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The Last Minute Frenzy of Afghanistan's Candidate Registration

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The Last Minute Frenzy of Afghanistan's Candidate Registration The Last Minute Frenzy of Afghanistan's Candidate Registration Author : Martine van Bijlert Published: 6 October 2013 Downloaded: 4 September 2018 Download URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/last-minute-frenzy-candidate-registration-for-afghanistans-2014-presidential- election/?format=pdf The registration for Afghanistan’s 2014 presidential election continued until the very late hours of 6 October 2013. Although it was to be expected that the political horse-trading and deal-making would continue until the last minute, the scramble that finally ensued took everybody by surprise and mixed up all electoral alliances that had been forged in the weeks before. The AAN team gives a first look at what is still a very fluid field (with input from Thomas Ruttig, Gran Hewad, Obaid Ali). Last minute scramble The registration of presidential candidates for the 2014 elections has descended into a last minute scramble, with almost everybody who had even fleetingly considered running, finally making their way to the IEC. The frenzy seems to have been largely inspired by the absence of a clear endorsement of any of the candidates by President Karzai and the ever-widening field with each person that registered. With everybody’s chances diluted, it suddenly became more interesting for minor candidates to also cast in their lot. The IEC, as a result, had to keep its offices open until midnight to accommodate the last minute interest; at closing time there was apparently still a queue of at least eight nominees, with their entourages, waiting to be registered. The purge of the ambitious According to sources in the government the candidate registration has resulted in the resignation of at least 25 government officials. High-profile resignations included the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Mines, Commerce, and Energy & Water; at least two provincial governors (Nangarhar and Bamyan); at least two senior advisers (Rahim Wardak and Arsela); the head of the High Office of Oversight, and several MPs. The fact that many of them resigned only on the very last day, suggests that they too got caught up in a spur of the moment decision. Not everyone will really eventually run As usual, not everyone who registers as a candidate will finally stand. Given the seemingly spontaneous nature of some of the decisions, some of them will probably fail to meet the nomination criteria. These include handing over the names, voter card numbers and fingerprints of 100,000 supporters and a deposit of 1 million afghani (approximately USD 20,000, which will be repaid if the candidate receives at least 10% of the vote in the first round). Like in previous elections, many of the candidates will have only “stood up, to be persuaded to sit down again” in the on-going game that includes eliminating possible rivals and co-opting potential vote banks. This means that the merry-go-round of meetings and support-swaps is likely to continue unabated in the six months that still remain until Election Day. It also means that Karzai’s (so far very indirect) candidate endorsements are likely to continue to be ambiguous and fluctuating, keeping everybody guessing as to what his plan might be – most probably until the very end. Quite a spectacle The registration process this time around was much more of a spectacle than it had ever been in the past, when candidates just came to the IEC with their VPs. It started with the registrations of Abdullah and Sayyaf, both of them turning up at the IEC compound with as many cars and high- level supporters as they could find, prompting all major candidates after them to attempt to do the same. The long motorcades of armoured cars, bodyguards and entourages were in many ways reminiscent of the show of force associated with militia leaders or newly appointed government officials in an area that is not their own. The increased use of social media, compared to five years ago, and the droves of journalists gathered at the IEC, only added to the whole circus. 1 / 3 A very divided field With the list slowly shaping up, now begins the task of unpicking what the possible vote banks are and how badly they have been divided. For this, one should not only look at the ticket itself – the presidential candidates and their VPs – but also at who has declared their support, among others by turning up at the registration ceremony. When looking at who went with whom, it becomes clear how very divided the field has become; none of the major election alliances concluded over the past weeks has survived unscathed. The National Front, that had long announced the fielding of a unity candidate, is now divided between three tickets: (1) Dr Abdullah who was joined by Mohaqeq as second running mate; (2) Ahmad Zia Massoud who joined the ticket of Zalmay Rassoul (and seems to be trying hard to outshine him); and (3) Dostum who has joined Ashraf Ghani. The fact that Ismail Khan joined the ticket of Sayyaf further fractured the Tajik and Jamiati network. The remarkable and unlikely Jamiat-Hezb-e Islami agreement, that led to the inclusion of Hezb’s vice chairman Mohammad Khan on Dr Abdullah’s ticket, had already been shaken by considerable criticism from the fringes of both parties. It was further challenged when Qutbuddin Helal, prominent member of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, registered his own candidacy. The Hazara vote – to the extent that it is indeed ethnically tied – may split between Mohaqeq, Danesh (Khalili network, VP on Ashraf Ghani’s ticket), and Habiba Sohrabi (former Bamyan governor on Rassul’s ticket). Even the vote bank that is generally considered most stable, that of the Uzbeks under the leadership of Dostum, has become somewhat shaky, with some of the non-Junbesh Uzbek vote possibly going to Shahrani (Minister of Mines until today and VP with Qayum Karzai) and Erfan (VP with Sayyaf). Ashraf Ghani is running, but so is his brother Hashmat Ghani, and with Sarwar Ahmadzai also stepping forward (a minor presidential candidate in 2009), there are three contenders from the same tribe. Despite his overall poor showing, Sarwar Ahmadzai did win more votes than Ashraf Ghani in their home province Logar in 2009. Nader Naeem, grandson of the king is running as a candidate, while Mustafa Zaher, another grandson was spotted in Zalmay Rassoul’s entourage. The Karzai team, if there is still such a thing, is split in many directions: prominents like Spanta and Mahmud Karzai support Qayum Karzai. Modaber is upset for having been bumped off a ticket at the last moment. Daudzai, as a former Hezbi, may be supporting Abdullah’s Jamiat/Hezb ticket, but then again he may not. Khalili may well put his weight behind Ashraf Ghani, now that he has teamed together with Danesh (Khalili is himself not running after two terms as Vice President, but Danesh is his ally and was most likely his pick). Rahim Wardak, Azizullah Ludin and Ahadi have registered their own candidacies. Mojaddedi’s blessing for the Rassul team, which Zia Massoud joined, means that the “mujahedin vote bank” is also split – at least between Rassul’s ticket (who was in exile, and not a fighter) and that of Sayyaf and Ismail Khan who, as “jihadi leaders” will try to mobilise on that basis. Rahim Wardak will probably also try to make the most of his role during the jehad. Most of the so-called “doctors without borders” have stuck with Ashraf Ghani and refrained from being candidates themselves (Khalilzad, Jalali, Hanif Atmar), the main exception being Qayum Karzai who registered his own candidacy. There are also those who said they would run and then didn’t (although there are now surprisingly very few). These include most prominently Fauzia Kufi who repeatedly in the international press and at international conferences announced her intention to nominate herself – despite the fact that she did not meet the criteria (nominees have to be at least 40 years of age). All in all, there is so far no sign of a grand palace plan, unless it is – as some opposition figures have started to allege – to preside over several months of continued messy politicking. As the list firms up, first after the IEC releases the final count of initial nominees, then as the ECC checks whether all nominees meet the criteria, and finally as several candidates will decide to step down, the field of contenders should become clearer. For now, however, it is as murky as when the whole swirl of politicking started several months ago. Registered candidates: N.B. At the time of posting the final list of registered nominees was not yet clear, as the IEC continued to register the last waiting candidates. The info will be updated as it comes in. 1. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, main contester in the 2009 presidential elections, with Eng Muhammad Khan and Haji Muhammad Muhaqeq as first and second vice presidential candidates. 2. Besmillah Sher, leader of Hezb-e Wefaq Melli Islami (National Islamic Pact Party), minor contender in the 2009 presidential elections as well; with Abdul Karim Ahmadyar and Sultan Hameed Sultani as first and second vice presidential candidates. 3. Abdurab Rasul Sayaf, leader of the Dawat Party and MP from Kabul: with Ismail Khan (minister of water and energy, Jamiati from Herat) and Abdul Wahab Erfan as first and second vice presidential candidates. 4. Fazel Karim Najimi, former director in one of the USAID development project and advisor in the agricultural and rural development ministries; with Saber Tamkin and Susan Hajati as first and second vice presidential candidates. 5. Qutbuddin Helal, spokesperson of Hezb-e Islami Hekmatyar during the 1990s and, more recently, member of the Hezb-e Islami peace delegation to Kabul; with Enayatullah Enayat (former governor in Jowzjan and Badghis) and Muhammad Ali Nabizada (second VP for Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai in the 2009 presidential election) as first and second vice presidential candidates.
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