Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State
Ian Gary Catholic Relief Services Nikki Reisch Bank Information Center Report Team
Authors: IanGary StrategicIssuesAdvisor–ExtractiveIndustries CatholicReliefServices NikkiReisch AfricaProgramCoordinator BankInformationCenter GraphicDesigner: PaulO’Donnell SeniorGraphicDesigner CatholicReliefServices Translators: MikeFlynn Anne-MarieLavoie ResearchforthisreportwasconductedfromSeptember2002toNovember2004 andincludedfieldresearchinChadinSeptember2002,August2003andMayand October2004. Acknowledgements:TheauthorswouldliketothankCRSstaffatheadquartersin BaltimoreaswellasfieldstaffinAfricaforprovidinginvaluableassistancetomake thisreportpossible,especiallyPaulO’Donnell,BillO’Keefe,CecileSorra,Caroline Brennan,NicolePoirier,MargueriteDombaya,OliverMokom,JeanBaptisteTalla, JenniferNazaireandNellBolton.ThanksalsotoBankInformationCenterstaff, includingManishBapnaandGrahamSaul,fortheirsupportandfeedback. Thisreportwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthecontinuedcollaboration,support andassistanceofnumerousindividualsandorganizationsinChad.Wewouldlike tothankthemembersofthecivilsocietynetworksmonitoringpetroleumactivities, includingtheCommissionsPermanentePétrole(CPPL/CPPN/RESAP);theJustice andPeaceCommissionoftheCatholicChurch;aswellasGRAMP/TC,Intermonand Swissaid.WewouldalsoliketothankmembersandtechnicalstaffoftheCollegede ControleetdeSurveillancedesRevenusPetroliers,includingMichelBarka,Thérèse Mékombé,DobianAssingar,NaïmbayelDjékondé,MoctarSaadatuAbdouand MahamatRamadaneDagache,fortheirgenerousassistance.Finally,wewouldliketo expressourappreciationtoFatherAntoineBérilengar,DelphineDjiraibe,Boukinebe GarkaPeugonbaandthemembersoftheCPPL,includingNadjiNelambaye,whowere tremendouslyhelpfulincoordinatingvisitstotheoil-producingregion.Thanksalso toKorinnaHorta,TawfikRamtoolah,MartinZintandFr.MichaelPerryforproviding usefulcommentsandphotosforthedraftreport.
Notes: •Forconsistency,monetaryconversionsarebasedonanexchangerateof510CFAF (CommunautéFinancièreAfricainefranc)toU.S.$1. •ExxonMobilisreferredtointhisreportas“ExxonMobil”.Thecompanyisknown asEssoinChad,Europeandelsewhere.ExxonMobil’swholly-ownedaffiliatein ChadisknownasEssoExplorationandProductionChad,Inc.(EEPCI) Coverphoto:Chadvillagersreturningfromfetchingwaterwalkpastanoilwell drillingrigintheDobaoilfieldareaofsouthernChad.(TomStoddart,KatzPictures/ IPG/K2) ©CatholicReliefServicesandBankInformationCenter,February2005.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? i Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage Following the money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State
Table of Contents Page
Executive Summary ...... 1
Introduction: All Eyes on Chad ...... 4
1. Poverty, Politics and Petrodollars...... 15
2. Chad’s Landlocked Treasure: Oil Exploration and Production ...... 23 2.1.DrillingandPumping–TheDobaProject .................................. 23 2.2.NewProductionandExplorationinChadandBeyond........................ 27
3. Chad’s Oil Revenues: A First Taste of Black Gold ...... 35 3.1.OilCompany–GovernmentAgreements:Secrecyinthe“Model” ofTransparency ....................................................... 37 3.2.DividinguptheRevenues:ALeakyRevenueManagementLaw................ 41 3.3.FillingOuttheLegalFramework–BuildingonLaw001 ...................... 45 3.4.TheEndoftheHoneymoon............................................. 48
4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch ...... 51 4.1.CollègeComposition................................................... 51 4.2.ObjectivesandResponsibilities........................................... 52 4.3.PerformanceoftheCollègetoDate.......................................57 4.4.ChiefWeaknessesintheStructure,MandateandOperationoftheCollège........ 58 4.5.TechnicalSupporttotheCollège......................................... 64 4.6.ALawisOnlyasGoodasitsEnforcement................................. 64
5. Budgeting for the Boom: Spending Chad’s Oil Revenues ...... 68 5.1.BudgetBasics........................................................ 68 5.2.EarmarkingOilMoneyforPrioritySectors................................. 69 5.3.How“Oily”isthe2004Budget?......................................... 71 5.4.SpendingtheMoney:PrioritySectors..................................... 72 5.5.BudgetExecution:FromProblematicProcurementtoSkimpySpending .......... 74 5.6.The2005Budget:BigSpending.......................................... 75 5.7.RevenuesfortheOil-ProducingRegion .................................... 76
6. Changing Chad: The Role of External Actors ...... 79 6.1.DependenceonExternalFinancing:WillOilRevenuesDriveDonor79 DollarsAway?........................................................ 79 6.2.BuildingCapacity:TheWorldBankandtheTwo-SpeedProject................. 80 6.3.ChangingPolicies..................................................... 84 6.4.ChangingPolitics..................................................... 85 6.5.WaningDonorInfluenceOveranOil-RichGovernment? ...................... 86
Conclusion: A “Model Project” Hanging By a Thread ...... 88
ii Table of Contents (continued) Page
Appendices ...... 98 • Law001ConcerningtheManagementofOilRevenues....................... 98 • AdditionalResourcesontheChad-CameroonPipeline.......................103
The following appendices are available online at http//advocacy.crs.org/oil • Decree240ConcerningtheStructure,OperationsandOversightCapacitiesofthe PetroleumRevenueOversightandControlCommittee(CCSRP–Collège) • Decree457ConcerningtheCreationofaProvisionalRevenueManagement CommitteefortheOilProducingRegion • CouncilofMinistersDeclarationonthePrinciplesfortheUtilizationofFuture OilRevenues • CommuniquéconcerningGovernmentofChaddisputewithExxonMobil
Boxes 1. FinancingaProject:TheChad-CameroonOilandPipelineProject............... 6 2. TheInternationalPublishWhatYouPayCampaign............................ 7 3. TheWorldBank’sParticipationintheChad-CameroonProject................. 10 4. Chad’sOilRevenueManagementSystemataGlance......................... 11 5. MultipleMonitoringMechanisms:AllBarkandNoBite?..................... 13 6. EnvironmentalandSocialStandardsforNewOilDevelopments................ 28 7. ExplorationBeyondChad ............................................... 30 8. SocialandEnvironmentalImpacts:LastingEffectsandLessonsfor NewOilDevelopment.................................................. 32 9. NewRevenueforCameroon ............................................. 38 10.ClosingaLoophole?................................................... 45 11.Beremadji:TheManWhoKnewtooMuch................................. 63 12.TheElusiveNationalBudget............................................ 70 13.WeakEnvironmentalandSocialOversightbytheGovernment.................. 82
Charts/Graphs/Tables/Maps Chad-CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject...................... 9 GovernanceResearchIndicatorCountrySnapshotforChad........................ 16 Chad’sOil:PermitAreasandFields.......................................... 24 Sub-SaharanAfrica’sOilProducers........................................... 27 WorldBankDisclosureofEscrowAccountActivity.............................. 36 Chad’sOilProductionandRevenueProfile..................................... 38 Chad’s“Take”inComparisontoOtherAfricanOilProducers ...................... 39 HypotheticalExampleofRoyaltyCalculation................................... 41 OilRevenueAllocationandUtilization ........................................ 43 StagesintheBudgetExecutionProcess....................................... 54 StagesintheBudgetFormulationProcess...................................... 69 2004SummaryofOilRevenueProjectsApprovedbytheCollége................... 73 Proposed2005Budget..................................................... 76 AllocationofPetroleumRevenuesin2004/2005................................. 77
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? iii Key Terms and Abbreviations
bbl barrels bpd barrelsperday BEAC BanquedesEtatsdel’AfriqueCentrale BIC BankInformationCenter Brent NorthSeacrudeblendusedtosetabenchmarkpriceinthe worldoilmarket CCSRP CollègedeContrôleetdeSurveillancedesRessourcesPétrolières CFAF CommunautéFinancièreAfricainefranc Collège CollègedeContrôleetdeSurveillancedesRessourcesPétrolières Consortium ExxonMobil/ChevronTexaco/Petronasoilconsortium COTCO CameroonOilTransportationCompany CPPN CommissionPermanentePétroledeN’Djaména CPPL CommissionPermanentePétroleLocale CRS CatholicReliefServices CTNSC ComitéTechniqueNationaldeSuivietdeContrôle ECMG ExternalComplianceMonitoringGroup EIB EuropeanInvestmentBank EIR ExtractiveIndustriesReview EITI ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative EMP EnvironmentalManagementPlan FACIL Fondsd’ActionsConcertéesd’InitiativeLocale FGF FutureGenerationsFund FSO FloatingStorageandOffloadingvessel GRAMP/TC GroupedeRecherchesAlternativesetdeMonitoringduprojetPétrole Tchad-Cameroun HIPC HeavilyIndebtedPoorCountriesinitiative IAG InternationalAdvisoryGroup IBRD InternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment IDA InternationalDevelopmentAssociation IFC InternationalFinanceCorporation IFI InternationalFinancialInsitutions IMF InternationalMonetaryFund IRSC InstitutionalReformSupportCredit MPS MouvementPatriotiquedeSalut(PatrioticSalvationMovement) MTEF MediumTermExpenditureFramework NGO Non-governmentalorganization OFDA OilFieldDevelopmentArea PRGF PovertyReductionandGrowthFacility PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper PWYP PublishWhatYouPay RDP RegionalDevelopmentPlan RESAP RéseaudeSuividesActivitésliéesauPétroleauMoyenChari SAC StructuralAdjustmentCredit TOTCO TchadOilTransportationCompany USD UnitedStatesdollars UST UnitedStatesTreasury WBG WorldBankGroup
iv Executive Summary
Chad’sOil:MiracleorMirage?TheChad-CameroonPetroleumDevelopment andPipelineProject,transportingoilfromlandlockedsouthernChadtotheAtlantic coastofCameroonforexport,representstheforemosttestcaseoftheextenttowhich oilrevenuescanbeusedtoalleviatepovertyinachallengingdevelopingcountry context.Themostinnovativefeatureoftheprojectistheestablishmentofalegal framework(Chad’sLaw001andsubsequentamendmentsanddecrees)thatearmarks moneyforpovertyreductionexpendituresandcreatesanoversightcommitteeto ensurethetransparentmanagementofthecountry’soilwealth.Toutingthepromise ofpetrodollarsforChad’spooroverpublicconcernsthatnewrevenueswouldbelost tocorruptionandmismanagement,theWorldBankprovidedfinancingthatcatalyzed theExxonMobil-ledoildevelopment.Giventhedismaltrackrecordofoil-producing countriesaroundtheworldandthehighstakesinacountryasunstableasChad,this experimenthascomeintotheinternationallimelight.Thefateofthe$4-billionplus projectisnotonlyofvitalimportancetothepeopleofChad,whohopetoreapits benefitsbutriskbearingenormouscostsifoilproductionleadstocorruption,conflict andthefurtherconcentrationofpowerinthehandsofafew.Itisalsoofgreatinterest toothercountriesfacingthechallengeoftransformingtheiroilwealthintobenefitsfor theirpeople;todonorsattemptingtosolvetheproblemofthe“resourcecurse”;andto energy-hungryindustrializedcountriessearchingfornewandstablesourcesofoil. Poverty,PoliticsandPetrodollars:Chadisalandlockedcountrywithalonghistory ofcivilwar,continuedpoliticalinstability,aweakjudicialsystem,widespread corruptionandanall-encompassinginstitutionalcapacityproblem.Thisisan extremelychallengingenvironmentinwhichtoattempttoturnoilrevenuesinto benefitsforthepoor.Andthestakesarehigh—ifChad’soilmoneyismismanaged, itcouldmeanincreasedhardshipsandconflictforthenearlysevenmillionpeoplein Chadlivingonlessthan$1perday.Sinceindependencein1960,Chadhasknown moreyearsofwarthanofpeace,andrisingtensionsintheregionmeanthatviolenceis neverfaroff.AcoupattemptinMay2004remindedobserversofthefragilepolitical environment,andtensionshaveincreasedovertheattemptbyPresidentDéby’sruling partytochangetheconstitutiontoallowhimtorunforathirdtermin2006.The Chadianoilexperimentdependslargelyonthepoliticalwillofthegovernmentto respecttheruleoflawwherethereislittlehistoryofdoingso,todevelopaccountable institutions,andtoencouragedemocracy.Inanenvironmentwherethegovernment facesinternalandexternalthreats,suchpoliticalwillappearstobeinshortsupply. Chad’sLandlockedTreasure:Afterdecadesofon-again,off-againexplorationand negotiations,inJuly2003Chadianoilbegantoflowthroughthe1,050kilometer pipeline,producedbyaconsortiumcomprisedofExxonMobil,ChevronTexacoand Petronas,theMalaysianstateoilcompany.Productionfromthethreeactivefieldsin theDobabasinreacheditscurrentpeakcapacityof225,000barrelsperdayinlate2004 andmorethan60tankershipmentshavebeenexportedtodate.Beyondthe1billion barrelestimatedreservesinthesethreefields,thepresenceofthepipelineinfrastructure isspurringnewoilproductionandexplorationinChad.ExxonMobilplanstoaddfive new“satellite”fieldstoitsexistingproductionin2005-2006and,togetherwithother companieslikeCanada’sEnCana,isexploringotherpartsofChad.Withtheseongoing activitiesandthegovernment’seffortstoattractmoreinvestmentinthesector,Chad’s oilwindfallislikelytobemuchlargerthanoriginallypredicted. OilRevenues–Chad’sFirstTasteofBlackGold:Theunprecedentedmeasuresput inplacetosafeguardagainstmisappropriationofoilrevenuesarenowbeingputtothe test.Inlate2003,ExxonMobilmadeitsfirstroyaltypaymentintothegovernmentof Chad’sescrowaccountatCitibankinLondon,andChadwaslikelytoreceive$140-150 millioninoilrevenuesduring2004andover$200millionin2005.Overtheir25-year productionspan,thefirstthreeoilfieldsinsouthernChadmayearnthegovernment
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 1 morethan$5billioninoilrevenues.JusthowmuchmoreChadwillreceivefromother oilfieldstappedinthefutureisyetunknown. Inresponsetopressurefromcivilsocietyorganizationsconcernedthatthebenefitsof oildevelopmentwouldnotreachthepoor,theWorldBankconditioneditsfinancing forthepipelineprojectontheestablishmentofarevenuemanagementplan.Chad’s innovativepetroleumrevenuemanagementlawstipulatesthatthemajorityofdirect revenuesfromoilproduction–royaltiesanddividends–beearmarkedandspenton “prioritysectors”targetingpovertyreduction.Inaddition,ajointgovernment-civil societypetroleumrevenueoversightcommittee(theCollège)hasbeenestablished toplaya“watchdog”role,approvingprojectsandmonitoringthequalityoftheir implementation. WhilesomeinformationonChad’soilrevenuesismadepublic,detailsregardingthe calculationofrevenuesandmanykeyagreementsbetweentheoilcompaniesandthe governmentremainsecret.Furthermore,legalsafeguardscontainnotableloopholes. Forexample,allindirectrevenues–includingincometaxesontheoilcompanies–will godirectlyintogeneralgovernmentcoffers.Theseindirectrevenuesmayamountto morethan$3billionoverthenext25years.Inaddition,therevenuemanagementlaw doesnotcoveranyrevenuesfromoilproducedoutsidethethreeoriginalDobafields. Theseandotherweaknessmeanthatitisdifficultforcitizenstoverifytheaccuracy ofrevenueinformationdisclosedandthatmuchoilrevenuewillfalloutsideofthe jurisdictionofthelawandthecontroloftheCollège. Onthegovernmentside,thereisaprofoundlackofcapacitytomasterthetechnical aspectsofmonitoringoilproductionanddeterminingoilrevenues.Morethanoneyear intoChad’slifeasanoilproducer,manybasicaspectsregardingthecalculationofoil revenuesremainthesubjectofdisputebetweenthegovernmentandtheExxonMobil- ledconsortium. “JustAddOil”–AccountabilityfromScratch:Inacountrylackinganeffective systemofchecksandbalances,thejointgovernment-civilsocietyrevenueoversight committeecreatedbyLaw001isauniqueinstitution,criticaltotheefforttoholdthe governmentaccountablefortheuseofoilmoney.Experiencetodatehasshownthat theCollègehasmadepromisingstridestoestablishitselfandexertitsauthority.Atthe sametimeitneedsincreasedaccesstoinformation,animprovedabilitytoinvestigate expendituresandthecooperationofgovernmenttoprosecuteanywrongdoing identified.TheCollègelacksanindependentandsteadysourceoffunding,andwithout supportfromChadiancivilsocietywillbeunabletoeffectivelycarryoutoversightin acountryaslargeasChad.Finally,thegovernmenthasplacedtrustedallies–suchas PresidentDéby’sbrother-in-law–ontheCollègeandhasinterferedwiththeselection ofcivilsocietymembers.WhiletheCollègecaninfluencethebudgetingprocess, rejectill-foundedexpendituresandinvestigatetheexecutionofprojectsitapproves, ultimatelyitsabilitytoensurethatoilrevenuesareusedforpovertyreductiondepends onthewillingnessofthejudiciarytoprosecutecasesofmisuse,fraudorcorruptionthat theCollègemayuncover. BudgetingfortheBoom–SpendingChad’sOilRevenues:Fora$4billion-plus investment,theoilindustryenclaveinChadiscreatingpreciousfewjobs,makingthe generationofnon-oilemploymentandthecarefulmanagementandspendingofoil revenueparamount.TheultimatesuccessoftheChadexperimentwillbejudgednoton barrelsofoilproducedorrevenuesgenerated,butonthesuccessfulinvestmentofthese revenuesinChad’speoplethroughawell-plannedandexecutedbudgetsystem. Chadhaslittlerecordofeffectivelybudgetingandspendinggovernmentresources, andhasahistoryofcorruptionandmismanagementinbiddingandprocurement procedures.Theexperienceofthe2004budget–thefirstcontainingoilrevenues –andplansfor2005showthattherearemanyobstaclesstandingbetweentransparent budgetingofoilrevenuesandspendingthosemoniesinawaythatreducespoverty.
2 Executive Summary Withincreasedscrutinyofrevenueflowsatthemacro-level,problemswithcorruption andmismanagementwilllikelymigratedownstreamwheretheyaremorehiddenfrom publicview.Asinotheroilrichcountries,systemsofpatronagemaydevelopthrough thenon-transparentawardingofgovernmentcontractsfundedbyoilrevenues.These tendencies,togetherwithlimitedgovernmentcapacitytoabsorbincreasedlevelsof funding,havegraveimplicationsforthepovertyreductionobjectivesofaproject dependentontheeffectiveuseofmassivenewgovernmentrevenues.WorldBank projectsdesignedtoincreasecapacitiesintheseareaspriortothearrivaloffirstoil havefailedtomeettheirobjectives.DespiteWorldBankpromises,theresulthasbeen a“two-speed”projectwherebythepipelinewascompletedayearaheadofschedule butthegovernmentremainslargelyunpreparedtomanageitsoilwindfall. ChangingChad–TheRoleofExternalActors:EnsuringthatChad’soilboom benefitsthepoorrequiresnotonlybuildinggovernmentcapacity,butalteringpolicies and,ultimately,changingpolitics.Theexperiencetodaterevealsboththelimits ofexternalactors’abilitytoinfluencethesechangesandtheurgentneedforthose actorstousewhatleveragetheydohavetosupportadherencetotheruleoflawand compliancewiththerevenuemanagementsafeguards.InChad,wherecitizenshave limitedinfluenceontheirgovernment,externalactors–suchastheWorldBank, IMF,andtheU.S.andFrenchgovernments–canbeimportantsourcesofpressurefor greatertransparencyandaccountability.Therapidaccumulationofpetrodollarsin ChadconfrontstheWorldBank,IMFandotherdonorswithachoicebetweenusing theirknownleveragetodayandrelyingontheiruncertainleverageinthefuture. A“ModelProject”HangingbyaThread:Manyobstaclesstandinthewayof convertingChad’soilwealthintoconcreteimprovementsinthelivesofthecountry’s poor.WhilesomehaveprematurelyhailedtheChadprojectasa“newmodel”for harnessingoilrevenuestobenefitdevelopment,therecordofChad’sfirstyearasa petro-stateprovidesmanyreasonsforconcern. Importantbuildingblocksfortransparentandeffectiveoilrevenuemanagementare beingdevelopedandneedtobenurtured,butlimitedprogressonthisfrontistempered byworryingtrendsinthepoliticalenvironment,weaknessesandloopholesinthe revenuemanagementsystem,problemswithcorruption,transparencydeficitsand severegovernmentcapacityconstraints.Theoilexperimenthangsbyathread. Chad’sexperienceshowsthattransparencyisbutoneessentialingredientinasystem ofoversight,accountabilityandsanction.Transparentinformationcanbeusedfor bothformalandinformalenforcementofthelaw,butthetoolstouseithavetobein place.Investigativeandjudicialarmsofthegovernmentmustbeindependentand capableofprosecutingwrongdoing.ElectionsmustbefreeandfairandChadians musthavetheabilitytochangetheirgovernmentthroughtheballotboxiftheythink ithasnotmanagedtheoilwealthwell.Informalenforcement–throughmonitoringby civilsocietyandpublicizinginformationontheradioandviaothermedia–mustbe partofasystemofaccountability.Transparencyisonlymeaningfulifinformationis understoodbythegovernmentandthepublic,andifthefindingsofoversightbodies leadtoaction. ItistooearlytodeclaretheChadexperimentafailureorasuccess.Whetherornot Chadmanagestoescapethe“paradoxofplenty”maynotbeknownforyears.There are,though,clearlessonsthatcanbedrawnfromChad’sexperiencetodate,which canserveassignpoststocorrectpressingproblemsinChadandtoguideefforts toassistotherdevelopingcountriesinmanagingresourcewealth.Andoneofthe mostfundamentallessonsthatChadofferstodayistheimportanceofensuringthat minimumconditionsofrespectforhumanrights,fiscaltransparency,anddemonstrated governmentcapacitytoimplementpro-poorprogramsareinplacepriortopromoting investmentintheextractiveindustries. RecommendationsrequiringurgentattentionmaybefoundonPage93
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 3 Introduction: All Eyes on Chad
“Theexploitationofoilisamajornewopportunitytoacceleratedevelopmentinone oftheworld’spoorestcountries.”
– World Bank World Development Report 2003 on Chad- Cameroon Pipeline Project “Thisisgoingtobethemodelforeverysingleprojectofthistypeworldwide.”
– Mohamadou Diop, Central Africa Resident Representative, International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group1 “ThedevelopmentofthecrudeoilwillbenefittheentireChadiannation.” 2 – Chadian President Idriss Déby “WeknowthatprofoundpovertyisanunfortunaterealityinmuchofAfrica.Its alleviationrequiresprivateinvestment,collaborationandresponsiblegovernmental policies.TheChad-CameroonProjectembodiesalltheseelements.Itoffersgreat hopetothepeopleofthesetwocountriesandweareproudtobeinvolvednowandin thefuture.” – Tom R. Walters, Esso (ExxonMobil) Chad Komé Groundbreaking Ceremony - October 18, 2000
ChadisamongthenewestandmostprecariousofAfrica’semergingpetro-states.The Chad-CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject,transportingoilfrom southernChadtotheAtlanticcoastforexport,representstheforemosttestcaseofthe extenttowhichoilrevenuescanbeusedtoalleviatepovertyinadifficultdeveloping countrycontext.Themostinnovativefeatureoftheprojectistheestablishmentof alegalframework(Chad’sLaw001andsubsequentdecreesandamendments)that earmarksmoneyforpovertyreductionprojectsandcreatesanoversightcommitteeto ensurethetransparentmanagementofthecountry’soilwealth.Toutingthepromise ofpetrodollarsforChad’spooroverconcernsthattherightgovernanceconditions werenotinplace,theWorldBankprovidedfinancingthatcatalyzedtheExxonMobil- ledoildevelopment.Giventhedismaltrackrecordofoilproducingcountriesaround theworldandthehighstakesinacountryasunstableasChad,thisexperimenthas comeintotheinternationallimelight.Thefateofthe$4billion-plusprojectisnot onlyofvitalimportancetothepeopleofChadwhohopetoreapitsbenefitsbutrisk bearingenormouscostsifthingsgoawry.Itisalsoofgreatinteresttoothercountries facingthechallengeoftransformingtheiroilwealthintobenefitsfortheirpeople;to donorsattemptingtosolvetheproblemofthe“resourcecurse”;andtoenergy-hungry industrializedcountriessearchingfornewandstablesourcesofoil. Asalandlockedcountrywithalonghistoryofcivilwar,continuedpoliticalinstability andaweakjudicialsystem,Chadisaschallenginganenvironmentasanyforsuch anexperiment.Andthestakesarehigh–ifChad’soilmoneyismismanaged,it couldmeanincreasedhardshipsandconflict,especiallyforthe80percentofChad’s 8.3millionpeoplewholiveonlessthan$1perday.3Sinceindependence,Chad hasknownmoreyearsofwarthanofpeace,andrisingtensionsintheregionmean thatviolenceisneverfaroff.WithoilflowingsinceJuly2003,theunprecedented measuresputinplacetosafeguardagainstmisappropriationofoilrevenuesarebeing puttothetest.Atatimeofheightenedawarenessofthepitfallsofdependence onpetroleumexports,theWorldBankhasstakeditsreputationontheabilityof theprojecttotransformChad’seconomyandbenefitthecountry’spoor.Thevery proprietyofWorldBanksupportforthe“extractiveindustries”(oil,gasandmining) is,inlargepart,ridingontheoutcomeoftheChad“experiment.”Thelessonslearned fromthecountry’sexperiencetodateofferinsightintowhatcanbeexpectedinChad’s future,whatshouldbeavoidedelsewhere,andwhatroleinternationalactorsshould playtopromotetheinterestsofthepoorinAfrica’sunfoldingoilboom.
4 Introduction: All Eyes on Chad Context: The African Oil Boom Inaworldcharacterizedbyaseeminglyinsatiabledemandforenergyandagrowing NorthernpreoccupationwithdecreasingdependenceonpetroleumfromtheMiddle East,Africanoilisgainingbothgeopoliticalandcommercialsignificance.Oil productionontheAfricancontinentissettodoublebytheendofthedecade.The U.S.willsoonbeimporting25percentofitspetroleumfromsub-SaharanAfrica,and theregionisexpectedtosupply20percentoftotalworldoilproductionby2010.4 InthewakeoftheSeptember11,2001,terroristattacksontheU.S.andheightened tensionsintheMiddleEast,securingnewAfricanoilsuppliesasameansofenergy diversificationhasbecomestrategicallyimportant,notonlyfortheU.S.butforother industrializednations.Atthesametime,thesheerpaceofoilconsumptioninthe world’slargesteconomiesiscontributingtoatighterglobaloilsupply.Thelargest energyconsumers–suchastheU.S.andChina–arecompetingtosecurenewsources ofoil,pushingcompaniestofrontierareas.Thesefactorsaredrivinganewscramble forAfrica–thistimeforitshydrocarbonriches. OilandgasalreadycompriseAfrica’slargestexportcategory,three-and-a-halftimes asimportantasallnon-fuelcommodityexportscombined.5Theextractiveindustries accountedformorethan50percentofAfrica’sexportsand65percentofallforeign directinvestmentduringthe1990s.6Thedominanceofextractiveindustriesin Africa’straderelationships,coupledwiththedeclineinaidflows,makeitallthemore importantthatAfricauseitsoilintheinterestofitspeople. ThenewAfricanoilboom–centeredontheoil-richAtlanticwatersoftheGulfof Guinea,fromNigeriatoAngola,butexpandingacrossthecontinent–isamomentof greatopportunityandgreatperilforcountriesbesetbywide-scalepoverty.Onthe onehand,tappingoilreservescouldunleashenormousrevenuesforuseinimproving thelivesofthepoor;byCRS’estimate,Africa’spetroleumproducerswillearnat least$200billionoverthenextdecade.7Ontheotherhand,thedramaticdevelopment failuresthathavecharacterizedsomanyoil-dependentcountrieswarnthatpetrodollars maynothelpdevelopingcountriestoreducepoverty,butmayinfactexacerbateit.
A Cursed Past: Oil and the Paradox of Plenty Thereislittleevidencethatpastoilexportshavecontributedtothewelfareof FormoreonAfrica’soil developingcountries.Indeed,35yearsofpetroleumexportsinNigeria,forexample, boomandthepoor,see havenothelpedraiselivingstandards;despiteitsoilwealth,percapitaincomein the2003CRSreport, Nigeriaislessthan$1adayandlivingstandardsarebelowtheaverageinsub-Saharan BottomoftheBarrel: Africa.8Nigeriaisperhapsthemostprominentexampleof“theparadoxofplenty,” Africa’sOilBoomand wherebycountriesrichinnaturalresourcessufferfromlowerlivingstandards,slower thePoor,byIanGary growthratesandhigherincidenceofconflictthantheirresource-poorcounterparts.9 andTerryLynnKarl Theinverseassociationbetweenequitablegrowthandoilandmineralabundancehas http://advocacy.crs.org/ cometobeknownasthe“resourcecurse.”10From1970-1993,resource-poorcountries oil/ (withoutpetroleum)grewfourtimesmorerapidlythanresource-richcountries(with petroleum)–despitethefactthattheyhadhalfofthesavings.11Thegreaterthe dependenceonoilandmineralresources,theworsethegrowthperformancewas12–a findingthathasbeenconfirmedbyeconomistsintheWorldBankandInternational MonetaryFund.13 Historypaintsagrimpictureofwhatislikelytoaccompanyrapidgrowthin petroleumproduction.Oilboomstendtoincreasegovernmentappetitesforpublic spending,withoutanaccompanyingincreaseintheeffectivenessofthespending.The concentrationoffiscalresourcesfromanoilboomfrequentlyencouragesrent-seeking behaviorandfostersexcessiveandimprudentinvestment–allofwhichcontributeto themaldistributionofresources,adeclineinproductivityandmassivecorruption.The volatilityofoilpricesmakesplanningdifficultandrenderstheeconomyextremely
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 5 vulnerabletoexternalshocks.Nonoil-producingactivitiestendtosufferwhenoil salespushuptheexchangerate,makingotherexportsnon-competitive.Labor- intensivesectors,suchasagriculture,areoftenthemostadverselyaffectedbythis economicphenomenon,knownasthe“DutchDisease.”Asaformofrent,petrodollars decreasethegovernment’srelianceonnon-oilrevenues,includingtaxes,andactually weakenoneofthelinksbetweenpeopleandtheirgovernmentthatisessentialto popularcontrolovermajordecisionsaffectingacountryanditsresources.Insuch acontext,governmentstendtorelyincreasinglyonrepressionthroughtheuseof securityforces(ratherthanconsentofthegoverned)toremaininpower.Indeed, countriesthatdependuponoilexportsareamongthemosteconomicallytroubled,the mostauthoritarian,andthemostconflict-riddenstatesintheworldtoday.
Addressing the Curse Thegrowingawarenessofthe“resourcecurse”hassparkedanongoingdebate abouttherelationshipbetweenextractiveindustriesandpoverty,andtheproperroles andresponsibilitiesofinternationalinstitutions,oilcompaniesandcivilsocietyin addressingtheproblem. TheWorldBank,asasignificantsourceoffinancing,technicalassistanceandpolicy advicefortheextractiveindustriesindevelopingcountries,hasbeenatthecenter ofthisdebate.In2000,inresponsetoconcernsabouttheenvironmental,socialand economicimpactsofoil,miningandgasdevelopments,theWorldBankagreed toundertakeanassessmentofitssupportforthesesectorsinlightofitspoverty alleviationmission.ItlaunchedanindependentevaluationcalledtheExtractive IndustriesReview(EIR)–atwoyearprocessofstakeholderconsultationsand commissionedresearchaimedatidentifyingtheimpactofWorldBankGroup Box 1 financingforoil, miningandgason Financing a Project: thealleviationor The Chad-Cameroon Oil Development and Pipeline Project exacerbationofpoverty. WorldBankGroupparticipationinanoilprojectopensdoorstoother Thefinalreportof financingsources,asinthecaseofthe$4.2billionChad-Cameroonproject. theEIRissuedin January2004made Projectfinanceincludes: recommendations aboutthefuture •WorldBankGroup involvementofthe * IBRDloanstoChadandCameroon $92.9million * IFCloan $200million WorldBankGroupin theextractiveindustries. •EuropeanInvestmentBank $41.5million Theseemphasize •ExportCreditAgencies goodgovernance * U.S.EXIMBank $200million andtransparencyas * COFACE(France) $200million prerequisitestoeffective * AfricanEx-ImBank $500million povertyalleviation. TheReview’scentral •Morethanhalfofthetotalprojectcostwasmetbytheequitypartners –ExxonMobil,ChevronandPetronas–whocoveredthefullcostofoil conclusionsuggeststhat fielddevelopmentandonethirdoftheexportfacilities. theextractiveindustries canonlybeanengine •Remainingfinancingwasprovidedbycommercialarrangingbanks: ofequitablegrowthand * ABN-Amro povertyalleviationif CreditAgricoleIndosuez * certainbasicconditions (Note:Projectcostwasoriginallyestimatedat$3.7billion.InanOctober areinplacebeforeoilor 2004presentation,ExxonMobilstatedthatthetotalprojectcostwas mineralwealthistapped, $4.2billion.) including:respectfor Source:WorldBankGroup,ExportCreditAgencies,Afreximbank,EnvironmentalDefense, humanrights;consent PetroleumEconomist(Feb.16,2004–“Chad-Cameroon:AgainstAllOdds”) oflocallyaffected
6 Introduction: All Eyes on Chad communities;adequategovernmentcapacitytoenforcelaws,monitorandregulate theextractivesectors;anddemonstratedgovernmentandcorporatecommitment totransparency.ThisprincipalfindingwasderivedlargelyfromtheReview’s observationsabouttheabsenceof“enablingconditions”inChad,priortotheinitiation oftheoilpipelineproject. Heightenedattentiontotheresourcecurseandgreaterrecognitionthatthesecrecy shroudingtheextractiveindustriesfosterscorruptionhavealsoledtothecreationof severalinitiativesaimedatincreasingtransparencyintheextractiveindustries.The globalcivilsocietycampaign,PublishWhatYouPay,callsformandatoryrevenue disclosurebyoilandminingcompanies(seeBox2).TheU.Kgovernmentled ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative(EITI)promotesvoluntarydisclosureof companies’revenuepaymentsandgovernmentreceipts.Manyoilcompanieshave
Box 2
The International Publish What You Pay Campaign
Civilsocietygroups,churches,investorsandothershaveincreasinglycalledongovernmentsandextractiveindustry companiestobemoretransparentintheiroperationsandfinancialdealings.Withinformationabouttheamountofmoney receivedbytheirgovernments,civilsocietygroupsandordinarycitizenscanusewhatpoliticalspaceexiststotrytoholdtheir governmentsaccountable. CRSandBIC,alongwithmorethan220civilsocietygroupsaroundtheworld,aremembersofthePublishWhatYouPay (PWYP)campaign.LaunchedinJune2002,thePublishWhatYouPaycampaignpromotesmandatory,ratherthanvoluntary, disclosureofextractiveindustry(oil,gasandmining)paymentsfromcompaniestohostgovernments.NationalPWYP platformsareatworkintheU.S.,Europe,Azerbaijan,Nigeria,Chad,Congo-Brazzavilleandothercountries.Thecoalition iscallingontheG8industrializednationstotakeleadershipandpromotethetransparencyofoil,gasandminingrevenues worldwide.Thecampaignisadvocatinga“cocktail”ofmeasuresthatwouldcreatearegulatoryframeworkthatpromotes transparencyamongcompanies,governmentsandstate-ownedenterprises.Onepossibleapproachwouldbeforstockmarket regulatorstorequireoil,gasandminingcompaniestopublishnettaxes,fees,royaltiesandotherpaymentstoallnational governmentsasaconditionforbeinglistedoninternationalstockexchangesandfinancialmarkets.Relyingoncompaniesto discloseinformationvoluntarilyhassofarfailedinpartbecausetheyfeardiscriminationbyhostcountriesandcompetitive disadvantage;itisdifficultforacompanytotakepositivestepstowardtransparencyunlessallofitscompetitorsareobligatedto dothesame.Thecampaigncallsformandatorydisclosurebackedbylegislationsothatcitizensindevelopingcountriesareable toholdtheirgovernmentstoaccountforthemanagementofresourcerevenues. TheWorldBankGroup,throughitsExtractiveIndustriesReview,hascommittedtorequiringrevenuetransparencyforanynew oil,gasorminingprojectitfundsby2006.Agroupofinternationalinvestorsrepresentingseveraltrilliondollarsincapitalhas alsocalledonoilandminingcompaniestobemoretransparentintheirrevenuepayments.16 ThePWYPcampaignisnotsuggestingthatoilcompaniestellhostgovernmentshowtospendtheirmoney,butratherthat theyshouldpublishinformationthatwillhelpcitizensholdtheirowngovernmentsaccountable.Noristhecampaigncalling oncompaniestodisclosecommerciallysensitiveinformation,butrathertopublishthesamebasicdataonpaymentsmadeto governmentsastheyarerequiredtodiscloseinmany“developedcountries.”Mandatoryregulationwouldalsohelpaddress thelegalandcontractualobstaclestodisclosurethatcompaniesfaceinmanydevelopingcountries.Companiesmaybeableto disregardsecrecyclausesinproductionsharingagreementsandothercontractsifrequiredtodisclosepaymentsbytheirhome governments.
Chad - Publish What You Pay / Publish What You Earn InChad,someoilrevenuepaymentsaretransparent,butasthisreportshows,otherimportantaspectsofrevenuepaymentsand contractsremainhiddenfromview.InOctober2004,Chadiancivilsocietyorganizationsandchurcheslaunchedthenational platformofPublishWhatYouPayand,inChad,“PublishWhatYouEarn,”focusingonthetransparencyofgovernment spendingofoilmoneyreceived.Manylocalgroupsaremembersofthecoalition,includingtheJusticeandPeaceCommission oftheCatholicChurch,CommissionPermanentePétroledeN’Djaména(CPPN),CommissionPermanentePétroleLocale (CPPL),RéseaudeSuividesActivitésliéesauPétroleauMoyenChari(RESAP-MC),andGroupedeRecherchesAlternatives etdeMonitoringduProjetPétroleTchad-Cameroun(GRAMP/TC).Thegroupshavecalledontheoilcompaniestorenounce confidentialityclausesinoilcontractsandaskedthegovernmenttoamendtheoilrevenuemanagementlawtocoveralloil fieldsinthecountry.ThefulldeclarationoftheChadcoalitioncanbefoundatwww.catholicrelief.org/africanoil.cfm
Formoreinformationonthecampaign,visitwww.publishwhatyoupay.org
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 7 lentatleastrhetoricalsupporttotheneedforincreasedtransparencyinthesector.The BritshsupermajorBP,forexample,hassaid“Wesupporttheprincipleoftransparency, whilealsoacknowledgingthepracticalobstaclesthatstandinitsway–including traditionsofconfidentialityandthereluctanceofsometoembracechange.”14 Theworkoftheseinitiativestoincreasetransparencyrepresentsafirststeptoward breakingthe“resourcecurse”andensuringthedemocraticmanagementofnatural resourcestothebenefitofthepoor.Buttransparencyaloneisnotenough;true accountabilityfortheuseofoilwealthrequirespoliticalwill,corporateacceptance, democraticspaceandunrelentingpublicscrutiny.
Chad: The Experiment in Breaking the Curse OilwasdiscoveredinChadover30yearsago,butyearsofcivilwarandthesheer technicalchallengesofgettingoiloutofthelandlockedcountrytoworldmarketskept thecountry’s“blackgold”inthegrounduntilveryrecently.15In2000,WorldBank supportcatalyzedtheconstructionofapipelinedesignedtotransportoilfromsouthern ChadthroughCameroontotheAtlanticcoastforexport.The$4.2billionChad- CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProjectrepresentsnotonlythelargest singleprivateinvestmentinsub-SaharanAfricatoday,butalsooneoftheworld’smost significanteffortstoreversethe“oilcurse”andpromotepovertyreductionthrough targeteduseofoilrevenues.TheWorldBankhasexposeditselftoconsiderable “reputationrisk”bybettingontheabilityofthisprojecttoharnessoildevelopment forpovertyalleviationinoneofthepoorestcountriesonearth.Andmanypeopleare watchingandwaiting–bothinsideChadandout. SponsoredbyaconsortiumofoilcompaniesledbyExxonMobil,withpartners Petronas(Malaysia’sstateoilcompany)andChevron,thepipelinehasbeen operationalsinceJuly2003.17Theprojectisdesignedtocarryoilfromover250wells drilledintheDobabasinofsouthernChadthrougha1,050km.undergroundpipeline, withacurrentmaximumcapacityof250,000barrelsperday(bpd),tothetownof KribiontheAtlanticcoastofCameroon.A12-km.offshorepipelineconnectstoa floatingmarineterminalwheretankersareloadedfortheworldmarket.Theestimated 1billionbarrelsofoilinthethreeDobafieldsunderproductionwillbeextractedover aperiodof25years,withaplannedpeakproductionof225,000bpd,earningChad some$3billionovertheproject’slifetime(dependingonoilprices).18However,these productionestimatesdonottakeintoconsiderationoilfromnewdiscoveriesoutside thethreeDobafieldsspecificallysupportedbytheproject(Miandoum,Koméand Bolobo).Suchadditionaloildevelopmentsarenolongerjustapossibility;theyare likelytoincreasebothproductionlevelsandrevenuesforChadbyasearlyas2006. (SeeSectionTwo:Chad’sLandlockedTreasure) TheparticipationoftheWorldBankandothermultilateralfinancialinstitutions providedcrucialpoliticalcoverforprivatesponsorsandlenders,withoutwhichthe projectwouldnothavegoneahead.19InthewordsoftheWorldBankitself,“World BankGroupinvolvement,aswellasthefinancialinvestmentsofChadandCameroon inthepipelinecompanies,providecomforttotheseoilcompaniesandlendersthatthe politicalriskspresentedbythiscross-borderoperationandfirst-timepetroleumexport venturefromChadcanbeadequatelymitigatedoverthemediumtolongtermrequired tosupporttheirrespectiveequityandlong-termdebtinvestments.”20 Whilethebulkoftheprojectfinancingcamefromprivatebanksandtheproject sponsorsthemselves,publicfinancialinstitutionsboremuchofthepoliticalweightof theproject.WorldBankfinancingsupportedthegovernmentofChad’ssharesintwo specialpurposecompaniesformedthroughjointventureswiththeConsortium–Tchad OilTransportationCompany(TOTCO)andCameroonOilTransportationCompany (COTCO)–createdtobuild,ownandoperatetheportionsofthepipelineinChadand
8 Introduction: All Eyes on Chad CHAD / CAMEROON Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project Map
TheChad-Cameroonpipelineproject iscurrentlythesinglelargestprivate sectorinvestmentinsub-Saharan Africa.Theprojectwillcarryoil fromover300wellsdrilledinthe DobafieldsinsouthernChadthrough a1,000km.undergroundpipeline, withacapacityof250,000bpd,to Cameroon’sAtlanticcoastatthe townofKribi.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 9 Cameroon,respectively.Inaddition,twoWorldBankloansforChadwereapprovedto helpbuildthegovernment’scapacitytomitigatesocialandenvironmentalimpactsand tomanagetheoileconomy:the“ManagementofthePetroleumEconomyProject”and “PetroleumSectorManagementCapacityBuildingProject.” Priortothepipelineproject’sapprovalonJune6,2000,local,andinternationalcivil societyorganizationsexpressedconcernthatinacontextofcorruption,political repression,weaklegalframeworksandlittlecapacityforfiscalmanagement,thepoor wouldnotreapthebenefitspromisedbytheproject,thoughtheywouldbearitssocial andenvironmentalcosts.However,theWorldBankmaintainedthatoilrepresented theonlyviableeconomicdevelopmentpathforthepoorcountry,andthatwithBank assistanceChadwouldbereadytomanageitspetro-wealthwellbythetimeoil flowed.WhiletheBank’sownexpertsarguedthatinacountrylikeChad,oilrevenues wereunlikelytobenefitthepoorandcouldactuallyfuelcivilconflict,Bankappraisal documentsneverthelesspaintedarosypictureofthecountry,helpingtheprojectto proceed.Thus,contrarytotheviewsofotherobservers,suchashumanrightsanalysts
Box 3 The World Bank Group’s Participation in the Chad-Cameroon Project
Betweenitspublicandprivatesectorloans,theWorldBankGroupprovidedover$300million infinancingfortheChad-Cameroonproject.TheInternationalBankforReconstructionand Development(thecommercial-ratepublicsectorlendingarmoftheWorldBank)provided loanstothegovernmentsofChadandCameroontosupporttheirparticipationintheownership ofthetransportsystem(thepipeline)itself.The“softwindow”lendingarmoftheWorldBank, theInternationalDevelopmentAssociation,providedthreeconcessionaryloansforcapacity- buildingtothegovernmentsofChadandCameroon,withthestatedintentofreinforcingthe countries’institutional,legalandregulatorycapacitybeforeoilproductioncommenced.IFC providedbothdirectloanstotheConsortiumandsyndicatedloansfromprivatefinanciers.
World Bank Group Financing
IBRDLoans ToChad $39.5million ToCameroon $53.4million IDALoans Chad:ManagementofthePetroleumEconomyProject $17.5million Chad:PetroleumSectorManagementCapacityBuildingProject $23.7million Cameroon:PetroleumEnvironmentCapacityEnhancementProject $5.77million InternationalFinanceCorporationLoans A-loanstotheConsortium $100million (ofwhich$85.5milliontoCOTCO,$14.5milliontoTOTCO) B-loanumbrella(leveragedover$100millioninadditionalfinancingforT/COTCO) ProposedSupplementalIDAFinancing Chad:PetroleumSectorManagementCapacityBuildingProject $11.5million (anticipatedapproval:April2005) Chad:ManagementofthePetroleumEconomyProject $8.5million (anticipatedapproval:March2005) TotalFinancing $259.87million
attheU.S.StateDepartment,theBank’sProjectAppraisalDocumentin2000claimed: “Chadhassuccessfullyputinplacedemocraticpoliticalinstitutions.”21 Byprovidingcapacitybuildingloansalongwithsupportfortheinvestmentitself, theWorldBankfeltassuredthatthegovernmentwouldbepreparedforthecoming
10 Introduction: All Eyes on Chad petroleumeralongbeforetheoilbegantoflow.Largelyasaresultofcivilsociety pressure,theWorldBankconditioneditsfinancialsupportfortheprojectonthe adoptionofseveralmeasuresforwhichtheprojectismostwell-knowntoday:the
Box 4 Chad’s Oil Revenue Management System At A Glance
Chad’sinnovativeoilrevenuemanagementsystem–basedonLaw001andsubsequentdecrees –setsoutalegalandinstitutionalframeworkformanagingoilrevenuesfromChad’sthree Dobafields.Keyfeaturesofthissysteminclude: •Alldirectrevenues–royaltiesanddividends–arepaidbytheExxonMobilconsortiuminto Chadiangovernment-controlledescrowaccountsatCitibankinLondon. •Indirectrevenues–incometaxesontheoilcompanies,customsduties,etc.–arepaiddirectly intoChad’streasury. •AfterdebtpaymentstotheWorldBankandEuropeanInvestmentBankarewithdrawnfrom theCitibankaccount,theremainingdirectrevenuesareallocatedasfollows: * 10percenttoaFutureGenerationsFundtosaveforthepost-oilerainChad * 72percenttocapitalinvestmentsinfive“prioritysectors”tofightpoverty:education, healthandsocialservices,ruraldevelopment,infrastructure,andenvironmentaland waterresources * 4.5percenttotheoil-producingregioninsouthernChadasadditional, earmarkedfunding * 13.5percenttoChad’streasuryfordiscretionaryspending,until2007;thereafter,these fundswillbedividedamongprioritysectors. •Ajointgovernment-civilsocietyPetroleumRevenueOversightandControlCommittee –a.k.a.theCollège–hasbeenestablishedwiththeauthoritytoapproveorrejectspecific projectsfinancedbydirectoilrevenues. Theoilrevenuemanagementsystemcontainsmanyweaknesses,notleastofwhichisitslimited applicationtorevenuesfromonlythreeoilfieldsinChad,ratherthanthewholepetroleum sector.(FormoreonrevenuemanagementinChad,seeSectionThree“Chad’s OilRevenues.”)
passageofarevenuemanagementlaw,stipulatinghowoilrevenueswouldbespent tobenefitthepoor;thecreationofajointgovernment-civilsocietyrevenueoversight committee;andtheestablishmentofseveralindependentmonitoringbodies,totrack theproject’simplementationanditsimpactsonthelocalpopulation.22
Whose Risk? Whose Reward? TheWorldBankhascalledtheoilprojectinChada‘high-risk,high-reward’endeavor. Buttherealquestioniswhoseriskandwhosereward?TheConsortiumandthe governmentwillstillreapbenefitseveniflittleispassedontothepeople.Theultimate costsoftheproject’sfailurewillbebornebythepopulation,whowillhavetolive notonlywiththeenvironmentalandsocialfootprintofoildevelopment,butwiththe consequencesofpouringpetro-dollarsintothepocketsofagovernmentthatmaynot havetheinterestofitsownpeopleinmind. InthecontextoftheExtractiveIndustriesReview,theWorldBankoftencitedthe Chad-Cameroonpipelinetojustifyitscontinuedengagementintheextractivesectors. Atthesametime,civilsocietyobserversarguedthattheChadprojectexemplified whyoildevelopmentshouldnotproceedunlessminimumgovernanceandhuman rightsconditionsareinplace.Giventhepoortrackrecordofoil-producingcountries aroundtheglobe,theworldislookingforamodelofhowtomakepetroleumworkfor thepoor.AlotisridingontheChad-Cameroonproject.Notjustthereputationsof
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 11 itsfinancialbackers,whoclaimedthattheirparticipationwouldhelpensurethatthe projectimprovedthelivesofChadians,butthefutureofotheremergingpetro-states, wherethelessonslearnedfromChadmayinfluencefuturepolicychoices.
About the Report Thisreporttracestheperformanceofthe“Chadexperiment”inoilrevenue managementoverthefirstyearofpetroleumproduction.Itisbasedonresearch conductedbetweenSeptember2002andNovember2004,includingfourtripstoChad andongoingexchangeswithcivilsocietyorganizationsinthecountry.(Note:The reportdoesnotfocusonthesocialandenvironmentalimpactsoftheconstruction phaseoftheprojectinChadandCameroon.Thesehavebeenwelldocumented inotherreports.(SeeAnnex,“AdditionalResourcesontheChad-Cameroon Pipeline”.)Thereportseekstoanswerthreefundamentalquestions:HowareChad’s oilrevenuesbeingused?Whataretheprospectsforpovertyreductionthroughthe investmentofpetrodollars?WhatlessonscanbedrawnfromChad’soilexperiment? TheReportisorganizedasfollows: SectionOne,Poverty,PoliticsandPetrodollarsprovidesanoverviewofthe politicaltrends,recenteventsandinstitutionalfactorsaffectingorlikelyto affectChad’sabilitytomanageitspetroleumwealthwell. SectionTwo,Chad’sLandlockedTreasure–OilProductionandExploration describesthebasicrealityofcurrentandfutureoilextractioninChad. SectionThree,OilRevenues–Chad’sFirstTasteofBlackGolddiscusses Chad’soilearnings,fromthecalculationofrevenuestothesystemfortheir management. SectionFour,“JustAddOil”–AccountabilityfromScratchdescribesthe PetroleumRevenueOversightCommittee(theCollège)andrecountsthe challengesofmakingthisuniqueaccountabilitymechanismwork. SectionFive,BudgetingfortheBoom–SpendingChad’sOilRevenuestraces howChadhasuseditsoilmoneytodateandwhatobstaclesitfacesduringthe firstfullyearofpeakoilproduction. SectionSix,ChangingChad–TheRoleofExternalActorsdescribesthe ongoingroleoftheInternationalFinancialInstitutions(IFIs)andotherdonors intheChad-Cameroonprojectandevaluatestheirattemptstobuildgovernment capacityandinfluencegovernmentpoliciesandpractices. TheConclusionoffersasummarycritiqueoftheproject,aprognosisforthe future,lessonslearnedtodateandasetofrecommendationsfortheoil companies,theIFIs,donorcountries,theChadiangovernment,theCollège,and civilsociety,abouthowtohelpensurethatthisexperimentdoesnotfailthe peopleofChad.
Bank Information Center and Catholic Relief Services Interest in Chad’s Oil Boom Beforethepetroleumprojectbegan,mostcivilsocietygroupsinChaddidnotoppose theexploitationofoiloutright.Theydemandedthen,andcontinuetodemandnow,a justexploitationofoil—suchthattheChadianpopulationwillreapoil’sbenefitsrather thansufferitspotentiallydireconsequences.Likeourlocalpartnergroups,bothBIC andCRSareconcernedwiththejustuseofoilwealthtobenefitAfrica’spoor. TheBankInformationCenter(BIC)seekstoensurethatthevoicesofthepoorare heardsothatpeoplehaveasayinthedevelopmentdecisionsaffectingtheirlives. GiventheinfluentialroleoftheIFIs,suchastheWorldBank,intheChad-Cameroon
12 Introduction: All Eyes on Chad Box 5
Multiple Monitoring Mechanisms: All Bark and No Bite?23
TheChad-CameroonPipelinehasbeendescribedasthemostheavilyscrutinizedprojectinthehistoryofthe WorldBank.Thisdescriptionisnotsimplyduetotheattentionandmediacoveragetheprojecthasattracted internationally.Itisalsoareflectionoftheextraordinarymeasuresundertakentoestablishmultiplemonitoring bodieschargedwithoverseeingtheproject’simplementation,ensuringcompliancewithenvironmentalandsocial policies,andtrackingtheachievementoftheproject’sstatedpovertyalleviationobjectives.Althoughthese “watchdogs”couldhavesignificantpersuasivepower,theyhavenotalwaysliveduptotheirpotential.While criticalfindingsandrecommendationshave,attimes,supportedtheclaimsmadebylocalorganizationsandhelped prodprojectsponsorstotakeactiononsomeofthemostpressingproblems,theyhavealltoooftenfallenondeaf ears,makinglittleornodentintheproject’simplementation. BodiesliketheInternationalAdvisoryGroupcoulddomuchmoretoadvocatefortheadoptionoftheir recommendations,publicizetheirfindings,andensurethattheirreportsgetintothehandsofthosewhocanuse themtopressforremedies.
International Advisory Group (IAG) TheIAGisafive-memberindependentbodyofexpertscreatedbytheWorldBankin2001attheurgingofcivil societygroupstomonitortheimplementationoftheChad-Cameroonprojectandadvisetheprojectsponsors,host governmentsandtheWorldBankregardingproblemsandissuesthatarise.TheIAGreportsdirectlytotheWorld BankpresidentandisfinancedfromthecentralfundsoftheWorldBankGroupandbyEuropeandonors.Sinceit beganworkingin2001,theIAGhasconductedeightmissionstoChadandCameroonandhaspublishedsummary reportsaftereachvisit.ItsmostrecentreportwasreleasedonNovember18,2004.ThisandpreviousIAGreports canbefoundatwww.gic-iag.org Themostprominentexampleofa“watchdog”recommendationthathasgoneunheededistheIAG’srepeatedcalls forurgentmeasurestoacceleratecapacity-buildingefforts.Sinceitsearliestreports,theIAGhascritiquedthe two-speednatureoftheproject,wherebyconstructionhasfaroutpacedmeasurestoincreasetheinstitutionaland technicalcapacityoftheChadiangovernment.However,projectconstructionblazedahead,finishingayearahead ofschedule,whileChadianinstitutionalandlegalsystemsremainweakandunpreparedtomanagethegrowing petroleumsector. WhiletheIAGhasprovidedafrequentlycriticalvoiceandvaluableperspectiveontheproject,itsrecommendations haveseemedtocarrylittleweight.Thefactthatmanyofthesamerecommendationshavebeenrepeatedinits reportsindicatesthattheyhaveresultedinlittleconcreteaction.In2003,civilsocietygroupsinChadobserved that,“afterfivestatutorymissionstoChad,theIAG’smandatedoesnotgrantitanygreaterinfluencethanthe abilitytomakerecommendationstothedifferentprojectactors.”24
External Compliance Monitoring Group (ECMG) TheECMG,staffedbyaconsultingfirmcalledD’Appalonia,isundercontractwiththeInternationalFinance Corporation(theprivate-sectorlendingarmoftheWorldBankGroup)tomonitortheConsortium’scompliance withtheenvironmentalmanagementplan.Throughoutprojectimplementation,theECMGconductedquarterlysite visits.Afterprojectcompletion(certifiedin2004)theECMGismandatedtoconductyearlyvisits.Sincetheir firstvisittotheprojectsiteinFebruary2001,theECMGhaspublished10reports.Theseandotherinformation abouttheECMGcanbefoundontheWorldBank’swebsiteat:www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/pro_monitor. htm
Comité Technique Nationale de Suivi et de Contrôle (CTNSC) TheCTNSCisthegovernmentbodyinChadchargedwithoversightoftheenvironmentalandsocialimpactsof thepetroleumsector.Responsibilityforensuringcompliancewithenvironmentalandsocialstandardsultimately restswiththegovernmentofChad,buttheCTNSChasfacedcapacityconstraints,financialandorganizational hurdlessinceitsestablishment.TheCTNSCiscurrentlyfundedentirelybytheWorldBank,throughcapacity buildingloans.However,withtheseloansrunningoutanditsstaffshrinking,theCTNSC’sfutureisuncertain. ThegovernmentofChad’sfailuretobudgetanyresourcesfortheCTNSCin2004or2005castsdoubtonits commitmenttotheoperationofthemonitoringagency.Becauseofweaktechnicalcapacityandlimitedequipment, theCTNSChasreliedheavilytodateonExxonMobilfacilitiesanddata,andthushasnotbeenabletoprovidetruly independentinformationontheimpactsofoildevelopment.TheWorldBankhasenvisagedatrainingprogramfor theCTNSC,wherebyitsstaffwouldworkcloselywiththeECMGincomingmonthstolearnfromthem,butthe governmentofChadhasyettoagreeuponthefinancingmodalitiesforthisarrangement.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 13 project,BICaimstohelpaffectedcommunitiesandcivilsocietyorganizationsinChad holdpublicinstitutionsaccountablefortheimpactsoftheiractivitiesinaneffortto promoteenvironmental,socialandeconomicjustice. CatholicReliefServices(CRS),alongwithitspartnersinAfrica,includingthelocal CatholicChurch,supportstheproperdemocraticmanagementofnaturalresources andtheimplementationofdevelopmentstrategiesthatprovideconcretebenefitsfor thepoor.TheCatholicChurchinChadandCameroonhasbeenattheforefrontof thestruggletoensurethattheChad-Cameroonprojectbenefitsthepoor,respectsthe humanrightsoflocalpopulationsandlimitstheimpactonfragileecosystems.CRSis committedtohelpingtoensurethatAfrica’soilboomimprovesthelivesofthepoor throughincreasedinvestmentineducation,health,waterandothervitalnecessities. Forthistooccur,Africa’soilrevenuesmustbewellmanaged.
14 Introduction: All Eyes on Chad 1. Poverty, Politics and Petrodollars
“Risks…toChad’sdevelopmentprospectsincludethoseofpoliticalturbulenceand deteriorationsoftheruleoflawmorebroadly…Asoilrevenuesbegintoaccrueand thestakesrise,powermaybecontestedbyviolentmeans.Androadblocking,violent crime,andtheftofpublicresourcesmayincrease.”
– World Bank, Chad: Country Assistance Strategy, December 200325
PetrodollarsareprofoundlytransformingChad,oneofthepoorestandmostcorrupt countriesonearth.AccordingtotheWorldBank,80percentofthepopulationof 8.3millionlivesonlessthanonedollaraday.Thebulkofthepopulationrelieson agriculturalproductiontosurviveandoutsideofoil,themajorexportsarelivestock andcotton.Thecountryranks167thoutof177countriesintheUN’sHuman DevelopmentIndex.Lifeexpectancyis44years,only35percentoftheschoolage populationisinschoolandonly45percentoftheadultpopulationisliterate.26One infivechildreninChadwilldiebeforetheyreachtheirfifth birthday.Cleandrinkingwaterisarareluxury.Inacountry morethantwicethesizeofFrance,thereareonlyroughly 1 650km.ofpavedroadsandmanystreetsinthecapital, N’Djamena,aredirttracks.Inanoilexportingcountry,there arescarcelyanyfillingstationsandrefinedproducts–petrol andkerosene,forexample–aresuppliedbyathriving marketinsmuggledproductsfromNigeriaandCameroon. Inacountrywithagiantfossilfuelextractionproject,only 1percentofthepopulationhasaccesstoelectricity.27The needs,then,areoverwhelming. The$4.2billionoilinvestmentinsouthernChadhasboosted economicgrowthandinvestmentindicators,butthistrendis levelingoffnowthatthemajorpipeline,oilwellandfacility constructionphasehascometoanend.Chad’slong-stagnant GrossDomesticProduct(GDP)rosefrom$1.5billionto $2.6billionin2003becauseoftheoilproject.Exportshave alsojumpedwiththebeginningofoilproductionandChad, accordingtotheEconomistIntelligenceUnit,hadthehighest realGDPgrowthintheworldin2004,estimatedat38 percent.28 LikemostotheroilproductioninAfrica,thisoilinvestment andtheassociatedgovernmentrevenuesarebeinginserted intoacountrywithweakinstitutionsaswellasatragic historyofcorruption,conflict,badgovernance,repression andhumanrightsabuses.TheWorldBankhasdescribed Chad’sinstitutionalweaknessas“allencompassingand greaterthaninmostsub-SaharanAfricancountries, reflectingtheimpactofalmostthreedecadesofcivil 29 EventhoughChadnowexports225,000barrelsofoilperday,ithas strife.” Corruptionisapervasiveproblem–Chadwas norefineryofitsown,somostgasolineandkeroseneissmuggledinto tiedwithBurmaasthethirdmostcorruptcountryinthe thecountryfromNigeriaandCameroonandsoldatmakeshift“filling stations”likethisonepicturedabove.(photo:KorinnaHorta) worldinTransparencyInternational’sannualCorruption PerceptionsIndexfor2004.30The2003/4PublicInstitution Index–aninfluentialrankingofthestrengthandintegrityoflawsandinstitutionsand thepresenceofcorruptionpublishedbytheWorldEconomicForum–placedChad atthebottomofthelistof21countriessurveyed.31Theextensivemisuseofpublic fundscompelledtheCatholicbishopsofChadtodeclarein2004thatcorruptionwas
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 15 Governace Research Indicator Country Snapshot
Chad (2002)
Voice and Accountability
Political Stability
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption
025 50 75 100 Country’s Percentile Rank (0-100)
Source:D.Kaufman,A.KraayandM.Mastruzzi,2003:GovernaceMattersIII:GovernaceIndicatorsfor1996-2002 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governace/pubs/govmatters3.html)
The“GovernanceResearchIndicatorCountrySnapshot”forChadfromtheWorldBankInstituteshows thatChadrankspoorlyonanumberofgovernanceindicators.(Percentilerankindicatesthepercentageof countriesworldwidethatratebelowtheselectedcountry.)
“consumingalltheinstitutionsoftheChadian state.”32Chadalsoperformsmiserablyonsix governanceindicatorscompiledbytheWorld BankInstitute,scoringatorwellbelowthe lowestquarterpercentileinallsix.(Seechart “GovernanceResearchIndicatorCountry Snapshot”) PoliticalpowerinChadisstronglyconcentrated inthepresidency,currentlyoccupiedbyIdriss Déby,whotookofficein1990afterhisarmed rebelforcescapturedthecapital,N’Djamena. Thelastpresidentialandlegislativeelections –whichsawDébyre-electedandhisparty maintainstrongcontroloftheNationalAssembly –weredeeplyflawed.TheU.S.StateDepartment reportedthat“fraud,widespreadvoterigging,and Thelastpresidentialandlegislative localirregularitiesmarredthe2001presidential elections–whichsawPresident electionandtheApril2002legislativeelections”inwhichDéby’spartywon110out Débyre-electedandhisparty 33 maintainstrongcontrolofthe of155seatsintheNationalAssembly. Toalargedegree,checksandbalancesin NationalAssembly–weredeeply thegovernmentexistonlyonpaper,andPresidentDébyhasexertedcontroloverthe flawed.TheU.S.StateDepartment reported“fraud,widespreadvote judiciarytosuchanextentthatitcannotbesaidtobeacurbonexecutiveauthority. rigging,andlocalirregularities marredthe2001presidential Thethreatofviolenceisomnipresent.Thereisahistoryoftensionandconflict electionandtheApril2002 betweenthepopulationsinsouthernChad–hometomostagricultureandoildeposits legislativeelections.”(Photo: Africaphotos.com) –andthenorthern-dominatedgovernmentinN’Djamena.Accordingtoreportsbythe U.S.StateDepartmentandAmnestyInternational,massacresofciviliansoccurred duringthe1990sinsouthernChadneartheoil-producingfields.34Regionalrebellions intheNorthbytheMovementforDemocracyandJusticeinChad,andintheEast, havefurtherdestabilizedthecountry.
16 1. Poverty, Politics and Petrodollars TheU.S.StateDepartment2003humanrightsreportforChadpaintsableakpictureof thegovernanceandhumanrightsenvironmentinthecountry: Despitethecountry’smultipartysystemofgovernment,power remainsconcentratedinthehandsofanorthernethnicoligarchy anditsallies,resultinginacultureofimpunityforarulingminority ...Thejudiciaryremainedineffective,underfunded,overburdened, andsubjecttoexecutiveinterference. Civilianauthoritiesdidnotmaintaineffectivecontrolofthesecurity forces,andtherewerefrequentinstancesinwhichelementsofthe securityforcesactedindependentlyofgovernmentauthority.Security forcescommittedserioushumanrightsabuses. TheGovernment’shumanrightsrecordremainedpoor,andit continuedtocommitserioushumanrightsabuses.TheGovernment limitedcitizens’righttochangetheirgovernment.Securityforces committedextrajudicialkillingsandcontinuedtotorture,beat,and rapepersons.Prisonconditionsremainedharshandlifethreatening. Securityforcescontinuedtousearbitraryarrestanddetention.The Governmentrarelyprosecutedorpunishedmembersofthesecurity forceswhocommittedhumanrightsabuses. TheGovernmentremainedhighlycentralized.Thenational Governmentappointedallsubnationalgovernmentofficials, whooftenreliedonthecentralGovernmentforfundsandfor administrativepersonnel.InaJuly15pressrelease,humanrights associationscriticizedthemilitarizationoftheadministration, notingthatmostofthecountry’s17newgovernorswereformerly high-rankingmilitaryofficials;theyalsocriticizedthenewDirector ofJudiciaryPolice,whowasimplicatedinseveraloutstandingcases ofjudicialabuse. TheGovernmentobstructedtheworkofhumanrightsorganizations duringtheyearthrougharrest,detention,andintimidation;however, suchgroupsstillwereabletoinvestigateandpublishtheirfindings onhumanrightscases.Governmentofficialsgenerallywere accessibletohumanrightsadvocatesbutgenerallyunresponsiveor hostiletotheirfindings.35
From Bad to Worse Thisisnotapictureofapolitycharacterizedbytheruleoflaworonethatappears abletomanagepetrodollarwealthwell.Arguablythough,thisbleakpicturehas actuallyworsenedsincetheonsetofoilproduction.36 TherearenosignsthatrecentWorldBankandotherdonorsupportfortheChad- Cameroonprojecthasimprovedthehumanrightsandgovernancesituationinthe country–ifanything,thesituationhasgottenworse.Inthemonthspriortoandsince theinaugurationofthepipelineonOctober10,2003–whichChadiancivilsociety groupsmarkedwithanational“dayofmourning”–PresidentDébyandhispartyhave mademovesthatsomeanalystssayaredesignedtostrengthenandconsolidatepower. Severaleventshaveledobserverstoworrythatthepoliticalsituationisbecoming moreunstableandthegovernanceandhumanrightsenvironmentmoretenuous.
Closing the Circle of Power PresidentDébyhasreshuffledthecabinetatleastthreetimesduring2003and2004, placingfamilyrelativesandmembersofhisZaghawaethnicgroupinkeypositionsof
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 17 powerandsideliningpotentialrivalsorsourcesofinternaloppositionpriortothenext nationalelectionsin2006.InJune2003,despiteprotestsfromsouthernopposition leaders,PresidentDébyappointedhisnephew,MoussaFakiMahamat,whoisalso fromtheNorth,asprimeminister,upendinga25-yearpoliticaltraditioninthecountry thatheldthatthereshouldberegionalbalancebetweenthosewhooccupytheoffices ofpresidentandprimeminister.InFebruary2004,PresidentDébyappointedhis brother-in-law,IdrissAhmedIdriss,tobecomeNationalDirectorofBEAC,Banque desÉtatsdel’AfriqueCentrale,theregionalbankforFrancophonestatesinCentral AfricaandessentiallythecentralbankofChad.37(Byvirtueofthisposition,Idriss becameamemberofthejointgovernment-civilsocietycommitteeresponsiblefor overseeingoilrevenueexpenditure.)Thefrequentgameofministerialmusical chairshasmadeitdifficulttodevelopthecapacityofkeyministriesatatimewhen administrativecompetenciesneedtobestrengthened.(Therehavebeenmorecabinet reshufflessincePresidentDébycametopowerin1990thanintheprevious30years ofChadianhistory.38)SomeobserversbelievethatPresidentDéby’sgriponpower maybeweakening.Atthesametime,therearewidespreadpressreportsthatDéby’s healthisworsening,andthatthepresidentwasafrequentvisitortoParisformedical treatmentduring2003and2004.39
A Coup Attempt Rattles the Capital InMay2004,whatwasinitiallyreportedtobeafairlycontainedmilitarymutinyover payandconditionsofservicewaslaterexposedasanattemptedcoupd’etat.While thecoupattemptwasbeingsuppressed,thecapitalwastense,newmilitarycheckpoints emerged,tanksappearedonthestreetandmobilephonecommunicationswerecutoff fordays.InatelevisedaddresstothenationonMay18,PresidentDébyconfirmed thatelementsofthePresidentialGuardandNationalNomadicGuardhadmadean attemptonhislife.“Agroupoffanaticandmanipulatedofficerstriedtodisruptthe functioningofrepublicaninstitutionsonthenightof16May...Theirhiddenagenda wastheassassinationofthepresident,”Débysaid.40 Localandinternationalobserversattributedthecoupattempttotwopossiblefactors: •AstruggleforpowerandtensionswithintheZaghawaethnicgroupandDéby’s rulingregimepriortoavoteonremovingtheconstitutionalprovisionthat imposespresidentialtermlimits.Somereportssuggestthatunitsinvolvedin therebellionwerecommandedbyseniorofficersclosetoandtrustedbythe president.ReportsalsosuggestedthatcloseZaghawapoliticalalliesofDéby mayhavebeeninvolvedinthecoupattempt,includingDaoussaDéby,the president’selderhalf-brother;TomErdimi,whohassincebeendismissedfrom hispositionasanadvisortoDébyontheoilindustry;andhisyoungerbrother TimanErdimi,alsoacloseadvisortothepresident.41 •UnhappinessofsomeZaghawainthegovernmentandthemilitaryoverDéby’s “ambiguous”positionontheDarfurconflict.Accordingtopressreports,the twomajorDarfurrebelgroups–theJusticeandEqualityMovement(JEM) andtheSudanLiberationArmy(SLA)–drawsupportfromZaghawalivingon bothsidesoftheChad-Sudanborder.SeniorChadianofficersandgovernment figuresaresaidtohaveprovidedlogistical,financialandpoliticalsupportto therebelmovements.42Meanwhile,Débyhasattemptedtowalkatightropeby actingasan“honestbroker”inDarfurpeacenegotiationsandmaintaininggood relationswithKhartoum. Inthebackground,thegrowingoilprizemustalsobeafactorinthecalculationsof thosejockeyingforpower.
18 1. Poverty, Politics and Petrodollars A Third Term for Déby? ThecoupattemptcamedaysbeforeavoteintheNationalAssemblyonwhetheror nottoputthequestionofabolishingconstitutionaltermlimitsonthepresidencytoa nationalreferendum.ThroughoutAfrica,maintainingandrespectingpresidentialterm limitshasbeenakeyindicatorofprogressonthetransitiontoastrongdemocracy. Chad,itseemed,wasdriftingbackwardsagainstacontinentaltide.Amonth afterChad’soilprojectwasinauguratedinOctober2003,Chad’srulingparty,the MouvementPatriotiquedeSalut/PatrioticSalvationMovement(MPS),declaredits intenttochangetheconstitutionalprovisionlimitingpresidentstotwotermsinoffice. Priortotheapprovalofthereferendum,Chad’sambassadortotheUnitedStates, AhmatHassaballahSoubiane,issuedanopenletterdeploringthemoveandcriticizing aperceivedpersonalizationofDéby’srule.Soubianewaspromptlyrecalledfromhis postandhasnotsincereturnedtoChad,preferringinsteadtoparticipateinopposition politicsfromhisexilebaseintheU.S. Giventherulingparty’sdominanceintheNationalAssembly,thevotetoputthe constitutionalamendmenttoapublicreferendumwasnotclose,and30opposition legislatorsstagedawalkouttoprotestanallegedviolationofparliamentaryrules.In supportingthechangeandsignalinghisintenttorunagain,PresidentDébybrokehis 2001campaignpromisetostayinpowerforonlytwoterms.Someobserversbelieve thatthenation’snewoilrevenuesmayhavecausedhimtorethinkhisposition.The referendumontheconstitutionalamendmentwasduetotakeplaceinearly2005,with oppositiongroupslikelytourgeaboycott.Oppositionpartieshavealreadyrefusedto participateinthecommissionestablishedtoprepareforthereferendum.43Fewhave anydoubtsthatPresidentDébywillgetthedesiredresultfromthereferendum.Asthe EconomistIntelligenceUnitnotes,“Mr.Débywillusehiscontrolovertheelectoral processandlocalauthoritiestoensurethatareferendum...willresultinapositive outcomeforhim,enablinghimtostandforelectionagain.”44 France,Chad’sformercolonialpowerandmajortradingpartner,withmorethan 1,000militarytroopspermanentlystationedinthecountry,hascomeoutinsupportof PresidentDéby.France’sMinisterwithSpecialResponsibilityforCooperation,Xavier Darcos,visitedChadshortlyaftertheNationalAssemblyvoteontheconstitutional amendmentandmadeastatementonnationalradiothatwasfulsomeinitspraise: “FrancesupportsthepositionofPresidentDéby,whohasbeendemocraticallyelected ontwooccasions.ShewelcomesthefactthattheNationalAssemblyapprovedthe revisionoftheconstitutionwithanevengreatermajoritythanthatusuallyenjoyedby thegovernment.”45 InastatementrespondingtoquestionsfromCRSandBICabouttheabolitionof presidentialtermlimits,U.S.AmbassadortoChad,MarcWall,said: TheChadianpeoplehavetomakethatdecision.Webelievethey shouldbeabletodosodemocraticallyandtransparently.Webelieve governmentsmustholdelectionsthatenablepeacefulpolitical transitionstotakeplace.Leadersmustbepreparedtohandover poweronaregularbasisbasedonthewillofthepeopleexpressed indemonstrablyfreeandfairelections.KofiAnnanwasright whenheobserved,“thedaysofindefiniteone-manorone-party governmentsarebehindus.”46 Whilelayingoutthismarkerontheupcomingreferendum,theU.S.hassteadily increasedcooperationwithChadonanti-terrorismefforts,providingmilitary assistanceandtrainingforcompany-sizedunitsoftheChadianarmedforcesthrough the“Pan-SahelInitiative.”47
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 19 Darfur: Spreading Conflict and Instability TheprecarioussituationinwhichChadperenniallyfindsitselfhasbeenexacerbated bythecrisisintheDarfurregionofSudan,whichhasspilledacrosstheborderinto Chad.ChadiansareinvolvedinbothsidesoftheconflictinDarfur,withChadian “Arabs”fightingwiththeJanjawidandethnicZaghawafightingwiththeanti- governmentJusticeandEqualityMovementandtheSudanLiberationArmy. Over200,000refugeeshavestreamedacrosstheborderintoChad,initiallyreceivinga warmwelcomefromtheirdesperatelypoorneighborsbutplacinganadditionalfinancial burdenontheChadianstateandaidgroups.AsU.S.AmbassadortoChadMarcWallhas said,“Thepresenceof200,000Sudaneserefugeesin easternChadhasplacedastrainonanalreadyfragile environment.Competitionforscarceresources,such asfirewood,water,andpasture,isincreasingtensions betweenhostcommunitiesandtherefugees.”48Tobe arefugeeisalmostalwaystoliveincrampedquarters, withscarceresourcesinsubstandardconditions.To bearefugeeinChadisevenmoreprecarious.The localcommunitiesineasternChadthathavereceived mostoftherefugeesarethemselvesextremelypoor, andthepopulationinfluxisplacingstrainsonsocial andeconomicinfrastructure.Ironically,someofthe refugeecampshavebetterinfrastructureoraccess tocleanwaterthanthesurroundingvillages.Inlate 2004,tensionseruptedintoviolencebetweenthelocal populationandtherefugees,andseveralrefugeeshave beenkilled. TheprecarioussituationinwhichChadperenniallyfindsitselfhasbeenexacerbated bythecrisisintheDarfurregionofSudan,whichhasspilledacrosstheborder Thesecuritysituationintheeastofthecountryhas intoChad.Over200,000SudanesehavesoughtrefugefromtheDarfurconflictin refugeecampsineasternChad.(Photo:DavidSnyder/CRS) deteriorated,andFrenchtroopshavebeendeployed tohelpdeliveraid,guardtheborderandincrease securityintheareaoftherefugeecamps.SomereportsstatethattheSudanese governmentisincreasingitslinkswithanti-Débymilitiagroups.Therebellionthat broughtPresidentDébytopowerin1990waslaunchedineasternChadwithSudanese support.49In2004,Janjawidmadecross-borderincursionsintoChadandDéby,long anallyofSudan,foundrelationswiththecountrystrainedatbest.Accordingtothe InternationalCrisisGroup,“TheseattacksappeardesignedtowarnN’Djamenathat anysupport–evenunofficial–totherebelscouldhaveseriousconsequences... DarfurisaseriousthreattoDéby.”50ThestrategictownofAbéché,whichDébytook in1990duringtherebellionheledthateventualllytoppledtheChadiangovernment,is nowthecenterofreliefactivitiestosupportmorethan200,000refugeesinthearea. TheDarfurcrisishasaddedtolong-runningtensionsbetweennomadicherdersand farmers.Thisproblemisgrowingasherdersroamfurtherandfurthersouth.Indeed,in earlyNovember2004,newsreportssaid12peoplewerekilledandnumeroushouses destroyedduringaclashbetweenMuslimherdersandChristianfarmersinthetownof Bebedjia,neartheoilfields.51 GrowingconflictandinstabilityinDarfurandalongtheborderwillincreasepressure tospendnewoilrevenuesonthesecurityforcestoprotecttheregimeandcouldcreate increasedtensionsinthemilitary.PresidentDébywillhavehishandsfulltoboth preventtheDarfurconflictdynamicsfromspreadingtootherpartsofChadandkeep aneyeonsimmeringinternalthreats.
20 1. Poverty, Politics and Petrodollars Curtailing Press Freedom Inthisclimateofincreasinginstability,conflictandconsolidationofpowerby PresidentDéby,independentvoiceshavetroublebeingheard.Afewindependent newspapersthatmanagetopublishinN’DjamenaareoftenquitecriticalofPresident Débyandthegovernment,buttheircirculationissmallandmostlylimitedto thecapital.Inalargelyilliteratesociety,radioisthemostimportantmeansof communicationandanessentialelementinanysystemofgovernmentaccountability forthemanagementofChad’snewoilwealth.InJune2003,theeditorsoftheradio Inalargelyilliterate stationFMLiberté–runbylocalhumanrightsgroups–werearrestedandcharged society,radioisthe withdefamingthepresident,followingacriticalbroadcast.Thegovernmentshut mostimportantmeans downthestationlessthantwoweeksafterinternationalVIPshadbeeninthecountry ofcommunication fortheOctober2003pipelineinauguration.Itwasnotallowedtore-openuntilmid- andanessential December.Thestationwasagainthreatenedwithclosureduring2004.InFebruary elementinany 2004,afterbroadcastinganinterviewwithanoppositionpolitician,RadioBrakos, systemofgovernment anotherindependentstationinthesoutherntownofMoissala,wasclosedandits accountabilityforthe directorassaultedbysecurityforces.52Otherindependentradiostationshavealsobeen managementofChad’s shutdown,journalistshavehadtheirequipmentconfiscated,andotherstations,such newoilwealth. astheCatholic-runLaVoixdePaysanneinDoba,havebeenforcedtopayexorbitant licensefeestostayontheair.
Public Executions OnOctober25,2003,anN’DjamenacourtsentencedfourChadianstodeathforthe previousmonth’smurderofSheikhIbnOumaIdrissYoussouf,theSudaneseexecutive directoroftheprivately-ownedChadPetroleumCompany.AccordingtoDobian Assingar,thepresidentoftheChadianLeagueofHumanRights(LTDH),themen weresentencedtodeathafterathree-dayspecialtrialofthecriminalcourtandnever receivedtherighttoappeal.53JeanPadre,vicepresidentoftheLTDH,describedthe executionsas“veryworrying”andsaid“[w]ebelieveweareinapolicestate.We didn’tgivethesuspectsachancetoappeal.”54Fiveothermenwerealsoexecutedin whatwasthefirstjudicialapplicationofthedeathpenaltysince1991.55Thehasty natureoftheseexecutions,aswellasthefailuretoguaranteedueprocessprotections tothedefendants,alarmedinternationalandlocalhumanrightsorganizations.56 Authoritieshavejustifiedtheexecutionsasanecessaryresponsetorepeated complaintsbyoppositionpartiesandthepopulationsabouttheinsecurityreigning inChad.57However,ratherthanreassuringthelocalpopulation,thegovernment’s disregardforlegalproceduresandspeculationsabouttheincident’sconnectionto disputesoveroilcontractshaveleftmanyfeelinguneasy.
An Experiment Hanging by a Thread “IthoughtDébywouldunderstandthetremendousstakesthat everyonehasinthisproject–especiallythepresidentunderwhose tenureitwasrealized–buthehasbeentakingsomeveryunhelpful steps.” – Donald Norland, former U.S. Ambassador to Chad and a frequent proponent of the Chad oil project58
Asoilrevenuesincreaseandtensioninthecountrybuildsintherunuptothe2006 elections,PresidentDébyappearsincreasinglyvulnerable.Duringthesummerof2004, Débyspentmuchtimeoutsideofthecapital,inAbéché,andwassaidtohaveheld meetingswithamuchsmaller-than-usualcircleofadvisors.Débybroughtbackhis son,BrahimDéby,fromCanadatobehispersonalsecretaryandpotentiallytogroom himasasuccessor.InSeptember2004,Débypersonallydirectedaraidofarmscaches inthecapitalratherthanconferthetasktosubordinates.AndinearlyNovember,the governmentorderedthemilitarytoconfiscatesatellitephonesfromprivateindividuals andmembersofthemilitary.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 21 TheChadianoilexperimentdependsheavilyonthepoliticalwillofthegovernmentto “[Déby’s]asurvivor, respecttheruleoflaw,developaccountableinstitutionsandencouragedemocracy.In buthedoesseem anenvironmentwherethegovernmentfacesexternalandinternalthreats,suchpolitical beleaguered.Another willappearstobeinshortsupply.AninternalWorldBankassessmentfromApril coup?Iwouldn’truleit 2004notedthat“politicalandgovernance-relatedrisksloomlargeinacountrystill outatall.” recoveringfromdecadesofcivilwar,wheredemocraticinstitutionsarestillnascent andclansorregionalloyaltiesoftenover-ridenationalinterest...Mostimportantly, –AWesterndiplomat basedinChad60 implementationofthePetroleumRevenueManagementProgramissubjectto significantgovernance-relatedrisks.Althoughstepsarebeingtakentoaddressthese problems...effectsoftheselong-termeffortsaregradual.”59
22 1. Poverty, Politics and Petrodollars 2. Chad’s Landlocked Treasure: Oil Exploration and Production
ForeigncompanieshavebeeneyeingChad’soilpotentialsinceasfarbackasthe 1960s,butcivilwars,politicalturmoil,periodiclowoilpricesandotherbarriers havepreventedthedevelopmentofChadianoilfieldsuntilrecently.Chadishome tosevenpetroleumbasins–Doba,Doseo,Salamat,Bongor,LakeChad,Logone BirniandErdis–withDobabeingtheonlysiteofproductionactivitytodate.The U.S.company,Conoco,drilledexploratorywellsinChadinthemid-1970s,butit wasnotuntilthelate1980sthatoilcompanies,throughtheExxonMobilconsortium, becameseriouslyinterestedinthecountry’s“blackgold.”61In1996,whenitsseismic explorationprogramfound800millionto1billionbarrelsinprovenreserves, ExxonMobilsteppedupeffortstoconsolidatefinancingforthepipelineprojectandto bringtheWorldBankonboard.
2.1 Drilling and Pumping – The Doba Project Inadditiontofinancingthe1,000km.pipelinetotheAtlanticcoast,alargeportion ofthenearly$4.2billionExxonMobil/Chevron/Petronasinvestmentwasearmarked fortheconstructionof250-pluswells,anetworkoffeederpipelinesandaprocessing 2andpumpingstationinsouthernChad.62CurrentoilproductioninChadcomesfrom threefieldsintheDoba“OilFieldDevelopmentArea”(OFDA)–Komé,Miandoum andBolobo–whichstartedproductioninJuly2003.Theseproductionactivities takeplaceunderalegalframeworkbasedona1962petroleumcodeandthe1988 conventionand subsequentamendments agreeduponbythe Consortiumandthe government.The conventionestablishes aroyaltyrateof12.5 percent,andsetsother financialarrangements aswellastechnical aspectsofproduction. (SeeSectionThree, OilRevenues:Chad’s FirstTasteof“Black Gold”) Villagesenclavés,or“cutoff”villages,standintheshadowofgasflares andarealmostcompletelysurroundedbyoilfieldinstallations.High- volatagelinesandotherinfrastructurecriss-crosstheirfarmlands.Noneof Theoilconsortium’s thevillageshaselectricity,andtheironyofahugepowergridfeetaway “21stcentury”industrial fromtheirhomesisnotlostonmanyresidents.(Photo:IanGary/CRS) installationshavelanded ontheplainsofsouthernChad,asavannahareawherethevastmajorityofthe populationpracticessubsistenceagriculture.Governmentpresencethere,intheformof civiladministration,securityforces,healthclinicsorschools,isvirtuallynon-existent. Despitetheproliferationofoilproductioninfrastructure,villagershaveexperienced fewofthebenefitsthatsuchdevelopmentscouldprovide.Thevillagesclosesttothe facilitiesstandintheshadowofgasflaresandarealmostcompletelysurroundedby oilfieldinstallations,earningthemthename“villagesenclavés.”High-tensionpower linestraversethelandscape,yetthosevillagesinandneartheOFDAarestillwithout electricity–afactnotlostonmanyvillagers.“Thisdoesn’tappeartobea‘petroleum village,’”saidthechiefofNgalaba,avillageenclavéneartheMiandoumoilfield. “There’snovisiblepositiveimpact.Noschool,noclinic.”63(Forinformationon negativeimpactsoftheoilprojectonlocalvillages,seetheBox8.)
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 23 Chad’s Oil: Permit Areas and Fields
MapcourtesyofAfricanEnergy,www.africa-energy.com
24 2. Chad’s Landlocked Treasure Consortiumofficialsarefondofsayingthattheinvestmentislessofapetroleum projectthanalogisticalproject–andindeeditis.Almosteverythingneededhastobe shippedintothelandlockedcountrybyair,roadandrail.Newroadsandbridgeswere builtandsomeexistingroadsupgraded;fourgeneratorswereinstalledwithatotal capacityof120megawatts(morethanfourtimesChad’sentirenationalgenerating 64 Fora$4billion- capacity); anairstripreceivesdailyflightsfromthecapitalforoilworkersfromthe plusinvestment,the U.S.,thePhilippinesandelsewhere,comingandgoingonfour-weekrotations;and oilindustryenclave apre-fabricatedofficepark,whichwouldnotbeoutofplaceinsuburbanAmerica inChadiscreating (completewithU.S.voltageandpoweroutlets),hasbeenhousedinsidethehigh- preciousfewjobs, securityfencesatKoméBase.There,oilcompanystaffworkinasophisticatedcontrol makingthegeneration roomtomonitorthefacilitiesandtheflowofoilalongtheentirepipelineroute. ofnon-oilemployment Asconstructionactivitieshaveslowedandtheprojecthasenteredtheproduction throughthecareful phase,Chadianandforeignemploymenthassteadilydecreased.Inthesecond managementand quarterof2004,ExxonMobilanditscontractorsemployed2,292Chadiansand1,091 spendingofoilrevenue expatriates.OftheChadians,only8percentwereinsupervisorypositionsandmany paramount. oftheChadianemployeeswerenotlocaltotheoilfieldarea.65Fora$4billion-plus
PresidentIdrissDébyofChad,center,turnsonasymbolicpipelinetocelebratetheinaugurationofthe1,050km. Chad-Cameroonpipeline.TohisrightareExxonMobilGeneralManagerforChadRonRoyal,PresidentDenisSassou NguessoofCongo-BrazzavilleandPresidentOmaral-BechirofSudan.Komé,Chad,October10,2004.(Photo: DesireyMinkoh/AFP/GettyImages)
investment,theoilindustryenclaveinChadiscreatingpreciousfewjobs,making thegenerationofnon-oilemploymentthroughthecarefulmanagementandtargeted spendingofoilrevenueparamount.
First Oil Exports – A Year Ahead of Schedule ExxonMobilannouncedthefirsttankershipmentofChadiancrudeonOctober 3,2003,afullyearaheadofschedule,andjustoneweekbeforetheofficialproject inaugurationbyPresidentDébyinKoméonOctober10,2003.Attheceremony,Déby declared: “TheChadianoilwillservepeaceinChad,peacewithour neighbors,withtherestofAfricaandtherestoftheworld.Itwill enableChad,thehubofthecontinent,tofinallyplayitsroleas
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 25 alinkandaninstrumentof dialoguebetweenvarious regionsofthecontinent...I saythatthisChadianoilmust beasourceofharmonyand reconciliationbetweenthesons andthedaughtersofChad.” ByNovember2004,approximately 250wellshadbeendrilledandoil productionhadreacheditsplanned peakof225,000barrelsperday.By October2004,56tankercargoeshad beenloadedatKribiandmorethan 52millionbarrelsofChadianoil exportedtotheworldmarket.66Meters atbothKoméPumpStation1,nearthe beginningofthepipeline,andatthe KribiFloatingStorageandOffloading (FSO)vessel,whereoilisloadedonto tankers,measuretheflowofcrude exports.AccordingtoExxonMobil,in 2004theKribimeasurementhasbeenon average1.4percentlessthantheKomé measurement.67Thereissomedispute betweenthegovernmentandConsortium abouttheaccuracyofmeteringand whereofficialreadingsshouldbe takenforthecalculationofrevenues. Awell-drillingriginoperation.Approximately250wellshavebeendrilled (SeeSection3.4,“TheEndofthe intheDobaoilfieldarea.Mostwellsarearound2,000metersdeepandcan Honeymoon”) bedrilledinonlyfourdays.Oncethedrillingrigmovesontoanothersite,all thatremainsisasmallwellheadandaclearedpieceoflandcalledawellpad. Thediscrepancybetweentheplannedandactualamountoflandoccupied AlloilproducedinChadflowsthrough byfinishedwellpadshasbeenthesubjectoflocalgrievances.(SeeBox8) acentraltreatingfacilityatKomé,where (Photo:IanGary,CRS) waterisremovedandoilfromthethree fieldsisblendedinordertoproducesalesqualitycrudeforexport.Whatbubblesout ofthepipelineinKribiislowerqualityoilthanthatfoundinneighboringNigeria –nota“lightsweet”crude,buta“heavysweet”crudewithhighaciditylevels,making itmuchlessattractiveontheinternationaloilmarketsandabletobeprocessedinonly afewrefineriesglobally.OneoilindustryanalystdescribedDobacrudeas“theworst oftheworst–absolutedregs.”Thispoorqualityhasmeantaroughly$10-15perbarrel Chad’smuch-vaunted discounton“Dobacrude”offthebenchmarkpriceofBrentNorthSeacrudeoil.Oil tradersinLondonsaythatinOctober2004Dobacrudewasfetching$30to$35per oilrevenuemanagement 68 law–Law001of1999 barrelascomparedto$50perbarrelforlight,sweetNigerianoil. Thisdiscounthas –coversonlyrevenues beenthesubjectofsomedebatebetweenExxonMobilandthegovernmentofChad. producedbytheoriginal (SeeSection3.4,“TheEndoftheHoneymoon”) threefieldsinDoba, MostChadiancrudeissoldforrefininginNorthAmericaandAsia.Thethree soanyexplorationand Consortiumpartnersalsotakeashareoftheoilproducedforrefiningandsalesusing productionfromoutside theirownfacilities. thesefieldshasserious implicationsforthe Production Profile futureofChad’soil Atthetimetheprojectbegan,productionfromthethreefieldswasforecastto revenuemanagement graduallydeclineto150,000bpdby2010andslumpfurtherto100,000bpdafter experimentoverall. 2014,accordingtoConsortiumdocuments.However,thisforecastmaynowchange dependingonsatellitefieldproductionandpossiblenewdiscoveriessinceExxonMobil iskeentokeepthepipelinefullforaslongaspossible.69
26 2. Chad’s Landlocked Treasure Sub-Saharan Africa’s Oil Producers
2,500,000
Ranking in estimated average 2004 2,000,000 production, barrels per day
1,500,000 2.1 million 1 million 1,000,000
500,000 350,000 345,000 289,000 240,000 225,000 60,000
0 Nigeria Angola Equatorial Sudan Gabon Congo- Chad Cameroon Guinea Brazzaville
Source:EnergyInformationAdministrationandpressreports
WhileChad’soilproductionisrelativelymodestincomparisontootherAfricanandglobalproducers,the revenuesgeneratedbyproductionwillhaveasignificantimpactonChad’seconomyandsociety.
2.2 New Production and Exploration in Chad and Beyond Chad’smuchvauntedoilrevenuemanagementlaw–Law001of1999–covers onlyrevenuesproducedbytheoriginalthreefieldsinDoba,soanyexplorationand productionfromoutsidethesefieldshasseriousimplicationsforthefutureofChad’s oilrevenuemanagementexperimentoverall.ExxonMobilandtheCanadiancompany, EnCana,areconductingexplorationinChad,withreportedinterestfromAsianfirms aswell.BothExxonMobilandEnCanawillhavetorelinquishsomeoftheiracreagein 2005,makingroomfornewinvestors. Withthepipelineinfrastructureinplace,Chadhasbeen activelycourtingincreasedinvestmentintheoilandgas industry.InOctober2004,Chadorganizeditsfirstever- internationaloilandgasconference,underthepatronageof PresidentDébyandsponsoredbyExxonMobil,Chevron, Petronas,EnCana,Schlumberger,Halliburtonsubsidiary KBR,andotherindustryplayers.(Whileonememberof Chadiancivilsocietywasincludedontheofficialprogram– ThérèseMékombé,thenactingpresidentofChad’spetroleum revenueoversightcommittee–intheend,shewasnotgiven thechancetospeak.)Thesectionofseatingdemarcatedfor “civilsociety”remainedconspicuouslyemptythroughoutthe two-dayconference.The1000-euroentrancefeeandlack ofpublicityaroundtheconferenceinChadleftlittledoubt thattheeventwastailoredtooilindustryattendeesandnot representativesoftheChadianpublic. AlloilproducedinChadflowsthroughthegatheringstation inKoméandbeginsitsjourneythroughtheChad-Cameroon Attheconference,theMinistryofPetroleumstressedits pipelinehere.(Photo:IanGary,CRS) desiretoupdatethecountry’spetroleumcode,perhapsbytheendof2004,with specialemphasisonmovingthecountryfromaconcessioncontractsystemtothe productionsharingsystemthatisstandardinmostotherAfricanoil-producing countries.TheMinistryofPetroleumalsoindicateditsintenttoestablishaNational
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 27 Box 6
Environmental and Social Standards for New Oil Developments
WithatleastfiveofExxonMobil’s“satellitefields”scheduledtobeginproducinginthe nexttwoyears,andongoingexplorationactivitiesbybothExxonMobilandEnCana,there isanurgentneedtoaddressthepotentialenvironmentalandsocialimpactsofthesenewoil developments. TheloanandprojectagreementssignedbetweentheWorldBankandthegovernmentofChad containclausesoutliningthegovernment’sresponsibilitytoensurethatalloiltransported throughtheChad-CameroonpipelinebedevelopedinaccordancewiththeEnvironmental ManagementPlan(EMP)implementedforthedevelopmentoftheoilfieldsintheDobabasin: Section4.10.TheBorrowershallensurethatanyoildevelopedoutsidetheDobaBasin OilFieldswhichisproposedtobetransportedthroughanypartoftheTransportation SysteminChadisdevelopedinaccordancewiththeprinciplessetforthintheEMPwith respecttoenvironmentalanalysisandprotection,consultation,informationdisclosure, resettlementandcompensationandwiththeequivalentlegalandadministrativeapproval processesandinformationdisclosureasappliedwithrespecttotheoildevelopedinthe DobaBasinOilFields.
SimilarlanguageisfoundintheagreementbetweentheIBRDandCOTCO,regardingoil transportedthroughtheportionofthepipelinelyinginCameroon. Todate,however,thegovernmentagencyresponsibleforenvironmentalandsocialmonitoring ofoilactivitieshasnotdemonstratedthecapacitytofulfillitssupervisoryrole.Consequently, ongoingoilexplorationandnewdevelopmentsoutsidethethreeoriginalfieldsinDoba arebeingundertakenwithoutenvironmentalandsocialoversightbythelocalornational government.71Thefailuretodiscloseinformationaboutthescopeandstatusofcurrentand plannedoilactivitiesortocomplywithenvironmentalandsocialstandards,notonlymay constituteaviolationofcontractualobligations,butmoreimportantlyjeopardizesthewellbeing ofcommunities.Furthermore,theaboveclauseintheloanagreementisonlybindingsolongas theloanisoutstanding.AssoonasthegovernmentofChadpaystheWorldBankback,asitis expectedtodoby2015,thislegalleveragemaybeallbutlost. Aspetroleumactivitiesintheregionaccelerate,theWorldBankGroupandoilcompanies seekingtoexploitChad’sreservesmustshareresponsibilitywiththegovernmentfor safeguardingagainstthenegativeenvironmentalandsocialconsequencesofoilproduction. Clearguidelinesonwhatisexpectedofnewoildevelopmentsandhowstandardsaretobe metshouldbefinalizedandmadepublicimmediately.
OilCompany(NOC),inlinewiththepatterninmanyotherAfricancountries.Partof thegovernment’smotivationstemsfromadesireforgreatercontroloverthemarketing andsaleofthecountry’soil,givenconcernsaboutthefairnessofthepricethatthe ConsortiumclaimsDobacrudeisfetchingintheworldmarkettoday.TheSecretary Allfivenewfieldsfall GeneraloftheMinistryofPetroleumindicatedthattheywoulddrawinspiration undertheexisting1988 andadvicefromtheNOCsofAlgeria(Sonatrach),Cameroon(SNH)andCongo- conventionandare Brazzaville(SNPC).70(WhiletheSNPChasmadesomepositivemovesrecently,none coveredbythesame ofthesecompaniesisknownforitstransparencyinthemanagementofoilwealth.) 12.5percentroyaltyrate thatappliestothefirst ExxonMobil’s Satellite Projects – New Oil Falling Outside the Revenue threefields,butChad’s Management Law oilrevenuemanagement Productionfromoilfieldsoutsidetheoriginal“DobaThree”–Komé,Miandoum lawcoversnoneofthese andBolobo–hasmovedquicklyfromatheoreticalpossibilitytoanimpending newfields. reality.ExxonMobilusesa“spokeandwheel”conceptinitsoilfielddevelopment –theprocessingfacilitiesatKoméarethehubintowhichplannedadditionalfields willfeed.Afterthelastof30wellshavebeendrilledintheBolobofieldinlate 2004,ExxonMobilplannedtomovedrillingrigstobegindevelopingfivenew
28 2. Chad’s Landlocked Treasure “satellite”fieldsnearDoba.Thesefields–Moundouli,Nya,M’Bikou,Belangaand Mangara–holdsignificantamountsofoil.BothNya(fourwells,10millionbls.)and Moundouli(30-35wellsand105millionbls.)willcomeon-lineinlate2005/early 2006.A30km.pipelineisplannedtoconnectMoundouliwithMiandoumandthe Koméprocessingandexportcomplex.Allfivenewfieldsfallundertheexisting1988 conventionandarecoveredbythesame12.5percentroyaltyratethatappliestothe firstthreefields,butChad’soilrevenuemanagementlawcoversnoneofthesenew fields.(SeeSectionThree,OilRevenues–Chad’sFirstTasteof“BlackGold”) AccordingtotheWorldBankloanagreementwithChad,though,allnewoilusingthe pipelinemustconformtothesameenvironmentalandsocialstandardsastheoriginal Dobafields.(SeeBox6)
Exploration ThepipelineprojecthasspurredexplorationinotherpartsofChadanditsneighbors, includingtheCentralAfricanRepublic,NigerandCameroon.(Priorityaccessto thepipelineisprovidedfirsttotheExxonMobilconsortium,thentoothercompanies operatinginChadandfinallytopotentialCameroonianonshorefinds.)Nowthatthere isareliablewaytogetoiltomarket,theExxonMobilconsortiumandothercompanies arelookingfornewpocketsof“blackgold.”
ExxonMobil Consortium TheExxonMobilconsortiumsignedanewconventionwiththegovernmentofChad onMay10,2004,whichappliestofutureexplorationanddevelopmentactivitiesin Thenewconvention fieldsoutsidethosecoveredbythe1988convention.ThesefieldslieintheChariWest betweenChadand (akaDoba),ChariEast(akaDosseo)andLakeChadbasins.Theconventiongrantsan ExxonMobilshowsthat explorationpermitforfiveyearsfromFebruary3,2004,withanoptionforafive-year thecompanyplansto 72 renewal. TheConsortiummustrelinquish50percentofitspermitareaafterthefirst spendapproximately fiveyears.(WhiletheministerofpetroleumsignedtheconventionandPresidentDéby $94milliononseismic usedrecesspowerstoapprovetheconventioninMay,asofDecember2004,itwas operationsin2005/6. notyetformallyratifiedbyChad’sNationalAssembly.) ExxonMobilholdstherightsto10milliongrossacresintheDoba,Dosseo,andLake Chadbasins,andhasmadediscoveriesinallthreebasins.73AccordingtoExxonMobil, seismictestscontinuedthroughJune2004inseveralareasoutsidethethreeoilfields oftheoriginalproject.“Earlyresultsofexplorationthatbeganin2001haveshown promisebuttheConsortiumhasnotyetdecidedtoproceedwithanyadditional oilfieldconstruction.Ifneweconomicallyfeasiblereservesarefound,theadditional crudecouldextendthepeakproductionperiod,”accordingtoExxonMobil.74The May10,2004,convention,whileconfidential,wasobtainedbyCRSandBICand showsthattheExxonMobil-ledconsortiumplanstospendapproximately$94million onseismicoperationsanddrillatleastfiveexploratorywellsinbothChariWestand Eastin2005/6.75
EnCana Consortium ThesizeableCanadiancompanyEnCana,inconsortiumwithtinyClivedenPetroleum Company,holdstherightstoPermitH,amassivepermitareaof430,000sq.km.(the sizeofSpain),coveringallorpartofeachofChad’ssevenoilbasins.76EnCanahas conductedseismicoperationsintheBongorandLakeChadregions,andhasdrilled fourexploratorywellsintheBongorbasinin2004.EnCana’sexplorationprogramwas valuedat$50millionin2004anditplanstospendmorethanthatamountin2005to drillexploratorywells,conductadditionalseismictestinginBongor,andundertake newseismicexplorationoutsideofBongorintheLakeChad,WestDobaandDosseo basins.EnCanasignedaconventionin1999coveringexplorationandexploitationand willhavetorelinquish50percentofitsacreageinJanuary2005.Theroyaltyrateis containedinthisconventionandissaidtobeslightlyhigherthanthe12.5percentfor
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 29 theoriginalExxonMobilconvention.77 EnCanawouldnotdisclosetheresultsofitsexplorationtodate,butestimatedthat thereisa25percentchanceoffindingacommerciallyviablereserve.78Inorderto beeconomicallyfeasible,therightreservesizeanddistancefromKoméwouldhave tobefoundinordertojustifyconstructionofafeederpipeline.Ifafindwasmadein apartofthepermitareaclosetoKomé,thereservesizecouldberelativelysmallto justifytheinfrastructureexpense,whilereservesfoundfurtherafieldwouldhavetobe muchlarger.Thequalityofthecrudefoundisanothersignificantfactorincalculating economicfeasibility–heavycrudesimilartoDobawouldbelessattractivethana findoflightercrude.EnCanaestimatesthattheearliestitcouldbeproducingwould be2009,assumingcommerciallyviablefieldsarefound.AtChad’sfirstinternational Box 7 oilandgasconferenceinOctober2004, anEnCanarepresentativepresented Exploration Beyond Chad theirexplorationeffortsandplans andconcludedbysayingits“upside” OutsideofChad,explorationistakingplaceinanarcofpotentialreserves estimatewasofa3-5billionbarreloil thatstretchesfromNiger,aroundLakeChadthroughthenorthofCameroon resourcepotentialinChad.79 totheCentralAfricanRepublic(C.A.R.).InNiger,ExxonMobil,Petronas andtheChineseNationalPetroleumCorporation(CNPC)havelaunched AfilinginaHoustonbankruptcycase explorationprograms,althoughareservefindwouldhavetonear1billion 86 relatedtoTrinityEnergyResources, barrelstohaveexportpotential. InCameroon,thestateoilcompany aformerminorityshareholderofthe SNH,incooperationwiththeAlgerianstateoilcompany,Sonantrach,has PermitHconcession,seemstoindicate undertakenseismicstudiesandplanstodrillatestwellintheLogoneBirni 87 thatEnCanamayhavefoundsizeable intheextremenortherntipofCameroonnearthetownofMaroua. In theC.A.R.,U.S.-basedGrynbergPetroleumhassecureda55,000sq.km. quantitiesofoil.Accordingtothefiling, concessionintheDobaandSalamatbasinsthatstraddletheChad-C.A.R. basedonresultsfromexplorationdrilling border.88CanadiancompanyUnitedReefLimitedhasa25percentinterestin andothersurveys,anengineeringfirm theconcession.89 hasreported16“identifiedprospects” and57leadsintheEnCanaconcession’s twomainbasins,Bongor(30,000sq. km.)andLakeChad(18,250sq.km.).Thestudyrevealeda50percentlikelihoodof atleast660millionbarrelsoverall.ThepotentialEnCanafindintheBongorbasin isapproximately160km.fromKoméacrossflatterrain.80Trinity’sfilingalsosays capacityofthe1,050km.pipelinecanbedoubledto500,000bpdwiththreeadded pumpingstations. Thepotentialtodramaticallyincreasethepipeline’scapacityhighlightshow conservativeinitialproductionestimateswereandunderscorestheneedfora cumulativeimpactassessment,aregionaldevelopmentplan,andasector-widesystem fortransparentrevenuemanagement.
Energem – A New Player on the Scene InDecember2004,Energem,acompanylistedontheTorontostockexchangewith oilandmininginterestsacrosssub-SaharanAfrica,announcedthatithadbeengranted anexplorationandproductionpermitinChad–thefirstmajornewexplorationpermit grantedbythegovernmentsincetheinaugurationofproductionintheDobafields. TheChadcontractrunsforfiveyearsandisrenewablefortwofurtherthree-year periods.Energem,whichhasa“strategicalliance”withPetroChina,wasgrantedthe permittoexplore8,200sq.km.IntheChariWestbasinadjacenttotheDobafields and259,664sq.km.intheLargeaubasin.Thelatterbasinisroughlythesizeofthe UnitedKingdomandislocatedinnorthernandcentralChad.Accordingtoacompany pressrelease,Energemhasalreadypaida$6millionsigningbonus,withadditional$4 millionand$6millionpaymentstobemadein2005and2006,respectively.Another $21millionwillbepaidtothegovernmentatthestartofanyproduction.81(These paymentsgodirectlytotheTreasuryandbypasstherevenuemanagementlaw.) Accordingtopressreports,thepermitwasagreedupononOctober16,2004,and
30 2. Chad’s Landlocked Treasure confirmedbypresidentialdecreeonDecember8ofthatyear.82 Energem’s51percent-ownedsubsidiary,GulfofGuineaPetroleumCorporation (GGPC),wastechnicallyawardedthepermit.“TheawardoftheChadpermitisa substantialstepforwardinourupstreamoildevelopmentandaddsconsiderablevalue toourassetportfoliotogetherwithwhatwealreadymanagethroughGGPC,”said EnergempresidentTonyTeixeira. AccordingtoAfricaEnergy,“EnergempresidentTonyTeixeirahasacolourfulpast. InJanuary2001,hewasaccusedbytheU.K.’sthenAfricaministerPeterHainof sanctionsbustinginAngola.TeixeiradeniedtheaccusationandchallengedHainto repeatitoutsideparliament,wheretherulesofparliamentaryprivilegewouldnot apply.”EnergemwasformerlyknownasDiamondWorks,aminingconcernlinked inpressreportstoprivatesecurityfirmExecutiveOutcomes.83DiamondWorkswas alsoinvolvedinanoildealinSaoTomeandPrincipethatledtothedismissalofthe country’sprimeministerbythepresident.
Other Players BothChinaandTaiwanhavebeencourtingChaddiplomaticallyandseekingaccess toChad’soilopportunities.InOctober2004,Chadsigneda“preliminarycooperation agreement”withTaipei’sChinesePetroleumCorp.(CPC)forcooperationonoil exploration.84Accordingtosomepressreports,theChineseNationalPetroleum Corporation(CNPC)hasbeenwooing“politicallyconnectedminnowCliveden Petroleum”forastakeinthePermitHconcession.85
Doba – The Tip of the Iceberg? Whilepriortoprojectapproval,theWorldBankportrayedtheChadoilinvestmentas adiscreteprojectexploitingthreefieldsinsouthernChad,confirmedproductionfrom ExxonMobil’ssatellitefieldsandongoingexplorationbyExxonMobil,EnCanaand potentiallyothers,makeitlikelythatChad’soilproductionwillsignificantlyexceed theinitialreserveestimatesof1billionbarrels.Indeed,theFinancialTimes,recently quotedaWorldBankofficialassayingthatactualreservesarelikelytobeatleast2 billionbarrels,withhugeimplicationsforthesizeofChad’soilrevenuewindfall.90 TheWorldBankinvestmentplayedacatalyticrolenotonlyinbringingthethreeDoba fieldstofruition,butinspurringfurtherproductionandexploration.Thiswilllead tounplannedimpactsonlocalpopulationsaswellasnewchallengesfortherevenue managementsystem.Assuch,theWorldBankwillcontinuetoshareresponsibilityfor theimpactsrelatedtothedevelopmentofChad’soilsectorforyearstocome.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 31 Box 8
Social and Environmental Impacts: Lasting Effects and Lessons for New Oil Development
“TheBankseesChad-Cameroonasalearningprocess,butatwhoseexpensearethey learning?Forcommunities,whenaprojectfails,theydon’thaveasecondchance.”
– Samuel Nguiffo, Center for Environment 91 and Development “AnylargeprojectliketheChad-Cameroonpipelineentailsrisksforthenatural environment,andtheserisksmustbemanaged.”
– World Bank, “Questions and Answers on the Chad Cameroon Pipeline”92
TheWorldBankclaimsthatitssupportfortheChad-Cameroonpetroleumproject representsanewapproachforinvestmentsintheextractiveindustrysectors,not onlybecauseofitsinitiativeswithregardtorevenuemanagement,butalsobecause itsinvolvementhas“helpedensurethat…theproject[wasimplemented]inan environmentallyandsociallyresponsiblemanner.”93However,outstandingproblems documentedinBank-commissionedmonitoringandinvestigationreports,andcited bylocalcivilsocietyobservers,castdoubtonthesoundnessoftheenvironmental andsocialmanagementoftheprojectanditsnetbenefitsforthelocalpopulation. Ifsomesignificantenvironmentalandsocialharmswerenotavoidedinthe developmentofthethreefieldsintheDobabasin,whereWorldBanksupervision washeavyandinternationalscrutinyhigh,whatshouldbeexpectedinzonesofnew oildevelopment,wherethesamemonitoringmeasuresarenotinplace? InAugust2004,localorganizationsissuedajointstatementcallingupontheWorld BankGroupnottogranta“completioncertificate”totheConsortium(signifying thattheprojecthadbeenimplementedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheEMP andpermittingtheConsortiumtowithdrawmoneyheldinanescrowaccountas aguarantee)untiloutstandingissueswereaddressed.94Intheirjointdeclaration, Chadiancivilsocietygroupshighlightedwhattheyviewedasunresolvedproblems relatedto:dustintheoilzone;wastedisposalandmanagement;thefailure ofExxonMobil’ssubcontractorstorespectcontractswithsuppliers;increased appropriationoflandanddisplacementoflocalvillagers;communitycompensation paymentsmadeonanarbitrarybasis;theabsenceofanindependentrecourse mechanismtoresolvedisputesregardingdamages;andthelackofconsultationwith communitiesabouttheprocessof“socialclosure”bywhichvillagersareaskedto signpapersindicatingthatallclaimsforcompensationhavebeenresolved.The “completioncertificate”wasgrantedoverthisappeal.However,thefailureto resolvelong-standingproblemshasnotgoneunnoticed. AsrecentlyasNovember2004,areportbytheIAGnoted,“theenvironmentaland socialissuesraisedbytheIAGareongoingissuesthatneedtobeaddressed,rather thannewproblems.Theyincludewastemanagement,dustcontrol,soilreclamation, communitycompensation,socialclosureandemergencyprojects,”adding,“These issuesmustbegivenproperattention.”95 Followingaresomeofthemostfrequentlycitednegativeimpactsandoutstanding problemslinkedtothepetroleumdevelopment.
32 2. Chad’s Landlocked Treasure Box 8 (continued) Inadequate Planning for Cumulative Project Impacts or Oversight of New Oil Activities TheWorldBank’sProjectAppraisalDocumentacknowledgedthatthepipelinewould servemorethanjustthethreeoilfieldscurrentlyproducinginDoba,yetacumulative, regionalenvironmentalandsocialimpactassessmentwasnotcarriedoutpriortothe pipeline’sconstruction.Consequently,thegovernmentofChadisill-preparedtodeal withthevarietyofindirecteffectscausedbytheoilactivityortheinducedimpacts ofadditionaloildevelopmentsintheregion.Ongoingoilexplorationactivitiesare beingundertakenwithoutenvironmentalandsocialoversightbythelocalornational government.In2004,theECMGnotedthat,“[T]heConsortiumisconducting explorationcampaignsintheMoundouli-Nyazonewithapotentialconnectionto theDobapipelinefromMiandoum,withoutanyeffectiveenvironmentalandsocial monitoringbytheCTNSC[thegovernmentbodychargedwithmonitoring].”96The IAGfoundasimilarlackofoversightofotherexplorationactivitiesbeingconducted bytheCanadianfirm,EnCana:
“[EnCanaisconductingitsactivities]withoutany applicableenvironmentalorsocialregulationsandwithonly asporadicpresencebytheCTNSC,whichacknowledges thatithasjurisdictionbutlackstheresourcestoexert supervision...EnCanahasdecidedtocomplywiththe principlesoftheDobaProjectEMP.Inreality,thecompany istheonlyjudgeofitscompliance...TheexpansionofEsso andEnCana’sactivitiesasaresultofthelaunchingofthe pipelinerevealsthepotentialforacceleratedexploration inseveralbasinsinChadoveraperiodofseveralyears. ThiscouldeitherbeadvantageousorharmfulforChadand itspeopledependingonwhetherornotthereislegaland regulatoryoversightandwhetheritsapplicationisrigorous andeffective.Forthetimebeing,however,theframework andtheoversightmechanismsforthefewregulationsthatdo existareallbutabsent.”97
The Absence of a Regional Development Plan (RDP) Aregionaldevelopmentplanfortheproject-affectedareaismorethanfouryears overdue—andstillincomplete.DespiteclaimsthattheRDPwasunderwayatthe timeofprojectappraisalin2000,theplanhasnotyetbeenfinalized.InNovember 2004,theIAGwrotethattheRDP“hasseenlittleprogress.”98Inabsenceofa comprehensivemapoflocalneedsandpriorities,itremainsunclearwhatwillguide theuseofthe5percentofoilrevenuesearmarkedfortheregion.OnSeptember2, 2004,thegovernmentofChadissuedadecreeproposingthecreationofaninterim committeetomanagetheuseofoilrevenuesintheproducingregion.However,the committeeisnotyetfunctionalandtobeeffective,itwillrequireadevelopmentplan onwhichtobaseallocationdecisions.
Inflation TheIAGandlocalcivilsocietygroupshavenotedaproblemwithinflationinthecost ofhousingandotheressentialcommoditiesintheoilproducingarea.Programsto mitigatetheimpactsofinflationweremarkedbymanydelays.Concernswereraised inparticularaboutthehighpriceandscarcityofmeat,poultry,fishandstaplessuch asmilletandmanioc.99
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 33 Box 8 (continued) Dust Pollution Althoughproblemsrelatedtodustpollutionhavenowbeenacknowledgedbythe Consortium,afteryearsofrepeatedcommunitycomplaints,theDustControlPlanhas notyetbeenfullyimplementedandtheConsortiumremainsreluctanttoapplyamore permanent(andmorecostly)coatingontrafficked areasoftheroads.100Ofallthekilometersof roadstracedintheoil-producingregion,onlynine kilometershavebeentreatedwithanasphalt-like material,approximatelysixofwhicharewithinthe KoméBase.Themajorityoftheroadsthatpass throughvillagesandbesideagriculturalfieldsare treatedwithwaterormolasses,neitherofwhich hasprovenverysuccessfulatsuppressingdustfora sustainedperiod.101
Increased Impact on Land Use and Household Viability Upto300householdsmaybemadenon-viableas aresultoftheDobaproject—manymorethanhad beenanticipated.Becauseprojectinstallations, Dustfromaheavytruck suchaswellpads,havetakenmorelandinsouthern envelopsabicyclistonthe Chadthanpredicted,theimpactonhouseholds’economicsustainabilityhasbeen roadfromDobatoSarhin southernChad.Chadhasonly moreseverethanexpected:“thenumberofpotentiallynon-viablehouseholdsin afewhundredkilometersof theOFDAiscurrentlyabout240andisprojectedtoreachabout300,asopposedto pavedroads.Manydirtroads theinitiallyestimated150.”102Thisheightenedimpactisexacerbatedbythelackof intheoilregionthatwereused 103 mostlybyox-carts,bicycles progressonlanduseplanningsinceAugust2003. andpedestriansinthepastare nowfrequentedbytrucksand Furthermore,concernshavebeenraisedaboutthequalityofhousingprovided cars.Thedustfromsuchtraffic tovillagerswhohavebeendisplaced.Inseveralcases,houseswerenotbuiltto hasbecomeaseriousconcern forthelocalpopulation. withstandtheclimateandhavedeterioratedorcollapsedunderheavyrains,leaving (Photo:MartinZint) therelocatedvillagerstoreconstructhomes.104
Waste Management Thedisposalofwastelubricatingoilanddrillingfluidsintheoilfielddevelopment areapresentsapotentialthreattothegroundwater.Concernsaboutwaste managementhavebeenrepeatedlycitedinofficialmonitoringreportsandvoicedby localpopulations.DuringitsvisittoChadinMay-June2004,theIAGfoundthat “Wastemanagement,dustcontrolandsoilreclamationarestillnotregulatedand requirepromptmeasuresonthepartofEssoandthegovernment.”105TheECMGhas raisedconcernsaboutthepotentialimpactofpresentmethodsfordisposingofdrilling fluidsontheshallowgroundwaterand,byextension,thequalityofwaterusedfor drinkingandhouseholdpurposesinnearbyvillages.106 (SeeAnnex,“AdditionalResources,”forinformationonreportsdescribingthe socialandenvironmentalimpactsoftheoilindustryinChad.)
34 2. Chad’s Landlocked Treasure 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues: A First Taste of Black Gold
Afteryearsofplanning,negotiationandconstructionofthepipelineandoilfields, Chad’soilrevenuesstartedtotrickleinwiththefirstshipmentsofDobacrudeinlate 2003.ExxonMobilmadeaninitialpaymentof$6.5millionintotheCitibankescrow accountinLondonattheendofNovember2003,representingthefirstofwhatwill beseveralbilliondollarsofoilrevenueflowingintoChadoverthenextthreedecades ormore. EarlypublicestimatesfromtheWorldBankaboutChad’sfutureoilrevenuestended toemphasizethelowendofpossiblerevenuescenarios,withconservativeprojections of$2billionoverthelifetimeoftheprojectandroughly$80millionannually.In addition,projectloandocumentsusedanassumptionof$15/bbl.Thesesmallerfigures madethetaskofimprovinggovernmentcapacitytomanagethewindfallfromanoil boomappearmoremanageablethanwasactuallythecase. However,recentestimatesportrayamuchbiggerChadianoilboom. • AWorldBankinternalreportfromApril2004statesthat“totalrevenuesare expectedtoreach$5billion”overthenext25years.107Anearlierinternalreport hadamedium-tohigh-endrangeof$5-8billion.108 3 • TherespectedPFCEnergyconsultingfirmestimatedin2004thatChadwould gain$3.8to$6.1billionfromoilrevenuesoverthenext15years.109 Withthetighteningofglobaloilsupply,itislikelythattheworldwillnotseeareturn tobelow$20perbarreloil(Brent)pricesanytimesoon.Thus,whileitisimpossible tomakefirmprojectionsgivensomanyunknownvariables,itisverylikelythat Chad’soilrevenueswillfarexceedtheinitial$2billionestimate.Thiswillbeahuge booninaneconomypreviouslyreliantonsubsistenceagricultureandtheexportof cottonandcattle.
Show Me the Money ForyearsobserverswonderedifChadwouldbereadytomanagetheoilwindfallby thetimethefirstoilrevenuesarrived.Intheend,Chadwasfarfromreadytoreceive, letalonemanageandeffectivelyallocate,itsoilwindfallwhenthefirstpayment wasdepositedintheCitibankaccountinLondon.Theearlier-than-anticipated completionoftheconstructionphaseoftheproject,combinedwithlongdelaysin theimplementationofcapacitybuildingprojectsinChad,leftthepetroleumrevenue Bythetimefirstoil managementsystemstrugglingtocatchupwiththerealityontheground. revenuesarrivedinthe Citibankaccountin Itwasafulleightmonthsfromthewell-publicizedinaugurationoftheprojecttothe London,Chadwasfar first$32milliontransferofoilmoneytoChadonJuly6,2004.Thislongdelayfuelled fromreadytoreceive, suspicionsamongthepopulationconcerningthegovernment’sintentregardingoil letalonemanageand revenues.Severalfactorsservedtopostponethetransferofrevenues.Thegovernment effectivelyallocate,its andBEAC–thecentralbankforChad–hadtofinalizecontractsregardingthe oilwindfall. establishmentofaccountsforrevenuedisbursement,stabilization,theFuture GenerationsFundandtheoil-producingregion.Inaddition,acommercialbank(or banks)inChadhadtobechosentoreceivefundsfromBEACanddisbursemoneyfor prioritysectorprojects.Otheraspectsofthepetroleumrevenueplanhadyettobeput inplace,suchasamechanismtomanagethe4.5percentofdirectrevenuesearmarked fortheoilproducingregion,andthefullcapacityoftherevenueoversightcommittee. TheIMFandWorldBankworkedwithBEACtoestablishtheseaccountspriorto thefirsttransfer.TherewassomedebateregardingtheselectionoftheChadian commercialbanktohandlelocaldisbursements.Somebelievedthatchoosingmore thanonebankwouldaddfurtherconfusionandmakeitmoredifficultto“followthe money.”TheIMFindicatedthathavingmorethanonebankwouldbeinconsistent
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 35 World Bank Disclosure of Escrow Account Activity
Chad Cameroon Pipeline Project Financial Statistics Escrow Accounts Monthly Balances June04 July04 August04 September04 October04 November04
Transit Account(1) 11,946,578 10,148,548 13,797,340 10,299,538 14,200,195 11,969,270 USDollars
IBRDdebt service 2,470,000 2,470,000 2,470,000 2,470,000 2,470,000 2,470,000 USDollars
IBRDdebt servicereserve 7,410,000 7,410,000 7,410,000 7,410,000 7,410,000 7,410,000 account USDollars
EIBdebt service 2,604,889 2,977,016 3,349,143 3,721,270 4,093,397 4,465,524 Euros
Borrower Account(2) 35,733,031 15,570,396 48 0 9,855,319 9,288,644 USDollars
Citibank feesand 0 0 0 0 0 0 commission
Monthly transfersto 0 32,159,728 24,774,288 13,360,491 0 14,308,221 Chad USDollars
(1)Royalties,interestsandproceedsoffundsinvestedinCiticorpinvestmentfunds (2)IncludingfundsinvestedinCiticorpinvestmentfunds
“withtheprovisionsofthedecreeonsterilizationofoilrevenuesaimedatfacilitating transparency.”110OthersmaintainedthatbecausetheChadiancommercialbanking sectorisweak,noonebankcouldaccommodatetheinflowsofrevenuealonewithout WhiletheWorld disruptingthefinancialsystem. Bankbeganposting informationregarding Intheend,twobankswereselected:CommercialBankTchad(CBT)andSociété Chad’sescrowaccounts GénéraledeBanqueTchadienne(SGBT).Whileitwaspositivetonotethatthe inLondoninJuly2004, governmentofChaddidnotdrawdownfundsfromtheescrowaccountbeforethe theChadiangovernment mechanismswereinplace,itwasequallyworryingtoseethatthemechanismswere itselfhasmadenosuch notreadyeventhoughtheWorldBank,theIMFandthegovernmentofChadhadhad disclosure. yearstoworktogethertoprepareforthearrivaloffirstoilrevenues. BytheendofSeptember2004,ExxonMobilreportedthatithadpaidatotalof approximately$109millionintoChad’sescrowaccountsinCitibankinLondon.With thefirstpaymentinJuly2003,theWorldBankbeganpostinginformationonChad’s escrowaccountbalancesonitswebsite.Accordingtothisdisclosure,$84,602,728 hadbeentransferredtoChadfromtheCitibankaccountbytheendofNovember 2004.111Thedifferencebetweentheamountpaidinandtheamountpaidoutreflects withdrawalsfordebtservicepaymentstotheWorldBankandEIB.(SeeChart “WorldBankDisclosureofEscrowAccountActivity”)TheChadiangovernment itselfhasmadenosuchdisclosure.
36 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues Multiple Revenue Streams Asisthecaseinmostotheroil-producingcountries,therevenueaccruingtoChadfrom theoilindustrycomesinmanyforms.Alltheserevenuestreamscombinetodetermine whatiscommonlyreferredtoasthegovernment’s“take”fromtheoilprojectversus whattheoilcompanygeneratesinprofits.Thesesourcesofrevenueinclude: •Signaturebonuses •Directrevenues *Royalties *Dividendsfromthegovernment’sminorityparticipationinTOTCO andCOTCO •Indirectrevenues *Incomeandothertaxesontheoilconsortium *Customsduties Signaturebonuses,acommonpracticeintheglobaloilindustry,aretypicallypaidin cashtohostgovernmentsuponsigningacontractforanewconcession,andarepaid whetherornotoiliseventuallyfound.Insomecases,signaturebonusescanbevery large–inAngolainrecentyearstheyhaverangedfrom$100millionto$300million. InChadtodate,signaturebonuseshavebeensmall.Chadreceiveda$25million signaturebonusinApril2000whentwonewprivatesectorcompanies,Chevronand Petronas,joinedtheproject.InDecember2003andMarch2004,Chadreceivedtwo $15millionsignaturebonuspaymentsrelatedtoanewexplorationagreementthen Inaprojectpraisedfor undernegotiationwiththeExxonMobilconsortium. itstransparency,many Inthefirstfewyearsofoilproduction,Chadwillreceiveonlydirectrevenues– keyagreementsremain royaltiesanddividends.Indirectrevenues–taxesontheConsortium–fromoperations confidential. inthethreeDobafieldswillbeginaccruingin2007andwilllikelyexceedtotaldirect revenuesfromthosefields.Overtheroughly25-30yearlifespanoftheDobafields project,revenuestreamswillbeuneven.IfnonewoilisfoundinChad,mostoil revenueswillaccrueinthefirst15yearsoftheproject,accordingtotheWorldBank.112 Directrevenuesstartedtoflowinimmediatelywithproduction,whileindirectrevenues areexpectedtobegintoaccruetoChadin2007,peakingin2009,andthendeclining ina“lumpy”mannerfortheremainderoftheproject.Assomecivilsocietyobservers havenoted,theConsortiumenjoysa“taxholiday”duringpeakyearsofproduction, thusrepresentingconsiderablelostincometothegovernmentofChad.113
3.1 Oil Company – Government Agreements: Secrecy in the “Model” of Transparency WhatChadreceivesfromitsoilproductionisgovernedbyanumberofagreements betweenthegovernmentandtheoilcompanies.Itisironicthatinaprojectpraised foritstransparency,manyoftheseagreements,orkeyaspectsofthem,remain confidential. OildevelopmentinChadisregulatedthrougha1962PetroleumCodedescribedbythe country’sMinsterofPetroleumas“clearlyoutdated.”115Thecodesetsgeneralterms forexploration,productionandtransportofpetroleuminChad,aswellasthefiscal regimefortheseactivities.Foryearsthegovernmenthassaiditwouldpromulgatea newpetroleumcode,butanumberofkeyagreementshavebeensignedbetweenthe governmentandoilcompaniesintheabsenceofanupdatedcode. ThetermsoftheDobaoilfielddevelopmentarecoveredbya1988“Convention forExploration,ProductionandTransportationofHydrocarbons”betweenthe governmentandtheConsortiumandsubsequentamendments.116Signedbetween
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 37 Box 9
New Revenue for Cameroon
Cameroonisalsogeneratingsignificantnewrevenuesfromtheprojectthroughpipeline transitfees.Thesefeesaresetat$0.41perbarrelandcouldamounttoroughly$500 million–orhigherifnewfieldsaredevelopedinChad–duringthelifeoftheproject. Theserevenuesareflowingintoacountrythat,inthepast,hasrankedasthemostcorrupt intheworldaccordingtoTransparencyInternational.IncontrasttoChad,Cameroon –alreadyanestablishedoilproducer–hasnotenactedanynewoilrevenuemanagement laws,norhasitputinplaceanyspecialmeasurestomanagethisnewrevenuesource. TheWorldBank,foritspart,didnotuseitsleveragebeforeprojectapprovaltoextract increasedtransparencyconcessionsfromthegovernmentofCameroon.Thishasbeena continualsourceoffrustrationforcivilsocietygroupsinthecountrywhoaccusetheWorld Bankofdoublestandardsintheproject.“Transparencymeansyoucanseeifyoumadea gooddecision.Herewedon’thavethetransparency,”saidSamuelNguiffooftheCentrefor theEnvironmentandDevelopment,aCRSpartnerorganizationinYaounde,Cameroon.114
ExxonMobilandtheChadiangovernment,theconventionreportedlyprovidesChad witha12.5percentroyaltyrate.(Thedetailsofthisconventionremainconfidential.) UnlikemanyotherAfricanoilproducers,Chadusesaconcessioncontractsystem andnotaproductionsharingcontractsystem.Thatis,ratherthansharinginthe production,Chadderivesrevenuefromroyaltiesandallowstheoilconsortiumtosell productionontheinternationalmarket.Chad’sroyaltyrateand“take”fromitsoilis alsolowerthan manyother Chad’s Oil Production and Revenue Profile Africanoil producers. 2002 estimates from Agence Française de Development based on production from first three Doba fields only Industryofficials ascribethisto thehighdegree ofpoliticalrisk inChadand Cameroon,the low-qualityof Dobacrude,the landlockednature ofthecountryand thesignificantup- frontinvestment requiredtobuild thepipeline infrastructure. Chad’s inexperiencein negotiatingwith oneoftheworld’s largestcompanies shouldnotbe overlookedas ThischartshowstheproductionprofileofthethreeDobafieldsaswellasthedramaticpeaksandvalleysinoilrevenues.The anotherimportant suddenarrivalsofindirectrevenues–notcoveredbytherevenuemanagementlaw–areshowninthesteepincreaseinrevenues factor. in2008/2009.ThevariabilityofrevenuestotheChadianstateemphasizestheimportanceofplanningandafunctioning stabilizationmechanismtosmoothoutvariationsinrevenueflows.ItisalsoworthnotingthattheoilConsortiumenjoysatax holidayinthefirstfewyearsofpeakproduction. ExxonMobil’s Note:Thechartusesconservativeassumptionsofbothreservesize–883millionbarreltotalproduction–andsalespriceof exploration $20/barrel.Reservesizeisnowestimatedtobeatleast1billionbarrelsevenwithoutpotentialnewdiscoveriesandoilprices activitiesare mayaveragemuchhigherthan$20/barreloverthelifeoftheproject.
38 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues coveredbyarenewedexploration,productionandtransportationconventionsignedon May10,2004,providingfora14.5percentroyaltyrate–aminisculeimprovement overtheoriginalconvention.117(CRSandBIChaveobtainedacopyofthisconvention. Accordingtosection18.5oftheconvention,theroyaltyrateappliesduringthe contract’s35-yearvalidity.)Thisconvention,negotiatedprimarilyinParisovermany months,wasprecededbythesigningofaProtocoled’Accord(protocolagreement) Chad’sroyaltyrateand andrelateddecreeinJanuary2003.Accordingtosomepressreports,thegovernment “take”fromitsoilis tieditsownhandsinthenegotiationsofthenewconventionwithExxonMobilwhen lowerthanmanyother aformerofficialsignedtheProtocole,whichreportedlylockedkeyprovisionsofthe Africanoilproducers. 1988conventioninplace,preventingthegovernmentfromincreasingtaxes,feesor otherregulatorymeasuresinitsfavor.118AccordingtoEnergyCompassinLondon,
Chad’s “Take” in Comparison to Other African Oil Producers
Percentage of mean estimated oil value retained by African governments, 2002-2010
100%
80%
60%
40%
20% 80% 75% 75% 66% 60% 60% 28%
0% Nigeria Gabon Cameroon Congo- Angola Equatorial Chad Brazzaville Guinea
Source:PFCEnergy,WestAfricaPetroleumSector:OilValueForecastandDistribution,December2003.
“Thegovernmentapparentlytriedtodismisstheletter,arguingthattheinexperienced ministerhadactedwithoutexpertadviceandthatthedocumentwasillegalunder Chadianlaw.”119Despiteapproximately$1.6millioninWorldBank-financedlegal assistance,theChadiangovernmentwasabletonegotiateonlyamarginallybetterdeal inthenewconvention.
Calculating Revenues Chad’sroyaltiesarecalculatedonthebasisofthesalevalueofeachbarrelofoil producedaftertransportationcostshavebeendeducted.ExxonMobilhasbeenusing atransportationcostofapproximately$10/barrel,apricethathasbeenthesubject oflong-runningdisagreementswiththegovernment,whichbelievedthatthecost wassettoohigh.Thetransportcost,adjustedonaquarterlybasis,hasbeenhigher thaninitiallyanticipated,asnotedbytheIMF.120(SeeSection3.4“TheEndofthe Honeymoon,”page48)AccordingtoExxonMobil,fourfactorsareinvolvedin calculatingthetransportcost,eachofwhicharedetailedintheconfidentialagreements betweenExxonMobilandthegovernment.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 39 Thesefactorsinclude: 1.Operationandmaintenancecostsforthepipeline; 2.ReturnonInvestment(ROI)onthepipeline(describedasa“difficult calculation”byExxonMobil);121 3.Commercialdebtservicingonthepipelineinfrastructure(paidtwiceayearona $600millionloan); 4.AtransitfeeofU.S.$0.41perbarrelpaidtothegovernmentofCameroonfor allowingthepipelinetopassthroughitsterritory.122 ThemarketpriceforashipmentofChadiancrudeisnegotiatedbetweentheseller –oneoftheConsortiummembers–andpotentialbuyersapproximatelytwomonths beforeactuallyloadingtheoil.Thesalepricesofthemorethan56shipmentsofcrude exportedfromtheterminalinKribisinceOctober2003arenotpubliclyavailable. DocumentsobtainedbyCRSandBIC,though,showthattheaveragesalepricefor Dobacrudewas$37.52/bbl. AccordingtooilindustryjournalistsinLondon,trackingthesalesandmarketingof shipmentsofDobacrudeisextremelydifficult–itisperhapsthemostsecretiveoil productioninsub-SaharanAfrica–andthisiswithinthealreadymurkyandcomplex oiltradingmarketsystem.WhatisknownisthatDobacrude–whentradedonthe internationaloilmarket–hasbeenfetchingasubstantiallylowerpricethanthemuch- publicizedBrentNorthSeabenchmarkprices.123(Becausetherearesomanydifferent varietiesandgradesofcrudeoil,buyersandsellershavefounditeasiertorefertoa limitednumberofreference,orbenchmark,crudeoils.Othervarietiesarethenpriced atadiscountorpremium,accordingtotheirquality.)AccordingtoExxonMobil,the discountofftheChadiancrudehasaveragedaround$8-$10abarrel,whileaccording tosomeoilindustryanalyststhisdiscountforanearlyDecember2004shipmentwas ashighas$18abarrel.124 Thedeterminationofthediscountisdynamic,varyingovertimeinrelationtoa numberoffactors: •Onefactoristhequalityofcrude–thecurrentDobablend,asdescribedin SectionTwo,isofpoorqualityandnotveryattractiveontheworldoilmarket. Whilethisphysicalqualitymaynotchange,itsinfluenceonthediscountmay lessenovertime.Oilproducersmaygivecustomersadiscountfornewoil blendstocompensateforthecostsofrecalibratingrefineriestotaketheoil. Thisisknownasa“newcrude”discount. •Asecondfactorrelatingtothediscountin2004wasthehigh“freightrates” forshippingtheoil.Globally,thereismoreoilbeingproducedthatneedstobe shippedthantherearetankerstoshipit.OilfromtheGulfofGuineais“freight sensitive”sinceitmusttravellongdistancestoNorthAmericanandAsian markets. •Athirdfactorinthelasthalfof2004wasthelargediscountforallmediumand heavy“sweet”crudes,owinginparttoweakdemandinAsia. BecauseofthepoorqualityoftheDobacrude,fewrefineriesintheworldcanprocess itwithoutdamagingtheirfacilities.Chevron,forexample,retrofittedarefineryin Pembroke,Wales(U.K.)tohandleDobacrudeatacostof$12million.125 SincetheConsortiummembersarealllarge,vertically-integratedoilcompanieswith theirownrefineriesandsalesoutletsforrefinedproductsapproximately40percentof thecrudeisbeingrefinedandsoldbytheConsortiummembersthemselves.(Thismay alsobeareflectionoftherelativelytepidresponseofoutsidebuyerstoDobacrude.)
40 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues AccordingtoExxonMobil,“safeguardshavebeenbuiltintotheagreementstomake surethattheConsortiummemberscannottakeadvantageofthatsituationbyselling totheirownrefineriesatbelowmarketprices.Toguardagainstthatpotential,sales tonon-Consortiumrefineriesareusedtocalculatetheaveragepriceperquarter.This quarterlyaveragemarketpriceisthensubmittedtoChad’sMinistryofPetroleumfor approvalandusedinthecalculation ofChad’sroyalties.”126Theamount Hypothetical Example of ofthequalitydiscountforDoba Royalty Calculation crude,andhowitisdetermined,has beenthesourceofdisagreementand 950,000-barrelshipmentofDobaoil confusionbetweenthegovernment andtheConsortium,especiallyinlight NorthSeaBrentCrudeprice $45* ofrecordhigh-globaloilpricesduring 2004.(SeeSection3.4,“TheEndof Dobatradingprice $35 theHoneymoon”page48) (minus$10discount) AftersellingDobacrudeand Transportcost -$10 deductingthetransportationcosts,the Netprice $25 Consortiumdepositsthenetroyalties onamonthlybasisinChad’sescrow Royalty=12.5percentor$3.125/bbl accountatCitibankinLondon. Netroyaltiesforshipment $2,968,750 Monthlypaymentsaremadeusinga *AsofNovember26,2004 provisionaloilsalepricesetforeach quarteronthebasisoftheadjusted Contrarytosomepress priceforthepreviousperiod.Atthe reportsindicatingthat endofeachquarter,royaltypayments theWorldBankcontrols areadjustedtoreflecttheactualpricereceivedduringthatperiod,whichthenserves theaccount,Chad’s astheprovisionalpriceforthenextquarter.OnceChadhasmadeloanpayments Citibankaccountsare totheWorldBankandtheEuropeanInvestmentBank,theremainingamountinthe underthesolecontrolof CitibankaccountistransferredtoChad.Contrarytosomepressreportsindicating thegovernment,while thattheWorldBankcontrolstheaccount,Chad’sCitibankaccountsareunderthesole theCollégecanmonitor controlofthegovernment,whiletheCollégecanmonitormovementsinandoutofthe movementsinandoutof accounts.127 theaccounts.
3.2 Dividing up the Revenues – A Leaky Revenue Management Law
“Inallconscience,outofloveandfaithfulnesstoourpeople,withnoexternalpressure,wefreely madethedecisiontomanagetheoilrevenuesinascrupulousandtransparentway,throughthe lawrelatingtothemanagementoftheoilrevenues.Thislawisunique,oneofakind.”
– Chadian President Idriss Déby at the oil project inauguration ceremony, October 10, 2003 Findrelevantlaws anddecreesat ThemostimportanttestoftheChad-Cameroonexperiment–howthemassiveamounts www.ccsrp-tchad.orgor ofnewrevenueswillbeusedinChad–isnowunderway. WhiletheChadrevenue atwww.catholicrelief. managementplaniswidelyconsideredanexampleforotheroil-exporters,evenunder org/africanoil.cfm thebestcasescenario,iffollowedexactlyasdesigned,therevenuemanagement frameworkstillhasmajorflawsandgapsthatneedtobeaddressedifoilrevenuesare tobenefitthepeopleofChad.TheseproblemscenteronthedesignofChad’srevenue managementlawandtheoversightcommitteeestablishedtomonitorcompliancewith thelaw.(SeeSectionFour“JustAddOil”:AccountabilityfromScratch) TheWorldBankhadjustifiedinvolvementintheprojectbyhighlightingitspoverty alleviationpotentialandpromotingsocialandenvironmentalsafeguardsandmitigation measuresnotfoundinotheroilprojects.TheBankurgedthegovernmentofChadto makelegalchangesandsubstantivepromisesifitwantedthepipelinetoproceed.The
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 41 Chadiangovernmentagreedtotheseandothermeasuresaimedatmanagingtheoil sectorinordertoseetheprojectmoveforward.Forreasonsofreputationandsecurity, theConsortiumitselfalsohadaninterestinseeingthatrevenuesnotgodirectlyinto thehandsofagovernmentwithaless-than-savoryreputationbutbeearmarkedfor povertyreductionprograms,especiallyintheoil-producingregion,soastoavoid tensionswiththelocalpopulation.
Chad’s Law 001 – The Devil is in the Details Asaconditionofitssupport,theWorldBankobligedthegovernmentofChadto passanewlawonthemanagementofoilrevenues.Itprovidedthegovernmentwith a$41millionloantodeveloparevenuemanagementandfinancialcontrolsystem, includingfinancialsupporttokeyinstitutions,andmaintainedthatChadwouldhave theinstitutionsandcapacitytomanageoilrevenueswellbeforetheirarrival. TheNationalAssemblypassedthenewlawonDecember30,1998,afteronlythree hoursofdebatewith108votesinfavorandnoneinopposition.128Signedintolaw Criticalweaknesses byPresidentDébyonJanuary11,1999,thelawstipulatestheallocationofdirect intherevenue oilrevenues.TheLawalsoestablishesaCollègedeContrôleetdeSurveillancedes managementlaw RessourcesPétrolières(CCSRP)oraPetroleumRevenueOversightandControl remain.Takentogether, Committee(hereafter,the“Collège”),ajointgovernment-civilsocietybodywhose theymeanthatmuchof taskisto“verify,”“authorize”and“oversee”expenditureofoilrevenues. thestatemoniesraised ThePetroleumRevenueManagementLawcontainsseveralsignificantprovisions, fromtheoilsectorwill outlinedbelow.(AnEnglishtranslationofLaw001isincludedinthisreportas falloutsidethescope Appendix1,page98.)129 ofthenewlawandthe oversightmechanisms •Thelawstipulatesthatdirectrevenues–netroyaltiesanddividendsafterWorld establishedtomonitor BankandEuropeanInvestmentBankdebtserviceispaid–arefirstdepositedinan them. offshoreaccountopenedwithaninternationalbank.(Citibankhasbeenchosento providethesebankingservices.) •Ofthebalance,10percentofthedirectrevenuesaretobedepositedinanoffshore accountandinvestedinlong-termexternalinvestments,theproceedsofwhichare tobeusedtofundpovertyreductionprogramsinapost-oilfuture(i.e.a“Future GenerationsFund”). •Theremaining90percentofrevenuesfromthepost-debtservicebalancepass throughChadianTreasury“SpecialPetroleumRevenueAccounts”openedin Chadiancommercialbanksandaredividedinthefollowingmanner: * 80percent(or72percentofthetotaldirectrevenues,netofdebtservice)is earmarkedforinvestmentexpenditures–suchastheconstructionofhealth clinicsorschools–infiveprioritysectors(education,healthandsocial services,ruraldevelopment,infrastructure,andenvironmentalandwater resources.)TheWorldBanksaysthismustbeoverandaboveapre-oilrevenue spendinglevelinthesesectors,using2002spendingasabaseline. * 5percentoftheremainder(or4.5percentofthetotaldirectrevenues,netof debtservice)istobeallocatedasasupplementtotheDobaoil-producing regiontobedisbursedbylocalauthorities. * Untiltheendof2007,theremaining15percentisallocatedtofinancerecurrent governmentexpenditures.Afterthat,itistobeaddedtoprioritysectorspending. Asgoodastherevenuemanagementlawappearsonpaper,thereareverysignificant weaknessesinitsdesignandpracticalapplication.Thiswasmadepainfullyclearin late2000whenthegovernmentannouncedthatithadspentthefirst$4.5millionofa $25millionsigningbonuspaidbytheConsortiumonmilitaryequipmentratherthan onanyprioritysectors.EmbarrassedafterhavingtoutedChad’srevenuemanagement
42 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues Oil Revenue Allocation and Utilization ChadRevenueManagementLaw
Komé, Miandoum and Bolobo oilfields
Direct Revenue Indirect Revenue (dividends and royalties) (taxes and customs duties on oil production)
Sequestered Offshore Account Deposited in accounts at Public Treasury (international financial institution)
Future Generations Fund: 10% Special Treasury Accounts (international investment company) (one of several commercial banks)
Priority Sectors: Up to end of 2007, recurrent expenditure: Decentralized authorities in 80% royalties 15% royalties and 15% dividends; oil producing region: 85% dividends thereafter: priority sectors 5% royalties
The Petroleum Revenue Management Law contains several significant provisions.45 •Thelawstipulatesadivisionofdirectrevenues–netroyaltiesanddividends(WorldBankandother donorloanrepaymentsaresubtracted)–whicharedepositedinanoffshoreaccountopenedwithan internationalbank–(Citibank). •10percentisdepositedinanoffshoreaccountandinvestedinlong-termexternalinvestments,the proceedsofwhichwouldbeusedforpovertyreductionprogramsinapost-oilfuture(i.e.a“Future GenerationsFund”). •Theremaining90percentpassesthroughTreasury“SpecialPetroleumRevenueAccounts”openedin Chadianbanksandisdividedinthefollowingmanner: * 80percentisdevotedtoexpendituresinfiveprioritysectors(education,healthandsocialservices, ruraldevelopment,infrastructure,andenvironmentalandwaterresources);theWorldBanksaysthis shouldbeoverandaboveapre-oilrevenuespendinglevelinthesesectors,using2002spendingas abaseline. * 5percentofroyaltiesisallocatedasasupplementtotheDobaoil-producingregiontobedisbursedby localauthorities. * Untiltheendof2007,theremaining15percentcanbeusedtofinancerecurrentgovernment expenditures.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 43 systemasamodel,theWorldBanknotedthattheplantechnicallydidnotcoversuch bonuses.130Nonetheless,inthewakeofpublicoutcrytheBankandtheIMFurgedthe governmentinOctober2000toestablishtherevenueoversightcommitteeassoonas possible,freezetheremainderofthesigningbonus,brieftheNationalAssemblyon thematter,andcomplywithexistingbudgetproceduresforallotherrevenues.131Chad agreedtothesetermsinordertobeeligibleforbadlyneededdebtrelieffunds.132 Criticalweaknessesinthelawremain.Takentogether,theymeanthatmuchofthe statemoniesraisedfromtheoilsectorwillfalloutsidethejurisdictionofthelawand theoversightmechanismsestablishedtomonitorthem.Thispotentiallygiveswide latitudeforrent-seekingonthepartofboththegovernmentandtheprivatesector. First,significantoilrevenuesfalloutsidethejurisdictionoftheCollège.Fiscal controlisonlyexercisedoverspecialaccountsthatcorrespondtodirectrevenues generatedbyroyaltiesanddividends.133Otherindirectrevenues,suchascorporate taxesandcustomdutiesgeneratedbytheoilproject,arenotcoveredandgointo ordinaryTreasuryaccounts.134 AccordingtoananalysisbytheFrenchofficialdevelopmentaidagency,Agence FrançaisedeDeveloppement(FrenchDevelopmentAgency),theseleviesmay representasmuchas45percentoftotalrevenuesoverthelifeoftheproject.135A Theseveralbillion WorldBankprojectionofthedistributionofnetrevenues,usingassumptionsof917 dollarsinindirect millionbarrelsproducedatanaverageof$25perbarrel,showthattwo-thirdsoftotal revenuesfalloutsidethe revenueswouldbeindirect–$3.3billionwouldgotogeneralbudgetexpenditures, revenuemanagement dwarfingthe$1.6billiongoingtoprioritysectors,theDobaregionandtheFuture lawandmaydwarf GenerationsFund.136 directrevenuescovered bythelaw. Second,theLawdoesnotcoverallofChad’soilbutonlythethreefieldsinDoba. TheLawspecificallyappliesonlytothethreeDobafieldsofBolobo,Koméand Miandoum,eventhoughExxonMobilwillbeginproductiononfivenewfieldsin 2005andsoonthereafter.Thus,significantnewrevenueswillfalloutsidetherevenue managementsystem.AccordingtoformerU.S.AmbassadortoChad,Christopher Goldthwaite,thesepotentialrevenuesarearealconcern.“Thisisthebiggestdanger. Thereisalotofoilinthiscountrythatisnotyetexploited.Dependingonwhoyou talkto,thereareseveraltimesmorethantheprovenreservesatDoba(roughly900 millionto1billionbarrels).”137Thegovernmenthassoughttoallaytheconcernsof theIMFandWorldBankoverthisissue,buthasyettolegallyclosethisloophole. (SeeBox10)
Chad’smuchtouted Third,theallocationof5percentofrevenuestotheoil-producingcommunitiesmay revenuemanagement beinadequate.Oilcommunitiesbearthebruntoftheimpactofoildevelopment,as lawcoversonlythree witnessedinNigeriaandelsewhere,thusthefigureallocatedtotheoilregionhasbeen specificfields,which stronglycriticized.WorldBankmanagementhassaidthatthe5percentfigurewas todayrepresentonly arrivedat“throughaninternalpoliticalprocess”inChad.Butgiventhehumanrights afractionofChad’s andsecuritysituationinsouthernChad,flawedelectionsandconsultationsinthe anticipatedoil presenceofarmedsecurityforces,observersdoubtthatthepeopleoftheoil-producing production. regionhadmuch,ifany,sayatallintheselectionofthe5percentfigure.Some observersquestionwhetherthe5percentannualallocationwillbeenoughtoredress harmssufferedintheregion,letalonesecuretheadditionalbenefitsofwhichDéby spokeatthepipeline’sinauguration.138 Fourth,thelawisvagueregardingprioritysectorandregionalspending.Whileit stipulatessectorssuchaseducationandhealth,spendingwithinandamongthese areasiswideopen.Thereisnorulingaboutwhethermoneybespent,forexample,on primaryhealthclinicsinruralareasorstateofthearthospitalsinthecapital.Regional allocationsarealsonotspecified.Inacountrywithahistoryofethnicandregional discrimination,thismaysowseedsforfutureconflictsoverthedistributionofoilrents.
44 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues Box 10 Finally,the5percentallocation specifiedbytherevenuelawfor theDobaoil-producingregion Closing a Loophole? canbechangedbypresidential Themanagementofoilrevenuefromnewfieldshasbeenasubjectof decreefiveyearsafterthe discussionbetweentheGovernmentofChad,theWorldBankandtheIMF. passageofthelaw,orfrom2004 InDecember2003,Chad’sprimeministerpromisedinalettertotheIMF onwards.ThepresidentofChad, thatthegovernmentwouldmanagetheserevenuesinasimilarmannerto actingalone,hasthepowerto thosefromtheoriginalthreefields.Thisvaguelywordedletterofintent changetheseallocations. wasseenasunsatisfactoryandtheIMFdemandedmoreclarityfromChad’s CouncilofMinistersonthisissueasaconditionforanewPovertyReduction Furthermore,institutionsrelated GrowthFacility(PRGF)loantothegovernment.OnSeptember9,2004, tothejudiciaryortheruleoflaw theCouncilofMinistersissuedadeclarationstatingthatallnewpetroleum arenotearmarkedasapriority resourceswould“conformtothespiritofLawNo.001,”andthatrevenues sector;thus,littleapparent fromnewfieldswouldbeplacedintothenationalbudget.The“majority”of effortexiststostrengthenother therevenueswouldfinanceprioritysectorspendinginlinewiththecountry’s branchesofgovernmentthat NationalPovertyReductionStrategyandtheserevenueswouldbeplaced mightserveasacounterweight firstintoanoffshoreaccount.Thedeclarationaddsthatacontrolmechanism “similar”totheCollègewouldbeputinplace. topresidentialdecree.Thisis troublingbecause,astheWorld ThisdeclarationfallsshortofeitheranamendmenttoLaw001oranewlaw Bank’sInspectionPanelnoted, tocoverthesenewrevenues.Inaddition,thesuggestionthata“similar”body thesuccessful“translationofoil toCollègewouldbeestablishedisworryingandinvitesthepossiblecreation revenuesintoequitable,effective ofduplicativeoversightbodies.Finally,itisunclearhowrevenuesfromDoba economicdevelopmentand shipmentsthatcontainbothoilfromthefirstthreefieldsandoilfromnew povertyreductionextendswell fieldswouldbemeteredanddisaggregatedforaccountingpurposes.Ifthere arestrongerrevenuesafeguardsononeproductionsourcethananother,there beyondbudgetallocationsand maybeincentivestoreporthigherproductionfiguresfornewoilratherthan theauditingandcontrolofpublic oilfromtheoriginalthreefields. expenditure.”139Italsorequires effectivedemocraticinstitutions.
3.3 Filling Out the Legal Framework – Building on Law 001 Chad’sLaw001providedthelegalskeletonofapetroleumrevenuemanagement system,butmuchremainstobefleshedoutbothinlawandinpractice.Manyofthe Institutionsrelatedto keyaspects–ormodalities–ofChad’srevenuemanagementsystemremainedunclear thejudiciaryorthe evenafterthestartofpetroleumproduction.ThiswasnotincompliancewithChad’s ruleoflawarenot loanagreementswiththeWorldBank,whichrequiredcompletionofallnecessary earmarkedasapriority implementationdecreesbytheendof2001.140 sector,thus,little TheWorldBank’sInspectionPanelreportnotedthatneitherastabilizationfundnor apparenteffortexists asterilizationmechanismhadbeenspelledoutintherevenuemanagementlaworthe tostrengthenthose loanagreementsandthattheBank“shouldhaveaddressedthisseriousrisktopoverty branchesofgovernment reductionobjectivesinamoredefinitemanner.”141 thatmightserveas acounterweightto Sterilization and Stabilization presidentialdecree. AfterlongnegotiationsbetweentheWorldBankandthegovernment,decreeswere finallyissuedonJuly1,2003,tocovertheestablishmentoftherevenuestabilization andsterilizationmechanisms,aswellastoprovidefurtherclarificationonthe “additionality”ofspendingintheprioritysectorsandthefunctioningoftheCollège. (SeeSectionFour,“JustAddOil”:AccountabilityfromScratch) Stabilizationfundsareusedtomanageexternalrisksduetopricevolatility–surplus earningsarestowedawaywhenoilpricesarehighanddrawnuponwhenoilprices arelow.Thehighvolatilityofoilpricesmakesitextremelydifficultforoil-dependent countriestoplanandbudgetgovernmentrevenuesandexpenditures.Initsfirstyearof production,Chad’soilshipmentshavesoldforbetween$25and$44perbarrel,and benchmarkBrentcrudepriceshavefluctuatedby$3or$4inasingleday.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 45 ThereisbroadagreementwithintheIFIsontheneedforstabilizationfundsto smoothoutoilpriceshocksandenableefficientbudgetingandplanningforpoverty reduction,butnoAfricanoilproducerhasaneffectivestabilizationfund.Suchfunds Thehighvolatility aretechnicallydifficulttomanageandcomeunderstrongpoliticalpressuretobe ofoilpricesmakesit usedforimmediatepurposes.Oilstabilizationfundscanonlybeusefuliftheyare extremelydifficultfor relativelylargeowingtosignificantmarketpricefluctuations.Theyseemtoworkbest, oil-dependentcountries oneWorldBankobservernotes,“whereoildoesnotdominatethelocaleconomyand toplanandbudget wherealongtraditionofgoodgovernanceexists,asinNorway.”142 governmentrevenues andexpenditures.Inits AccordingtoDecrees238and239,ofthe90percentofdirectrevenuestobe firstyearofproduction, depositedinthespecialtreasuryaccountatBEAC,80percentistobedepositedin Chad’soilshipments asecond“sterilizationaccount,”fromwhichdisbursementswillbemadequarterly havesoldforanywhere tolocalcommercialbanksaccordingtoapprovedbudgetexpenditures.Alldirectoil between$25and revenuesreceivedinexcessofbudgeted(predicted)revenueswillbedepositedinthis $44perbarreland sterilizationaccount. benchmarkBrentcrude priceshavefluctuated Whenactualrevenuesdonotmeetplannedrevenues,thestabilizationmechanismis by$3or$4inasingle activated.Whenplannedrevenuesexceedactualrevenuesbyupto20percent,the dayduring2004. differenceiswithdrawnfromthesterilizationaccount.Ifthedifferenceexceeds20 percent,thenthebudgetmustberevised.Ifthissituationlastsformorethanthree months,thegovernmentmustrevisethemacroeconomicframeworkandthemedium- termexpenditureframework. Givenpricevolatility,maintainingthestabilizationmechanismwillnecessitate Maintainingthe significanttechnicalcapacityandpoliticalwillonthepartofthegovernment.Already, stabilizationmechanism theIMFhassaidthatthegovernment’s2004budgetsetasidelessoftheearmarkedoil willnecessitate revenue–$13.3million(6.785billionCFAF)–underthestabilizationmechanismthan 143 significanttechnical advisedbyIMFstaff. capacityandpolitical Itisclearthatawell-functioningstabilizationmechanismiscrucialtoChad’ssuccess willonthepartof inoilrevenuemanagement,butitisalsolikelythatChad,withoutahistoryofgood thegovernment.The governanceorstronggovernmentinstitutions,willfinditdifficulttomanagesucha IMFhassaidthatthe mechanism. government’s2004 budgetsetsasideless Future Generation Funds oftheearmarkedoil revenueunderthe FutureGenerationFunds(FGFs)areusedtosavemoney“forarainyday”–to stabilizationmechanism investaportionofpresentoilrevenuetoprepareforapost-oilfuture.AsNorway thanadvisedbyIMF haslearned,theyarealsopotentiallyusefulinpreventing“Dutchdisease”andthe staff. overheatingofaneconomyduringoilwindfallperiods.Insomecountries,FGFshave beensetupbuthavenotbeensufficientlysecuretoavoid“earlywithdrawals”by politicians,corruptionandmismanagement.EvenincountriessuchasNorway,there hasbeenenormouspoliticalpressuretospendthemoneysoonerratherthanlater. FutureGenerationFundsrequiregoodoveralleconomicmanagement;todate,there arenoknowncasesofawell-administeredFGFownedbyabadly-runstate.144 TheissueofFGFshasproventobedivisivewithintheIFIs.Theviewthatsuchfunds canscarcelybecontemplatedinacontextofdirepovertycontrastswiththatofacross- the-boardenthusiastswhociteexamplesfromNorwayandtheStateofAlaska–two casesthathardlysharetheconditionsofsub-SaharanAfrica.145TheIMFhasexplicitly advisedagainstFGFsinthecaseofCongo-Brazzaville,citingtheneedforpostwar reconstruction.ChadhasaprovisionfortheestablishmentofaFGFaspartofits revenuemanagementscheme,andoneisrecommendedforEquatorialGuineaonthe basisofthecountry’sevidentlackofabsorptivecapacity. AccordingtotheloanagreementbetweentheWorldBankandChad,“Moneys depositedintheFutureGenerationsFundshallbeinvested,underprudentialrulesand investmentarrangementssatisfactorytotheBank,inlong-terminvestmentinstruments. Upontheirliquidation,proceedsofsuchinvestmentsshallbeusedtobenefitpoverty
46 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues reductionobjectives.TheBorrowershalladoptnotlaterthanDecember31,2001, suchprudentialrulesandinvestmentarrangementssatisfactorytotheBank....”146 TheoutlinesofChad’sFutureGenerationsFundarecontainedinadecreefinally issuedonMarch18,2004.Alittleover5.8billionCFAF($11.3million)wasbudgeted fordepositintotheFGFfor2004,while12.53billionCFAF($24.5million)wasset asidefortheFGFin2005.Accordingtothedecree,nomoneymaybewithdrawn fromtheFGFunlesstotaloilrevenuesarelessthanorequalto10percentofthetotal staterevenuesfortheprecedingyear.Themaximumwithdrawalcannotexceedthe totalamountoffundsdepositedintheFGFfortheprecedingyear. AninvestmentcommitteefortheFGFiscomposedoftheprimeminister,theminister offinance,theministerofpetroleum,theministerofplanning,thenationaldirector ofBEAC(currentlyabrother-in-lawofPresidentDéby)andonememberofthe Collège,selectedbyhisorhercolleagues.Withthepossibleexceptionofthemember oftheCollège,thepresidentofChaddirectlyappointsallmembersoftheinvestment committee,whichisresponsiblefordefininganinvestmentstrategyfortheFGF. AFGFaccounthasbeenestablishedatBEAC,butaninvestmentstrategyhasyet tobedeveloped.BEACwillchooseaninternationalfinancialinstitutiontomanage investmentsonitsbehalf,withtheinvestmentcommitteehavingapprovalauthority overthecontract.BoththeinvestmentcommitteeandtheCollègehavethepower toorder,onanadhocbasis,auditsoftheperformanceandmanagementofthe investmentfund. Asusual,manyquestionsremain.Whatsortsofauditswillbeconductedandhow willtheybefinanced?Willtheauditsbemadepublic?Doestheinvestmentcommittee havethenecessarycompetencetoevaluatehowwelltheinternationalinvestmentfirm ismanagingtheFGF?Howwilltheinvestmentcommitteefulfillitsdutiesandwill itmanagethefundinthelongterminterestofallChadians?Howwillthemoney eventuallybespent?
Money for the Oil-Producing Region Thecommunitiesnearesttotheoilproductionhaveexperiencedthemostsignificant socialandenvironmentalimpactsfromtheproject.(SeeBox8).Inthedesignof therevenuemanagementplan,5percentofdirectrevenuesweretobeallocated todecentralizedlocalauthoritiesforpovertyreductionprograms.Chad’spolitical decentralizationprogramhasbeendelayedforyears,andattheendof2004there remainednolocallyelectedgovernmentbodies.Consequently,thegovernmentargued thataninterimmechanismhadtobedevelopedtohandlethecash.Thisinterim mechanismisthecauseofsomeconcernasitpresentsfurtheropportunitiesfor governmentrent-seeking. ItwasnotuntilMarch18,2004,thatDecreeNo.457wasissuedregardingmodalities forthetemporarymanagementofrevenuesfortheoil-producingregion.Anaccount inthenameoftheproducingregionwasestablishedattheBEAC.InChad’s2004 budget,$5.1million(2.6billionCFAF)wasallocatedtotheproducingregion. Theverydefinitionoftheoil-producingregionwasstillunderdiscussionbetween theWorldBankandthegovernmentwellinto2004.Eventuallythegovernment issuedDecreeNo.457onSeptember29,2004,indicatingthatthisregionwould correspondtotheadministrativestructureoftheregionofLogoneOriental,rather thanasmallergeographicareaclosertothethreeDobafields.Thisdecreealso establishedaprovisionalcommitteetomanagethespecialearmarkedfundsforthe region.Thecommitteeiscomposedofninemembersfromgovernment,civilsociety andtraditionalauthorities.Thecommittee,withanofficeinthetownofDoba,is responsibleforselectingandapprovingprojectsof“regionalinterest”inlinewiththe nationaldevelopmentstrategy.Thedecreespecifiesthatthemoneywillstillbesubject
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 47 totheoversightoftheCollège,butthatdecisionsregardingtheallocationofmoney betweenprojectsintheregionwillbemadebytheinterimcommittee.Thecommittee woulddissolveitselfonceelectionsforlocalauthoritystructureshavetakenplace. ThegovernmentnamedcommitteemembersinOctober2004,but,asoflate2004, noneoftheearmarkedmoneyhadbeendisbursed.147 Atleastoneprominentoppositionpolitician,NgarlejyYorongar,adeputyofthe NationalAssemblyfromtheoil-producingregion,hasexpresseddismayatthis temporarymechanismformanagingfundsearmarkedfortheregion.148Inanopen letterinOctober2004,hearguedthatuntildecentralizedlocalauthoritiesareput inplaceintheoil-producingregion,theallocationshouldremainsequesteredinan offshoreaccount.Anyotherapproachwouldbean“operationtendingtodivertthe incomes”destinedfortheregion.Inaddition,Yorongararguedthatthetemporary mechanismwasitselfinviolationofArticleEightoftherevenuemanagementlaw callingforthefundstobemanagedbyelectedlocalauthorities.
3.4 The End of the Honeymoon Remarkably,theExxonMobil-ledconsortiumandthegovernmentofChadwerestill debatingthemethodformeasuringproduction,salesandcalculatingrevenuesmonths afterDobacrudestartedtobeexported.Indeed,revenuedeterminantswerestilla Remarkably,the subjectofdisputeinNovember2004,overayearafterthefirstexports.Allrevenue ExxonMobil-led paymentsintoChad’sescrowaccountinLondonsincetheendof2003havebeenpaid consortiumandthe onthebasisofExxonMobil’sviewofthematterandareconsideredbythegovernment governmentofChad ofChadtobeprovisional,ratherthanfinal,payments. werestilldebatingthe methodformeasuring Theselongrunningbehind-the-scenesdisputesflaredintotheopenatthebeginningof production,salesand October2004,afewdaysbeforeChadwastohostitsfirst-everinternationaloiland calculatingrevenues gasconference.Astatementissuedbythe“PresidentialPressService”onOctober monthsafterDoba 7,entitled“Chadianoil:swindling,murkinessandfraudbytheConsortiuminthe crudestartedtobe exploitationofDobacrude,”waswidelycoveredbyChadianstateradioandtelevision exported. andlaidoutalitanyofcomplaints,including: •A“fundamentaldivergence”overtheapplicationofExxonMobil’s1988 conventionwiththegovernment.Thecommuniquésaid,“Despiteacalltoorder issuedrepeatedlybytheChadiangovernment...therehasbeenonlysilenceand amanifestrefusaltorespectpreviousundertakings.”149 •AngeroverthelowsalepriceofDobacrudewhenBrentcrudepriceswere peakingoverthe$50/bblmark.“ThesalepriceofChadianoilislessthan20 dollars,yetthebarrelpriceis50dollarsontheinternationalmarkettoday.This practiceputsconsiderablestrainonthemeagreresourcesChadexpectsofits oil.”(Accordingtothecommuniqué,Chadiancrudewasbeingsoldataquality discountof$10.12/bbloffofBrentprices,witha$10.52transportationcost deduction.) •Receivingnoroyaltypaymentsforthefirstquarterofproduction.The communiquésaidthatthegovernmenthadreceivednoroyaltypaymentsforoil productionfromJulytoSeptember2003becausetheConsortiumconsidered thisas“stockmort”oroilusedtoinitiallyfillthepipelinethatwouldonlybe paidforattheendoftheproject’slifespan. •ExxonMobil’sinsistenceonmeteringDobacrudeattheloadingfacilityat theendofthepipelineinKribi,ratherthanatthebeginningofthepipeline inKomé,wheremetersregisteraslightlyhigheramount.Accordingtothe communiqué,Article13ofthe1988conventionindicatesmeteringshouldbe doneatKomé.
48 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues ExxonMobilappearedblindsidedbythecommuniquéandwasaskedforcomment bythepressbeforeithadseenthestatementorreceivedanyofficialgovernment notice.Inastatementseveraldayslater,ExxonMobilsaid,“Theconsortiumhas continuouslyconformedtotheagreementsinforcewiththegovernment...and withalltheChadianlawsthataffectouractivitiesinChad.Contrarytocomments attributedtothegovernmentwehaveconsistentlycommunicatedallrelevantcrude oilsalesinformationtothegovernmentasprovidedforinouragreementswiththe government.”ExxonMobilnoted“fromtimetotimedifferencesofopinionmay arisewithrespecttocontractinterpretation.Intheseinstancesourobjectiveisto seekequitablesolutionsthroughdiscussions.However,therearedisputeresolution mechanismsintheagreements,includingarbitration,whichmaybeusedtoresolve certainimpasses.”150 Duringthe“ChadInternationalOilandGasConferenceandShowcase”attheMinistry ofForeignAffairsinN’Djamena(October13-14,2004),ExxonMobilrepresentatives werenotablyabsentfromtheVIPseatingsection.PresidentDéby,inhisopening remarks,struckaconciliatorytoneanddidnotmentionthecommuniquédirectly, sayingthatChadanditsoilbusinesspartnersshould“cooperateindignityandrespect oneanother...Werequestfromourpartnerstohavegoodfaithandhonestyinorder tohelpusavoidthesyndromeofcertainoilproducingandexportingcountries.Let’s notworkalone,butintotaltransparencyforthebenefitofall.”151 AccordingtoasubsequentreportinAfricanConfidential,“governmentofficialswere anxioustodisassociatethemselvesfromthe[communiqué]...Aslightlyembarrassed oilministryofficialsaiditcamefromthepresidency,whilepresidentialspokesman HassanGuedallahsaiditwas‘notanofficialcommuniqué,justanarticlewrittenbya journalistofthepresidentialpressservice’.”152 ComingontheeveofChad’sfirstconferencedesignedtoattractnewinvestors, thetimingofacommuniquéaccusingtheConsortiumofbreachofcontractwas puzzling.Themotivationforgoingpublicwiththedisputeisunclear.Perhapsit wasanegotiatingployonthepartofthegovernmenttoextractabetterdealwith ExxonMobilonexploration,oritmayhavebeenamovebyelementswithinthe Itisclearthatthe administrationtoembarrassanotherfactionwithingovernment.Itmayalsobeseenas governmenthasa thecomplaintofagovernmentthatisnowrealizing,withoilrevenuescomingin,the distinctlackofcapacity poordealthathasbeenstruckforthecountry. tomonitorproduction, Withoutaccesstothe1988conventionandsubsequentamendments,itisdifficultto verifytheaccuracyof evaluatethemeritofsomeaspectsofthegovernment’scomplaints.Itisclear,though, royaltypaymentsonits thatthediscountforthequalityofDobacrudeissetbytheinternationaloiltrading ownortounderstand marketandnotbyanaspectoftheconvention.Regardingthetransporttariff,atone manytechnicalaspects pointChadiangovernmentestimateshadsetthiscostat$5/bbl,whileaninternal oftheoilindustry, WorldBankstudyhadsetthecostataround$9/bbl,closetoExxonMobil’scharge. includingcalculations oftransportcosts. Itisalsoclearthatthegovernmenthasadistinctlackofcapacitytomonitor production,verifytheaccuracyofroyaltypaymentsonitsownortounderstand manytechnicalaspectsoftheoilindustry,includingcalculationsoftransportcosts. TheConsortiumitselfprovidesmuchofwhattrainingisgiventothegovernment’s MinistryofPetroleum.Withfrequentcabinetandministrychanges,capacitythatis builtintheChadiangovernmentisoftenlostsoonthereafter. Atthesametime,ExxonMobilmayhavecontributedtothedisputebynotbeingas forthcomingwithinformationasitcouldhavebeen.Soonafterthecommuniquéwas published,ExxonMobilorganizedathree-dayworkshoponthedeterminationofoil revenuesandthepricingoftheDobablendforChadiangovernmentofficials,members oftheCollège.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 49 AccordingtomembersoftheCollègewhometwithPresidentDébythedayafterthe communiquéwasreleased,thegovernmentplannedtohiretwointernationalauditing firmstoinvestigatetechnicalandfinancialaspectsoftheproject,includinga“cost audit”designedtodetermineifallthecostdeductionsthatExxonMobilhastaken arelegitimate.
Managing Oil Revenues Without Capacity MorethanoneyearintoChad’slifeasanoilproducer,itisclearthatmanyaspects oftheoilrevenuemanagementsystemareonlynowbeingsetupandstilllack definition.Atthesametime,thereisaprofoundlackoftechnicalcapacityinthe petroleumministryandotherrelevantdepartmentstomasterthetechnicaldimensions ofoilproductionandtoprovideeffectivemonitoringofoilactivities.Manybasic aspectsregardingthecalculationofoilrevenuesarethesubjectofongoingdisputes betweenthegovernmentandtheoilconsortium.Andtherearemanyelementsofthe project–renownedforitstransparency–suchasthe1988convention,whichremain confidentialorhiddenfrompublicoversightforallpracticalpurposes.Itisdifficult foroutsideobservers,or,itseems,evenfortheChadiangovernment,todetermine whetherExxonMobil’srevenuepaymentsaccuratelyreflectwhatisowed.
50 3. Chad’s Oil Revenues 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch
“Everythingdependsonwhetherthelawwillbeadheredto.”
– Christopher Goldthwaite, former U.S. Ambassador to Chad153 “IftheWorldBankdoesn’tmonitorit,themoneywillgowhoknowswhere!”
– Pierre Djasro, Chef de Canton, Miandoum, Chad
Perhapsthemostinnovativeandmosttalked-aboutaspectoftheChad-Cameroon pipelineprojectisthejointgovernment-civilsocietybodyestablishedtomonitorthe useofChad’soilrevenues.Inresponsetopressurefromcivilsocietyorganizations concernedthat,inacountrycharacterizedbyendemiccorruptionandpolitical repression,thebenefitsoftheprojectwouldnotreachthepoor,theWorldBank conditioneditsfinancingforthepipelineprojectonthedevelopmentofarevenue managementplan.Theplancentersonapetroleumrevenueoversightcommittee establishedbyLaw001calledtheCollègedeContrôleetdeSurveillancedes Perhapsthemost RessourcesPétrolières(theCollège).(SeeSectionThree,OilRevenues:Chad’s innovativeandmost FirstTasteof“BlackGold”)TheCollègeistaskedwithapprovingandverifyingthe 4expendituresofoilmoneyinlinewithrelevantfiscalandprocurementregulationsand talked-aboutaspectof theChad-Cameroon theauthorizednationalbudget—quiteanambitiousmandateforacommitteeofnine pipelineprojectisthe part-timemembersandonlyfourtechnicalstaff. jointgovernment-civil TheexperienceoftheCollègesinceitwasconstitutedin2001representsamicrocosm societybodyestablished ofthedifficultiesofcreatingafunctioningsystemofpoliticalaccountabilityina tomonitortheuseof countryunfamiliarwithsuchmechanisms.Despitethesedifficulties,theCollègehas Chad’soilrevenues. madepromisingstridestoestablishitselfandexertitsauthority.Althoughprogresshas beenmadewithinthelast18monthsonequippingtheCollègeandfamiliarizingits memberswiththeirresponsibilities,thechallengesaheadaredaunting.TheCollège isempoweredtorejectproposedexpendituresandtoshedlightonthegovernment’s use(ormisuse)oftheoilrevenues,butwhetheractionsaretakenonthebasisoftheir Theexperienceofthe findingsultimatelydependsonChad’sjudiciaryandthegovernment’spoliticalwill. Collègesinceitwas Alawisonlyasgoodasitsenforcement,andwhiletheCollègecanhelpapplythe constitutedin2001 law,itcannotupholdit.Itremainstobeseenwhetherexposureofwrongdoingwill representsamicrocosm precipitateanysanctionsorremedies,andwhethertheCollègeitselfwillfilltheshoes ofthedifficultiesof of“towncrier”forthecountryiflawsgounheeded. creatingafunctioning systemofpolitical 4.1 Collège Composition accountabilityina countryunfamiliar Thenine-memberoversightcommitteewasinitiallydesignedtoincludeseven withsuchmechanisms. governmentrepresentativesandtwocivilsocietydelegates.154However,pressure Despitethese fromChadianorganizationsandtheirinternationalalliesledtothelaw’samendment, difficulties,theCollège increasingthenumberofcivilsocietyrepresentativesonthecommitteetofour,three hasmadepromising peoplefromvariousconstituenciesandonereligiousrepresentative(whoseseatwould stridestoestablishitself alternatebetweenMuslimandChristiancommunities).155Giventhestrongcontrolthat andexertitsauthority. theMPShasoverthegovernment,manyviewthefourcivilsocietyrepresentativesas theCollège’sonlylegitimatelyindependentmembers. Today,theCollègeiscomposedofninemembersincluding: • onemagistrate,memberoftheSupremeCourt • oneDeputy(representativeoftheNationalAssembly) • oneSenator(NB:TheSenatehasneverbeenconstituted;seatoccupiedby aDeputy) • TheNationalDirectoroftheBankofCentralAfricanStates(BEAC)
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 51 • TheGeneralDirectoroftheTreasuryandPublicAccounting(thecentral Treasurer) • Arepresentativeoflaborunions • Arepresentativeofhumanrightsassociations • Arepresentativeofnon-governmentaldevelopmentorganizations • Arepresentativeofthereligiouscommunities(alternatingbetweenMuslims andChristians).156 WiththeexceptionoftheDirectorofBEAC(theequivalenttotheChadiancentral Theoilrevenue bank)andtheTreasuryrepresentative,whooccupyseatsontheCollègebyvirtueof managementlawis theirgovernmentoffices,allothermembersareappointedbytheirpeers. onlyasgoodasits enforcement,andwhile ThepresidentoftheCollège,whoiselectedbytheninemembers,hassignificant theCollègecanhelp responsibilities.Heorsheisresponsiblefor:theadministrationoftheCollège; applythelaw,itcannot representingtheCollègeinallofficialceremonies;convokingandpresidingover upholdit. meetings;overseeingtheCollège’sownexpenditureswithinitsbudget;recruiting thenecessarypersonnelfortheCollège’sfunctioninginaccordancewithrelevant legislation;conveyingactsoftheCollègetothegovernmentandotherparties;and signingnecessarydocumentsprovidingtheCollège’sapprovalforbudgetexpenditures anddisbursements.Whilethepresidenthasthesesignificantresponsibilities, differentofficersintheCollègearedelegatedvariousrolesandtheCollègereliesona consensus-drivenapproachtodecision-making. ThefirsttwopresidentsoftheCollègewereboththedirectorsofthenationalbranch ofBEAC.Thistrendfosteredawidespreadmisconceptionthatthedirectorofthe centralbankwasautomaticallythepresidentoftheCollège.However,whilethe directorofBEACisautomaticallyamemberoftheCollège,hedoesnothavearight toanyparticularofficewithintheCollège.Breakingwiththepast,onNovember4, 2004,theCollègeelectedoneofthedeputiesfromtheNationalAssembly,Lamana Abdoulaye,asitsthirdpresident.Atthesametime,themembersaffirmedthat Withtheexceptionof ThérèseMékombé,NGOrepresentative,shouldremainasvice-presidentandthat theDirectorofBEAC unionrepresentativeMichelBarkashouldcontinueasthegeneralsecretary.157Critics (theequivalentto note,however,thatwhileLamanaisnotPresidentDéby’sbrother-in-law,asaformer theChadiancentral presidentialadvisorandmemberoftherulingparty,heisalsoclosetotheregime. bank)andtheTreasury representative,who Together,thepresident,vicepresidentandgeneralsecretaryconstitutethe“Executive occupyseatsonthe Committee”oftheCollège.In2005–thefirstfullyearofpeakproductionoil Collègebyvirtue revenues–theyhavetheirworkcutoutforthem. oftheirgovernment offices,allother 4.2 Objectives and Responsibilities membersareappointed bytheirpeers. TheprincipleobjectiveoftheCollège,accordingtoitsownoperationsmanual –adoptedbelatedlyin2003–istomakecertainthatChad’soilrevenuesareused tofightpoverty.TheCollègeistaskedwithensuringthatpetroleumrevenuesare allocatedincompliancewithnationalregulations,ingoodfaithandtransparently,so astopreventanylostearningsforChad.Accordingtothelegaltextsofestablishment, themissionoftheCollègeistoverifycompliancewiththerelevantfinancelaws,and authorizeandcontrolwithdrawalsfromthespecialaccounts.158 TheCollègehastheauthoritytoexertitscontrolinfourkeyways.First,byverifying thecorrespondencebetweenproductionvolumesanddepositsintotheChadian accounts;second,byensuringthatrevenuesareallocatedaccordingtothelaw;third, byparticipatinginthepreparationofbudgetsforprioritysectorexpendituresof petroleumrevenues;andfinally,byoverseeingtheexecutionofthebudget,ensuring compliancewithprocurementregulationsandproperimplementationofprojects throughdeskreviewsandinvestigativemissions.159
52 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch Intheory,theCollègeistoworkwithotherauthoritiesintheChadiangovernmentto exercise“upstream”control–verificationofrevenuesreceivedfromthethreeDoba fieldsandtheformulationofthenationalbudget–aswellas“downstream”control overtheexecutionofthebudgetandtheimplementationofindividualprojects.The Collègeistotakepartindebatesregardingtheformulationofthedraftpriority sectorspendingplansandaggregatenationalbudget,andisgivenanopportunityto participateinthediscussionofproposedexpendituresattheinter-ministerialBudget Committee.Thedraftbudget(includingmediumtermexpenditureplansandprogram plans)issupposedtobesenttotheCollègeatleast10daysbeforeitisdiscussedby theCouncilofMinisters.160TheCollègeistoverifythatthebudgetisconsistentwith therelevantlaws,andtoflaganyaspectsoftheapprovedbudgetthatdeviatefromthe revenuemanagementlaworprioritiesestablishedinthePRSP.Thecommentsofthe CollègeonthedraftbudgetaretobeconveyedbothtotheCouncilofMinistersandto theNationalAssemblywhentheproposedbudgetissubmittedforadoption.161 Oncethebudgetisadopted,theCollègeisrequiredtoapproveallcommitmentsof fundsforspecificprojectsfinancedfrompetroleumrevenues,andallpaymentson TheCollègehasjust thebasisofworkcarriedout.Withregardtopublicprocurement,forallprojectsthat fiveworkingdaysto cost10millionCFAF[approximately$20,000]ormore,theCollègeischargedwith reviewrequestsfor verifyingthecomplianceoftenderswithrelevantlawsandstandardprocedures.The commitmentsand Collègehasjustfiveworkingdaystoreviewrequestsfordisbursementsoffundsfor disbursementsoffunds proposedprojects.Ifitdoesnotissueanapprovalorrejection(withjustifications) forproposedprojects. withinfivedays,itsconsentisassumed.Decisionsregardingtheapprovalofproposed Ifitdoesnotissuean expendituresaretakenonthebasisofrecommendationsfromthetechnicalstaff, approvalorrejection 162 andrequireatwo-thirdsmajorityincaseswherethereisnoconsensus. Following (withjustifications) disbursementoffunds,theCollègehasthepowertoconductfieldinvestigationsof withinfivedays,its projectimplementation. consentisassumed. Insum,theCollègehasatleastfouropportunitiesforinterventioninthespendingof oilmonies: • Duringbudgetformulation • Atrequestforcommitmentoffunds • Atrequestforpaymentoffunds • Duringprojectexecution(Seechart,“StagesintheBudgetExecution Process,”onPage54)
Regular Monitoring of Accounts TheCollègeregularlymonitorsthebalanceofandtransactionsinalltheaccounts designatedtoreceiveoilrevenues.Oneofthetechnicalstaffhasprimary responsibilityfortrackingthebalancesoftheoffshoreaccounts,aswellasthose maintainedinChad.Although,intheory,theTreasuryistosubmitthebalancesofthe offshoreaccounts(atCitibank)andthenationalaccounts(inBEAC,CBTandSGBT) totheCollège,theCollègestaffmustregularlyrequesttheinformationfromthe MinistryofFinanceandEconomy. TheCollègemonitorsandanalyzestheevolutionofpetroleumrevenuespaidtoChad, withattentiontothepriceofoilandthevolumeofsalereportedbytheConsortium. Accordingtoitsoperationsmanual,theCollègeistoverifythatthetruenumberof barrelsproducedcorrespondstowhatisindicatedinofficialreports.Whileitdoes notreceiveproductionfiguresdirectlyfromtheConsortium,theCollègeobtainsdata aboutoilsalesviatheMinistryofPetroleum,whichhasdailyaccesstotheproduction andsalemeters,ifitsochooses.163Perhapsmoreimportantly,theCollègehasthe righttocalluponindependentexpertstoverifythedeterminationandreporting ofrevenues.164WhiletheCollègehasaccesstodataonroyaltypayments,itdoes notcurrentlyhaveaccesstoinformationondividendspaidtoChadinitsroleasa shareholderinTOTCOandCOTCO.165
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 53 Stages in the Budget Execution Process
Budget Expenditure initiated by line ministries Execution
Amount > 10.000.000 CFAF ($16,700) Amount < 10,000,000 CFAF Contract Needed Proforma
Solicitation of Bids
Collège is Informed
Opening of Bids (Tender Commission)
Collège Evaluation of Bids: technical undercomission Examines Report prepares report
Collège is Contract Award (Tender Commission) Informed
Stage 1: Commitment Ministry of (an act by which the spending agencies Finance incur obligations)
Work Completed/Goods Delivered Line Ministries/ Spending Agencies Stage 2: Verification (the process of checking goods delivered, work done and exact amount due)
Payment Request Stage 3: Order To Pay Countersigned (order given to Treasury to pay) by Collège
Stage 4: Payment (from Special Treasury Account housed at a commercial bank in Chad)
The CCSRP reserves the right to be present, as an observer, on the Tender Commission especially when the contract is for a large amount or when strong suspicions of collusion arise.
Source:TawfikRamtoolah,USDepartmentofTreasury,AdvisortotheCollege,October2003.
54 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch InJuly2004,theWorldBankbeganpostingthebalanceoftheCitibankaccounts onitswebsite.TheGovernmentofChadhasnotyetmadeanysuchdisclosures. (SeeSectionThree,OilRevenues:Chad’sFirstTasteof“BlackGold”)Initially, membersoftheCollègecomplainedofpoorservicefromCitibankstaff.Itwasonly afterCitibankwasalertedtothepoliticalandeconomicimportanceofthisparticular clientthatmeasuresweretakentofacilitatetheCollège’sdirectaccesstoaccount balances.SincetheCollègeofficeswerecompletedin2003andequippedwith computersandageneratorallowingregularelectricitysupply,themembershave InternetaccesstotheCitibankaccountbalances.However,thebalancesofaccounts heldinChad,atBEACandtwolocalcommercialbanks,arenotavailableon-line.
Upstream Analysis of Budget TheCollègeistoparticipateintheanalysisofthedraftbudgettoensurethatthe contentisgenerallycompliantwiththelawonthemanagementofpetroleum resources,andthatproposedexpendituresareconsistentwiththenationalpoverty reductionstrategy(PRSP).166Intheory,this“upstream”involvementinthedefinition ofthebudgetshouldallowtheCollègetobefamiliarwiththeprojectsthatwillbe submittedtoitforapproval,beforetheyareaskedtoevaluateandrespondtorequests fordisbursementwithinadelayoffivedays.Nevertheless,membersoftheCollège continuetocallforanextensioninthetimetheyareallottedtoreviewproposed expenditures,arguingthataperiodoffiveworkingdaysdoesnotallowforathorough considerationofprojects. TheseproceduresregardingCollègeparticipationinthebudgetingprocesswere notfollowed,however,fortheelaborationofthe2004spendingplan.TheCollège receivedthedraft2004budgetfromtheMinistryofFinanceonDecember3,2003, onlyonedaybeforeitwasrequiredtosubmititsobservations.167In2005,compliance withtheaboveprocedureswasstillnotstandardpractice.Althoughthedraftbudget for2005wascompletedonschedule,itwasonlyatthebehestoftheCollège, throughanofficiallettertothegovernment,thatitwasprovidedwithanopportunity tocomment–andthen,onlyafterthebudgethadbeenpreparedforsubmissionto theCouncilofMinisters.Thedifficultiesexperiencedinboth2004and2005reveal Althoughthedraft persistentobstaclestotheCollègeexercisingits“upstream”control,andmayindicate budgetfor2005was reluctanceonthepartofthegovernmenttoallowittodoso. completedonschedule, itwasonlyatthebehest Procurement Oversight oftheCollège,through TheCollègeisalsoresponsibleforensuringthatprojectsfinancedwithpetroleum anofficiallettertothe revenuesfollowproperbiddingandcontractprocedures.Withheightenedscrutiny government,thatit ofthemanagementofthepetroleumaccountsandthenational-levelallocationof wasprovidedwithan revenues,therisksofcorruptionandmisuseoffundsmaymigrate“downstream” opportunitytocomment. inthespendingprocess,surfacinginirregularprocurementpracticesandflawed Thedifficulties projectexecution.Patronagesystemscommonlyemergeinoileconomieswhere experiencedinboth actorsengageinrent-seekingbehaviortocapturepetrodollarsthroughunproductive 2004and2005reveal orcorruptmeansandrulersdistributeoilrevenuetokeyalliestoexertcontrolovera persistentobstaclesto politicalsystem.168TheWorldBankwrotethatinChad,“[t]hegovernanceenvironment theCollègeexercising hastendedtofosteralocalprivatesectordependentonpatronage,inwhichpolitical its“upstream”control, connectionsaremoreimportantdeterminantsofbusinesssuccessthanmanagerial andmayindicate competence.”169AcablefromaWesternembassyinChadtothehomecountrycapital reluctanceonthepart notedinMarch2003: ofthegovernmentto allowittodoso. Wehavereceivedseveralreportsthatthoseclosetothepresident andthecentersofpowerareestablishingtheirownconstruction companies,non-governmentalorganizationsandotherenterprises thatcanbidonpriority-sectorcontracts.Theyarethuspositioning themselvestobenefitpersonallyfromtheoilrevenueswhileabiding bytheletterofthepetroleumlaw(albeitdemonstratingalimited understandingoftheprincipleofconflictofinterests.)170
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 55 Particularlyinlightofthesetendenciesandpastproblemswithimproperbidding proceduresandcronyisminChad,theCollège’soversightofhowprojectcontractsare awardedandexecutedisofutmostimportance. OneoftheCollège’sfourtechnicalstaffisresponsibleforprocurementoversight. Thisprocurementspecialisthastheresponsibilityofensuringthatallbidding proceduresandrelatedprocurementregulationsarefollowedforprojectstobe financedfrompetroleumrevenues.AccordingtoChad’scurrentprocurementcode, allprojectswithatotalcostof10millionCFAF(approximately$20,000)ormore mustbesubmittedtoacompetitivebiddingprocess.TheNationalAssemblyhas approvedarevisedprocurementcode,butitsimplementationhasbeenstalleddue todelayedissuanceofdecrees.AsofOctober2004,13ofthe20implementation decreesnecessarytobringtheprocurementlawintoeffecthadbeenpassed,andthe remainingsevenweretobeissuedsoon.However,the2005budgetdesignatesno Withheightened resourcesfortrainingthestaffofthegovernmentministriesandtheregionalofficers scrutinyofthe inthenewprocurementprocedures.171 managementofthe petroleumaccounts RecentauditsofpublicprocurementbytheChadianNationalDirectorofPublic andthenational-level Procurementfoundpoorcompliancewithregulations,highlightingrisksof“leakage” allocationofrevenues, intheprocurementstageofthespendingprocess.172AccordingtoaninternalWorld therisksofcorruption Bankreport: andmisuseoffundsmay migrate“downstream” “During2002-2003,reportsoftheministryofFinance’sGeneral inthespendingprocess, InspectorateandtheAGOrevealedcontinuingproblemsinpublic- surfacinginirregular fundmanagement.Procurementregulationswereoftenignored, procurementpractices resultinginover-billing.Thequalityofexpenditurewaspoor,with andflawedproject moreemphasisontheneedsofthecentraladministration,rather execution. thanonimprovingdeliveryofbasicservices.Moreover,several instancesofcorruptionandembezzlementofsuppliesintendedfor localfacilitiesoccurred.”173 A“PublicExpenditureTrackingSurvey”oftheMinistryofNationalEducation showedthatonly38percentofbudgetedexpendituresonsuppliesactuallyreached theschoolsforwhichtheywereallocated.AccordingtotheWorldBank,thisisdue toappropriationofresourcesatintermediarylevels,toleakagesandinadequaterecord A“PublicExpenditure keepingandreporting,particularlyinthemonitoringofdeliveries.Thesefindings TrackingSurvey” callattentiontotheneedformuchmoreextensivereformsinbudgetexecutionand monitoring,andunderscoretheimportanceoftrackingoilrevenueexpenditureson oftheMinistryof 174 NationalEducation theground. showedthatonly38 SuchproblemsmayhaveaneffectontheCollège’swork.Whilealltheprojects percentofbudgeted submittedtotheCollègein2004seemtohavefollowedapplicableprocurement expendituresonsupplies procedures,contractingofthelargestprojectfinancedfromoilrevenuesin2004 actuallyreachedthe (thethree-year,35billionCFAF($68million)Ngoura-Bokororoadconstruction), schoolsforwhichthey wasalreadyinprocesswhensubmittedtotheCollège.Asaresult,theCollègehad wereallocated.These limitedopportunitytorevieworcommentontheplannedprojectorbiddingprocess. findingscallattention Nowitfacesthechallengeoftrackingevolvingexpendituresthroughouttheproject’s totheneedformuch three-yearimplementationtoensurethatpriceadjustmentsovertimedonotmask moreextensivereforms “leakages.”175 inbudgetexecution andmonitoring, Disbursements andunderscorethe TheCollègeistotrackandcontrolallpaymentordersreceivedfrompriority importanceoftracking sectors,andmaintainasummarytableofoperationsrealizedbypriorityministries oilrevenueexpenditures correspondingtotransactionsinthecommercialandBEACaccounts.Oneof ontheground. thetechnicalpersonnelisresponsibleforallpaymentsmadeintheprogressive disbursementsystem,wherebymoneyisreleasedintranchesasprogressismeasured onprojectimplementation.ThusateachstageofbudgetexecutionforwhichCollège
56 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch approvalisrequired,theprocurementspecialistandthepaymentspecialistsubmit theircommentsandrecommendationstothemembersoftheCollège,whobasetheir decisiononthecounseloftheirtechnicalstaff. Responsibilityforoversightofspendingineachoftheprioritysectorshasbeen delegatedtooneofthemembersoftheCollège.Forexample,MichelBarka,the laborrepresentativeandgeneralsecretaryfortheCollège,isresponsibleforthehealth sector,whileDobianAssingar,thehumanrightsrepresentative,isinchargeofpublic worksexpenditures.176Althoughthisdivisionoflaborhelpstofacilitatesystematic MembersoftheCollège trackingofexpenditures,somemembersoftheCollègecomplainthatwithout complainthatwithout particularexpertiseinthesectorforwhichtheyareresponsible,andgivenlimitedtime particularexpertisein toreviewprojectdossiers,theycannotnecessarilyverifythequalityofprojectsand thesectorforwhich safeguardagainstflawsinprojectdesignormisuseoffundsduringimplementation. theyareresponsible, andgivenlimited Investigating Expenditures timetoreviewproject Accordingtotherevenuemanagementlawandaccompanyingdecrees,theCollège dossiers,theycannot mayconductinvestigationsoftheMinistryofEconomyandFinanceandthetechnical necessarilyverifythe ministriesresponsiblefortheprioritysectorstoverifythatexpendituresundertaken qualityofprojectsand areexecutedinconformitywiththeapprovedbudgetandfollowpropercontractual safeguardagainstflaws procedures.However,theCollègedoesnotnecessarilyhavethefundsandcapacity inprojectdesignor necessarytoexercisethisinvestigativeauthority.IntheirquarterlyreportforJuly- misuseoffundsduring September2004,theCollègenotedthatithadnotconductedvisitstomanyofthesites implementation. ofprojectsfinancedbyoilbonusmoneyorrevenues,becauseofinsufficientbudget.177 Forexample,in2004,despitehavingrequested80millionCFAF($156,000)for monitoringmissions,theCollègereceivedonly4.1millionCFAF($8,000).178 Furthermore,withonlytwovehiclesavailableandlimitedstafftime,travelingto sometimesremoteprojectsitesinacountrymorethantwicethesizeofFranceisnot alwayspractical.
4.3 Performance of the Collège to Date
Oil Bonus Money as the Test Case Withonlytwovehicles TheCollègecutitsteethoverseeingtheuseofseven-plusbillionCFAF(approximately availableandlimited $13.7millionatcurrentratesofexchange)ofthe2000signingbonus–theamount stafftime,itisnot remainingafterapproximately$4.5millionwasspentonmilitaryequipmentand alwaysfeasibleforthe another7billionCFAF(morethan$10million)wasspentondiverseitems,from Collégetotravelto buildingrenovationtoroadmaintenance,tothepurchaseofover30vehiclesforthe remoteprojectsitesina government.Mostoftheseexpenditureswerenotsubmittedtothefinancialcontroller, countrymorethantwice didnotfollowprocurementproceduresand/orwerenotincludedintheofficialstate thesizeofFrance. budget.Afterasomewhatslowstart(aspendingplanfortheoilbonusmoneywasnot originallysubmittedtotheCollège),theCollègecontrolledthedisbursementofthe remainingbonusfundsandundertooksitevisitstoverifytheexecutionofsomeofthe approvedprojects. AlthoughtheCollègedid,intheend,exercisecontroloverexpendituresinmostof theprioritysectors,alargeportionoftheoilbonusremainderspentbytheMinistry Mostoftheearlyoil ofPublicWorkswasnotsubjecttotheCollège’soversight.Forexample,thepublic bonusexpenditureswere workssectorwithdrewmorethan1billionCFAFofthebonusmoney,whilethe notsubmittedtothe 179 Collègeonlyapproveddisbursementof235millionCFAF. TheMinistryofPublic financialcontroller,did Workshasproposedtouse998millionCFAFtofinancetheimprovementofa notfollowprocurement segmentofroadfromAbéchétoAdré,neartheSudaneseborder,andsome50million proceduresand/orwere 180 CFAFmoreforthepurchaseof20motorcyclesandthreevehicles. However,the notincludedinthe Collègehasvowednottoapproveanyfurthervehiclepurchasesuntilthoserecently officialstatebudget. boughtdepreciate.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 57 Getting to ‘No’ Inthefirstexerciseofitsoversightauthority,theCollègerefusedtoapprove disbursementofaportionofthebonusfundsdesignatedforafoodsecurityprogram, toaprojectthatincludedthepurchaseofseveralvehicles.TheCollègealsodisagreed Inthefirstexerciseof withtheproject’sdesign,whichplannedforthepurchaseofgrainfromSalamaatin itsoversightauthority, Chad,onthegroundsthatpurchasingthefoodlocallywouldnothelpalleviatethe theCollègerefusedto foodcrisis.181CivilsocietyobservershavenotedthatwhentheCollègemadeclearits approvedisbursementof intenttocontrolthedisbursementoftheoilbonusmoneyatameetingofthemanaging aportionofthebonus directorsoftheprioritysectorministries,thedirectorsweresoputoffthattheyno fundsdesignatedfora longerwantedtohearabouttheremainingbonusmoney,letalonesubmitspending foodsecurityprogram, planstotheclosescrutinyoftheCollège. toaprojectthat includedthepurchaseof Inthefirstquarterof2004,themembersoftheCollègeundertookinvestigationsofthe severalvehicles. expenditureofbonusmoney.Inthecourseofvisitstothesitesof30ofthepriority sectorprojectsfinancedfromthepetroleumbonus,theCollègefoundnumerous irregularitiesincludingincompleteprojects,waterlesswells,andchangestothe implementationplansforprojectsaftertheirapproval.InMoundou,wheremoney hadbeenapprovedfortheconstructionofatechnicalhighschool,localauthorities hadnoknowledgeoftheproject(thelastinformationtheyhadreceivedaboutahigh schooldatedfrom2000whenaprojectfinancedbyTaiwanesefundswasplanned). Inresponsetothisconfusion,theMinistryofNationalEducationexplainedthatthe Inthecourseofvisits projectwasnot,infact,forahighschool(ashadbeenapprovedbytheCollège), tothesitesof30ofthe buttheconstructionofprimaryschoolclassrooms.TheCollègenotedthatfurther prioritysectorprojects investigationwasnecessarytogettothebottomoftheconflictinginformation.Ofthe financedfromthe 12wellsvisitedintheregionofOuddai,onlytwowerefunctional.182 petroleumbonus,the Collègefoundnumerous Amongthereasonsfortheirregularitiesinprojectexecution,theCollège’s irregularitiesincluding investigationsfoundthefollowing:non-paymentofstart-upadvancestotheexecuting incompleteprojects, companies;theabsenceofpreliminarygeophysicalstudiestodeterminethenecessary waterlesswells, depthofwells;lackofsupervisionbytheprioritysectors;andthelackofinformation andchangestothe providedtolocalauthoritiesaboutprojectstobecarriedoutintheirzone.183The implementationplans Collègesubmittedareportoftheirfindingstothegovernment,butitisnotclearwhat, forprojectsaftertheir ifanything,happenedasaresult. approval. Public Reporting Obligations Theexperiencewiththeuseofoilbonusmoneyin2003underscorestheimportance ofensuringthatinformationabouttheprioritysectorprojectsplannedandapprovedby theCollègeisdisseminatedtoexistinglocalgovernmentauthoritiesandtothepublic. During2004,theCollègetookanumberofstepstoimproveitspublicreporting practices,includingdevelopinganewwebsiteandholdingpressconferencestoreport ontheCollège’sactivitiesandthestatusofbudgetexecution.AsofNovember2004, Theexperiencewiththe theCollègehadproducedquarterlyreportsthroughthethirdquarterof2004and useofoilbonusmoney publishedsomeinformationonoilrevenueexpenditurestodate.Thesedocumentsare in2003underscoresthe availableontheCollège’swebsiteatwww.ccsrp-tchad.org importanceofensuring thatinformationabout However,mostofthereportingpublishedbytheCollègeisretrospectiveinnature. theprioritysector Collègestaffhavesaidthattheyhavenotyetconsideredalertingthepublicinadvance projectsplannedand ofprojectstobecarriedout,soastoenablethepublictotracktheuseofoilmoney approvedbytheCollège andreinforcetheCollège’seffortstosuperviseprojectexecutionontheground. isdisseminatedtolocal governmentauthorities andtothepublic. 4.4 Chief Weaknesses in the Structure, Mandate and Operation of the Collége
Part-time Members for a Full-time Job TheCollègeisstructuredmuchlikeaBoardofDirectors,whosememberseachhave full-timejobsoutsideoftheirserviceonthecommittee.Theninepeoplewhositon
58 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch theCollègerespectivelyholdpositionsingovernment,asdirectorsandrepresentatives withinministriesandtheNationalAssembly,andincivilsociety,asleadersand activistswithinvariousorganizations.Fulfillingitsimportantmandaterequiresthe Collègetofunctionverymuchasanactivistboardofdirectors.However,overseeing theuseofthecountry’soilrevenues(whichmaysoondoubleChad’snationalbudget) isnosmalltask,andmayrequiremoreresourcesthanthe(part-time)membersofthe Collègeareabletocontribute.TimeconstraintsposearealobstacletotheCollège’s task.Althoughfourfull-timetechnicalpersonnelwerehiredtosupporttheCollège inthethirdquarterof2003,dependingontherateofoilproductionandpaceof spending,theworkmaysoonsurpassthecapacityofthislimitedtechnicalstaff. AlthoughthereisnostatutorylimitonthenumberofsupportstafftheCollègemay employ,thebudgetmayconstituteaconstraintonthefutureabilityoftheCollègeto adapttoneedsthatarise. ThereseMékombé,theactingpresidentoftheCollègeuntilOctober2004,spenta tremendousamountoftimeintrainingsandmeetingsin2003and2004.Whileher dedicationiscommendable,andenabledtheCollègetoberepresentedatandtotake partinvariousdecision-makingprocesses(suchasthosesurroundingthefinalization ofthestabilizationaccountandthearrangementswithlocalcommercialbanks),her effortshaveexceededtheexpectedroleofCollègemembers.Itisnotcertainthat futurememberswillhavecomparabletimetodevotetotheworkoftheCollège. Furthermore,itisnotclearthattheCollègehas,todate,madebestuseofthelimited timeofitsmembers.Thetypesoftrainingsconducted,includingavisittoNorwayto learnaboutmanagementofpetroleumrevenues,maynothavebeenthemostproductive waytotraintheCollègemembersonhowtocarryouttheirroles.Giventhatthe membersoftheCollègecanonlysitonthecommitteeforamaximumofsixyears(and mostarethereforfarlesstime,givenfrequentchangeswithingovernmentoffices), expensiveandtime-consuminginvestmentsincapacity-buildingactivities(especially thosethatarenotdirectlyrelevanttotheChadiancontext)maynotbeappropriate. WhilethreeeconomistsandaprocurementspecialistwerehiredinAugustand September2003,atleastonememberoftheCollègeindicatedthattheystilllack certaincompetencies.Forexample,therearenoplanstohireafiscal(tax)specialist, despitethefactthattheresourceflowswillbecomemorecomplexasindirectrevenues begintoaccrueinthecomingyears,andthetechnicalstaffdonotincludeexpertsin eachoftheprioritysectorsthattheCollègemustoversee.184(WhiletheCollegehas theauthoritytocommissionauditsorhireexperts,itisnotclearthatithassufficient fundsortimetodosoasneeded.)AsofOctober2004,noneofthetechnicalstaffhad receivedanyprofessionaltrainingrelatedtotheirfunctionsontheCollège.185
Eyes on Half the Prize OneofthemoststrikinglimitationsontheCollège’soversightrolestemsfromthe lawsthatitischargedwithenforcing.MembersoftheCollègehavelong-pointedout weaknessesinthedesignoftherevenuemanagementsystemwhichlimittheirmandate andmayultimatelydiminishtheimpacttheycanhaveongovernmentaccountability. (SeeSection3.2,“DividinguptheRevenues:ALeakyRevenueManagement Law”)First,theCollège’soversightislimitedtotheuseofdirectrevenuesfrom thethreefieldsinDoba.Secondly,becauseLaw001doesnotspecifyhow“indirect revenues”aretobeallocated,theCollègehasnoroletoplayinverifyingtheuseof whatwillsoonbealargeportionofthecountry’srevenues,particularlyafteranumber oftaxexemptionswillbeliftedby2008.Furthermore,thelawdoesnotspecify whethernon-fiscalrevenuessuchassigningbonusesaresubjecttooversightbythe Collège.Althoughthescandalsurroundingtheinitialuseofthe2000bonusprompted thegovernmenttosubmittheremaindertotheCollège’soversight,thisisnot mandatedbylaw.In2003-2004,forexample,thegovernmentreceivedtwopayments
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 59 of$15millioneachfornegotiationssurroundinganewconventionwithExxonMobil, butthesepaymentsdidnotpassthroughtheCollège.
Short Tenure of the Collége Members AnotherstructuralweaknessoftheCollègehastodowiththeinstabilityofits membership.AsofNovember2004,theonlymembersoftheCollègewhohadbeen presentsinceitsestablishmentwerethethreecivilsocietymembersrepresenting developmentNGOs,laborunionsandhumanrightsassociations.Allofthe governmentmembershavechangedatleastoncesincetheCollège’sestablishment, andinsomecases,asmanyasthreetimes.Thehighturnoverofgovernment representativesreflectsthefrequencywithwhichthecabinethasbeenreshuffledby In2003-2004the thegovernment.ThecontinualshiftsintheCollège’scompositionhavetakenatoll governmentreceived onitsabilitytofunctioneffectivelyandjeopardizedinstitutionalmemoryandcapacity twopaymentsof building.NewmemberslackwhattrainingtheCollègehasreceivedandaheavy $15millioneach relianceononeortwoindividualsleavesseriousquestionsregardingsustainable fornegotiations capacitybuildingfortheinstitutionasawhole.186 surroundinganew conventionwith InitsNovember2004report,theInternationalAdvisoryGroup(IAG)warned ExxonMobil,butthese thatwithacompleteoverhaulofitsmembershipintwoyears,theCollègerisked paymentsdidnotpass tolosetheskillsgainedandtheinstitutionalmemoryacquiredtodate.TheIAG throughtheCollège. recommendedthathiringadditionaltechnicalstaffwouldhelptooffsettheinevitable knowledgelossesthatwilloccurastrainedmembersterm-outoftheCollège,aswould continualtrainingfortheCollègeanditsstaff.Furthermore,theIAGsuggestedthat aphasedrenewaloftheCollègemembers(forexample,rotatingmembersinthirds) mayalsoreducesomeofthedisruptionandinefficiencythatcharacterizethehigh- turnoversysteminplacetoday.187Civilsocietyobservershavealsocalledonthe Débyadministrationtocommittogreaterstabilityinthegovernmentofficesthatare allocatedseatsontheCollège.
Limited Access to Information PerhapsoneofthegreatestconstraintsontheCollège’soperationisthedifficulty ofobtainingnecessaryandcompleteinformationinatimelyfashion.InMay2004, ThereseMékombé,thenactingpresidentoftheCollège,satonapanelattheRoyal InstituteofInternationalAffairsinLondonwithAndreMadecofExxonMobil,and explainedthedifficultythatsheandhercolleagueshadobtaininginformationon productionfiguresandsalesdata,withwhichtocross-checkreportedrevenues.Ms. MékombéassertedthattheCollègewas“underfunded,understaffedanddeprivedof informationbybothExxonMobilandtheChadiangovernment.”Atthatmeeting,Mr. MadecpromisedthatExxonMobilwouldprovidetheCollègewithanydocumentation itrequested.188However,inOctober2004,Collègestaffstillmaintainedthat ExxonMobildidnotregularlyprovidedocumentstotheCollège.189 AccordingtoitsOperationsManual,theCollègehasarightofaccesstoinformation relevanttothedeterminationofpetroleumrevenues,including,butnotlimitedto: •volumeofcrudeproducedandsold •discountoffthepriceofabarrelofoil •transferfeesandbankingcommission •debtservicepayments •bankaccountbalances •transactionfees •exchangeratefortransactions •paymentofdividendsandroyaltiesbyoilcompanies •taxes,customsdutieslinkedtopetroleumexploitation •productionandtransportationcostsofcrude •allotherfactorsthatinfluencedirectlyorindirectlypetroleumrevenues.
60 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch AnyirregularitiesnotedintheaboveinformationaretobereportedtotheAuditor General(ChambredeComptes). ExxonMobilmaintainsthatitsobligationistoprovideinformationtotheMinistry ofPetroleum,anditisuptotheChadiangovernmenttoensurethatthatinformation issharedwiththeCollège,asneeded.However,membersoftheCollègenotethat isremainsdifficulttoaccessinformationfromtheTreasuryandtheMinistriesof PetroleumandFinance,whoareresponsibleforreportingonthequantitiesofoil exportedandfinancialflows.190TherearenoregularmeetingsbetweentheCollègeand thegovernmentandtheMinistryofPetroleumdoesnotroutinelysendthequarterly productionfigurestotheCollège;theymustberequested.191TheWorldBankproject staffhaverecommendedthecreationofaninter-ministerialcommitteetoensure communicationbetweentheCollège,theMinistryofPetroleumandtheCoordination Nationaleresponsiblefortheoversightofthepetroleumdevelopmentandpipeline project.However,asofNovember2004,suchregular,monthlymeetingsbetweenthe Collègeandrelevantgovernmentandcorporateactorswerenotyetinstitutionalized. Thereluctanceoftheoilconsortiumandthegovernmenttomoreproactively disseminateinformation,togetherwiththehesitancyoftheCollègetoaskforit,make forstuntedcommunicationandanirregularflowofinformation,atbest. Thereluctanceofthe oilconsortiumandthe The Hen Guarding the Foxhouse governmenttomore Formorethantwoyears,themembersoftheCollègehavebeencallingforan proactivelydisseminate independentbudget,earmarkeddirectlyfromoilrevenuesorotherwisefixedoutside information,together ofnationalfiscalprocesses.Atpresent,theCollège’sbudgetisdeterminedannually withthehesitancyof andauthorizedbytheMinistryofFinance–theverybodywhosefiscaloperationsthe theCollègetoaskfor Collègeoversees.Todate,fundingfortheCollégehascomefromthegovernment it,makeforstunted directlyaswellasfromWorldBankloans. communicationand In2003,theplannedbudgetfortheCollègewasontheorderof381millionCFAF anirregularflowof ($745,000),ofwhich131millionCFAF($255,000)wastobeprovidedoutofthe information,atbest. nationalbudget,whiletheremaining250millionCFAF($490,000)wastobepaid fromaWorldBankcapacitybuildingproject.AttheendofDecember2003,only186 millionCFAFhadbeenspent,andofthat,only83millionCFAFhadbeensuppliedby theBank’scapacitybuildingcredit.192(SeeSectionSix,ChangingChad-TheRole ofExternalActors) AlthoughthegovernmentofChaddidnotgrantthefullamountoffundsrequestedin 2003bytheCollège,themoneyitdidallocatewasdisbursedmorerapidlythanwere thedesignatedWorldBankfunds. The2004Chadiangovernmentbudgetcontainedalineitemallocationof75.9million CFAF($149,000),althoughtheCollègehadproposedabudgetofnearlytentimes asmuch,at677millionCFAF($1.3million).193AccordingtoCollègedocuments,in 2004theWorldBankcapacitybuildingcreditprovided28millionCFAF($54,000) tocoverthesalariesofthetechnicalstaff,butdidnotcontributeanymoneytothe Collège’sgeneraloperatingbudget.194 For2005,theCollègeproposedabudgetofnearly600millionCFAF($1.1million), butitisnotyetknownwhatthegovernmentwillagreetofinance,asthe2005Budget wasstillunderdiscussionintheNationalAssemblyatthetimeofwriting.195 TheWorldBank’sproposedsupplementalcapacity-buildingcredit,scheduledfor approvalinApril2005,includes$1.3millionearmarkedforsupporttotheCollège andtheAuditorGeneral’soffice.TheportionoftheloanallocatedtotheCollège wouldcover“salariesoftheCollège’stechnicalstaffuntilthoseareassumedby thestatebudget,trainingandstudytours,technicalassistance,andinformationand communicationservices.”196
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 61 TheCollègeattributesitsinabilitytoperformallofitsfunctionslargelytobudgetary constraints.However,theproblemmaynotonlybethattheCollège’sfundingis insufficient,butthattheirproposedbudgetreflectsapoorprioritizationofexpenditures andincludesunreasonablyhighcostsforcertainitems.Somehavearguedthatthe Formorethantwo budgetshouldprioritizeprojectevaluationandinvestigationmissions,andmaintenance years,themembers ofthegeneratorfortheoffice(necessarytoprovidesteadyaccesstocomputers, oftheCollègehave email,andtheinternet)overotherlesscrucialactivities,suchasvisitstoneighboring beencallingforan countries.However,debatesovertheallocationoftheCollège’sownbudgetmaybe independentbudget, oflessimportanceinthenear-termthansimplysecuringasteadystreamoffundingfor earmarkeddirectly theircontinuedoperation.TheriskoftheCollègebeingstarvedforthefundsneeded fromoilrevenuesor todovitalworkifitiswhollyreliantonthegovernmentforitsbudgetoutweighs otherwisefixedoutside concernsaboutappropriatebudgetingpriorities. ofnationalfiscal Collège processes. Additionalresourceconstraintsalsolimitthe ’sabilitytoconduct investigations.AsofNovember2004,theCollègeonlyhadtwovehiclesatitsdisposal, ofwhichatleastonemustbeinN’Djamenaatalltimes.GivenhowvastChadis andhowfewpavedroadsthecountryhas,thetaskofinvestigatingpetroleumrevenue projectsonthegroundisadauntingone,requiringnotonlysturdyvehiclesand sufficientgas,butenoughtimetomakethetripouttosomeofthezonesinwhich projectsaretobeexecuted.Withlimitedfundsavailablebothforequipmentandthe additionalcostsofmissionsoutofN’Djamena,andthelimitedavailabilityofmembers oftheCollège,itisunlikelythattheCollègewillbeabletotracetheoilmoneytoits endusewithouttheassistanceofcivilsocietyorganizationsandcitizens.
Controversy over Appointments – the Government Trying to Choose its Watchdogs? Todate,therehavebeenquestionsabouttheindependenceofgovernment representativesappointedtotheCollègeandconcernaboutthegovernment’srecent attemptstocontrolcivilsocietyappointments.Itcouldbesaidthatcivilsociety predictedtheemergenceofsuchcontroversies.Shortlyafterthelaw’spassage,civil societyintroducedintotheNationalAssemblyanumberofmodificationstoLaw001, includingthesuggestionthattheprocedurefordesignatingthemembersoftheCollège beclarified.Theyassertedthatwithregardtothecivilsocietyrepresentatives,thelaw mustbeveryclearthatitisuptocivilsociety,andcivilsocietyalone,todesignate thoserepresentativesitjudgesworthytorepresentit.197Recenteventshavecastdoubt onthisexclusiveright. IdrissAhmedIdriss,thebrother-in-lawofPresidentDéby,wasnamedheadofthe Withlimitedfunds centralbankinearly2004and,byvirtueofthatposition,becameamemberofthe Collège availablebothfor .Thisappointmentwasgreetedwithconcernandskepticismnationallyand equipmentandthe internationallybecause,despitethefactthatmanycharacterizeMr.Idrissasextremely additionalcosts capable,heiscloselylinkedtoDéby’sfamily.Althoughhewasnamedtothe ofmissionsoutof directorshipofBEACinFebruary2004,AhmedIdrissdidnottakehispositiononthe Collège N’Djamena,itis formonths.HewassenttoneighboringCameroonfortrainingonthebanking unlikelythatthe andfinancialsystemofthecentralAfricanmonetaryunion–ajourneythatalthough onlyseveralhoursfromN’Djamena,somehowpreventedhimfromjoiningtheCollège Collègewillbeable Collège totracetheoilmoney andattendingmeetingsuntillateAugust2004,therebydelayingtheelectionof toitsendusewithout officers. theassistanceofcivil InadditiontoappointingDébyfamilymemberstoinfluentialgovernmentposts, societyorganizations thegovernmentalsoappearsinterestedininfluencingtheselectionofcivilsociety andcitizens. representativesontheCollège.Whenthereligiousseatbecamevacantattheend of2003,thegovernmentfailedtoauthorizetheCatholicChurch’snomineeforthe position—astepthatisusuallyjustaformality.Formonths,thegovernmentdragged itsheels,refusingtoissueadecreeconfirmingtheappointmentofMarcBeremadji,a formerChadianfinanceministerwhoworkedasalaymemberoftheChurch.Though
62 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch Box 11
Beremadji: The Man Who Knew Too Much
InNovember2003,theseatontheCollègedesignatedforarepresentativeofthereligious communitiesbecamevacant.AChristianrepresentativewastobenamedtoreplacethe outgoingMuslimclericwhohadsatontheCollègesinceitsformation.TheProtestantand CatholicChurcheshadagreedtoalternatetheiroccupationoftheChristianseat,sothatwhile thespotontheCollègerotatesbetweenaChristianandMuslimeverythreeyears,theChristians alternatetheirturnsbetweentheCatholicandProtestantconfessions(effectivelyeachChristian confessionsitsontheCollègeeverysixyears). AccordingtoExecutiveDecreeNo.314/PR/PM/2002,concerningthereplacementofmembers oftheCollège,eachseatrepresentingadesignatedconstituency(notautomaticallyoccupied bytheholderofaparticulargovernmentoffice)shallbeselectedbyhisorherpeers,foraterm ofthreeyears,renewableonce.Uponnominationbyhisorherpeers,arepresentativeistobe confirmedbygovernmentdecree.ThelawregardingthecompositionoftheCollègenowhere stipulatesthatthegovernmenthasarighttorevieworobjecttochosenrepresentatives;itis impliedthatthegovernmentshallsimplyrendertheappointmentofficialbyissuingadecree confirmingtheappointee’snameandpositionasamemberoftheCollège. Nevertheless,inlate2003,whentheCatholicChurchofChadnamedasuccessortothe outgoingMuslimclericsittingontheCollège,thegovernmentfailedtoissuesuchadecree. TherepresentativenamedbytheCatholicauthoritieswasMarcBeremadji,amanwithample relevantexperienceasaformerChadianMinisterofFinanceandastutebudgetaryanalyst.Mr. BeremadjihadrecentlybeenaconsultanttotheMinistryofFinanceundertheWorldBank’s ManagementofthePetroleumEconomyproject.Bytheendof2003,thegovernmenthad stillnotissuedadecreeconfirminghisnomination.TheseatontheCollègeremainedvacant. InDecember2003,duringameetingwiththeArchbishopNgarteriofN’Djamena,theprime ministerofChadofferedhisexplanationforthegovernment’sfailuretoconfirmtheselected representative.Heexplainedthatthegovernmentunderstoodthelawtorequireaclerictofill theseatdesignatedforarepresentativeofthereligiouscommunities,notalayperson.The primeministerindicatedthatthegovernmentsoughtthe“moralauthority”thatamemberof theclergywouldbestowupontheCollège.However,ArchbishopNgarteriandtherestofthe CatholicChurchrejectedthenotionthattheirrepresentativewouldsimplyprovidearubber stamporareligioussealofapprovalontheCollège’soperations.Theywantedsomeone competentinthefieldoffiscaloversight.Somespeculatethatthegovernment’sinaction stemmedlessfromtheirresistancetohavingalaypersonoccupythepositionthanfromtheir displeasurewiththenominationofsomeoneasqualifiedandabletomonitorfiscalactivities asMr.Beremadji.AlthoughtheprimeministerurgedtheArchbishoptoreconsiderhis nomination,theChurchrefusedtorevokeMr.Beremadji’snameuntilorunlessthegovernment providedaformalwrittenexplanationofitsresponse. SomedebatewashadwithintheCollègeaboutwhetherornotthereligiousconstituent’sseat hadtobefilledbyacleric,butthemoresignificantconcernrevolvedaroundthequestionofthe government’sauthoritytoreviewandopposerepresentativesnominatedtositontheCollège. ByJuly2004,theChurchhadstillnotreceivedanofficialexplanationfortherefusalto authorizeBeremadji’sappointment.Reluctantto“playthepoliticsoftheemptychair”by allowingtheseattoremainvacant,theChurchdecidedtoreviseitsnominationandappointa priest,FatherAntoineBérilengartositontheCollège.FatherAntoine,himselfexperienced withissuesrelatedtothepetroleumsector,wouldnotfacethesameovertresistancefrom governmentbecauseheisaclergymember.FatherAntoineBérilengar’snominationwasfinally confirmedbygovernmentdecreeinOctober2004.
thegovernmenteventuallyexplaineditsresistancearguingthattheseatreservedfora religiousrepresentativehadtobefilledbyaclergymemberandnotalayperson,many speculatethattherefusaltoconfirmBeremadjiwasanattempttokeepthequalified fiscalspecialistofftheCollège.TheChurcheventuallycapitulatedandnominated apriesttotheposition,whoisknowledgeableoftheoilsectorinhisownright.He
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 63 wasconfirmedinlateOctober2004.Althoughthestormhaspassed,theincident signalstheimportanceofcheckingagainstfuturegovernmentattemptstoinfluencethe compositionoftheCollège.(SeeBox11)
“Société Civile-Bis”: A Parallel Civil Society? Someobserversfearthattheexperiencewiththereligiousrepresentativemaysignal thegovernment’sdesiretohaveastrongerhandincontrollingtheselectionofCollège members,andultimatelytheCollègeitself.Severallocalorganizationshavenoteda trendtowardthecreationofasecond,pro-governmentcivilsociety,sponsoredbythe Débyadministrationorthepresident’sparty,theMPS.Astargetedeffortscontinue tostrengthenpro-governmentNGOs,thereissomeconcernthatgovernmentattempts toexertcontrolovertheselectionprocessforCollègememberscouldlaterpermitthe regimetoinstall“friendly”civilsocietyrepresentatives. DobianAssingar,amemberoftheCollègefromtheChadianLeagueofHuman Rights,expressedconcernaboutthedesignsofthesefauxNGOsontheCollègeseats reservedforcivilsociety:“Alreadyacertaincivilsocietycomposedon43phantom organizations,createdwhollybytheregime,islyinginwait,andhasbeenjockeying forawhiletooccupythespacesreservedforthecivilsocietyontheCollège.”198
4.5 Technical Support to the Collège Fortwoyears,arepresentativeoftheU.S.TreasuryOfficeofTechnicalAssistance servedasaconsultanttotheChadianMinistryofFinanceandtotheCollège.After thedepartureoftheadvisorinJanuary2004,theCollègewasleftwithnotechnical supportatacriticaljunctureinitsshorthistory–revenueshadjustbeguntoflow toChad,the2004budgetwasnearingfinalizationandtheoperationsmanualfor theCollègehadyettobefinalizedandadopted.Despiteearlierapparentstaff-level tensionsbetweentheWorldBankandU.S.TreasuryDepartment,inApril2004,the WorldBankexpresseditsdesiretoseeU.S.Treasuryre-appointapermanentadvisor toChad.InJuly-August2004,theU.S.TreasuryDepartmentsentatechnicalmission toChadtoassessthefunctioningoftheCollègeandtogaugetheneedforfurther support.AsofNovember2004,theU.S.Treasurywastryingtorecruitoneortwo Longbeforethe French-speakingbudgetspecialiststoprovidetechnicalassistancetotheChadian projectwasapproved, MinistryofFinance,aswellastheCollège.However,itisimportantthattheCollège InternationalFinancial receivededicatedassistance,asmembersoftheCollègehaveraisedconcernsinthe Institutionsandcivil pastabout“sharing”anadvisorwiththeMinistryofFinance,whoseactivitiestheyare societyalikerecognized responsibleforoverseeing. theweaknessofChad’s legalsystemandthe lackofindependenceof 4.6 A Law is Only as Good as its Enforcement thejudiciary. WhiletheCollègecaninfluencethebudgetingprocess,rejectill-foundedexpenditures andinvestigatetheexecutionofprojectsitapproves,ultimatelytheabilityofthe Collègetoensurethatoilrevenuesareusedforpovertyreductiondependsonthe willingnessofthejudiciarytoprosecutecasesofmisuse,fraudorcorruptionthat theCollègemayuncover.AsCollègememberThereseMékombéhighlightedina presentationtotheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairsinLondon,“Manyfear thatperpetratorswillnotbepunished[under]...Law04onpunishmentinthecases ofembezzlement.[Thereisa]lackofconfidencebecauseoftheexperiencesofother monitoringinstitutionssuchastheAuditorGeneral’soffice,GeneralInspection ofFinancesandtheGeneralAssembly.”199Ifandwhendisputesarisebetweenthe government(FinanceMinistry)andtheCollègeregardingtheuseofoilrevenues, theyaretobereferredtotheSupremeCourt.ThisrelianceonChad’sjudicialsystem representspossiblytheweakestlinkintherevenuemanagementsystem.
64 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch Longbeforetheprojectwasapproved,bothIFIsandcivilsocietyrecognizedthe weaknessofChad’slegalsystemandthelackofindependenceofthejudiciary. Indeed,corruptionwithintheChadianjusticesystemhasallowedfortheimpunity withwhichgovernmentofficialsroutinelyviolatedrightsandextortedfundsinthe past.TheChadianSupremeCourt,containingtheofficeoftheAuditorGeneral (ChambredeComptes),wasonlyestablishedin1999–testimonytoChad’sshort historywithjudicialandfinancialaccountabilitymechanisms.InJanuary2000,the WorldBankresponded tocriticismaboutits lackofattentiontothe oversightcapacityof theSupremeCourt, explaining,“Thelittle detailontheoversight capacityoftheGAO oftheSupremeCourt reflectsthefactthat thisisaveryrecent institution,putin placethislastspring. Ithasnocapacityat thistime”(emphasis added).200Thesituation hasscarcelyimproved overthelastseveral years.InMarchof 2004,forexample,in anextra-constitutional move,Débyreplaced theheadofthe SupremeCourt.This latestmovecallsinto Giventhelimitedstaffand resourcesoftheCollège, questiontheabilityoftheSupremeCourttoplayanimpartialroleasadjudicatorof activeparticipationofcivil disputesregardingthespendingofoilrevenues. societyorganizationsand citizensinapublicrevenue trackingandalertsystemis TheWorldBankandtheIMFhavebothmademuchofseveralauditsthatwere vitaltotheoverallsuccessof conductedofthegovernment’suseofdebtrelieffunds(fromtheHeavilyIndebted theaccountabilitymechanism. Oncecommunitiesareaware PoorCountries(HIPC)initiative)andtheproceduresfollowedforthefivelargest ofgovernmentspending publicprojectsexecutedin2002.Theinstitutionsmaintainthatthecriticalreports targetedfortheirarea,they canassisttheCollègein issuedfromtheseauditsattesttothegovernment’scommitmenttoimprove monitoringprojectexecution. transparencyandaccountabilityfortheuseofpublicresources.TheWorldBank (Photo:MartinZint) calledthepublicationoftheauditreports“amajorandcommendablesteptoward transparency.”201However,onemustask,beyondtheirpublication,whatimpactdid thesereportshave?InApril2004,theWorldBanknoted“effectiveenforcementof accountabilityandsanctionmechanismsstillrequiressignificantstrengtheningand streamlining.”202 DuringconsultationswiththeIMFinearly2004,thegovernmentofChad committedto“implementingmeasuresaimedatimprovingaccountabilityintheuse ofpublicresources…[including]byearly2004,alltherecommendationsoftherecent auditsofHIPCInitiative-financedcontractsandofthefivelargecontractsawardedin 2003.”TheIMFreportontheconsultationfurtherexplains: “Thegovernmentwilltakeactionagainstofficialsandcompanies implicatedinirregularitiesidentifiedbytherecentaudits.ABudget DisciplineCourtwillbesetup,anditsworkwillbelinkedwith astrengtheningofthecontrolsoftheinspectoratesinvarious
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 65 ministries.Thegovernmentintendstofinalizesoonanactionplan toreformthejusticesystemandinitiateitsimplementation.Italso intendstoreviewexistinganticorruptionlegislationandthedegree ofitseffectiveness;studythepossibilityofcreatingananticorruption body;andpromulgatethenewprocurementcodeandmakeit effectivebyadoptingitsimplementationdecrees.”203 AsofNovember2004,thereisnosignofthisBudgetDisciplineCourtandlittle evidenceofactionstakenagainstofficialsandcompaniesimplicated.Furthermore, thenewprocurementcodehasnotyetbeenfullypromulgated.Similarly,the government’sapparentinactiononthefindingsoftheCollègeregardingthe implementationofprojectsfinancedbytheoilbonusmoneybespeakseitheralackof poweroratroublinglackofwill.
The Right Mix: the Collége’s Focus and its Future Role TheCollègehasavitalroletoplayinmonitoringtheformulationandexecutionofthe budgetandinexercisingthirdpartyverificationofreportingonoilrevenuepayments andexpenditures.Whilethereisgreatneedforoversight,theCollègemustuseits scarceresourceswell,concentratingitstimeandfundsonthemostcriticalpointsof intervention.TheCollège’suniqueadvantageanditsstrengthliein: Thegovernment’s •Itsprivilegedaccesstocompleteandtimelyinformationaboutoilrevenue apparentinactionon inflowsandgovernmentbudgetaryexpenditures,and; thefindingsofthe Collègeregardingthe •Itsabilitytorenderthisinformationpublic,diffusedwidelysothatpeopleon implementationof thegroundcanverifythatstatedprojectsandexpensescorrespondwithactual projectsfinancedby realitiesinlocalareas. theoilbonusmoney DisproportionatefocusonrevenueinflowsmayhindertheCollège’sabilitytoinform bespeakseitheralack thepublicinadvanceofwhattheycanexpecttobedonewithoilrevenues,ortoshed ofpoweroratroubling lackofwill.
Asignwarnstravelersthatnewroads,alongwithmakingiteasiertoconductbusiness,facilitatethespread ofAIDS.Chad’soilrevenueswillhavetobeinvestedwiselynotonlyinroads,butinhealth,educationand othersocialservicesforthepopulation.(Photo:IanGary/CRS)
lightoftenandinatimelymanner,onprojectsthatarenotexecutedproperlyonthe ground.GiventhelimitedstaffandresourcesoftheCollège,activeparticipationof civilsocietyorganizationsandcitizensinapublicrevenuetrackingandalertsystemis vitaltotheoverallsuccessoftheaccountabilitymechanism.However,theCollège’s ultimateimpactdependslargelyonthegovernment’sresponsivenesstoitsfindings
66 4. “Just Add Oil”: Accountability from Scratch andtheenforcementoflaw.(Inthissense,theroleoftheCollègecanbecompared totheU.S.CongressionalBudgetOfficethatcanhighlightproblemsingovernment procurementcontractsbutisunabletotakelegalaction.)Theapparentfailureofthe governmenttoundertakeanyremedialactionfollowingthereleaseoftheCollège’s reportonthespendingofthebonusmoneyraisesseriousquestionsaboutthefuture efficacyandpoweroftheCollège’soversightfunction,theindependenceofthe judiciary,andthepoliticalwilloftheChadiangovernment. Thefailureofthe Collège’sreport onthespendingof thebonusmoneyto precipitateimmediate remedialactionby thegovernmentraises seriousquestionsabout thefutureefficacyand poweroftheCollège’s oversightfunction, theindependenceof thejudiciary,andthe politicalwillofthe Chadiangovernment.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 67 5. Budgeting for the Boom: Spending Chad’s Oil Revenues
Astheprecedingchaptershavedescribed,Chadisanextremelychallengingcontext inwhichtotestthepoverty-alleviatingpotentialofpetroleumrevenues.Buteven ifthepoliticalclimatewasstable;evenifoilexploitationhadnodeleteriousimpacts ontheenvironment,socialstructuresorthelocaleconomy;eveniftherewasno uncertaintyabouthowoilrevenueswerecalculated;evenifgovernmentearningswere maximized…therewouldstillbethechallengeofthebudget—itsformulationandits execution.Inessence,thepoverty-reductionpotentialoftheoildevelopmentproject hingesontheeffectiveuseofoilrevenuesthroughthestatebudget.Oil-producing countriescommonlyfacedifficulties“‘sowingtheirpetroleum,’thatis,turningoil revenuesintolong-termbenefitsfortheirpeople,”afeatwhichdependsonthequality ofpublicpolicy.204AndChad’shistorywithsystematicandtransparentbudgetingis bothshortandflawed;thecoordinatedbudgetprocessisstillverymuchatanascent stage,andChadislearningwithasetofrapidlychangingnumbers.Furthermore, whilesomeprocurementirregularitiesaretobeexpectedanywhere,historyshows usthatChadsuffersfromahigher-than-averageincidenceofproblemswithbudget execution.Thus,inChad,theprognosisforthepipelineprojectcannotbeseparated fromthatofthebudgetaryprocessitself. Inessence,the“poverty 5alleviation”potential oftheoildevelopment 5.1 Budget Basics projecthingeson theeffectiveuseof Chad’sbudgetfollowsthecalendaryear.Atpresentexchangerates(particularly oilrevenuesthrough giventhedecliningvalueofthedollar),thenationalbudgetisapproaching$1billion. thestatebudget.The Excludinggrants,loansandotherexternalfinancing,oilrevenuesnowmakeupthe prognosisforthe largestsinglesourceofgovernmentrevenues.Thebudgethasgrownbymorethan50 pipelineprojectcannot percentsince2003,whenoilproductionbegan.Understandingwhatrolepetrodollars beseparatedfromthat haveplayedinthisgrowthandwhatitmeansforspendingrequiresacloserlookatthe ofthebudgetaryprocess budgetprocessandresultsfor2004and2005. itself. Learning by Doing: The Short History of Budgeting in Chad ThetaskofensuringeffectiveandtransparentmanagementofChad’spetroleum revenuesismademoredifficultbythesheercomplexityoftheChadianbudget system.NotonlyhastheChadiangovernmenthadarelativelyshortandcheckered historyoffollowingformalbudgetprocedures,theMinistryofFinanceandotherline Excludinggrants,loans ministriesarejustgettingaccustomedtoproducingmulti-yearbudgets(“medium-term andotherexternal expenditureframeworks”orMTEF’s,asrequiredunderIMFlendingprograms)and financing,oilrevenues haveexperienceddifficultymanagingvariousrevenuestreams,eachwithdifferent nowmakeupthe expenditureconstraints.Ontopofoilrevenues,theChadiangovernmentaccrued largestsinglesourceof savingsfromdebtrelieflinkedtotheHighlyIndebtedPoorCountries(HIPC) governmentrevenues. initiative,andreceivedadditionalfinancingfromdonorsandIFIs.In2003,some ministriesfailedtokeepoilbonusmoneyandrevenuesfromHIPCdistinct,makingit extremelydifficulttotrackhowthemonieswereused.
Budget Process in Theory and Practice In2003,someministries Eachgovernmentministrysubmitsitsindividualbudgettotheministerofeconomy failedtokeepoilbonus andfinance,whothensynthesizesthemfordiscussionbytheinter-ministerialBudget moneyandrevenues Committee(onwhichmembersoftheCollègesit).Afterthebudgetarycommission fromHIPCdistinct, makesadjustments,thedraftbudgetissenttotheCouncilofMinistersforapproval. makingitextremely Onceapproved,theCouncilofMinisterstransmitsthebudgettotheNational difficulttotrackhowthe Assembly(alongwithcommentsfromtheCollège),whereitisadoptedandmadeinto monieswereused. law.Expenditureofthebudgettakesplaceinseveralstages:commitmentoffunds, verificationofworkstobereimbursed,authorizationofpayment,anddisbursement offunds.205
68 5. Budgeting for the Boom Public Participation in Budget Formulation Stages in the budget formulation process TheChadianbudget isformulatedbythe 1. Macroeconomicframeworkletter(describe macroeconomiccontext,explainbudgetarypolicy, technicalministries, Thereislittle provideguidancetolineMinistriesontheir eachofwhichdefends forthcomingbudgetrequests).Copysubmittedto opportunityfor itsprogramplanbefore Collège membersoftheNational theCouncilofMinisters. RoleofCollège:ensurethatguidelinesand AssemblyinChad Untilitissubmittedtothe overallcontentconsistentwithlawonoil todiscussproposed NationalAssemblyfor revenuemanagement spendingplanswith review,electedofficials theirconstituencies. 2. RequestsfromlineMinistriessubmittedto havenoopportunityto BudgetDirectorate.CopysubmittedtoCollège inputintothenational RoleofCollège:examinecarefullyconsistency budget,andeventhen, ofrequestswithrespecttopovertyreduction thereislittleopportunity strategy(paycloseattentiontoprojectsites forNationalAssembly andbreakdownofexpenditureitems) deputiestodiscussthe proposedspendingplan 3. BudgetCommittee(lineministriespresentand explaintheirrequests) withtheirconstituencies RoleofCollège:participateinsessionswith orforcitizenstohave prioritysectorMinistriesandensure inputintothebudget consistencyofrequestswithpoverty process.Inthebest-case reductionstrategy scenario,deputiesin theNationalAssembly 4. FirstbudgetdraftfinalizedbyDirectorGeneral receivecopiesofthe ofBudget.CopysenttoCollègetendaysbefore submissiontoCabinet draftnationalbudget RoleofCollège:examinecarefullysectoral twoweeksbeforeit allocation,projectsitesandlineitems. isscheduledtobe Preparecommentstobeincludedwithdraft debatedandpassedby budgetwhensubmittedtoNationalAssembly thelegislature.This briefdelayaffordslittle 5. DraftbudgetexaminedbyCabinet timeforpublicinputon 6. Cabinet-approveddraftbudgetsubmittedto budgetallocationand Collège spendingprioritiesorfor RoleofCollège:cannotmakeanychangeto membersoftheNational thisseconddraft.Itsconcerns,ifany,willbe Assemblytounderstand passedontotheNationalAssemblybythe anddigesttheproposed twomembersrepresentingtheinstitutionon nationalbudget.Thelack theCollège ofdecentralizedlocal 7. DraftbudgetsubmittedtoNationalAssembly authoritiesalsomeans Source:TawfikRamtoolah,formerU.S.TreasuryDepartment thatnoneedsassessments technicaladvisortotheCollège,October2003. orplanningdiscussions takeplaceattheregional orlocallevelstofeedintoorrespondtotheproposednationalbudget.Iftheultimate goalistoensurethatoilrevenues(alongwithotherstateresources)arespentina waythathelpsalleviatepoverty,thenitisimperativethatthebudgetcorrespondtothe needsofthepoor.
5.2 Earmarking Oil Money for Priority Sectors Theoilrevenuemanagementsystemattemptstoensurepro-poorspending,by earmarkingmoneyfor“prioritysectors”andsettingaminimumrequirement foroverallbudgetallocationtothosesectors.AccordingtoLaw001andthe accompanyingdecrees,Chadrequiresthatatleast42.6percentofthenon-oilrevenue budgetbespenton“prioritysectors,”andthatalloilrevenuesearmarkedforpriority
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 69 Box 12 sectorsbeadditionaltothis baselinespendinglevel.206(This The Elusive National Budget baselinewasderivedfromthe2002 nationalbudgetspendinglevels, Anobviousprerequisitetoanalyzingthebudgetisseeingit.However, thisseeminglysimplestepposesasignificantchallengeinChad.Whether priortothestartofoilproduction.) becauseofthehighcostsofreproductionortheperceivedlackofpublic Thisso-called“additionality” interestinthedocument,thegovernmentdoesnotmakecopiesofthe requirementappliestoaggregate approvednationalbudgetreadilyavailable,letalonedisclosethedraft prioritysectorspending,butdoes budgetforcommentbeforeadoption.DuringaBIC/CRSresearchtripto ChadinMay2004,acopyofthenationalbudgetwasseenonlyonce,on notmakeanystipulationsaboutthe thedeskoftheIMFresidentrepresentative.TheIMFrepresentativewas wayinwhichoilrevenuesaretobe reluctanttoloanhercopyforfearthatshewouldnotbeabletoobtain allocatedbetweenprioritysectors. another.Intheoil-producingregion,staffofthesocialdevelopment Consequently,thereisnothingto fundestablishedunderthepipelineproject,FACIL,hadnotseenthe preventtheextremelyimbalanced 2004budgeteither.Withoutanunderstandingofwhatexpendituresthe allocationsbetweenprioritysectors governmenthadplannedfortheregion,itisunclearhowFACILcould seeninthe2004budget,wherethe ensurethatitsfundingwaswell-targetedandnotredundantwithother publicworkssectorreceivedover publicspending.Mostimportantly,withoutaccesstoinformationabout halftheoilrevenuesearmarkedfor thebudget,theChadianpopulationcannotknowwhattoexpectfromthe prioritysectors,andoversixtimes government,andthuscannotcheckagainstmisuseofpublicfinances. thatallocatedforeducation. Intheend,CRSandBICresearchersobtainedacopyofthenational budgetafteramonthofsearching. Justwhatshouldbeconsidered aprioritysectorinChad,where almosteverythingisneeded urgently,hasbeenthesubject ofsomedebatesincethedesignoftherevenuemanagementsystem.Therevenue managementlawdefinedprioritysectorsas: Thereisnothingto •PublicHealth preventtheextremely •SocialAffairs imbalancedallocations •Infrastructure betweenprioritysectors •Education seeninthe2004budget, •RuralDevelopment(AgricultureandLivestock) wherethepublicworks •EnvironmentandWater sectorreceivedover halftheoilrevenues Manyhavecalledthefailuretoincludeexpendituresonthejudiciaryandonenergy earmarkedforpriority needsillogical,giventheimportanceofafunctioningjudiciarytosoundrevenue sectors,andoversix managementandimprovedpublicadministration,andtheimportanceofenergyto timesthatallocatedfor economicdevelopment.Furthermore,observershaveexpressedconcernaboutthe education. lackofcorrelationbetweentheprioritysectorsasdefinedintherevenuemanagement lawandthoseidentifiedinthenationalpovertyreductionstrategy(PRSP),which emphasizestheimportanceofgoodgovernanceandjudicialreform.DuringtheAugust 2004IMF/WorldBankmissiontoChad,anagreementwasreachedtoallowcotton andenergyexpenditurestobeincludedundertheexistingdefinitionofprioritysectors, withthecaveatthatthegovernmentdefineandadheretoacleartimetableforcotton Tofurthercomplicate sectorreforms.(TheIMFwantstoensurethatthegovernmentdoesnotuseoilmoney analreadyconfusing indefinitelytocoverthecostsofcottonsector“mismanagement.”207) budgetaryprocess, thedesignated Tofurthercomplicateanalreadyconfusingbudgetaryprocess,thedesignatedpriority prioritysectorsdonot sectorsdonotcorrespondneatlytoexistinggovernmentministries.Forexample, correspondneatlyto educationactuallyfallsundertwoministries,theMinistèredel’Education,focused existinggovernment onprimaryschooleducation,andtheMinistèred’EnseignementSupérieur,focused ministries. onsecondaryandtertiaryeducation.Whilethereisnothinginherentlyproblematic aboutthiscabinetstructure,itscomplexityrendersthetaskoftrackingoilmoneymore difficult. BySeptember15eachyear,thegovernmentistoprepareadetailedplanforthe allocationofoilrevenues(forallprioritysectors)tothesatisfactionoftheWorldBank.
70 5. Budgeting for the Boom Theplanistobereflectedintheprogramofpublic expenditurespresentedinthefinancelaw(national budget)forthefollowingyear.208 Itisnotclear,however,thatthegovernment isadheringtotherequirementsregarding prioritysectorallocations.TheIMF’sArticle IVConsultationReportforChad,publishedat theendofApril2004,notedproblemswiththe Chadiangovernment’sfailuretoincreasepriority sectorspendinginthe2004budgetabovebaseline levels.209Becausenon-prioritysectorspending washigherthanexpected,the2004budgetdid notmeetthe“additionality”constraint.210The IMFreportstated,“Thecompositionoffiscal expendituredidnotimprove,ashoped,infavor ofprioritysectorspending.Whilenonpriority AnoperatingroominaruralclinicinsouthernChad.Publichealthisone expenditurescontinuedtoexceedtheirtargets, ofthegovernment“prioritysectors”earmarkedtoreceivefundingfromoil mainlyindefense,priorityoutlayswerelowerthan revenues.Accordingtotheoilrevenuemanagementlaw,fundsmustbespent oncapitalinvestments–suchasmedicalfacilitiesandequipment–andnot programmedin2002andthefirstninemonths onrecurringexpensessuchassalariesforhealthworkers.FewChadianshave of2003.”TheIMFattributedtheinadequacyof accesstohealthcareandtheaveragelifeexpectancyis48years.(Photo: MartinZint) prioritysectorspendingto,amongotherthings,“a lackoffocusbytheauthoritiesonputtinginplacethemeasuresenvisagedunderthe PRGF-supportedprogramtoimproveexecutionofprioritysectorspending.”211
5.3 How “Oily” is the 2004 Budget? ThelatearrivalofChad’sfirstoilrevenuestothenationalaccountsinJuly2004, coupledwithsuspensionofbudgetaryassistancefromtheIMFandotherdonors earlierintheyear,causedseveredelaysintheexecutionofthe2004nationalbudget. (SeeSectionSix,ChangingChad:TheRoleofExternalActors)TheNational AssemblydidnotapprovethebudgetuntilFebruary2004,andarevisedbudget (amendingthefinancelawfor2004)waspassedinAugust.212Thetotalnational budgetfor2004was484.2billionCFAF(approximately$950million).Oilrevenues comprisedslightlymorethan15percentofanticipatedgovernmentreceipts,equivalent toapproximately40percentofnon-oilrevenues(excludingaid,grantsandloans).213 Basedonproductionestimatesandoilpriceprojectionsfor2004,Chadbudgeted73.5 billionCFAFinoilrevenuesfortheyear,ofwhichapproximately36billionCFAF,or roughly$72million,wasallocatedtoprioritysectorspending. Itislikelythatoilrevenueswilldoubletotalgovernmentrevenuesinthecomingyears. Annualnon-oilrevenuesinChadareapproximately150billionCFAF($294million). At225,000bbl/day(thepipelinecapacity),Chadwouldonlyhavetoearn1800CFAF perbarrel(orapproximately$3.50)fromroyalties,dividends,andincometaxonthe Consortiumcombined,inorderforoilrevenuestoequalnon-oilrevenues.Depending onthepriceofoilandtheresolutionofoutstandingdisputesconcerningthecalculation ofChad’searningsperbarrel,expertsbelievethatoilrevenuescouldsurpassnon-oil revenuein2005.Otherwise,adoublingofthecountry’srevenuesisexpectedtotake placein2007,oncetheConsortium’staxexemptionsexpire.Whilethe2004revenues mayseemrelativelymodest,thecontributionofoiltothenationalbudgetisrapidly growingsincethepeakproductionlevelwasachievedinlate2004.With2007just aroundthecorner,indirectrevenueswillsoonbeaddedtotheroyaltiesanddividends alreadyaccruingtothestate,placingagreatdealmorediscretionaryfundsinthe handsofthegovernment.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 71 Whenformulatingitsannualnationalbudget,thegovernmentofChadusestheIMF’s With2007justaround WorldEconomicOutlookpriceforoilasabenchmarktoestimateprojectedpetroleum thecorner,indirect revenuesfortheyear.Accordingtothegovernmentstabilizationdecree(DecreeNo. revenueswillsoonbe 238),onlythoseoilrevenuesthatwerebudgetedforagivenyearcanbespent.Any addedtotheroyalties oilrevenuesreceivedinexcessofthebudgetedamount(duetohigher-than-predicted anddividendsalready oilpricesorproductionvolume)areconsidered“windfall”andaretobedeposited accruingtothestate, inastabilizationaccount,alongwithanyotherrevenuesthatthegovernmentdecides placingagreatdeal inadvanceto“save.”Thisprovisionismeanttoguardagainstpracticesthathave morediscretionary commonlyoccurredinotheroil-producingcountries,suchasCongo-Brazzavilleand fundsinthehandsof Angola,wherebyconservativeoilpricesareusedtoestimatethebudgetandrevenues thegovernment. inexcessofthisamounthavebeenusedforunbudgeted(andthusuntraceable) expenses.Anybudgetedoilrevenuesthatarenot disbursedinthecourseofayeararecarriedovertothe followingyear’sbudget.Sofar,Chadappearstobe complyingwiththestabilizationdecree. Basedonanaverageproductionof140,000barrelsper daythroughoutthefirstyearofproduction,Chadcould reasonablyexpecttoreceiveatleast$140-150million inrevenuesbytheendof2004,earningitawindfall (inexcessofbudgetedoilrevenues)ofapproximately $20-$30million.Thedraft2005budgetcontained estimatedfiguresforthepreviousyearthatseemedto confirmthesehigher-than-expectedearnings;petroleum revenuesfor2004werelistedas81.3billionCFAF,or some$158million.214 Theexactamountofunspent,budgetedoilmoney from2004thatwillbecarriedoverto2005isasofyet unknown.AccordingtoofficialCollègerecords,ina AsthisphotofromtheextremesouthofChadattests,thecountryneedsboth roadsandpublictransportation.Morethan50percentof“prioritysector”oil meetingwiththemembersoftheCollègeonSeptember revenueswenttoroadprojectsin2004,whileothersectors,suchashealthand 29,2004,PresidentDébyindicatedthatalloilmoney education,receivedmuchless.(Photo:MartinZint) notspentbyOctober30,2004,wouldbetransferred toministriesthoughttobecapableofabsorbingthefunds.Theofficialclosuredate forthenationalbudgetisusuallyNovember30,butsomespeculatethatthedatewas pushedupbyonemonthinordertochannelmoremoneyintocertainsectors,such asPublicWorks.215However,thedraft2005budgetindicatedthatsome$22million inunspent,budgetedfundswouldremainwiththeministriestowhichtheywere Onlythoseoilrevenues allocatedandbecarriedoverinto2005.216 thatwerebudgetedfor agivenyearcanbe spent.Anyoilrevenues 5.4 Spending the Money: Priority Sectors receivedinexcessofthe Spendinggotofftoaslowstartin2004,duelargelytodelaysindisbursementof budgetedamountare oilrevenues.AlthoughoilhasbeenflowingsinceJuly2003andthefirstsalewas considered“windfall” registeredinNovember2003,revenuesdidnotarriveinChaduntilJuly2004. andaretobedeposited inastabilization Justunderhalfoftheoilmoneyinthe2004budget,orapproximately36.7billion account. CFAF($72million)wasallocatedtotheMinistryofEconomyandFinancetocover debtservice(9.567billionCFAF–$18.76million),the10percentofdirectoil revenuesfortheFutureGenerationsFund(equivalentto5.794billionCFAF–$11.36 million),the5percentfortheoil-producingregion(equivalentto2.611billionCFAF –$5.12million),andthestabilizationfund–inwhichthegovernmentdeposited6.785 billionCFAF($13.3million)in2004.217Afterdebtservicepaymentsandallocations tospecialaccountsaredeductedfromthetotaloilrevenuecontributiontothe2004 budget,onlyslightlymorethanhalf,orsome36.8billionCFAF($72million), remainedforprioritysectorinvestmentsandoperationalexpenses.218
72 5. Budgeting for the Boom 2004 Summary of Oil Revenue Projects Approved by the Collége (Numbers are rounded for display purposes)
(approx.$963millionUSD, Total2004Budget 491,329,951,000 atpresentexchangerate CFAF 510CFAF/$1USD)
73.5billionCFAF/$144 Totalcontributionofoil millionUSD(revised revenuesto2004budget estimate,fromJune2004)
OilRevenueallocations 2004Budget Commitmentsapprovedby Paymentsapprovedby bysector Collége,Oct.2004 Collége,Oct.2004
PublicWorks 19.3billionCFAF 16.6billionCFAF 16.5billionCFAF ($37.8million) ($32.6million) ($32.5million)
2.8billionCFAF 892millionCFAF NationalEducation 0 ($5.5million) ($1.7million)
HigherEducation 2.2billionCFAF 1.6billionCFAF 1.3billion andResearch ($4.3million) ($3.2million) ($2.6million)
2billionCFAF Health 0 0 ($3.9million)
2.2billionCFAF EnvironmentandWater 0 0 ($4.3million)
3.6billionCFAF 2billionCFAF 2billionCFAF Sanitation ($7.1million) ($4million) ($3.9million)
640millionCFAF 78.1millionCFAF 78.1millionCFAF SocialAction ($1.3million) ($153,278) ($153,278)
Agriculture 4billionCFAF 2billionCFAF 321billionCFAF andLivestock ($7.8million) ($1.9million) ($630,588)
36.8billionCFAF 22.2billionCFAF 20.2billionCFAF TotalPrioritySector ($72.2million) ($44million) ($39.8million)
AsofNovember8,2004,theCollègehadapprovedcommitteddisbursementstotaling approximately24.4billionCFAF($47.8million),andpaymentsofapproximately21.7 billionCFAF($42.5million).219
The Road to Abéché Asthetableaboveshows,theMinistryofPublicWorksreceivedover19billion CFAF($37.25million)inthe2004budget,ormorethanhalfofthetotalpetroleum revenuesavailableforprioritysectors.Theentireamounthasbeenallocatedtotwo roadprojects.(TheMinistryofLand,UrbanismandHabitatsreceivedthenexthighest allocationofoilrevenuesin2004orsome3.6billionCFAF($7.06million)–onlya fractionofthatwhichwasallocatedtoPublicWorks.220)
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 73 NoonewoulddenythatChadisindireneedofroads.Onetripoutsidethecapital city,eventotheclosestsuburbsofN’Djamena,highlightsthelimitedreachofChad’s transportinfrastructure.However,Chadisinneedofmanythingstohelpelevateits populationoutoftheabjectpovertyinwhichmostofthecountrylives,anditisnot clearthatspendingthebulkofoilmoneyonroadswillbeasilverbullettoreduce poverty. Thefundshavebeencommittedtofinancethepavingof140km.betweenBisney- NgouraandNgoura-Bokoro,eastofN’DjamenaontheroadtoAbéché.According totheapprovedbidsforthiswork,thesetwostretchesofroadwillcosttheChadian governmentapproximately56billionCFAF($109.8million)overthreeyears.221 TheEconomistIntelligenceUnitobserved: Thefactthat40%oftheoilrevenueisallocatedtoroadbuilding whileeducationreceivesonly5.1%andhealthcare3.3%suggest thatithasnotadheredtothespiritofthelaw.Spendingon infrastructureimposesconstraints,however,aslimitedgovernment capacityandthelead-timerequiredtoimplementinfrastructure projectswillslowdownthegovernment’sabilitytospendthenew revenue.222 Incontrast,thegovernmentandotherobserversexplainthedisproportionateallocation topublicworksnotonlyintermsofthecountry’sdireneedforbetterroads,butalso intermsoftherelativelyhigherabsorptive(spending)capacityofpublicworksas comparedtootherpriorityministries. Recentauditsof InthereportofitseighthmissiontoChad,theInternationalAdvisoryGroup(IAG) publicexpenditure noted,“Theallocationofoilrevenuesin2004didnotfollowtheguidelinesofthe conductedbyChad’s NationalPovertyReductionStrategy(NPRS)ascloselyasexpected.Intheattemptto ownInspectorGeneral acceleratespending,mostoftherevenueswenttotheMinistèredesTravauxPublics havefound“continuing etTransports.AsofOctober15,65percentoftheoilfundshadbeenearmarked; widespreadproblems howeverthisfiguremasksmajorinequalitiessincesomeofthemainministrieshave inprocurement,” notyetcommittedanyfundsbythisdate.”223 and“persistent weaknessesandabuses inpublicexpenditure 5.5 Budget Execution: From Problematic Procurement to Skimpy Spending management.” Beyondquestionsregardingtheallocationofoilrevenuesamongprioritysectors, thesefundsmustbespenteffectivelytohelpreducepoverty.Recentevaluationsand auditsofpublicexpenditureconductedbythegovernmentofChad’sownInspector Generalhavefound“continuingwidespreadproblemsinprocurement,”and“persistent weaknessesandabusesinpublicexpendituremanagement.”224 TheBank’sCountryAssistanceStrategyforChaddescribesthepervasivenessof problemsandtheriskofincreasedcorruptionintheoilera: “Thelackofformalcontrolsatthecentralandregionallevels, especiallywiththecountry’sgeographicalfragmentation,has oftenledtomisuseofpowerandpublicfunds.Withthenewoil resources,itbecomesallthemoreimportanttoremedyinstitutional weaknessesthatmightotherwiseleadtoevermorecorruption… Corruptionandnon-transparentpracticesalsoconstrainprivate sectordevelopment.Thegovernanceenvironmenthastendedto fosteralocalprivatesectordependentonpatronage,inwhich politicalconnectionsaremoreimportantdeterminantsofbusiness successthanmanagerialcompetence.”225
74 5. Budgeting for the Boom Lack of Absorptive Capacity ManyexpertobserversbelieveChadhaslittlecapacitytospendpublicresourcesin atimelyandeffectiveway.TheIMFhaspredictedthat“verylittleofthebudgeted 2004oilrevenueswillbespentin2004.”226TheEconomistIntelligenceUnitwrote, “ThearrivalofoilrevenueinJulyandAugustwillhelptoeasefiscalproblems,butthe 227 spendingofthisrevenuewillcontinuetobeslowedbycapacityconstraints.” “Thegovernance BasedonpastexperiencewithitslendingportfolioinChad,theWorldBankshould environmenthastended haveexpectedthatChadmightfacedifficultiesspendingtheoilmoneyasitbegan tofosteralocalprivate toaccruetothegovernment.InFebruary2003,forexample,ofthe$273.8million sectordependenton committedtoChadintheformofapprovedloansandgrantsfromtheWorldBank’s patronage,inwhich IDA,only$51.8million(orlessthan20percentofthefunds)hadbeendisbursed.This politicalconnections poordisbursementrecordreflectsthedifficultythatthegovernmenthadinspending aremoreimportant fundsinamannerandtimeframeconsistentwithprojectplans.Asof2003,theaverage determinantsofbusiness lengthoftimethatittookforthegovernmentofChadtoactuallystartexecuting successthanmanagerial projectsapprovedbytheBankwas10months.228TheBank’sownresearchexposes competence.” Chad’sweakabsorptivecapacity,showingthatbetween1999and2002,theaverage –WorldBankChad CountryAssistance annualdisbursementofBankfundstoChadwaslessthan$40million(includingboth Strategy investmentprojectsandstructuraladjustmentloans).229TheBankattributedthispoor performance,inpart,toChad’slongandcomplexprocurementprocedures. Thegovernment’slackofabsorptivecapacitywillhaveprofoundimplicationsforthe objectiveofturningoilrevenuesintovisiblebenefitsforthepoor.Withslowproject execution,theremaybegrowingdiscontentamongthepopulation.Overthenexttwo years,theEconomistIntelligenceUnitpredictsthat:
Oilrevenuewillcontinuetoincreaseatafasterpacethanthe government’scapacitytospendit...thesurplusisforecastto widento1.8%ofGDPin2005.In2006theforecastreductioninoil prices,whichwillreduceoilrevenue,coupledwithanincreasein governmentspendingintherun-uptotheelections,willcausethe movefromafiscalsurplustoafiscaldeficitof1%ofGDP.230 Thegovernment’slack 5.6 The 2005 Budget: Big Spending ofabsorptivecapacity willhaveprofound Incontrastto2004,the2005budgetpreparationprocessgotunderwaymuchearlier implicationsforthe andadraftfinancelawwasapprovedbytheCouncilofMinistersonSeptember30, objectiveofturningoil 2004.Thedraftspendingplanfor2005reflectsa15percentgrowthoverthe2004 revenuesintovisible budget,largelyattributedtosizeableinvestmentsandtheinfluxofoilrevenues.231 benefitsforthepoor. Figuresregardingtheanticipatedoilrevenuesfor2005werebasedonestimated annualoilexportsof79.8millionbarrels.TheprojectedrevenuestoChadperbarrel werecalculatedusingasalepriceof$38.50perbarrel(takenfromtheIMF’sWorld EconomicOutlook),fromwhichdeductionsof$7.80fortransportcostsand$9.80for thequalitydiscountareexpected,givinganetpriceperbarrelof$20.90.232 Accordingtothedraftspendingplan,estimateddirectoilrevenuesfor2005–thefirst fullyearofpeakoilproduction–willbe125.3billionCFAF($245.6million).This representsanincreaseofabout55percentoverthepreviousyear,whentotalpetroleum revenueswereestimatedtobe81.3billionCFAF($159.4million).233Thetablesbelow provideabreakdownofhowtheserevenuesaretobeallocated. Thedraft2005budgetproposessharpincreasesintheallocationofoilrevenuesto certainsectorsseeminglywithoutregardtodemonstratedcapacitytospendthemoney. (SeeTable,“AllocationofPetroleumRevenuesin2004and2005”)Membersof theCollègehaveexpressedconcernaboutthe2005budget,questioningthedecision toradicallyincreasetheannualallocationtocertainsectorsthathavefailedtospend
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 75 moneybudgetedin2004.Eventhoseministriesthatmanagedtospendagood portionoftheirpetroleumrevenueenvelopeslastyearwillbechallengedtospend thesignificantlylargerallocationsplannedfor2005.Forexample,theMinistryof
Proposed 2005 budget (allocation of direct petroleum revenues) in CFAF (USD equivalents rounded)
Thedraft2005 TotalRoyalties 125,300,000,000($245.6million) budgetproposes FutureGenerationsFund(10%) 12,530,000,000($24.5million) sharpincreasesin theallocationofoil DebtService 200,000,000($392,156) revenuestosectors PrioritySectors 90,056,000,000($176.5million) seeminglywithout regardtodemonstrated AllocatedSpending 87,000,000,000($170.5million) capacitytospendthe StabilizationFunds 3,056,000,000($6million) money.Forexample, theMinistryofPublic Oil-ProducingRegion(5%) 5,628,500,000($11million) Healthspentonlyone Non-PrioritySectors(15%) 16,885,500,000($33million) quarterofits2004oil revenueallocationbut Source:MinistryofEconomyandFinance,GeneralBudgetOffice,Draft2005Budget,allocationof petroleumroyalties,November2004. receivesafive-fold increasein2005. Agriculture,whichusedalmost80percentofitspetroleumrevenueallocationin 2004,isexpectedtospendthreetimesthatamountin2005.Otherministriesthat performedfarworsein2004arealsoexpectedtoradicallyincreasetheirabsorptive capacities.Forexample,theMinistryofPublicHealthspentonlyonequarterofits 2004oilrevenueallocation.The2005budgetraisesthesector’sallocationtoalmost Todate,noneofthe 10billionCFAF–afive-foldincrease.Itisunclear,however,whatisbeingdone revenuesearmarkedfor toimprovethissector’sabilitytoresponsiblyspendthesegreatlyincreasedfunds. theoil-producingregion AlthoughtheMinistryofPublicWorkswillnotreceiveasdisproportionateanamount havebeendisbursed, oftheprioritysectorallocationsasitdidin2004,approximately40percentofthe largelybecausethere revenuesforprioritysectorshavebeenearmarkedforpublicworksandtransport isnoonetoadminister in2005.Notably,theMinistryofMinesandEnergy,whichwasnotpreviously them. consideredoneofthe“prioritysectors”undertherevenuemanagementlaw,has beenincludedinthiscategoryforthe2005budget,andwillreceive8.2billionCFAF ($16.08million)inoilrevenues.
5.7 Revenues for the Oil-Producing Region Withoutfunctioning “ThedevelopmentofthecrudeoilwillbenefittheentireChadiannation.However,the localauthoritiesora residentsoftheoilareawillspecificallybenefitfromit,notablythroughtheregional comprehensiveregional developmentplan.” developmentplan – Chadian President Idriss Déby at the oil project baseduponinputfrom inauguration ceremony, October 10, 2003 localcommunities, itisunclearhowthe Todate,noneoftherevenuesearmarkedfortheoil-producingregionhavebeen governmentwillensure disbursed,largelybecausethereisnoonetoadministerthem.AccordingtoaWorld thattheregional BankProjectAppraisalDocumentforoneofthepipelineprojectloansin2000,the allocationisusedto governmentofChadwasrequiredtodevelop“mechanismsacceptabletotheBank meettheneedsofthe regardingthedistributionandapplicationoffunds[designatedforthepetroleum localpopulation. producingregion],”bynolaterthanJanuary31,2003.234Itwasnotuntilmorethan18 monthsafterthatdeadlinethatthegovernmentofChadissuedadecreeregardingthe modalitiesfortheadministrationofthe5percentofdirectrevenuestobeallocatedto
76 5. Budgeting for the Boom Allocation of Petroleum Revenues in 2004 and 2005 (in CFAF) Note: Carry-over figure represents 2005 allocation plus unspent 2004 allocation)
2004 2005
20,814,500,000 Ministry of Economy 36,698,600,000 ($40.8 million) and Finance ($71.9 million) (23,426,100,000 with carry-over)
2,800,000,000 12,280,000,000 Ministry of National Education ($5.5 million) ($24 million) (12,870,000,000 with carry-over)
9,760,000,000 2,000,000,000 Ministry of Public Health ($19.1 million) ($3.9 million) (11,260,000,000 with carry-over)
640,000,000 2,400,000,000 Ministry of Social Action ($1.2 million) ($4.7 million)
8,810,000,000 3,065,544,000 Ministry of Agriculture ($17.2 million) ($6 million) (9,490,600,000 with carry-over)
1,050,000,000 1,000,000,000 Ministry of Livestock ($2 million) ($1.9 million) (2,050,000,000 with carry-over)
8,200,000,000 Ministry of Mines and Energy 0 ($16 million)
33,150,000,000 19,301,001,000 ($65 million) Ministry of Public Works ($37 million) (34,726,000,000 with carry over)
Ministry of Environment 2,190,000,000 2,690,000,000 ($4.3 million) ($5.2 million)
2,210,000,000 4,000,000,000 Ministry of Higher Education ($4.3 million) ($7.8 million)
2,260,000,000 3,622,140,000 Ministry of Sanitation ($4.4 million) ($7.1 million) (5,533,965,000 with carry-over)
9,283,456,000 19,885,500,000 Other departments ($18.2 million) ($38.9 million)
125,300,000,000 82,810,741,000 Total $245.6 million ($162.3 million) (136,532,165,000 with carry-over)
Source:MinistryofEconomyandFinance,GeneralBudgetOffice,Draft2005Budget,Annex1:AllocationofPetroleumRevenues, November2004.
theoil-producingregion.235(SeeSection3.3,“MoneyforOil-ProducingRegion”) For2005,morethan5.6billionCFAF(over$10million)hasbeenallocatedtotheoil- producingregion.236Evenwiththeestablishmentofatemporarycommitteetooversee useoftheregionalfunds,withoutfunctioninglocalauthoritiesoracomprehensive regionaldevelopmentplanbaseduponinputfromlocalcommunities,itisunclear howthegovernmentwillensurethattheregionalallocationisusedtomeettheneeds
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 77 ofthelocalpopulation.TheJuly2004reportoftheIAGnotedthatthedecentralized governmentagenciesintheprojectzone,responsibleformanagingtheoilrevenuesto beallocatedtotheregion,“willnotbeinplacefortwoyears”and“stillsufferfroma lackofinformationandinvolvementintheDobaProject.”237Evenwiththecreation oftheinterimmechanism,intheabsenceofafunctioninglocalgovernmenttoabsorb andeffectivelyadministrateoilrevenues,aswellasaviableRegionalDevelopment PlanfortheDoba,moneythataccruestotheregionalaccountinthefirstyearsmay gounspentaltogetherormaynotbeeffectivelyspent.Asaconsequence,thelocal Withoutfunctioning populationswhohavebornethebruntofthesocial,environmentalandeconomic localauthoritiesora costsoftheprojecttodatemaybethelasttoseetheextrabenefitspromisedfromoil comprehensiveregional revenues. developmentplan baseduponinputfrom TheWorldBank’sPetroleumSectorManagementCapacityBuildingProjectfinanced localcommunities, thecreationofapilotsocialdevelopmentfundtosupportinfrastructureprojects itisunclearhowthe andeconomicactivitiesintheoil-producingregion,withaparticularemphasison governmentwillensure “micro-credit”and“localsocioeconomicinvestments.”Thisinitiative,calledtheFond thattheregional d’ActionConcertépourlesInitiativesLocalesorFACIL,wasgivenabudgetof$3.5 allocationisusedto million.Start-upoftheinitiativesufferedsignificantdelays;itwasnotuntil2003that meettheneedsofthe fundsbegantobeallocatedandwithinoneyear,almosttheentirebudgetwasspent. localpopulation. Sincethen,FACILhasfacedpersistentfundingproblems,anditremainsunclear how,ifatall,theworkofthisinitiativewillbesustained.Initsmostrecentreport, theindependentmonitoringgroup,theIAG,notedthat“Thedisappointingresults ofFACILandtheuncertaintyregardingitsfuturefinancingcallsintoquestionthe sustainabilityofthispilotproject.”238
Conclusion – Pro-Poor Budgeting in Chad Astheexperienceofthe2004budgetandplanningfor2005show,therearemany Thelocalpopulations obstaclesstandingbetweentransparentallocationofoilrevenuesthroughthenational whohavebornethe budgetandspendingthosemoniesinawaythatreducesthepovertyofmillionsof bruntofthesocial, Chadians.Thebudgetdevelopmentprocesswillhavetobeopeneduptogreater environmentaland inputfromtheCollège,membersoftheNationalAssemblyandtheChadianpeople economiccostsofthe themselvestoensurethatallocationsaddressthemostpressingneeds.Thegovernment projecttodatemaybe willneedtodeveloptheproperdistributionoffundsbetweenprioritysectorsrather thelasttoseetheextra thanmerelygivingmoremoneytoministries–suchaspublicworks–thatappearable benefitspromisedfrom toabsorbitfasterthanothers.Allgovernmentministrieswillneedincreasedcapacity oilrevenues. toplanandexecuteprojectsinanefficientwaysothat“earlysuccesses”intheuseof oilmoneywillboostpublicconfidenceinthemanagementofChad’snewoilwealth. (ThiswillbeadifficulttaskgivenChad’spoorhistoryofexecutingprojectsandlong delaysinspendingdonormoney.)Procurementandbiddingprocesseswillneedto beimprovedtocurtailcorruptionandnon-transparentpractices.Andfinally,special effortswillhavetobemadetoensurepromptandresponsibleuseoftargetedfunds designatedforChad’soilproducingregion.Externalactorsmusturgentlyrespondto theseneeds,but,asSectionSixdescribes,externallysupportedcapacity-buildingand governancereformprogramshavehadalimitedeffect.
78 5. Budgeting for the Boom 6. Changing Chad: The Role of External Actors
EnsuringthatChad’soilboombenefitsthepoorrequiresbuildinggovernment capacity,alteringpoliciesand,ultimately,changingpolitics.Thedriveforthose changesmustcomefromwithinthecountrytobesuccessful,buttheroleofoutside forcescannotbeignored.Experiencetodaterevealsboththelimitedabilityofexternal actorstoinfluencechangeswithingovernmentandtheneedforthoseactorstouse whatleveragetheyhavetosupportadherencetotheruleoflawandcompliancewith safeguards,suchastherevenuemanagementsystem. Asthepivotalfinancieroftheoildevelopmentandpipelineproject,theWorldBank continuestobearsignificantresponsibilityforthefateoftheexperimentintrading petroleumforpovertyalleviation.Whileatthetimeoftheproject’sapprovalthe BankmaintainedthattheChadiangovernmentwouldbewell-preparedtomanagethe petroleumsectoranditswindfallbeforeoilbegantoflowthroughthepipeline,this rosypicturecontrastsstarklywiththerealityontheground.Morethanayearafterthe oilbegantoflowthroughthepipeline,thegovernmentremainsacutelychallengedto manageandregulatetheoilsectorandtouseitsnewfoundwealthwell. Theinfluxofpetroleumrevenuestothecountrywillinevitablyalterrelationsbetween thegovernmentandthedonorsonwhomthecountryhasdependedsomuchinthe 6past.Whatwillbetheconsequencesofthischangedrelationship,andhowwilldonors fulfilltheirownobligationstoseethattheoilexperimentinChaddoesnothave disastrousresultsforthecountry’speople?Whileadeclineinrelianceonforeign aidisgenerallyconsideredapositivesignalofincreasingeconomicindependence, inChad,wherecitizenshavelimitedinfluenceontheirgovernment,itcouldalso Experiencetodate spellthelossofimportantsourcesofexternalpressureforgreatertransparencyand revealsboththelimited accountability.TherapidaccumulationofpetrodollarsinChadconfrontstheBank, abilityofexternalactors IMFandotherdonorswithachoicebetweenusingtheirknownleveragetodayand toinfluencechanges relyingontheiruncertainleverageinthefuture. withingovernment andtheneedforthose actorstousewhat 6.1 Dependence on External Financing – Will Oil Revenues Drive Donor leveragetheyhave Dollars Away? tosupportadherence Evenasitlooksaheadtodecadesofoilrevenues,Chadremainsextremelydependent totheruleoflaw intheshort-termonexternalfinancingfrombilateralandmultilateraldonors,including andcompliancewith theWorldBankandIMF.Duringthefirstyearofoilproductionandsales,Chad’s revenuemanagement budgetrestedlargelyonaid,subsidies,grantsandloans.In2004,grantsandloans systemsafeguards. accountedforapproximately56percentofChad’stotalrevenues–amoresignificant portionofthebudgetthanoilmoney.239Evenin2005,whenpetroleumrevenuesare predictedtogrowby55percentoverthepreviousyear,thegovernmentwillrelyon externalfinancingforatleast40percentofitsbudget. TheIMFandtheWorldBankprovidethebackboneofthecountry’sexternalfinancing andplayanimportantroleinsecuringadditionalfundsforChadbecauseotherdonor commitmentsarecommonlytiedtothestatusofthecountry’sprogramswiththe institutions.Inearly2004,whentheIMFfailedtocompleteareviewofChad’s performancebeforethepreviousPovertyReductionandGrowthFacility(PRGF) programexpiredonJanuary6,2004,disbursementofIMFfundswasdelayedand consequentlyotherdonorswithheldplannedbudgetsupport.Thisprecipitateda financingcrisisinChadthatledtobacklogsinthepaymentofpublicservants’ salariesandotherdelaysinbudgetexecution.Whilethesituationimprovedslightly oncenegotiationsonanewPRGFcommenced,relationswiththeIMFwerefurther strainedwhenChadtemporarilyfellintoarrearsonitsdebtpaymentsinJuly2004 (latepaymentsreached$8.8million).240DisbursementsfromtheWorldBankwere (again)suspendedinNovember2004duetoadditionalarrearsondebtservice.241
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 79 OnNovember12,2004,theIMFannouncedthatithadreachedanagreementwith thegovernmentofChadontheissuanceofanew,three-yearloanunderthePRGF, amountingtoapproximatelyU.S.$37.9millionfortheperiod2005-2007.242 InadditiontotheBankandFund,thelargestsinglesourceofaidtoChadisthe EuropeanUnion.ImportantbilateraldonorsincludeFrance(theformercolonial power),Taiwan,Switzerland,GermanyandtheUnitedStates.243 ItremainsuncertainwhetherdonorswillwithdrawfromChadasoilrevenuesto thegovernmentincreaseoverthecomingyears.However,thereisgoodreasonto believethatasoilrevenuesrise,officialdevelopmentassistancewilldecline.This couldspelltroublefortheChadiangovernment.BecauseLaw001restrictstheuse ofalargeportionofdirectoilrevenuestoprioritysectorcapitalexpenditures(aswell asdebtservice,savingsandstabilizationaccounts),theChadiangovernmentrelies heavilyonloansandgrantsfromexternaldonorstopayfornon-priorityandrecurrent (non-capital)expenditures,includingthingslikesalariesforcivilservants,customs administration,thejudiciary,andthemilitary,tonamebutafewoftheexpensesthat falloutsideofthesectorsearmarkedfordirectoilrevenues.TheIMFexplainsthat “foreignbudgetarysupportwouldcontinuetobeneededoverthemediumterm,even inthepresenceofoilreceipts,asmostoilrevenueintheearlyyearsofoilproduction isbylawearmarkedtofinancespendinginprioritysectorsthatisadditionalto ‘baseline’prioritysectorspendingandnon-earmarkeddomesticbudgetsourcesare Bysupportingthe insufficienttocovernonpriorityandbaselineprioritysectorspendingin2004-07.”244 pipeline,theWorld However,theseprojectionsdonotfactorinadditionalrevenuesfromnewoilfields,the Bankcatalyzedthe useofwhichwillnotbesubjecttotherestrictionsofLaw001. emergenceofanoil economyinChad. TheWorldBank’sprominenceamongdonorinstitutionsstemsnotonlyfromthe Whetherornotthisnew magnitudeofitslendingtothecountry,butfromthehighpublicprofileithastaken oileconomyservesthe arounditsroleinreshapingthesocialandeconomiclandscapeofChadthrough country’spopulation supportfortheoilsector.TheBank’sfinancingforthedevelopmentoftheChad- dependsonfundamental Cameroonpipelineandcapacitybuildingcomponentsisthemostprominentdimension changesinthe ofitsoveralllendingprogram,whichincludes12activeprojectswithatotal government’scapacity, commitmentvalueofalmost$389million.245Whiletheloansforthepipelineproject policies,andpolitics. arenotaslargeasthosetheBankhasprovidedforotherinitiativesinChad,their impactonthecountry,whethergoodorbad,farexceedsthoseofsomeofthemore costlyinfrastructureandsocialdevelopmentprojectsinitsportfolio.Bysupporting thepipeline,theWorldBankcatalyzedtheemergenceofanoileconomyinChad. Whetherornotthisnewoileconomyservesthecountry’spopulationdependson fundamentalchangesinthegovernment’scapacity,policies,andpolitics.
6.2 Building Capacity: The World Bank and the Two-Speed Project Translatingpetrodollarsintopovertyalleviationdependsontheabilityofthe governmenttouseoilrevenueswell.WhentheWorldBankdecidedtosupportthe Chad-Cameroonpipelineprojectin2000,itdidsoonthepremisethatitwouldbe abletobuildChad’scapacitytomanageitsoilwealthbythetimethepipelinewas operational.Tothisend,itprovidedloansforthepipelineinfrastructureandfortwo capacity-buildingprojectsforChad–thePetroleumSectorManagementCapacity BuildingProject($23.7million)andtheManagementofthePetroleumEconomy Project($17.5million).246TheWorldBankextendedthesethreeloanstoChad simultaneously,arguingthatitcouldreinforcethecapacityoftheChadiangovernment tomanagepetroleumrevenuesandregulatetheimpactsoftheindustrybeforeand duringpipelineconstruction.Justpriortoprojectapproval,theBankclaimedthat: Therewillbecross-effectivenessconditionstoensurethatthe pipelineprojectdoesnotgoforwardunlessthecapacitybuilding projectsareinplace,[andthatthoseprojectswouldbe]phased
80 6. Changing Chad – The Role of External Actors toproducethecriticaloutputs(improvementoftheregulatory framework,humanandtechnicalcapacity)beforetheendofthe 18-monthperiodfollowingBoardapproval…[allowing]required capacitytobeinplacepriortothebeginningofthepipelineproject’s majorinfrastructureworksandlongbeforeprojectedfirstoil.247 Therealityonthegroundtellsadifferentstory. Civilsocietyorganizationswarnedthatcapacityshouldbeimprovedanddemocratic 248 structuresstrengthenedbeforetheprojectstarted. ButtheBankwasconfident–and Althoughoilproduction overlyso,asthepastfewyearshaveproven.Thefailureofthecapacitybuilding hasbegun,the projectstokeeppacewiththeconstructionofthepipelineandoilproductionhasbeen 249 governmentstill welldocumentedbyofficialmonitoringbodiesandcivilsocietyalike. lacksthecapacityto Persistentdelaysingovernmentcapacitybuildinghaveplaguedtheprojectsincethe effectivelymasterthe outset,leadingtheBank-appointedIAGtodenounceits“two-speednature”whereby budgetaryprocess, pipelineconstructionfaroutpacedneededchangesingovernanceandgovernment regulatethesocialand capacity.Asearlyas2001,theIAGcalledforaslowdowninconstructionactivities environmentalimpacts toallowforthesocialandenvironmentalprojectcomponentstocatchup.250This ofoiloperations,or recommendationwasnotheeded.AccordingtotheWorldBank“TheGovernments absorbtheanticipated [ofChadandCameroon]havetheprimaryresponsibilityforthemanagementofthe influxofrevenueinits indirectimpactsandformonitoringandevaluationoftheenvironmentalmanagement priorityministries. plans.”251However,capacitybuildingeffortshavebeensoseriouslydelayedand governmentparticipationinmonitoringsolimited,thatthegovernmentwasnotable tofulfillitsroleduringthecriticalconstructionperiodandisstillfacingchallenges today.Constructionofthepipelineandassociatedfacilitieswascompletedafullyear inadvance,whiletrainingprogramsandimprovementsingovernmentcapacityhave laggedbehindschedule. Asaresult,althoughoilproductionbeganmorethanayearago,theChadian authoritiesdonothavethecapacitytofullyparticipateinmanagingtheimpactsofthe petroleumeconomy.AsrecentlyasJune2004,theExternalComplianceMonitoring Group(ECMG)wrote,“Governmentcapacitytomonitortheoperationsoftheoil projectisnotyetfullyeffective,althoughtheDobaProjectconstructionphaseis almostcompleteandnewsatelliteoilfieldsarebeingexplored.”252Onlyamonth later,theIAGstatedsimply:“TheobjectivesofthetwoWorldBank-fundedprojectsto “Theobjectivesof buildChad’scapacitytomanagethepetroleumeconomy,includingaprogramtotrain thetwoWorldBank- Chadianadministratorstomanagetheeconomyandthepetroleumsector,havenot 253 fundedprojectstobuild beenmet.” Chad’scapacityto In2000,theWorldBankclaimedthat,“Themaineffortofcapacitybuilding managethepetroleum (recruitmentandtraining)willtakeplaceduringthefirstyearofproject economy,including implementation,andtherestduringthesecondyear,i.e.beforethemainpipeline aprogramtotrain constructionbegins,andonetotwoyearsbeforethefirstoilflows.”255Ironically, Chadianadministrators nearlyfouryearsaftertheproject’sapproval,theWorldBankisstilltalkingaboutthe tomanagetheeconomy needtobegincapacitybuilding.InSeptember2004,theCountryDirectorforChad, andthepetroleum Mr.AliKhadrstatedthat,“Today,Chadisreadynowtoturntoacapacity-building sector,havenotbeen phase–tothinkaboutwhatskills,knowledge,andincentivespeoplewhoworkwithin met.” 256 theinstitutionsneedinordertofunction.” – InternationalAdvisory Group,July2004254 Thefailuretobuildgovernmentcapacityasquicklyasthepipelinehashighlightedthe pitfallsofsupportingincreasedinvestmentintheextractiveindustriesinparallelwith governanceandinstitutionalreforms.In2003,afterassessingavarietyofprojects includingtheChad-CameroonpipelinefortheExtractiveIndustriesReview,the Bank’sownOperationsEvaluationDepartmentconcludedthat“wherethegovernment lackstheabilitytomanagerevenueswell,increasedinvestmentdesignedtoaugment governmentrevenueswillhavelittlebenefit,andtheBankshouldfocusitssupport onstrengtheninggovernanceandmanagingofenvironmentalandsocialrisks.”257
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 81 Anassociatedstudyrecommendedthat,“TheBankshouldnotsupportincreased investmentincountrieswhosegovernmentslackthecapacitytobenefitfromor managesuchinvestment.”258 Today,someBankofficialsarguethateveniftheyhaddelayedthestartoftheproject bytwoyears,ascivilsocietygroupsdemandedin2000,thingswouldnotbebetteroff Thegameof“musical because“capacity-buildingtakesmorethantwoyears.”Thisrecognitionofjusthow chairs”withinthe time-consumingitistobuildgovernmentcapacityseemstohavecometoolate. governmentand politicaltensions betweenmembersof Internal Weaknesses in Government Déby’spartydisplaced Theslowdisbursementsofthecapacity-buildingloansandthelatestartoftraining thetwopeoplewho activitieshavedelayedinstitutionalstrengtheninginChad.Inaddition,frequent werearguablythemost reshufflingoftheChadiancabinetandthelossofkeyadvisorshascostthe knowledgeableabout governmentsomeofitsmostcapablemembersandmostknowledgeablepetroleum thetermsofcontracts specialists.TheOctober2004government“communiqué”anddisputessurrounding withtheExxonMobil- thecalculationofpaymentstoChad(SeeSection3.4)mayreflectthegovernment’s ledconsortium. poorgrasponthetechnicalitiesofhydrocarbonproductionandsales,andtheabsence ofinstitutionalmemorywithinthegovernmentregardingthetermsnegotiatedwith theConsortiumpriortotheproject’sstart.Thegameof“musicalchairs”withinthe governmentandpoliticaltensionsbetweenmembersofDéby’spartydisplacedthe twopeoplewhowerearguablythemostknowledgeableaboutthetermsofcontracts withtheExxonMobil-ledconsortium.Bysomeaccounts,thePetroleumDirectorate fellapartfollowingthedepartureofitsformerhead,HassaneMahmatNasser,when hewasnamedastheminister Box 13 ofminesandenergyinJuly Weak Environmental and Social Oversight 2004,withnojurisdiction by the Government overmattersrelatedtooil. Similarly,therepresentative Oneofthemostglaringweaknessesingovernmentcapacityis withregardtoenvironmentalandsocialregulationandoversight oftheChadiangovernment ofthepetroleumsector.Thegovernmentbodyresponsiblefor mostdirectlyinvolvedinthe environmentalandtechnicalcomplianceoftheoilsector,theComité negotiationsofthecontract TechniqueNationaledeSuivietdeContrôle(CTNSC),iscurrently withExxonMobilinHouston financedwhollybytheWorldBank,throughtheManagementof in1998,TomErdimi,was thePetroleumSectorCapacityBuildingProject.Butthissupport dismissedfromoffice willonlycontinuethroughDecember2005,andremainingfundsare followingtheattemptedcoup insufficienttocoverthecostsoftheCTSNCforallofnextyear.It onMay16,2004.259 isnotcleartowhatextenttheChadiangovernmenthasprioritized fundingthecontinuedoperationofthisoversightbodyinthecoming Thereappeartobefew years.Neitherthe2004northe2005nationalbudgetincludes capablestaffintheMinistry fundingforCTNSC,andasofNovember2004,theWorldBank ofPetroleum.InApril2004, andthegovernmentofChadhadnotyetreachedanagreementon theWorldBankclaimedto thetermsofasupplementalcredittothecapacitybuildingproject, 261 havesupportedthetraining whichcouldhelpfinancethecontinuedfunctioningofCTNSC. Its of10inspectorscapable operationwillbeofincreasingimportanceasoilexplorationsleadto ofreadingmetersinKomé thedevelopmentofadditionalfields. andKribi,andfivepeople Ironically,justasproductionacceleratedinrecentmonths,thequality onthemodernizationofoil oftheCTNSC’soversighthaswaned.InitsNovember2004report, revenuemanagement.260 theIAGnotesthattheCTNSC“hassufferedadrasticdiminutionofits Theshortsupplyofskilled strength/manpowersinceMay2004,callingintoquestionthequality staffiscompoundedbythe ofthesocialandenvironmentalmonitoringoftheDobaProjectand factthatthemostcompetent theotherpetroleumactivitiesinthecountrybygovernmentteams. governmentemployeesare TheofficeofExecutiveSecretaryoftheCTSNChasbeenvacantfor severalmonthsandtheon-sitesupervisionteamhasgonefrom14to frequentlyluredawayfrom 4people,duetoresignationandthefailuretorenewcertaincontracts publicofficebytheprivate whichhadended.”262 sector,withoffersofhigher paychecks.Indeed,several
82 6. Changing Chad – The Role of External Actors ofthemosthighlytrainedhydrocarbonspecialistsinChadleftthegovernmentforjobs withExxonMobil. RegardingChad’sfiscalsystem,inApril2004,oneWorldBankofficialsaid,“Ihave neverseensuchaweakcapacityinanycountryintheworld...We[theWorldBank] areherefor10-20years.”Thatis,ifthegovernmentagreestokeepthemaroundfor thatlong.
Making up for Lost Time – and Money Recognizingthatitspreviouscapacitybuildingloansdidnotachievetheirobjectives, theBankisintheprocessofpreparingsupplementalcreditstosupportfurthertraining and“capacity-building”activitiesfortheChadiangovernment. However,onemustaskwhatwillmaketheseloansmore successfulthanthoseimplementedinthepast?Whatwill preventmoredebtaccruingtotheChadianpeoplewithlittle resulttoshowforit? AsofDecember2004,thereweretwoadditionalprojects inthe“pipeline”forChadattheWorldBank(International DevelopmentAssociation):agranttosupplementthe ManagementofthePetroleumEraEconomyloananda supplementalloanforthePetroleumManagementCapacity BuildingProject.AlthoughtheBankhasidentifiedobjectives andtentativetimelinesfortheprojects,Chadiangovernment officials,havingjudgedthepreviouscapacitybuildingprojects tobeinsufficient,areinsistingonfurtherdiscussionsabout thenatureofthesesupplementalprojectsbeforeincurring additionaldebt.263 ManagingChad’spetroleum-eraeconomymustinclude TheBankconceivesoftheproposed$8.5millionsupplemental specialattentiontodevelopinglabor-intensive,non-oil grantfortheManagementofthePetroleumEconomyProject, sectorsoftheeconomysuchasagriculture.Ifpoverty reductionistobeachieved,agriculturemustformthe expectedtobeapprovedinMarch2005,asthe“vehiclefora backboneofthelong-delayedRegionalDevelopmentPlan numberofessentialreforms”includingofthecottonsector,and fortheoil-producingregioninsouthernChad. (Photo:MartinZint) theconsolidationofreformsofthebudgetarysystem,which werenotachievedorremainincompletedespitepreviouscreditswiththesameaims.264 ThesupplementalPetroleumManagementCapacityBuildingcreditof$11.5million wasoriginallyscheduledforapprovalinSeptember2004,butwasdelayeduntil April2005.Theproposedsupplementalloanwillbeusedto:financeastudyofthe sustainabilityofandfurthertechnicalassistancetotheCTNSC;supportthePetroleum Directoratetoformulateanewpetroleumregulatoryframework;extendfinancingfor FACIL;andfinancethecompletionoftheRegionalDevelopmentPlan.265 TheRegionalDevelopmentPlan(RDP)fortheoil-producingarea,whichwas supposedlyunderwayatthetimeofprojectapprovalinJune2000withfinancing fromtheoriginalPetroleumSectorManagementCapacityBuildingProject,wasstill notcompletebyNovember2004.AccordingtosourcesattheWorldBank,more than$600,000hadbeenspentontheplanasofApril2004,withlittletoshowforit. AlargeportionofthatmoneywaspaidtoaCanadianconsultingfirm,whosework wasdeemedunsatisfactorybyboththeBankandtheChadiangovernment.After receivingasecond,inadequateversionoftheplanfromtheconsultantsinmid-2004 (bywhichpointsome85percentofthe$500,000contracthadbeenpaid),theBank andgovernmentofChadagreedtohireJeromeMagrin,theauthorofabookcalled “FromtheCottonEratothePetroleumEra,”toreviseandcompletethelong-overdue RDP,incollaborationwithfiveChadianspecialists.Theintentistobuildoffthework thatconsultantsdid,butwithgreaterattentiontoactualdevelopment“planning”and theprioritizationoftheregion’sneeds.Afteradelayofmorethanfouryears,during
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 83 whichtimeconstructionhasimpactedlocalcommunitiesandsmallsocialdevelopment initiativeshaveproceededwithoutmuchregionalcoordination,afinalizedplanfor developmentoftheoil-producingzonewouldbeawelcome,ifoverdue,tooltohelp addressemergingproblemsandmeetlongstandingneeds. ThemoneyspentontheRDPtodatewasnottheonlyportionoftheBank’scapacity buildingloanthatwas“lost.”Bankstaffarguethatapproximately$5millionwaslost duetofluctuationsintheexchangerate(depreciationoftheU.S.dollar)alone,and TheRegional another$1.6millionwasusedtocoverthecostoflegalandtechnicalassistancetothe DevelopmentPlan ChadiangovernmentduringthenegotiationofthenewconventionwithExxonMobilin (RDP)fortheoil- April2004—anunforeseencostatthetimetheloanwasapproved.266 producingarea, whichwassupposedly TheadministrativecostsoftheBank’sinvolvementinthePetroleumDevelopment underwayatthetimeof andPipelineProjecthavebeenexceptionallyhigh,bothintermsoftimeandmonetary projectapprovalinJune resources.ThefrequentturnoverinWorldBankstaffontheprojectteamhas 2000withfinancing interruptedthecontinuityofimplementationandresultedinthelossofinstitutional fromthePetroleum memory,nottomentiontime,delayingtheachievementofstatedprojectobjectives. SectorManagement Sincetheproject’sapproval,therehavebeenatleastthreedifferenttaskmanagers CapacityBuilding andavarietyoftechnicalstaff.Despitethisextra-ordinaryattention,thescaleofthe Project,wasstillnot problemsremainingraisesquestionsabouttheeffectiveuseofBankfunds. completebyNovember 2004. MuchofthiscostispassedontothegovernmentofChad,throughexpensespaidout ofexistingloansor,ultimatelythroughdebt.Whobearsthecostforill-usedorwasted money?UltimatelythepeopleofChadthemselvesdobecause,notonlydotheyfailto reapthebenefitsofmoneywell-spenttoday,butfuturegenerationsbeartheburdenof repayingtheloanstakenoutbythegovernment. Thefrequentturnover inWorldBankstaff 6.3 Changing Policies ontheprojectteam hasinterrupted “[T]heBankteamwillcontinuetomonitorthesituationcloselyandstandreadyto thecontinuityof interveneinresponsetoanybreachofChad’scommitmentsunderthePetroleum implementationand RevenueManagementProgram.” 267 resultedinthelossof –WorldBank,April2004. institutionalmemory, nottomention time,delayingthe TherequirementthatthegovernmentofChadestablishanoilrevenuemanagement achievementofstated systemisperhapsthemostprominent,butcertainlynotthesoleexampleofthe projectobjectives. WorldBank’seffortstopushforpolicychangeinChad.Since1994,theBankhas beensupportingadjustmentloansthataimatreformingChad’seconomicpolicies andpublicinstitutions,complementedbyIMFpovertyreductionandgrowthfacility credits,aswellasstructuraladjustmentsupportgrantsfromotherdonors(namely,the E.U.,FranceandtheAfricanDevelopmentBank).Asixthstructuraladjustmentcredit of$25million,the“InstitutionalReformSupportCredit”orIRSC,wasapprovedfor ChadonNovember30,2004,followingthesuccessfulconclusionofnegotiations betweenChadandtheIMFontherenewalofamacroeconomicprogramforthe country.“Likeitspredecessors,theFourthandFifthStructuralAdjustmentCredits (SACIVandSACV),theproposedIRSCfocusesonstrengtheningandimproving governanceandpublicresourcemanagement.”268Theveryfactthattheobjectivesof thislatestloanarethesameasthoseofpreviousStructuralAdjustmentCreditsIVand Vsuggeststhattherehasnotbeensubstantialprogressonmanyofthepolicyreforms thattheBankhassupported. WhenthesixthandmostrecentSACwasapproved,theBanknotedthat:“Chad’s recordontheimplementationofgovernanceandtransparencyreformsremains uneven…[and]governanceproblemspersist,notablyintheareaofpublic procurement.”Forallthefocusonestablishinglawsandinstitutions,therehasbeen
84 6. Changing Chad – The Role of External Actors insufficientattentiontotheirenforcementandoperation.TheBankhasconditionedits continuedsupportforadjustmentloansontheadoptionofmethodologies,completion ofaudits,orpassageoflaws.However,theindicatorsofprogressitidentifiesdo notassesswhetherthelawshavebeenadheredtoorauditsfollowed-up.Indeed,the Bank’sownassessmentrecognizedthat“effectiveenforcementofaccountabilityand sanctionmechanismsisstillinneedofsignificantstrengtheningandstreamlining.”269 ThetrackrecordoftheBank’sefforts,however,tellsofthedifficultyofeffecting meaningfulandlastingpolicyreform.TheBank’sambitiousagendaofincreasing transparency,accountability,theruleoflaw,andtheefficientuseofpublicresources, ultimatelyrestsonthegovernment’scommitmentandpoliticalwill. Forallthefocuson establishinglaws Wielding Leverage over the Chadian Government: How Hard to Push? andinstitutions, Attimes,staffoftheWorldBankandIMFhavehaddifferencesofopinionabouthow therehasbeen tousetheirrespectiveleverageovertheChadiangovernment,aslendersandadvisors. insufficientattention OnesuchdisputesurroundedtheissueofhowhardtopushtheChadiangovernment totheirenforcement regardingtheextensionoftheoilrevenuemanagementsystemtoalloilfoundinthe andoperation.The country.Asaconditionofits2003PRGFcredit,theIMFrequiredChad’sCouncilof Bank’sambitious Ministerstoadoptprinciplesfortheuseofoilrevenuesfromnewfields.However, reformagendain thegovernmentfailedtoobservethiscondition,andconflictingviewsemergedabout Chadultimatelyrests whetherornottheIMFshouldrequirethemeasureasa“prioraction”inorderfor onthegovernment’s Chadtoaccessasubsequentcreditin2004.270SomeBankstaffmaintainedthat commitmentand stringentconditionsrequiringtheextensionoftherevenuemanagementprovisions politicalwill. tonewoilfieldswouldnotbeacceptedbytheChadiangovernmentandwouldrisk drivingPresidentDébyfurtheroutsidetheinstitutions’sphereofinfluence.One importantbilateraldonoralsoexpressedconcernaboutpushingthegovernment ofChadtoohardontheextensionofrevenuetransparencyandmanagement commitmentstotheentireoilsector,citingrisksofrepercussionsonregionalstability. AlettertotheWorldBankandIMFfromtheprimeministerofChadinlate2003 outlinedthegovernment’scommitmenttotheprincipleofextendingtherevenue transparencyandmanagementpracticestonewoilfields.Thismoralassuranceand subsequentoralpromisesbytheformerprimeministerseemedtoreassuretheWorld Bankofthegovernment’scommitmentinthisregard,buttheIMFwaslesssatisfied. Itwasnotuntileightmonthslaterthat,inthecourseofanAugust2004jointIMF- WorldBankmission,theIMFseemedtosoftenitsstanceandacceptthegovernment’s non-bindingcommitmentasasatisfactorymeasure.TheCouncilofMinistersissued Discordbetweendonors apublicdeclarationinSeptember2004regardingthegovernment’sintenttofollow canleadtoconvergence thesameprinciplesoftransparencyandpro-poorexpendituresinmanagingoilmoney arounda“lowest fromnewfields.Thisincidentrevealshowdisagreementsbetweendonorscanlead commondenominator” toconvergencearounda“lowestcommondenominator”policyandultimatelydetract andultimatelydetract fromdonors’abilitytohelpinstitutionalizegreatertransparencyandaccountability fromdonors’abilityto withintheChadiangovernment. helpinstitutionalize greatertransparency 6.4 Changing Politics andaccountability withintheChadian AlthoughtheWorldBankfrequentlyclaimsthatitsArticlesofAgreement“require government. ittofocusoneconomicconsiderationsandnotonpoliticalorothernon-economic influencesasthebasisforitsdecisions,”liketheIMF,theBank’sinvolvement inreformingeconomicpoliciesandinstitutionsisinevitablypolitical.271Bank managementhasarguedthathumanrightsandissuesofpoliticalrepressiononly becomeamatterofconcerntotheBankiftheyhave“significantdirecteconomic effects”onaBankfinancedproject.272InacountrysuchasChad,characterizedby politicalinstabilityandpersistenthumanrightsviolations,theverypossibilityof achievingmeaningfuleconomicreformisconstrainedbythepoliticalenvironment. BecauseoftheseverityofpoliticalproblemsinChad,theWorldBank’sInspection
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 85 Panelexplainedthatit“feltobligedtoexaminewhethertheissuesofproper governanceorhumanrightsviolationsinChadweresuchastoimpedethe implementationoftheProjectinamannercompatiblewiththeBank’spolicies.”273 Bankmanagement,too,hashadtoconfronttherealityofpoliticalrepressioninChad onmorethanoneoccasion,thoughithasnotnecessarilytakenasustainableapproach toaddressingissuesofgovernanceandhumanrights.Forexample,in2000,World BankPresidentJamesWolfensohnpersonallyintervenedtohelpfreelocalopposition leaders,anditwassuggestedthathewaspreparedtointerveneagainifthepresident’s brother-in-lawhadbecomeheadoftheCollège.274Whilelaudable,suchexceptional measuresdonotconstituteasustainableremedyforthegovernanceandhumanrights challengesinChad,whichmayincreaseintheoilera.Accordingtothenarrative accompanyingtheWorldBank’slateststructuraladjustmentcreditinNovember 2004,“[B]yraisingthepotentialstakesassociatedwithpoliticalpower,oilrevenues riskmakingthemaintenanceofsocio-politicalstabilityevenmoreofachallenge.”275 ThefateofChad’soil-for-poverty-reductionexperimentcannotbedivorcedfromthe country’spolitics,andhigh-levelphonecallsaloneareinsufficientsafeguards. SeniormanagementattheBankhavedeclaredit“themostpowerfulinstitutionin assistingcountriesintheirobligationwithregardtoallhumanrights—civiland politicalrightsandeconomicandsocialrights.”276TheBanksaysithas“always takenmeasurestoensurethathumanrightsarefullyrespectedinconnectionwiththe projectsitsupports”andisworkingto“identifyareaswherewecandoevenmoreto reflecttheprinciplesenshrinedinthe[UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights]into allofourwork.”Asitmakesprogressexpandingitseffortstoprotectandpromote humanrights,theBankshouldconsiderChadasamongthemostimportantandmost urgentplacesinwhichtoputthosemeasuresintopractice.277 InChad,where democracyhasyet 6.5 Waning Donor Influence over an Oil-Rich Government? totakeroot,citizens andcivilsociety AsoilmoneyflowsintoChadanddependenceondonordollarsdeclines,multilateral organizationswith andbilateraldonorsmayloseleverageoverthegovernment.Insomecountries,this limitedinfluenceover mightbeperceivedasapositivedevelopment,heraldinggreaterindependencetomake theirowngovernment policyandspendingdecisionsfreefromdonorconditionality.However,inChad, oftencountonthe wheredemocracyhasyettotakeroot,citizensandcivilsocietyorganizationswith pressurethatexternal limitedinfluenceovertheirowngovernmentoftencountonthepressurethatexternal actorscanbringto actorscanbringtobearinthestruggletomakethegovernmentmoretransparentand bearinthestruggleto accountabletoitspeople. makethegovernment Thetimeframeforinfluencingthegovernmentmayberunningout,sinceoilrevenues moretransparentand couldsoonenablethegovernmentofChadtopayoffsomeloansandtodistanceitself accountabletoits fromdonorinstitutions.Infact,thedebtservicearrangementputinplaceforthe people. repaymentofWorldBank(IBRD)andEuropeanInvestmentBankloanstoChadfor thepipelineseemdesignedtofacilitatethiseventuality. TheIBRDandEIBloanstothegovernmentofChadarerepaiddirectlyfromthe off-shoreescrowaccountinLondon.278Inaddition,adebtservicereserveaccount wasestablished“[to]holdatalltimesanamountequalto18monthsofdebtservice paymentsduetoIBRDundertheChadloan.Thereservewouldbefundedfrom Chad’sroyalties,taxesanddividendsgeneratedduringthefirst12monthsofproject operations.”279Thedebtservicereserveaccounthasbeenestablishedandholds approximately$7.41million.280ThisrepaymentarrangementprivilegestheIBRDover othercreditors,includingIDAandtheIMF,andreducestheenvelopeofoilrevenues fromwhichadditionalprioritysectorspendingisdrawn,ratherthanspreadingthe pipelinedebtburdenacrossallsectorsofthenationalbudget.However,perhapsmore importantly,thestrictdebtserviceschedulemayactuallyacceleratethepaceatwhich thegovernmentofChadseversitsfinancialtieswithdonors.
86 6. Changing Chad – The Role of External Actors Chadbeginsitseight-yearrepaymentperiodforitsIBRDloanonJune15,2005,and isrequiredtomakefixed,semi-annualpaymentsof$2.47million.281From2004to 2013,Chad’sestimateddebtservicetotheIBRDandEIBwillbe$60million.282The WorldBankexpectstheIBRDloantothegovernmentofChadforitsparticipation inthepipelineprojecttobepaidbackby2014.Alldebtfinancingfortheproject (incurredbyprojectsponsorsandthegovernmentsofChadandCameroon)isexpected TheWorldBank,IMF, toberepaidby2017.283Thuswhilethegovernmentmaycontinuetobedependent andotherdonors ontheWorldBankandotherdonorsforbudgetarysupport,oncethepipelinecredit shouldnotacceptthe isrepaid,theWorldBankwillnolongerbeinapositiontoenforceclausesinthe “incrementalpolicy pipelineloanagreement.If,forexample,newoilfieldsarediscoveredafterthe slippages”thatcould IRBDloanispaidback,requirementsintheloanagreementregardingcomplianceof adduptoafundamental thoseoildevelopmentswithenvironmentalandsocialstandardswillnolongerapply, departurefromthe strippingtheWorldBankofimportantlegalleveragetoensurethatthegovernment accountablesystem preventsandmitigatesharm. ofpublicresource GiventheuncertaintyaboutjusthowdependentChadwillbeonexternalfinanciers managementwhichthey inthefuture,donorsneedtoactsoonanddecisivelytohelpinstitutionalizethe claimtosupport. safeguardsandbuildthecapacitynecessarytocheckagainstfutureabuseofthe country’spetroleumresources.Ratherthansofteningtheirrequirementsregarding transparencyandaccountabilityfortheuseofpublicresourcestoappeasepresent relationships,theWorldBank,IMF,andotherdonorsshouldnotacceptthe “incrementalpolicyslippages”thatcouldadduptoafundamentaldeparturefromthe accountablesystemofpublicresourcemanagementwhichtheyclaimtosupport.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 87 Conclusion: A “Model Project” Hanging By a Thread
“ThesuccessoftheDobaprojectwillbemeasuredbypovertyreductionratherthanby barrelsofoilproducedormillionsofdollarsreceivedbyChadfromoilexports.”
– World Bank, Project Appraisal Document 268
“Wehopeso.Itsleadershipsaysitwill.Ithassignedtheagreementsandissued thedecreescommittingittodoso.Webelievethatthelawshouldbeimplemented fully.Weshallmonitoritsimplementationverycarefully.Aslongasitisproperly implemented,webelieveitwillyieldconsiderablebenefitsfortheChadianpeople andcouldserveasamodelformanagingnaturalresourcerevenuesresponsiblyand transparently.”
– U.S. Ambassador to Chad Marc Wall on whether the oil revenue management law will be followed269
ManyobstaclesstandinthewayofconvertingChad’s oilwealthintoconcreteimprovementsinthelivesofthe country’spoor.WhiletheChadprojecthasbeenprematurely hailedasa“newmodel”foroilrevenuemanagement benefitingdevelopment,therecordofChad’sfirstyearasa petro-stateprovidesmanyreasonsforconcern. Whileimportantbuildingblocksforaccountableandeffective oilrevenuemanagementarebeingdevelopedandneedto benurtured,limitedprogressonthisfrontistemperedby worryingtrendsinthepoliticalenvironment,weaknesses andloopholesintherevenuemanagementsystem,problems withcorruption,transparencydeficitsandsevereinstitutional capacityconstraints.Despitealltheattentionandsupport ItisfartooearlytodeclaretheChadexperimentafailureor ChadhasreceivedfromtheWorldBankandotherdonors, asuccess.WhetherornotChadmanagestoconvertitsnew thecountryremainsessentiallyunpreparedtomanagethe “blackgold”intorealgainsforthepoormaynotbeknown foryears.Thereare,though,clearlessonsthatcanbedrawn complexitiesofaneconomyincreasinglydominatedbyoil. fromChad’sexperiencetodate.(Photo:MarcThomas) Theoilexperimenthangsbyathread. ItisfartooearlytodeclaretheChadexperimentafailureorasuccess.Whetherornot Chadmanagestoescapethe“paradoxofplenty”maynotbeknownforyears.There are,though,clearlessonsthatcanbedrawnfromChad’sexperiencetodate.These canserveassignpostsbothtocorrecturgentproblemsinChadaswellastoimprove Despitealltheattention effortstoassistotherdevelopingcountriesinmanagingresourcewealth. andsupportChad hasreceivedfromthe WorldBankandother Power, Politics and Conflict donors,thecountry remainsessentially Chadisneitheranabstractionnorablankslate,butasystemofpoliticsandpower unpreparedtomanage thatpredatestheoilprojectandthe“experiment”increatingasystemofaccountable thecomplexitiesofan revenuemanagement.Asmallrulinggroupcontrolsthegovernment,itsresources economyincreasingly andinstitutions.Asthecoupattemptandothereventsin2004show,thepossibilityof dominatedbyoil.The violentconflictisever-presentandthesetensionswillonlyincreasewiththearrivalof oilexperimenthangsby newoilwealth.Tensionsexistwithintherulingcircle,betweendifferentethnicgroups, athread. betweennomadicherdersandpastoralistsandbetweenrefugeesandlocalpopulations. Anynumberof“nationalemergency”scenarios–suchasthecurrentspilloverofthe Darfurconflict–couldprovideapretextforthediversionofoilrevenues.Witha violentcataclysmoragovernmentdecisiontoignorethesafeguardsputinplace,the elaboratelyconstructedtechnocratic“quickfix”forChad’sgovernanceproblemscould goupinsmoke.
88 Conclusion: A “Model Project” Hanging By a Thread Chadischaracterizedbyasystemofimpunityratherthanruleoflaw.Chad’sjudiciary isweak,underfundedandsubjecttoexecutiveinterference.Thecountry’sSupreme Courtwasonlyestablishedin1999.WhileChad’srevenuemanagementlawand otherlegalandinstitutionalinnovations–suchastheCollège–areimportant,these newlawsareinsufficientsafeguardsinChad.EverythingintheChad“model”rests EverythingintheChad ontheenforcementofthelawandsanctionsforviolatorsinacountrywithahistory “model”restsonthe ofneither.Thisisatenuousbasisforhope.Thesupremelawofthelandisthe enforcementofthe constitutionandthatcanbeeasilychangedinaone-partysystemwhereobserverssee lawandsanctionsfor electionsasneitherfreenorfare.Whatmakestherevenuemanagementimmunetoa violatorsinacountry similarfate? withahistoryofneither. Overtime,Chadianpoliticalactorsmaydevelopwaystoevadelegalsafeguards Thisisatenuousbasis orabsorbnewaccountabilityinstitutionsintothesystemofpoliticalpowerand forhope. patronage.Newmoneynotearmarkedintheoilrevenuemanagementsystemwill strengthenthehandofthegovernment.
A Narrowing Window for Reform ThenexttwoyearswillbeextremelycriticalforChadandthoseactorstryingto encourageimprovementsingovernance,humanrightsanddemocracy.Tensionsmay increaseintherun-uptoelectionsin2006andthegovernmentwillearnhigher-than- expectedoilrevenuesduetoelevatedoilprices,aswellasnewoilfieldscomingon lineinsouthernChad.By2006,ifthereisnosignificantevidenceofqualityspending ofoilrevenuesintheproducingregion,tensionsmayriseinsouthernChad.Andin 2007,thegovernmentwillhaveaccesstonewmoneyfromindirectoilrevenuesnot coveredundertherevenuemanagementlaw.Thesefactorswillallcombinetoheighten tensionsandincreasetheabilityofthegovernmenttoignoreinternalandexternal pressureforreform.
Flaws in the “Model” Design Largeloopholesinthedesignoftherevenuemanagementsystemshouldhavebeen addressedintheprojectformulationstage.Becauseindirectrevenues–taxesonthe Largeloopholesin Consortiumandotherfees–falloutsidetherevenuemanagementlaw,$1-3billion thedesignofthe overthelifeoftheprojectwillgodirectlyintogovernmentcoffers.Whilethelawon revenuemanagement petroleumrevenuemanagementshouldhavecoveredalloilfoundanddevelopedin systemshouldhave Chad,itinfactcoversonlythreespecificfields.Governmentstatementsmayreassure beenaddressedinthe donors,buttheybynomeansguaranteesoundrevenuemanagementinthefuture.In projectformulation fact,thecarefullywordeddeclarationissuedbyChad’sCouncilofMinistersleaves stage.Becauseindirect thedooropentothecreationofanentirelyseparatemechanismformanagingnewoil revenues–taxesonthe revenues–amovethatcouldsqueezeouttheCollègeandcreateparallelsystemsfor Consortiumandother managingoilrevenue. fees–falloutsidethe revenuemanagement The Hen Watching the Fox House law,$1-3billionover thelifeoftheproject Innovativeoversightinstitutions–bothwithinChadandoutside–havebeenhampered willgodirectlyinto bylimitedmandatesandinsufficientcapacity.WithinChad,theall-importantCollège governmentcoffers. needsaccesstoinformationinatimelyfashion,theabilitytoinvestigateexpenditures andthecooperationofthegovernmenttoprosecuteanywrongdoingidentifiedbythe body’sinvestigations.TheCollègelacksanindependentandsteadysourceoffunding, andtheabilitytoeffectivelycarryoutoversightinavastcountry.OutsideChad,new layersofoversight,liketheInternationalAdvisoryGroupappointedbytheWorld Bank,havetheabilitytoexposeproblemsbuthavenoauthoritytoenforcecompliance withtheirrecommendations.Theseoversightmechanismsrelyonthewillofthe governmentofChad,theWorldBankandtheoilcompaniestoheedtheiradvice.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 89 Transparency and Secrecy ThereismuchthatremainsopaqueconcerningChad’soilandtherevenuesgenerated fromproduction.Keycontractsbetweenoilcompaniesandthegovernmentare shieldedbyconfidentialityclausesandnegotiatedinsecretbyafewpeople.These contracts,whichshapeamajorportionofthecountry’staxstructure,arehiddenfrom publicview,therebypreventingtrueoversightofrevenuesgeneratedbytheproject. Keydeterminantsofrevenue,suchasproduction,shipmentandsalesfigures,arenot madepublic.Thereisanurgentneedtoclarifythecalculationofrevenuepaymentsto thesatisfactionofboththegovernmentandthepublic.Despitethefactthatdividends Thereismuchthat fromChad’ssharesinthetwotransportationcompanies(TOTCOandCOTCO)were remainsopaque expectedtoprovidesignificantrevenuesandbesubjecttotheCollège’soversight,to concerningChad’s datetheyhavenotbeentracked.Thereisscantinformationabouthowmuchdividends oilandtherevenues havecontributedtothegovernmentandwherethemoneyhasgone. generatedfrom production.Key Chadhasbeenputforwardasamodelofoilrevenuetransparency,butsome contractsbetweenoil neighboringcountrieshaveachievedmoreincertainaspectsofoiltransparency.The companiesandthe governmentofCongo-Brazzaville,forexample,recentlypublishedonitswebsiteallof governmentareshielded itsProductionSharingAgreements,recentproductionfiguresandauditsofthestateoil byconfidentiality company,revealinghugeproblemsinthemanagementofoilmonies.270 clausesandnegotiated insecretbyafew WhilesomeelementsoftheChadprojectaretransparent–thepublicationofreports people. fromtheCollègeandthepostingoftheCitibankescrowaccountactivityonthe WorldBankwebsite–thesemeasuresdonotgofarenough.Somedocuments,while availabletothepublicenprincipe,areunavailableforallpracticalpurposes.Ifitis difficultfortheIMFresidentrepresentativeorexternalresearcherstoobtainacopy ofthenationalbudgetofChad,imaginethedifficultiesforanordinarycitizen.Basic informationonthegovernment’sfinancesandexpendituresispracticallyunavailable. Citizensneedtohaveaccesstospendingplansofpriorityministriessotheycantrack theallocationofmoneydowntothelocallevel.And,inacountrywithlittleaccessto theInternetandlowlevelsofliteracy,Internet-onlypublicationofinformationwithout Transparencyisan explanationispracticallymeaningless. essentialingredientin Transparencydoesnotequalaccountability.Transparencyisanessentialingredient asystemofoversight, inasystemofoversight,accountabilityandsanction,buttransparencyalonedoes accountability notleadtoaccountability.Transparentinformationcanbeusedforbothformaland andsanction,but informalenforcementofthelawandsanctionofwrongdoingiftherightconditions transparencyalone exist.Investigativeandjudicialarmsofthegovernmentmustbeindependentand doesnotleadto capableofprosecutingwrongdoing.ElectionsmustbefreeandfairandChadians accountability. musthavetheabilitytochangetheirgovernmentthroughtheballotboxiftheythink thegovernmenthasnotmanagedtheoilwealthwell.Informalenforcement–through monitoringbycivilsocietyandpublicizinginformationontheradioandothermedia –mustbepartofasystemofaccountability.Transparencyisonlymeaningfulif informationisunderstoodbythegovernmentandthepublic,andifthefindingsof oversightbodiesareactedupon.
“Sowing the Oil” – Spending Oil Money to Reduce Poverty Spendingoilmoneytoreducepoverty–“sowingtheoil”–isnoeasymatter.Because oilproductionisanenclaveindustrythatproducesfewjobs(onlyafewhundred Chadiansaredirectlyemployedintheoilindustry)andhasfewlinkagestotherestof theeconomy,thegreatestimpactonthecountryisthroughthegenerationofrevenues. Theonlyreallinktotheeconomyisthroughrevenuesprovidedtothenational budget,makingeffectivefiscalpoliciesandexpendituresallthemoreimportant. Chadhaslittlerecordofeffectivelybudgetingandspendingresources,andahistory ofcorruptionandmismanagementinbiddingandprocurementprocedures.While therearenotableelementsoftransparencyregardingrevenuesatthemacro-level,itis
90 Conclusion: A “Model Project” Hanging By a Thread likelythatproblemswithcorruptionandmismanagementwillmigrate“downthefood chain”wheretheyaremorehiddenfrompublicview.Asinotheroilrichcountries, systemsofpatronagearelikelytodevelopthroughthenon-transparentawardingof governmentcontracts fundedbyoilrevenuesto companiesconnectedto thecircleofpower. Toreducepoverty, livelihoodsofthepoor mustimprove–through increasedaccessto healthcare,education, sanitation,etc.–and jobsmustbecreatedin thenon-oileconomy. Thisdependsonthe capacityoftheChadian governmentministriesto absorbincreasedlevels offundinganddevelop WomencarrymangostomarketinthesoutherncityofMoundou.Womenwalkupto25kilometersto effectivespendingplans earnalittlecashtopayforschoolfeesormedicaltreatment.Sinceoilgeneratesfewjobs,thegovernment musteffectively“sowtheoil”tocreateemploymentandimprovelivelihoodsinnon-oilsectorssuchas –capacitiesthatare agriculture. woefullylacking.Outside thecapital,thegovernment’sreachisminimal;thepublicprovisionofsocialservices islargelyunheardofinsouthernChad.Thelackofgovernmentinfrastructurein theregionsandtownsofChadwillmakeitdifficulttoabsorbandspendmoney effectively.Thishasgraveimplicationsforthepovertyreductionobjectivesofa projectdependentupontheeffectiveuseofmassivenewgovernmentrevenues. Increasedspendingonprioritysectorsdoesnotequalpovertyreduction;thespending mustbeeffective.(Otheroilrichcountries,suchasnearbyGabon,havehighlevelsof spendingonsocialsectorsbutlowerthanaveragepovertyindicatorsforsub-Saharan Africa.)Thegovernmentmustmakegreatereffortstofosternon-oilsectorinvestment inthecountry.
All Encompassing Institutional Weakness TheChadiangovernment’sall-encompassingweakness,toborrowaphrasefromthe WorldBank,hasenormousimplicationsonmanyfrontsfortheoutcomeofChad’s oilstory.Thegovernmenthasalackoftechnicalunderstandingoftheoilindustry andtherelevantcontracts,andfewtrainedstaffwhounderstandhowtocalculate andmanagerevenuestoensurethatChadiansreceiveasmuchaspossiblefromoil sales.Keytechnicalstaffaretransferredfrequentlyluredawaybytheprivatesector, andthegovernmentcapacitytomonitorsocialandenvironmentalimpactsfromoil productionisextremelylimited.TheMinistryofFinanceisstillunabletomanagethe complexitiesofanoilboomeconomy. WhileChad’soilfieldsandpipelineswerebuiltmorequicklythanplanned,the capacityofgovernmenthaslaggedfarbehind.Thistwo-speedproblemwasidentified bymanyearlyonintheprojectandisnowaffectingthegovernment’sabilitytouseoil revenuestoreducepoverty.Inmanyways,thecapacityoftheChadiangovernmentis farbehindwhereitneedstobeevenafterayearofoilproduction.
The World Bank – Remaking Chad? WorldBankfinancingplayedalinchpinroleinbringingprojectfinancetogetherand raisingthe“comfortlevel”oftheprivatesectorinvestors.TheWorldBankrecognized
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 91 manyofthechallengesthatnewoilrevenueswouldposeforChad,butarguedthat itsinvolvementintheprojectwouldensurethatgovernmentcapacitywouldbe sufficientlydevelopedbeforeoilrevenuesarrived.Thisclearlyhasnotbeenthecase andBankstaffhavesince“learned”ofthelong-termnatureofreformingandbuilding governmentcapacity.TheChad-Cameroonprojectprovidesastrongargumentfor propersequencingofbothgovernancereformsandincreasedgovernmentcapacity priortoWorldBanksupportforanoilinvestment.Itreinforcestheneedtoensure thatminimumconditionsoftransparency,theruleoflaw,respectforhumanrights, TheChad-Cameroon anddemonstratedcapacitytoimplementpro-poorprogramsexistpriortopromoting projectprovidesastrong investmentintheextractiveindustries.Moreover,governanceandhumanrights argumentforproper conditionsarguablyhavenotimprovedsinceprojectapprovalin2000.Indeed,as sequencingofboth thisreporthasshown,conditionshavedeteriorated,raisingnewconcernsregarding governancereformsand theultimatesuccessoftheproject.Finally,whiletheWorldBankhasjustifiedits increasedgovernment involvementinoil,gasandminingprojectsinthedevelopingworldonthebasisof capacitypriortoWorld undeniableenergyneedsofthepoor,itisimportanttorememberthatthisprojecthas, Banksupportforan sofar,onlyexportedoil;norefinedproductsderivedfromChad’soilareavailablein oilinvestment.The thecountryitself.Inaddition,Chad’sneedforelectricitygenerationanddistribution, experiencetodate eveninthecapital,remainssevereandisakeyimpedimenttoincreasedeconomic supportsafindingofthe development. ExtractiveIndustries Reviewthatgovernance Chad’s Special Relationships – The Role of Bilateral Donors reformsmustoccur beforeWorldBank Withthefateoftheoilprojecthangingbyathread,therelationshipbetweenChad investmentinthe andforeigngovernments,mostnotablyFranceandtheUnitedStates,willbecome extractiveindustriescan key.TheWorldBank,IMF,France,theU.S.andEuropeanUnion,amongothers, bejustified. mustshareacommonpolicyontheneedfortransparencyandaccountabilityinthe managementofChad’snewoilwealth.Theseactorswillhavetoemphasizetheneed forprogressonincreasingpoliticalspace,democraticgovernanceandrespectforthe ruleoflaw,andcarefullycalibratediplomaticengagementonthebasisofprogress. Ifpetrodollarspourinaspredicted,diplomaticengagementcouldbecomeamore importantleverforencouraginggovernancereformsthanwhateverfinancialassistance maybeoffered.WithlargeAmericancompanyinvestmentinChad,andstrong AmericansupportforWorldBankfundingoftheproject,theU.S.governmenthasan interestinseeingcontinuedoilflowaswellasbroadlydistributedeconomicgrowth Ifpetrodollarspour andpovertyreduction. inaspredicted, diplomaticengagement couldbecomeamore The Need for Transnational Civil Society Alliances importantleverfor ThecomplextransnationalnatureoftheChad-Cameroonprojectonthecommercial encouraginggovernance sidehasbeenmatchedbyimportantalliancesbetweengroupsinChad–NGOs,human reformsthanwhatever rightsgroups,churches,laborunionsandothers–andinternationalcivilsociety financialassistancemay allies.Keyreformsandinnovations–suchastherevenuemanagementsafeguards beoffered. andtheInternationalAdvisoryGroup–likelywouldnotbeinplacetodaywereit notforpressurefromatransnationalcivilsocietycoalitionworkingtoensurethat globaldecision-makershearlocalvoices.Astheprojectentersthecriticaltestphase ofmanagingoilrevenues,itwilltakecontinuedactionandattentionfromlocaland internationalcivilsocietyorganizationstotrackChad’srevenuesandholdtheproject proponentsaccountablefortheirfate.Thenewlyestablished“PublishWhatYouPay/ PublishWhatYouEarn”coalitioninChadwillneedassistancetoeffectivelypushfor increasedtransparencyofrevenueinformationandmonitoroilmoneyspending.
Whose Risk, Whose Reward? Chad’sdevelopmentasAfrica’snewestpetro-staterestsatacriticaljuncture.Willnew oilrevenuesfuelfurtherconflict,corruptionandimpoverishment–ashasbeenthe
92 Conclusion: A “Model Project” Hanging By a Thread caseinmostotheroilproducingcountries–orwillChaddefeatthe“resourcecurse” andenteraneweraofoil-fuelledpovertyreduction?TheWorldBankhassaidthatits Chadgambleisa“highrisk,highreward”project.Whiletherewardsoftheproject arecertainfortheoilcompaniesinvolved,therisksoffailurewillbebornebythepoor ofChad.Failurewillnotmeanmerelylosttimeormoney,orthatthingswillsimply notimprove.Oilcouldmakethingsdemonstrablyworseforthepoor.Thiswillmean disasterformillionsofChadianswhosehopeshingeoneverycargoofDobacrude. Willnewoilrevenues Allactors–theChadiangovernment,theInternationalFinancialInstitutions,the fuelfurtherconflict, oilcompanies,Northerngovernmentsandcivilsociety–mustworkurgentlyandin corruptionand concerttoensurethatChad’soilboomdoesnotfadeintoamirageforthepoor. impoverishment–as hasbeenthecasein mostotheroil- Recommendations producingcountries Thefollowingrecommendationsarebasedonresearchconductedoveratwo-year –orwillChaddefeat period,includingvisitstoChad,interviewswithprojectactors,andongoingexchanges the“resourcecurse” withChadiancivilsocietyorganizations.Manyoftherecommendationsechocalls andenteranewera madebyNGOs,Churches,humanrightsassociations,andcommunityorganizationsin ofoil-fuelledpoverty Chad. reduction?
Oil Companies
The ExxonMobil-led consortium should:
•Publishallconventionsandcontractsregardinghydrocarbonexplorationand productioninChad.TheConsortiumshouldrenounceconfidentialityclausesin contracts. •Providekeyinformationregardingthedeterminantsofoilrevenuedirectlytothe Collège(PetroleumRevenueOversightandControlCommittee),including: •volumeofcrudeproducedandsold •informationonthepricediscountforDobacrude •productionandtransportationcostsofcrude •paymentofdividendsandroyalties •debtservicepayments •exchangeratefortransactions •taxesandcustomsdutieslinkedtopetroleumexploitation. •Makepublicannualauditsconductedbyreputableinternationalfirms(e.g.,Ernst& Young,KMPG)relatingtoConsortiumactivitiesinChad. •Publishmapsofplannedoilwellsitesandfeederpipelinesinareasofnewoil developmentandmaketheseavailabletolocalcommunitiesandcivilsociety organizationsinChad. •Immediatelypublishoilfield-specificandcumulativeenvironmentalandsocial impactassessments.WiththedevelopmentofExxonMobil’ssatellitefieldsand EnCana’songoingexploration,theimpactareaofthepipelineprojectcanno longerbeconsideredasconfinedtothethreeoriginalDobafields.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 93 EnCana should: •Publiclysupporttheapplicationofexistinglawsregardingthetransparencyand managementofpetroleumrevenuestoanyfutureEnCanaoilproductioninChad. •Publishallconventionsandcontractsregardinghydrocarbonexplorationand productioninChadandrenounceconfidentialityclausesincontracts. •Publish,inatimelyandsystematicfashion,informationregardingexplorationand potentialproductionactivities. •Fundthird-partyverificationofitscompliancewithsocialandenvironmental safeguardsduringexplorationactivitiesinordertocomplywiththeWorldBank loanagreementregardinguseofthepipelineexportfacilities.
International Financial Institutions
The World Bank and IMF should: •Requiredemonstratedprogressonenforcementoflawsrelatingtofiscal management,includingsanctionsbythegovernmentforviolationsofprocurement regulationsandprosecutionofwrongdoinguncoveredthroughstateaudits,prior toprovidingadditionalprojectorpolicylendingormacroeconomicsupport.In absenceofdemonstratedenforcementandcorrectionofidentifiedproblems,the passageoflawsorpublicationofauditsshouldnotbeconsideredsatisfactory progressontheimprovementofthejudicialsystemor,forexample,procurement procedures. •Ensurethatthegovernment’scommitmenttoextendoilrevenuemanagement principlestotheentireoilsectorismadelegallybinding.TheWorldBankand IMFshoulddiscouragethecreationofasecond,separatesystemofoversight forrevenuesfromnewoilfields.Aparalleloversightframeworkcouldprovide additionalloopholesandmuddleeffortstorenderthesectortransparent. •Requirethedisclosureofallauditsrelatedtooilrevenuedetermination, managementandallocation,aswellasspendingbygovernmentministries. Thiswouldincludeauditsoftheoilconsortium(costaudits),auditsofanystate oilcompanycreatedinthefutureandauditsofthemanagementoftheFuture GenerationsFund.TheWorldBankandIMFalsoshouldrequirepublicationof anyauditsupportedbytheirfinancingorrequiredundertheloanagreementsand contractsfortheChad-Cameroonproject. •HoldpublicbriefingsinN’Djamenaandinregionalcapitalstoexplainanddiscuss thefindingsofregularreviewsandevaluationsconducted,suchastheIMF’s ArticleIVConsultationReports,WorldBankCountryAssistanceStrategies,or progressreportsonthePovertyReductionStrategy. •Supportthepublicdisseminationofinformationaboutthenationalbudgetin Chadbyhelpingtooffsetcostsofreproduction,distributionandcommunication ofinformationtothepublic,andbymaximizingtheamountofmeaningful informationthatIFIsmakeavailablethroughtheirwebsitesandlocaloffices. •Provideexplanationsofaccountbalances,debtpaymentsandrevenuefigures postedontheWorldBank’swebsite.WhileencouragingthegovernmentofChad todisclosesuchinformationonitsown,theWorldBankshouldpublishadditional informationthatitisentitledtodisclose,suchasoilproductionfigures. •Supportandpublishanindependentassessmentofthespendingconstraintsand absorptivecapacitychallengesfacingtheChadiangovernment,soastofacilitate moreevenandeffectiveuseoffundsacrossprioritysectors.(Preferenceshouldbe giventocompetentChadiansvs.foreignersforWorldBankconsultancies.)
94 Conclusion: A “Model Project” Hanging By a Thread •IncreasebudgetarysupporttotheCollègeintheshorttermtoreinforceitsability toinvestigatepetroleum-financedexpenditures,andtocommissionthird-party assessmentsofproductionandrevenuereporting. •IdentifyanddiscloseclearbenchmarksforprogressinthedevelopmentofChad’s capacitytomanageandspendoilrevenues.TheWorldBankandIMFshould linkthoseindicatorstoclearsanctionsandremediesaimedatpreventingthe consequencesofmisuseofrevenuesbeforetheyoccur.Theyshouldnotignore “incrementalpolicyslippages”thatcoulddevelopintofundamentalviolationsof therevenuemanagementsystem. •Devotemoreattentiontothedevelopmentofthenon-oileconomyinChad, includingthepovertyreductionbenefitsofmorelabor-intensivesectors. •Redoubleeffortstopromotegreaterfiscaltransparencyandaccountabilityforthe useofallpublicresources(oilandnon-oilrevenues)—aparticularlyurgentneed inlightofsubstantial“indirect”oilrevenues(taxesandfees)arrivingin2007. Thecurrentfocusonthetransparentmanagementofdirectoilrevenuesshouldnot divertattentionfromtheneedforresponsibleuseofallgovernmentresources. •BasedontheexperienceofChad,ensurethatbasicminimumgovernancestandards –suchasdemonstratedrespectforhumanrights,anindependentmedia,a functioningindependentjudiciaryandtestedfiscalmanagementandregulatory capacity–existpriortoextendingsupportforoil,gasormineraldevelopmentsin anycountry.
International Advisory Group •Increaseeffortstowidelydisseminatereportsandrecommendations.TheIAG shouldissuepressreleasesandholdpressconferencesorpublicmeetingswiththe publicationofeachofitsreports. •Conductadvocacyonrecommendationsbetweentheissuanceofsemi-annual reports,infulfillmentofitsmandatetoadvisetheWorldBankGroup,governments ofChadandCameroon,andtheoilconsortiumontheimplementationofthe pipelineprojectandrelateddevelopments.TheIAGshouldrequestperiodic briefingswiththeExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankGroup. •Includeamatrixineachreporttotrackprogressontheimplementationofspecific pastIAGrecommendations.
Key donors such as the U.S., France and the European Union should: •Calibratediplomaticengagementandbilateralsupporttomeasurableprogress towardincreasingpoliticalspace,democraticgovernanceandrespectforhuman rightsandtheruleoflaw.(Headofstateorministeriallevelvisits,without demonstratedprogressintheseareas,sendsthewrongsignalregardingreform.) •Carefullymonitorpressfreedomandprovidefinancialsupportandbackingto independentmediaoutlets,especiallyradio.TheU.S.shouldcontinueandexpand itssupportforindependentradiostationsandspecialbroadcaststhatdisseminate informationregardingthenationalbudgetandfiscaltransparency. •SupportChadiancivilsocietyeffortstoimplementamonitoringsystemtotrack oilrevenueexpendituresfromthecapitaltolocallevels,alertingtheCollègeto problemswithprojectimplementationandreinforcingitsoversightfunction. •ExtendtechnicalassistancetotheChadiangovernmenttostrengthenfiscal management,aswellasprovidededicatedassistancetotheCollège,withthegoal
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 95 oftraininglocalChadianstoprovidetheneededtechnicalsupportonasustainable basisinthefuture.
The Chadian government should: •ExtendtherevenuemanagementlawtocoveralloilproducedinChad.The governmentshouldmakeclearwhatwillbedonetoensureaccountabilityforoil revenuesfromfuturefieldsandtoguaranteeagainstthedevelopmentofduplicate oversightmechanisms. •DiscloseallcontractsandconventionsforoilexplorationandproductioninChad andrenounceconfidentialityclausesinallfuturecontracts. •AllowforpublicdebateintheNationalAssemblyontheelementsofanew PetroleumCode. •RefrainfromfinalizingnewoilcontractsuntilthenewPetroleumCodeisadopted. •Publishallrelevantauditsrelatingtothegeneration,managementandallocation ofoilrevenues.Thiswouldincludecostauditsofoilcompanies;auditsofbudget executionbyprioritysectorministries;auditsofthemanagementoftheFuture GenerationsFund,andotherrelevantaudits. •Designandimplementacontinualgovernmenttrainingprogramonoilrevenue managementincludingtechnicalexpertisetoverifyproductionfiguresandrevenue paymentsfromoilcompanies. •Committogreaterstabilityofstaffingovernmentministries,inanefforttoretain institutionalmemoryandskillsacquiredthroughtrainingprograms. •RefrainfrominterferinginselectionofcivilsocietymembersoftheCollège. •Earmarkaminimumpercentageofannualoilrevenuesforthefunctioningofthe Collègetoensuretheindependenceandsustainabilityofitsoperations. •ComplywithdecreesregardingtherightoftheCollègetoprovideinputintothe budgetprocess.ThegovernmentshouldensurethattheCollègeparticipatesinthe budgetcommitteemeetingsandreceivesthedraftbudgetatleast10daysbeforeits adoptionbytheCouncilofMinisters. •TakeactiononthebasisofthefindingsofauditsandCollègereports(e.g. regardingmisuseofoilbonusmoney),andimplementcommitmentsmadeto theIMFregardingthecreationofa“budgetcourt”andsanctionsforviolationof procurementlaws. •Institutionalizeaninter-ministerialmonthlymeetingofgovernmentofficialsfrom theMinistryofPetroleum,MinistryofFinanceandtheCollège,amongothers,to shareinformationonoilproductionandrevenuegeneration.Thesemeetingsshould servetofacilitatecommunicationbetweenactorsalreadyengagedinthepetroleum sectoranddonotrequirethecreationofanynewstructuresoroffices. •Ensureadequatefundingforthejudiciaryandrespectitsindependence.
The Collège (Petroleum Revenue Oversight and Control Committee) should: •Dedicatemoreofitslimitedresourcestoinvestigationsofapprovedprojects,to ensurethattheyareproperlyexecutedasplannedandactuallybenefitthepooron theground.TheCollègeshoulddisseminatethefindingsofitsinvestigationsto boththegovernmentandthepublicinatimelyfashion.
96 Conclusion: A “Model Project” Hanging By a Thread •Publishanddisseminateinformationonprojectstobefinancedwithoilrevenuesas earlyaspossible,alertingthepublictowhattheycanexpectinthecomingmonths oryear. •Holdpublicinformationsessionsinregionaltownstoalertthepopulationtothe Collège’smandate,increasepublicawarenessofhowoilrevenuesaretobeused, andexplainwhatmechanismsareinplacetocheckagainsttheirmisappropriation. •Actonapresumptioninfavorofdisclosureofanyandallinformationthatthe Collègedeemsinthepublic’sinterest. •Whennecessary,useitsrighttocommissionthirdpartyexpertstoassessproposed projectsorauditproductionorrevenuereporting. •Holdquarterly“open-house”meetingsforChadiancivilsocietyanddevelopstrong workingrelationshipswithcivilsocietygroupstoachieveitsmission. •Developaregularlyupdated“matrix”ofproblemsidentifiedandwhatactions, ifany,weretakentoaddresstheseproblemsorviolationsofthelawbythe government.
Civil Society
Local civil society should: •ProactivelyseekoutinformationfromtheCollègeandconveythisinformationto keynetworksintheregions.TheCollègewillbeunabletofulfillitsoversightrole withoutactivecollaborationwithcivilsociety,fromthecapitaltothevillagelevel. •Organizationsinthecapitalshouldprovideasimplifiedbreakdownofthenational budget,showingplannedoilexpendituresbyregionandsector,toenablelocal residentstoalertoversightbodiestoanydiscrepanciesbetweenplannedandactual projectimplementation. •Developacoordinatedmonitoringandalertsystemtotracktheuseofoilrevenues. Civilsocietygroupsshouldidentifyexistingstructuresornetworksattheregional andlocallevelsthatcanhelpdisseminateandcollectinformationaboutproject executiontoandfromthepopulationatlarge. •Regularlyconveyfindingstointernationalalliesandmediaoutletsaswellasto Chadiansatlargethroughpopulareducationprograms.
International civil society should: •SupporttherevenueoversighteffortsofChadiancivilsocietyandthenascent “PublishWhatYouPay/PublishWhatYouEarn”coalition. •DevoteresourcestomonitoringthestatusofhumanrightsinChad,incollaboration withlocalhumanrightsassociationsconductingday-to-daysurveillance. •ContinuetoholdInternationalFinancialInstitutions,oilcompanies,andNorthern governmentstoaccountfortheirresponsibilitiesvis-à-vistheprojectandthe Chadianpeople.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 97 Appendix 1: Unofficial Translation of Chad’s Revenue Management Law
LAW NUMBER 001/PR/99 RELATING TO THE MANAGEMENT OF OIL REVENUES PursuanttotheConstitution,atitsDecember30,1998sittingtheNationalAssembly debatedandadopted,andThePresidentoftheRepublicpromulgatedaLaw,theterms ofwhichfollow:
CHAPTER I: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Article 1: ThisLawisintendedtodefinethemechanismsforthemanagementof oilrevenuesfromthedevelopmentofthethree(3)oilfieldsatKOME, MIANDOUMandBOLOBO.
Article 2: Oilrevenuesentailbothdirectandindirectresources. Directresourcesarecomposedofdividendsandroyalties,while Indirectresourcesarecomposedofthetaxes,customsandotherduties relatedtotheexploitationofpetroleumresources.
Article 3: Thedirectresources,referredtoinlinetwoofArticle2,aretobedeposited inaspecialaccountinthenameoftheGovernmentofChadspecifically openedforthispurposewithaninternationalfinancialinstitution,hereafter calledtheoffshoreescrowaccount.
Thesefundsaretobeallocatedasfollows: •90%ofthesefundsaretobedepositedinaspecialconsolidatedrevenue fundinoneortwomajorbankinginstitutionsactiveinthisarea; •theremaining10%istobedepositedinasavingsaccount,asperthe stipulationsofArticle9ofthepresentLaw.
Article 4: Indirectresources,taxes,customsandotherdutiesaretobedeposited directlyintothenation’spublicaccounts.
Article 5: ThevariousresourcesidentifiedunderArticle2ofthepresentLawarean integralpartoftheGeneralBudgetoftheState.
Article 6: Theserevenuesaretobeallocatedinaccordancewiththecriteriadefinedin ChapterIIofthepresentLaw.
CHAPTER II: REGARDING THE ALLOCATION OF REVENUES
SECTION 1: PRIORITY SECTORS AND REGIONAL ALLOCATION.
Article 7: Inessence,directresourcesaretobeallocatedtotheprioritysectors.
Prioritysectorsincludepublichealthandsocialwelfare,educational infrastructure,ruraldevelopment(agricultureandlivestock),environment andwaterresources.
98 Appendix 1 Article 8: Directresources,involvingdividendsandroyalties,aretobedeposited inthespecialaccountforeseenunderArticle3andaretobeallocatedas follows:
a) Eightypercent(80%)oftheserevenuesaretobedirectedtoexpenditures relatedtotheprioritysectorsasspecifiedinparagraphtwoofArticle7,
b) Foraperiodoffiveyearsfromthedatethatproductionbegins,fifteen percent(15%)oftheserevenuesaretobedevotedtotheState’srecurrent operatingandinvestmentcosts,
c) AsperthestipulationsofArticle212oftheConstitution,fivepercent (5%)ofoilroyaltiesaretobedirectedtothedecentralizedauthoritiesin theproducingregions.
Basedonavailableresources,existingneedsandtheabsorptivecapacityoftheregion, theseallocationscanbemodifiedbydecreeeveryfiveyears.
Thewaysandmeansformanagingandcontrollingtheserevenueswillconformtothe publicaccountingregulationsinforceatanygiventime.
SECTION 2: SAVINGS
Article 9: Theremainingtenpercent(10%)ofdirectrevenues,thatisthetaxesand royaltiesspecifiedunderArticle3ofthepresentLaw,aretobedepositedin asavingsaccountmaintainedwithaninternationalfinancialinstitutionfor theexpresspurposeofbenefitingfuturegenerations,inaccordancewiththe regulationsoftheBankoftheCentralAfricanStates(BEAC).
CHAPTER III: MECHANISMS FOR MANAGING THE SPECIAL ACCOUNTS.
SECTION 1: IN OPERATIONAL TERMS
Article 10: Withrespecttoapprovals,withdrawals,follow-upandcontroloverthe GeneralBudgetoftheState,themechanismformanagingtheSpecial AccountsfallsundertheGovernment’snormalbudgetingprocesses.
Article 11: TheSpecialAccountsaretobemaintainedwithoneortwoofthe availablemajorcommercialbankscertifiedbytheCentralAfricanBanking Commission[COBAC].Theseaccountsaretobedirectlyfedbytheescrow accountreferredtointhefirstparagraphofArticle3ofthecurrentLaw.
SECTION 2: CRITERIA FOR WITHDRAWALS
Article 12: Fundsdepositedinthespecialaccountforpurposesoffinancing prioritysectorexpendituresaretobecommittedinaccordancewiththe Government’sannualpublicspendingestimates.
Partsofthethree-yeardevelopmentframework,thepublicspending estimatesarethepointofreferencefortheFinanceLawandaresubjectto annualreviewbytheGovernment.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 99 Inaccordancewiththeprincipleofadditionality,oilrevenuesexpenditures onprioritysectorsareunderstoodtobeinadditiontothegeneralbudgetfor thefiscalyearpriortotheinitialreceiptofoilrevenues.
Article 13: RequestsforwithdrawalsbytheDirectorGeneraloftheStateBudgetmust adheretotheproceduresoutlinedintheFinanceLawandmustbesubmitted fortheexplicitauthorizationofthePetroleumRevenueOversightand ControlCommittee(theCollège).
CHAPTER IV: REGULATORY BODIES.
Article 14: Controloverthemovementanduseofoilrevenuesisexercisedseparatelyor jointlybytheFinancialControlleroftheMinistryofFinanceandEconomy, thePetroleumRevenueOversightandControlCommittee,theAuditor GeneraloftheSupremeCourtandtheParliament.
SECTION 1: THE PETROLEUM REVENUE OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL COMMITTEE (The Collège)
Article 15: APetroleumRevenueOversightandControlCommitteeisinstituted.
Article 16: ThePetroleumRevenueOversightandControlCommitteeiscomposed asfollows:
• Onemagistrate,memberoftheSupremeCourt • Onedeputy • OneSenator • TheNationalDirectoroftheBEAC • TheDirectorGeneraloftheTreasury • TheDirectorofPetroleumResources • TheDirectorofPlanningandDevelopment • OnerepresentativeoflocalNGOs,and • Onerepresentativeofunions
Article 17: ThemembersoftheCollègerepresentingParliament,theSupremeCourt, nationalNGOsandunionsareappointedtothree(3)yeartermsrenewable once.
Article 18: ThemissionoftheCollègeis:
a) toensurethatcommitmentsundertheSpecialAccountsconformtothe FinanceLaw. b) toauthorizeandcontrolwithdrawalsfromtheSpecialAccountsandto overseetheallocationofthesefunds.
Article 19: Aseparatedecreewilloutlinetheorganization,operationalproceduresand controlandoversightmechanismsavailabletotheCollège.
SECTION 2: OTHER REGULATORY BODIES
Article 20: TheParliamentcontrolstheallocationofoilrevenuesbyadoptingand monitoringtheimplementationoftheGeneralBudgetoftheState.
100 Appendix 1 Article 21: TheAuditorGeneraloftheSupremeCourtexercisescontroloverthe legalityofStateexpendituresbyofficialwritoveritsrevenueaccounts andbyoverseeingthelegalstipulationsdefiningthedivisionofresources betweentheState’sGeneralBudgetandthatofthedecentralizedauthorities andtheprovisionsdealingwithdevelopingreservesorinvestingsurplus fundsoutsideofthecountry.
SECTION 3: OVERSIGHT MEASURES.
Article 22: Oversightofthemovement,allocationandutilizationofoilrevenuesis guaranteedbyvirtueofperiodicauditsandreportstoGovernmentand particularlythrough:
• annualauditsoftheSpecialAccountsandoftheFutureGenerations Fund; • periodicreportsonthemanagementoftheFutureGenerationsFundand onthestabilizationaccount • periodicreportsfromtheCollège; • theCOBACreportsandauditsonthemajorbankschargedwiththe effectivemanagementofspecificSpecialAccounts; • theAuditorGeneral’sannualauditoftheGeneralStateBudget. • theGovernment’spracticeofannuallypublishingthesevariousreports andaudits.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS:
Article 23: ThisLawwillberegisteredandpublishedintheOfficialBulletinofthe RepublicandimplementedastheLawoftheState.
Proclaimed at N’djamena, January 11, 1999
IDRISS DEBY REPUBLIC OF CHAD Unity-Work-Progress PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
LAW NUMBER 016/PR/2000 AN AMENDMENT TO LAW 001/PR/99 OF JANUARY 11, 1999 REGARDING THE MANAGEMENT OF OIL REVENUES PursuanttotheConstitution;atitsJuly26,2000sittingtheNationalAssembly debatedandadopted,andthePresidentoftherepublicpromulgatedaLaw,theterms ofwhichfollow:
Article 1: Lawnumber001PR/99ofJanuary11,1999dealingwiththeManagement ofPetroleumRevenuesisamendedasfollows:
Instead of the previous Article 16: which reads, ThePetroleumRevenueOversightandControlCommitteeiscomposedasfollows:
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 101 • Onemagistrate,memberoftheSupremeCourt • Onedeputy • OneSenator • TheNationalDirectoroftheBEAC • TheDirectorGeneraloftheTreasury • TheDirectorofPetroleumResources • TheDirectorofPlanningandDevelopment • OnerepresentativeoflocalNGOs,and • Onerepresentativeofunions
The new formulation of Article 16 reads: ThePetroleumRevenueOversightandControlCommitteeisanindependentbody composedasfollows:
• One(1)magistrate,memberoftheSupremeCourt • One(1)deputy • One(1)Senator • TheNationalDirectoroftheBEAC • TheDirectoroftheTreasury,and • Four(4)civilsocietyrepresentatives
The remainder of Article 16 remains unchanged.
Article 2: ThisLawwillberegisteredandpublishedintheOfficialBulletinofthe RepublicandimplementedastheLawoftheState.
102 Appendix 1 Appendix 2: Additional Resources on the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline
Additional CRS and BIC reports
IanGaryandTerriLynnKarl,BottomoftheBarrel:Africa’sOilBoomandthePoor,CatholicRelief Services,June2003.www.catholicrelief.org/get_involved/advocacy/policy_and_strategic_issues/oil_report. cfm BankInformationCenter,CatholicReliefServicesandEnvironmentalDefense,TheChad-Cameroon PetroleumDevelopment&PipelineProject:EnvironmentalandSocialProblemsIdentifiedbytheExternal ComplianceMonitoringGroup,theInternationalAdvisoryGroup,andtheInspectionPanel,July2004. www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/Chad-Cam_ES_July2004.pdf BankInformationCenter,CatholicReliefServicesandEnvironmentalDefense,TheChad-Cameroon Pipeline:TheCasefortheImplementationoftheEIRRecommendations,April2004.www.bicusa.org/ bicusa/issues/Chad-Cam
Environmental Defense, Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, Center for Environment and Development
DelphineDjiraibe,AssociationTchadiennepourlaPromotionetlaDefensedesDroitsdel’Homme(Chad); KorinnaHortaEnvironmentalDefense(U.S.);andSamuelNguiffoCentrepourl’Environnementetle Developpement(Cameroun),AccesstoJusticefromLocalVillagetoGlobalBoardroom:AnExperience inInternationalAccountability,September30,2004.www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/4065_ AccessToJustice.pdf • TheChad-CameroonOilandPipelineProject:ACallforAccountability,June2002 www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/2134_Chad-Cameroon.pdf • TheChad-CameroonOilandPipelineProject:PuttingPeopleandtheEnvironmentatRisk, September1999www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/728_ChadCameroon_pipeline.pdf DelphineDjiraibeandKorinnaHorta,“SebastianMallaby’sPortrayaloftheChad-CameroonOil&Pipeline ProjectinhisbookTheWorld’sBanker:AnExampleofPoorResearchandMisrepresentation.” www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/4187_mallaby_rebuttal.pdf
Friends of the Earth-International
FriendsoftheEarth-International,TraversingPeople’sLives:HowtheWorldBankFinancesCommunity DisruptioninCameroon,September2002www.foei.org/publications/worldbank/traversing.pdf FriendsoftheEarth-International,CenterforInternationalEnvironmentalLaw,Urgewald;BrokenPromises: TheChad-CameroonOilandPipelineProject:ProfitAtAnyCost?June2001www.foe.org/camps/intl/ worldbank/brokenpromises.pdf
Other Chadian and Cameroonian NGOs
ChadianNGOAppealfora‘JustExploitation’ofChadianOil(May17,2000)[AppeldesONG/ADH (1)duTchadpouruneexploitationjustedupétroletchadien]www.amisdelaterre.org/imprimer.php3?id_ article=171 RéseauxCommissionsPermanentesPétrolesetGRAMP/TC,Document-Bilandel’AppeldeJuin2000,July 8,2003.www.gramptc.org/Publications/Bilan%20appel%20juin%202000.pdf
Amnesty International
DocumentsonChad:web.amnesty.org/library/eng-tcd/index
Academic Resources
Chad-CameroonOilPipelineProject:AStudyToolandCaseStudy,DevelopedbyDr.J.PaulMartin,SIPA andtheCenterforNewMediaTeachingandLearning,ColumbiaUniversity,www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/ martin/chad-cam/
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 103 ExtractiveIndustriesReview,ReportontheVisittotheChad-CameroonPipeline,February2003,www2.ifc. org/ogmc/files/eirreport/volume4cameroonvisit2.pdf Leubuscher,Susan“TheLawinWhoseHands?anAnalysisoftheCOTCOConventionofEstablishment” FERN,July6,1998www.fern.org/pubs/archive/cotco.htm
Useful websites
CollègedeContrôleetdeSurveillancedesRevenusPétroliers www.ccsrp.td(français) GroupedeRecherchesAlternativesetdeMonitoringduprojetPétroleTchad-Cameroun www.gramptc.org(français) ExxonMobil(EssoChad)website Chad-CameroonDevelopmentProjectpage www.essochad.com/Chad/Chad_HomePage.asp WorldBankwebsite Chad-CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProjectpage www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj InternationalAdvisoryGroupwebsite GroupeInternationaldeConseil www.gic-iag.org
104 Appendix 2 Endnotes
1 CRSInterviewwithMohamadouDiop,CentralAfricaResidentRepresentative,InternationalFinance Corporation,Douala,Cameroon,September25,2002.
2 PresidentIdrissDeby,StatementatinaugurationceremonyoftheChad-Cameroonpipeline,October10, 2003.
3 WorldBank,“Chad:WorldBankApprovesGrantof$23MillionforLocalDevelopmentProgram SupportProject,”September16,2004,athttp://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ AFRICAEXT/CHADEXTN/contentMDK:20255280~menuPK:349881~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theS itePK:349862,00.html
4 HectorIgbikiowubo,“TwentyPerCentofWorldOilConsumptiontoComeFromAfricain2010,”Vanguard (Lagos),October28,2003.
5 U.N.ConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD),“AfricanOilTrade&FinanceConferenceOpens inMarrakech,”April28,2004athttp://www.unctad.org/Templates/Webflyer.asp?docID=4758&intItemID=1 634&lang=1
6 InternationalFinanceCorporation,“BuildingthePrivateSectorinAfricatoReducePovertyandImprove People’sLives”athttp://www.ifc.org/ifcext/publications.nsf/Content/BuildingthePrivateSectorinAfrica
7 IanGaryandTerryLynnKarl,BottomoftheBarrel:Africa’sOilBoomandthePoor,Baltimore:Catholic ReliefServices,June2003.
8 WorldBank,“MakingPetroleumRevenueManagementWorkforthePoor:TransparencyandGood GovernanceDominateDiscussiononPetroleumRevenueManagement,”November4,2002.
9 TerryLynnKarl,TheParadoxofPlenty:OilBoomsandPetro-States,Berkeley:UniversityofCalifornia Press,1997;seealsoTerryLynnKarl,“TheImpactofOilBoomsonOil-ExportingCountries:Reflections onTheParadoxofPlenty,”inFuelingthe21stCentury:TheNewPoliticalEconomyofEnergy,special editionofTheJournalofInternationalAffairs,vol.53,no.1(fall1999).Theseworksshouldbeconsulted foramorecompleteexplanationoftheoilphenomenondescribedhere.Bothstatisticalworkandcase studiesareclearonthispoint.See,e.g.,PaulCollierandAnkeHoeffler,GreedandGrievanceinCivilWar, PolicyResearchWorkingPaper2355,DevelopmentResearchGroup,Washington,DC:WorldBank,May 2000(showingthatstatesdependentontheexportofoilandmineralsfaceariskofcivilwarof23percent foranyfiveyearperiod,comparedtoariskof0.5percentforacountrywithnonaturalresourceexports).
10 Manyeconomistsusethisphrase.See,e.g.,GobindNankani,“DevelopmentProblemsofNonfuelMineral ExportingCountries,”FinanceandDevelopment17,January1980;AlanGelb,OilWindfalls:Blessingor Curse,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1988;andRichardM.Auty,SustainingDevelopmentinthe MineralEconomies:TheResourceCurseThesis,London:Routledge,1993.Formorerecentquantitative studies,seeRichardM.Auty,ResourceAbundanceandEconomicDevelopment,Helsinki:UNUWorld InstituteforDevelopmentEconomicsResearch,1998;JeffreySachsandAndrewWarner,“Natural ResourcesandEconomicGrowth”(revisedversion),HarvardInstituteforInternationalDevelopment DiscussionPaper,1997.
11 SeeRichardM.Auty,“NaturalResources,theStateandDevelopmentStrategy,”JournalofInternational Development9,1997,pp.651-663.
12 AcomprehensivestudybyHarvardeconomistsJeffreySachsandAndresWarnerdemonstratesthat countrieswhosenaturalresourceexportscomposedahighpercentageofgrossdomesticproducthad abnormallyslowgrowthratesbetween1971and1989whencomparedtocountriesfollowingnon-resource baseddevelopmentmodels.Drawingondatafrom97developingcountries,thisresearchconfirmsthatthere isanegativerelationshipbetweenacountry’sdependenceonnaturalresourceexportsandtheirsubsequent growth.Thus,countriesthatbasetheirdevelopmentonresourceslikepetroleumgrowmoreslowlythan thosethatfollowotherdevelopmentmodels.See,NaturalResourceAbundanceandEconomicGrowth, DevelopmentDiscussionPaperno.517,Cambridge:HarvardInstituteforInternationalDevelopment,1995.
13 See,e.g.,CarlosLeiteandJensWeidmann,“DoesMotherNatureCorrupt?NaturalResources,Corruption, andEconomicGrowth,”IMFWorkingPaperWP/99/85.
14 SeeBP’swebsiteathttp://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=2011557&contentId=2016957.
15 AlthoughexploitableoilreserveshavebeenknowntoexistinChadsincethe1970s,civilwarsand protractednegotiationsamongoilcompanies,thegovernmentsofChadandCameroon,andtheWorldBank delayedexploitation,butitisnowmovingaheadatfullspeed.
16 “InvestorsCallforGreaterTransparencybyExtractiveCompanies,”ISISAssetManagementPressRelease, London:May19,2003.Thelackoftransparencyrepresentsasignificantbusinessrisk,makingcompanies vulnerabletoaccusationsofcomplicityincorruptbehavior,impairingtheirlocalandglobal“licenseto operate”,renderingthemvulnerabletolocalconflictandsecurity,andpossiblycompromisingtheirlongterm commercialprospectsinthesemarkets.
17 PaulF.Hueper,“TappingIntoaNewFrontierOilProvince”PetroleumEconomist,October22,1998,p.5.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 105 18 PaulF.Hueper,“TappingIntoaNewFrontierOilProvince”PetroleumEconomist,October22,1998,p.5.
19 WorldBank,Chad-CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:ProjectAppraisalDocument, April13,2000,p.22(“Chad-CameroonPAD”).
20 Chad-CameroonPAD,Annex4,p.63,para.8.
21 Chad-CameroonPAD,Annex11,p.121.
22 FormoreaboutcivilsocietyinfluenceontheestablishmentoftheInternationalAdvisoryGroupsee, “ChadianNGOAppealforaJustExploitationofChadianOil,”May17,2000athttp://www.amisdelaterre/ imprimer.php3?id_article=171;“Appealfrom73NGOsandNGOUmbrellaOrganizationsin23Countries RegardingtheEstablishmentoftheInternationalAdvisoryGroupfortheChad-CameroonOil&Pipeline ExportProject,”July10,2000.
23 SeealsoDelphineDjiraibe,SamuelNguiffoandKorinnaHorta,“AccesstoJusticefromLocalVillageto GlobalBoardroom:AnExperienceinInternationalAccountability;TheWorldBankInspectionPaneland theChad-CameroonOilandPipelineProject,”ATPDH,CED,EnvironmentalDefense,September2004 and“TheChad-CameroonOilandPipelineProject:ACallforAccountability”,June2002;Reseaudes CommissionsPermanentesPétroleduTchad(CPPL-CPPN-RESAP)etGRAMP/TC,“Document-Bilande l’appeldejuin2000”;GRAMP/TC,“Observationsetrecommandationssurlaméthoded’approcheduGIC,” 2003,athttp://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/14_pts_juillet_3_bis.pdf.
24 ReseaudesCommissionsPermanentesPétroleduTchad(CPPL-CPPN-RESAP)etGRAMP/TC, “Document-Bilandel’appeldejuin2000,”2003,p.2,athttp://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/14_pts_juillet_ 3_bis.pdf.
25 InternationalDevelopmentAssociation(IDA)andInternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC),Chad: CountryAssistanceStrategy,November18,2003,pp.31-32,at:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/ WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/11/19/000160016_20031119173351/Rendered/PDF/269380CD.pdf
26 UNDPHumanDevelopmentReport2004,at:http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_HDI.pdf
27 WorldBank,ChadCountryBriefat:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ AFRICAEXT/CHADEXTN/0,,menuPK:349885~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:349862,00.html.
28 TheEIUprojectsthiswillfallto14%in2005and10%in2006.EconomistIntelligenceUnit,ChadCountry Report,November2004.
29 WorldBank,ProjectAppraisalDocumentonaProposedCredit…totheRepublicofChadforManagement ofthePetroleumEconomyProject,December29,1999p.3,at:http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/ project/tdpadmpe.pdf.
30 TransparencyInternational,CorruptionPerceptionsIndex2004,at:http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/ cpi2004.en.html#cpi2004
31 WorldEconomicForum,PublicInstitutionsIndex2003,at:www.weforum.org/pdf/Africa_2003/pr_pub_ inst_index.pdfContractsandlawismeasuredby:judicialindependence;propertyrightsinlaw;therisk posedbyorganizedcrime,suchasextortion;andfavoritismindecisionsbygovernmentofficials.The corruptionrankingexaminesfrequencyofirregularpaymentsbyfirmstoobtain:importandexportpermits; connectionstopublicutilities,suchaselectricity;andfavourabletreatmentbytax-collectionofficials.
32 “DéclarationdesEvêquesduTchadsurlaSituationSociopolitiquedanslePays”(«Declarationofthe ChadianBishopsontheSociopoliticalsituationinthecountry»),Moundou,April29,2004,at:http://www. tchadforum.com/pages/news_item.php?nid=571orhttp://www.lotiko.org/.
33 U.S.Dept.ofState,CountryReportonHumanRightsPracticesforChad,2002,BureauofDemocracy, HumanRights,andLabor,March31,2003.TheU.S.StateDepartmentHumanRightsReport2001also notesthat“InMay2000,thePresidentandtheNationalAssemblyappointed15membersoftheHigh CourtofJustice,despitealawprovidingfortheirelection.TheSupremeCourtbeganfulloperationsin October2000.TheConstitutionmandatesanindependentjudiciary;however,thejudiciarywasineffective, underfunded,overburdened,andsubjecttoexecutiveinterference.”
34 U.S.Dept.ofState,BureauofAfricanAffairs,BackgroundnoteonChad,January2002(Amnesty InternationalAI-Index:AFR20/004/199701/03/1997).(Note:TheLogoneprefecturesarewheretheoil projectislocated.)“AIregularlydrewtheattentionoftheChadianauthoritiesandofinternationalopinion tothesystematicuseofsummaryandextrajudicialexecutionagainstunarmedcivilians.Duringthepast fouryears,thesecurityforceshavecarriedoutsuchexecutionsonseveraloccasionsamongthecivilian populationoftheOuaddaïandLogoneOccidentalandLogoneOrientalregions.Duringthelastquarter of1996andearly1997,AmnestyInternationalreceivednewinformationaccordingtowhichthesecurity forcesarecontinuingtocarryingoutsummaryandextrajudicialexecutions.AmnestyInternationalbelieves thattheperiodicrecurrenceofmassacresofciviliansinChadisdueinlargeparttotheimpunityenjoyed bytheperpetratorsofsuchatrocities.NeitherthemassacreofciviliansinOuaddaïin1994andinthetwo Logoneprefecturesin1994and1995northeextrajudicialexecutionofBicharaDiguiinAugust1996 broughtanyofficialcondemnationorindependentandimpartialinquiries.Hundredsofcivilianshavebeen killedandnotoneperpetratoroftheseviolationshasbeenbroughttojustice.”
106 Endnotes 35 U.S.Dept.ofState,CountryReportonHumanRightsPracticesforChad2003,BureauofDemocracy, HumanRights,andLabor,February25,2004,at:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27719.htm
36 TheCatholicBishopsofChadnotedinApril2004that“weobserveagrowingdegradationofsociopolitical conditionsofChad,aggravatedbytensionsinthecountriesofthesub-region.”
37 Chadsharesacommoncurrency,theCommunautéFinancièreAfricainefranc(CFAF),withother FrancophonecountriesinCentralAfrica.TheBEACserves,amongotherthings,toenforcecommon monetarypoliciesandthestabilityofthecurrency.
38 ChrisMelville,“VeteransClearedOutinChadianCabinetReshuffle”,WorldMarketsAnalysis,February4, 2004.
39 AkbarSaleh,“ChadpresidentgoesbacktoParishospitalthreedaysafterreturninghomefromtheFrench capital”,AssociatedPress,August12,2003.
40 PanafricanNewsAgency(PANA)DailyNewswire,“ChadianLeaderIdrissDebyConfirmsCoupAttempt”, May21,2004.
41 UNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,UNIRINNews,“CHAD:Armymutineers surrender–government:,May19,2004.
42 ChrisMelville,“RumoursandRuminationsPointtoClanFeudatHeartofChadian‘Mutiny,’”World MarketsAnalysis,May20,2004.Also,interviewsbytheauthorsinN’Djamena,May17-20,2004.
43 WorldBank,ProgramDocumentforaProposedInstitutionalReformSupportCredit,October27,2004, p.6,at:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/08/000160016_ 20041108092047/Rendered/PDF/282430TD.pdf
44 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,ChadCountryReport,November2004.
45 Quotedin“Deby’sDilemma”,AfricaConfidential,September10,2004,Vol.45,No.18.
46 AmbassadorMarcWall,e-mailcorrespondencewithauthors,December7,2004.
47 “ThePanSahelInitiativeisanongoingefforttoassistfourcountries–Mali,Niger,Chad,andMauritania –indetectingandrespondingtothemigrationofasymmetricthreatsacrossandwithintheirextensive andpoorlycontrolledborders.Underthisprogram,company-sizedunitsaretrainedandequippedas rapidreactionunits,providingthemthemobility,communication,navigation,andindividualsoldierskills essentialforbordersecurity,internaldefense,andcounterterrorismefforts.”FederalDocumentClearing HouseCongressionalTestimonybyGeneralJamesL.Jones,U.S.EuropeanCommand,SupremeAllied Commander,Europe,BeforetheCommitteeonSenateAppropriations,U.S.Senate,September23,2004.
48 AmbassadorMarcWall,e-mailcorrespondencewithauthors,December7,2004.
49 UNIntegratedRegionalInformationNetworks(IRIN),“CHAD:DarfurforcesPresidentDebyontopolitical tightrope”,October5,2004.
50 UNIRIN,“CHAD:DarfurforcesPresidentDebyontopoliticaltightrope”,October5,2004.
51 UNIRIN,“CHAD:Ethnicclashinsouthkills12,wounds16”,November1,2004.
52 UNIRIN,“IndependentRadioStationClosed,DirectorBeaten”,February18,2004.
53 UNIRIN,“Chad:Firstexecutionsbyfiringsquadinmorethanadecade,”November6,2003.
54 AbakarSaleh,“FiringsquadexecutesfourmenconvictedofmurderingSudanesebusinessman,”Associated Press,November6,2003.
55 AgenceFrancePresse,“NinthexecutioninChadincrackdownoninsecurity,”November9,2003.The ninthmanwasexecutedforthekillingofaGuatemalanreligiousworker.Accordingtohighrankingjustice official,theman’slawyermadenoplea,appeal,orrequestforpardonand“[i]ntheseconditionshissentence hadtobecarriedout.”
56 AgenceFrancePresse,“NinthexecutioninChadincrackdownoninsecurity”,November9,2003;Abakar Saleh,“FiringsquadexecutesfourmenconvictedofmurderingSudanesebusinessman”,AssociatedPress, November6,2003;UNIRIN,“Chad:Firstexecutionsbyfiringsquadinmorethanadecade,”November6, 2003availableat:www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37687&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCount ry=CHAD.
57 AgenceFrancePresse,“NinthexecutioninChadincrackdownoninsecurity”,November9,2003.
58 KenSilverstein,“ChadSeesFirstTrickleofCashFromPipeline”,LosAngelesTimes,December26,2003, p.A48.
59 WorldBank,Chad-CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:SeventhSemi-AnnualReportto theExecutiveDirectors(July–December2003),April28,2004.Documentonfilewithauthors.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 107 60 UNIRIN,“CHAD:DarfurforcesPresidentDebyontopoliticaltightrope”,October5,2004.
61 TheconsortiumwasoriginallycomprisedofExxonMobil,Total(nowTotalFinaElf)andShell.Totaland Shellpulledoutin1999andwerereplacedbyChevronTexacoandPetronas.ExxonMobilisthelargest shareholderintheconcession(45%)andleadoperator,with35%goingtoChevronTexacoand25%to Petronas.OutsidetheU.S.,ExxonMobilisknownasEsso.InChad,itoperatesunderthenameEsso ExplorationandProductionInc.(EEPI).
62 RobKase,ExxonMobilrepresentativeatChadInternationalOilandGasConference,October14-15,2004.
63 Authors’interviewwithvillagechieffromNgalaba,Chad,May16,2004.
64 MBendi,“Chad:ElectricalPower-Overview,”accessedathttp://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/powr/af/ch/p0005. htmonDecember19,2004;“ChadHasNoElectricitytoMeetItsOwnPowerNeeds,”Alexander’sGasand OilConnections:NewsandTrends:Africa,October28,2003.
65 EssoChad,Chad-CameroonDevelopmentProjectReportNo.15,SecondQuarter,2004,at:http://www. essochad.com/Chad/Library/Reports/Chad_QuarterlyReports.asp;interviewwithMilesShaw,EssoChad, Kome,May18,2004.
66 MeetingwithEssoChadstaff,N’Djamena,October8,2004.
67 MilesShaw,EssoChad,e-mailcorrespondencewithauthors,December2,2004.“AttheFSOthereisa CustodyTransferMeterwhichisacomputerizedandexpensivemeterusedintheindustrytomeasuresales transactions.Aspartoftheoverallmetersystem,thismeteralsohassomethingcalledaProverwhich isusedtoregularlycalibratethemeter.Thismeterisaccurateto+/-0.2%whichexceedsinternational standards.Inaddition,ateachloadingoperationtherearetwoothermeasurementstakentoprovide verification.ThefirstisamanualgaugingthatismadeontheFSOtanksandthesecondisamanualgauging oftheoff-loadingvessel’stanks.TheChadianandCameroonianofficialsarestationedontheFSOand observealltheseprocesses.AtKome,thereisnoCustodyTransferMeter(astherearenosaletransactionsat thatpoint);insteadthereare3operationalmetersatPumpStation1.Theyarenotintendedforsales-level accuracyanddonothavethesameProversystemtoprovideforcalibration.Sincethebeginningof2004, theyeartodateaveragevariationbetweenthetwopointsofmeasurement(KomePumpStation1andthe FSO)islessthan1.4%.Aswehavenowgainedmoreexperiencewiththelesssophisticatedoperational meterswerecentlyadjustedthesemeterstomanuallyeliminatethecontinuingdifferenceandwewillsee withthisadjustmentoverthenextfewmonthsifthedifferenceisfurthereliminated.”
68 Reuters,“ChadPromises‘newspirit’overoil”,October14,2004.
69 PaulF.Hueper,“TappingIntoaNewFrontierOilProvince,”PetroleumEconomist,October22,1998,at: www.esso.com/eaff/essochad/news/press_oct98/main.html
70 TheSNPCwasrepresentedbyacontingentattheconferenceheadedbyBrunoItoua,Presidentofthe SNPC.TheSNPCandthegovernmentofCongo-BrazzavillehavebeenunderpressurefromtheIMF,local civilsocietyorganizationsandtheCatholicChurchtoreformitsopaquefinancialaccountingofitsoil wealth.Recentlysomeproduction,revenue,auditandcontractinformationhasbeenpublishedbytheSNPC.
71 D’Appolonia,ReportoftheTenthVisitoftheExternalComplianceMonitoringGroupApril-May2004,June 2004,p.53;andInternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofVisittoChadandCameroonMay17-June52004, July9,2004,pp.18-19.
72 “ConventiondeRecherches,D’ExploitationetdeTransportdesHydrocarburesentreLaRépubliquedu TchadetLeConsortiumEsso-Petronas-Chevron,PermisChariOuest,ChariEst,LacTchad”,May10,2004.
73 ExxonMobilwebsite,http://www2.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/About/OurActivities/NEW_Corp_OA_Up_ Africa.asp,accessedonOctober28,2004.
74 EssoChad,Chad-CameroonDevelopmentProject,ReportNo.15,SecondQuarter,2004;interviewwith MilesShaw,EssoChad,Kome,May18,2004.
75 “ConventiondeRecherches,D’ExploitationetdeTransportdesHydrocarburesentreLaRépubliquedu TchadetLeConsortiumEsso-Petronas-Chevron,PermisChariOuest,ChariEst,LacTchad”,signedMay 10,2004.
76 Eachcompanyhasa50%stakeinPermitH.Cliveden,registeredintheBritishVirginIslands,iscontrolled byGeneva-basedoiltraderanddeal-makerFriedhelmEronat.JamesNorman,“FilingspointtoEnCana successinChad”,PlattsOilgramNews,Vol.82No.148August4,2004.,p.1.
77 InterviewwithBenViseur,EnCana,N’Djamena,October8,2004.ShouldEnCanabesuccessfulintheir exploration,anadditional“ConcessionAgreement”wouldneedtobesignedbutthiswouldnothavean impactontheroyaltyrate.
78 InterviewwithBenViseur,EnCana,N’Djamena,May13,2004.
79 EnCanapresentation,“PlansandProspectsforOperators:NewFieldDevelopment,Opportunitiesfor ExplorationandDevelopment”,at1stChadInternationalOilandGasConference,N’Djamena,October13, 2004.
108 Endnotes 80 JamesNorman,“FilingspointtoEnCanasuccessinChad”,PlattsOilgramNews,Vol.82No.148,August 4,2004,p.1.“OtherdisclosuresintheTrinityChapter11caseshowexpectedPermitHproductionof 30,000b/din2007and40,000b/din2008,with10%ofthattoTrinityat$25/bbl.Thereisnomentionof thegravityorothercharacteristicsofthecrude.”
81 “Chadup-streamoilconcessionawardedtoEnergem”,Energempressrelease,December9,2004.
82 AngusRodger,“ControversialResourcesFirmTakesUpstreamAcreageinChad”InternationalOilDaily, December13,2004.
83 ThaliaGriffiths,“Energem’sColourfulPast”,AfricanEnergy,January2005,Issue82.
84 “ChinaFinalizesMajorOilfieldDealinChad”,ChinaEnergyReportWeekly,February20,2004,and CentralNewsAgency–Taiwan,“CPC,ChadSignPreliminaryCooperationPact”,CPC,October09,2004.
85 ChristinaKatsouris,“ResourceWars”,EnergyCompass,October22,2004.
86 “ExplorersHardatWork”,AfricaEnergyIntelligence,No.376,September8,2004
87 SociétéNationaledesHydrocarbures,“PartenairedessociétéspétrolièresauCameroun”,Douala:2004.
88 BarryMorgan,“BanguisettogetE&Pontrack”,Upstream,May16,2003.Seealso,“CentralAfrican Republic:OutlookBrightensforGrynberg”,AfricanEnergyIntelligence,No.343,April2,2003.
89 SeeUnitedReef’swebsite,http://www.unitedreef.comRoyaltiesfortheC.A.R.permitare12.5%foroiland 5.0%fornaturalgas.
90 MichaelPeel,“CameroonactivistsaccuseWorldBankofdoublestandardsoverpipelineproject:Critics saygovernmentremainsunaccountabledespitethecountry’sreputationforcorruption”,FinancialTimes, November3,2004.
91 MeetingwithWorldBankstaffinWashington,DC,October2,2004.
92 WorldBank,“QuestionsandAnswersontheChadCameroonPipeline,”at:www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/ questions/index.htm
93 WorldBankPressRelease,“Chad-CameroonPipelineRepresentsNewApproach,AnInterviewwith CountryDirectorAliKhadronthestartofoilproductioninChad”,October10,2003.
94 CommissionsPermanentesPétrole(CCPN-CPPL-RESAP)etleGroupedeRecherchesAlternativesetde MonitoringduprojetPétroleTchad-Cameroun(GRAMP/TC),“AppelàlaResponsabilitéetàl’EquitéAvant laDélivranceduCertificatd’AchèvementauConsortium”,August30,2004.
95 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChad,October10-262004,December3,2004,p.iv.
96 D’Appolonia,ReportoftheTenthVisitoftheExternalComplianceMonitoringGroupApril-May2004,June 2004,p.53.
97 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofVisittoChadandCameroonMay17-June52004,July9,2004,pp. 18-19.
98 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChad,October10-26,2004,December3,2004,p.v.
99 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofvisittoChadandCameroon,October15-November4,2002, December11,2002,p.16.LaoroGondjé,“Bébédjahieretaujourd’hui”,TchadetCulture,at:http://www. cefod.org/Tchad%20et%20Culture/Tc209-210/tchad_petrole_bebedja.htm;DokalyoAlphonse,“Moundou: L’inflationenconstantehausse”,TchadetCulture2004at:http://www.cefod.org/Tchad%20et%20Culture/ Tc219/ville_rurale%20moundou%20inflation.htm;CPPL-CPPN-RESAP,“LepétroledeDobaARTICLES” (series),TchadForum,August17,2003athttp://www.tchadforum.com/?page=article_item&aid=119
100 D’Appolonia,ReportoftheTenthVisitoftheExternalComplianceMonitoringGroupApril-May2004,June 2004,p.26.
101 FOCUSInternationalMaponDustControl,ESSO,EEPC/EMP,frommeetingwithWorldBank,October5, 2004.
102 D’Appolonia,ReportoftheTenthVisitoftheExternalComplianceMonitoringGroupApril-May2004,June 2004,p.7
103 D’Appolonia,ReportoftheTenthVisitoftheExternalComplianceMonitoringGroupApril-May2004,June 2004,p.47.
104 GRAMPTC/CPPN/CPPL/RESAP,«AppelalaResponsabilitéSocialeetal’EquitéavantlaDélivrancedu Certificatd’AchèvementauConsortium(Exxon,Petronas,Chevron)»,August30,2004.
105 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofVisittoChadandCameroonMay17-June52004,July9,2004,p. ii.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 109 106 D’Appolonia,ReportoftheExternalCompianceMonitoringGroup(ECMG)NinthSiteVisitOctiber- November2003,December2003.
107 WorldBank,Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject–SixthSemi-AnnualReportto theExecutiveDirectors,July-December,2003,April28,2004,p.40.Documentonfilewithauthors.The reportestimatesrevenuesat$140millionin2005/6,usingWorldEconomicOutlookoilprojections$23-25 barrelandsubtractinganoilqualitydiscount.
108 WorldBank,Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject–SixthSemi-AnnualReportto theExecutiveDirectors,January-June2003,p.39.AssumptionsincludedoilpriceatU.S.$25/bbl,917 millionbarrelreserve.
109 PFCEnergy,“AfricaPolicyAdvisoryPanel:WestAfricaPetroleumSector:OilValueForecastand Distribution”,March2004.
110 StatementbytheIMFStaffRepresentative,March19,2004,at:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/ longres.cfm?sk=17359.0
111 Disclosurestatementsareavailableathttp://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/fin_dis.htm.
112 WorldBank,Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject–SixthSemi-AnnualReportto theExecutiveDirectors,January-June2003,p.39.
113 DobianAssingar,LePrixdeBarilFlambe,lePétroleVaenFumée,November2004.
114 MichaelPeel,“CameroonActivistsAccuseWorldBankofDoubleStandardsoverPipelineProject”, FinancialTimes,November3,2004.
115 “Chadeyeschangetorevenuelaws”,Upstream,July1,2004.
116 OriginalconventiondatedDecember19,1988,andamended:May19,1993;March12,1997;andOctober 16,1999.WorldBank,ChadCameroonPAD,Annex13,p.135,April13,2000andPaulF.Hueper,“Tapping IntoaNewFrontierOilProvince”,PetroleumEconomist,October22,1998.
117 Theconventionhasadurationof35years.“ConventiondeRecherches,D’ExploitationetdeTransport desHydrocarburesentreLaRépubliqueduTchadetLeConsortiumEsso-Petronas-Chevron,PermisChari Ouest,ChariEst,LacTchad”,May10,2004.
118 InterviewwithMichelPommier,WorldBank,Washington,DC,April2004.
119 ChristinaKatsouris,“Chad:GrowingOilRevenues,GrowingInstability”,EnergyCompass,June10,2004.
120 InternationalMonetaryFund,Chad:2003ArticleIVConsultationandExPostAssessmentofPerformance UnderESAF/PRGFPrograms,April2004,IMFCountryReport04/111,p.13(“Chad:2003ArticleIV Consultation”).
121 MeetingwithRonRoyal,ManagingDirector,EssoChad,andstaff,October8,2004,N’Djamena.
122 MeetingwithRonRoyal,ManagingDirector,EssoChad,andstaff,October8,2004,N’Djamena.
123 ThisbenchmarkisnowacompositeindexofthetradedpricesofthreesimilarNorthSeagrades–Brent, ForetiesandOseberg.Thelowesttradedgradeforaparticulardayservesasthe“benchmark”forthatday.
124 ThispricewasforoilloadedinDecember2004andmayrepresentalowpointforthediscountoffDoba crude.
125 DeborahKelly,“DobaFindsaHome”,InternationalOilDaily,June25,2004.“Chevronidentifiedthe PembrokerefineryinsouthwestWalesasoneofahandfulofrefineriesintheworldcapableofadapting equipmentandprocessestorefineDobacrude.Chevrondescribedthegradeas“aheavy,acidicblend similartotheNorthSeacrudeoilcurrentlyrefinedatPembroke,”addingthatitis“particularlychallenging” duetoitshighercalciumcontent.Theacidicnatureofthecrudemeansthatunlesstreated,itcorrodespipes intherefinery.TheacidityhasmadeDobadifficulttosell,forcingproducerstoputmuchofthecrude throughtheirownsystemsintheU.S.andAsia–whichabsorbsaround40%ofDoba’scurrentshipments.”
126 EssoChad,ChadExportProjectReport#16,3rdQuarter2004,Section12.
127 Seeforexample,CesarChelala,“Povertypersistsinoil-richAfrica;Corruption:Whileofficialsgrowrich offsub-Saharanoil,thegeneralpopulation’sstandardoflivingstillsuffers,”InternationalHeraldTribune, August15,2004.“MostofthemoneyisheldbytheWorldBankinaLondonaccount,andacitizens’ committeeoverseesitsexpenditures.”
128 LawNo.001/PR/99waspromulgatedonJanuary11,1999;seealsoGenovevaHernandezUriz,“To LendorNottoLend:Oil,HumanRights,andtheWorldBank’sInternalContradictions”,TheHarvard EnvironmentalLawReview,Spring2001.
129 LawNo.001/PR/99.TextofthelawcanbefoundinFrenchatwww.ccsrp-tchad.org
110 Endnotes 130 AfricanEnergy,September2002.
131 WorldBank,“NoteontheUseofthePetroleumBonus”,June2001,at:http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ ccproj/project/bonus.pdf
132 TheIMFinsistedonanauditofthebonusandtherevenueoversightcommittee,withthepublicbackingof PresidentDéby,hassubsequentlyplayedaroleinapprovingtheallocationoftheremainder.“FreshLook atOilBonus”,AfricaEnergyIntelligence,No.333,November6,2002.“AtthebehestoftheInternational MonetaryFund,Chadhasbeenworkingforoverayearonanauditofexpenditureflowingfroma$25 millionfront-endbonuspaidbyExxonMobilandPetronasfortheDoba-Kribipipelineprojectwhichhas beenpartiallyfundedbytheWorldBank.TheIMFdisburseda$7millionloantoChadinlateOctober. OneconditionwasthatChadcompletetheauditandpublishthefindingsbytheendoftheyear.Modest comparedtootherbonusespaidbyoilcompanies,thesumtriggeredanoutcryinlate2000becausepart ofthemoney-$5million-wasimmediatelyusedbythegovernmenttobuymilitaryequipment.The transactioncamedespiteallthemechanismssetupbytheWorldBanktocontrolandverifyhowcountries useoilrevenue.Thereasonissimplythatsuchmechanismsdon’tcoverbonuses.”
133 SeeWorldBank,ChadCameroonPAD,April13,2000.
134 InternationalDevelopmentAssociation/WorldBank,“ProgramDocumentforaProposedFifthStructural AdjustmentCredit(SACV)totheRepublicofChad”,February13,2003,ReportNo.P7555-CD,p.12.
135 AgenceFrançaisedeDéveloppement,“AnalysesetperspectivesmacroéconomiquesduTchad”,Paris, September2002.AlsoreportedinAfricanEnergyIntelligenceNo.332,October23,2002.
136 WorldBank,Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:SixthSemi-AnnualReportto theExecutiveDirectors,August4,2003,p.40.
137 InterviewwithformerU.S.AmbassadortoChad,ChristopherGoldthwaite,N’Djamena,September30, 2002.
138 InNigeria,13percentofoilrevenuesareearmarkedfortheoil-producingstatesintheNigerDelta.In practice,though,littlerevenuereachesthepopulation.
139 WorldBankInspectionPanel,InvestigationReport:Chad-CameroonPetroleumandPipelineProject, September2002,p.84.
140 “TheBorrowershallissuebynotlaterthanDecember31,2001,allthenecessaryimplementationdecress, satisfactorytotheBank,relatingtothePetroleumRevenueManagementLawincludingthedecree regardingCCSRP,referredtoinArticle19ofthePetroleumRevenueManagementLaw.”LoanAgreement (PetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject)betweentheRepublicofChadandtheInternationalBankfor ReconstructionandDevelopment,LoanNumber4558CD,March29,2001,p.43.
141 WorldBankInspectionPanel,InvestigationReport:ChadCameroonPetroleumandPipelineProject, September2002,p.90.
142 CharlesP.McPherson,“PetroleumRevenueManagementinDevelopingCountries,”Washington,DC:World Bank,2002,at:www.ifc.org/ogc/publications
143 IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsultation,p.4at:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04111.pdf
144 GovernmentsbentonserialborrowingconceivablycanuseanFGFasanothersourceofcollateral.TheState OilFundoftheRepublicofAzerbaijan(SOFAR),establishedin2000,stipulatesthattheFund’sassetmay notbeusedeitherforlendingtogovernmentbodies,publicorprivatecompanies,orascollateralfordebts, commitments,guaranteesorotherliabilitiesofanyentityinthecountry.
145 Analogiescommonlyusedbypro-FGFvoicesarethoseofNorwayandtheStateofAlaska;also,somewhat outofthecontextofmineralresources,thatoftheTuvaluFund.RecentFGFexperienceinCentralAsiais conspicuouslyabsentfrommostdiscussions.
146 LoanAgreementontheChad-CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProjectbetweentheRepublic ofChadandtheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment,March29,2001,p.41.
147 OnOctober28,2004,thegovernmentnamedthefollowingmemberstotheprovisionalmanagement committeefortheoilproducingregion:DeputiesoftheNationalAssembly:NgarndoMilengar;Ngandala Marie;YorissimKozoutouSimone;CivilSocietyrepresentatives:AbbeMauriceNdimadjingar;Mbaitelsem BetelEsac;TraditioinalAuthorities:NadjidoumngarEdouardNgarnguinam,ChefdeCanton,Doba;Djasro Pierre,ChefdeCanton,Miandoum;StateRepresentatives:GeneralSecretaryoftheLogoneOrientalRegion; DelegateoftheMinistryofEconomyandFinanceforLogoneOriental.
148 LetterfromDeputyNgarlegyYorongartothePresidentoftheNationalAssembly(“Lettreauprésidentde l’Assembléenationale”),October15,2004,at:http://www.yorongar.com/article.php3?id_article=56
149 “Pétroletchadien:arnaque,opacitéetfraudeduconsortiumdansl’exploitationdubrutdeDoba”,Servicede PressePrésidentielle,October7,2004.
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 111 150 AgenceFrancePresse,“ExxonMobildenieschargesbyChaditfailedtorespectdeals”,October11,2004.
151 OpeningremarksbyPresidentDébyat“ChadInternationalOilandGasConferenceandShowcase”,Hallof theMinistryofForeignAffairs,N’Djamena,October13,2004.
152 AfricaConfidential,Vol.45No.21,22Oct2004.
153 InterviewwithformerUSAmbassadortoChad,ChristopherGoldthwaite,N’Djamena,September30,2002.
154 RepublicofChad,Law001/PR/99,article16,at:http://www.ccsrp-tchad.org/site/page. cfm?owner=774F8207-EAF7-D00C-26506076968CCF22&template=department_default.cfm
155 RepublicofChad,Law016/PR/2000,August1,2000at:http://www.ccsrp-tchad.org/site/page. cfm?owner=77510545-EF1D-3D71-5CDBE2CF6B4E2103&template=department_default.cfm
156 AsofNovember2004,themembersoftheCollègewere:
1) LAMANAABDOULAYEReprésentantdel’AssembléeNationale,PrésidentduCollège
2) MEKOMBETHERESEReprésentantdesorganisationsnongouvernementalesdedéveloppement,Vice- présidenteduCollège
3) BARKAMICHELReprésentantdel’UniondesSyndicatsduTchad(UST),RapporteurGénéral
4) DOBIANASSINGARReprésentantduCollectifdesAssociationsdeDéfensedesDroitsdel’Homme, MembreduCollège
5) MAKIADAMISSAKAReprésentantdelaCourSuprême,MembreduCollège
6) NADJIOTANOUDJIReprésentantdel’AssembléeNationale,MembreduCollège
7) leReverendPèreAntoineBERILENGARReprésentantdesCongrégationsreligieuses,Membredu Collège
8) IDRISSAHMEDIDRISSDirecteurNationaldelaBEAC,MembreduCollège
9) ABOUBAKARBAHARDirecteurGénéralduTrésor,MembreduCollège.
157 CollègedeContrôleetdeSurveillancedesRessourcesPétroliers(CCSRP),CommuniquédePresse, November4,2004,at:http://www.ccsrp-tchad.org/site/?CFID=160821&CFTOKEN=95384769
158 CCSRP,ManueldeProcédures,Janvier2004.
159 CCSRP,RapportAnnuel2003,at:http://www.ccsrp-tchad.org/site/page.cfm?owner=CF74CA1E-9D45- AFBA-EF779A5E9E8AB360&template=department_default.cfm.
160 RepublicofChad,OfficeofthePresident,MinistryofFinanceandEconomy,DecreeNo240/PR/MEF/03, Article26,July1,2003.
161 RepublicofChad,OfficeofthePresident,MinistryofFinanceandEconomy,DecreeNo240/PR/MEF/03, Article26,July1,2003.
162 DobianAssingar,LePrixdeBarilFlambe,lePétroleVaenFumée,November2004,p.15.
163 MilesShaw,ExxonMobil,e-mailcorrespondencewithauthors,November2004.
164 CCSRP,ManueldeProcédures,January2004,p.49.
165 DobianAssingar,LePrixduBarilFlambe,lePétroleVaenFumé,November2004andNaïmbayel Djékondé,economistforCCSRP,e-mailcorrespondencewithauthors,November29,2004.
166 ChaddraftedanationalpovertyreductionstrategyinJune2003inordertoaccessfundinganddebtrelief fromtheWorldBankandIMF,aswellasotherdonors.Althoughsupposedlyaparticipatory,“country- driven”document,thePRSPissubjecttoapprovalbytheWorldBankandIMF.Chad’s2003-2005 strategypaperwasapprovedbytheinstitutionsinOctober2003.Chad’sPovertyReductionStrategy Paper(2003-2005)canbeviewedat:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03209.pdforhttp:// poverty.worldbank.org/files/Chad_PRSP.pdfTheJointWB-IMFStaffAssessmentofthePRSPcanbe foundat:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000090341_ 20031021100239
167 CCSRP,RapportAnnuel2003,http://www.ccsrp-tchad.org/site/page.cfm?owner=CF74CA1E-9D45-AFBA- EF779A5E9E8AB360&template=department_default.cfm
168 SeeBennEifert,AlanGelb,andNilsBorjeTallroth,“ManagingOilWealth:Thepoliticaleconomyofoil- exportingcountries–whysomeofthemhavedonesopoorly”,FinanceandDevelopment,Volume40,No. 1,March2003;CarlosLeiteandJensWeidemann,“DoesMotherNatureCorrupt?NaturalResources, CorruptionandEconomicGrowth,”IMFworkingpaper,WP/99/85;AlanGelb,OilWindfalls:Blessingor Curse?,NewYork:OxfordUnivesityPress,1988.
112 Endnotes 169 IDAandIFC,Chad:CountryAssistanceStrategy,November18,2003,p.11.
170 Cableonfilewithauthors.
171 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChad,October10-262004,December3,2004,para. 90-92,pp.11-12.
172 IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsultation,April2004,p.17.
173 WorldBank,Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:SeventhSemi-AnnualReportto theExecutiveDirectors,April28,2004,p.11.
174 WorldBank,ProgramDocumentforaProposedInstitutionalReformSupportCredittotheRepublicof Chad,October27,2004,pp.30-31.
175 CCSRP,Rapportsurl’étatdel’avancementdelapassationdesmarchésendatede30juin2004;interview withMahmatDagache,N’Djamena,October2004.
176 TheMinistryofEducationistheresponsibilityoftheMemberoftheNationalAssemblyontheCollège, currentlyMr.LamanaAbdoulaye.TheMinistryofSocialAffairsistheresponsibilityofNadjuTaonidji, anotherMemberofParliamentservingontheCollège.ThereseMekombe,therepresentativeof developmentNGOsontheCollègeandactingpresident,isresponsibleforagriculturalprojects.The magistratefromtheSupremeCourt,MakéAdoumisresponsibleforoverseeingtheactivitiesoftheMinistry ofWaterandEnvironment.InterviewwithMichelBarka,N’Djamena,October14,2004.
177 CCSRP,RapportTrimestriel3emeTrimestre2004:Juillet-Septembre,p.10at:http://www.ccsrp-tchad.org/ site/pics/RAPPORT%203T04.pdf
178 CCSRP,BudgetDuCollègedeContrôleetdeSurveillancedesRessourcesPétrolières2004Exécutés Jusqu’au14/09/2004,onfilewithauthors.
179 CCSRP,RapportAnnuel2003.
180 CCSRP,RapportAnnuel2003.
181 GRAMP/TC,RapportduMonitoring003/20043at:http://www.gramptc.org/Publications/ Rapport%20monitoring3.pdf
182 CCSRP,RapportAnnuel2003.
183 CCSRP,“DossierdePresse,”Octobre2004,onfilewithauthors.
184 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChad,October10-262004,December3,2004,p. 12-13;Assingar,pp.17-18.
185 InterviewswithCollègestaff,N’Djamena,October2004.
186 DobianAssingar,LePrixdeBarilFlambe,lePétroleVaenFumée,November2004,p.20.
187 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChad,October10-262004,December3,2004,p.12.
188 Authors’notesfromRoyalInstituteofInterationalAffairs,ConferenceonOilandGasinAfrica,May23-25, 2004.MarkDoyle,“Chad’sOilWatchdogPowerless,”BBC,May25,2004at:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/3748061.stm
189 InterviewwithMahmatDagache,procurementspecialist,CCSRP,N’Djamena,October12,2004.
190 DobianAssingar,LePrixduBarilFlambe,LePétrolevaenFumé,November2004,p.20;interviewswith Collègemembers,October2004.
191 InterviewwithNaïmbayelDjékondé,CCSRP,October2004,N’Djamena.
192 CCSRP,RapportAnnuel2003.TheWorldBankcreditpaidforsalariesfortechnicalstaff,someequipment andsomeinternationaltravelandtrainingformembers.
193 RepublicofChad,BudgetGeneraldel’Etat2004,p.121;CCSRP,«BudgetduCCSRP2004Exécuté Jusqu’au24/09/2004»(bothonfilewithauthors).
194 CCSRPRapportAnnuel2003;CCSRP,«BudgetduCCSRP2004ExecutéJusqu’au24/09/2004»(onfile withauthors).
195 InterviewwithMahamatRamadaneDagache,October2004.
196 WorldBank,ProjectInformationDocument:ManagementofthePetroleumEconomyIIProject,Sept20, 2004at:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/10/14/000104615_ 20041015104427/Rendered/PDF/GEEP0PID0After1view0Stage1Oct014104.pdf
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 113 197 DobianAssingar,LePrixduBarilFlambe,LePétrolevaenFumé,November2004,p.15.
198 Assingar,LePrixduBarilFlambe,LePétrolevaenFumé,November2004,p.10.
199 Authors’notesfromRoyalInstituteofInterationalAffairs,ConferenceonOilandGasinAfrica,May23-25, 2004.
200 CheikhIbrahimaFall,WorldBank,MemorandumtoExecutiveDirectorsandAlternates,Subject:Chad/ CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:QuestionsandAnswers,January19,2000,p.30.
201 WorldBank,Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:SeventhSemi-AnnualReportto theExecutiveDirectors,April28,2004,p.11.
202 WorldBank,ProgramDocumentforaProposedInstitutionalReformSupportCreditfortheRepublicof Chad,October27,2004,p.25;WorldBank,Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject: SeventhSemi-AnnualReporttotheExecutiveDirectors,April28,2004,page11.
203 IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsultation,para.38.
204 TerryKarl,TheParadoxofPlenty:Oil-BoomsandPetro-States,Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1997;seealso,KarlandIanGary,BottomoftheBarrel:Africa’sOil-BoomandthePoor,June2003,pp. 18-20.
205 GuiléClabé,«CycleBudgétaire,»RépubliqueduTchad,MinistredesTravauxPublicsetdesTransports, DirectiondesAffairesAdministratives,FinancièresetduMatériel(onfilewithauhtors).
206 RepublicofChad,OfficeofthePresident,MinistryofEconomyandFinance,Decree238/PR/MEF/03, Article11.
207 MeetingwithIMFstaff,Washington,DC,September27,2004.
208 CCSRP,ManueldeProcedures,2004,p.45;“PetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject,Loan AgreementbetweentheRepublicofChadandInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment,” March29,2001,5(a)(i),p.42.
209 IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsultation,p.4.“Theadditionalityconstraintregardingprioritysector spending,asspecifiedinthemodalitiesofuseofoilrevenue,wouldalsonotbemet.”
210 IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsulation,p.17.
211 IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsultation,April2004,para.7,pp.7-8.
212 BEAC,«ConjonctureEconomiqueetFinancièreduTchadafinJuin2004etPerspectivesaCourtTerme» at:http://www.beac.int/conjoncture/conjtch.htm;InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8to Chad,October10-262004,December3,2004,p.2.
213 RepublicofChad,LawNo.07/PR/2004,February11,2004regardingthe2004nationalbudget.
214 MinistryofEconomyandFinance,DirectionGénéraleduBudget(DGB),«TableauRecapitulatifdes RecettesLoideFinances2005»(onfilewithauthors).
215 CCSRP,«CompteRenduTenantLieuduProcèsVerbaldelaRéunionPrésidentdelaRépublique,Premier Ministre,MinistresdesSecteursPrioritaires,DirectionGeneraldesMarchésPublics,etMembresdu CCSRPduAoût2004,»August21,2004.
216 MinistryofFinanceandEconomy,DirectionGénéraleduBudget(DGB),«Annex1,ProjetdeBudget 2005,Répartitiondesrevenuspétroliers»(onfilewithauthors).
217 RepublicofChad,«BudgetGénéraldel’Etat:Gestion2004,»February2004.
218 WorldBank,“QuestionsandAnswersonChad-CameroonOilPipeline”October4,2004at:http://www. worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/questions/index.htm
219 CCSRP,Suivibudgétaire,«CompteSpécialRevenusPétroliers(5617/1)2004;SituationGénéraledes engagementsetpaiementsau08/11/2004SecteursPrioritaires»
220 CCSRP,«DossierdePresse»,October2004,p.5(onfilewithauthors).
221 CCSRP,«Tableau1:PassationdesMarchesPourleMinistèredesTravauxPublicsetdesTransport»,and «RevenuesPétroliers:Budget2004,Rapportsurl’Etatd’AvancementdelaPassationdesMarchesenDate du30juin2004»(onfilewithauthors).
222 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,ChadCountryReport,November2004,p.9.
223 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChad,October10-262004,December3,2004,p.ii-iii.
114 Endnotes 224 “TheyearlyreportbytheGeneralInspectorateoftheMinistryofFinanceandtheauditoftheHIPC Initiative-financedexpendituresinthesecondhalfof2002,aswellasthatofthefivelargecontractsin2002, pointedtocontinuingwidespreadproblemsinprocurement.”IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsultation;see also:WorldBank,Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:SeventhSemi-Annual ReporttotheExecutiveDirectors,April28,2004,p.vi.
225 IDA-IFCChad:CountryAssistanceStrategy,December2003,p.11.
226 MeetingwithIMFstaffinWashington,DC,September2004.
227 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,Chad:CountryReport,November2004,p.14.
228 “Portefeuilledel’IDAauTchad:Vued’ensembleduportefeuilleBanqueMondialeauTchad,”presentation byWorldBankstaffatseminarinN’Djamena,August2003.
229 “Portefeuilledel’IDAauTchad:Vued’ensembleduportefeuilleBanqueMondialeauTchad,”presentation byWorldBankstaffatseminarinN’Djamena,August2003.
230 EconomistIntelligenceUnitChadCountryReport,November2004
231 «CompteduConseildesMinistres,»AgenceTchadiennedePresse,30septembre,2004.
232 Interview,NaïmbayelDjékondé,CCSRPstaffeconomist,October14,2004.
233 RepublicofChad,MinistryofFinanceandEconomy,DirectionGénéraleduBudget(DGB),“Tableau RecapitulatifdesRecettes,LoideFinances2005”(onfilewithauthors).
234 WorldBank,ProjectAppraisalDocument:Chad/CamPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject,April 13,2000Annex11,PartC,p.105-107.
235 RepublicofChad,DecreeNo.457/PR/MEF/2004,(Portantcréationd’unComitéprovisoiredegestiondes revenuespétroliersdestinesàlaregionproductrice),September2,2004.
236 RepublicofChad,MinistryofFinanceandEconomy,DirectionGénéraleduBudget(DGB),«Annexe3, ProjetdeBudget2005,Répartitiondelaredevancedesrevenuspétroliersen2005»(onfilewithauthors).
237 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportonVisittoChadDecember5to21,February12,2004,pp.iiandp.14 para128.
238 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChad,October10-262004,December3,2004;see also,InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMissiontoCameroonandChadNovember14-25,2001, December21,2001at:http://www.gic-iag.org/doc/IAGReportofMission14-25Nov.pdf
239 InterviewwithGregorBinkert,formerWorldBankCountryDirectorforChad,N’Djamena,Chad,May 2004.
240 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,Chad:CountryReportNovember2004,p.14.
241 WorldBank,InternationalDevelopmentAssociation,“SuspensionofDisbursements:Chad,”November 4,2004.“Inviewofnonpaymentofoutstandingobligations,IDAandIRBDhavesuspendedeffective November1,2004,Chad’srighttomakewithdrawalsundereffectiveandnotfullydisbursedcreditsand loans.AsofcloseofbusinessonOctober29,2004,overduepaymentstotaledapproximatelyUS$603, 804.1”
242 IMFPressRelease04/237,“StatementbytheIMFResidentRepresentativeinChad,”November12,2004, at:http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2004/pr04237.htm
243 RepublicofChad,Budgetdel’Etat2004,“TableaudeDeveloppementdesRecettes”(onfilewithauthors).
244 IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsultationReport,p.15.
245 WorldBank,ChadCountrypage,listofactiveprojectsat:http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?m enuPK=349907&pagePK=141155&piPK=141124&theSitePK=349862
246 UnliketheloanforChad’sstakeintheoiltransportsystemitself,thecapacity-buildingloanswerefinanced on“concessionary”terms,throughtheInternationalDevelopmentAssociation.AlthoughChad,oneofthe world’spoorestcountries,qualifiesforIDAfinancingthroughtheWorldBank,theloanforthecountry’s stakeinthepipelinewasprovidedatnear-marketratesthroughIBRD,underaclauseintheWorldBank’s articlesofagreementwhichallowsfortheexceptionalextensionofIBRDloanstoeventhepoorest countries,for“enclaveprojects.”TheWorldBankdrewuponaspecialclauseinitsarticlesofagreement (regarding“enclaveloanarrangements”)thatallowedittoofferChadaloan,notontheconcessional termsthatthispoorcountrywouldtypicallyreceive(fromtheInternationalDevelopmentAssociation, orIDA),butonnear-marketterms(fromtheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment,or IBRD).“TheIBRDloantoChad,anIDA-onlycountry,wouldbeprovidedunderthetraditionalelements oftheenclaveloanstructure.Underthisstructure,IBRDloansaresupported,inadditiontothesovereign repaymentobligations,byvarioussupportarrangementsdesignedtoenableIBRDtolookdirectlytothe
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? 115 projectrevenuesforrepayment,together,incertaincases,withotherguarantees.Theprojectisexpected togenerateforChadrevenueseachyearfarinexcess(byafactorofgreaterthanfour)oftheannualdebt servicepaymentsduetheBankundertheloan.”,WorldBank,Chad-Cameroon:PetroleumDevelopmentand PipelineProject:ProjectAppraisalDocument,April20,2000,p.16.Seealso:UseofIBRDGuarantees toSupportPrivateEnclaveProjectsinIDAOnlyCountries(R97-85,IDA/R97-36),approvedMay27,1997; ““TheBank’sExecutiveDirectorshaveapprovedguaranteesforenclaveprojectsinIDA-onlycountries whichearnforeignexchangerevenuesfromcreditworthycustomers.Theenclaveguaranteeisintendedto coverrisksofgovernmentactionthatmayinterferewiththefunctioningoftheproject.”FromFacilitating PrivateInvestmentinInfrastructure:AnActionProgramat:http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/infraact/ en.pdf
247 “MemorandumtoExecutiveDirectorsandAlternatesfromCheikhIbrahimaFall,Subject:Chad/Cameroon PetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:QuestionsandAnswers,”January19,2000,p.9;p.19.;IBRD andIFC,“Chad/Cameroon-PetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:QuestionsandAnswers,”June5, 2000,p.9.
248 “OpenLettertoMr.JamesD.Wolfensohn,PresidentoftheWorldBank,from86NGOsin28Countries ConcerningtheChad/CameroonOil&PipelineProject,”July9,1998.
249 Forcivilsociety’saccountsofthefailureofcapacitybuildingmeasures,see:ATPDH,CED,Environmental Defense,“TheChadCameroonOilandPipelineProject:PuttingPeopleandtheEnvironmentatRisk,” September1999;“TheChad-CameroonOilandPipelineProject:ACallforAccountability,”June2002.
250 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportonVisittoChadandCameroon19Julyto3August2001,September 28,2001,p.3at:http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/IAG%20Summary%20Report%20of%20Miss ion.pdf
251 WorldBank,Chad-CameroonPAD2000,p.30.
252 D’Appolonia,ReportoftheTenthVisitoftheExternalComplianceMonitoringGroupApril-May2004,June 2004,p.45.
253 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofVisittoChadandCameroon,May17-June5,2004,July9,2004,p.ii.
254 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofVisittoChadandCameroon,May17-June5,2004,July9,2004,p.ii
255 MemorandumtoExecutiveDirectorsandAlternatesfromCheikhIbrahimaFall,Subject:Chad/Cameroon PetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:QuestionsandAnswers,”January19,2000,p.9.p.19.
256 WorldBank,PressRelease,September23,2004http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/ contentMDK:20261758%7EmenuPK:34460%7EpagePK:64003015%7EpiPK:64003012%7EtheSitePK:4607 ,00.html
257 WorldBankOperationsEvaluationDepartment,ExtractiveIndustriesandSustainableDevelopment:An EvaluationofWorldBankGroupExperience,July2003,p.63at:http://www.worldbank.org/oed/extractive_ industries/.
258 WorldBankOperationsEvaluationDepartment,ExtractiveIndustriesandSustainableDevelopment:An EvaluationofWorldBankGroupExperience(draft),January2003,p.21(onfilewithauthors).
259 UNIRINNews,“Chad:ArmyMutineersSurrender–Government”,May19,2004.
260 MeetingwithMichelPommier,WorldBank,Washington,DC,April9,2004.
261 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChadOctober14-26,2004,December3,2004,p.4
262 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChadOctober14-26,2004,December3,2004,p.4.
263 InternationalAdvisoryGroup,ReportofMission8toChadOctober14-26,2004,December3,2004,p.7
264 MeetingwithWBstaff,October12,2004,N’Djamena
265 MeetingwithWorldBankstaff(LucienneM’Baipour,IsabelleParis,Marie-FrançoiseMarie-Nelly), N’Djamena,Tchad,October12,2004.Seealso,WorldBank,ProjectInformationDocument:Petroleum ManagementCapacityBuilding,http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/ IB/2004/08/10/000104615_20040811091806/Rendered/PDF/Project0Inform1Concept0Stage0072004.pdf
266 MeetingwithMichelPommierandJeromeChevallier,WorldBank,Washington,DC,April9,2004.
267 WorldBank,Chad-CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject:SeventhSemi-AnnualReportto theExecutiveDirectors(July–December2003),April28,2004.(Documentonfilewithauthors.)
268 WorldBank,ProgramDocumentforanInstitutionalReformSupportCredittotheRepublicofChad, October27,2004,p.4.
116 Endnotes 269 WorldBank,ProgramDocumentforanInstitutionalReformSupportCredittotheRepublicofChad, October27,2004,p.25.
270 IMF,Chad2003ArticleIVConsultationReport,p.40,http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/ cr04111.pdf.
271 InspectionPanel,InvestigationReportonChad-CameroonPetroleumandPipelineProject(LoanNo.4558- CD);PetroleumSectorManagementCapacityBuildingProject(CreditNo.3373-CD);andManagement ofthePetroleumEconomy(CreditNo.3316-CD),September2002,paragraph212,p.61(“Investigation Report,Chadianclaim”).
272 InspectionPanel,InvestigationReport,Chadianclaim,p.61.
273 InspectionPanel,InvestigationReport,Chadianclaim,para.35.
274 InspectionPanelInvestigationReport,InvestigationReport,Chadianclaim,para.37.
275 WorldBank,ProgramDocumentforanInstitutionalReformSupportCredittotheRepublicofChad, October27,2004,p.6.
276 WorldBank,HumanRightsDay–“AninterviewwithAlfredoSfeir-Younis,Senior AdvisortoWorldBankManagingDirectorMamphelaRamphele”(pressrelease), December10,2003,at:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/ 0,,contentMDK:20143686~menuPK:34457~pagePK:64003015~piPK:64003012~theSitePK:4607,00.htm
277 WorldBank,“DevelopmentandHumanRights:theRoleoftheWorldBank,”1998,http://www.worldbank. org/html/extdr/rights/hrtext.pdf
278 SuchanarrangementdidnotsitwellwithCameroon’smanycreditors.Instead,theBankcharged Cameroona10%premiumonitsloans.See:Djiraibe,Horta,Nguiffo,AccesstoJusticefromLocalVillage toGlobalBoardroom:AnExperienceinInternationalAccountability,September2004,p.7.
279 WorldBank,ProjectAppraisalDocument:Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject, SectionC.6,pp.16-17,April13,2000.
280 WorldBank,“EscrowAccounts—MonthlyBalances,”http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/fin_dis. htm,November28,2004.
281 LoanAgreement(PetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject)RepublicofChadandInternational BankforReconstructionandDevelopment,March29,2001,Schedule3,p.35.http://www.worldbank. org/afr/ccproj/project/td_la_en.pdf.Seealso,WorldBank,ProjectAppraisalDocument:Chad/Cameroon PetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject,Annex3,Table5andAnnex6,TableC,p.82.
282 WorldBank,ProjectAppraisalDocument:Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject, Annex11,table2(“ChadRevenues:Royalties,TaxesandDividends”).
283 WorldBank,ProjectAppraisalDocument:Chad/CameroonPetroleumDevelopmentandPipelineProject, Annex5,p.79.
284 WorldBank,ProjectAppraisalDocument:ManagementofthePetroleumEconomy,CreditNo.3316-CD.
285 AmbassadorMarcWall,e-mailcorrespondencewithauthors,December7,2004.
286 Informationoncontracts,auditsandrevenuesfromtheCongoleseoilindustryhasbeenpublishedatwww. congo-site.net
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