis as the Nations of Esthonia and Latvia , and I have received orders to communicate this information to you .

I have the honor to be , Sir,

Your obedient servant ,

S D L ieut. C l n el ( igned) WAR , o o ,

C mmissar or the B al ti P ovinces. Asst. o y f c r

To His Excellency,

of The President Lithuania ,

Kaunas .

TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY FINLAND

BURE AU OF FORE IGN AFFAIR S

1 1 1 7 9 9. HELSINGFORS , Nov . , 4 1090 . No .

To T H E PRE SIDENT OF T H E COUNCIL

’ I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency s letter o f October 23r d last by which I was informed of the desire of the Gov . ernment of Lithuania to obtain from the Government o f Finland recog nition of the Independence of Lithu ania and of its Provisional Govern ment. f The President o the Republic, who has always been actuated by t the most sympa hetic feelings toward Lithuania , has ordered me to convey to your Excellency the information that he is happy to extend recognition to the Government of Lithuania as Government d e fa cto of said countrya nd that he extends the heartiest wishes for the prosperity of the new Nation and for the establishment of bonds of friendship between our two countries . of Please accept , Mr . President of the Council , the assurance my highest consideration .

T] (Signed) HOLS .

To His Excellency,

Gal van au skas Mr . ,

President of the Council of

Lithuania , etc Kaunas . I9

TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RE COGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY LATVIA

REPUB LIC OF LATVIA

MINISTRY OF FORE IGN AFFAIRS

12 1921. RIGA, Feb . ,

2368 . N r . p .

R E M . MINIST R

m of I have the honor to infor you that , in accordance with the will A the President of the Constituent ssembly, the Cabinet of Ministers has decided torecognize Lithuania d e jure as free and independent . In sending o n this occasion my heartiest good wishes to the Repub lic i ﬁrm of L thuania , permit me to express my most conviction that our two peoples will be united in even closer friendship in the future . The Government of Latvia is ﬁrmly convinced that the fraternal Letto Lithuanian union constitutes the most solid basis for the consolidation of of the independence and sovereignty our young States . This friend our ship , nourished by inextinguishable will to live independently, will o permit us to g forward in the path of progress and prosperity, while our of i pursuing common ideals justice and true l berty . A Mr of ccept, . Minister, the assurance my highest consideration .

Z A M E I . . EROVI ( Signed) cz,

M iniste F ei n A a i s r of or g ff r . To His Excellency

of Aff The Minister Foreign airs of Lithuania . TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY NORWAY

MINISTRY OF FORE IGN AFFAIRS

T A 1919. KRIS IANIA , ugust 22,

M E DE T : R . PR SI N I have had the honor to receive the letter by which your Excellency has kindly informed me that following the declaration Of the Norwegian Government that it consents to recognize d e facto the Lithuanian Nation Au stuol is and to accept its Representative , Mr. Jonas g , Lawyer, has been designated as the Lithu ani an Representative to the Government of

Norway. I thank your Excellency for this kind communi cation and for the w sentiments which it expresses toward Nor ay . Au s uolis In adding that I have provided a cordial welcome for Mr . g t , I take the Opportunity to Offer to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration .

L (Signed) OE VLAN D .

To His Excellency,

The President of the Council

of Ministers of Lithuania . 2]

TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTE NDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY POLAND

TELE GRAM

W 1171 187. WARSA ,

4—7 20-16 To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic

at Kovno .

MR TE . MINIS R

I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the Polish Government has decided to recognize the Constituent AS sembly of Lithuania and the Government placed in power by said A the ssembly as independent organizations d e fa cto . Desiring to give at same time practica l testimony as to the sentiment which the Polish

Nation has always entertained toward your country, sentiments which the past relations of the two Nations, so closely allied , will I hope serve to a expand and strengthen , the Polish Government decl res it is ready o n its part to enter into friendly relations with the Lithuanian Govern The l of rinci l s ment . Polish Government believes that the app ication p p e of justice and equity in al l the relations between the tw o countries and toward the national minorities o f each other will form the most secure basis for this friendship .

I take this Opportunity to present to you , Mr. Minister, the assurance of my high consideration .

TE OF E A A I (Signed) MINIS R FOR IGN FFAIRS S P E H A. TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY SWEDEN

12 1918 . BE RLIN , December ,

M R . MINISTE R

Referring to your interview with the Counsellor of the Legation , I have the honor to inform you that I have not delayed in acquainting my Government with the desire expressed by your Government to see

Sweden recognize the Government of Lithuani a as an independent State . In accordan ce with the instructions of my Government I have the ou n r honor to inform y that the Gover ment of the King, desi ing to

follow the same policy which it has followed in similar precedents , and n recognizing the situation actually existing, is ot able to accord a al the of form recognition of the Lithuanian State , but Government the King is entirely disposed to enter into unofficial relations d e facto with

the representatives of the actual Government of Lithuania . In so far as your note refers to the handling of Lithuanian affairs

in Russia by the Government of Sweden , my Government , not seeing its way clear to extending formal reco gnition for the present to the s Lithuanian State , doe not believe that it should charge itself with

the protection of Lithuanian interests in Russia .

of . Please accept , Mr . Minister, the assurance my high consideration

V N E ( Signed) O ESS N ,

in i t e M s er ofS wed n . 23

COPY OF NOTE ANNOUNCING RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIA BY THE AR GENTINE REPUBLIC

Embajada de la R epubl ics Argentina

T r 24 1921. WASH ING ON , D . C Ma ch ,

VIL E I S I s, t A Representa ive of Lithuania in merica , 1 h 703 5t Street, N . W

s Wa hington , D . C .

We have the pleasure of informing you that according to cable m L h despatches received at the E bassy, our Government recognized it u 14 ania as a free and independent State on March th , instant .

Very respectfully,

E I PE A E S PI L (Signed) F L . ,

i s e r h E F r t S ecr ta y of t e mbassy .

FAE zE HS COPY OF NOTE ANNOUNCING RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIA BY ME$ ICO

Embajada de Mexico

SH T . C . 19 1. WA ING ON, D , May ﬁfth , 2

The Of b of the Government the Repu lic Mexico , which I have honor f to represent at this Capital, has instructed me to in orm you that , after giving due considera tion to the contents of your letters of February -fi second and February the twenty rst, respectively, addressed to this of f ni Embassy, the Republic Mexico , Of icially recog zes the independence of the Republic of Lithuania . Allow me to give expression to the personal sentiments of gratiﬁca tion with which I have the honor to bring the foregoing to your knowl edge and to request you to be assured that the people and the Govern ment of Mexico will not spare any effort to entertain the harmonious and friendly relations that I am conﬁ dent will always exist between o of them and the people and Government f the Republic Lithuania . ou s I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to y , Sir, the a sur ances of my distinguished consideration

E S A UE T LLE z . ( igned) M N L C .

E U IL E I I MONSI R J . V S s,

Representative of Lithuania,

etc . , etc . , etc . ,

Washington , D . C .

LETTER TO HON . CHARLES E . HUGHES, SECRE

TARY OF STATE, FROM WM . G . M cADOO .

6 1921. May ,

RE : RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE .

E ET Y MY DEAR MR. S CR AR

In anticipation of seeing you personally next week on behal f of ’ for the Lithuanian Government s claim recognition by the United States , I respectful ly invite your attention to o ur letter to Secretary of State 15 1921 Colby, dated February , , and to the memorandum submitted therewith (extra copies of which are enclosed) in which are set forth the i in some detail considerations appl cable to the situation . Having received no reply from Secretary Colb y to this letter and believing

ﬁrmly that a favorable decision should be given , I take the liberty of pressing upon your earnest consideration the arguments therein pre sented.

In this connection it should be mentioned that since the date of the letter mentioned above , the plebiscite planned by the League of Nations ” S O- for the called Vilna District has been temporarily abandoned , owing to the difficulties involved in its supervision by the League of ’ Nations and perhaps because of Poland s military control of the area in question . In lieu thereof, the League has suggested that the boundary disputes between Poland and Lithuania be settled if possible by direct the diplomatic negotiations under auspices of the League , conducted f through a joint commission o delegates from the two nations . The abandonment of the pl ebiscite renders inapplicable our previous discussion of the unfairness of holding it without recognition i i of L thuania by the Un ted States, but does not postpone the necessity Th for such recognition . e latest advices indicate that a diplomatic settlement of the disputes will be impossible— Polan d in the absence of recognition of Lithuania regards the Vilna District as territory with out ofﬁcial status and appears to be relying upon her present military control to result in permanent acquisition of the area . The situation to ni presents a real menace peace which , I believe , recog tion of Lithuania will tend greatly to lessen . Up p e r Silesia .

The placing of Poland and Lithuania on an equal political and diplomatic footing in the United States is essential to the success of peaceful negotiations . In any case it will powerfully aid a peaceful of outcome . The recent invasion Upper Silesia by Polish forces , after l ebsicit the unfavorable p e there , indicates an attitude which Lithuania , of in the absence recognition , may well have reason to fear , in the m a not event of a diplomatic adjust ent with which Pol nd may be satisﬁed .

Recognition by Argentina .

To o ur previous memorandum are attached translations of notes ni o extending recog tion t Lithuania by other nations . To this list Should now be added the Argentine Republic which has extended d e jure recog ni ion i t to Lithuan a . SO b I sincerely trust that the United States , favora ly disposed to the national aspirations of dependent peoples , will give the request of the Lithuanian Republic for recognition the most careful and favorable consideration .

Faithfully yours ,

M M cAD WILLIA G . oo.

Hon . Charles E . Hughes ,

Secretary of State ,

Washington , D . C . THE ECONOMIC B ASIS FOR LITHUANIA’S CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE

The following facts and ﬁgures have been compiled by the L ithu m n a ia Information Bureau , with the special purpose of disproving the i c statement , sometimes heard , that Lithuania is econom cally in apable of The in supporting herself as an independent State . data herein are tended to present in condensed form what is most pertinent to Lithua ’ nia s economic situation .

L thuan a an i i Agricultural C o untry .

to It may be observed , begin with , that as Lithuania is more entirely an agricultural country than any of the States which have emerged as l - of se f governing entities from the world war, she is in less need assist e ow n anc from without . She produces within her borders everything - x necessary to a self contained , independent e istence . To be sure , she has no mineral resources , but not being an industrial country, she has for no absolute necessity them . On the other hand , Russia has no need r of anything which Lithuania p oduces . This is not to say that Lithuania “ ” c could lead a healthy existen e merely as a peasant republic , such as A the Boer republics of South frica . Her full cultural development of o course demands active interc urse with other countries . But merely ’ as a question of existence , Lithuania s position is as favorable as that ’

of any country, and much more favorable, naturally, than that of a

country like Switzerland , say, which has managed to maintain its inde pen dence during a period when larger and more powerful States have been broken up or absorbed by their neighbors .

AR A AN D A I . E POPUL TION OF LITHUANIA.

] Lithuania , including the Meme District , has an area s uare mil es t q , more han Belgium square miles) , The Nether m lan ds square miles) , Den ark square miles) , or Swi tzer ’ land square miles) . Lithuania s area and population are of approximately the same as those Bulgaria before the war. The p opulation of this territory in 1914 was greater than that of Denmark Norway or Switzerland

A large majority of the population is of Lithuanian blood and

. : i 70 speech Percentages Lithuan ans , per cent ; Jews , 13 per cent ; Poles, 29

8 e R per c nt ; ussians and White Russians , 7 per cent ; other nationalities ,

2 per cent . f Population o larger cities : Vilna (capital) , Kovno , ] Grodno , Meme , Suvalki , Shavli , the u o u The rural population is per cent of whole , the rban p p lation , per cent .

189 ff The population was divided , by occupations , in 7 (latest o icial A ﬁgures) as follows : griculture and forestry, per cent ; industrial 7 commerce a nd r occupations, per cent ; transpo tation , per cent ; fﬁ domestics and laborers , per cent ; o cials and liberal professions , o per cent ; army and navy, per cent ; other ccupations, per cent .

Educa tion .

f ar S 1 Number o schools before the w : econdary schools , 0 ; l a l 600 . 1919 1 others, In there were 3 secondary schools , primary schools and 42 private schools . Several agricultural and other al 1911 on e technical schools have so been established . In there was school for each of population ; there is now one school for each

The Lithuanian Government spent in 1919 ﬁve times . as much for o educational purposes , relative to the proporti n of Lithuanian terri as tory actually administered , was spent by the Russian Government before the war.

A II . GRICULTURE.

This is the chief occupation in Lithuania . Eighty per cent of the population are now engaged in agricultural pursuits . The entire area

of a . of arable l nd is acres (Compare with State Indiana , where farms occupy acres . ) Before the war farmers (peasant 5 c of O proprietors) owned 0 per ent the land , distributed as follows : ne per cent owned 125 to 250 acres ; 66 per cent owned 25 to 125 acres ; 3 n 7 1-2 25 30 712 per cent ow ed to acres , and per cent less than acres . Great landed proprietors owned 40 per cent of the land and the govern ment and churches owned 10 per cent . Seventeen per cent of the rural O the ubl ic population owned no land . f p lands , acres have been r the distributed du ing past two years among soldiers and their families , 0 in far ms of from 25 to 5 acres .

w The staples are rye , heat , barley, oats, peas , potatoes and ﬂax . We give the average annual production before the war for the of ] f whole Lithuania (excluding Meme , then part o Germany) and 30

1920 for of for , that portion Lithuania under the administration of 5 -8 the Lithuanian Government (about of the whole , and also excluding Memel) . It will be noted that as to wheat , peas and pota toes there is a relative increase in the 1920 crop over the pre-war

- figures . There is also a great increase in flax production , but pre war fl 19 1 figures for this are not available . The area planted in ax in 2

- was 50 per cent greater than pre war .

P re-war avera e 92 - o L ith a g . 1 0 ( 5 8 f u nia ) . bushels bushels

t t r f h Unite S at s in 1913 w s ( The o al rye c op o t e d t e as bu hels. )

o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

( The potato crop of Switzerl and in 1917 was the same as that of it ania for 1920 b s L hu u hels. )

tons bushels

E stimate ex rts o ab ve r cts d po f o p odu ,

1920-21

bushels

tons

Stock Ra ising .

of 1913 i We give the number animals in , in the whole of Lithuan a, and in that portion which is now administered by the Lithuanian Gov

m n 19 0 for . ern e t, also the number in 2 the latter territory The actual increase in the quicker breeding animals , sheep and swine , as well as the relatively small diminution in the number of horses and one c cattle are notable when onsiders the destruction of the war, and ’ indicate Lithuania s power of recuperation .

1913 1913 ( 5 8 1920 ( 5 -8

a v n b n i h v r Of the a e ( C l es a d l am s are not i clude d n t e abo e ﬁgu es. c ttl

are milch cows. ) 31

For purposes of comparison we give the numb ers of stock and their r 1 1919 of value on Janua y , , in the State South Carolina , which has an area almost the same as that of Lithu ania square miles) although the population is much less in

r E stimat e valu N umbe s. d e.

Forests. ’ f These are Lithuania s greatest sources o wealth . More than o n e- of fourth the territory is in forests , which 80 per cent is pine 20 and fir and per cent hard wood . Half the timber cut is available for Th export . e normal annual production is feet board measure . ( Compare the figures for the State of Washington , which 1 1 9 8 . in cut about half the above quantity, board feet ) Before the war most of the lumber was rafted into Germany and sawn of and milled there . With establishment sawmills in Lithuania this of industry could be greatly and profitably developed . Value timber 191 exported in 3,

III . IN DUSTRY.

Lithuania has never been a manufacturing country, largely because customs duties made it more proﬁtable for her to export her raw material . Just before the war, however, certain industries , such as r i tanning and potte y, were beg nning to develop . Labor is cheap in Lithuania and if machinery can be Obtained it will be possible for

Lithuania to proﬁtably exploit her own raw materials . The factories were almost all destroyed during the war, but are being restored as of rapidly as me an s permit . Total number manufacturing establish ments’ in Lithuania in 1913 was employing workmen and producing an annual value o f

MM R . IV. CO E CE

1913 : Exports and imports in , exclusive of Memel Exports , ff of which breadstu s , cattle and their products ,

forest products , The imports were about n chieﬂy Of coal , iron , textiles and metal manufactures , i 1912 cluding machinery. ( Compare Serbia with imports in , of and exports Of 32

1920-21 of For the present year ( ) the exports hogs , sheep and w poultry should approach the normal , like ise exports of timber which during the ﬁrst par t of 1920 were seriously hindered because no tariff agreement had been reached with Germany. The recent abolishment ] ofthe Meme customs frontier should also be of great advantage . Exports for the ﬁrst six months of 1920 were of a value of marks , while imports were marks .

Ship p ing Port of M eme l .

It is to be supposed that the Port of Meme] will belong to L ithu wil l ’ ania in the near future . It be Lithuania s only port . It is superior to Koenigsberg, to which , however, it was subordinated under German

. The of ] 15 control average depth water at Meme is feet , while at 12 i of Koenigsberg it is only feet . Me nel is free ice at all times . The average number of vessels entered and cleared at Meme] for the ﬁve 1909 13 817 years , 7 , inclusive , was ; the average tonnage , The 1913 value Of cargoes for was marks . This port could and would be greatly improved and developed under Lithuanian control .

of The total mileage railroads in Lithuania is miles, of i which m les are broad guage and the rest narrow guage .

The roadbeds are generally in good condition , but the ties need of t replacing. Thirty per cent the railroad sta ions were destroyed the during the war, but have been rebuilt provisionally. So also of of bridges , most of which are now wood , except on the line Wirballen

- Kovno Vilna . Rolling stock is greatly needed . Gross revenue of 1913 Lithuanian railroads in , net revenue, deducting nothing for sinking fund , new equipment , etc . , Lithuania is to 88 receive locomotives and cars from Germany, by the terms of the agreement between the Allied Military Mission and the German A n far 58 889 Railroad dministratio . So only locomotives and cars have been delivered . 31 1920 : Rolling stock on hand , December , ( a) broad gauge roads ; 115 locomotives , cars (b) narrow gauge roads ; 52 locomotives 42 o ut r 671 40 out of ( per cent of repai ) , cars ( per cent repair) .

r Chief of these is the Rive Niemen , 500 miles in length , 360 118 As navigable for rafts miles and for vessels miles . far as Smal ininken (70 miles from its mouth) the Niemen is navigable for 420 vessels of tons . Small vessels go as far as Grodno . The principal

Lithuania purchased from the United States army supplies in France to the sum of about A temporary internal loan o f marks raised in 1919 has An Of already been repayed . internal loan marks was A A recently voted by the Constituent ssembly . loan is al so being raised A among Lithuanian citizens in merica .

— ( Note The above memorandum was presented to the Secretar of State on M onda y y, W M a 16 1921 b Re resentative . M . an er in nnec i n wit i i y , , y p Ch dl , co t o h a pl ea for recogn t on of the B altic States. ) LITHUANIA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

H ERB ERT ADAM S GI B B ONS

i article i a red in e t i an S i t terati ns and an dditi n Ths or inal ea th C en r Ma az ne for ar I9ZI . l h al a ( g ly pp u y g J u y, g o , o

o se ver a es have een made t rin it t date . f al p g , b o b g up o ) Without laying stress upon the inﬂuence of the Entente promises l to free and defend sma l nations , none can understand the situation that has arisen since the armistices in the territories of the former Haps

f . burg, Romanof , and Ottoman empires The alternatives before the - l Paris peace makers were treating all subject nationa ities alike , in a o f spirit impartial justice , with the idea of establishing a tolerable new world order ; or blowing hot or cold upon the aspirations and claims o f of subject nationalities , with the aim advancing the particular selﬁsh of th interests e strongest members of the conference .

on f ct n o ci C li i g P li es in Euro p e . The inability -of President Wilson to resist the pressure brought to bear upon him by his European colleagues made the latter choice in

evitable . Why and how may always be moot questions , but the fact remains that the American exponent of the doctrine of self- determina

tion failed to dominate the conference . Small states and subject nations As lost faith in his power to help them . a factor in the settlement , the

United States , the only strong state with no ax to grind , the only power

mi . which might have filled the le of arbiter, was eliminated Had it been f r possible o Great Britain , France , and Italy to agree upon a common policy by mutual sacrifices and compromises and a delimitation of of spheres influence , they could have played favorites among the small nations and emancipated races , and played them to win . The political

organisms would have endured as Entente statesmen created them , and

the frontiers as Entente statesmen drew them . But because those whose combined forces alone could have established peace have followed

divergent and conﬂicting policies and do not play the same favorites , not a single new frontier line in central and eastern Europe and in

western Asia is as yet deﬁnitely settled .

N e w Trea ties. What about the treaties Europe has signed ? What about the u of A Leag e Nations , which misguided mericans tried to convince their fellow- countrymen was functioning ? What ab out the authority of the 36

Supreme Council of the victorious ’ allies ? Treaties are not binding unless force is behind them . The League of Nations is a hollow mockery c without force behind it . The Supreme Coun il can be deﬁed with im unit to p y unless it is in a position to use force win respect for its decrees . ’ Gabriele D Annunz io taught us this lesson soon after the treaties of

i . u Versailles and St . Germa n were signed He seized Fi me, and held it

f . ﬁi in deﬁance o Europe for a year and a half General Gouraud , o cial ly of A responsible to France , violated both the spirit and letter rticle XXII of the covenant by seizing Damascus , and forcing into exile one of the signers of the covenant .

ot nce Imp e of the Lea gue of Na tions.

The unwillingness of members of the council of the League to abide by their covenant themselves and to agree to do their part in ful ﬁl ling the terms of the treaties imposed upon enemy nations led to other of breaches of good faith and disturbances the peace . For lawlessness breeds lawlessness . How can the Great Powers expect smaller states to observe the principles of international equity which they themselves ? of ignore One does not doubt the good intentions of Mr . Paderewski Vol d emar of Poland when he shook hands with Mr . Lithuania at the r meeting of the council of the League of Nations in Pa is last September. But the League of Nations was unable to prevent Polish aggression against Lithuania , even though the Polish member on the Council gave ’

not . assurances of Poland s good faith . Had Mr Paderewski pledged his country at Paris a year before in the matter o f the use of the Haller i troops against Ukraine, only to ﬁnd that his government repud ated the pledge ?

’ Ze llgouski s Adventure .

t th e Refusing to recognize the authori y of the League, and binding own character of an armistice entered into by his Government , the O 1920 Polish General Zel l gouski invaded Lithuania , in ctober, , took on i possession of the capital , Vilna, and marched Kovno , giv ng battle Zel l ouski merrily to the Lithuanians . g had no fear of being called to account . ‘ The Zel l gou ski escapade accelerated the whirl of the international ’ For r e whirlpool more than those of D Annunzio and Gouraud . this tractory Polish general mixed things up in the most dangerous spot in f - Europe . The diferences between Yugo Slavs and Italians , between ar of Arabs and French , e of secondary importance to the general peace the world in comparison with events in the border-lands between Ger i Z many and Russia and Polan d . The support Poland has g ven to ell gouski— or at least her failure to suppress him without foreign interv en 37

’ Annunz o— tion , as Italy ﬁnally did in the case of D i is jeopardizing the e e of xist nce Poland .

Live and Let Liv e

Poland cannot weaken Lithuania without weakening herself ; she cannot destroy Lithuania without destroying herself ; she cannot incor ra t p o e Lithuania without fattening herself for the slaughter. It is ' either live and let live with the border—states of the ol d Romanoﬁ and o of i Hohenzollern empires r repartition . The tragic lesson history in th s on i a case is plain . Unless e bel eves that the Germ n and Russian ra ces O A have been crushed into impotence, ccidental Europe and merica will

play a losing game in establishing Poland as the lone sentinel , at the

expense of her neighbors , between Germany and Russia .

Finland had a great start in getting on her feet over her less fortu m ately situated Baltic sister republics . During the war she was not a

- battle ground , and when the Petrograd revolution precipitated the

collapse of the Russian Empire , the Finns were able to proclaim and h maintain t eir independence . They were off in a corner by themselves , on th and not e path to where the Bolshevists wanted to go . No other state laid claim to any portion of their territory other than the Aland

. b ark of Islands They were able to back to the Treaty Vienna , which had stipulated the preservation of the integrity and autonomy of the of Duchy Finland , and had sanctioned only a personal union with the

of . Russian Empire . The Czar was to be Duke Finland The Finns argued with reason that the disappearance of the Czar annul ed ip so facto the the union with the Russian Empire . This paved way to a speedy recognition o f the independence of Finland by the Entente powers and

of of . neutrals , and the admission Finland to the League Nations The successive revolutionary governments in Russia made no objection to of the secession Finland from the empire , but the compelling motive of speedy Entente recognition was the fact that Germany recognized

Finland and had a powerful propaganda in Finland . Before the revo l ution the Entente powers had been bitterly hostile to Polish and Finnish

aspirations , and this fact had won Finnish sympathy for Germany . te i ed en te Unlike Poland , Finland had no rre rr to claim from the Central o f empires , and therefore saw in the victory the Central empires her

of . A chance breaking away from Russia fter the revolution , the Entente

- powers conveniently forgot the pro Germanism of Finland . Being able z f h to recogni e Finland without o fending Russia , t ey promptly did so , n d a began to intrigue to induce the Finns to attack the Bolshevists . 38

e a ti Th B l c Barons. Prussian inﬂuence had been strong in the Baltic countries north of the frontier of 1795 ever since the Middle Ages . Memel and Libau - A o f and Riga were German built cities . lmost to Petrograd a nobility

- Germanic origin constituted the land owning class along the coast, and

German merchants abounded in the ports . The Baltic barons fell in readily with the extension of Russian sovereignty to the Baltic Sea in m of the Esthonia , Latvia, and Lithuania , and beca e loyal servitors An d Russian Government and co oppressors o f the subject races . as readily, when the Russian armies were beaten in the World War, the Baltic barons welcomed their invading kinsmen and worked for the l King of Prussia . The Russian Revolution did not give the other Ba tic races the opportunity it gave the Finns . The Lithuanians were under

German military domination . The Latvians were in the ﬁeld of military - operations until the Treaty of Brest Litovsk was signed . The Esthonians of soon had to cope with the Bolshevist movement , which Reval , their capital , became a center.

thu an a is N ot - Li i Pro German .

At of 1917 ff the end , Lithuania , like Poland , was o ered independence Au - for by the stro Germans in exchange a political alliance , economic

o . advantages , and military co peration against the Entente Intrigue and i int midation failed . The Lithuanians not only resisted with success the who pressure of their conquerors , tried to disguise themselves as liber ators on 16 1918 , but held a national council at Vilna February , , which o proclaimed the independence f Lithuania , declared against special or and favors either to the conqueror the former master , set up a pro visional government . Kaiser Wilhelm ﬁrst , and the King of Saxony later, tried to beguile the Lithuanians into forming an alliance with who Germany . Is it conceivable that the Lithuanian leaders deﬁed Germany in her hour o f triumph and when their country was held by a German army have been in connivance with defeated Germany ? Vil eisis b of m When Dr . , a mem er the Lithuanian Government, ca e to the United States recently to try to secure American recognition of

Lithuanian independence , I was told by a highly placed Pole that he “ ” - l a l . was notoriously pro German , like the Lithuanian politicians Vil eisis ou t When I inquired into the record of Dr . , I found that he had for been arrested by the Germans , thrown several months into prison and threatened with execution because he would not aid the Germans , and then exiled to an internment camp in Germany . There has been a systematic and persistent propaganda in the United States , in which certain men connected with the State Department have had their part ,

- to represent the Lithuanians as pro Germans , Bolshevists , or Poles . You can take your choice . 39

ec of e Eff t G rma n De fea t .

Real liberation and the h0 pe of statehood came to the Baltic Sea of At republics only after the defeat Germany . Vilna for Lithuania and for at Riga Latvia , independence was formally proclaimed and govern

ments set up before the Germans withdrew . The Esthonians at Reval

were already under a regularly constituted independent government . There was no more reason to doubt the genuineness and permanency and legi timacy of these national movements than in any other part of

Europe . The Baltic Sea republics , ethnographically and historically, ha d as much right to expect from the victory of the Entente the revival

of their nationhood as Poland and Bohemia .

a t Aid a nst B l ic Ag i Bo lsheviki.

' of the Before the conference met at Paris , the powers victorious al liance had entered into diplomatic relations with the Baltic Sea

. and ov republics They received accredited military missions , their g ernmen ts had no intimation that they would be treated differently from h Poland . In fact, t ey were assured that formal recognition of their independence and a seat at the peace conference were withheld only because it was necessary no t to discourage or discredit the anti-Bolshe vist generals to whom the Entente was giving milita ry aid to crush As Lenine . they felt that their existence depended upon the overthrow of or the Moscow soviet, at least in keeping soviet propaganda away ' ow n S ea r e ubli cs from their countries , the Baltic p were content with

informal pledges . They realized the delicacy of the situation and kept

. O in the background at Paris n the other hand , their cooperation alon e of made possible the military plans the Entente against the Bolshevists . They allowed their territory to be used as a base of o perations against

Petrograd and Moscow , they received military supplies from the Enten te

powers , and were guided by the advice of the military missions in the

projected campaigns against Petrograd and Moscow .

Fa ilure of Atta c ks on Bolshe viki.

The Baltic Sea republics needed food and supplies and money. Ravaged and plundered during ﬁve years by Russians and Germans alike , they were beggars who could not choose their friends . Loyalty and decency did no t seem to abide in Entente diplomacy any more than in that of the Germans . But the Baltic states could not break with As of us . long as there was hope killing sovietism , the Baltic Sea repub l ics were ready to work with us . The complete disasters that attended the anti-Bolshevist movements Opened the eyes of the Baltic Sea republics . 40

nit h Ar Kol tchak D enikin Yud e c , the changel Republic , , and had been induced by Entente military missions to attack Lenine . But each in su ccession had been left in the lurch to shift for himself when the fortunes of war changed . We were merely rooters on the side lines .

' The withdr awal from Archan gel was the strongest p ossibl e argument of against a Baltic Sea republic invasion of Russia . The plan using the Baltic states for pulling Entente chestnuts out o f the ﬁre had to be f abandoned . The military missions limited their political e forts to preventing the Baltic republics from signing peace .

A The Kol tchak debacle and . the abandonment of the rchangel front by the Entente armies compelled Esthonia to treat with the Bolshevists . A glance at the map will convince any fair-minded man that the E sths

“

or . had no other choice . It was peace extinction The Entente missions strenuously objected to the negotiations, but they failed to advance the l only argument that would have counted , a deﬁnite pledge of mi itary aid to the amount of two hundred thousand Entente troops to be kept in the country as long as the Esthonian Government had reason to fear a Bolshevist invasion .

“ ” Moral Sup port. 1 1920 The Peace of Dorpat , signed on January2 , , was not evidence — of of Esthonian p erﬁdy or p ro Bolshevist leanings. It was evidence the complete military importance of the Entente and the United States and of the failure of o ur blockade to destroy sovietism in Russia . During of the recent Presidential campaign , Mr . F . D . Roosevelt told the Poles Milwaukee that they had Senator Lodge to thank for the presence cf the

Bolshevist army before Warsaw , because , if the United States had been a member of the league , the Bolshevists would not have dared to cross for the n . the Polish frontier. A d yet Mr Roosevelt was careful to add ( sake of the votes of mothers present) that our aid to Poland would have “ ” E sths been only moral . If the , face to face with the Red armies , had refused to make peace with Lenine,relying on the moral support o f our the League of Nations , what does common sense tell us would have happened to Esthonia ? Esthonia was bitterly reproached for having who signed the Peace o f Dorpat by the very journals and men , seven r months later, gave Poland in a similar plight u gent counsels to do what they had denounced Esthonia for doing.

ua nia and La tv a a e ea ce W th Russ a . Poland, Lith i M k P i i There is no word of condemnation for Poland because she signed O 1920 . the Peace o f Riga in ctober, In fact , she was ofﬁcially advised to M make peace with Lenine . But abandoning the ﬁght against oscow and

the n E s hs Churchill , is ready to sacriﬁce Lithuania s , Latvians , and t to whatever Russian Government may be able to st amp out Bolshevism and

replace Lenine and his associates . The Russians who pulled the strings for the Entente in the various anti - Bolshevist ﬁasco s still watch the development of the Baltic situation and refuse to admit any diminution “ ” of of integral Russia . Polish propaganda ridicules the right the Baltic

races to separate existence .

b o e ofA u C ol y N t ug st 10 , 1920 .

Under these conditions , the observer of European international politics who believes in a square deal for everybody deplores the Colby A 10 19 0 . note of ugust 2 . None questions the good faith of Mr Colby and his associates in their anxiety to convince the Russian people of our detachment and good -will and to try to reconcile our implacable oppo s ion our f O it to Bolshevism with a fection for Russia . ur State Depart

ment undoubtedly meant well , and thought it was making a masterly move ; but one does not need to go farther than the Encyclopaedia

Britannica , certainly an impartial source in the present debate , to con

vince oneself, by glancing over the admirable summaries of historical ’ facts from the best sources, of Mr . Colby s unfairness and inconsistency in announcing in the same document that the policy of the United “ ”

States is to, preserve at all costs Russian integrity and at the same time ’ “ to maintain Poland s territorial integrity by the employment of all ” available means .

- Austria Hung ary and Russia .

After reading in the Britannica the stories of the formation of the

of 1914 A - two political organisms , ustria Hungary and Russia , compare ’ o f 7 1918 A r - Mr . Wilson s note September , , to the ust o Hungarian Gov nt f ernme . Did not the Romano fs as much as the Hapsburgs build their empires upon the ruins of small races of alien blood and institutions and religion ? I f the moral sense of the world demands the liberation and restoration to nationhood of races in slavery to Austrians and Hun f r arians how . o ou g , can Mr Colby declare that the policy Government stands for the retur n to slavery of nations whose life was extinguished by the Russians ? We asked the blessing of Go d upon ou r arms to u t assure us the victory because we were ﬁghting for h mani y. In our

prayers we put no l imit o n ou r philanthropy.

’ e America s Promise to Op pressed Peo p l .

O 1918 c n July 4, , when President Wilson re eived the representa

tiv es of subject races at Mount Vernon , he made a solemn pledge in A the name of the American people to all subject races . Lithuanian 43

’ stood with the others before Washington s tomb . Neither in that speech “ nor of in any other did Wilson say, You understand , course , that the victorious allies mean to free and restore only the subject races whose freedom and restoration will be at the expense of and to the confusion ” of our enemies . Had he said this , it would have been a manly con fassion— to avoid false hopes and false pretences— o f what was after r wa d evident at the peace conference , that the yearning for humanity was a sham and the proclamation o f the doctrine of self- determination a falsehood . The moral issue was simply bunk to make people feel good an d arouse them against the Germans . Because races were conquered ' omanoﬂs by the R , have they less right to freedom than if they were conquered by the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns ?

o nc Inc nsiste y o f Russia n Po licy .

l When we read carefully the Co by note , which is meant to justify the refusal of the State Department to follow the example of our asso ciates in recognizing and dealing with and helping the Baltic Sea

republics , we can challenge its logic as well as its misrepresentation of the American idealism expressed by President Wilson during the “ ” of war. Poland and Finland were portions integral Russia ; so was

Russian Armenia ; so was Bessarabia . Without consulting Russia , we of A have recognized the independence Poland , Finland , and rmenia , and

have agreed to the inclusion of Bessarabia in Rumania .

a of Tre ty Vienna . The State Department expert will respond that Poland and Finland

had a special status under the Treaty of Vienna . Why go back in regard to Russia only to the Treaty of Vienna ? In making the treaties of Ver

of . sailles and St . Germain we canceled the Treaty Vienna We ignored this treaty and all other treaties in dealing with subject races of Austria of Hungary and Germany. The attempt to justify partiality treatment between Poland and the Baltic Sea republics on the ground of the Treaty o f Vienna fails even if we did accept the Treaty of Vienna as the law Th and the prophets . e Grand Duchy of Lithuania enjoyed an individual status in the Russian Empire by v irtue of arrangements made before 18 0 the Napoleonic period and not infringed upon until 3 . The charter 1848 o f Lithuania was not ﬁnally abrogated until , and the title of grand Duke of Lithuania was assumed by the Russian Czar on a par with that

of King of Poland and Grand Duke of Finland at coronations . This acknowledgment of the separate identity of Lithuania in the empire of was never given up . The late Nicholas was crowned Grand Duke

Lithuania . 44

o a nd Lithuania on Sa me Foo ting as P l .

From a historical point of view the American State Department has no ground to stan d upon in regarding Lithuania as a Russian province and at the same time holding that Poland is an independent kingdom . The relations O f the two countries toward the Russian Empire ar e strik in l g y alike . Both lost their independence through the partitions Of ﬂour the eighteenth century, after having been for centuries great and h ff ' is ing empires . Both su ered horribly from czardom during the

- nineteenth century . Both were battle grounds during the late war .

’ Commissione r Ga de s Op inions .

A f who r e r e Commander Gade , an merican reserve naval O ﬁcer p sented us in the Baltic provinces and has since been able to impress his personal Opinions upon the State Department, justiﬁes the non n recogni tion policy o practical economic grounds . He maintains that not to encour these countries cannot exist independently, and ought be i for aged n their aspirations nationhood , because Russia needs them of as an economic outlet to the sea , while much their prosperity must come from transit trade . Commander Gade has advanced this point of I t ‘ A view earnestly and plausibly. appeals to merican common sense , which believes that in union there is strength .

Na t ona st ov em n i li M e ts. O But we forget the treaties Of Versailles and St . Germain . ne may have his own Opinion about the advisab ility Of the policy Of émiettemen t (breaking in pieces) Of pol itical organisms that represented the econ omic evolution Of past centuries . We are committed , however, to just that policy . It is too late to question it . I have never been an unreason

- ing and sentimental pleader for the doctrine Of self determination , but Of I have maintained , as a student nationalist movements , that the effort to limit the application Of self- determination to races whose liberation helps the fancied interests Of a few great powers is disastrous and b o f makes impossi le the establishment peace .

conom c Stre n h h n a E i gt of Lit ua i .

Political expediency is never more than a temporary makeshift . ol d problems are solved only by creating new ones . It stands to reason that we cannot in one breath lop O ff frontier provinces from Germanv on the ground of the alien character of their inhabitants and destroy the Hapsburg Empire on the ground Of the right Of its various elements i to an independent ex stence , and in the next breath tell other,an d n eigh

‘ boring subject races that they have no future outside of the R omano ﬁ 45

ais n d et e d Empire . Lithuania has a better economic r o r than Polan

- and C z echO Slovakia . Lithuania and the other Baltic Sea republics have precedents that refute the argumentation Of Gade and our State Department not only in regard to their right and ability to exist inde

f Of . pendently o Russia , but also independently one another

e um and B lg i Ho lland .

If the reader will take the map Of Europe and look at the location Of the German Empire and follow its river courses in relation to

Belgium and Holland , and then compare the similar situation Of Russia t d how in relation to Lithuania , Latvia , and Es honia , he will rea ily see o the Gade position , which ur State Department has foolishly adopted , resembles the position Of German economists toward Belgium . Stand ing between a great empire and the sea is no reason to deny the right

Of a race to nationhood . The Dutch and a part Of the Belgians are very much closer the Germans racially than the Lithuanians and L a tvi u ans are to the Russians and Poles . The access to the sea arg ment for a big fellow crushing the life out of a little fellow I thought we had our ow n definitely scotched . It is disconcerting to see it crop up in country in Official circles . The other two parts Of the Gade economic argument are also refuted by Belgium and Holland . These countries to have existed economically, flourished , and been able defend them A n a . nd selves against Germany, Engla d , and Fr nce they have existed now for nearly a hundred years as separate entities . Why should no t Baltic Sea states get along as well as North Sea states ? The Baltic Sea already has little states less extensive in territory and some o f them less populous than the new Baltic Sea republics .

ed e a t on W F r i ith Russia .

for n But Lithuania , Latvia , and Esthonia , by asking the recog ition O f n ot O f their independence , do close the door upon the possibility a

Russian federation or a federation among themselves . In this time Of upset and confusion they are asking simply for a free hand to look

for . As out their own interests Russian provinces , with no separate nor international status , they could resist neither Bolshevists Russian now reactionaries . They would be in the plight of the rest Of Russia . r to and tomor ow , when the reaction comes , have to submit to a return b O fﬁce - the Old intolera le conditions , alien landowners and alien holders

grinding the life out Of them . The Baltic Sea republics may develop into vigorous independent o f states , or they may return to membership in the political organism

a new and regenerated Russia ; but in the meantime they have to live ,

and when the moment for the reconstitution of integral Russia comes , 48 these subject races will know -by experience whether independence is Of possible or preferab le from an economic point view , and will be able to lay down political and social stipulations if they feel that it IS W isest to go back to Russia .

“ A m e e Re e s Co p l t v r al .

' The best thought in Great Britain is in favor Of looking upon the for Baltic Sea republics in this light . The British Government stands A - giving them a chance . The nglo Saxon instinct says , give them a chance $ Why do we have to tolerate such an unjust and stupid policy as that outlined in the Colby note ? One is thankful that President “ ” Harding has promised a complete reversal Of American foreign policy . f r our Of For our honor as well as o interests , the election Harding is a n ot to on great victory . We may be able take the defense Of the small nations the world over ; at least we shall refrain from giving Official sanction to stiﬂing their aspirations .

’ o a nd s er to a P l T ri ri l Appe tite .

for 1916 In an article in The Century November, , advocating inde en d ence for f p Poland , when the Poles had n O friends in Entente O ﬁcial circles and Americans regarded the resurrection Of Poland as a dream

— I in the category with the restoration Of Alsace Lorraine to France , warned the Poles against the danger Of an inordinate territorial appetite . A year later, when the Russian Revolution had made encouragement

fo r . Of Poland a diplomatic possibility the Entente , I heard M Roman ’ D mow ski é d E tu d es , at the Comit National in the Cour de Cassation , O f Dmowski w o . t Paris , set forth the aspirations Poland . M spoke as if racial units alone , the Russians and the Poles , faced each other from t the Baltic to the Black Sea . He limited the problem Of the fu ure borderlands between Russia and the Central empires to the recognition ’ ’ o f Poland s independence and the backing Of Poland s claims at the Dmow ski n peace conference . did not mention the Lithua ians and the

Ukrainians . This was the beginning Of a policy that has ruled the Of Polish attitude toward the eastern frontiers their state . The Poles o f insisted in the west on the inclusion every district inhabited by Poles . In the east they have regarded the ethnographical argument as non existent .

h ’ Lit uania s Re la tions with Poland .

Poland claims all the Russian borderlands , including Lithuania , as The part Of historic Poland . Ukrainians and Lithuanians , whose i m ethnograph cal territories are thus refused them , clai also to have al l o n ruled these lands at e time . The Lithuanians deny ever having 47 been conquered by the Poles or having formed more than a personal n u ion with the Polish state , and declare that they were victims Of the

n ot . partitions as a part Of Poland , but as an independent state The historic argument applied to the Russian border - lands is very much like that used by the Balkan States in their rival claims to Macedonia . At some time or other each in turn was the upper dog and owned the disputed territories .

h o c s Polis P li ie . The ungenerous attitude Of Poland toward all her neighbors is O ff peculia rly disheartening . ne would think that the Poles had su ered so much from the hands Of their masters that they would instinctively one refrain f rom playing the detested r Ol e themselves . But must reluctantly admit that the Poles seem to have learned only ho w to As employ the brutal methods Of their o w n conquerors . Russians and h Germans acted toward t e Poles . so have the Poles been acting toward

Lithuanians and Ukrainians . We remember how the Poles pilloried the coloniz ation schemes Of their Prussian masters . Exactly the same schemes they are adopting in turn toward weaker races .

on . The Poles have taken as enemies all their neighbors , Germans

- C z e chO . Slovaks , Ukrainians , Russians and Lithuanians The state they propose to form contains so many alien enemies in juxtaposition geo “ ” graphically to brothers Of blood that it is bound to collapse under t - the weight of a circle of irreden ist movements . The Poles should have made friends with the Lithuanians . But they have stood behind the

- high handed seizure Of the capital Of Lithuania , and , instead Of disavow ing the outlawed general , they have made his military adventure the basis Of bargaining with the League Of Nations for additional territory at the expense Of Lithuania .

The e a u e o f N a n L g tio s. The attitude Of the League Of Nations towards Lithuania is most i I t u no t dishearten ng. proves that the Council of the Leag e is an for impartial body, dispensing justice among nations the common good

Of all , but a group Of statesmen furthering special interests . Decisions n o t s Of the League are being made o the principle Of d a d e . The dispute i not between L thuania , the victim , and Poland , the aggressor , is decided to o n e according its merits , but is small pawn in the game Of compromise between France , Great Britain , and the other states , ’ Ze llg ouski s Raid .

The facts Of the case are these . When the League Of Nations took over the adjudication Of the frontier between Poland and Lithuania , both countries agreed to an armistice , and the line between the Opposing armies was settled by the League Of Nations . Within a month after ' w a s si ne d this agreement g , the Poles violated the armistice , made a not surprise attack , and in a few days only occupied the disputed frontier territory, but went a long distance beyond and seized the capital Of

Lithuania .

ro o d P p se Plebiscite .

The methodical preparations fo r this move had lo n g been Observed Vol demar o ut by the Lithuanians , but when Mr . pointed to the Council Of the League that Poland was preparing to anticipate by violence the A n ot . u award , he was assured that this would be allowed fter the co p , the Lithuanian Government received no satisfaction from the Council . Zell ou ki The Polish Government denied responsibility for g s , and claimed that the army O f General Zel l go uski was composed Of men from the d dispute territory . The League Of Nations ﬁnally agreed to settle the the r matter by means Of a plebiscite , but including in plebiscite a ea the ni $ T O district Of Vilna , capital Of Lithua a guarantee a fair vote . the plebiscite area was to be occupied by an international body of troops . Zel l ou ski n But in the meantime, General g has reigned supreme, e cour aged by Poland and reaping the rewards Of his deﬁance Of the League “ ” t for $ Of Nations . He is preparing the coun ry he occupies the plebiscite

’ Ru ssia s Attitude .

to . Russia has now intervened in the question . This was be expected Russia’ s rights and interests in the relations between Poland and L ithu ania are far more important than the Leag ue Of Nations . We might say , of Of to in fact , that it was folly on the part the League Nations believe that any territorial matters O f this sort could be settled without con sul tin h s g Russia . Russia a treaties Of peace with both the Poles and the the Lithuanians . Her Government is virtually at war with Govern ments controlling the League Of Nations . These Governments have been doing all in their power for several years to destroy the present Russian

Government . Russia , therefore , declares that the League Of Nations hasno business interfering in matters that concern her and her neigh bors , with whom she is at peace . The terms Of the treaties between Russia and Pol and and Lithuania have nothing to d o with the League of N a s of ations , and their interpret tion and execution i a matter direct h o negotiation between Russi a and er neighb rs .

t her equal rights and an equal oppor unity for justice with Poland , and , above all , to be ready to defend Lithuania against the threatened in w v asion Of a soviet army . Mosco is simply asking the world to state what it intends to do in regard to Lithuania . If the world yields to the ab of threat Of Lenine , andons the idea occupying (and defending $)

Vilna, and lets both Poles and Russians use unchallenged the argument to ? O f force in relation Lithuania , is not the League Of Nations a farce And what can we call the policy of the Wilson administration towar ds Lithuania ? P OF H LEA ON . WALTER M . C HANDLER, FOR REC OGNITION OF LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTHONIA, PRE

SENTED TO THE SEC RETARY OF STATE,

MAY 16 , 192 1

Mr S e eta . cr ry, I wish to present at this time facts and arguments in favor Of the recognition by the United States Of America Of the ind epend d e u e Of of ence j r the Baltic Republics Esthonia , Latvia , and Lithuania i The great war brought about a new era in th s history of mankind . It recast the map Of the earth and created a new political world for the human race .

The group Of men who composed the peace conference at Paris , in reconstructing the map Of the world and in determining the rights o to f peoples with reference the boundaries then created , were guided

— by certain well known political principles . These principles were rep in resented , part , by the theories Of President Wilson in his famous fourteen points .

Se - e e m n a t n lf D t r i io .

One Of these points related to the so - ca lled doctrine O f self- deter mination , a doctrine ﬁrst proclaimed on this continent by Thomas ff Je erson in the Declaration Of Independence , when he declared that all just powers Of government were derived from the consent of the governed , and later beautifully described by Lincoln in his Gettysburg “ O f for address as government the people , by the people and the people .

- By self determination is meant , as I understand it , that any con siderabl e group Of people having a proper physical basis Of territory and population , with certain national earmarks or characteristics of

- race , language , and religion , can claim this right of self determination , O f provided a p roper educational basis citizenship can be shown , and r r p ovided further, that many yea s of Oppression have been exercised by the dominating power over the smaller power seeking separation

f - and claiming rights o self determination and independence .

a se s de e n n B for In p de ce .

It quite naturally follows , then , that the small nation that asserts

- independence and claims rights Of self determination , in the reconstrue o f tion Of the map the earth after the Great World War , must show the existence Of four essential concurring elements : 52

1 o u ( ) The requisite physical basis Of geography, territory, and p p lation . 2 -d eﬁn ( ) Certain well ed distinctions in blood , language , and religion that differentiate its people radical ly from the people of the l arger nation from whom separation is sought . (3) An educational basis O f citizenship that justiﬁes the enjoyment o o f - f rights self determination and independence . 4 o r ( ) Governmental oppression , extending over decades centuries ,

- exercised by a larger over a small nation , rendering self determination by the smaller nation a supreme necessity . N ow l l , it is easily demonstrable that a these conditions and char a cteristics r of exist in the histo y Of the Baltic Republics Esthonia , Latvia , and Lithuania . Let us consider brieﬂy each of the above subdivisions in order .

Area s a nd Po p ula tions.

(1) The exten t of the a rea s of the B a l tic S ta tes with reference to i hts o sel -d ete min a ti n an in e e en r g f f r o d d p nd ce . The following tables Of comparative statistics furnish satisfactory proof on this point

(A) BALTIC GROUP

Area .

S quare mil es.

(B) GROU P OF OT H E R INDE PENDE NT STAT E S

41,690

An examination Of these tables will show that all Of the Baltic i are States , Esthon a , Latvia , and Lithuania , larger in territory than

Holland , Belgium , Denmark , Switzerland , and Montenegro . It will also show that both Latvia and Lithuania are greater in population than

Montenegro and Norway, and that the population Of Lithuania is greater, O f r as her territory is larger, than that Denma k and Montenegro combined . I t will thus be seen that the ﬁrst essential of the right Of self is determination , a proper physical basis Of territory and population , 53

undeniably present in the case Of all the Baltic States . Everything . r great or small , good or bad , right o wrong, must be measured by standards Of comparison and contrast . Every little patch Of land and every little handful Of people can not assert independence and reason ably expect recognition from larger nations having greater geographical to units an d more numerous populations . But unless we are prepared O f deny rights independence to Holland , Belgium , Denmark , Switzer land , Norway, Montenegro , and Greece , we must grant that Esthonia , L atvia , and Lithuania are as well qualiﬁed by the proper standard Of physical comparison to be free and independent as they .

i ness is N ot B g Grea tn ess.

While a certain extent of territory is necessary as an element o f Of - n t the right self determination , it should o be forgotten that neither liberty nor civil ization can be gauged by acres Of land or by density

Of population . The greatest and freest peoples Of the earth , as well i as the noblest civilizations of all the centuries , have l ved and thrived o f al l upon small and barren tracts Of land . The most gifted the

e . A ancient races were , perhaps , th Hebrews and the Greeks round the civilizations of Palestine and Of Greece have circled all the other high O f civilizations Of the world . The Hebrews were the master builders the great spiritual temple Of the human race , whose corner stone is Hebrew prophecy and whose gorgeous domes are the claims Of Jesus and Mahomet to the Messiahship of God . The Greeks surpassed all mankind , ancient or modern , in the variety and grandeur Of intellectual o f triumph , and today , among the ruins and wrecks their genius , the modern world still wanders to contemplate , admire , and study, the pride O f o f every master and the perfection every model . And yet both Hebrews and Greeks inhabited comparatively barren f stretches Of land , not as large nor as fertile as Lithuania ; or it must be remembered that Palestine has only square miles , a territory smaller than that Of either Esthonia or Latvia .

ood an u Bl , L g ag e and Re ligion.

(2) Let us now consider the second element above mentioned O f the right of self- determination ; that is C e ta in well -d e n ed d istin tions in bl ood l an ua e and el i ion r ﬁ c , g g , r g tha t d iffe ren ti a te its p eop l e ra dica l ly from the p e opl e of the l a rger i n m h a t n i na t o fro w om sep ra io s sought. This element is also very clear and well deﬁned in the claims of all O f - the Baltic States to rights self determination . ff The racial and religious di erences between Esthonians , Letts , and on o ne o n Lithuanians , the hand , and Russians the other, are as radical 54

or as those between Germans and Russians , between Englishmen and

Frenchmen .

The Esthonians are Finns in blood ; the Russians are Slavs . The

Esthonians are Finnish in language ; the Russians are Slavic . The Esthonians are Lutheran in religion ; the Russian s are Orthodox Greek i Cathol cs . The Letts and Lithuanians are Indo-Europeans in blood and lan m n guage ; the Russians are Slavs . The Letts are overwhel ingly Luthera , and the Lithuanians are overwhelmingly Roman Catholics , while the O Russians are overwhelmingly rthodox Greek Catholics . In each of the Baltic States the language both of the Government and the people is the mother tongue , which is spoken and written by a vast majority of the population . of In short , a pure strain Finnish blood ﬂows through the veins of as Esthonians , an almost pure Finnish language is spoken by them , while a pure strain of Indo -European blood ﬂows through the veins of Letts

- and Lithuanians , at the same time that an almost pure lndo European f language is spoken by them , proving a radical di ference in blood and language between the peoples of all the Baltic States and those of Slavic

Russia .

d Race Preju ice . The logic and philosophy at the foundation of this second element of the right of self- determination as a reason and requirement for separate national life are to be found in the experiences and observa f i tions o mankind , that race and religious differences breed str fe among

i . nations , result ng in bloodshed and in warfare The reason of the principle and the cause of the trouble are found deeply imbedded in human nature and in the bias and prejudices of men . We like our “ ” kith and kin and are naturally disposed to regard strangers with distrust , if not with positive dislike . Deadly feuds are born of the loves f and hatreds o the clans , and race prejudice and tribal impulse are the most powerful of the motives of men .

duca tion a nd u u e E C lt r .

3 I n o i : ( ) come w to discuss the th rd element, namely An ed ucational and cultura l status that justiﬁes the privil ege and

- the enjoymen t of the right of self d etermination . This element is absolutely necessary in appealing to the nations of the earth for recognition . However extensive the territory and how ever numerous the people , illiterate barbarians can not reasonably ex peet recognition of their independence from literate and civilized races . The ability to be self- governing must be shown in order to claim self 55

- government, and the ability to be self governing is impossible without a certain degree of educational and cultural development and achieve ment . This third element of the right of self-government is conspicuously f of of present in the history, li e and civilization the peoples all the

a . Baltic St tes . There is practically no illiteracy among them The man o r or ca n woman of adult years in Esthonia , Latvia , Lithuania who

no t . read or write is usually a mental delinquent , a lunatic, or an idiot The extraordinarily high rate of literacy in the Baltic countries is really astonishing when we consider that just across the border in 70 Russia the population is per cent illiterate, by conservative estimate , 80 and is placed by many writers as high as per cent .

Univ e rsity Edu ca tion . In university as well as in common —school education the populations

f . o Esthonia , Latvia , and Lithuania are remarkably advanced The fol lowing comparative statistics in university education are illustrative . of 1913 The university students Latvia in , the year before the war, were by comparison as follows :

UN I VE RS I TY STUDE NTS

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 It will thus be seen that although her population is smaller than of or of that either Denmark , Sweden , Portugal , the number university a students of Latvia is numeric lly greater , and what is true of Latvia in of university education is equally true Esthonia and Lithuania .

n a t on Perso a l Obser v i . I beg yo u to pardon me for personal reference to myself and to n what I have recently done and seen and heard i this connection . In u of 1 19 the s mmer 9 and again in January, February, and March of this year I visited al l the Baltic countries and traveled extensively through

- them by train and automobile . I was astonished at the high grade civiliz ation of the masses of the people and at the ﬁne accomplishments At and brilliant educations of the public men with whom I met . Reval , of a at Kovno , and at Riga , the capitals, respectively, Esthonia , Lithu nia , and Latvia , I was honored by being the invited guest at public dinners given by ministers of state . I was surprised and pleased to learn that all of these statesmen were university graduates and that most of them spoke several languages , including English , ﬂuently . 56

Cu lture Amon g Pe a sa nts.

Any doubt as to the educational qualifications of all the Baltic Republics for self- determination and independence will be removed o u by a short visit to these countries . The visitor will find peasant p p z l ations with books , periodicals , maga ines , and musical instruments in the home, and , to his amazement , he will find that a considerable per

’ s eak thre e centage of the people of Esthonia , Latvia , and Lithuania p

— — languages German , Russian , and their mother tongue and that they are somewhat familiar with the history and literature of the countries o f these languages . Of all the elements that form a just basis of claims to rights of self of government and independence among the Baltic peoples , the test for a literacy is the greatest, the thirst of Esthonians , Letts , and Lith a nians for knowledge and education is as unquenchable as their thirst for freedom is unconquerable .

Russian O p pression of Ba ltic People s.

(4) Permit me , if you please , at this time to discuss the fourth of - i element of the right self determination above ment oned , namely n nta l ession exten din ve d e ad es or en tu i s x r Gover me oppr , g o r c c r e e e l a v a s a ll e nati n end e i sel -d ete inat n b cised by a rger o er m r o , r r ng f rm io y tion e essit the smal l er n a a sup rem nec y . I t to or of seems quite unnecessary _ discuss this element phase the Al l su bject at any length . men are thoroughly familiar with the history of r of Russian cruelty and oppression . Scholars eve y nation know well the details of Russian tyran ny and persecution . Siberian dungeons have been the horror and the nightmare of Russian freedom in every age .

Not only nihilists and anarchists , who deserved incarceration , but patri ots and freemen who thirsted and fought for liberty spent wretched lives and met horrible deaths within them .

f ann A Po licy o Tyr y . Russian history is replete with instances of governmental cruelty ff and oppression . Russian imperial administrative a airs were simply ’ records of revolting and horrible stifling of man s natural cravings and O — struggles for freedom . ther nations Greece , Rome , Spain , France ,

— of a nd England have had periods despotic sway . Russia has been uniformly the land of barbarism and illiteracy, of tyranny and oppre s not to sion . This tyranny and oppression have been dealt out only to Letts , Esthonians , and Lithuanians but the Russians themselves . Slavs as well as Finns and Indo -Europeans have been the barbarized and f o f persecuted victims o the Russian imperial system government . The

58 language the Russians replied by forbidding such judges to use the

Lettish language . When Esthonians an d Letts demanded a voice in the solution of the agrarian problem in accordance with modern notions of right and i justice , the Russians repl ed by extending sympathy and aid to the

German Baltic barons , and , to aggravate the matter , brought Russian of colonists from the interior Russia to colonize Esthonia and Latvia . lnnumerable forms of Russian tyranny and oppression might be f i mentioned , but it is considered that su ﬁcient has been sa d as a matter of illustration . Up to this moment I have discussed the subject of the recognition of the independence of the Baltic peoples from the viewpoint of certain o f - cardinal elements of the right self government ; that is , extent of ff territory and population , race and religious di erences , educational

- status , and long continued oppression .

nom c of a tic Eco i Bases B l Sta tes.

I come now to discuss the economic , industrial , and agricultural life of r these countries as a seconda y, but nevertheless very essential , ele ment of the claim to recognition of independence by the nations of the world . Indeed , this element is given primary consideration by many writers upon the subject of the justice and advisability o f recognizing the independent national existence of the newly created non -Russian republics of the former Russian Empire . It is contended by some of t these writers that Latvia , Esthonia , and Lithuania are oo weak and undeveloped economically, industrially, and agriculturally to maintain separate and independent stations among the nations of the earth . It is further asserted by them th at to recognize the independence of these little States would be to create permanently dependent communities whose helplessness would make them perpetual wards o f the larger of of nations . This is the chief contention the advocates a reunited and federated Russia .

Facts and ﬁgures , however, and especially comparative statistics , negative completely the idea that these countries are not ﬁtted econ ca n omical ly for separate and independent life . It be easily shown that other nations less strong and well developed economically, commercially, and agr iculturall y have maintained centuries of separate national to existence . Unfortunately, however, the time allotted me does not of permit an elaboration argument from statistics . I have time to suggest only o n e illustration of the economic strength of the Baltic countries . 59

Reve nues in 1913.

I respectfully submit o n this point that the revenue-producing of powers a country, under normal conditions of equitable taxation ,

give a most satisfactory idea of the economic strength of that country . 1913 o f In , the year before the outbreak the war, when conditions t were normal , Es honia , the smallest and poorest of the Baltic Republics ,

paid rubles into the Russian treasury . This money pai d all l l the expenses of her loca government and left a balance , a net d ep os t of rubles for the beneﬁt of some other Provinces of the Russian

Empire that showed a deﬁcit . Esthonia being the smallest and poorest , this fact alone is proof of the economic abilities of all the non -Russian to - r ime Republics be self sustaining under an independent eg . t Nevertheless , it may be mentioned as additional proof hat Latvia , 1913 in , produced rubles revenue ; that the grand total of her

local provincial expenses in that year were rubles , leaving a net revenue amounting to rubles to be sent to the Imperial

Russian treasury .

’ n es Lithu an ia s Re ve u .

t As still further illustra ion and proof, permit me to say that in the 1913 same year, , Lithuania raised a national or, rather, provincial f revenue o rubles , and spent some rubles in her m i b local govern ent , according to a statement furn shed me y Mr . J . Vil eisis o f of , former minister ﬁnance of the Republic Lithuania . It

, i will thus be seen that Lithuania sent n the year preceding the , _war rubles as a contribution to the Imperial Russian treasury to - of help pay the expenses of less favored portions the Empire . I respectfully submit that these facts and ﬁgur es furnish indubitable proof that these little countries could each maintain the government of an independent republic at home and sustain all necessary diplomatic

ofﬁces abroad .

ed Objections Answ er .

The contentions therefore made in behalf o f the independence of

the little republics have been afﬁrmative . Certain negative considera i tions or objections should be noted at this t me .

nt In ex p e rie nce in Go v e rn me .

In the ﬁrst place , it is contended that the peoples of these non Russian republics are not ﬁtted for self-government because they have had no experience ; because it would be like sending ou t little children

into the world without training and guidance . This is worse than foolish , 60

for it ﬂies completely in the face of the history and the essential con i n s N o dit o of the lives of nations and of men . great nation of this earth

ever began national existence with ﬁnished experience . The history of mankind shows no graduate or postgraduate nations from birth . Each and all have been compelled to tread the bitter pathway of suffer

- - ing, self development , self denial , and individual experiment . Every gr eat man of eminence o f the earth of any calling or profession has

had to have his beginning and his individual experience .

The Ame can n s ri Colo ie . At the time of the American Revolution it was contended by the enemies o f America in England that the colonists were not ﬁtted for

— self government . William Pitt , Earl of Chatham , defended them most

brilliantly in Parliament against this charge . With superb eloquence he declared that he had studied the political masterpieces o f antiquity and of modern times and that he had never read ﬁner productions of statesmanship than had been sent overseas from America to England — f by the inexperienced colonial statesmen Je ferson , Madison , and Ham An d A ilton . yet today we have what mericans believe to be the greatest of o f A and mightiest all Republics the earth , and when we mericans make speeches in Congress we support our arguments by citations from the words and deeds of these inexperienced colonial master builders of

the early Republic .

ta t me n of ti S es Ba l c Rep u blics.

As of n o t a matter fact , however, it can be truthfully contended that the statesmen of these little countries have not had considerable experience and have not demonstrated the ﬁnest qualities of statesman A ship under the most trying circumstances . bout three years have

elapsed since they separately declared their independence . During that

time they have adopted constitutions , organized stable governments ,

with cabinets of ministers , and with national assemblies . They have organized and outﬁtted splendid young armies that have already given

a fine account of themselves upon the battlefield . The deliberations and offi cial conduct of their ministers have been marked in all things

by ability and conservatism . Their national assemblies have acted with wisdom in most cases and have as yet enacted no foolish or extremely

radical legislation . Civil and religious liberty and the sacred rights of private property are everywhere to be found in the provisions of their of constitutions and in the enactments their national parliaments . 61

e so na Rec o t o P r l llec i ns.

It is now and will always be a matter of pride and pleasure that I o f have met and known the leading statesmen the Baltic Republics . Many of them I met at Paris in the summer of 1919 during the sessions f o . O of the peace conference thers I met in the capitals their countries . Al l of them are , without exception , brainy and accomplished men , and I never talked to o ne of them that I did n ot think of the remark of o n e o f the to European diplomats , referring Venizelos , of Greece , that the smal l nations of Europe had furnished to the conference at Paris its

greatest statesmen .

s h n an E t o i Lea de rs.

At A Pu o f f of Paris I met ntoine p , present minister foreign a fairs was Esthonia , a young, grave , serious , and accomplished man , who formerly professor o f international law at the University of Petrograd . A l ii who fterwards , at Reva , I met Konstantin P tz , is now president of of of the constituent assembly and virtual head the Republic Esthonia . a of who P tz is a writer and lawyer distinction , has translated the Consti tution o f the United States into the Esthonian language for the beneﬁt of ’ his countrymen . His life s history has a deep touch and coloring o f the high heroic and of martyrdom , for he spent many months in prison an d was once condemned to death for his supreme devotion to the cause of o f the liberty and independence his country. While at Reval I met other of O S tr an dman able ministers of state Esthonia , among them tto , prime L id n r a o e of . minister, and Gen . , minister war

Lithua nia ns.

At o f of Kovno the temporary capital Lithuania , I had the pleasure S tul i nskis meeting g , president of the constituent assembly and the recog niz e d f O of head of the Republic o Lithuania . ne my most pleasant and interesting experiences in Europe was to listen to S tul ginskis address the national assembly on the occasion of the celebration of the third f At Grinius anniversary o Lithuanian independence . Kovno I also met , ff of P urickis . prime minister, and , minister of foreign a airs , Lithuania Purickis is a Roman Catholic priest of great learning and piety and o r intensely devoted t his count y .

a n L tvia s. At Riga it was my great pleasure and privilege to meet the leading T s hakste of Latvian statesmen . I met c , president the constituent as sembl y and titular chief of the Latvian State , a venerable and aecom l i he of p s d man , whose great good nature and merry twinkle the eye 62

’ r M i r endea him to all who know him . I also met e e ovics, minister of n of foreig affairs Latvia , a youth in years but a veteran in statesmanship

and diplomacy, a man of ﬁne accomplishments and wonderfully pleasing

. as al Ul manis personality It w my good fortune , so , to meet , prime of minister Latvia , a big, brave , brainy man , a rugged patriot who loves A Latvia as Macaulay says Pitt loved England , as an thenian loved A of thens , as a Roman loved the city Seven Hills .

u ders N e B il of w Governme nts. Al l these men are university graduates and have had wide political experience under the Imperial Government of Russu and later as And founders and builders of their ow n Republics . I want to assure you th at I have little patience with the views of those who contend that

such men are inexperienced and incompetent , and that the destinies f o no t . to the Baltic Republics are safe in their hands I wish , further, say that it would be decidedly ungenerous to judge these statesmen of or the Esthonia , Latvia , and Lithuania , their early Governments , by records of a few short years immediately following a great and par alyz of ing war , and without any recognition their independence whatever of from the nations the earth . It would be just as generous to chain a man han d and foot and then command him to run and condemn him

because he could not .

Ru N o n a t ta es ssia C a n t Gove r B l ic S t . In this connection it may be well to observe that the strange and absurd proposition is advanced that the non - Russian Republics are not capable of governing themselves but that Russia is capable of gov ermn g A ’ l them . moment s reﬂection will demonstrate the fa lacy and the

of . absurdity this contention Russia is worse than a broken reed . The poor old Russian ship of state is a mass of wreckage swept by every O storm and tossed ruthlessly by every wave . n the other hand , the little

Republics have stable Governments , organized along constitutional lines o - f right and freedom , and sustained by well disciplined armies that have beaten back bolshevism from their territories and that stand today of as breakwaters against a great tide anarchy and ignorance . C an it be seriously contended that these little well-ordered States can no t govern ? themselves , but that Russia can govern them

The Ru ssian o m Pr ble . O a f course , it is nothing but f ir to state that the advocates of a greater Russia contend that a stable government can be established out of of the ruins the present Russia , and that it might be well to leave 63

Esthonia , Latvia , and Lithuania as political units or national members n or of this greater Russia . Such a proposition is neither fair, feasible , t of nor of just . Nei her the wisdom the philosopher the vision the prophet can tell what will be the result of government in Russia in the of of next generation or century . The return the Czar and absolutism n the is unthi kable , and is seriously contemplated by nobody except

interested Russian aristocracy . But whether a constitutional monarchy,

a federative republic , or several independent republics , for the territory

of . the ancient Russian Empire , is a question for debate Each has its

one of . advocates , and of them must be a solution the Russian problem

A Constitutiona l Mona rchy

A constitutional monarchy is n ot practicable or advisable for w Russia . The history of England shows that years and generations ere o f required to determine whether a given race people , endowed with of - certain national and individual attributes , are capable self govern m o f ent under a liberal monarchy . The ﬁrst Englishmen more than a thousand year s ago were probably more intelligent and conservative

- and adapted to self government than are the Russians of today, and yet of n it took all these years painful development , with all the stra ge f of vicissitudes o British history , such as the contest the Barons with of K King John over Magna Charta , the beheading ing Charles , and the o f of establishment the Commonwealth Cromwell , to bring England to her present proud station as the leading monarchial democratic C om

monw e al th of the world .

A Fed erative Re p u blic A f federative republic is out o the question , as a conference of

th e ime . A Russians at Petrograd , under e Kerensky r g , admitted republic o f to of of any kind , be worthy the name , must necessity rest upon the of will of the people and be controlled by the action the majority . Russia proper has of the people of the former

Russian Empire . This vast majority is densely illiterate and can not - i non . justly rule the intelligent , literate Russian m nority If England,

France , the United States , or some other masterful and intelligent nation r could be placed where g eat Russia is , a federative republic might be

possible , since the dominating race would then form the intelligent head f o a confederacy of peoples of different ra ces and religions . The United

States , Great Britain , and France illustrate this truth in their govern b ments today . But it is inconceiva le to think that great Russia could govern a federative republic where the non -Russian members of the

confederation would form the only intelligent and educated elements . 64

The Russians ruled the empire of the Czar on principles and under terms of of absolutism , and not upon the principles freedom and democracy, c of such as the existen e a republic necessarily implies .

A Besides , our merican experiment throws serious doubt upon the o f A advisability a federative republic for Russia . In merica , after seven an d of years eight months bitter struggle, we gained our independence ; but from the surrender o f Cornwallis at Yorktown to the adoption of o ur 1 87 of Constitution at Philadelphia in 7 was a period six years , and l f ur then it required more than ha f a century, until the close o o Civil 1865 r War in , to dete mine whether free government under a federative i A And republ c in merica were possible . I respectfully submit that A mericans in every age , besides being homogeneous in race , language,

and religion , and contiguous in territory, have been more intelligent , of conservative and literate than are the Russians today.

To suppose that Russia can develop in a generation a stable form of government is to ﬂy in the face of the facts and teachings o f history . The illiteracy and the emotional and idealistic tendencies of the Russian mind will make Russians for many years to come a buffet and a prey of every fanatic like Lenin and every demagogue like Trotsky that may come along.

a t c Sta tes hou d B l i S l be Recogniz ed .

- - R e Should the rights of the intelligent , well organized , non Russian p ublics to self-determination and independence be made contingent upon the speculative proposition of the establishment of a stab le govern ment in Russia any time within the next few years ? I think not . Justice requires that these little countries he immediately recognized and a d mitted to the League of Nations or otherwise protected by an all iance f al l o nations , with the understanding that they are to perform their of obligations under the league or alliance, including the maintenance friendly relations with al l mankind , and especially with their immediate

surrounding neighbors , and that they shall then have the protection of th e league or alliance of nations against the aggressors of all mankind , particularly against Germany and Russia .

66 and to pledge their natural resources a n d future revenues for the pay ment .

B a t c orts The l i P .

The advocates of a reunited Russia insist that the independence o f t Latvia , Esthonia , and Lithuania would practically shut o u Great Russia from the Baltic Sea and from free commerce with the western world . o f These gentlemen contend that the absolute independence these States , t considering their small territory and geographical loca ion , would be to of f a constant menace the peace the world , because o the supreme necessities of Russian industrial and commercial life , and that their r e conquest by some Charles XII or Peter the Great would be only a f matter o time and provocation and circumstance in history . The answer to this objection is that the Baltic States have all to repeatedly proposed the peace conference at Paris , and at other times f to to the representatives of dif erent nations , keep their ports on the Baltic Open to the Russians under fair and equitable conditions of port duties and customs charges ; also to guar antee to the Russians equitable railway transit across their territories , thus furnishing fair and unob structed passage from Russia to the open sea . In the various treaties they have made with soviet Russia they have already acted and are no w i acting in good fa th in the proposals they have made in this regard .

Disme mbe rme nt of Russia . A l gain , certain objectors to the independence of the Ba tic States ca n have urged that legally, under international law , the allied nations not recogniz e them as independent governments . It is contended that the doctrine o f self- determination was and is intended to apply only A t - to the enemy countries , namely, Germany, us ria Hungary, Bulgaria , r of r r and Tu key, and that the application the p inciple to fo mer Russian Provinces would be a virtual dismemberment of the territory of a friendly country . The ﬁrst reply to this contention is that Russia has never been in any proper sense a friendly country since the last days of the Kerensky r egime . of In the second place , reply should be made that the principle self determination , if just and righteous in any case , should be applied in all cases where the elements forming the necessary basis of self-determina tion are present . Certainly a just and righteous principle of government should not be employed as an instrument of punishment or revenge by being applied alone to enemy countries . It is ironically cruel to deny to friends the beneﬁts that enemies enjoy. 67

sme m e me nt a n Ac o m ish Di b r c p l ed Fa ct .

In the third place , it may be replied that Russia has already been

- dismembered by both Russians and the Allies . In the Brest Litovsk treaty the bolshevik rulers of Russia practically ceded al l the Baltic

Provinces to Germany, and subsequently by complementary agreements at Berlin in the summer of 1918 completed the cession by waiving all rights of sovereignty of any kind over these western Russian States . The fact that the treaty of Brest—Litovsk has since been repudiated by the Allies and has been canceled by Germany does not alter the fact that

Russia was dismembered by Russians themselves .

in and o a nd F l , P l , Armenia .

A a gain , in the acknowledgement of the independence of Finl nd , A the llies themselves have particularly dismembered Russia . This dis memberment was further carried o ut by the acknowledgement of the of P l and R u an Ar independence Russian o , ssi menia , and by the separation of and cession Bessarabia . The contention has been made that these no t of were exceptions and were intended as precedents , but the fact m r disme berment remains nevertheless , and the precedents a e there regardless of the intention .

eat i Tr ies With Russ a . The various recent treaties between the soviet government and the Governments of the Baltic Republics by which the bolsheviki have formally and solemnly acknowledged the independence of the little countries is the best possible proof of the willingness o f the bolsheviki And i to dismember Russia . not only the Russians under Len n and

Trotski but Russians who are not bolsheviki have also consented . I Yud enitch of A o personally saw Gen . , commander the Russian rmy n the

- e north western front , sign an agreement to acknowledge the independenc

of . Esthonia Conditions were attached however, to the agreement which rendered it impossible for the Esthonians to accept . Nevertheless , the fact of the willingness of the leader of one of the non -bolshevik Russian armies to acknowledge the independence of Esthonia and thereby dis member the Russian Empire remains .

’ u r S p eme C ouncil s Action .

to ou al l Permit me say, in conclusion , if y please , that discussion of the dismemberment of Russia in the future will be worse than idle talk . The Russian Empire has been recently deﬁnitely and irrevocably dismembered by the allied powers at Paris when they acknowledged 68

d e u e and the independence j r of Esthonia and Latvia , intimated that they would acknowledge the independence d e jure of Lithuania as soon R e as the Polish frontier question had been settled . The brave little publics of the Baltic Sea are now free and independent States and memb ers in good standing of the great family of nations . Their sovereignty has been established and decreed by all the great Govern c o f ments of the world excepting our ow n . The re ogni tion their inde end en e e e to— ab not — p c was d jur , not d e fac solute , conditional and they wil l remain forever free until they waive and surrender their sovereignty by treaty stipulations or until they are overrun by some conqueror who o f 1 13 robs them of their freedom . Neither one these contingenc es to be thought of at this time . I am well aware that the Government of the United States is not l o f necessari y bound by the action other Governments in this regard . But I respectfully suggest that a decent respect for the opinions of man a kind, _ proper spirit of international comity, and a due appreciation n of the action of other Gover ments , should impel us to follow immedi ately the example of other nations and to recognize at once the inde end ence v p absolute of Esthonia , Lat ia , and Lithuania .

’ d R n a Brian s ecog ition of L tvia .

When Aristide Briand sent ofﬁcial notiﬁcation of the recognition of L atvia to the president of the Latvian delegation at Paris he used this language

of i i The supreme council the allied powers , tak ng nto consideration the repeated requests presented by your Govern

ment , has decided at its session of today to recognize Latvia as

a d e jure State . “ The powers desire to mark by this the sympa thy which they feel toward the Latvian people and to render homage to what it has aecom lished in the establishment of order and ” a i na peace in its n t o life .

The suggestion o f the establishment of order and pea ce as the reason of the recognition of the independence of Latvia is full of mean ing and is a direct and powerful appeal to us for our official recognition . With the fall of the Russian Empire and the establishment of the soviet government a supreme crisis confronted Latvia and the other Baltic of States . The alternative following Russia into bolshevism an d anarchy or of standing with the civilized nations o f the world for the maintenance

of an . law d order presented itself There was no hesitation in deciding. 69

a t c Sta tes o h sh B l i F ug t Bol e viki.

The brave little Republics at once scornfully and deﬁantly r epudi ated Lenin and Trotski and all their teachings and practices , and allied An d themselves with the antibol shev ik peoples of the earth . from the very ﬁrst there has been no change of resolution , no wavering, no retreat .

Bravely, steadfastly, and with sublime purpose and resolve they have borne the brunt of battle against the hordes of anarchy in Russia . While university professors throughout the world were learnedly discussing th bolshevik theories in e quiet an d seclusion of academic shades , and while statesmen of Rome , Paris , London , and Washington have been of loudly denouncing Lenin and Trotski from afar , the brave soldiers in Esthonia , Latvia , and Lithuania have been engaged a death struggle f at close quarters with the Red armies o Russia . ff no Do these su erings and sacriﬁces deserve recognition , no reward ? Is it without meaning that men and women and children should starve and wear rags and die for others ? Men and women and children have starved and worn rags and died rather than accept bolshevik favors or submit to bolshevik rule .

s d E thonian Sol ie rs.

I n 19 T o ennison the summer of 19 I visited Esthonia . Through Gen . , their commander, as interpreter , I addressed the various units of the A Esthonian rmy . While I was speaking the soldiers were standing at

i of 15 . rig d salute . Many them were boys not more than years of age ff i Though young in years , their su erings and sacrifices had g ven them faces and features that looked bronzed and granite like . From each eye a glint of desperation and defiance gleamed fiercely when they looked across their barbed -wire entanglements toward the bolshevik battle line of a few miles away . Most these brave fellows were poorly clad and

‘ barefooted . I assured them that the greatest Republic in the world , my ow n who country, had been founded by barefooted soldiers left blood prints upon the snows at Valley Forge . I told them that I saw in them the resurrected , the reincarnated soldiers of Valley Forge , and that I would never cease pleading their cause until their country was as free And and independent as mine . I am here today to fulﬁll that pledge , no t to only to Esthonians but to others as well , Letts and Lithuanians -sa riﬁcin who are equally brave and self c g as Esthonians .

Reco n t on is a g i i Duty . I respectfully submit that a sacred and solemn duty rests upon the d e u e United States to recognize at once the independence j r of Esthonia , our , . i o ur i Latvia and Lithuania They mer t recognition and good w ll , 70

. n our sympathy, and our support They merit the recog ition and good will and sympathy and support of all civilized mankind .

Their people are literate, their statesmen are able and accomplished , and their soldiers are brave and unconquerab le . These are the real attributes of sovereignty and the right to be free and independent , for, after all , the permanency and prosperity of nations depend upon the wisdom of the. statesmen who conceive the constitution and create the i of laws, upon the patriotism and intell gence the people who make and c of i support the government , and upon the ourage sold ers who defend Al l - the national frontiers . these things are pre eminently present in the life, character , history, and civilization of the Baltic Repub lics of

Esthonia , Latvia , and Lithuania , the recognition of whose independence as free and independent States I advocate today.

TH I S B OOK I S D U B ON T HE LA ST D A TE STAM P-D B E LOW

A N I N I T I A L F I N E OF 25 C E N T S

W I L L B E ASSESSED FO R FA I L U R E T O R E TU R N

TH I S B O O K O N T H E D ATE D U E . T H E P ENA L TY W I L L I N C R EASE TO 5 0 C ENTS O N T H E FO U R TH D AY A N D TC O N T H E SEV ENTH D AY V ER D U E O .

L D 21— l oom