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Home , Aware (town), Borama, Burao, Edna Adan Ismail, Education in Ethiopia, Erigavo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 MAPS / IN THE GREATER HORN OF ...... 2 KEY FINDINGS...... 3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 7 CHRONOLOGY / SOMALILAND’S MARCH TOWARD SELF-DECLARED INDEPENDENCE ...... 8 THE RED SHOES ...... 10 REFUGEES THROUGH THE TURNSTILE...... 11 ETHNIC FLEE ...... 11 TARGETED DEATH AND DESTRUCTION...... 11 SEEING DOUBLE: THE NUMBERS GAME ...... 12 SOMALILAND RE-EMERGES AND REFUGEES RETURN ...... 13 SOMALILAND: INDEPENDENT OR NOT? ...... 14 EASTERN ETHIOPIA’S REFUGEE CAMPS ...... 17 SOMALILAND WEBSITES...... 18 FORGOTTEN SOMALILAND...... 19 THE STATE OF ...... 20 TAKING MATTERS INTO HER OWN HANDS ...... 21 THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE...... 22 WHERE WATER IS MORE PRECIOUS THAN GOLD ...... 23 THE STATE OF WATER...... 24 A LIVESTOCK LIVELIHOOD THREATENED ...... 25 MAKING UP FOR THE NINE YEARS THAT WERE TAKEN FROM ME...... 26 THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY ...... 27 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 29

This report was written by Joel Frushone, Africa policy analyst for the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR). The report is based on two site visits to the by Mr. Frushone in 2001. USCR staff members Jeff Drumtra, Margaret Emery, and Bill Frelick edited the report. It was produced by Koula Papanicolas and Eunice Kim of Immigration and Refugee Services of America (IRSA) staff. The 21st Century ILGWU Heritage Fund provided generous financial support for this report.

Cover Photo by Joel Frushone

© 2001 Immigration and Refugee Services of America ISBN 0-936548-12-6 WELCOME HOME TO NOTHING: Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland

thousands of refugees repatriating from eastern I. INTRODUCTION Ethiopia’s refugee camps. The large-scale return home, though welcomed, is placing additional stress on Somaliland’s fragile, Today, more than at any other time during Somaliland’s war-torn infrastructure. The continued lack of mean- complex recent history, peace is prevalent and refu- ingful development assistance has limited the al- gees are readily returning home. A self-declared ready weak capacity of Somaliland’s government, independent located in ’s northwest UN agencies, and international non-governmental region, Somaliland has not received the international organizations (NGOs) striving to properly reinte- recognition it has hoped for and has endured more than grate returnees. a decade of unwanted anonymity. A decade after declaring independence from the The long-awaited opportunity for the interna- rest of Somalia, Somaliland remains devastated; its tional community to help Somaliland’s long-term government lacks the institutional capacity and finan- refugee population repatriate, reintegrate, and rebuild cial resources needed to address the physical, social, its homeland is greater than ever. Despite its poverty and economic needs of its own citizens, including and growing needs, however, Somaliland is still largely repatriating refugees. Reviving its shattered economy forgotten by the rest of the world. to foster job creation, rehabilitating water infrastruc- The humanitarian and emergency aid trickling ture, and enhancing and expanding education and health into Somaliland is meager compared to what the rest care systems are but a few of the seemingly insur- of Somalia and other Horn of Africa mountable tasks facing 3.5 million war-weary receive. With negligible help from the international Somalilanders who have an equally pressing concern: community, Somaliland continues to absorb tens of overcoming an identity crisis.

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 3 U.S. Committee for Refugees u 4 Somaliland is an anomaly in today’s Africa. ducted site visits to Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Modern Western democratic principles, fortified by during 2001 to assess the repatriation and reintegration tradition and centuries-old cultural beliefs, of refugees to Somaliland. hold Somaliland together. Refugees returning to USCR visited the Dadaab refugee camps in north- , the Somaliland capital, find stoplights east Kenya in May 2001, home to some 100,000 pacing a steady flow of commercial traffic, teeming Somalis from central and southern Somalia, and the outdoor markets, and uniformed policemen patrol- refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia, home to an ling the streets. In May 2001, a resounding 97 estimated 30,000 refugees from Somaliland. In July percent of Somaliland voters approved a new con- 2001, USCR conducted an assessment trip to the stitution, affirming the self-declared nation’s ten-year- Somaliland towns and surrounding rural areas of old independence from Somalia. Hargeisa, , , and . Despite Somaliland’s dramatically improved USCR returned to Ethiopia’s Aware camps in security situation and modest political progress, the August 2001, and also visited Hartisheik and international community continues to ignore Kebribeyah camps housing Somaliland refugees in Somaliland’s claim to independence and draws no eastern Ethiopia. distinction between Somaliland and Somalia. In Somaliland, USCR conducted many inter- Somalia—one of Africa’s largest producers of views with returnees and internally displaced persons. refugees and internally displaced persons—remains a While in Ethiopia, USCR interviewed Somali refu- nation rife with lawlessness, violent inter-clan and gees in various stages of readiness to return. In Kenya, sub-clan warfare, and pervasive food insecurity. Since USCR talked with Somali refugees about their fears of the collapse of the repressive regime in returning to southern and central Somalia. USCR also January 1991, violence and population displacement met with government officials, international and local in Somalia have resulted in more than a half-million relief organizations, representatives from UNHCR deaths, according to various estimates. and other UN agencies, and private citizens in In 1992, during the worst of Somalia’s , Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Kenya. an estimated 800,000 Somalis were refugees in neigh- This report includes key findings regarding the boring countries, and an additional 2 million people repatriation and reintegration of Somali refugees to struggled to stay alive as internally displaced per- Somaliland, a historical description of Somaliland’s refu- sons. Even with the formation of a new national gee crisis, current conditions in Somaliland, profiles of government in 2001, conditions in Somalia have returned refugees, and USCR policy recommendations. improved only slightly. As divergent as Somaliland and Somalia have become, international recognition and subsequent mul- tilateral development assistance for Somaliland re- II. KEY FINDINGS main elusive. This fact encumbers rehabilitation, development, and refugee reintegration in Somaliland. With proper support for refugee reintegration, the From February 1997 to October 2001, the United international community can play an integral and Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) overdue role in the rehabilitation of Somaliland. officially assisted the voluntary repatriation of an estimated 170,000 refugees back to Somaliland. Somaliland’s five years of uninterrupted peace, one of UNHCR expects that the remaining estimated 80,000 its greatest achievements since declaring indepen- refugees living in eastern Ethiopia’s refugee camps dence in 1991, currently presents the international will voluntarily repatriate by the end of 2002. community with a long-awaited opportunity to sig- What is in store for refugees upon their return to nificantly assist many long-term Somali refugees in Somaliland? Why has such a large number, many of repatriating, reintegrating, and rebuilding their whom have struggled as refugees for more than a homeland. decade, waited so long to repatriate? To where in Meaningful international financial investment Somaliland are they returning? What obstacles and technical expertise to rehabilitate Somaliland’s have returnees encountered? What critical assis- inadequate and deteriorating social services, repair tance do they need? Who is able and willing to aid water and transportation infrastructure, and improve their survival? education capacity could dramatically assist The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) con- Somaliland’s government and non-governmental

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 5 organizations in their efforts to reintegrate return- Lack of international financial assistance or di- ing refugees. rect foreign investment seriously hampers rehabilita- tion, development, and refugee reintegration in Somaliland. A decade after declaring independence, Somaliland remains devastated and economically depressed. The true number of Somaliland refugees and A three-year war for independence, fought on returnees has long been unclear because of poorly Somaliland soil from 1988 to 1991, and two subse- managed programs and corruption. quent civil wars, in 1992 and from 1994 to 1996, completely shattered Somaliland’s frail economy. Official statistics state that hundreds of thousands of Many refugees who repatriated to Somaliland ten refugees have repatriated to Somaliland during the years ago live in makeshift camps and slums in their past ten years, but the true number is unknown because own homeland and are no better off than refugees thousands repatriated spontaneously without assis- repatriating today. tance. Thousands of others have repatriated as part of an officially assisted repatriation program that has suffered from duplication, fraud, and corruption that Repatriating refugees find inadequate social persist today. services in Somaliland. The number of Somaliland refugees who re- Prompted by UNHCR’s closure of several Somali mained in Ethiopian refugee camps as of mid-2001 refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia during 2001, Soma- was probably fewer than officially reported by UN- lis are readily repatriating to a peaceful but war- HCR and Ethiopian authorities. Although UNHCR scarred and economically depressed Somaliland. reported in October 2001 that 80,000 Somaliland The marginal rehabilitation of social services refugees remained in Ethiopia awaiting repatriation, achieved over the past decade falls far short of provid- the actual number was probably 30,000 to 60,000. ing repatriating refugees with the most basic life- UNHCR staff and the Ethiopian government’s Ad- supporting needs. Throughout Somaliland, in desig- ministration for Refugees and Returnee Affairs nated and potential returnee areas in particular, there (ARRA) privately acknowledge that the official num- are virtually no reliable public health care systems. ber of Somaliland refugees has long been inflated. Limited and overcrowded public education facilities A decade of corruption in the refugee program in lack teachers and learning materials. Assistance to Ethiopia affecting Somaliland refugees has hurt the build or repair rudimentary housing is unavailable. reputation of UNHCR/Ethiopia and Ethiopian govern- ment refugee officials in the eyes of international donors. The international community does not recognize Somaliland’s independence. Somaliland is barred from receiving most multilateral financial Refugee reintegration in Somaliland is difficult in assistance. part because of persistent drought and a ban on Somali livestock imposed by . No government or international body formally recog- nizes Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia Chronic drought and a 14-month Saudi Arabian ban on and declared independence in 1991. Lack of interna- Somali livestock have crippled Somaliland’s already tional recognition disqualifies Somaliland from enter- struggling economy and severely affected returnees’ ing into formal trade agreements with foreign govern- ability to earn income. Livestock traders and milk ments and receiving multilateral financial assistance wholesalers, vocations many refugees endeavor to from international banking institutions. resume upon their return to Somaliland, have been hit A nation with few exploited natural resources, particularly hard. Somaliland depends primarily on export earnings from its struggling livestock trade for a substantial Most refugees are repatriating to areas in and portion of government revenues. The Somaliland around Somaliland’s major population centers and government’s Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabili- not to their areas of origin. tation and Reconstruction (MRR&R) has inadequate funding and human resources for refugee reintegra- Instead of returning to their village or town of origin, tion and rehabilitation programs. the majority of refugees are repatriating to Somaliland’s

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 6 cities and suburbs of Hargeisa, Borama, and Burao, gible skills. They cannot compete for scarce jobs and despite exceedingly difficult living conditions there. have no income-generating alternatives. Returnees have the false notion that greater economic opportunities and better social services await them in urban areas. The majority of the estimated 30,000 to 60,000 Somali refugees who remained in Ethiopia as of December 2001 are generally poorer and less Lack of jobs throughout Somaliland has hindered educated than refugees who have already the ability of thousands of repatriated refugees to repatriated. reach even a modest level of self-sufficiency. Absent opportunities to enhance their education or Somaliland’s post-war economy is growing, but jobs learn new job skills, thousands of Somali refugees remain scarce relative to the demand. have sat idle for as many as ten years in Ethiopia’s The construction industry is prospering with the eastern refugee camps, where they still receive food repair of war-damaged businesses, government build- rations and minimal social services. Many refugees ings, and homes. Private compa- who remain in Ethiopia are hesitant to return home nies, business technology centers, hotels, and financial because of the rising cost of living. institutions are emerging and becoming successful. Smaller businesses such as restaurants, bakeries, gro- Reintegration programs for Somaliland returnees cery stores, and dry good and clothing wholesalers are are relatively small, under-funded, and difficult to also earning better profits. sustain. Somaliland’s estimated unemployment rate in mid-2001, however, exceeded 80 percent. Many refu- Since 1993, UNHCR has invested approximately $15 gees are repatriating with limited education and negli- million in small-scale development projects to assist

A Somali woman and her daughter tend to family chores in the entryway of their makeshift home, a single room in the former residence of the governor to . Abandoned decades ago, the residence and surrounding grounds are now home to thousands of former refugees who have repatriated to Hargeisa. Photo credit: USCR/J. Frushone

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 7 the reintegration of approximately 400,000 refu- Somaliland’s tens of thousands of refugee returnees. gees. The weakness of the Somaliland government The effectiveness of basic refugee reintegration pro- has resulted in the collapse of many projects funded grams in Somaliland depends on large-scale assis- by UNHCR that addressed needs in education, health, tance by bilateral donors. water and sanitation, , and income gen- eration. The international donor community’s lack of commitment and poor representation of other UN Lack of appropriate investment in Somaliland’s agencies in Somaliland have further diminished returnee areas could result in a backflow of support for current and future refugee reintegration repatriated refugees to Ethiopia. programs. The majority of Somaliland’s returnee areas cannot currently accommodate the housing, health, water, and sanitation needs of repatriating refugees without UNHCR budget cuts negatively affect the additional assistance. repatriation and reintegration of Somali refugees. Many repatriated Somali refugees are hesitant Cutbacks imposed by international donors on UN- to remain in Somaliland because basic services are HCR worldwide programs in 2001 significantly re- lacking. Refugees who have repatriated to duced the agency’s already under-funded and under- Somaliland do not rule out returning to refugee staffed refugee program in Somaliland. The 20 per- camps in eastern Ethiopia. Lack of appropriate cent reduction imposed on UNHCR’s operating bud- infrastructure and social services in Somaliland’s get in Somaliland and 40 percent reduction in person- returnee areas could result in large backflows of nel further undermine UNHCR’s ability to assist with already repatriated refugees. the repatriation and reintegration of tens of thousands of returnees to Somaliland. International aid agencies in Somaliland are numerous and have the structure and strategy Budget cuts within UNHCR have hampered the needed to assist repatriating refugees. ability of international aid organizations to plan and Despite poor funding, numerous international non- implement projects. governmental organizations (NGOs) operate refugee Funding difficulties have undermined UNHCR’s So- reintegration programs in Somaliland. Many have repatriation program and have impeded ongoing worked in Somaliland since the mid-1990s and main- reintegration projects in Somaliland. The Somaliland tain good working relationships with government au- government and humanitarian agencies are growing thorities and Somaliland citizens. reluctant to enter into contractual agreements to Many indigenous NGOs are emerging in implement refugee returnee rehabilitation projects Somaliland as well. While most indigenous NGOs are because they are uncertain of sufficient UNHCR ineffective, some are working rather successfully in funds. conjunction with international partners. As a result, many refugees are repatriating at a With proper support from international donors, slower-than-anticipated pace from Ethiopia’s eastern NGOs in Somaliland could expand and enhance criti- refugee camps to areas devoid of essential services and cal refugee repatriation programs. facilities throughout Somaliland. UNHCR plans to end its programs in Somaliland by The Somaliland government currently is unable to the end of 2002. provide the most basic of services to returnees and UNHCR plans to close its Somaliland operations when other citizens. it completes the voluntary repatriation of Somali refu- The does not have the gees from Ethiopia’s eastern refugee camps and ful- institutional capacity or financial resources needed to fills basic reintegration program responsibilities. The sustain the physical, social, and economic needs of long-planned phase- out is not a result of recent UN- repatriating refugees. The government’s Ministry of HCR global budget reductions. International develop- Resettlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction ment workers in Somaliland strongly believe that (MRR&R) maintains a skeletal staff that struggles to UNHCR’s departure will create a vacuum difficult to address the basic needs of a limited number of fill.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 8 There is little confidence in a plan by the United food supply package, commensurate with the repatria- Nations Development Program (UNDP) to facilitate tion package provided to Somali refugees repatriating reintegration of refugees in Somaliland. to Somaliland. Neither Ethiopian authorities nor inter- national humanitarian organizations have other large- Although refugees are steadily returning to Somaliland, scale assistance programs in place to address the the UNDP plan contains no development projects to special needs of this uprooted population. reinforce the continued reintegration of returnees. As of December 2001, the plan’s inadequate budget was not fully funded, and critical staff positions remained A residual number of Somali refugees from south unfilled. Initially supportive international NGOs, UN and central Somalia will remain in Ethiopia’s agencies, and Somaliland governmental officials are eastern refugee camps. growing weary of the insufficient and long-discussed A prominent reason refugees are repatriating to UNDP plan. Somaliland is the assurance of peace and security there. Conversely, because of continued factional Availability of potable water is a chronic concern of fighting and overall lack of peace and security in the repatriated refugees. rest of Somalia, refugees from south and central Soma- lia cannot safely repatriate. Throughout Somaliland, access to water is essential to UNHCR plans to close all but one or two of the survival of repatriated refugees. In designated and Ethiopia’s eastern refugee camps by the end of 2002. potential returnee areas, however, water infrastruc- An estimated 10,000 refugees from south and central tures, where available, are unreliable and fail to meet Somalia will remain there under UNHCR’s care. the needs of growing populations. Somaliland gov- ernmental officials engaged in reintegration programs cite the provision of water to returnees as their biggest challenge. Without adequate water in Somaliland, returnees III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND are likely to go back to Ethiopia in search of reliable and accessible sources of water. The current notion of a separate Somaliland is not new. For more than a century, northwest Somalia saw itself, Many Somalis living in Ethiopia’s eastern refugee and was even treated by colonialist Britain and , as camps travel freely to and from Somaliland. separate from the rest of Somalia. In 1887, Major A. Hunt, representing Great Brit- Before repatriating, many refugee heads of house- ain, drafted and presented to several Somali holds conduct assessment missions to Somaliland to inhabiting coastal towns on the Gulf of formal better understand living conditions and economic op- protection treaties guaranteeing military support in the portunities. The free flow of refugees to and from event of armed aggression by surrounding Somaliland is also an indicator that the time for repa- ruled by other nations. Clan elders accepted and triation is now. ratified the treaties, establishing the British Somaliland and securing trade routes for Great Brit- ain, including the strategic strait of Bab Al Mendeb, Ethiopian citizens who have lived for up to ten years long coveted by the British East Company. in refugee camps intended for Somalis will face During the early 1900s, trade prospered in Brit- special problems as the camps close in Ethiopia. ish Somaliland’s port cities, owing in part to political Many Ethiopian citizens live in Ethiopia’s eastern stability strengthened by the presence of the British refugee camps intended for Somali refugees. As military. Despite Islamic nationalist leader Sheik UNHCR gradually closes the camps, Somali refugees Mohamed bin Abdullah Hassan’s fierce 20-year armed repatriate to Somaliland and the displaced resistance to British rule, the Protectorate also enjoyed disperse. While many Ethiopians attempt to return to relative peace. their areas of origin, most simply remain in close After suppressing Abdullah Hassan and his proximity to the closed camps. movement, which culminated in his defeat and flight In 2000, UNHCR initiated a program that pro- to Ethiopia in 1920, launched “pacifi- vides to Ethiopian families in the camps a nine-month cation campaigns” against Somali clans and gradu-

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 9 Somaliland's March Toward Self-Declared Independence

1887 Great Britain and Somali clan elders ratify treaties creating the British Somaliland Protectorate. 1920 Britain suppresses Islamic nationalist leader Mohamed Abdullah Hassan and institutes “pacification campaigns” against Somali clans. 1940 Italian troops invade and capture British Somaliland. 1941 Great Britain regains control of British Somaliland Protectorate and captures (central and southern Somalia). 1947 Italy signs peace treaty relinquishing all rights and titles in Italian Somaliland. 1941-50 Great Britain allows limited local governance in British Somaliland. 1960 Somaliland declares independence and joins Italian Somaliland to form the (a unified Somalia). 1961 National constitution for unified Somalia adopted in controversy. 1967 Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, former prime minister of British Somaliland, appointed prime minister of unified Somali Republic. 1969 Somali President Dr. Abdirashid Shermarke is assassinated by bodyguard. Major General Siad Mohamed Barre seizes control of unified Somali Republic in a bloodless coup d’état. 1977 Somalia’s President Barre invades eastern Ethiopia, hoping to seize region for Somalia. 1977-78 between Somalia and Ethiopia pushes 400,000 Ethiopian refugees into Somalia. 1978 Somalia loses Ogaden War. 1980-81 Drought, famine, and armed clashes in Ethiopia push refugees into northwest Somalia. 1988 Armed clashes in northwest Somalia between Barre’s government forces and insurgent Somalia National Movement (SNM) erupt into . Somalia’s first refugees flee. 1988-91 More than 700,000 Somalis flee all areas of Somalia to neighboring countries. 1991 Siad Barre is overthrown. Struggles for power and economic assets result in anarchy in much of Somalia. Northwest Somalia declares independence from the rest of Somalia, calling itself Somaliland.” Somaliland selects its own president. About 100,000 refugees repatriate to Somaliland. 1992 Clan fighting engulfs Somaliland in civil war. Clan elders negotiate an end to Somaliland’s civil war. 1993 Mohamed Ibrahim Egal is appointed . 1994 New civil war erupts in Somaliland. 1994-96 Some 90,000 refugees flee Somaliland to Ethiopia. Some 200,000 people are uprooted within Somaliland. 1996 Somaliland’s second civil war ends. 1997 Somaliland’s clans and sub-clans agree on new structure for government. President Egal remains in power. About 12,000 refugees voluntarily repatriate to Somaliland. 1998 About 50,000 refugees repatriate to Somaliland, according to the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1999 Some 20,000 refugees repatriate to Somaliland, according to UNHCR. 2000 New government is established in central and southern Somalia, based in . An estimated 45,000 refugees repatriate to Somaliland, according to UNHCR. 2001 UNHCR closes two refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia to promote repatriation to Somaliland. Somaliland voters approve new constitution that affirms self-declared independence from rest of Somalia.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 10 ally moved inland to assume more stringent control agreed to a union with the rest of Somalia because over greater British Somaliland. cultural influence from the nearby Gulf States con- In 1940, Italy declared war on Great Britain and vinced many Somaliland leaders that a unified Muslim , and Italian troops invaded and captured Brit- Somalia could better neutralize and protect itself from ish Somaliland. Great Britain recaptured the Protec- predominately Christian Ethiopia. Experts also agree torate in 1941 and proceeded to seize the entire that central and southern Somalis convinced Somaliland Italian-ruled Somali peninsula. Following the de- leaders that unity was the best option for realizing feat of Italy in World War II, British authorities economic self-sufficiency. placed British and Italian Somaliland under British The Somali Republic quickly experienced grow- military administration. ing pains. In 1947, Italy signed a peace treaty relinquishing In June 1961, political leaders adopted a national all rights and titles it still maintained in Italian constitution under a cloud of controversy. Somaliland. In 1949, under UN direction, Italian Leaders in northern Somalia could not find com- Somaliland was placed under a ten-year trusteeship mon ground on an official “Act of Union” with politi- administered by Italy with the understanding that upon cal leaders in the south. The young nation’s leaders did the conclusion of the trusteeship, the would not carry through on plans to conduct a nationwide become an autonomous state. British Somaliland was to confirm reunification prior to a referen- also on course toward independence. dum on the constitution. From 1941 to 1950, Great Britain established Much to the chagrin of the north, political leaders local courts, planning committees, and the Protector- in the south offered a combined referendum instead. ate Advisory Council to prepare British Somaliland The Somali National League (SNL), the clan- for self-governance. based party in the north, boycotted the referendum. During the late 1950s, leaders held constitutional Fewer than 100,000 out of 650,000 northern citizens meetings in Hargeisa, Burao and , the voted. Although opposed by 65 percent of northern Protectorate’s major population centers, to find a bal- Somalis, the referendum passed nationwide. ance of power between regions and clans. At the same In 1964, divisions within the leadership of the time, political parties began to emerge and coalesce ruling SYL resulted in the appointment of Abd ar- geographically throughout the Protectorate. Razak Hussein as Somalia’s new prime minister. He Before the decade ended, Great Britain instituted was a clan member. In June 1967, with the SYL universal suffrage and transferred the majority of its still divided, the National Assembly elected the executive power to local authorities. republic’s first prime minister, Dr. Shermarke, to the In February 1960, British Somaliland held Leg- presidency. islative Assembly elections. In April 1960, in its first In August 1967, the National Assembly con- act, the Assembly voted unanimously for Somaliland’s firmed President Shermarke’s nominee for prime min- independence from Great Britain. On , ister, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. Egal was a member of 1960, Great Britain granted independence to the the northern Isaaq clan and former prime minister of Protectorate, officially ending 80 years of colonial British Somaliland. rule. Some 38 nations officially recognized In October 1969, all endeavors to build a party- Somaliland’s independence. based constitutional democracy in the Somali Repub- Five days later, on , 1960, Italian Somaliland lic shattered. That month, a bodyguard assassinated achieved independence from Italy and immediately President Shermarke. joined the formerly British Somaliland in the north to Prime Minister Egal nominated a member of the form the Somali Republic. Darod clan to replace Shermarke. Adamantly opposed Political and clan leaders appointed Dr. Aden to Egal’s choice for president, the army, led by Major Abdullah Osman the new republic’s first president. General Siad Mohamed Barre, seized control of the Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, a member of the Darod government in a bloodless coup d’état on October 21, clan’s (SYL) and advocate for 1969. The ’s police backed Barre, a member of a single nation that would encompass all Somali- the Darod clan, in his seizure of power. populated areas—including , the Ethiopian The new governing authority, the Supreme Revo- Ogaden, and northeast Kenya—was appointed prime lutionary Council (SRC), immediately installed Siad minister. Barre as president, suspended the constitution, abol- According to Somaliland experts, Somaliland ished the National Assembly, banned all political

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 11 “The Red Shoes”

ixteen-year-old Abdi Siyad Yousuf (left) is Sa typical Somaliland teenage boy. He works hard in school, loves to play soc- cer, has experienced the atrocities of war, and knows little of his homeland after more than a decade as a refu- gee in eastern Ethiopia. In May 1988, the out- break of civil war in north- west Somalia uprooted his family to Daror, Ethiopia, a tiny village in the harsh, wind- swept Ogaden Desert. Within days, nearly 30,000 hungry, exhausted, and terrified fel- low Isaaq clan members populated the area. A few in a secondary school, he will have to find work in a weeks later, the Daror refugee camp emerged out of the stagnant economy where jobs for unskilled laborers red sand. are scarce. UNHCR has provided humanitarian assistance to “When I arrive to Hargeisa, my main concern is Abdi, his family, and thousands of other refugees in going back to school,” Abdi declares. “If I cannot find Daror for the past 13 years. Because of peace and a free education like I had in Daror, then it is up to my stability in Somaliland, UNHCR is scheduled to close father to pay for private school. But he does not work. the camp in December 2001. If there is no money for school, then it is up to me to find To an extent, this is good news for Abdi. Al- a job.” though he is ready to go home after living most of his Fitting in socially is also a concern. young life in Daror, he feels unprepared. After a recent “fact-finding” mission to Hargeisa, “I think I have made the best of a not-so-good life a common journey undertaken by refugees about to as a refugee in Daror,” Abdi says. “My family is repatriate, Abdi returned to Daror feeling belea- registered with UNHCR to return to Hargeisa (the guered. The pace of life in the Somaliland capital is Somaliland capital), and I am excited. I am also a bit much faster than what he is used to in the Ogaden nervous.” Desert. Food and clothes are very expensive. And, During his thirteen years in Daror, Abdi received to his surprise, people, particularly girls his age, only two years of formal education. In 1998, when Save knew he was a refugee. the Children opened a primary school in the camp, Abdi “Girls wear make-up and nice clothes in was one of the first to enroll. Two years later, he Hargeisa,” Abdi observes. “The few I talked to knew graduated in the top fourth of his class. right away that I live in Daror. Because the sand from “The excitement I felt when graduating did not the desert covers everything we wear, they call me and last long,” he recalls. “Daror has no secondary school. other refugees ‘the red shoes.’ I have more to learn So at age 15, my options for continuing my education than I thought.” were zero. This is true for my schoolmates, too. When The challenges before Abdi, and thousands of we return to Hargeisa as refugees with little education, similar young refugee boys and girls who are repatri- we are way behind other kids our age.” ating, highlight the need for education programs in Overcoming a limited education is one of many Somaliland. Many of Somaliland’s youths are eager to obstacles Abdi is expected to encounter upon his return improve themselves and their homeland, if they can and reintegration to Somaliland. If he is unable to enroll only gain the skills to do so.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 12 organizations, and arrested and detained leaders of the refugees also began returning spontaneously from former government, including Prime Minister Egal. Somalia to Ethiopia. Barre harbored deep malevolence toward the In early 1981, the steady stream of refugees Isaaq clan and sub-clans, whom he often referred to as flowing in and out of Somalia ceased. “his Jews.” According to Somaliland experts, Barre, How many refugees fled to Somalia and how as a child, was present when an Isaaq person killed his many returned to Ethiopia during 1978-81 remains father during an inter-clan battle. under dispute and plays an integral role in today’s During the ensuing two decades of Barre’s op- efforts to repatriate refugees to Somaliland. pressive rule, the country suffered widespread human (See Seeing Double: The Numbers Game page 12). rights abuses. Somaliland, more than 65 percent Isaaq, During 1984-86, a combination of drought, fam- bore the brunt of Barre’s violence. ine, continued villagization, and armed fighting be- tween Somali and ethnic-Oromo insurgents in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region caused two new flows of refugees from eastern Ethiopia to northwest Somalia, totaling about 100,000 people. IV. REFUGEES THROUGH THE TURNSTILE The first influx crowded into Gannet, a make- shift camp on the outskirts of Hargeisa, the provincial capital of northwest Somalia, during 1984-85. Un- ETHNIC SOMALIS FLEE ETHIOPIA sanitary and overcrowded conditions eventually forced Ethnic Somali refugees have been a constant presence the Somali government to close the camp and transfer in the Horn of Africa for the past quarter-century. the refugees to a newly established reception center in The 1977-78 Ogaden War, instigated by Somali Togwajale, one mile (two km) from the Ethiopian dictator Siad Barre’s 1977 military invasion of eastern border. Ethiopia, produced the first ethnic Somali refugees. In During 1985-86, a second influx of refugees 1978, following the defeat of Somalia’s army at the soon overcrowded Togwajale. Mounting international hands of the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Ethiopian pressure concerning the center’s proximity to the bor- army, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Somalis and der and worsening conditions prompted the Somali Ethiopian Oromos living in the long-disputed Ogaden government to relocate most of the refugees to a new region of eastern Ethiopia fled to northwest and south- camp in nearby Daawaali. ern Somalia. In 1988, a decade after emerging as one of The government of Somalia, maintaining its cen- Africa’s major refugee-hosting nations, Somalia itself turies-old claim that the Ogaden region was part of began to fracture and produce refugees on a large Somalia, initially received the uprooted Somalis and scale. defined them as internally displaced persons rather than as refugees. One of Africa’s poorest nations, TARGETED DEATH AND DESTRUCTION Somalia lacked the basic physical and social infra- structures necessary to assist the massive influx, and Distrusted and despised in many quarters, President the government’s efforts quickly failed. Siad Barre’s popularity shrank considerably after So- In September 1979, the Somali government re- malia was defeated in Barre’s war against Ethiopia and classified the uprooted population as Ethiopian refu- he failed to annex the Ogaden. Barre responded by gees and appealed to UNHCR for international as- tightening his repressive grip. sistance. Conflicting estimates of the number of During the late 1980s, in an attempt to eliminate refugees in the camps in northwest and southwest growing armed domestic resistance to his dictatorship, Somalia delayed the arrival of much-needed hu- Barre increased his government’s atrocities against manitarian aid. Somali citizens. The Red Berets, a dreaded elite unit Persistent drought and Ethiopian government handpicked from Barre’s Merehan sub-clan, was en- “villagization” programs continued to push additional listed to exact a reign of brutality against the ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden region into Somalia. and Isaaq clans, as well as against the , a Most of the refugees who entered Somalia after those Darod sub-clan. who fled the aftermath of the Ogaden War were In 1981, Somalis living in Saudi Arabia, prima- of the Somali Ogadeni clan. During 1980, as rily from the Isaaq clan, established the Somalia Na- the influx to Somalia continued, tens of thousands of tional Movement (SNM). The SNM emerged in the

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 13 Seeing Double: The Numbers Game

ow many refugees have fled Somaliland during to Somaliland has been inflated in official records. the past 12 years? How many refugees have UNHCR and the Ethiopian government refu- Hrepatriated to Somaliland since 1991? How gee agency, the Administration for Refugee and many Somaliland people remain refugees in late 2001? Returnee Affairs (ARRA), rely on often-inaccurate Accurate answers to these basic questions remain registration records, random recounts, and the tabu- in dispute and complicate efforts to assess refugee lation of refugee ration cards to estimate refugee repatriation and reintegration in current-day Somaliland. camp populations. During the past dozen years, internal and external Many refugees fraudulently possess multiple armed conflicts have ration cards to obtain ex- uprooted people from tra monthly food allot- Somaliland. Some ments and are often were citizens of So- counted more than once malia, while some as a result. Many ARRA were Ethiopian refu- officials reportedly ex- gees who had fled to aggerate refugee popu- Somalia during the lations to obtain addi- 1980s. tional food aid, which When hun- they allegedly use for dreds of thousands of personal consumption men, women, and or sell for considerable children fled profit. Somaliland to seek Identifying who is safety in Ethiopia, hu- and is not a Somaliland manitarian relief of- refugee is so difficult ficials found it impos- that the governments of sible to distinguish a Somali refugee from an Ethiopian Somaliland and Ethiopia and their respective refugee returnee because of shared ethnicity. Ten years later, agencies, as well as UNHCR, other UN agencies, and officials in Ethiopia were still unable or unwilling to sort international NGOs regularly cite different refugee out who was a refugee and who was not. population figures when conducting programs for as- As a result, accurate census numbers for sistance, repatriation, and reintegration. Somaliland refugees and returnees do not exist to this When refugees repatriate to Somaliland, ARRA day. officials in Ethiopia are commonly accused of masking Thousands of internally displaced Ethiopians, their corruption by inflating official repatriation num- posing as Somali refugees, have over the years trickled bers. Extra repatriation packages, which include a in and out of refugee camps meant for Somalis, and nine-month supply of food for each returnee, are an many Ethiopians remain in those camps today. Many additional windfall for corrupt officials and entrepre- genuine Somaliland refugees repatriated spontaneously neurs. Some UNHCR workers have also fallen under on their own without being properly counted or regis- suspicion. tered, and received no assistance from the international In November 2001, UNHCR reported that the community. Many other refugees simply never re- total number of Somali refugees who repatriated to turned to Somaliland and started new lives in Ethiopia Somaliland from Ethiopia’s eastern refugee camps or in a myriad of other foreign countries across the between February 1997 and October 2001 in the orga- globe. nized repatriation program surpassed 170,000. Some Complicating matters further, violence, drought, humanitarian aid workers estimate that the actual num- and economic hardship during the 1990s uprooted addi- ber of returnees assisted during that time frame was tional tens of thousands of people from Somaliland, probably less than 60,000. including many of the same individuals who had re- How many Somali refugees remained in Ethio- turned home after fleeing years earlier. Because of pia in November 2001? The official UNHCR number fraud and double counting in refugee camps in neigh- was approximately 80,000. USCR and some humani- boring Ethiopia, the number of genuine refugees has tarian aid organizations estimated that the actual num- been exaggerated, and the number of genuine returnees ber was 30,000 to 60,000.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 14 late 1980s as a prominent and determined insurgency based United Somali Congress (USC) dislodged gov- group opposed to Barre’s tyrannical rule and his ernment troops throughout Somalia and brought the government’s political and economic discrimination Siad Barre dictatorship to an end. against northwest Somalia. Operating from bases in The flight of Barre, the collapse of his regime, Ethiopia, the SNM initiated a guerilla war to protect and the capture of Mogadishu by forces loyal to the Isaaq clan interests and, ultimately, oust Barre. USC immediately led to two significant population In May 1988, when clashes between the SNM shifts in central and southern Somalia. and Barre’s government forces escalated into a full- The first involved Somali civilians and Ethio- scale civil war, virtually all inhabitants of Hargeisa, pian refugees fleeing Somalia. UNHCR estimated that Borama, Berbera, and Burao, northwest Somalia’s approximately 250,000 central and southern Somalia major population centers, fled their homes. Farms, members of the Darod clan fled revenge killings car- rural areas, and nomadic pasturelands were also aban- ried out by the rival Hawiye and other anti-Barre clans, doned. The conflict soon broadened when other insur- and sought refuge in camps in Kenya. Some 150,000 gent groups began attacking government forces fled to the North Eastern and Rift Valley provinces, throughout the rest of Somalia. while an estimated 50,000 fled to the southeast Ken- During the ensuing two years of intense fighting, yan port city of Mombassa. Tens of thousands of other steady government air and artillery bombardments civilians, representing numerous clans and sub-clans, and systematic Red Beret attacks targeted innocent as well as Ethiopian refugees living in camps through- Isaaq clan members and killed an estimated 100,000 out Somalia fled to eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti. people, reducing northwest Somalia to rubble. The The second population movement involved So- civil war, fought almost exclusively in northwest So- mali civilians and Ethiopian refugees who were unable malia, imposed an additional layer of misery in a to flee Somalia. Trapped in conflict areas, tens of region already suffering from national neglect. thousands of uprooted central and southern Somalis Siad Barre’s sustained military offensive crippled fled their homes and relied on an informal clan-based agricultural production, destroyed nearly all of the food distribution system for their survival. An addi- region’s livestock, decimated northwest Somalia’s tional 35,000 Ethiopian refugees living in Qoryoley businesses, places of worship, and water infrastruc- and other refugee camps in southern Somalia fled to ture, and uprooted almost the entire population of Mogadishu. Continued poor security prevented hu- approximately 2.5 million people. manitarian agencies from providing the displaced Ethio- Fleeing war, mass executions, and torture, ap- pian refugees with emergency relief for several months. proximately 400,000 residents of northwest Somalia In February 1991, while anarchy and violent clan sought refuge in other countries. Approximately and sub-clan power struggles raged throughout central 350,000 fled to Ethiopia, while thousands fled to and southern Somalia, citizens in the northwest began and North America. Tens of thousands of to pursue a different future. others fled to Djibouti, where they were allowed to enter the country but were denied refugee status by the government. An estimated 1.5 million additional 1991 - 2000: SOMALILAND RE-EMERGES people were displaced within northwest Somalia. AND REFUGEES RETURN UNHCR established eight camps in eastern Ethio- pia to accommodate the influx of refugees. The camps, including six that still exist today, were located In early 1991, after a horrific three-year civil war, along the Ethiopia-Somalia border and were orga- political leaders in northwest Somalia emerged and nized according to clan demographics. In Djibouti, began to pursue a peaceful transition toward civilian UNHCR eventually established two camps near the rule. borders with Ethiopia and Somalia. Both camps exist In February 1991, while central and southern today. Somalia plunged into disarray, the Isaaq clans con- Many internally displaced Somalis subsisted in vened a local shir (traditional council) in the northwest SNM strongholds, while tens of thousands of others port city of Berbera. The Dolbahante, Gadabursi and struggled in remote areas for interminable months clans, even though they had allied with with no humanitarian assistance. President Barre and had fought against the Isaaq, In January 1991, guerrilla offensives coordi- reached a critical amnesty with the SNM. Clan elders nated by the loosely allied SNM, the southern-based and SNM leaders, determined to prevent rogue mili- Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the central- tary commanders from developing into faction lead-

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 15 Somaliland: Independent or Not?

oes the Republic of Somaliland—a remote place ticularly after 18 U.S. soldiers were killed there in hidden in the far reaches of the Horn of Africa, October 1993. Dwhere nomads and their laden with frank- Somaliland’s leaders justify their separation from incense and share desert roads with Mercedes-Benz a unified Somalia by citing the sharp contrast between trucks hauling state-of-the-art televisions—truly exist? their homeland’s relative peace and the rest of Somalia’s Not according to the international community. continued violence. They suggest that a politically On , 1991, Somaliland unilaterally declared unified Somalia was attempted for three decades and independence from the rest of Somalia. Somaliland’s showed itself to be ungovernable. They point out leaders claim that their territorial borders derive from the that Somaliland has formed its own representative borders drawn by Great Britain more than a century government and that 97 percent of Somaliland’s earlier, when the British ruled northwest Somalia and voting population approved a new constitution in May called it the British Somaliland Protectorate. 2001. Today, most of Somaliland’s estimated 3.5 million “The international community has disenfran- population considers itself to be politically independent chised Somaliland, but we haven’t let this stop us,” said from the anarchy that prevails in southern and central Abdul Qadir Jirde, deputy speaker of the Somaliland Somalia. The world’s other nations, however, have cho- parliament. “With our own muscle, blood, and very sen to withhold of Somaliland and small wallets, we have established a government, and continue to regard it merely as one region of a unified are beginning to rehabilitate our schools, health clinics Somalia. and other important sectors of Somaliland society. We The Organization of African Unity (OAU) refuses are slowly moving in the right direction. International to recognize Somaliland independence in part because the recognition of our independence, and the multilateral OAU has a long history of holding existing national financial support that goes with it, would help us move borders sacrosanct. Some Somaliland experts speculate faster.” that , a powerful OAU member, insists on maintain- Official recognition would enable Somaliland to ing a politically unified Somalia in order to check neigh- sign formal trade agreements with foreign govern- boring Ethiopia’s political and economic power in the ments and receive multilateral financial assistance from region. the , International Monetary Fund, and the Wealthy Saudi Arabia, the largest financial sup- African Development Bank to address its massive porter to the League of Arab States, also refuses to endorse development needs. fragmentation of a League member country. “Although standing alone in the Horn of Africa Western countries, including the , re- allows us to rebuild our homeland on our terms, it is not portedly have been deliberately slow to endorse Somaliland completely ideal,” Jirde acknowledged. “While we independence because of doubts about Somaliland’s long- welcome international recognition, it represents only term economic and political viability. Major powers are one of so many other priority issues before Somaliland.” also uncertain whether Somaliland independence would Somaliland independence is not a political or dampen or inflame instability in the Horn of Africa. The legal reality—at least not yet. But for Somaliland’s future of Somaliland and the rest of Somalia has been a people, independence has become a very real state of bottom-rung priority for American policy-makers, par- mind.

ers, agreed to exchange prisoners of war uncondition- northwest Somalis considered the repeal to be an ally, work together to rebuild the decimated northwest, overly bold step to take so soon after the fall of Barre. and determine their collective future. The SNM elected its chairman, Abdi Rahman In May 1991, clan elders convened a “national” Ahmed Ali Tour, as the first president of the Republic shir in the central northwest city of Burao. Clan elders of Somaliland. The SNM also named an interim and SNM leaders repealed the controversial “Act of legislature and judiciary, and encouraged Somali refu- Union” of 1960 and declared independence. Many gees who fled in 1988 to return home.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 16 Somaliland’s declaration of independence encour- multilateral assistance from international financial aged most of the estimated 400,000 institutions. refugees living in neighboring countries to consider repa- During its first six months of self-declared inde- triation. While more than 200,000 refugees repatriated to pendence, Somaliland achieved modest success in Somaliland during late 1991, two major deterrents assembling a government and maintaining peace un- hampered their reintegration and hindered the return der seemingly insurmountable conditions. Although home of the remaining 200,000 refugees. laden with problems that required human and financial First, unexploded ordnance and more than 1 resources beyond its means, the new Somaliland lead- million landmines, strategically planted throughout ers put in place the cornerstone of a foundation for a Somaliland by insurgent groups and forces loyal to stable government to grow. Barre, endangered the safety and slowed the return of Not all Somalis, however, appreciated the direc- tens of thousands of refugees. The mines were preva- tion of the government’s admittedly slow progress. lent in and around the cities of Hargeisa, Burao, and The SNM leadership remained fragmented, and clan- Berbera. Fears about the presence of unexploded based factions and armed militia groups from the war ordnance and landmines reduced the amount of land competed for political prominence. available for livestock grazing and cultivation. In October 1991, Somaliland’s first armed rebel- Secondly, UNHCR was slow to draft and imple- lion tested the political unity of Somaliland. The ment a repatriation plan. Although various UN agen- Habar Awal, a minority Isaaq sub-clan, controlled cies maintained operations in Somaliland amidst secu- Somaliland’s strategic port city of Berbera and refused rity concerns, the estimated 200,000 refugees who to share port revenue with the government or other spontaneously repatriated during 1991 received no sub-clans. The Habar Gerhajis, the majority Isaaq sub- coordinated humanitarian assistance. Facing an al- clan, acting “in the interest of the state,” attacked ready difficult situation, refugees returned to a devas- Berbera. tated Somaliland without basic food and non-food By mid-1992, the attack had escalated into a civil items, and without minimal cash grants. war between the government and a coalition of clan- Three years of civil war destroyed northwest based militias led by the Red Flag faction of the SNM. Somalia’s negligible water and transportation sys- Although intense clashes occurred in Berbera, Burao, tems. Economic, political, and social structures— and Hargeisa, they did not result in major population tremendously weakened under the Barre regime—had displacement. deteriorated to a state of disrepair. Rehabilitating and Fatigued by war, clan elders reflected the views reconstructing all aspects of a nation in ruins presented of the majority of Somaliland’s citizenry and over- President Tour and the military-minded SNM leader- whelmingly condemned the attack and resulting vio- ship, the transitional government until 1993, with lence. In September 1992, the xir (traditional conflict formidable challenges. resolution system), resuscitated by clan elders at a shir The foremost challenge was restoring law and in the town of , averted potential anarchy by order and re-establishing normal trade and commerce. negotiating an end to the fighting. The government acknowledged the reintegration as- Somaliland’s leaders convened a national shir in sistance needs of the hundreds of thousands of refu- Borama in January 1993 to build upon the peace gees and internally displaced Somalis, but deemed restored in September 1992. Concluding in May 1993, them a lesser priority. the shir peacefully dissolved the SNM transitional The government needed substantial funds to for- government and transferred power to a community- mulate and implement the multitude of programs vital based system that consisted of executive, legislative, to rebuilding a nation and sustaining the peace. Rem- and judicial bodies. The shir also elected Mohamed nants of the ruined economy, consisting of airport, Ibrahim Egal, who had been the prime minister of road, and seaport revenue, represented the only finan- British Somaliland and Somalia, the second president cial resources available to the government. of Somaliland. Unwilling to endorse any fragmentation of the Discontent within the Habar Gerhajis sub-clan Horn of Africa, the international community refused over the election of Egal, who was a member of the to recognize Somaliland’s self-declared independence. rival Habar Awal sub-clan, combined with continued Its unofficial status disqualified the impoverished ter- factional discord within the SNM, soon shattered ritory from formal trade agreements with foreign gov- Somaliland’s tenuous peace. ernments and blocked Somaliland from receiving In November 1994, clan and sub-clan tension

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 17 A Somaliland soldier stands guard at military base in Burao. Unlike central and southern Somalia, Somaliland enjoys relative peace ensured by a citizenry fatigued by war, a small police force, and a 10,000-man military. Photo credit: USCR/J. Frushone escalated into a full-scale civil war—Somaliland’s ernment to hold a nationwide referendum in three second internal war in a span of four years. The years. Under Article 151, a vote in favor of the conflict began in the capital, Hargeisa, and by March referendum equated approval of the provisional con- 1995 spread west to Burao and to Somaliland’s central stitution and endorsement of the of regions of Woqooyi Galbeed and . Somaliland. The war displaced the entire population of Burao The deep involvement of the two non-Isaaq clans, and tens of thousands of civilians in and around the Dolbahante and Warsangali, was the critical ingre- Hargeisa. More than one year of fighting pushed an dient to the success of this peace agreement. In late- estimated 90,000 Somalis into refugee camps in neigh- 1996, Dolbahante and Warsangali leaders realized that boring Ethiopia and uprooted an additional 200,000 Isaaq clans and sub-clans, their former arch-enemies, people within Somaliland. were serious about forging a sustainable peace and The civil war destroyed the modest rehabilitation began to participate actively in the peace process. Somaliland had achieved during its first five years of In early 1997, UNHCR and Somaliland govern- self-declared independence and halted the favorable ment officials updated their plans to repatriate more conditions that had encouraged the return of Somali than 100,000 Somali refugees. Somaliland’s Presi- refugees. dent Egal, however, warned against a rapid large- A third national shir, convened in Hargeisa in scale return. “We are not strong enough, our October 1996 and concluded in March 1997, again economy is not strong enough, and the country is not ushered official peace to Somaliland. The Hargeisa yet safe enough for these people to return,” he said shir preserved Egal’s presidency and created a bicam- in June 1997. eral legislature, consisting of a house of parliament, Heeding the president’s warning, Somaliland elected by the populace, and the Guutri (traditional officials and UNHCR reached a compromise to allow leaders), chosen by clan councils. Two-thirds of the for the repatriation of 50,000 Somalis in 1997. Fewer shir representatives approved the new structure and than 12,000 refugees voluntarily repatriated that year, ratified a provisional constitution requiring the gov- however, including 10,000 as part of a pilot return

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 18 Eastern Ethiopia’s Refugee Camps

uring the past 12 years, Ethiopia has ami- and grazing lands are scarce, and after harvests. cably hosted hundreds of thousands of Until recent years, poor regional security DSomali refugees. Today, most Somali endangered humanitarian aid workers and truck refugees live in six camps under the care of the convoys traveling by road to and from the isolated Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs refugee camps. Although security has improved (ARRA), the Ethiopian government’s refugee in recent years, logistical challenges of delivering agency. food and other supplies to the camps persist. Many of Ethiopia’s eastern refugee camps Many Somali refugees have lived under the have evolved into major trading centers over the care of the international community in Ethiopia’s years. The camps’ isolated locations in a cultur- eastern refugee camps for more than ten years. ally and economically homogenous region of Ethio- The harsh camp conditions and minimal social pia, and their proximity to the extremely porous services have left many refugees destitute and Ethiopia- Somaliland border, make them ideal for dependant on United Nations agencies and non- commerce. governmental organizations (NGOs) for basic life The refugee camps overshadow most local support. villages and have grown into economic bases Most refugees live in weathered shelters controlled by various ethnic-Somali clans. How- made of tattered plastic sheeting stretched over ever, the camps also manage to benefit the local sticks, subsist on donated food, and rely on sub- Ethiopian population, particularly by sharing scarce standard education, health care, water, and sanita- food and water. Refugees from Somaliland, re- tion assistance from the United Nations High turnees to Ethiopia, and local Ethiopian residents Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World all benefit from the sharing of resources, although Food Program (WFP), and international NGOs. not always equally. No longer self-reliant, most long-term refugees Ethiopia’s and Somaliland’s agro-pastoralists face uphill challenges upon repatriating to and nomads have incorporated the refugee camps Somaliland. into their seasonal migration patterns. Many com- In June 2001, UNHCR officially closed monly use the camps as a base where women and Ethiopia’s eastern Teferiber and Darwanaji refu- children remain year-round. Men and boys fre- gee camps. As of November 2001, six camps quent the camps during the dry season, when water remained open.

Camaboker Camp Aisha Camp Established: August 1998 Established: November 1989 Current official population: 20,000 Current official population: 14,000 Major clan affiliation: Isaaq Major clan affiliation: Refugee areas of origin: Hargeisa & Burao Refugee areas of origin: Zeyla &

Daror CampCa Hartisheik Camp Established: August 1988 Established: May 1988 Current official population: 13,000 Current official population: 12,000 Major clan affiliation: Isaaq Major clan affiliation: Isaaq Refugee areas of origin: Hargeisa, Burao, Refugee areas of origin: Hargeisa & Erigavo & Berbera

Kebribeyah Camp Rabasso Camp Established: February 1991 Established: August 1988 Current official population: 12,000 Current official population: 10,000 Major clan affiliation: Merehan & Major clan affiliation: Isaaq Refugee areas of origin: Mogadishu & Refugee areas of origin: Hargeisa & Burao

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 19 project. Many thousands of the returnees settled in tions. “Heaven knows, we need help to rebuild this Sheikh Nur, a newly designated resettlement area in country,” he affirmed in May 1999. “We have stabi- Hargeisa. lized Somaliland, we have pacified Somaliland, and UNHCR attributed the small refugee return in we have disarmed all the tribal militia in Somaliland 1997 to several factors: the lack of humanitarian without any assistance from anybody. But you cannot programs and basic social services in returnee areas; build a country with empty hands.” uncertainty over land distribution; and the presence of The continued influx of repatriating refugees from landmines in Somaliland. Many well-informed refu- Ethiopia’s eastern refugee camps during 1999 added to gees, although eager to return home, knew about the anxieties of the Somaliland government. During Somaliland’s difficult conditions and decided to 1999, more than 20,000 Somali refugees repatriated to remain in camps in neighboring countries, where locations across Somaliland, UNHCR estimated. they received ready access to UNHCR assistance To accommodate refugees returning to Hargeisa, programs. the government established another resettlement area, In 1998, as relative peace began to settle over Mohamed Mooge. The estimated 5,000 returnees who Somaliland, the government turned its attention to resettled in Mohamed Mooge, however, found inad- formidable rehabilitation and development needs that equate shelter and insufficient education and health had persisted since 1991. Refugee reintegration re- care facilities. mained a prominent concern of the government, but The estimated 15,000 other returnees resettled received little attention and less support because of throughout Somaliland, many in and around the cities scant resources. of Borama and Burao, where they received even less With the intention of obtaining financial devel- reintegration assistance. The government and hu- opment assistance, President Egal embarked on diplo- manitarian agencies failed to persuade international matic missions to neighboring countries and Europe to agencies and foreign governments to contribute present Somaliland’s case for international recogni- financial and human resources to refugee reintegra- tion. While successful in securing informal agree- tion or for necessary development programs for ments to exchange ambassadors with and open Somaliland. a in Ethiopia, Egal returned home During 2000, while Somaliland began planning as he had left: financially empty-handed. for a 2001 referendum on its constitution, a national Refugees, however, continued to repatriate. government formed in southern and central Somalia Despite limited services in exceedingly overcrowded for the first time since the ouster of dictator Siad Barre returnee areas, some 50,000 Somalis voluntarily repa- in 1991. Somaliland refused to endorse the new triated to Somaliland during 1998, according to UN- government. Many central and southern Somalia HCR estimates. citizens, including some warlords and their militia, During 1999, Somaliland remained relatively also refused to recognize the new Mogadishu-based peaceful. More international NGOs began to operate government. in major population centers. International donors, Refugees continued to repatriate to Somaliland however, provided minuscule financial support to a throughout 2000, although in fewer numbers than in select few development projects, reflecting their con- 1999. tinued disinterest in Somaliland. By mid-2000, approximately 85,000 Somali refu- President Egal confirmed Somaliland’s frustra- gees in Ethiopia’s eastern refugee camps had regis- tered with UNHCR for eventual repatriation. By year’s end, UNHCR officially assisted with the volun- tary repatriation of an estimated 45,000 refugees to For more information on Somaliland, Somaliland, primarily to Borama. The Somaliland access the following websites: government and UNHCR failed to establish a desig- nated resettlement area or to make basic services http://www.somalilandgov.com available. Refugees repatriating to Hargeisa contin- http://www.somalilandforum.com ued to crowd into expanding resettlement areas. http://www.somalilander.org As 2001 began, repatriating refugees contin- http://www.somalilandnet.com ued to flow into Somaliland. To their disappoint- ment, most returnees found a war-scarred homeland nearly identical to the destruction they fled a decade earlier.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 20 A Somali refugee walks in eastern Ethiopia’s Ogaden desert, home to an estimated 80,000 Somali refugees, many of whom have lived in exile for more than a decade. Photo credit: USCR/J. Frushone

least once in their lives. The monumental and V. FORGOTTEN SOMALILAND complex task of reintegrating Somaliland’s uprooted population has spanned the past decade and contin- ues today. “In 1991, I was one of the first to return to With negligible help from the international com- Hargeisa after three years of war. I did not munity, Somaliland continues during 2001 to absorb recognize the city, once home to nearly tens of thousands of Somali refugees repatriating from 500,000 people. I found no more than three eastern Ethiopia’s refugee camps, putting added stress families, two barely running vehicles, and a on Somaliland’s already fragile infrastructure. handful of wild dogs fighting over the car- From February 1997 to October 2001, UNHCR casses of dead camels. The devastation reports that it officially assisted in the voluntary was beyond belief. Things have changed repatriation of an estimated 170,000 Somali refu- since then, but not much.” gees to Somaliland. During the same period, as many as 350,000 others returned home without Ahmed Elmi, former refugee, and assistance. During 2002, UNHCR expects to facili- current reintegration program officer tate the voluntary repatriation of an additional 60,000 of Danish Refugee Council refugees to Somaliland. Many in the international humanitarian commu- The world has all but forgotten about Somaliland and nity and in the government of Somaliland agree that its struggling people. the repatriation of Somalis living in eastern Ethiopia’s Among the poorest of the poor in Africa, most of refugee camps is long overdue. today’s estimated 3.5 million Somaliland citizens “It does not matter if refugees repatriate from as were refugees or internally displaced persons at close as Ethiopia or as far away as Europe or

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 21 Scandinavia, we need them all to come home, and school system is not only difficult, it is only half the come home now,” observed Mohamoud Aden Dheri, battle,” Somaliland’s minister of education, Ahmed the governor of Somaliland’s south-central region of Yousuf Duale, acknowledged to USCR. “The number Togdheer. “Somaliland is still in tatters, but full of of secondary schools available for our graduating peace. It is critical that all refugees return to help us children is tragically limited, and our government does physically and socially rebuild our homeland. We not have the means to build the necessary schools, cannot do it without them.” Nor can the government furnish them with desks and books, or hire qualified and returnees do it alone. teachers that we know are needed. This puts the future The government of Somaliland lacks the institu- of our children and Somaliland at risk.” tional capacity and financial resources needed to ad- As a result, most of Somaliland’s school-age dress the physical, social, and economic needs of its children, including many competent students, receive own citizens, including repatriating refugees. A de- nothing more than a primary school education at best. cade after declaring independence, Somaliland re- The condition of primary schools and lack of mains devastated and economically depressed, offer- qualified school administrators and teachers through- ing little incentive for Somali refugees to return and out Somaliland further limits the government’s ability limited opportunities to enhance the self-sufficiency to properly educate its growing population of school- of its current citizens. age children, including repatriating refugees. In fact, many refugees who repatriated to Only one primary school and no secondary school Somaliland ten years ago live in makeshift camps and exist in Sheik Nur, a Hargeisa neighborhood with an slums in their homeland and are no better off than estimated 6,500 families—Somaliland’s largest refu- refugees repatriating today. Although most return- gee resettlement area. Less than 5 percent of Sheik ees express a strong desire to participate in rebuilding Nur’s school-age population is receiving a formal their homeland, they have limited education and few education. skills. Because of a lack of schools in the western A closer look at the today Somaliland town of Borama, education officials are confirms that with proper support for refugee reinte- considering conducting classes outdoors to accommo- gration, the international community could play an date more than 1,000 newly repatriated students from integral role in the rehabilitation of Somaliland. eastern Ethiopia’s closed refugee camps. Many school- aged children who have returned from refugee camps are concerned that limited class space will marginalize THE STATE OF EDUCATION them further and end their education. Somaliland’s education system is in a state of disre- “When my father died in Darwanaji refugee pair. All levels of formal education ceased during camp, I became the man of the house,” 15-year-old Somaliland’s war for independence and two subse- Abdi Unis Tukale told USCR. He repatriated with his quent civil wars during the early and mid-1990s. mother and four younger siblings to Borama in June Each conflict killed large numbers of school admin- 2001 after 11 years as a refugee in eastern Ethiopia. istrators and teachers, destroyed schools and learn- “Now that we are back in Somaliland, my mother said ing material, and disrupted the education of hun- that I can best help our family by staying in school, dreds of thousands of children and adults in every and I hope to do so. But she learned that the schools region of Somaliland. in Borama are already crowded and have little room As of December 2001, fewer than 20 percent of for former refugees. If this is true, my education is Somaliland’s primary school-age children have re- over and I will have to find a job to support my turned to school, while nearly half of Somaliland’s family.” primary schools remain damaged and unfit for use. Somaliland’s dilapidated education system is The majority of Somaliland’s limited number of also hampering future development. During the past secondary and professional technical schools also re- decade, many Somalis with the financial means have main damaged, and few have reopened. While the sought education services abroad and have never re- newly constructed of Hargeisa and the turned to Somaliland, where their expertise is desper- rehabilitated University of Somaliland are conducting ately needed to rebuild their homeland. The resulting classes, each is capable of enrolling only a small “brain drain” has further hindered Somaliland’s abil- number of secondary school graduates. ity to rehabilitate its social services, economy, and “Nurturing our children through our primary government.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 22 Taking Matters Into Her Own Hands

he one-room apartment on the third floor of district of Hargeisa that is home to more than one-third of the nearly completed hospital has no door. the city’s population, yet has no health care facilities. The TExposed electrical wires hang from light fixtures hospital is scheduled for completion by the end of 2001. dangling from the ceiling, and tattered sheets of plastic When fully functional, the 50-bed facility will cover gaping holes in the whitewashed walls that have accommodate 25 patients in the maternity ward and long awaited windows. maintain an operating theater, x-ray and delivery rooms, The woman who sleeps here is not a homeless a library, and lecture hall. construction worker. To many, she is Somaliland’s Today, masons, and carpenters share the hospital Mother Teresa. To others, she is the former wife of corridors with 32 nursing students hand-picked by Ismail Somaliland’s current from a pool of more than president, Mohamed 300 applicants. Ibrahim Egal, now ob- “These very dedi- sessed with an unattain- cated students know full able dream. well that they represent To those who the foundation upon know her best, 62-year- which we will build old quality health care in (right) is a remarkable Somaliland,” she woman who has sacri- smiles. “Our rigorous ficed much to bring to three-year program will life a maternity hospital produce superb regis- on a former public ex- tered nurses. The top ecution field. 12 graduates I will re- An expert in ma- tain to work and teach at ternal health, Ismail the hospital. The re- knows how desperate mainder will work as people in Somaliland are for quality health care services. nurses and midwives in Hargeisa clinics.” “Simply put, we as a nation lack the technical The hospital also conducts evening adult literacy expertise and resources needed to rebuild a health care classes for laborers and employees who cannot read. infrastructure that two decades of war destroyed,” says Ismail’s financial contribution, and generous pri- Ismail, a Hargeisa native. “Because of this, the health of vate donations of money and equipment from North the people of Somaliland, particularly women and chil- America and Europe, have helped defray most of the dren, is among the worst in Africa.” initial expenses. While additional funding is still needed Every day in Somaliland, ten women die giving to complete the hospital, raising revenue to operate the birth. One in eight infants do not live to see their first facility is vital. birthday, and one in five die before they reach the age “Patients will pay what they can afford,” Ismail of five. Ismail has taken matters into her own capable acknowledges. “We hope that rent collected from a hands and maintains high hopes of reversing these separate building constructed on the hospital grounds to trends. house private medical-related businesses will provide In 1997, she conceived and completed the design of us with another source of income. We truly have the 10,000 square-meter, three-story Edna Adan Mater- nowhere else to turn.” nity Hospital. Construction of the hospital began in Unrecognized by the international community as Hargeisa one year later. She has invested her entire life an independent nation, Somaliland is barred access to savings and oversees every facet of the project. multilateral development assistance. Lack of interna- “If people wish to view me as a role model for tional aid for the past ten years has undermined Somaliland’s Somali women, that is fine,” Ismail submits. “I would modest nation-building and has forced private citizens, rather the world focus on the socially underprivileged like Ismail, to develop public institutions. people of Somaliland who greatly need basic medical “This is my second hospital,” Ismail says. “My services and the nurses and midwives we are training, first is occupied by a person with a very big gun in however, than revere an old woman like me.” Mogadishu. Tragically, this is the picture everybody has The hospital is located in Dumbuluq, a deprived when a Somali word is spoken. But this is not who we are.”

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 23 THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE lack well-trained professionals, diagnostic services, and medicines. Somaliland’s health care system is primitive. In Hargeisa’s seven returnee neighborhoods, 16 Somalilanders suffer unnecessarily and die daily from nurses support eight mother-and-child health care cen- preventable and curable diseases. ters (MCH) that serve tens of thousands of returnees. Somaliland has always struggled to provide its In the western Somaliland town of Burao—a desig- citizens with basic health care services. The territory nated return area for thousands of former refugees— has not yet managed to develop a comprehensive the hospital pharmacy cannot fill simple prescriptions health care system. During the Barre regime in the even though it is supposed to supply medicines to 1980s, government authorities in Mogadishu, the capi- MCH’s in the immediate area. tal of Somalia, intentionally ignored the health care “I am an old woman and rely on UNHCR for my needs of citizens in northern regions. Well before monthly supply of medicine to regulate my high blood Somaliland declared independence in 1991, most So- pressure,” said Fatumo Nur Abocker, a refugee cur- mali medical professionals were based in Mogadishu, rently living in Ethiopia but preparing to repatriate to more than 700 miles from Hargeisa. The uneven Somaliland’s Burao area. “During my recent trip to health care system posed obvious access problems for Burao, I visited the hospital pharmacy to see if they most northern Somalis in need of immunization ser- could fill my prescription. They could not. Because of vices and medical care. this, I am afraid to return and live in Burao.” Armed conflicts in Somaliland during the 1990s While the Somaliland government recognizes its completely destroyed the token facilities constructed deficiencies, it lacks the financial resources and insti- in the 1980s. The years of violence halted the sporadic tutional knowledge to implement even rudimentary training of medical professionals and disrupted deliv- changes to Somaliland’s health care system. The eries of critically needed medicines. While Somaliland Somaliland population lacks qualified nurses, mid- did achieve marginal health care improvements during wives, doctors, laboratory technicians, and profes- the past decade, its semblance of a health care system sional hospital administrators needed to address per- remains incapable of providing Somalilanders with vasive health care needs. the most basic services. Lack of accountability within the government “The health care situation in Somaliland is better has also hampered simple targeted improvements in today than it was ten years ago, but it is still very bad,” health care. said Edna Adan Ismail, former World Health Organi- “International humanitarian agencies will con- zation (WHO) representative in Djibouti and founder tinue to rehabilitate and construct new buildings to of the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital in Somaliland. provide health care services across Somaliland,” an “Somaliland’s lack of quality medical professionals, international humanitarian worker remarked to USCR. at all levels, tops the long list of deficiencies that “However, we are hesitant to provide beds, medical continue to impede our ability to develop a proper instruments, and continual supplies of medicines. This health care system needed to address the needs of all is the responsibility of the government. While we want Somalilanders.” to help, it is hard for us to provide equipment and Infectious and communicable diseases pose the supplies without assurances that they will reach in- greatest health threats to Somaliland’s population. tended beneficiaries.” Infant mortality remains high, with one in five children Although nearly all Somali refugees have dying before the age of five. Life expectancy is only experienced the atrocities of war, Somaliland’s health 48 years. Hepatitis, malaria, diarrhea, and tuberculo- care system also remains incapable of addressing the sis are prevalent in most urban centers and among needs of returnees who suffer from psychological many rural populations, including refugee returnee trauma associated with war. The only two psychiatric areas, which are even more under-served. hospitals in Somaliland are extremely ill-equipped Access to basic health care is a major concern and lack well-trained psychiatrists and psychologists. in refugee returnee areas where repatriating popula- Likewise, Somaliland’s health care system cannot tions are at a greater risk of succumbing to other- adequately care for returnees who suffer from war- wise treatable diseases. Returnees live in close related physical disabilities. quarters with inadequate sanitation and are more For many former refugees returning to susceptible to epidemics of infections and commu- Somaliland, the modest health care they received in nicable diseases. They have no choice, however, refugee camps was superior to the medical care await- but to rely on deteriorating health care facilities that ing them in their homeland.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 24 Where Water is More Precious than Gold

n the community of Sheikh Nur, water is more transportation allowance to help them travel within precious than gold. Somaliland, and a nine-month food supply. They I Sheikh Nur is one of seven refugee returnee areas happily sold what they could not carry and returned in Hargeisa, the Somaliland capital. Life in congested home. and growing Sheikh Nur, gated by a garbage dump “Before we departed Ethiopia, we made plans to where children compete with camels for discarded food, sell our repatriation package and invest the money in a is a constant struggle. Employment opportunities are water tap,” adds Abdi Ismail, Khadija A-Rahman’s nonexistent. Food is scarce. The only health clinic has father. “We heard from friends and relatives already no doctor. It is common for as many as five families to living in Sheikh Nur that access to water was a major share a 10-meter square plot of land and one pit latrine. problem. Spending all we had on a water tap at a time The community’s paramount concern, however, when we had nothing and needed everything was a risk is water. Hundreds of Sheikh Nur’s estimated 6,000 worth taking.” residents rely on a single source, the Ismail family Today, the Ismail family’s water tap runs con- (below), for their daily water needs. stantly. Early every morning, Sheikh Nur residents “That we survived more than a decade as refugees haul battered five-, ten-, and twenty-liter plastic con- in Ethiopia and are now selling water to fellow returnees tainers to the Ismails’ tukul (house) to collect water, for in Hargeisa astonishes me every day,” Khadija A- which they pay approximately 50 Somaliland Rahman, the Ismail family’s eldest daughter, acknowl- (1 cent) per liter. Tending to nearly 200 customers edges. “We are thankful that we listened to the advice of daily keeps the family busy. our relatives and constructed a water tap.” An average weekly profit of 100,000 Somaliland In 1988, Khadija A-Rahman was seven years old shillings (approximately $20) is the family’s only source when her family fled a burning Hargeisa on foot. She of income. Like the water the Ismails sell, not a vividly remembers but is reluctant to recount the terrify- of what they earn is wasted. ing 15-day walk to eastern Ethiopia. Her family eventu- “In addition to keeping my children fed, clothed, ally settled in Hartisheik refugee camp and remained and in school with the profits we take in from our water there for 11 years. tap, I am providing my neighbors a valuable service,” The disheartening experience as a refugee is one Abdi says. “In a very important way we are contribut- that Khadija A-Rahman will not soon forget. ing to rebuilding Somaliland.” “We were always sick, medicine and water were in The initial success realized by Khadija A- short supply, and my father could not find work,” she Rahman’s family emphasizes how even rudimentary recalls. “In the beginning, we sold portions of our repatriation assistance can lay the groundwork for self- monthly food ration and used the money to attend sufficiency for refugees finally returning home to private school. When food ran short, we were faced with Somaliland. the choice of not eating or not attending school. Of course we had to eat.” In 1997, the family agreed that a degree of stability had returned to Somaliland and registered to repatriate with help from the United Nations High Com- missioner for Refugees (UNHCR). “Although we badly wanted to leave Hartisheik, officials with UNHCR told us that at the time they could not provide our family with any repatriation assistance,” Khadija A-Rahman explains. “Having left Hargeisa empty-handed, we decided that it was best to wait until they could help us.” Two years later, the Ismail family registered for repatriation again and met success. UNHCR provided the family of seven with blankets, plastic sheeting, a

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 25 THE STATE OF WATER Somaliland’s primitive urban water infrastruc- ture, which consists of aged systems installed in the Water is the most essential life-sustaining element in early 1900s during British colonial rule, constantly semi-arid Somaliland. Years of neglect and poor breaks down and barely meets the daily water needs of management, however, have left Somaliland’s water most Somalilanders living in and around major popu- infrastructure in a decrepit state. lation centers. Equally neglected is Somaliland’s rural Despite extensive repairs during the past decade water infrastructure, comprised mainly of poorly main- to its war-damaged urban and rural water systems, tained boreholes and reservoirs that fail to deliver Somaliland’s marginally improved water infrastruc- adequate water to rural residents, including farmers ture today remains incapable of providing the general and pastoralists heavily dependent on water for their population—and returning refugees in particular—with livelihoods. reliable sources of water for drinking and agriculture. Somaliland’s universally unre- liable water systems have forced most urban and rural Somalilanders to de- pend on river water, rainwater, hand- dug wells, water delivered by trucks and donkeys, and other unprotected and potentially contaminated water sources for cooking, drinking, wash- ing clothes, and bathing. Most Somalilanders enjoyed better water systems in refugee camps. “The water needs of repatriat- ing refugees who are continually ar- riving present us with a growing chal- lenge,” Mohamed Sulbaan, Borama’s water manager, told USCR. “In the first two weeks of July 2001, 200 families arrived from refugee camps in Ethiopia and settled in Borama. Every day during the third week of July, all of Borama’s water was consumed by 10:00 a.m. Before the families resettled here, the system did not run dry until 11:30 a.m. Even though it is a struggle, we are able to replenish the system daily because our water supply is good. The sys- tem, however, can’t handle much more of an increase.” Although Somaliland is prone to drought, its underground water table is relatively abundant, particu- larly in and around Hargeisa, Borama, and Burao—areas that are receiving large numbers of returnees. The main Men survey water wells dug manually three to five meters problem throughout most of underneath the surface of a dry riverbed by refugee returnees Somaliland is not lack of water, but bringing the water to the surface in near Borama. Many Somaliland citizens struggle daily to secure a convenient locations and properly fresh supply of water. Returnees digging beneath dry riverbeds to managing its distribution. locate water are often crushed to death when the unstable wells Urban and rural Somalilanders collapse. Photo credit: USCR/J. Frushone

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 26 A Livestock Livelihood Threatened

n Somaliland, where the is highly regarded as In September 2000, Saudi Arabia imposed a ban a national symbol and nomads still roam the land on all livestock from Somaliland, alleging that more than Iwith their herds, raising animals pervades every 100 Saudi citizens died from Rift Valley Fever con- aspect of society. tracted from Somali goats and sheep. The livestock For more than a century, livestock has supplied the ban—the second in the past three years—has crippled majority of Somaliland’s export earnings and remains the Somaliland economy. the lifeline and backbone of the Somaliland economy. Prior to the re-imposed ban, Somaliland exported Today, it is estimated that more than 70 percent of all up to 10,000 heads of sheep and goats per day, primarily Somalilanders depend directly or indirectly on the pro- to the Gulf States. Today, livestock exports are a duction and export of goats and sheep, cattle, and camels miniscule fraction of that. for their livelihood. Cut off from their export market, Somaliland’s A majority of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists herders have flooded local markets with meat and milk families rely on their livestock for daily subsistence. sold at dramatically reduced prices, hurting their already Milk, meat, and butter are staples in the diets of most negligible profit margins. With diminished incomes, Somalilanders. households dependent on livestock sales are struggling Most livestock, however, are raised for economic to purchase local grains and vegetables that have in- purposes rather than for personal consumption. Sales of creased in price because of poor rains. livestock and livestock byproducts are often the only Returnees to Somaliland who had long dreamed of incomes the majority of Somalilanders earn. The Somaliland rebuilding their animal herds are, instead, slowly eating seylad (livestock market) is the most dynamic spot in local their herds to curb their economic losses. For many villages. Setbacks to the local livestock industry are Somalilanders, it seems as if they are being forced to eat economically damaging to all of Somaliland. away their own future.

frequently live for days without a fresh supply of camel to earn money to buy a plot of farmland to water. Years of improper planning have also limited resettle his family near Borama. “Nobody seems to the expansion of waters systems and hampered devel- care that we struggle to collect an important neces- opment of new systems in returnee areas. sity like water. I am very old and the process of UNHCR and Somaliland government officials returning home has been hard on me. Not knowing expect 10,000 to 20,000 refugees to repatriate to Burao if my wife will return each day with enough water during the remainder of 2001 and throughout 2002. for the family—well, this makes for an even harder Gudadheer, an area the government has designated for life.” the majority of the returnees to resettle, however, is a “Collectively during the past eight years, inter- semi-arid desert clearing with no identified reliable national NGOs and UN agencies have provided tre- water source, two miles (three km) north of the center mendous technical support and have invested more of Burao. than $2 million in non-agriculture water programs in Because of crowded conditions in Borama, many Somaliland,” an NGO worker told USCR. “That recently repatriated families are resettling on the out- major water problems persist throughout Somaliland skirts of town on fallow farmlands that have limited today is not for lack of interest or support from the and primitively developed water resources. Most international community.” returnee women and young girls spend the majority of The sustained physical health of the population their day trekking to dry riverbeds where they dig, by and the health of their economy depend on solving the hand, three to five meters underneath the surface to water problem. International NGOs and UN agencies locate water. suggest that if the Somaliland government remains “Every morning, my wife, two daughters and incapable of providing safe and reliable water to sister head to the dry river to dig for water,” said 65- Somalilanders, officials should consider privatizing year-old Siad Hassan Barre, who sold his last female the water sector.

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 27 “Making Up for the Nine Years That Were Taken from Me”

ne day after Dahar Jama Fahiye (right) crossed the border to return Oto his native Somaliland, the din of whining table saws and drill presses lured him to the Daldhis Furniture and Voluntary Training Workshop in the western town of Borama. After sitting idle for nine long years in Teferiber refugee camp in eastern Ethiopia, 20-year-old Dahar sized up machines he had never seen before, submitted an application to the workshop’s manager, and walked to the neighborhood to pray. The next morning, an anxious Dahar returned to learn that he and 19 other former refugees had been accepted to the workshop’s six-month carpentry program. In a matter of 48 hours, “Each convoy that arrives from the emptying Dahar’s decidedly uncertain future took a turn for the refugee camps in Ethiopia brings more young men who better. want and need the training skills we provide,” Mr. “Without question, if I did not come across the Ahmed says. “Because I cannot afford to expand, the 30 Daldhis workshop, I would have quickly returned to applications I have from recent returnees must wait Teferiber where I ate and slept for free,” a quick-witted until the current class graduates. Who will help them in Dahar admits. “Job opportunities in Somaliland are few the meantime? I do not have the answer.” and far between. This is even more so for a person like me In June 2001, UNHCR closed Teferiber and with only a sixth-grade education and no marketable Darwanaji refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia after an skill. I came home with nothing, to nothing, and have estimated 20,000 refugees repatriated to Somaliland. decided to stay because of Daldhis.” Most of the camps’ former residents originate from Founded by Ismail Yassin Ahmed in 1995, the across western Somaliland. But they are returning in Daldhis workshop promotes social skills and provides large numbers to Borama, the provincial capital, and to technical carpentry and welding training to Somali teen- other urban centers, with the expectation of gaining age boys and young men. During the late 1990s, all of the access to government social services or securing jobs, workshop’s trainees originated from within Borama. which are in short supply. Today, reflecting the area’s growing population, Mr. Similar to hundreds before him, Dahar departed Ahmed’s classrooms are predominantly comprised of Teferiber refugee camp with no immediate desire to recently repatriated refugees like Dahar. return to or live in his home village of Dilla, 12 miles (20 “Despite the fact that they received no training km) southeast of Borama. skills and a very limited education in the camps, my best “Returning to Dilla was never an option,” he students are former refugees,” Mr. Ahmed states. “They concedes. “I figured that my chances for survival were have lived a difficult life and are now working hard to better in Borama. Still, starting over, even with Daldhis, make up for lost time. I just wish I had the additional has not been easy.” space and means to help more of them.” Upon graduation in January 2002, Dahar plans to Mr. Ahmed personally oversees and finances all relocate within Somaliland to a place where the oppor- aspects of the workshop, including interviewing appli- tunities to apply his new carpentry skills are greatest. cants, importing lumber from the , He also plans to acquire accounting and computer skills and modestly compensating the 13-member teaching in an effort to open his own furniture workshop. staff, which includes several Daldhis graduates. “I did not enjoy one day of my refugee life,” The current 25 trainees, who work six days a week Dahar says. “Finding Daldhis is a good start toward in a rented building that doubles as a fully functional making up for the nine years that were taken from me. workshop and classroom, do not pay school fees. Mr. This is not the case for my friends and the thousands of Ahmed absorbs the $200 per student expense for six others like them who have returned to Somaliland and months of training. are struggling to make ends meet.”

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 28 THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY Many repatriating refugees are experienced farm- ers, but need additional training and support services. Somaliland’s war-scarred economy is gradually im- However, such services are rare. Throughout proving, but it continues to struggle to stimulate sig- Somaliland, agricultural professionals, extension ser- nificant job growth for new returnees as well as those vices, irrigation systems, equipment, tools, and seeds who returned years ago. are in short supply. Enhanced agriculture develop- The economy remains overwhelmingly depen- ment could produce more jobs, increase economic dant on animal husbandry, and, to a lesser extent, on revenue, and safeguard the population’s health and agriculture. Livestock is the backbone of Somaliland’s nutrition. economy, representing the majority of Somaliland’s Somaliland’s 600-mile (1,000 km) fish-rich coast- export earnings and a substantial portion of govern- line and Berbera port also remain underutilized. Stra- ment revenue. It is estimated that more than 70 percent tegically located on the , Somaliland has of all Somalilanders depend directly or indirectly on the potential to develop into a major international the production and export of goats and sheep, cattle, fishing and commercial center. The port is fairly and camels for their livelihood. (See A Livestock inactive, however. Livelihood Threatened, page 25.) Many refugees repatriate to Somaliland hoping While fewer Somalilanders derive their incomes to find jobs in the livestock industry, primarily as from agriculture, the production and sales of livestock traders and milk wholesalers, but few find and maize account for approximately 30 percent of such work. A ban on Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia Somaliland’s economy. The potential for increased has left the economy reeling, and most returnees lack productivity is substantial. An estimated 10 percent of alternative job skills and have little education, leading Somaliland’s land is arable, but only 3 percent is to a grim economic future unless they find opportuni- cultivated. ties for skills training.

Young Somali men deliver Somaliland shillings to a hawala (money transfer center) in Burao. Somaliland has no central banking system. Nearly all of the millions of dollars transferred annually to Somaliland citizens from the flow through the unregulated hawala system, which is based on trust and is widely utilized in many Muslim countries. Photo credit: USCR/J. Frushone

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 29 “This is the second, and by far the worst, live- stock ban my family has suffered since we returned to Somaliland,” explained Ahmed Ayaanle, a 42-year- old subsistence farmer who cultivates a small plot of land in the rural village of Botor, 50 miles (80 kms) west of Hargeisa. “I can’t sell any of my animals without losing money and therefore have no income to replenish my herd or buy pasta or rice to feed my eight children. I tried to find work in Borama and Hargeisa, but came home unsuccessful. There are a lot of new small businesses, but no new jobs.” Throughout Somaliland, private sector business activities are partially revitalizing the economy. The construction industry is relatively active with the new construction and repair of war-damaged businesses, government buildings, and homes, but new construc- tion jobs are quickly filled. Similarly, while emerging Photo credit: USCR/J. Frushone private telecommunications companies and business ness training followed by the disbursement of loans technology centers are beginning to realize greater and grants to women’s cooperatives, widow associa- profits in Hargeisa, new technology jobs are also in tions, and other groups benefit extended families, short supply. Most of the limited new positions require communities, and, ultimately, the overall economy. computer skills and technical training that only a few Current loans and training programs are small com- Somalilanders possess. pared to the need, however. “In six years, we have grown to a company with “The [skills] capacity of returnees upon their about 150 employees—75 in Hargeisa and 75 in Burao,” arrival to Somaliland saddened the international com- said Mohamed Abdi, president of the Somaliland munity,” said David Murphy, Somaliland country Telecommunications Corporation (STC), one of director for the International Rescue Committee Somaliland’s biggest employers and one of five tele- (IRC). “Most refugees repatriated without acquir- communications companies. “Although we take pride ing additional education or new marketable skills in knowing that we are providing greater access to the while living in the camps. Our program to provide internet and more phone lines to Somalilanders, our small, organized groups with rudimentary business profit margin is so thin that we cannot afford to hire any skills and cash grants is a step in the right direction new employees. This is difficult because the majority down a long, long road.” of Somalilanders are without work, which is bad for our business and our economy.” In addition, the majority of new smaller business, CONCLUSION such as bakeries, restaurants, grocery stores, and tea and shops, are family-owned and operated by a Like most areas of Africa, Somaliland has enormous limited number of relatives. development needs that will take decades to fulfill. Although local private businesses and the Not all problems can be erased immediately. But Somaliland diaspora annually contribute millions of Somaliland’s leaders, citizens, and aid workers agree dollars to the Somaliland economy, including many that now is the key moment to enhance current efforts development projects, most refugee returnees do so that refugees returning to their homes will have not receive from abroad and grow poorer. reasons to stay. Entrepreneurial by nature, many struggling refugee Reintegration and development programs that returnees could benefit substantially and contribute unleash the Somali population’s aggressive entrepre- to the Somaliland economy if they had better access neurial skills can lay the groundwork for economic and to business management skills training and venture political stability so envisioned by the international capital to start micro-businesses. community and Somalilanders themselves. Some NGOs implementing micro-enterprise pro- “If we do not collectively act soon, what we grams in refugee returnee areas, primarily around have done is in danger of collapsing,” a UN official Hargeisa, are realizing notable results. Targeted busi- concluded.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 30 VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

TO RELIEF AGENCIES, DONORS AND FINANCIAL UNDP should reformulate its current plan INSTITUTIONS to adequately address the complex needs of the tens of thousands of underserved refugees who have repatriated to Somaliland, and the tens of 1. UNHCR should avoid further budget cuts or thousands who are expected to soon follow. UNDP personnel reductions in Somaliland or east- should seek adequate donor funding to make the ern Ethiopia until the voluntary repatria- plan work. tion of Somali refugees is completed and planned reintegration projects are fully 3. International donors and UN agencies implemented. should undertake fundamental rehabilita- tion and development programs in all Funding cuts imposed on UNHCR programs in Somaliland communities. Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia during 2001 have hindered the voluntary repatriation of Somali refu- Somaliland remains a devastated and war-scarred gees to Somaliland. country with needs well beyond repatriation pro- The reduction of dedicated funding has re- grams. In nearly every Somaliland community, sulted in the cancellation of road rehabilitation Somalis who repatriated in 2001 and those who projects that were intended to facilitate repatriation repatriated in 1991 have identical basic needs today. logistics. Some water projects in drought-prone Many Somalilanders live in makeshift camps and returnee areas of Somaliland have also been can- slums in their own economically depressed home- celled. Funding cuts have curtailed school con- land, forced to rely on a war-damaged infrastructure struction and rehabilitation projects and will indefi- that still lies in a state of disrepair. nitely delay the enrollment of thousands of repatri- ated school children. There is concern that some 4. International donors should work to im- refugees who repatriate to Somaliland might choose prove the competency and capacity of the to return to Ethiopia because Somaliland lacks Somaliland government. critical repatriation services. UNHCR has been unable to deploy an ad- Improved political stability and increased secu- equate number of professional staff on both sides of rity in Somaliland present the international com- the Somaliland-Ethiopia border for this repatria- munity with an optimal opportunity to enhance tion and reintegration. the capability of Somaliland’s government, which is currently ill-equipped in financial and human 2. The United Nations Development Program resources to address the needs of its own people. (UNDP) should develop a more comprehen- Somaliland’s long-term stability will require a sive and ambitious plan to facilitate the rein- government capable of responding to the chal- tegration of Somaliland refugees. lenges facing the population.

The current UNDP plan to facilitate the reintegration 5. International financial institutions should of Somali refugees in Somaliland is inadequate. find creative ways to assist Somaliland According to official plans, UNHCR ex- financially. pects to assist the voluntary repatriation of an estimated 50,000 Somali refugees to Somaliland Somaliland’s inability to gain the status of inde- during 2001 and an additional 60,000 during pendent nationhood prevents Somaliland from 2002. The UNDP reintegration plan however, is accessing multilateral development aid. inadequate. While the plan presents “program Somaliland is effectively disqualified from ob- strategies” and lists “proposed outcomes,” it does taining millions of dollars of assistance and loans not include explicit rehabilitation or develop- that would normally accompany such large-scale ment projects. reconstruction.

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 31 International financial institutions, such as revitalize and expand Somaliland’s educational the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and system. Donors and UN agencies should also African Development Bank should look for cre- ensure that the special needs of the generation of ative ways to provide Somaliland much-needed refugee children repatriating to Somaliland—most financial assistance to support development of whom received little or no education in Ethiopia’s projects. eastern refugee camps—are accommodated.

6. The United Nations Children’s Fund 8. International donors and NGOs should en- (UNICEF) should immediately implement hance and expand income-generation intensive feeding programs to aid malnour- projects that target women in refugee re- ished repatriated refugee children. turnee areas.

Most impoverished refugee families sell the nine- Women are the sole breadwinners in most refugee month repatriation food supply provided by the returnee families in Somaliland, yet they cannot World Food Program (WFP) to purchase other earn adequate incomes in an economy with limited basic necessities needed for their reintegration in job and business opportunities. Somaliland’s returnee areas. Somaliland’s major In an attempt to better equip returnee women population centers offer returnees inadequate shel- in their struggle to support their families, some ter, poor health care, limited access to clean water, international NGOs provide returnee women with and poor sanitation facilities. training in small-scale business skills and micro- Unable to secure limited employment oppor- credit loans. But many of these programs are small tunities, returnee heads of households struggle to and reach relatively few women. provide their children with proper nourishment. International donors should give NGOs the Malnutrition rates among children are 15 percent in financial support needed to enhance and expand returnee areas of Hargeisa. UNICEF should imple- current programs to include more female partici- ment intensive feeding programs in Hargeisa’s pants. returnee neighborhoods and monitor child nutri- tion in all other returnee areas. 9. International donors and NGOs should ex- pand and enhance vocational training pro- 7. International donors and UN agencies grams for male returnees and demobilized should work to rehabilitate and expand soldiers. Somaliland’s education system. Somaliland can ill-afford to ignore the special needs All levels of formal education ceased during of the increasing numbers of unskilled male return- Somaliland’s war for independence and two subse- ees and demobilized soldiers. Somaliland needs a quent civil wars. Each conflict killed large num- well-trained work force to rebuild. bers of teachers and completely destroyed schools The expansion of vocational training centers and learning material. to provide male returnees and demobilized soldiers Nearly half of Somaliland’s primary and sec- with carpentry, masonry, electrical, and other skills ondary schools remain damaged or destroyed, and can boost Somaliland’s reconstruction efforts. In- fewer than 20 percent of school-aged children have ternational donors and NGOs should expand voca- returned to school. The education rehabilitation tional training programs to help Somaliland rebuild achieved during the past decade by UN humanitar- its towns and lay the groundwork for economic ian agencies, including UNHCR, UNICEF, and the stability. United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), falls far short of meeting 10. International donors and NGOs should work Somaliland’s current and growing education needs. to identify and provide treatment to refugee UN agencies should provide more technical returnees who suffer from psychological expertise and financial support to international trauma associated with war. NGOs and Somaliland’s Ministry of Education to

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 32 Nearly all Somali refugees have experienced the During January to October 2001, UNHCR reports atrocities of war. Most refugees witnessed acts of that it officially facilitated the voluntary repatria- brutality that resulted in the death of relatives and tion of an estimated 40,000 Somali refugees and friends, and they still carry with them horrific memo- closed two of Ethiopia’s eight eastern refugee camps. ries of violence and bloodshed. Returning to The European Community Humanitarian Office Somaliland for the first time is often a traumatic (ECHO) contributed $1.3 million in July 2001 to experience for Somali refugees. The already-diffi- assist the repatriation program and camp closures. cult process of resuming a normal life in Somaliland International donors should follow ECHO’s is compounded for many returnees who suffer, often example to ensure that UNHCR has the financial unknowingly, from psychological trauma associ- resources needed to keep voluntary repatriation ated with war. and camp closures on schedule.

11. International donors and NGOs should bol- ster Somaliland’s veterinary services. TO THE SOMALILAND GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE BUSINESSES Somaliland’s economy relies overwhelmingly on animal husbandry. A prior ban imposed on Somali 14. The Somaliland government should provide livestock during 1998-99 starved the Somaliland refugee returnee areas with reliable water government of nearly 40 percent of its annual rev- systems and should better manage or priva- enues. Although the health of the Somaliland tize its water sector. economy is dependant on the health of its livestock, the government currently lacks the capacity to pro- Somaliland’s history is dotted with deadly con- vide important veterinary services to pastoralists. flicts over competition for its most precious re- International donors and NGOs should strengthen source: water. Repatriating refugees’ concern that Somaliland’s veterinary services. they will not find clean and reliable sources of potable water in Somaliland is valid. 12. International donors and NGOs should work Much of Somaliland’s water infrastructure is to ensure that refugee returnees who are in a chronic state of disrepair, including in desig- dependent on international humanitarian nated refugee returnee areas. In potential returnee agencies become self-reliant. areas, critical water infrastructures do not exist. The government’s continued mismanagement of Many Somali refugees have lived under the care of Somaliland’s water sector increases the likelihood the international community in Ethiopia’s eastern that outbreak of deadly diarrheal diseases, typhoid refugee camps for more than ten years. Many fever, and cholera epidemics will occur, particu- families have grown dependent on UN agencies and larly among returnee populations. NGOs for basic life-support services. If the Somaliland government is incapable of No longer self-reliant, many long-term refu- ensuring safe and reliable water for all its citizens, gees expect to find similar support upon their officials should consider privatizing the water sector. return to Somaliland. Many humanitarian aid experts express concern about a “dependency 15. Somaliland’s private business sector should syndrome” among returnees. Gradually, interna- establish a community-based association tional donors and NGOs should work to ease that supports repatriation and rehabilita- returnees’ transition from complete dependency tion programs. to complete self-reliance. Despite pervasive poverty, some businesses have 13. International donors and UNHCR should flourished in Somaliland, and some have donated continue to work systematically to close refu- to charitable causes. Somaliland’s wealthiest busi- gee camps in eastern Ethiopia in order to nesses should work with local communities to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of So- identify and fund refugee reintegration and com- mali refugees. munity rehabilitation programs.

Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland u 33 16. The Somaliland government should con- Much of Somaliland’s population considers itself tinue to provide sanctuary to Somalis flee- to be politically independent from the rest of Soma- ing factional fighting in central and south- lia. The international community, however, has ern Somalia. refrained from recognizing Somaliland’s self-de- clared independence. The number of Somalis seeking safe haven in There are many reasons why Somaliland might Somaliland from factional fighting and rampant merit political independence. Somaliland has formed violence in central and southern Somalia continues its own government and enjoys a state of peace that to grow. Currently an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 contrasts sharply with the rest of Somalia. Official central and southern Somalia citizens reside in independence would enable Somaliland to access Somaliland. much-needed multilateral development aid. Official Somalis who flee to Somaliland consider them- independence would also enable Somaliland to play a selves to be refugees. International law, however, does potentially constructive diplomatic role in the political not recognize them as refugees because they have not affairs of the Horn of Africa. crossed an internationally recognized border. Conversely, there are many reasons why grant- The Somaliland government should con- ing independence to Somaliland could be problem- tinue to give sanctuary to this growing popula- atic. Official independence is highly controversial tion, regardless of their unclear status or clan in Somalia and among African leaders. Granting affiliation. UN agencies and international NGOs nationhood to Somaliland might also encourage should provide this uprooted population assistance other disaffected regions of African nations to press commensurate to aid received by Somaliland’s own for independence, compounding existing political returnees. instability in the struggling continent. As events unfold in Somaliland and Somalia, 17. The Somaliland government should bar the United States and other countries should regu- Osama bin Laden and terrorist organiza- larly reassess the political situation and should not tions from operating in Somaliland if they summarily dismiss the option of eventually grant- attempt to do so. ing recognition to Somaliland.

International media have speculated that Somalia is 19. The U.S. government should look for op- a possible alternative refuge for Osama bin Laden, portunities in international circles to raise the accused influence behind the September 11, awareness about the needs of Somaliland. 2001 terrorist acts on U.S. soil. International policy- makers have expressed concern that Muslim ex- In recent years, the U.S. government has attempted tremist groups in Somalia might attempt to protect to encourage more interest in Somaliland among bin Laden or support future international acts of international donors. The U.S. government should terrorism. lobby other governments, UN agencies, and finan- Somaliland should ensure that extremist groups cial institutions to contribute financial and human do not establish bases of operation on Somaliland soil. resources to Somaliland’s refugee reintegration and In return, the U.S. and other nations should development programs. recognize that support for development and stabil- ity in Somaliland is ultimately in the world’s best 20. Saudi Arabia should lift its ban on Somali interest. livestock.

In September 2000, Saudi Arabia imposed a ban on TO ALL GOVERNMENTS all Somali livestock for health reasons. The ban has crippled Somaliland’s economy, and hampered refu- 18. The international community should regu- gee reintegration. Subsequent independent investi- larly assess the pros and cons of granting gation has concluded that Somali livestock are diplomatic recognition to Somaliland. healthy. Lacking scientific proof of a health haz- ard, Saudi Arabia should lift its livestock ban.

U.S. Committee for Refugees u 34