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Published under the authority of the General, this magazine is © NATO intended to contribute to a constructive discussion of Atlantic issues. Articles, therefore, do not necessarily represent FOCUS ON NATO official opinion or policy of member 4 governments or NATO. Alliance news in brief. EDITOR: Christopher Bennett ASSISTANT EDITOR: Vicki Nielsen PRODUCTION ASSISTANT: Felicity Breeze LAYOUT: NATO Graphics Studio Publisher:Director of Information and Press NATO, 1110 Brussels, THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TODAY Printed in Belgium by Editions Européennes 6 © NATO Lasting liaison revieweditor@hq..int [email protected] Simon Serfaty places the transat- ON THE COVER Articles may be reproduced, after permission lantic relationship in its historical been obtained from the editor, provided mention context. Colin Powell and Lord Robertson is made of NATO Review and signed articles are face the media on Powell’s first visit to reproduced with the author’s name. NATO as US Secretary of State on NATO Review is published periodically in English, 27 February. as well as in Czech, Danish (NATO Nyt), Dutch (NAVO Kroniek), French (Revue de l’OTAN), German (NATO Brief), Greek (Deltio NATO), Hungarian (NATO Tükor), Italian (Rivista della NATO), Norwegian (NATO Nytt), Polish (Przeglad DEBATE NATO), Portuguese (Noticias da OTAN), Spanish (Revista de la OTAN) and Turkish (NATO Dergisi). 15 One issue a year is published in Icelandic (NATO Is the fundamental nature of the Fréttir) and issues are also published in Russian and Ukrainian on an occasional basis. transatlantic security NATO Review is also published on the NATO web relationship changing? site at www.nato.int/docu/review.htm FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG Hard copy editions of the magazine may be 9 VS ROB DE WIJK obtained free of charge by readers in the follow- Steady as she goes Where is NATO headed? What ing countries from the addresses given below: James Dobbins sees continuity in impact are ESDP, NMD and RMA : Foreign Policy Communications Division transatlantic relations. having on the Alliance? Department of Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade 125 Sussex Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2 12 : Communication Planning Unit Starting over again Ministry of Defence Christoph Bertram assesses FEATURES Room 0370 Main Building European concerns and expecta- 20 London SW1A 2HB tions at the change of tenant in the Fresh faces at NATO : NATO Review - US Mission to NATO White House. PSC 81 Box 200 - APO AE 09724 Requests from other countries or for other NATO 21 publications should be sent to: CIMIC Reconstruction NATO Office of Information and Press 1110 Brussels, Belgium Fax: (32-2) 707 1252 E-MAIL: [email protected] Every mention in this publication of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by an INTERVIEW asterisk (*) referring to the following footnote: 22 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. Andras Simonyi: Hungarian herald

2 NATO review Spring 2001 Volume 49 Spring 2001 Judging by readers’ letters, the new-look NATO Review seems to have struck a chord. This issue contains several more innovations, including an interview feature and a statistics page. Otherwise, the central theme is the transat- lantic security relationship, the basis of the Atlantic Alliance, in the wake of the change of administration in the United States. Simon Serfaty, director of Washington OPINION DC’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, 24 places the transatlantic relationship in its historical con- Great expectations text. Ambassador James Dobbins, assistant secretary of Andrei Zagorski examines the thaw state for European affairs, tells in an interview how, in NATO-Russia relations. despite the changeover, he expects continuity in this key relationship. And Christoph Bertram, director of the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, assesses European concerns and expectations. In the debate, editorial François Heisbourg, director of Geneva’s Centre for Security Policy, and Rob de Wijk, professor of interna- tional relations at the ’ Royal Military Academy, explore the changing nature of the transatlantic security relationship. Features include articles on NATO’s Partnership for Peace Internship Programme and civil- military cooperation in . In the interview, Ambassador Andras Simonyi, Hungary’s first permanent representative to NATO, talks of the impact of NATO membership on his country. In the book review, Michael REVIEW Rühle, the head of speech-writing and policy planning in 28 NATO’s political affairs division, considers some of the Understanding NATO recent literature on NATO. Elsewhere, Andrei Zagorski of Michael Rühle reviews recent the EastWest Institute analyses recent developments in literature on the Alliance. NATO-Russia relations. And Elinor Sloan of the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at Canada’s National Defence Headquarters examines NATO force mobility and deployability. Statistics illustrating NATO’s defence expenditure round out the issue.

Christopher Bennett

MILITARY MATTERS 30 Speeding deployment The NATO 2000 CD-ROM helps users Elinor Sloan examines NATO force familiarise themselves with the role and mobility and deployability, as well workings of NATO. It charts the evolution as the impact of programmes aimed of the Alliance and describes the adaptation at improving capabilities. it has undergone to address the security challenges of the 21st century. Free copies are available on request from the STATISTICS Distribution Unit, 34 Office of Information and Press, Defence spending NATO, 1110-Brussels, Belgium.

Spring 2001 NATO review 3 FOCUS ON NATO

NATO Secretary General Lord Zone, a five-kilometre strip of south- violence in the neighbouring former Forces Southern (AFSOUTH), Robertson visited Skopje, the former ern bordering Kosovo, for the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* a regional headquarters based in Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* on first time since the Yugoslav Army’s with NATO Ambassadors on 5 March Naples, , took over day-to-day 26 March and met with President withdrawal from Kosovo in June at NATO. command of the Stabilisation Force Boris Trajkovski and leaders of the 1999. (SFOR) from Supreme Allied country’s political parties. Lord Exercise Cooperative Osprey 2001 Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) on 20 Robertson reaffirmed support for the Lord Robertson visited Athens, took place at Canada’s Pearson February. The command of the government in its struggle with ethnic Greece, on 16 March, meeting Peacekeeping Centre in Halifax, Nova (KFOR) transferred to Albanian rebels, but also urged President Constantinos Scotia, involving six NATO and 13 AFSOUTH on 18 January. restraint and appealed to the insur- Stephanopoulos and Prime Minister Partner countries from 1 to 9 March. gents to lay down their arms. Costas Simitis, as well as the Greek Moscow office foreign and defence ministers. Newly appointed UN Special Lord Robertson set out NATO’s prior- Representative Hans Haekkerup, the ities in southeastern Europe in the The situation in and around Kosovo former minister, visit- keynote speech of a conference dominated talks between the North ed NATO on 28 February to brief examining security challenges in Atlantic Council and the EU Political NATO Ambassadors on the situation southeastern Europe and regional and Security Committee in Brussels in and around Kosovo. perspectives in Rome, Italy, on 26 on 14 March. March. Powell visit Submarine rescue and medical Lord Robertson unveiled a package experts from 13 NATO countries par- of measures on 21 March designed to ticipated in Phoenix 2001, an exer- enhance stability in the southern cise to rehearse procedures for deal- and demonstrate support for ing with submarines in distress, held the multi-ethnic government of the at the NATO headquarters at former Yugoslav Republic of Northwood, England, from 13 to 15 Macedonia.* March.

President of the International NATO mediators brokered a cease- Committee of the Red Cross Jakob fire between the Federal Republic of Kellenberger met with Lord Yugoslavia and ethnic Albanians in Lord Robertson inaugurated the Robertson at NATO on 21 March and southern Serbia on 12 March. NATO Information Office in Moscow addressed the Euro-Atlantic on 20 February, a visible sign of Partnership Council. US trip improving relations with Russia. Lord Robertson visited the United Bosnia briefing States from 6 to 10 March. He met US Secretary of State Colin Powell NATO parliamentarians discussed UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan met Lord Robertson and Allied for- NATO’s current agenda with the and attended an informal meeting of eign ministers during a visit to NATO North Atlantic Council on 19 the UN Security Council before meet- on 27 February. Secretary Powell February. ing US President George W. Bush stressed the new administration’s and top officials in the new adminis- support for the development of a New Hungarian tration, as well as several senators European Security and Defence ambassador and congressmen. He also addressed Identity and its commitment to con- Ambassador János Herman suc- a symposium organised by the sult Allies on plans for a National ceeded Ambassador Andras Simonyi American Enterprise Institute on Missile Defense. as permanent representative of Capitol Hill. Hungary to the North Atlantic Council EU, OSCE, NATO, UN and UNHCR on 19 February. A career diplomat, On 8 March, Lord Robertson officials met at NATO for the first time Ambassador Herman, 48, was for- announced measures to restore sta- on 27 February to discuss how to merly deputy state secretary for mul- bility in southern Serbia and the for- address the problems of increasing tilateral affairs. mer Yugoslav Republic of violence along Kosovo’s boundaries. Macedonia* and prevent ethnic More than 1,500 people from seven Albanian extremists abusing the Lord Robertson met President NATO nations trained in a disaster Ground Safety Zone. Václav Havel, Prime Minister Milosˇ relief exercise, Relieve Discomfort High Representative Wolfgang Zeman, and the Czech foreign and 2001, on the Caribbean island of Petritsch met Lord Robertson at NATO and Russian parliamentarians defence ministers on 21 and 22 Curaçao from 18 to 22 February. NATO on 19 March and briefed a met at NATO on 5 and 6 March to dis- February in Prague, the Czech meeting of SFOR troop-contributing cuss political, military, scientific and Republic. Twelve NATO countries participated nations on the situation in Bosnia and environmental cooperation and the in the world’s largest annual anti-sub- Herzegovina (Bosnia). need to reinforce dialogue. New command marine warfare exercise, Dogfish arrangements 2001, which took place in the Ionian On 14 March, Yugoslav troops Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov In line with new command arrange- Sea east of Sicily, Italy from 15 to 28 entered entered the Ground Safety discussed concerns over increasing ments unveiled last year, Allied February.

4 NATO review Spring 2001 FOCUS ON NATO

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Kouchner Farewell Lord Robertson visited Armenia, between the Alliance and the European Nebojsa Covic and Yugoslav Foreign Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Union but noted that practical arrange- Minister Goran Svilanovic met Lord between 15 and 18 January, meeting ments still needed to be worked out. Robertson and NATO Ambassadors heads of state and foreign and Ministers also held meetings with their on 15 February at NATO to discuss defence ministers. counterparts from Russia and Ukraine, proposals to resolve tensions in and other Partner countries. southern Serbia. On 11 January, Lord Robertson visit- ed , which currently holds the Trajkovski visit NATO’s annual crisis management EU presidency, for talks with Foreign exercise, CMX 2001, took place from Minister Anna Lindh and Defence 15 to 19 February at NATO, involving Minister Björn von Sydow about Partner countries for the first time. establishing robust EU-NATO links in crisis management. Implementation of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in First Yugoslav visit Europe was discussed by its 30 signatory countries at the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee’s annual seminar from 14 to 16 February at NATO.

Marking the end of 18 months in Newly appointed UN High office, former UN Special Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Representative to Kosovo Bernard Lubbers met Lord Robertson at Kouchner addressed the Euro- NATO on 6 February. Atlantic Partnership Council and Boris Trajkovski, President of the for- representatives of other KFOR con- mer Yugoslav Republic of The first meeting of the EU Political tributing countries on 30 January at Macedonia,* met Lord Robertson on and Security Committee and the NATO. 7 December at NATO to discuss secu- North Atlantic Council under new rity in southeastern Europe, relations permanent EU-NATO consultation Lord Robertson met German Defence with KFOR and preparations for pos- arrangements took place on 5 Minister Rudolf Scharping on 25 sible future NATO membership. February in Brussels, Belgium. January in Berlin, , where he also delivered this year’s Manfred The first Yugoslav minister to visit New confidence-building measures Lord Robertson outlined key items Wörner Memorial Lecture. NATO since the ouster of former between Greece and Turkey, were on NATO’s agenda at the annual Yugoslav President Slobodan announced on 6 December, whereby International Security Policy Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Milosevic, Foreign Minister Goran each country will give the other advance Conference held in Munich, Nastase met Lord Robertson at Svilanovic, met Lord Robertson and notification of military exercises. Germany, from 2 to 3 February, NATO on 24 January to discuss NATO Ambassadors on 10 January. where he also met new US Secretary Romania’s preparations for NATO Allied defence ministers met in of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. membership and its contribution to New UK ambassador Brussels, Belgium, on 5 and 6 KFOR and SFOR. Ambassador David Manning succeed- December and discussed, in particular, Lord Robertson met Prime Minister ed Ambassador Sir John Goulden as the Defence Capabilities Initiative and Jens Stoltenberg and Norwegian Mongolian Prime Minister Nambaryn permanent representative of the EU-NATO relations. Ministers also foreign and defence ministers Enkhbayar met Lord Robertson at United Kingdom to the North Atlantic adopted a five-year force plan, on 1 and 2 February in Oslo, NATO on 22 January. Council on 8 January. A career diplo- reviewed the Allies’ national defence . mat, Ambassador Manning, 51, was plans for the period 2001-2005 and Depleted uranium formerly deputy under-secretary of approved new ministerial guidance for On 2 February, NATO’s highest mili- Set up in the wake of public concern state at the Foreign and NATO and national defence planning up tary authority, the Military about possible environmental health Commonwealth Office between 1998 to 2008. Ministers also met with their Committee, visited Northwood, risks associated with the use of and 2000. Before that, he was UK counterparts from Russia and Ukraine, England, the headquarters of both depleted uranium, the Committee on ambassador to Israel (1995-1998). and other Partner countries. UN the regional Allied East Atlantic Depleted Uranium, made up of Special Envoy Carl Bildt briefed minis- command (EASTLANT) and the NATO officials and representatives of On the fifth anniversary of NATO’s ters in the Euro-Atantic Partnership Allied Naval Forces North past and present SFOR and KFOR deployment in Bosnia, Lord Robertson Council on recent developments in the (NAVNORTH). contributing nations, met for the visited SFOR troops and met Bosniac, Balkans and the Supreme Allied first time on 16 January to discuss Croat and Serb political leaders in Commander, Europe, General Joseph Lithuanian Prime Minister Rolandas medical and scientific evidence. Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 20 December. Ralston, gave an update on the KFOR Paksas met Lord Robertson at NATO NATO’s senior medical advisory and SFOR operations. on 31 January to discuss relations body, the Committee of the Chiefs Allied foreign ministers met in with Russia, peacekeeping in the of Military Medical Services met Brussels, Belgium, on 14 and 15 For more information Balkans and Lithuania’s preparations the day before to exchange informa- December and tentatively agreed an see NATO Update at www. for NATO membership. tion on the issue. approach to permanent arrangements nato.int/docu/update/index.htm.

Spring 2001 NATO review 5 Lasting liaison Simon Serfaty places the transatlantic relationship in its historical context and considers issues likely to shape it in the coming years. © NATO

Visonary words: President Truman’s ideas served as a beacon to light up post-war darkness and still illuminate the way forward

hen future historians look back to the year 2001, policy of the administration of President Harry S. Truman, they will likely be in awe of what was achieved have contributed to the evolution of a responsible Euro- Win the second half of the previous century. What Atlantic community of interests and values, without which was a daring vision – and even, many warned, a dangerous neither the United States nor Europe could live as well, as illusion – gradually became an irreversible reality. History freely, and as safely as they do today. Moreover, even after changed its ways, and geography moved, as the states of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Europe developed an integrated personality à l’américaine (NATO) and the remain the institutional while the United States was adopting a security identity à pillars of this community. l’européenne. Despite the many accomplishments inspired by the The institutions formed in the wake of the Second World transatlantic link, Americans and Europeans remain deeply War, which were, in part, inspired by the “Europe first” sceptical about each other. Indeed, reported US ambiva- lence over Europe’s evolution towards a union of states and Simon Serfaty is professor of US foreign policy at Old Europe’s alleged ambiguities over US leadership within Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, and director of NATO continue to generate concern about a rift in transat- European Studies at the Center for Strategic & International lantic relations. Predictably, apprehension among Europe’s Studies in Washington, DC. He is author of, among others, nation-states is largely to do with the consequences of their Taking Europe Seriously (Palgrave, 1992), Stay the Course transformation. In the United States, however, the appre- (Praeger, 1997), Memories of Europe’s Future: Farewell to hension has to do with the feared emergence of Europe as a Yesteryear (CSIS, 1999), and Europe 2007: From Nation- counterweight that could act independently of, or even States to Member States (CSIS, 2000). against, the United States. However exaggerated such apprehension may be, it cannot be ignored. Four times in

6 NATO review Spring 2001 THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TODAY the 20th century – in 1917, 1941, 1949 and 1989 – US Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which each side of power and leadership helped save Europeans from them- the Atlantic is prone to present as a test of post-Cold War selves to the benefit of all, including the United States. cohesion. The test, however, is hardly convincing as both Nevertheless, too many in Europe remain willing to ques- NMD and ESDP continue to raise too many legitimate tion US leadership as intrusive, deceptive, ineffective and questions with too little evidence to offer enough credible even dangerous. answers. Can it work? Assuming it does work, is it afford- able? Assuming it is affordable, is it cost-effective? European anxieties were especially evident during the Assuming it is cost-effective, is it necessary? Assuming it most recent presidential elections in the United States. is necessary, will its impact exceed whatever gains it per- Then, the language used in some European media to pres- mits? And so it goes for both NMD and ESDP – a parallel ent the two main contenders, and especially the Republican debate over intentions that are so misrepresented on and candidate, bordered on the offensive. Much concern about each side of the Atlantic as to risk consequences seemed to reflect a simplistic belief that changes in politi- that neither side wants or can afford. Moreover, for the cal majorities or presidential leadership would inevitably next several years such a debate will be premature, as result in shifts in the country’s foreign and security poli- Europe is no more likely to rely on its virtual ESDP to cies. However, experience of the past 50 years suggests that fight without the United States than the United States is policy changes during the life of an administration are likely to distance itself from Europe behind its virtual often more profound than those from one to the next, as NMD. Instead, both ESDP and NMD will likely remain, external events have frequently caused presidents to above all, the source of debate among Europeans and change directions. In this way, Jimmy Carter’s foreign pol- Americans respectively, rather than between them. icy effectively turned 180 degrees in January 1980, a year before his successor’s inauguration, in the wake of the In any case, ESDP is what every US administration Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution. since 1945 has expected of Europe – namely, an enhanced Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan changed course as the “evil military capacity that would lighten the US burden by act- empire” he had battled earlier unravelled. And his succes- ing with or without, but not against or in spite of, the sor’s defining interest for world leadership was relin- United States. Moreover, conversely, NMD is what quished in autumn 1991 when George Bush assumed that Europe wants out of the United States – enhanced protec- his re-election required a new presidential image. That tion that would reduce the consequences of failure should image, however, suited Bill Clinton better until 1994 when, a conflict, started accidentally or by design, spread to the in the wake of the congressional elections of that year, he United States, its allies and friends. re-invented himself as a world leader and embarked upon many of the policies, whose consequences have now been Rather than threatening to decouple the United States inherited by his successor. from Europe, launch another Cold War, accelerate a new arms race, and destabilise deterrence, as its critics have To think that in 2001 a new American president might, argued, NMD seeks to ensure continued US engagement, by design or inexperience, turn away from Europe is to pre- bury the Cold War, avoid military competition, and sta- sume a luxury of choice that ceases to exist once a political bilise deterrence. The United States understands that campaign is over. The US presence in Europe has become today’s unipolar world is transitory, and that ascending so complete as to end any prospect of disengagement. In powers and nuisance states will eventually challenge the short, the partition line carefully built across the Atlantic in post-Cold War order and, therefore, the interests of the the 19th century has been swept away by the repeated United States and its allies. By choice (Alliance cohe- European storms of the 20th century. Although the United sion), necessity (radars in Greenland and England), and States is not a European power, either by vocation or by foresight (the rise of rogue states and other unspecified choice, it is a power in Europe, by position as well as by threats), the states of Europe would do well to reconsider interests. their objections to NMD. Meanwhile, the United States would do well to expand the concept into that of a multi- Early in the 21st century, both NATO and the European lateral system that would cover Europe and others, Union face a full and complex agenda. While the tasks and instead of deploying a more limited system, in spite of priorities differ from one institution to the other, the gener- allied opinion. al principle remains the same: widen in order to deepen, deepen in order to widen, and reform in order to do both. Improving EU-US and EU-NATO relations have been Neither institution, however, can expect to address its agen- hidden features of both NATO and EU enlargement. Since da independently of the other. Each institutional agenda is the Washington and Rome Treaties were signed in 1949 separable from the other, but neither can be separated from and 1957 respectively, there has been an implicit assump- the broader transatlantic agenda to which it belongs. tion, in the United States as well as in Europe, that both institutions would be enlarged in a way that brought High on the transatlantic agenda are prospects of a NATO members into the then European Community and National Missile Defense (NMD) and a European and EC members into NATO. The initial six EC countries

Spring 2001 NATO review 7 THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TODAY

were all founding members of NATO, and four of the six wedge between Europe and the United States – whether countries that joined the European Community between over NMD, NATO enlargement, ESDP or EU enlarge- 1973 and 1986 were already members of NATO ment. Here, it is critical to convince Moscow that the (Denmark, Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom), expansion of the Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood also while a fifth late entrant () joined the Alliance in a helps widen the area of NATO security and EU affluence matter of weeks. Indeed, by 1986, Ireland was the only to non-NATO and non-EU countries, including, above EC country that was not a member of the then 16-mem- all, Russia. Outside Russia, Europe’s institutional ber Atlantic Alliance, while Turkey, Norway and Iceland orphans, countries outside both the European Union and were the only European NATO members that were not NATO, which may have to learn to live on their own for part of the European Union of 12. Since the end of the a longer period of time should not be abandoned either. Cold War, however, this gap has widened, with all three Enhanced cooperation is imperative, not only with mem- new EU countries in 1995 being non-NATO members bers of a reinforced NATO Partnership for Peace, but (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) and all three new NATO also with bold and generous EU associate status. countries in 1999 being non-EU members (Czech Republic, Hungary, and ). The Greater Middle East, extending from North Africa through the Middle East and into the Gulf, is Closing this membership gap between the two another area which would benefit from a coordinated Western institutions would facilitate the institutional transatlantic approach. Here, even though interests are complementarity sought by both Europe and the United not always common, whether within Europe or between States. It could also serve as an implicit guideline for Europe and the United States, goals are usually similar future enlargement – creating what and policies, even when not com- the late Italian prime minister, Aldo mon, can be compatible. Moreover, Moro, would have called parallele even though capabilities are uneven, convergente, with the point of con- they are sufficiently complementary vergence reached when all EU coun- Despite the many for compatible policies to achieve tries are also NATO members, and accomplishments common goals more effectively all European NATO countries are when the United States and the also EU members. By spring 2002, inspired by the states of Europe act jointly, rather some applicant countries should transatlantic link, than separately. have made enough progress to per- mit NATO and the European Union, Americans and Asia, too, is an area about which meeting in separate or joint sum- Europeans remain Americans and Europeans must mits, to enforce their respective learn to think in unison, if they are to commitments to enlargement. deeply sceptical about act jointly or in a complementary each other fashion. This is especially the case EU-NATO complementarity is not with respect to China, a country only a matter of membership. It is which must feature in any discussion also a policy question. Since neither about NMD and the future of nuclear institution addresses all issues, both can attend to sepa- deterrence. But working in unison outside the Euro- rate, though not separable, functions. In this way, NATO Atlantic area requires enhanced mechanisms for transat- can protect its members from external aggression, while lantic policy coordination and consultation. the European Union can attend to the soft-security issues that might otherwise disrupt the peace. In several This cooperative transatlantic agenda and the respon- primary areas of instability and even conflict – includ- sive dialogue it requires are not about new visions. ing southeastern Europe and the Aegean – better coordi- Rather, the vision is the same as that which inspired nation between these two institutions and their members those European and US statesmen who created NATO would be desirable. Arguably, some of the horror that and the European Union and whose ideas served as a plagued the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s could beacon to light up the post-war darkness. On both sides have been avoided had not only NATO but also the of the Atlantic, post-war leaders shared a comparable European Union been involved earlier, and hopes to vision of a failed past and, accordingly, pursued similar escape further terror hinge decisively on a European ambitions to escape their respective histories and start involvement in a way that the United States has occa- anew. Under another set of post-war conditions, the bea- sionally failed to recognise. con held by President Truman and others still illumi- nates the path forward, as President Bush and other There is more to the transatlantic agenda, to be sure. political leaders complete their predecessors’ vision of a Russia is a case in point – too close to ignore, too big to whole and free Europe moving as a counterpart of the integrate, and too nuclear to offend. Russia can still be United States within a strong and cohesive Euro- expected to try to exploit any opportunity to build a Atlantic community.

8 NATO review Spring 2001 Steady as she goes James Dobbins, US assistant secretary for European affairs, tells Review editor Christopher Bennett that he sees continuity in transatlantic relations.

CHRISTOPHER BENNETT: Every periphery, leaving the United States tain and build a viable Bosnian state time there is a change in US adminis- to focus its energies on more strate- on a multi-ethnic basis in line with tration, analysts on both sides of the gic threats. How prevalent is such the Dayton Accords. The kind of Atlantic debate its significance for thinking in the new US administra- cooperation which Zagreb has the transatlantic relationship. How tion and what considerations are explicitly committed itself to and much continuity and how much likely to govern relations with Allies? which we can look to and demand change should US Allies expect in from Belgrade is the best hope for coming years? JD: The administration recognises that stability in Bosnia and the region as the task that we have taken on jointly a whole. Clearly, southern Serbia JD: Every time the administration in the Balkans is a task to which both remains volatile, but NATO is work- changes in Washington there is Europe and the United States are and ing effectively and interacting con- indeed debate about the exact bal- should remain committed. I can’t rule structively with the former Yugoslav ance of continuity and change. As far out longer-term policy planning dis- Republic of Macedonia,* with as the Atlantic Alliance is concerned, cussions of the type that you have sug- Serbia, and with moderate Albanian the new administration is going to be gested, although I haven’t seen any leaders in Kosovo to defuse the situ- unequivocally and strongly support- proposals to that effect as yet. ation. Otherwise, the basic elements ive. That is evident in everything that for building stability in the region President George W. Bush, Secretary are already in place. These are the of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Stability Pact, UN Security Council Defense Donald Rumsfeld and oth- CB: The peace processes in Bosnia Resolution 1244 concerning ers have said on the subject. In terms and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo, which lays out a path of the Balkans, there will be a contin- Kosovo have seen a number of break- towards substantial autonomy but ued effort to review the scale of throughs and conditions on the postpones a decision on the forces necessary to carry out NATO’s ground are improving. It is increas- province’s final status, and the tasks. However, the review will take ingly clear, however, that the interna- Dayton Accords, their gradual place within a NATO context. It is tional community will have to invest implementation and the building of important to review commitments many years, massive resources and multi-ethnic structures in Bosnia periodically and ensure that they are considerable political capital if it is that do not rely on the nationalist in line with developing circum- to rebuild functioning societies in the parties that were in power during the stances. The commitment to work Balkans. Given your experience of war. It’s less a question of new initia- together in the Balkans is evident. the region, what opportunities do you tives, than of continued commitment Secretary of State Powell made that see for creating a self-sustaining in all of these areas. The administra- clear when he visited NATO in peace? And how will the new US tion has indicated that it intends to February and President Bush has administration seek to re-energise the continue to work on the Stability similarly made it clear in the meet- process? Pact, on the NATO-led peacekeeping ings he has had in Washington with efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and on NATO Secretary General Lord JD: The most important develop- the issue of NATO enlargement, Robertson and other NATO leaders. ments of the past year and the most which over the longer term offers a hopeful developments are the way of stabilising and integrating the changes that have taken place in Balkans as well as northeastern Zagreb and Belgrade. In the 1990s, Europe. Here, Europe has an even CB: As a result of comments made much of the tension in the region, more daunting task, as it moves during the US electoral campaign, particularly as regards Bosnia, came towards integrating these societies in media have speculated that the new from the centrifugal pressure that the European Union. We recognise US administration is keen to explore these two capitals put on Bosnian that the European contribution is, in the possibilities of a “new division of society, effectively tearing it apart. many ways, the most important one labour” with its Allies. In such a sce- We now have an opportunity to see and we appreciate the efforts that the nario, Europeans would likely con- both Yugoslavia and Croatia playing European Union and its members are centrate on stabilising Europe and its a constructive role in helping to sus- making in this regard.

Spring 2001 NATO review 9 THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TODAY

CB: Many Allies and Partners have in Europe and elsewhere. In address- coming months. There are a number made it clear that they have reserva- ing some of these issues, the United of issues to address in the relation- tions about the new administration’s States has had concerns which some ship, but there are a number of points plans for building a National Missile of our Allies have not felt or have not where cooperation can be reasonably Defense. How does the new adminis- felt as keenly. We will continue to anticipated. We certainly support tration intend to take this project for- consult our Allies and work with NATO’s engagement with Russia as a ward? And how will it reassure Allies them as regards the ABM treaty, complement to these bilateral con- and Partners that NMD is both in which will also, obviously, be a sultations, including the Permanent their interests and will help make the major element of the discussions we Joint Council, and look forward to world a safer place? have with Russia. Concerning the developing it further during the com- International Criminal Court, it’s ing months. JD: The administration has already important to recognise that President begun the process of consulting its Clinton’s signature of the treaty was Allies on issues of missile defence essentially a technical step, rather and how missile defence fits into a than an expression of an intent to CB: Successive US administrations policy of deterrence, which also inte- submit the treaty to ratification. The have urged their European Allies to grates other aspects of defence as Clinton administration indicated that increase defence expenditure. As the well as arms control and non-prolif- it had problems with the treaty and European Union builds a crisis man- eration. Secretary of State Powell got that it did not believe that it would be agement capability, Europeans a very good response from Allies on able to bring it into force. Clinton’s appear finally to be taking on a these issues when he visited NATO in signature was not intended to reverse greater share of the burden for their February and he committed the his administration’s position on that own security. Despite this, many United States to consult early and point. It was intended rather as a Americans now appear suspicious of often on these issues, indeed, to con- technical step to include the United the European Security and Defence sult before we make basic decisions States in continued consideration of Policy (ESDP), even fearing that it about the architecture of a missile some aspects of the treaty’s adminis- might undermine NATO. What con- defence system. We have also made it tration. Even before coming into cerns does the new US administra- clear that we want to work with the office, the new administration tion have about this project and what Allies on missile defence arrange- expressed concerns about this agree- must the Europeans do to overcome ments that protect them as well as the ment which paralleled and were, if them? United States. And we have also anything, even stronger than those of made clear that we want to consult the Clinton administration. I expect The administration has made clear closely with others, including the therefore that it will continue to that it supports the development of a Russians and the Chinese. Indeed, express such reservations and con- European security and defence poli- Secretary of State Powell has already cerns in the future. cy that strengthens the Alliance, that discussed this subject, among other contributes to overall capabilities and issues, with the Russian foreign min- avoids duplicating existing Alliance ister. planning structures. This is how CB: Russia is an important Partner of ESDP is developing and the way in the Alliance, but one that has at times which we hope and expect that it will in recent years been disgruntled. continue to develop. There are still CB: For a variety of reasons, the How does the new administration unresolved issues, however, which United States has failed to endorse intend to engage Russia? How much have to be worked through in the several international agreements potential does it see in the Permanent coming months in the ongoing talks in recent years. These include the Joint Council? And how might that between NATO and the European Land Mine Treaty, the treaty estab- institution be developed? Union. These unresolved issues lishing the International Criminal include the mechanism by which Court and the Comprehensive Test JD: The administration intends to force planning is carried out in the Ban Treaty. In addition, plans for have a good working relationship European Union and NATO. The NMD risk undermining the ABM with Russia. Already, Secretary of relationship between the force-plan- Treaty. What approach will the new State Powell has had a preliminary ning processes of the two organisa- administration adopt towards these meeting with the Russian foreign tions is therefore under discussion, as treaties? minister and President Bush has had are arrangements for operational a conversation with Russian planning and the issue of whether JD: The United States has global President Vladimir Putin and the NATO can assure the European responsibilities which are in some relationship will be developed Union access to NATO planning in ways unique, reflecting our defence through the normal pattern of bilater- all circumstances. Further discussion commitments in Korea, in the Gulf, al and multilateral meetings over the is also necessary to identify process-

10 NATO review Spring 2001 THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TODAY es by which NATO assets could be not make unilateral decisions on established Membership Action made available to the European NATO enlargement, the new US Plans, are currently working on Union. And finally, the issue of the administration will have a large say implementing them and will be participation of non-EU Allies in EU on who is and who isn’t invited, or judged according to them, when the activities and operations still has to whether anybody is invited to join the time comes. Countries’ readiness and be resolved. Alliance. What factors will be taken the degree of effort that they have put into consideration in making this into preparing themselves for NATO decision and how can aspiring mem- membership are certainly major cri- bers maximise their chances of teria for decisions on future mem- CB: The nine countries taking part in admission? bers. Otherwise, the degree to which NATO’s Membership Action Plan are countries have irreversibly estab- all hoping to be invited to join the JD: The key to future Alliance mem- lished democratic institutions and the Alliance at its summit at the end of bership is the Membership Action prospects for democratic stability are next year. Although Washington does Plan. All aspiring members have also important considerations.

James Dobbins (left) was sworn in as US assistant secretary for European affairs in January 2001, a post he had filled on an acting basis since May 2000. A 58-year-old diplomat, he has

© US State Department spent more than two decades working on European affairs during a career spanning more than 30 years at the State Department.

Prior to becoming assistant secre- tary for European affairs, between February 1999 and May 2000, Ambassador Dobbins served as special adviser to the president and secretary of state for Kosovo and . In this capacity, he had lead responsibility for managing the Balkans crisis throughout NATO’s Kosovo air campaign.

Earlier in his career, Ambassador Dobbins acted as the State Department’s senior manager for peace operations in Haiti, coordinating the diplomatic and civil aspects of the 1994-96 interven- tion, and Somalia, overseeing the dis- engagement of US forces in 1993-94. Between 1996 and 1999, Ambassador Dobbins was special adviser to the president and senior director on the National Security Council Staff responsible for Latin America.

In addition to his official posts, Ambassador Dobbins has held appointments as a senior fellow with the Rand Corporation in 1993 and with the Council on Foreign Relations in 1995-96. Prior to joining the State Department, Ambassador Dobbins served three years as an officer in the US Navy, including two tours of duty in the Vietnam theatre.

Spring 2001 NATO review 11 Starting over again Christoph Bertram assesses European concerns and expectations at the change of tenant in the White House. © Reuters

Back to the future: President Bush has assembled a foreign policy team that is largely the same as the one which left office with his father eight years ago

henever a new face moves into the White House, cious of the seemingly irrepressible urge to reassess the European governments hold their breath. The previous administration’s policies and develop new visions. Wmassive turnover of key individuals that accom- panies all presidential changeovers means that many in the This time, however, things are different. President new administration are inevitably finding their feet in the George W. Bush has assembled a foreign policy team that is early months. Moreover, while every US presidential can- largely the same as the one which left office with his father didate promises to outdo the incumbent in “strengthening eight years ago. That administration was highly respected relations with our allies”, Europeans have learned to be for its deft handling of German reunification, the demise of cautious. They have never had reason to doubt the good the Soviet Union, and the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of will of a new president, but have sometimes felt uneasy Kuwait. But familiarity with this team has failed to reas- about the qualifications of some of the new team or suspi- sure Europe’s foreign policy community. It is not the com- petence of the new administration that causes concern, but its new agenda. Many Europeans fear they may face awk- Christoph Bertram is director of the Berlin-based Stiftung ward choices on Euro-Atlantic issues like missile defence Wissenschaft und Politik. He is co-author, together with and NATO enlargement, as well as issues further afield, Gilles Andréani and Charles Grant, of Europe’s Military where the United States is adopting a tougher stance, such Revolution (Centre for European Reform, 2001). as policy towards Iraq and China, on Russia and on global warming.

12 NATO review Spring 2001 THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TODAY

Such fears are largely unjustified when it comes to the NATO’s second round of enlargement is another poten- more traditional Alliance issues. They appear divisive but tial cause for transatlantic strain. A decision on which, if should turn out to be perfectly manageable. The real prob- any, candidate countries to invite to join the Alliance is due lems lie beyond NATO’s agenda. On such wider security at the next NATO Summit in Prague in 2002 and few issues, no coordination exists between the United States European governments are pushing the issue. However, and its European Allies and there is a genuine risk that the they realise that simply postponing the decision is not an gap in transatlantic policy perceptions, which has opened option because of commitments made at the 1999 in recent years, will widen. Washington Summit. Enlargement is on the Alliance agen- da because all members have put it there, not just the Looking at the traditional security agenda, US plans for United States. a National Missile Defense (NMD), one of the new presi- dent’s priorities, have generated the most controversy to While no clear line is as yet emerging, the contours of date. Yet the issue is already waning, as European govern- the debate are becoming clearer. But Allied leaders can- ments realise that they can do little about Washington’s not wait until Prague to make up their minds. This is decision to proceed. Many Allies had opposed NMD out of because the Baltic republics will inevitably be on the concern about the Russian reaction. However, with Russian agenda, whether or not they are invited to join the President Vladimir Putin sending out signals of a possible Alliance in the next wave, as a result of Russia’s protests deal, combining drastic cuts in Russian and US offensive that their membership would pose an unacceptable strategic forces with an adjustment of the ABM Treaty, affront to its own security. The decision to include or Europeans are beginning to recognise that NMD may actu- exclude them from the next membership round should, ally offer new opportunities for strategic arms reductions. therefore, be communicated to Russia and to the Baltic They are becoming aware, as are the Russians, that the pro- republics well in advance of the Prague Summit and not liferation of ballistic missiles will one day be a real threat sprung on them at the last minute. If the Baltic republics to their own security. If the introduction of NMD is recon- are admitted, Russia needs to be reassured about the ciled with a formal regime of restraint and accompanied by absence of any hostile intent. If the Baltic republics are significant cuts in nuclear arsenals, the grounds for oppos- put on hold, they will need clear reassurances that this ing it disappear. Even active participation in an Alliance- will not weaken their existing, more indirect security wide system becomes an attractive, if distant, prospect. ties with the West. There is therefore not that much time to prepare the consensus needed within the Alliance, We are, of course, not there yet. Real negotiations with generate the necessary US domestic support, particular- Russia on amending the ABM Treaty need to take place ly in the Senate, and develop a common strategy to and suggestions for deep cuts in nuclear warheads are no implement the decision. more than tentative. But now, at least, there is an objective that Europeans can share. The NMD project, which still has Another potential candidate for transatlantic misgivings to prove its viability, need not necessarily divide the is the European Union’s intention to establish a rapid reac- Alliance as long as any decision on abandoning the ABM tion force by 2003. Already circumspect under the Clinton Treaty is delayed. administration, US support is likely to remain somewhat less than enthusiastic under the new leadership. The United Many NMD supporters in the United States wonder why States continues to see NATO as the central instrument of their European Allies attach such importance to a treaty, its European policy and does not want to see the organisa- which they regard as an anachronism from a time when the tion weakened by any separate European defence project. Soviet Union existed and limitations on missile defences Nevertheless, within weeks of coming to power the new seemed a key element for the transparency of nuclear deter- administration was picking up roughly where the previous rence between the super powers. Europeans readily concede one left off: no overwhelming welcome for the European that the world has changed, but feel that the rules of nuclear initiative but no obstruction either. The only caveat is that competition are no less important in the new security envi- whatever new European coordination structures are created ronment. Formally, the ABM Treaty may be a bilateral should remain anchored to NATO. agreement between Russia and the United States, but it shapes the calculations of existing and future nuclear pow- The reasons for the Bush administration’s relatively ers and offers a measure of predictability in international relaxed attitude are those that guided its predecessor. If the nuclear competition. Europeans would, therefore, not object European Allies strengthen their military effort, even under even to major revisions of the treaty, but would be deeply a European flag, this will serve the Alliance as a whole. troubled by its demise. The United States should take this Moreover, since the Europeans will continue to depend on concern seriously, and can well afford to do so. The long US assets for any serious operation for the foreseeable lead-time for any realistic NMD system means that there is future, the United States will retain a powerful veto. The no hurry to quit the treaty. Since the Russian government advantages clearly outweigh the risks. President Bush’s appears inclined to consider some revision, European wishes declared position is now to give European governments the could well be satisfied without hobbling US plans. chance to live up to their word.

Spring 2001 NATO review 13 THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK TODAY

Ironically, the real risk to transatlantic relations may be leaning towards tougher military action. It is difficult to see the failure of the Europeans to meet their self-imposed tar- how this gap could be bridged. get, rather than their success. The project will be judged not on the institutions it builds, but on the additional military While welcome, efforts to devise “smart sanctions”, punch it delivers. While new EU bodies dealing with secu- which would target the regime rather than the Iraqi people, rity matters have been set up remarkably rapidly, the goal of are unlikely to produce tangible results quickly. Other a credible autonomous military capability remains elusive. avenues will, therefore, have to be pursued. Here, the underlying European and US preferences are likely to No one expects miracles by 2003. But to be credible, the cause friction, with the United States potentially blaming European venture requires at least a measurable increase, the failure of military action on the lack of European sup- matched by necessary funds, in force intervention capabili- port, and the Europeans responding by blaming US unilat- ties. In their commitments to the future rapid reaction force, eralism for frustrating their political approach. EU countries have largely drawn on the existing pool of forces. They have yet to increase the number of operational China is another case in point. Here, the differences soldiers and devote real money to improving military between the two sides of the Atlantic are less pronounced, mobility. Unless they do so in the next two years, their cred- largely because Europeans do not have much of a China pol- ibility in the United States and in Europe will surely suffer icy, unless the pursuit of commercial interests and a general severely. The failure to meet targets, after all the promises wish not to isolate China qualifies as one. The United States, made in NATO and EU communiqués, could lead to major on the other hand, is one of the pillars of stability in Asia and transatlantic misgivings as well as to recriminations among its relationship with China affects the region as a whole. The European countries. The United States can afford to adopt a apparent toughening of the US approach to China under the wait-and-see attitude. The Europeans cannot. Bush administration could have wide repercussions. Europe might see it as another example of US If the Europeans do produce some- unilateralism, doubly resented because thing tangible by 2003, their success it highlights the absence of any real will add to the military options of the European strategy. West in general. European govern- Security for the West ments may then feel encouraged to go has become a wider Areas of potential transatlantic dis- further in pooling their military cord in traditional Alliance issues, such resources and policies and US appre- brief than that as missile defence, enlargement and hension about a NATO that is less US- addressed in existing European defence integration, appear to centric may then gain some ground. be on the road to resolution. Together But the challenge of adapting the Alliance structures with its European Allies, the Bush Alliance to changing times and cir- administration will handle them no less cumstances has to be met in any case. effectively than previous administra- Indeed, a greater European contribu- tions. However, Iraq and China under- tion to crisis management on the continent would only help line the fact that security for the West has become a much meet it more effectively. But these are matters that need not wider brief than that addressed in existing Alliance structures, be addressed in President Bush’s first term. as well as the desirability of closer policy and crisis coordina- tion between the United States and its European Allies While NATO’s current structures will thus prove, once beyond NATO’s geographic remit. Here, the United States again, capable of addressing and defusing any of the poten- has little practice of consulting Europe on its policies, and tially divisive Euro-Atlantic issues on the horizon, the same perhaps little inclination. But an increasingly confident is not true for security items outside NATO’s geographic European Union, which through its own enlargement process remit. Two examples, those of Iraq and China, may illus- is being drawn closer to crisis regions further afield, will trate the general problem. gradually develop a sense of its own responsibility for inter- national order. And achieving such order will largely depend On Iraq, frustration is common. Neither sanctions nor on the two major Western power units working together. no-fly zones have succeeded in forcing Baghdad to drop its rearmament plans or to readmit UN inspectors. The Clinton administration seemed instinctively willing Meanwhile, support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is to begin thinking of evolving the relationship with Europe rising in the Arab world in the wake of the breakdown of along those lines, even though it is far from clear how such the Middle East peace process, weakening the West’s influ- cooperation could be organised. The Bush administration ence in this petroleum-producing region. Neither the and its supporters in Congress have not revealed a similar United States nor the European Allies have an answer to the disposition and seem both unprepared and unwilling to problem. However, their instincts point in very different develop one. It is on these wider, global issues then, rather directions. Europeans prefer a “political solution” without than the familiar Alliance themes, that the European-US being able to formulate it. The new US administration is relationship will face its greatest challenge.

14 NATO review Spring 2001 Debate Is the fundamental nature of the transatlantic security relationship changing?

Yes: No: François Heisbourg Rob de Wijk is professor of is director of international relations at Geneva’s Centre for Leiden University, the Royal Security Policy. Military Academy and the Clingendael Institute.

Dear Rob and London isn’t in the business of to the “old” NATO, even if it is the undermining NATO. Yet, ESDP is an most visible and politically charged. Given NATO’s success in proving agent of radical change if the NATO will be challenged more its relevance and its worth vis-à-vis European Union’s institutional and broadly by major and inevitable the challenges of the post-Cold War material targets are met, because it changes in US force structure and era in Europe, it may be tempting to implies that the Atlantic Alliance will doctrine flowing from budgetary and draw the inference that the Atlantic become a two-pillar organisation, strategic considerations. European Alliance need only adapt at the mar- with a collective EU political and governments, which are constantly gin in the coming years. After all, it military persona. Such a vision reminded of the deficiencies in their has successfully passed the test of should not, in itself, pose a metaphys- defence spending by their US friends war and peace in the Balkans. Were it ical problem for NATO in general and or by European analysts, such as you so simple! NATO will have to under- the United States in particular. After and I, will now have to come to terms go a major transformation, if it is to all, this would be the belated realisa- with the consequences of US budget continue to ensure the strategic part- tion of President John F. Kennedy’s constraints. Not only has US defence nership between its North American vision of a two-pillar NATO formu- spending dropped below 3 per cent of and European members. The first and lated in 1962. The fact remains, how- GDP in the current fiscal year, for the most obvious reason for advancing ever, that this will be a traumatic first time since the creation of NATO, such a view, is the sudden and sub- development, since NATO has never but, more importantly in the coming stantial emergence of a European functioned on this basis. decade, the US military will be faced Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the block obsolescence of major in the framework of the European The other source of potential weapon systems acquired during the Union. From the standpoint of NATO, upheaval flows from US choices. Reagan era. The replacement of such this is a revolutionary development. It National Missile Defense (NMD) systems on the basis of a steady-state is true that ESDP emerged not least comes most readily to mind. But this US force structure and doctrine because the United Kingdom decided is not, in my view, the principal would imply an annual increase of in 1998 that this would be a good idea source of the United States’ challenge defence spending by some $50 bil-

Spring 2001 NATO review 15 FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG versus ROB DE WIJK

on scarce defence spending. The Second, NATO has taken on new ESDP is an agent of Clinton administration’s version of missions. The European revolution of radical change because it missile defence was assessed as cost- 1989, the and the wars of ing $60 billion over a five-year period, Yugoslav dissolution paved the way implies that the Atlantic i.e. substantially more than planned for the execution of peace-support Alliance will become a increases in defence spending. missions and crisis-response opera- tions outside the NATO area. two-pillar organisation ESDP, on the one hand, and US- Moreover, this new mission took on a driven change on the other may well further dimension when Partners FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG prove to be compatible. But, whatever were invited to contribute to multina- the case, these are deeply disruptive tional coalitions led by NATO, such lion. This is unlikely to happen, par- forces vis-à-vis the first 50 years of as SFOR and KFOR. The Planning ticularly in the context of massive tax NATO’s history. In a sense, it is now and Review Process seeks to har- reductions. Force structure and doc- that the organisational and doctrinal monise the defence planning of trine will have to change. The fact legacy of the Cold War is finally NATO member countries and that Andy Marshall, whose name is beginning to wear out. Partners with the aim of improving linked to the Revolution in Military interoperability for combined opera- Affairs, has been entrusted with a Yours, tions. policy review, is a portent of deep François changes. Third, NATO has already Dear François, embraced the idea of a European pil- At the strategic level, the forces of lar. In the 1991 Alliance Strategic change are no less radical. The most You have argued that NATO will Concept, NATO’s political strategy, it serious risks of really major military have to undergo a major transforma- was agreed that within NATO “a confrontations involving US interests tion because of the rapid progress European security identity” should be and partners are essentially in Asia, made in ESDP and US policy choic- developed. The 1994 NATO summit from the Middle East and the Gulf to es. I agree with most of your analysis, endorsed concepts of “separable but Taiwan and Korea. Now that former but do not share your conclusion. The not separate forces” and Combined Yugoslav President Slobodan “old” NATO you referred to no Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) that could Milosevic has fallen from power in longer exists for the following rea- be made available for European-led Serbia, the United States may find it sons. operations other than collective reasonable to do away with the defence. In Berlin in 1996, NATO approximate parity which exists First, NATO has already undergone foreign ministers decided to build a today between US forces stationed in an impressive transformation. Since European Security and Defence Europe and those committed to Asia, the Cold War, NATO has transformed Identity (ESDI). During their 1998 St by focusing on the latter. itself from an alliance for collective Malo meeting, French President defence and transatlantic consultation and UK Prime Budgetary pressures and strategic into an organisation with more Minister Tony Blair took the initiative realities will reduce the absolute and emphasis on defence cooperation and to set up a capability for autonomous relative level of the US military pres- cooperative security. In this way, European action, which led to the ence in Europe. Moreover, that pres- NATO has launched new initiatives European Union’s Helsinki Headline ence may also change in nature, if, as such as the North Atlantic Goal of creating a 60,000-strong a result of the Revolution in Military Cooperation Council, the predecessor rapid intervention force by 2003. Affairs, the United States concludes of today’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership During the 1999 Washington summit, that the traditional centrepieces of US Council, the Permanent Joint NATO- Alliance leaders adopted the neces- force structure (the divisions of the Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine sary arrangements to allow EU access US Army, the carrier task forces on dialogue and the Partnership for to NATO collective assets and capa- the US Navy, the wings of the US air Peace. And the Alliance has taken in bilities for crisis-response operations force) need to be replaced by some- new members. In numerous commu- where the Alliance as a whole is not thing different. In this context, missile niqués, NATO leaders have argued engaged militarily. Moreover, it is defence will act as an accelerator, by that cooperative security requires important to remember that the emphasising the shift away from the close cooperation with Partners as a United States fully supported these post-Second World War centrepieces prerequisite for a peaceful, stable and arrangements. In other words, NATO of US force structure and by drawing undivided Europe. reached consensus on ESDI and its

16 NATO review Spring 2001 FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG versus ROB DE WIJK role in the development of the tary operations. In this way, the shift embracing the reality rather than the European Union’s Common Foreign in US foreign policy and the technol- idea, things are far from straightfor- and Security Policy (CFSP), includ- ogy gap have caused Europeans to ward. ing the ESDP. fear the decoupling of US and European security and helped spur The primary variable in determin- I support your remarks on the CFSP and ESDP. ing NATO’s ability to move from a potential upheaval stemming from one to a two-pillar construct is US US policy choices. Missile defence In sum, the “old” NATO no longer policy. Of course, if, as you suggest, could create division within NATO. exists, there is consensus on the way the United States was going strongly Moreover, the United States will forward, including the development unilateral, then the prospects for a undoubtedly put more emphasis on of a European defence identity, and two-pillar NATO would indeed be defending its interests in central Asia, the potential source of upheaval is the poor. After all, Washington did not especially in the oil-rich Caspian Sea perception that the United States has greatly enjoy the constraints imposed basin. Indeed, the United States will embarked upon a policy of selective by the multilateral nature of NATO have to invest in expeditionary armed engagement that could lead to decou- during the Kosovo air campaign. The forces for this purpose. But moving pling of US and Europe’s security. “war within the war” between the away from expensive mechanised The real question, therefore, is how to NATO chain of command and that of units and platforms (aircraft and keep the United States fully involved the United States was illustrative of ships), which were highly relevant to ensure that NATO retains its rele- this. If a one-pillar NATO appears during the Cold War period, to smaller vance in the future. onerous to some in the United States, and more flexible units with sub- there would seem to be little chance stantial firepower and better mobility Yours, of a two-pillar Alliance, with a for power projection abroad could Rob European caucus, enjoying much also save money. I expect Andy support in Washington. Marshall to put forward new ideas in Dear Rob, this field. Nevertheless, I am opti- However, radical military change mistic about President Bush’s ability Your emphasis on NATO’s capabil- in the United States opens scope for a to convince Congress to increase the ity to adapt to new circumstances is new modus operandi between the budget should Marshall come up with one I share. However, there is a quali- United States and Europe in NATO. a new strategic vision. ty to these changes which is reminis- Washington will want to focus more cent of the sentence in Giuseppe on Asia – where the more serious mil- The greatest source of upheaval is Tomasi Di Lampedusa’s The itary risks and strategic states are – a different one. Until 1998, multilat- Leopard: “Everything has to change and it will reduce its forward-based eralism was a dominant feature of US so that nothing changes.” The chal- force structure for budget and RMA- foreign policy. The United States took lenges I am referring to will force the related reasons. Missile defence will initiatives to strengthen cooperative Alliance not simply to adapt, but to also act as an accelerator of these security in Europe and to create a sys- transform itself into a two-pillar deep changes in the US force struc- tem of complementary and mutually organisation, in deeds and not only in ture and doctrine, since defence reinforcing institutions. For various words. ESDI could hardly become budget increases will presumably be reasons, US foreign policy put less substantive as long as there was no siphoned off into this area. Given emphasis on the strengthening of European-wide policy to sustain it, these budgetary constraints and cooperative security in 1998. Instead, and the absence of such a policy was strategic shifts, Washington will have more emphasis was put on the promo- not NATO’s fault. Now that ESDP is reason to press for more, not less, tion of national interests. This has led becoming a reality, NATO Allies are ESDP. to a more selective involvement in the faced with the challenge of fulfilling rest of the world. Interventions in the pledges adopted at the 1999 1998 in Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington Summit to give the NMD and the Senate’s refusal to rati- European Union access to NATO col- The Americans have to fy the Comprehensive Test Ban lective assets and capabilities. As you feel at ease with the speed Treaty underscore this change in US well know, at least one prominent foreign policy. Moreover, NATO’s member country, Turkey, has not of the process leading Kosovo air campaign made clear the proven enthusiastic in this regard. towards ESDP extent of European dependency on NATO may have embraced the idea of the United States for large-scale mili- the EU pillar, but when it comes to ROB DE WIJK

Spring 2001 NATO review 17 FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG versus ROB DE WIJK

permanent EU Political and Security by different rules. From a theoretical Committee, an EU Military perspective, Javier Solana, the The time has now Committee and an EU military staff. European Union’s foreign policy come for the European The importance of these decisions High Representative, should be lead- can hardly be overstated. ing the ESDP. But as long as the Union to embark on a European Union pursues intergovern- strategy review The establishment of new perma- mental security and defence policies, nent politico-military structures in this is unlikely. If the Europeans mis- Brussels will lead to the creation of a manage this process, a two-pillar FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG new bureaucracy. Indeed, the NATO could emerge, consisting of a European Union’s military staff has political forum for transatlantic con- I may be too optimistic. Maybe the already grown to more than 130 per- sultation, with the much-praised inte- Bush administration will mark a uni- sons. This bureaucracy will inevitably grated military structure divided lateralist break with US strategic and develop policies, which, in turn, will between the North Americans and the military engagement on the interna- create a momentum of their own. In European Union. This is not the tional scene, and that would be truly other words, the establishment of new NATO I wish to see. On the one hand, bad news for NATO. But the compo- permanent EU structures, together I am in favour of keeping the integrated sition of the new administration secu- with the catalogue of forces for EU- military structure, so that unneces- rity and defence teams doesn’t point led operations agreed during last sary duplication can be avoided. On in that direction. year’s Commitment Conference in the other hand, I believe we should Brussels, has created a momentum make it more flexible, so that EU-led Yours, independent of US policies, with CJTFs with “separable but not sepa- François potentially far-reaching conse- rate forces” and using collective quences for transatlantic relations. NATO assets will be possible. For Dear François, this, the Americans, and of course the It is because of this that the United Turks, have to feel at ease with the You have correctly argued that Kingdom has become the key player. speed of the process leading towards when it comes to embracing reality Where always favours speed- ESDP. rather than the idea, things are far ing the process towards ESDP, Prime from straightforward. I also agree Minister Blair is hesitant because of Yours, that the United States is likely to put the potential consequences for Rob more emphasis on its security inter- transatlantic relations. This under- ests outside Europe. This shift would, scores my earlier remark that the real Dear Rob, indeed, require Washington to press challenge is how to keep the United for more, not less, ESDP. States fully involved, to ensure that Although ESDP is intergovern- NATO retains its relevance. As a first mental in nature, it faithfully follows I have argued that the acceleration step, the EU member states should the “Jean Monnet” method of of both CFSP and ESDP was, among agree a strategic concept, spelling out : first one estab- other things, caused by European member states’ common interests, lishes a solidarité de fait – the new fears that shifts in US foreign policy where they may be at risk and how defence and security institutions and and the technology gap would lead to they can be protected. This should the headline force – and then, but a decoupling of European and US serve as a basis for defence and oper- only then, does one approach the security. The further development of ational planning. issue of what it is for, the finalité ESDP, however, no longer depends on strategique as it were. The time has US strategic choices. The reason is This brings me to the issue of lead- now come for the European Union – the process started in St Malo in ership. Probably the greatest obstacle perhaps under the incoming Belgian 1998. The St Malo declaration has to developing and deploying an presidency – to embark on a strategy complemented the debate on institu- autonomous European capability is review. This is crucial not only for the tional matters with decisions on capa- the absence of a clear leader. sake of ESDP per se but also for the bilities. Since St Malo, several crucial Leadership is a prerequisite both for transatlantic relationship. Both the steps have been taken to adapt effective defence and operational European Union and the United Alliance structures to the new ESDI. planning. So far, the major players – States will have to make up their col- During the 1999 Cologne European France, Germany and the United lective minds as to whether they wish Council, it was decided to establish a Kingdom – are all playing the game to emphasise division of labour –

18 NATO review Spring 2001 FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG versus ROB DE WIJK

“The Europeans do Europe, the point. The prosperity of EU member orientation, such as your country, United States does the world” – or to states depends on a stable and secure France, favour developing military underscore the sharing of risks inside global environment, which may be capabilities to take on these tasks and outside the NATO area. I would threatened by events in Asia or throughout the entire conflict spec- clearly prefer the latter, but there is no Africa. As a result, the European trum. firm consensus on such a view as yet Union has no choice but to play an in either the United States or in the active role in world affairs with the Things are changing, however. The European Union. aim of defending its interests and Dutch government is becoming more strengthening the international rule of sympathetic to the idea of strengthen- Then there is the existential prob- law. A strategic concept should there- ing European defence. In my view, lem of leadership in the European fore define the European Union’s people like you and me should try to Union. NATO has operated on a one- place in the global power distribution. convince politicians that a European pillar basis, with the United States If the European Union muddles on Union with global interests requires a being more than a primus inter pares. without a sense of direction, its influ- maximalist interpretation of the This model is obviously not appropri- ence will likely decline and a power Petersberg tasks. We should make ate to the European Union, in which vacuum could emerge. clear that this will not undermine, but no single member can consistently will strengthen NATO. Therefore, we bear alone the burden of leadership. I am not in favour of a division of should emphasise that unnecessary ESDP’s new institutions, which labour, where “Europe does Europe duplication should be avoided. A two- resemble NATO’s institutions, cannot and the United States does the rest of pillar NATO, with two bureaucracies work like NATO’s. As a result, the world.” We, Europeans, need dealing with similar tasks and ulti- ESDP’s capability to function effec- power-projection capabilities to mately two integrated military struc- tively as a second pillar of NATO will defend our interests. These capabili- tures, would be regrettable. depend on the European Union’s ties should also be used to project sta- institutional, and possibly constitu- bility, that is to carry out peace-sup- I share your view that it is reassur- tional, review which is slated for port operations. As a first step, ing to see that NATO and the 2004, at a time when neither France, European members of NATO should European Union are learning to oper- Germany nor the United Kingdom implement NATO’s Defence ate in a synergistic fashion in the for- face the pressure of imminent general Capabilities Initiative, preferably mer Yugoslav Republic of elections. through joint European ventures. Macedonia.* This is a critical test Only through close cooperation will case. If NATO and the European In the meantime, it is reassuring to we be able to generate greater output Union fail to manage it properly, the see that NATO and the European for our money. potential for escalation is enormous. Union are actually learning to operate If they handle the situation skillfully, together in a synergistic fashion in the A strategic concept would help us it will again demonstrate that NATO face of the extraordinarily complex define the so-called “Petersberg and the European Union are indispen- situation in the former Yugoslav tasks”, which are incorporated in the sable for peace and stability in Republic of Macedonia.* This devel- Treaties on European Union: human- Europe and can work together effec- opment gives some hope that a two- itarian and rescue tasks, peacekeep- tively. pillar model can be achieved over ing tasks and tasks of combat forces time. in crisis management, including Yours, peace-making. Within the European Rob Yours, Union there are still divergent politi- François cal views. On the one hand, EU mem- bers with strong transatlantic lean- Dear François, ings, such as my own country, the Netherlands, traditionally favour a The European I was happy to read that you favour limited interpretation of the Union has no choice a strategic concept for the European Petersberg tasks. To ensure US partic- Union. I, too, believe that we do not ipation in more demanding crises, but to play an active need a division of labour between the they wish to take on only small-scale role in world affairs Europeans and the Americans. What operations at the lower end of the we need is a strategic concept which conflict spectrum. On the other hand, takes collective interests as a starting EU members with a strong European ROB DE WIJK

Spring 2001 NATO review 19 FEATURES

“Special authorisations were issued to permit interns to attend FRESH FACES AT NATO meetings relevant to their daily work. Moreover, as a result of ongoing efforts towards the har- ew faces have appeared in appointments, which is based on monisation of classification NATO’s Brussels headquar- prospective interns’ qualifications between NATO and PfP docu- Nters in recent years as and a fair geographic distribution ments, interns already have access Partner nationals have seized of posts. To provide interns with to a wide range of newly declassi- opportunities to witness Alliance the most valuable experience and fied information.” decision-making and operations for ensure regular rotation of posts, themselves. Since 1999, more than internships are offered for a period In addition to hands-on training, 20 young civil servants from from a few months up to one year. interns are given the opportunity to Partner countries have benefited make a personal contribution to from a Partnership for Peace (PfP) The terms under which Partner Alliance operations. In agreement internship programme enabling nationals work at NATO is gov- with their parent division, Partner them to work at the very heart of the erned by a special policy, which civil servants are able to take on Alliance. seeks to marry the intern’s need for individual projects, from the pro- information with NATO’s security duction of NATO publications to The programme, which was regulations. Although many provi- the preparation of in-depth analyses unveiled at a meeting of the Euro- sions were drawn from existing and case studies on PfP-related sub- Atlantic Partnership Council in jects. November 1998, has proved increasingly popular since the first According to Marie Holmberg, a

Partner interns arrived at NATO © Holmberg Swedish intern who studied Partner headquarters immediately after the country involvement in NATO land Alliance’s 1999 Washington Sum- armaments and safety-related activ- mit. ities for the Defence Support divi- sion, “These individual projects Eight positions on NATO’s demonstrate the unique possibilities International Staff have been creat- offered by the PfP Internship ed for the programme in divisions Programme.” involved in PfP-related activities, two each in Defence Planning and Experiencing cross-cultural Operations, Defence Support, Civil cooperation and acquiring an in- Emergency Planning and Political depth understanding of the way in Affairs. which NATO operates help dispell myths about the Alliance. Ms Costs of the internship pro- Ms Holmberg: unique possibility Holmberg said that she now views gramme are the responsibility of the Alliance in terms of “the nine- Partner countries. However, in order arrangements for interns from teen nations behind it” and appreci- to ensure that individuals from all NATO member states, Partner ates “the value of consensus in deci- Partner countries have an equal nationals do not have access to sion-making”. opportunity to benefit from the pro- classified information or even gramme, some NATO members parts of NATO headquarters. As a With a maximum of eight have sponsored selected interns. A result, “non-escorted visitor” pass- Partner interns at any time, the PfP Ukrainian intern, who is just about es were issued to Partner interns to internship programme is modest in to join, will, for example, be sup- enable them to move between their comparison with similar pro- ported financially by the United offices, located outside NATO’s grammes in the military field. Kingdom. secure areas, and their parent divi- Nevertheless, the initiative has sion. In addition, special arrange- proved popular both among staff at All PfP-designated posts are ments have been put in place to NATO headquarters and Partner open to nationals of all Partner give Partner interns sufficient participants, with the result that it countries, but prospective interns access to restricted information to may be expanded. “The idea has are expected to have a good knowl- carry out their duties. been warmly welcomed, although edge of one of the two NATO further consideration is required working languages. Moreover, par- Eric de Labarthe, PfP internship for such an endeavour to be imple- ent divisions have the final say in programme coordinator, explained: mented”, Mr De Labarthe said.

20 NATO review Spring 2001 FEATURES

and prioritising reconstruction proj- ects, like that in Duge, in cooperation CIMIC with local authorities and the 120 or so non-governmental organisations RECONSTRUCTION operating in Kosovo. These projects, which cover all aspects of recon- struction, from repairing infrastruc- uge is a remote village in ture to regenerating the economy, Kosovo’s moun- have now been allocated EU funding. Dtains lying near the cross- © NATO The Kosovo Development Group’s roads between the towns of Urosevac original staff left the province at the and . It has a population of end of January as their tour of duty about 200, is largely cut off from the came to an end. Their successors will rest of the province in winter and, in be overseeing projects until July of common with much of Kosovo, suf- this year, by which time EU civilian fered large-scale destruction during structures should be ready to take fighting in 1998 and 1999. Today, over the task. life is beginning to return to normal, Since NATO-led peacekeepers in large part because of the efforts of arrived in the Balkans in December a KFOR civil-military cooperation 1995, the range of activities which (CIMIC) team. the military has become involved War damage to the main road out with has steadily expanded. of Duge meant that villagers found it Although the demands on soldiers extremely difficult to get in and out, and the skills they require have had no immediate access to health increased, CIMIC experience of care, and were unable to take their reconstruction has proved extremely children to school. Repairing the General Ortuño: long-term perspective positive, helping improve relations three-kilometre stretch of road link- both with the local population and ing Duge with the outside world was other international agencies working critical for the revitalisation of vil- and local authorities, but it has also in the field. lage life and one of some 1,000 helped build mutual understanding Based on experience in both reconstruction projects identified by between them and the military. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, a CIMIC team last year. Following a field assessment in SHAPE has prepared a policy docu- CIMIC is the process of coopera- March 2000, which identified that ment, laying down broad guidelines tion and coordination between a the international community lacked a for CIMIC, defining the concept and NATO commander and the civilian Kosovo-wide capacity to assess setting out operating principles. Most populations and civilian organisa- reconstruction needs, planners at importantly, it establishes the checks tions within his theatre of operations. Supreme Headquarters Allies Powers and balances to ensure that involve- The process involves the establish- Europe (SHAPE) set up the Kosovo ment in civilian tasks occurs only ment of liaison mechanisms and the Development Group. This was when there is no alternative. This coordination of the needs of the mili- detached under the authority of the document has already been agreed by tary and civilian organisations. It can European Union’s Kosovo recon- NATO member states and should also lead, under exceptional circum- struction department. Belgium, soon be endorsed by the North stances, to military involvement in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Atlantic Council. tasks that would normally fall under Greece, Italy, and Spain volunteered In an effort to improve field coor- a civilian mandate. a staff of 18 trained officers, who dination, SHAPE has also developed CIMIC’s involvement in recon- have worked in teams of three in the working relations with the key struction was key to the strategy of province’s five sectors as well as in CIMIC-oriented international organ- KFOR’s second commander, Spanish Pristina. Costs have been shared isations and NGOs, such as the General Juan Ortuño, who aimed to among the parties involved with par- European Union, the International “provide a long-term economic per- ticipating nations covering salaries, Committee of the Red Cross and UN spective to the province” and to KFOR providing lodging and work- agencies. Moreover, another, more endow it with “a mechanism to facil- space and the European Union ensur- comprehensive CIMIC doctrine doc- itate the flow of international donor ing transport, as well as stationery ument has been drafted, setting out in funding to regional and municipal and supplementary expenses. detail how CIMIC should operate in levels”. Moreover, not only has this Starting in July 2000, Kosovo theatre. This paper is currently being approach been welcomed by civilian Development Group teams travelled circulated for agreement among organisations, international agencies throughout the province, identifying member states.

Spring 2001 NATO review 21 Andras Simonyi: Hungarian herald As Hungary’s ambassador to NATO from 1995 and his country’s first permanent representative to the Alliance from 1999, Andras Simonyi played a key role first in steering Hungary to NATO membership and then in overseeing the transition. Ambassador Simonyi, now 49, left Brussels in January after nine years to start a new career as a consultant, working to attract international investment to central and eastern Europe.

NATO review: What impact has dom of NATO expansion because Hungarian membership of NATO our presence did not make the deci- © NATO had on Hungary and how has the sion-making process more diffi- Hungarian public responded? cult. Here, it’s important to pay tribute to the Hungarian public AS: The idea of Euro-Atlantic inte- because Hungary was actually the gration has had a huge impact on only member state whose popula- my country. Hungary inherited tion could see the impact of the air structures from communist times campaign directly. Indeed, those and a sick economy that had to be living on the Hungarian-Yugoslav reformed. Ultimately, the best way border could see and hear the to reform is to aim at integration bombings and often had relatives into the two main institutions that on the other side of the border. stand for modernisation, namely Despite this, support for the cam- NATO and the European Union. paign never fell below 50 per cent. Preparing for NATO membership The Hungarian public had a good has therefore been of enormous understanding of what NATO help for us, since it has maintained stands for and why we launched the maximum pressure on Hungarian campaign. institutions, on Hungarian society and on Hungarian politicians to NR: At the time Hungary joined the ensure that they execute the neces- Alliance, analysts opposed to sary reforms so that Hungary can NATO enlargement expressed vari- catch up and join the most modern, democratic nations of ous fears, including the impact it might have on relations the world, many of which are NATO members. with Russia, whether the North Atlantic Council would still Membership has not come without a price tag. It has be able to operate effectively, and whether Hungary and demanded many sacrifices both in human and in monetary other new members were militarily ready to join the terms. But in the end, Hungary has gained stability and Alliance. How have these fears panned out in practice? Hungary has gained a great deal of influence in forming Euro-Atlantic policies. Hungary now has a place at the AS: Some fears were totally unfounded and some stemmed North Atlantic Council where the most important decisions from worries about whether an enlarged Alliance of 19 on European security are made. would be able to be as strong and effective as it was at 16. The Kosovo campaign demonstrated that it is perfectly pos- NR: How did Hungary and the Hungarian public respond to sible to take extremely difficult decisions at 19 because, the Kosovo air campaign? despite Czech, Hungarian and Polish membership, the sol- idarity, efficiency and cohesion of the Alliance was not AS: After just over a week of joyful celebrations marking diminished, but enhanced. My message is that the ability to Hungarian membership of the Alliance on 12 March 1999, take decisions does not depend on the number of countries the NATO air campaign came as a huge shock. But what is sitting around the Council table, but on their attitude and important is that Hungary stood the test. Indeed, the way in whether they understand that, in the end, they have to pull which Hungary, and for that matter the other new members, in the same direction. As a result, I’m not worried about performed during the air campaign demonstrated the wis- future Alliance enlargement and would want to see as many

22 NATO review Spring 2001 INTERVIEW new members come in as possible, with the proviso that NR: How is Hungary ensuring that its armed forces are they understand the importance of maintaining the effi- equipped to meet the challenges of the 21st century? ciency, cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance. Concerning Russia, the Hungarian position has always been that NATO AS: We’re downsizing. We’re reorganising. We’re putting enlargement has nothing to do with fear of Russia. Rather, the pyramid back on its feet, meaning that we want to have NATO is enlarging because we want to extend the zone of an army of fighting men, which is not over-burdened by an stability and security towards the East. Indeed, we think it excessive number of officers and generals. Our military is in the interests of Russia that it sees more stable coun- will also need better equipment, which, whether we like it tries emerging on its western borders. The past couple of or not, we will have to procure. But reform is not only years have proved that the zone of stability has in effect about money. Ultimately, it’s about political leadership. It grown and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are takes political will, devotion, and clarity of leadership from much more stable, their economies are growing much the government to achieve successful military reform. You faster, and even those countries that are not yet members of can put huge sums of money into military reform, but, in the Alliance but are bordering the new members have ben- the absence of a good concept, political will and political efited from a sense of security and stability. leadership, the process is always going to fail.

NR: Have any problems proved more difficult to overcome NR: Based on Hungary’s experience, what lessons for future than anticipated? NATO enlargement can be drawn both for the Alliance and for other aspiring members? What preconditions should AS: As NATO enlarges, it must stay strong with proper NATO set and what steps should aspirants already be taking? capabilities. I have never been satisfied with the pace of military reform. This is an ongoing process, which will AS: The criteria for the three first new members were very probably never be completed, but is critical to meeting the clear. They were first, political democracy and stability; security challenges of the modern world. I regret that we second, economic reform and the establishment of a full- did not have the tools at our disposal during the preparatory fledged market economy; third, full respect for human process, which are now available for aspiring Alliance rights and good neighbourly relations; and fourth, military members and the deep engagement, which Partners now reform and civilian control over the armed forces. These have with NATO. I also wish that we had benefited from are the four crucial criteria that we have to stick to, what- the deep sharing of information, which is now routinely ever the country, because it’s important that, as NATO available to candidate countries, because that might have enlarges, the Alliance develops into a community of like- eased the preparatory process. But the bottom line is that minded nations. When it comes to ranking these criteria, we will have to continue to reform because Hungary needs the most important criterion should always be that in which smaller, more effective, more mobile and more commu- a country is weakest. My message to nations which wish to nicative armed forces, which are better able to serve both become members of the Alliance, therefore, is that they Hungarian and NATO interests. have to understand that entry criteria will be very tough, but that they are not on their own when it comes to meeting NR: Are there any lessons to be learned from the timing them. Partnership for Peace, the Membership Action Plan and way in which Hungary joined the Alliance? and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council offer so much more than was available to us during our preparatory AS: The most important lesson we learned is that military process five years ago. In addition, Hungary is ready to reform should be fast and effective. Doing it slowly will share its experiences, both positive and negative, with any not ease the pain, but will exacerbate it and make it last nation in order to help it meet the criteria. longer. It is important to concentrate efforts on priorities, which have to be identified at an early stage and restricted NR: After the best part of a decade at NATO HQ, what last- to a handful, which are then executed. The most important ing impressions do you take with you? part of military reform is downsizing, and then restructur- ing, and here it’s critical to concentrate on the human ele- AS: NATO is about many things, but, above all, it’s about ment. Human resource management is the key to success- maintaining the transatlantic relationship. The Alliance is ful military reform. All the money in the world can be the key tool keeping the two sides of the Atlantic together, poured into an outdated system and the effect will be total- but promoting this link is not only a task for governments, ly invisible. The way to reform militaries is to restructure, but also for individuals. As a private citizen, I intend to reorganise and prepare your manpower to be receptive to make the greatest possible use of the experience I have the process, before putting money in. We have had to learn gained at NATO, to promote the concept of North Atlantic the hard way that military reform should not be carried out cooperation and educate the public on the importance of because NATO demands it, but because it’s part and parcel the transatlantic relationship. When I left this Alliance a of the democratic reform process, in which the public couple of months ago, I said in my farewell speech to the scrutinises government expenditure and makes the coun- North Atlantic Council that this is a great Alliance, which try more efficient. must be kept strong.

Spring 2001 NATO review 23 Great expectations Andrei Zagorski examines the thaw in NATO-Russia relations and the reasons for both optimism and caution. © NATO

Partners in peacekeeping: NATO-Russia cooperation in the Balkans has been a particularly positive experience

ince the resumption of dialogue in May last year, rela- prospects for the NATO-Russia dialogue may be influ- tions between NATO and Russia have steadily enced by external developments. As a result, there may Simproved. Solid progress and an expanding pro- only be a narrow window of opportunity to reconcile the gramme of cooperation activities were evident at the meet- interests of Moscow and Brussels and build a vigorous dia- ings of the Permanent Joint Council at NATO headquarters logue on security issues. in December 2000, which brought together Allied defence and foreign ministers with their Russian counterparts, Having agreed a comprehensive work programme at the Marshal Igor Sergeyev and Igor Ivanov. But recent ministerial meeting of the Permanent Joint Council in improvements mask underlying differences between the Florence in May 2000, NATO-Russia relations underwent a Allies and Russia in their perceptions of the evolution of lengthy process of rehabilitation, which was largely com- Europe’s security architecture and of the nature of the pleted by the beginning of 2001. The work agenda has NATO-Russia partnership. Moreover, since Russia’s rela- expanded to embrace a wide range of issues of mutual tionship with the West is played out in many arenas, the interest including ongoing cooperation in and consultation on peacekeeping in the Balkans, discussions of strategy Andrei Zagorski is director of the EastWest Institute’s and doctrine, and cooperation in arms control, prolifera- Networking Early Warning Systems Project in Prague and a tion, military infrastructure, nuclear issues and theatre mis- widely published writer on Russia and security issues. sile defences, as well as the retraining of discharged mili- tary personnel and search and rescue at sea.

24 NATO review Spring 2001 OPINION

The practical experience of Russian and NATO soldiers anism for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum working together in the NATO-led peacekeeping opera- extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and tions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo has joint action with respect to security issues of common con- been particularly positive. Moreover, Russian officers have cern”. The declared “shared objective of NATO and played an increasingly constructive role in the planning of Russia” was “to identify and pursue as many opportunities joint operations at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers for joint action as possible”. Unfortunately, the envisaged Europe. The opening of the NATO Information Office in joint decision-making process has failed to materialise. Moscow in February 2001, after a year of tough negotia- Dialogue has remained at the level of regular consultations tions, is another visible sign of improving relations. and lost much of its initial purpose, after the launch of the Kosovo air campaign. Unwilling to share responsibility for Although Moscow generally seeks to avoid overtones in an action it could not endorse yet was unable to prevent, public statements, the spirit has changed notably in recent Moscow found it better simply to withdraw. months. Foreign Minister Ivanov, known for his reticence, has publicly acknowledged that successes at the practical level Things have clearly changed for the better since then. are beginning to spin off in other areas and are improving the The increased involvement of Russian officers in joint NATO-Russia relationship in general. Even Marshall operations planning has improved significantly in recent Sergeyev has sounded more optimistic recently, praising, in months and there is greater consultation before NATO particular, closer cooperation in the planning of joint opera- decisions are taken. Moscow has no power of veto, but its tions. That said, he has also cautioned that the relationship has positions and concerns are given a fair hearing. However, not yet been fully restored and that the page has yet to be while this mode of cooperation is working at the moment, turned on the sorry chapter in relations between Moscow and it is not clear whether it would still work if more controver- Brussels characterised by NATO’s Kosovo air campaign. sial issues were at stake, as in March 1999.

There are reasons for both optimism and caution. The Lord Robertson’s first trip to Moscow as NATO Secretary 2001 Permanent Joint Council work programme is almost General in February 2000 was aimed at re-energising the as broad as the one that existed at the end of 1998, during NATO-Russia relationship. He and Russian President what appears to have been the honeymoon period in Vladimir Putin agreed that NATO and Russia should pursue NATO-Russia relations. This, however, does not substanti- a “vigorous dialogue on a wide range of security issues....to ate expectations of the beginning of true partnership, but address the challenges that lie ahead and to make their mutu- seems rather to identify items on the agenda of a forthcom- al cooperation a cornerstone of European security”. However, ing bargaining process. A tough road lies ahead. Fixing the two sides continue to pursue notably different concepts of even simple things takes months and years. The protracted European security, which have become more divergent since negotiations that eventually led to the opening of the NATO the Kosovo crisis. Similarly, while the joint statement Information Office and those still ongoing to establish a released at the ministerial meeting of the Permanent Joint NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow reflect unre- Council in December 2000 welcomes progress achieved and solved differences between both sides in their perceptions reaffirms the “commitment to build, within the framework of of how European security should be organised. Such dif- the Permanent Joint Council, a strong, stable and equal part- ferences have not been reconciled in the rapprochement nership”, Brussels and Moscow still have different under- since the Kosovo crisis. Indeed, they predate the crisis. This standings as to the ends of such a partnership. begs the question whether NATO and Russia have actually achieved enough in terms of confidence-building, which NATO member countries see the Alliance as the centre- has been the centrepiece of activities over the past months, piece and as the single most effective military arm of any to lay the foundations for a true partnership. European security system. They remain open to improving cooperation with Russia and with other Partner countries in When the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in ways which strengthen NATO’s unique role in cooperative 1997 and the Permanent Joint Council was created, the security. In this context, the Permanent Joint Council is Russian élite saw it as a damage-limitation exercise in the regarded, in the words of Lord Robertson, as “one of the context of the first wave of the Alliance’s eastward enlarge- most important new institutional arrangements that have ment. In the first instance, Moscow sought to prevent the emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War”. eventual deployment of nuclear weapons, the extension of the Alliance’s military infrastructure and the stationing of Moscow, on the other hand, would like to see the devel- NATO troops in the new central European member states. opment of a pan-European security architecture within For their part, NATO member countries tended to regard which each country could feel equally secure and has con- the Founding Act as part of a deal to make NATO enlarge- sistently sought to boost the role of the Organisation for ment more palatable to Russia. Security and Cooperation in Europe. The new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, signed by President Putin on 28 Yet, the Founding Act itself was more ambitious. The June 2000, emphasises the need to improve and deepen Permanent Joint Council was supposed to “provide a mech- cooperation with the Alliance and recognises the important

Spring 2001 NATO review 25 OPINION

role NATO plays in European security. But it is also unusu- However, as recent history has revealed, the up-and- ally explicit about the problems Moscow has with NATO: down cycles in NATO-Russia relations may prove to be “The current political and military postures of NATO do short and could easily fall victim to worsening mutual rela- not coincide with the security interests of the Russian tions resulting from developments in areas outside the Federation, and sometimes even run contrary to them.” Permanent Joint Council framework. Practical cooperation This basically refers to the provisions of NATO’s 1999 through joint ventures may not have sufficient time to Strategic Concept, which do not exclude coercive “out-of- mature and yield spin-off effects. A brief look at Russia’s area” operations with no explicit mandate from the UN principal concerns helps understand how difficult it may be Security Council, and to the possibility of a second wave of to reconcile the interests of Moscow and Brussels. NATO enlargement, particularly if parts of the former Soviet Union are included. The fundamental concern, which was brought into sharp focus as a result of the Kosovo crisis, is the shape of the Russia, therefore, does not want to see the Alliance as the future world order and Russia’s position within it. With centre of the European security dialogue, but as one of sev- NATO seemingly challenging the authority of the UN eral partners for such dialogue. The Permanent Joint Council Security Council, in which Russia enjoys the status of a provides a forum where Russian positions on security issues permanent member and a veto, and with it proving difficult can be voiced, but it does not give Moscow the power directly to develop the Organisation for Security and Cooperation to influence events. For this reason, Foreign Minister in Europe into an effective regional collective security Ivanov, even while praising recent progress in cooperation, organisation, Moscow faces a difficult choice. Either give has described the role of dialogue through the Permanent in to closer cooperation with NATO, or risk the further ero- Joint Council as limited to “an important channel for sion of Russia’s status as a great power, albeit one inherited exchange of information and for the from the previous bi-polar world and exploration of certain issue areas”. no longer backed up by real capabili- ties, apart from its nuclear arsenal. These different perspectives lead Upcoming decisions on NATO Russia and the Alliance to pursue dif- Different perspectives enlargement and on National Missile ferent agendas for the NATO-Russia Defense (NMD) are likely to produce dialogue. During the past year, lead Russia and the disturbances in Russia’s relationship Moscow has pushed for the exchange Alliance to pursue with both NATO and the United States of views on issues such as military doc- because they will be seen as further trines, military infrastructure develop- different agendas for challenges to Russia’s status in the ment and theatre missile defence, and the NATO-Russia world order. for cooperation in science and technol- ogy. For its part, the Alliance has dialogue With regard to enlargement, emphasised the importance of practical Russian officials repeatedly confirm cooperation in areas such as military Moscow’s opposition, particularly to reform and has sought to motivate possible NATO membership for the Russia to take a more active part in Partnership for Peace Baltic states. Military considerations are probably of less activities. These different agendas are not irreconcilable. The concern than the fact that a future NATO with an almost 2001 Permanent Joint Council work programme covers all Europe-wide membership and links that stretch into the these areas, as well as a number of others. However, unless Caucasus and Central Asia through the Partnership for underlying differences are reconciled, it will be more diffi- Peace would undermine the chances for developing an cult and less likely to achieve substantial progress on any of increased pan-European security role for any other institu- the more controversial issues. tion. Moscow would be left with little alternative to closer cooperation with NATO. In the meantime, progress can be achieved in less con- troversial areas. In addition to the successful cooperation On missile defence, Russia is concerned that its status that has developed between KFOR and SFOR troops on the as a global nuclear power would be threatened should the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia (the rationale of which is United States be unwilling or unable to find a compro- nevertheless questioned in Russia each time things appear mise on the modalities of its NMD project and on the to go wrong in the Balkans), other success stories can be future of the ABM Treaty. Such concerns are magnified identified in areas such as search and rescue at sea and the by Moscow’s expectation that US foreign policy under the retraining of discharged officers. The importance of even Bush administration will become increasingly unilateral. modest practical collaboration or the significance of open- This, Moscow fears, could undermine the role of the ing a NATO Information Office or seeking to establish a and also impact on US cooperation with NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow should not, Russia, which might in turn limit Russia’s possibilities for however, be underestimated. Real partnership, if ever pos- bargaining within the framework of the NATO-Russia sible, can only grow out of such projects. dialogue.

26 NATO review Spring 2001 OPINION

So far, Moscow seems to be adopting a more unilateral The key decisions on enlargement and on NMD, which policy approach and expressing a determination to main- could potentially have a major impact on the NATO-Russia tain its freedom of choice and action. At the same time, relationship, are likely to be taken sooner rather than later. Russia is showing its readiness to pursue ad hoc coopera- This leaves little time for the development of the “vigorous tion with both NATO and the United States in areas where dialogue” agreed between President Putin and Lord there is no conflict of interest, while repeatedly stressing Robertson. Both sides have a long tradition of tough bargain- the supremacy of the United Nations and the rule of inter- ing with each other. If no results are achieved in the near national law. Should Russia prove unable actively to future and no progress is made in reconciling fundamental oppose developments that it believes would undermine its differences, the dialogue between Moscow and Brussels risks great power status, it is likely to fall back to a more absen- stagnation and the future direction of NATO-Russia relations tee stand in international politics. could be held hostage to external developments.

NATO Information Office NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson The agreement to open such an office was reached inaugurated a NATO Information Office in central at the December 2000 ministerial meeting of the Moscow on 20 February. Permanent Joint Council, after a year of tough negotiations, and was followed by an exchange of The office will provide Russians with information letters between Lord Robertson and Russian about the Alliance and its missions and reinforce coop- Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. eration between NATO and Russia. It will be staffed by two senior NATO employees with local support. “More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, at the start of the 21st century, NATO-Russia Its opening is a reflection of the improvement in relations must evolve into a true strategic partner- relations between NATO and Russia since the 1999 ship,” Lord Robertson said at the inauguration Kosovo air campaign. ceremony. © NATO

Ceremonial opening: Lord Robertson unveils a plaque commemorating the inauguration of NATO’s Moscow Information Office

Spring 2001 NATO review 27 Understanding NATO Michael Rühle reviews some of the best and the worst recent literature on the Alliance.

onographs on the post-Cold War Atlantic not knowing exactly what NATO’s Combined Joint Task Alliance are a challenging task. They attempt to Forces Concept (CJTF) is. Yet, to mistake CJTF for the Mpin down a moving target. However, compared to (worldwide) US Military Assistance Program requires a edited volumes, which often are just hastily assembled con- special effort in getting things wrong. The same holds true ference papers of uneven length and quality, monographs for turning the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council into should at least offer consistency and clarity of argument. the “NATO Russia Forum”, or for his claim that the Soviets With only one author in charge, the problem of too many were hiding SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles in cooks should not arise. East Germany. His discussion of NATO’s Balkan engage- ment does not fare better: Ibrahim , a symbol of But what if the cook has no recipe? Such is the case with Kosovo’s peaceful road to independence if ever there was the monograph by Peter Duignan, a scholar at the Hoover one, would surely be surprised to learn that he was in Institution in Stanford, California. His NATO: Its Past, favour of Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia. Present, and Future (Hoover Institution Press, 2000) brings to mind the immortal words of Ambrose Bierce: In getting all his facts wrong, Duignan shows at least “The covers of this book are too far apart.” Indeed, the cov- some consistency. In his political judgements, however, not ers of Duignan’s 150-page book are too far apart by about even a modicum of consistency remains. While Duignan 150 pages. Already as early as page 9, we learn that takes NATO enlargement critics to task and argues that NATO’s famous Lisbon force goals of 1952 were apparent- enlargement was the right thing to do, he changes his mind ly agreed in Boston. We learn that: “The NATO powers later in the book, warning the reader that “diluting” NATO agreed on enlargement in 1998” (page 61), apparently one with more members might jeopardise its decision-making year after the 1997 Madrid Summit. The 1945 “Yalta sell- process (page 115). In a similar vein, he argues that Lord out” has been moved to 1946 (page 71). A map on page 78 Ismay’s famous characterisation of NATO as an instrument dates NATO’s creation three years ahead of its time, to to “keep the Germans down” was still applicable today, yet 1946, and we also learn that Slovenia, Romania and Austria as the book proceeds, he again changes his mind, arguing are likely to be the next members in an alleged “2003 that “leadership of NATO ... should pass from the tranche” (pages 115 and 118). Americans to the Europeans early in the twenty-first century” and that “Germany is a logical choice to take over In discussing NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation from the United States” (page 119). Duignan displays appallingly poor knowledge. For exam- ple, based on sources from 1990 (!) he opines that the WEU This intellectual rollercoaster is further aggravated by will have an expanded role to play in European security — the absence of a structure (for example, the Committee on blissfully unaware that the WEU has, to all intents and pur- the Challenges of Modern Society is discussed under the poses, been dismantled. He also seems to believe that ESDI heading of NATO enlargement). Instead, the narrative flip- is an institution rather than a policy. And so he offers some flops between the past and the present, between facts cob- sweeping policy advice: “The WEU, therefore, should be bled together from the NATO Handbook and personal mus- encouraged to take on more of NATO’s responsibilities and ings, all of it carrying the ring of someone who doesn’t to work with the ESDI for a Europe-wide defense system really know what he wants to say. Indeed, “say” is the backed up by NATO. Let the WEU, the Anglo-French appropriate word here, because much of the book reads like “Euro force”, OSCE, and ESDI handle most of the peace- it was spoken straight into a dictaphone. keeping and conflict resolution functions of NATO in Europe. Activities outside Europe should also be shared if Bad books are legion, and yet there is a sense of tragedy the EU wants to participate” (page 119). here. After all, Duignan is a pro-NATO Atlanticist. Apparently, he wanted to write a defence of the US engage- This travesty continues across the entire spectrum of ment in Europe. That he failed so spectacularly in crusad- NATO’s activities. Perhaps the author may be forgiven for ing for such a laudable cause is saddening.

Michael Rühle is head of policy planning and speech writing That the case for NATO’s undiminished relevance can in NATO’s Political Affairs Division. indeed be cogently argued is demonstrated by David Yost’s NATO Transformed (United States Institute of Peace Press,

28 NATO review Spring 2001 REVIEW

1998). Although published nearly three years ago, i.e. decades. Yet it remains highly consistent, and the few before the Kosovo air campaign, it still ranks among the inevitable overlaps and repetitions do not matter much. finest monographs on the subject. Painstakingly researched, Yost’s book takes the reader through NATO’s Kaplan is a historian. The reader should therefore not Cold War history before examining NATO’s post-Cold War expect too much on NATO’s present or future. Indeed, adaptation — an adaptation marked by a shift from collec- whenever Kaplan tackles current issues he becomes vague tive defence only towards a mix of collective defence and and evasive. Moreover, as the title implies, Kaplan’s focus collective security. is very much on US foreign policy. But none of this dimin- ishes the value of this collection. Indeed, his focus on the Yost leaves no doubt as to where he sees trouble brewing. past is a healthy antidote to those “experts” who believe He is concerned that NATO’s venturing into col- that the world began with the end of the Cold War in 1989. lective security might risk undermining both the Kaplan also proves wrong those who believe capabilities as well as the cohesion needed to pro- that history must always be boring. For vide for its core function of collective defence. example, his essay NATO: A Counterfactual Hence, his rather elaborate treat- History offers a thought-provoking ment of the idea of speculation about collective security the path Europe and its pitfalls. might have taken Indeed, given the dif- had NATO never ficulties of sustaining been created. Even if NATO’s current mili- the reader may not tary engagement in the always agree with Balkans, Yost’s warnings Kaplan’s extrapola- are to be taken seriously. tions of “what would have happened if ...”, The well-known diffi- this chapter alone is culties of NATO’s Kosovo worth the price of the campaign may even add Two hits and a miss entire book. more credibility to Yost’s warnings about NATO embarking on the slippery slope Yost and Kaplan offer good, solid writing on NATO and towards over-extension. Still, is it really so important to transatlantic relations. But these are books for the NATO achieve conceptual clarity as to what NATO “is”? Should aficionado, not for the average reader. The NATO “primer” we not be more concerned with what NATO “does” — and has yet to be written. The student of international relations does right? Collective defence may be a less challenging who is looking for a readable monograph of modest length concept than collective security, but can NATO really still has to wait. afford to fiddle while the Balkans are burning? Indeed, Yost himself acknowledges that the Allies have little choice but to follow a dual strategy of pursuing collective security aspirations to the extent that this is feasible and prudent, while maintaining their collective defence posture and ori- entation. Thus, one cannot help but suspect that his lengthy treatment of collective security may be something of a straw man. However, Yost employs it in such an effective and enlightening manner that it is highly worthwhile. Those not deterred by the book’s hefty 430 pages will learn more about the NATO of today than from any other book Fellowships on the subject. NATO offers a limited number One of the victims of NATO’s Kosovo campaign was the of research fellowships each year Alliance’s 50th anniversary. The Balkan tragedy that to both individuals and institutions. unfolded in spring 1999 did not leave much time for reflec- Both NATO-member and tion on NATO’s first half-century. That the Alliance ulti- Partner-country nationals may apply. mately prevailed in Kosovo was certainly worth the cancel- lation of this or that commemorative event. For those who are nevertheless interested in NATO’s history, Lawrence S. Full details can be found on the NATO web site: Kaplan’s The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years (Praeger, 1999), will be a treasure chest. It is not a mono- http://www.nato.int/acad/home.htm graph, but a collection of 12 essays written over almost two

Spring 2001 NATO review 29 Speeding deployment Elinor Sloan examines NATO force mobility and deployability, as well as the impact of programmes aimed at improving capabilities.

or much of the past decade, military and security lit- fessionalization process is now well underway and is to be erature has been filled with discussion of the so- completed by 2002, by which time more than 90 per cent of Fcalled Revolution in Military Affairs. This notion the French military will be careerists, as compared to less immediately conjures up visions of high-tech warfare filled than 60 per cent in 1996. with advanced sensing, communications and computing capabilities, stealth technology and precision-guided By contrast, in the first post-Cold War decade successive weapons. However, what is often lost in the debate is the German governments steered clear of any talk of reducing fact that there will be no revolution until such time as tech- or eliminating conscription, arguing that national service is nological wizardry is combined with dramatic doctrinal an important part of German defence culture that effective- and organisational change. Central to NATO’s ability to ly binds the military and civilian society together. This respond effectively to the challenges of the new interna- viewpoint has only recently softened. In May 2000, in the tional security environment, is the increased deployability wake of glaring evidence provided by Operation Allied and mobility of its forces. Not surprisingly, NATO’s Force, NATO’s Kosovo campaign, that a conscript force Strategic Concept calls deployability and mobility an was ill-suited to today’s international security environment, “essential operational capability” of Alliance forces, and the government-mandated Commission for Common the Defence Capabilities Initiative, NATO’s high-level ini- Security and the Future of the (the tiative to improve and update military capabilities, includes Commission) recommended significant changes to the the deployability and mobility of NATO forces as a key conscript system. As a result, the number of German con- area of focus for transformation. scripts is to be reduced to 80,000 per year, much less than the previous level of 135,000, though still significantly Force deployability and mobility can be seen as a func- more than the Commission’s recommendation of 30,000. tion of the readiness of forces, their training, organisation- al structure and equipment. Legal hurdles to deploying Over the past decade, several other NATO nations have conscript forces outside national boundaries, combined changed the composition of their militaries by increasing with the requirement for highly skilled and therefore the proportion of professional forces. Belgium and the longer-serving troops mean that force deployability is more Netherlands have eliminated conscription altogether, while easily achieved by professional armies. Many NATO Italy, Portugal and Spain have plans to do so over the next nations, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and the few years. The Czech Republic and Hungary plan to elimi- United States have always had a professional force, or at nate or reduce conscription once they are in a financial least have had one for several decades. But others have tra- position to do so, and Poland recently announced its inten- ditionally had conscript forces and here the past few years tion to reduce and professionalize half its forces by 2003. have seen significant changes. Changes in the heavy force structures of the Cold War Perhaps most notably, in 1996 French President Jacques era are also central to enhancing the deployability and Chirac made the dramatic decision, after more than 200 mobility of NATO forces. Part of this involves the reduc- years, to eliminate conscription and in this way to profes- tion in size of large Cold War armies. The French armed sionalize the . France had for its impe- forces are being reduced from a 1996 level of 500,000 to tus the Gulf War and the rapid reaction force that went into 357,000 personnel by 2002, while Germany’s force levels Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) in 1995. In both cases, it will be reduced from the current 320,000 to about 275,000 could only provide a force contribution by “skimming off ” over the next three or four years. Other NATO nations, such professional soldiers from many disparate units. The pro- as Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, car- ried out similar force reductions of the order of 25 to 30 per cent in the early to mid-1990s. Elinor Sloan is a defence analyst with the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at Canada’s National Defence More important is the organisational restructuring of the Headquarters and author of Bosnia and the New Collective remaining forces into more rapidly deployable units, which Security (Praeger, 1998) and The Revolution in Military are still highly lethal. Here again, there have been signifi- Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO (McGill- cant developments over the past few years. The United Queens Press, forthcoming 2001). Kingdom’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review set in train a

30 NATO review Spring 2001 MILITARY MATTERS shift from a continental Readiness Force in European strategy to which sailors, soldiers one of expeditionary © Reuters and airmen will be forces for power pro- available in three jection during a crisis. 50,000-man rotations. The British Army has been reorganised into Meanwhile, the US two deployable divi- Army, stung by its sions, each made up of inability to deploy rap- three flexible, mobile idly its Apache heli- brigades. The United copters into Albania Kingdom is also creat- during Operation ing a Joint Rapid Allied Force, has Reaction Force, a pool undertaken its own dra- of “powerful and versa- matic overhaul of force tile” units from all structure. To round out three services set to its heavy and light become fully opera- components, the serv- tional this year. ice is creating a medi- um-weight strike force In accordance with to be comprised of at its 1996 Military least five rapid- Programme Law, response brigade com- France is restructuring bat teams by the end of its army into 51 this decade. In addi- manoeuvre regiments, tion, the US supported by 15 logis- has completely reor- tics regiments and 19 ganised its combat specialised support forces into ten Air regiments, all grouped Expeditionary Forces into 11 combat that are designed to be brigades. The regi- able to deploy rapidly ments represent the anywhere in the world. basic modular units Several other NATO that can be brought nations, including Italy, together in varying the Netherlands, Spain combinations depend- and Turkey, have also ing on the nature of the restructured their crisis to which they are forces over the past responding. France decade to increase also aims to have in deployability and place, by 2002, a Rapid mobility. Reaction Force of between 50,000 and NATO as a whole 60,000 troops to be has undertaken initia- quickly deployable to tives to adapt its force areas around the world. structure to the post- Meanwhile, Germany Cold War security has created its own environment. In the Crisis Reaction Force, early 1990s, NATO comprised of six fully established the Allied equipped brigades, 18 Command Europe’s squadrons and roughly Big bird: NATO nations are dependent on the United States for long-range air transport Rapid Reaction Corps 40 per cent of the (ARRC), a mobile navy’s ships at any one headquarters of some time. Made up entirely of professional troops, in accor- 1,000 multinational military personnel. In addition, since dance with the Commission’s recommendations, this force 1994 the Alliance has been working to implement the of 50,000 is to be transformed into a 150,000-strong Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. This entails

Spring 2001 NATO review 31 MILITARY MATTERS

the development of mobile command and control head- not be operational for at least a decade. The United States quarters that can be detached from the Alliance’s permanent, is most inclined to the shift from a heavy to lighter, more standing command structure, and will allow units from dif- mobile and deployable ground force, as a result of its ferent services and nations to be brought together and tai- geostrategic position and global security interests. It has lored to a specific contingency. NATO’s standing command therefore significantly cut its Abrams upgrade and structure itself has been significantly modified, with the Crusader self-propelled howitzer programmes, and chan- transition to a new command structure well underway. nelled these funds into its Future Combat System. By con- trast, European investment programmes continue to main- While the CJTF concept is proceeding, it has yet to be tain heavier armoured vehicles, such as tanks, fully implemented. Moreover, there is a growing recogni- self-propelled howitzers and artillery. tion that the ARRC — which was deployed to both Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 — needs to be augmented by Even more important for increasing deployability and at least a second such mobile corps headquarters. Admiral mobility is strategic air and sealift. Here, Canada and Guido Venturoni, chairman of NATO’s Military European NATO members lag far behind the United States. Committee, has argued that the figure may be closer to Although several countries have fleets of C-130 and C-160 three land corps headquarters and forces at high readiness, transport aircraft, these are considered more of a tactical and six such headquarters at lower readiness for sustain- than a strategic platform. Moreover, many larger transport ment operations. Comparable forces and headquarters are aircraft, like the French and German C-160s, are old and needed for the navy and air elements. Member countries due for replacement. With no equivalent to the US C-17 or have already offered a dozen head- C-15 heavy transport aircraft, NATO quarters that would have to become nations are almost completely multinational (or more multination- dependent on the United States for al) to operate at Alliance level, the long-range air transport of their among them the five-nation To date, Canada and troops and “outsize” equipment. and the German-Dutch corps. Decisions on these issues will European members of Measures are being taken to no doubt figure in the conclusions NATO have made little address this problem. Several and recommendations of NATO’s European members of NATO — current force structure review. In progress towards including Belgium, France, this way, a number of national and equipping their militaries Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Alliance measures are underway to the United Kingdom — have signed address the organisational and with the means of moving on to buy about 200 Airbus restructuring demands of a rapid their armies swiftly into Industries A400M heavy lift air reaction capability. transporters, otherwise known as place by air and sea the Future Large Aircraft. But the In terms of equipment, two ele- aircraft is not expected to be in serv- ments are central to increasing the ice before about 2007 and current deployability and mobility of mili- design specifications indicate it will tary forces. First, there is the requirement for more mobile not be built to transport “outsize” equipment. To fill this army platforms that are still highly lethal and do not reduce strategic airlift gap, the United Kingdom has undertaken to troop protection. Many NATO nations have equipped or lease four C-17 aircraft, with the first due for delivery to plan to equip their crisis reaction forces with light armoured the later this year. To meet short to medi- vehicles, such as the LAV III (Canada and the United um-term requirements, France and Germany may also States), the future armoured infantry combat vehicle lease some C-17 aircraft, or perhaps the Russian-Ukrainian (France) and the All-Protected Carrier Vehicle (Germany). AN-70 airlifter, though a decision has yet to be taken. These wheeled platforms are much lighter than a tracked Canada is also exploring options to improve its airlift capa- main battle tank, can be deployed by plane in greater num- bility. In 1999, France backed a German initiative to form a bers and are more versatile once on the ground. Yet, they do European Military Airlift Command to pool across nation- not offer the same levels of troop protection and firepower al boundaries airlift resources such as strategic transport as a main battle tank. As a result, NATO nations continue to and air-to-air refuelling tankers. This initiative is being upgrade and/or field new tanks, such as the Leclerc, considered in the European Air Group, which as a first step Leopard 2, Challenger 2, and M1 Abrams. is establishing an Airlift Coordination Cell.

Projects are underway to develop light combat vehicles To increase sealift capabilities, the United Kingdom is designed to suit the transport requirements for rapid planning to build two new, larger, aircraft carriers by about deployment. They include Canada’s Armoured Combat 2015 and is increasing the number of its roll-on/roll-off Vehicle, Germany’s New Armoured Platform, and container vessels from two to six. France has cut back its America’s Future Combat System. But these systems will carriers to just one, the Charles de Gaulle, but has plans to

32 NATO review Spring 2001 MILITARY MATTERS acquire more roll-on/roll-off ships and has agreed with the Much of what happens will depend on defence budgets Netherlands to pool shipping capacity to move heavy and particularly on the proportion allocated to equipment equipment to trouble spots by sea. Canada is progressing acquisition. The defence budgets of all NATO nations fell with its Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability project, dramatically during the 1990s, a trend that has only recent- which is designing a multi-role ship geared in part to ly been reversed. Canada, the United Kingdom and espe- strategic lift for the army. Germany is focusing not so cially the United States have registered real increases in much on strategic lift but rather on building a flexible their defence budgets over the past couple of years. By con- naval force, with new frigates, U-2 boats and supply ships trast, Germany’s has continued to fall, while the French on the way. defence budget has remained essentially static. Eleven other European members of NATO have indicated that they For those countries that are members of both the plan real increases in defence spending in 2001, but the European Union and NATO, a major incentive to increase increases will be small and it will be some time before they the deployability and mobility of their military forces is the can be translated into concrete capabilities. As armies pro- European Union’s Headline Goal of creating a 60,000- fessionalize, more money will presumably be freed up for strong rapid intervention force by 2003. The force is to be defence acquisitions. However, this is also a long-term mobile, militarily self-sustaining and deployable to a far- proposition. France, for example, has found that the pro- off crisis within 60 days. Whereas NATO’s responsibilities fessionalization of its army is costing a lot more than orig- range across the full spectrum of conflict, the EU force will inally expected. likely focus on peace-support operations and crisis-man- agement missions. The differing tasks make it conceivable A pragmatic examination of the deployability and that the EU initiative could divert EU members of NATO mobility of NATO forces reveals a mixed picture. In some from improving their military capabilities in those areas countries, significant progress has been made in the pro- that are more relevant to high-end collective security oper- fessionalization and restructuring of national forces, while ations, like precision engagement and suppression of transformation has been much slower in others. This is enemy fire. However, whether responding to war or con- true, too, of NATO’s force structure. Armies are being flicts of an intensity less than war, EU members of NATO made lighter and more mobile, but there continues to be a will want to be able to get their troops to the crisis quickly strong emphasis on preparing for heavy armoured warfare. and to be mobile once in theatre. Indeed, the primary incen- Generally speaking, the EU initiative can be expected to tive for France and Germany to lease heavy-lift assets in boost the deployability and mobility of NATO forces. the next few years would be their EU commitments, with- Moreover, there are several important projects on the out which the 2003 deadline will not be met. books. But the fact remains that, to date, Canada and European members of NATO have made little progress The impact of the EU initiative on developing a lighter, towards equipping their militaries with the means of mov- yet still highly lethal, ground force is more difficult to ing their armies swiftly into place by air and sea. It will be gauge. The European Union’s focus on lower-end tasks some time before planned defence budget increases can be may speed up the acquisition of wheeled armoured plat- translated into concrete capabilities. Even the United forms that, by virtue of their greater battlefield mobility, States, hampered by the costs of current operations and are better suited to peace-support operations. But by the readiness, could be constrained in its army transformation same token, it may slow the development of systems akin efforts. The revolution, while underway, is still many years to the Future Combat System. from fruition.

HE NATO SCIENCE PROGRAMM T“Bringing scientists together for progress and peace”E The NATO Science Programme supports collaborative projects between scientists from Allied and Partner countries. The programme - which is not defence-related - aims to stimulate cooperation between scientists from different backgrounds, to create enduring links between researchers, and to help sustain scientific communities in Partner countries.

Full details can be found on the NATO web site:

http://www.nato.int/science

Spring 2001 NATO review 33 STATISTICS Defence spending NATO releases defence expenditure al definitions, the figures may diverge Iceland has no armed forces. Figures for figures once a year. The complete fig- from those quoted by national authori- the Czech Republic, Hungary and ures, which have hitherto been repro- ties or given in national budgets. Data Poland begin in 1999, when these three duced in NATO Review, now instead relating to France is indicative only countries joined the Alliance. appear on the NATO web site. In view of because France does not belong to the // not applicable the difference between NATO’s defini- integrated military structure and does | break in continuity of series tion of defence expenditures and nation- not participate in defence planning. e estimate

Defence expenditures of NATO countries Defence spending Country Currency unit (million) 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000e per capita (0) (-) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1995 prices and exchange rates) Current prices and exchange rates Belgium Bf 115754 144183 155205 131156 131334 131796 133007 136252 140256 Czech Republic CZK // // // // // // // 41167 44022 USD Denmark DKK 9117 13344 16399 17468 17896 18521 19079 19428 19349 0 200 400 600 800 1000 France FRF 110514 186715 231911 238432 237375 241103 236226 239488 243936 Belgium Germany DEM 48518 58650 68376 58986 58671 57602 58327 59854 59617 Greece GRG 96975 321981 612344 1171377 1343276 1510684 1724621 1853189 1981984 Czech Republic Hungary HUF // // // // // // // 187672 218023 Italy 1000 ITL 7643 17767 28007 31561 36170 38701 40763 43062 43002 Denmark Luxembourg LUF 1534 2265 3233 4194 4380 4797 5197 5330 5468 Netherlands NLG 10476 12901 13513 12864 13199 13345 13561 14534 14192 France Norway NOK 8242 15446 21251 22224 22813 23010 25087 25809 25675 Poland PLN // // // // // // // 12599 14065 Germany Portugal PTE 43440 111375 267299 403478 401165 418772 420654 452843 475178 Spain ESP 350423 674883 922808 1078751 1091432 1123046 1124054 1180075 1266429 Greece Turkey 1000 TRL 203 1235 13866 302864 611521 1183327 2289430 4167636 6998960 United Kingdom GBP 11593 18301 22287 21439 22330 21612 22477 22548 22823 Hungary NATO - Europe USD 111981 92218 186189 184352 186821 172732 175184 | 179671 164559 Italy Canada CAD 5788 10332 13473 12457 11511 10831 11716 12360 11948 United States USD 138191 258165 306170 278856 271417 276324 274278 280969 296373 Luxembourg North America USD 143141 265731 317717 287933 279860 284146 282176 289288 304441 NATO - Total USD 255122 357949 503906 472284 466681 456879 457360 | 468960 468999 Netherlands

Norway Defence expenditures as % of gross domestic product Country Average Average Average Average Poland 1980 - 1984 1985 - 1989 1990 - 1994 1995 - 1999 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000e (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Portugal Based on current prices Belgium 3.2 2.8 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 Spain Czech Republic // // // // // // // 2.2 2.3 Denmark 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 Turkey France 4.0 3.8 3.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 Germany 3.3 3.0 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 United Kingdom Greece 5.3 5.1 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9 Hungary // // // // // // // 1.6 1.7 NATO - Europe Italy 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 Luxembourg 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 Netherlands 3.0 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 Canada Norway 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.2 1.9 Poland // // // // // // // 2.0 2.0 United States Portugal 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 Spain 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 North America Turkey 4.0 3.3 3.8 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.4 5.4 6.0 United Kingdom 5.2 4.5 3.8 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 NATO - Europe 3.5 3.2 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 | 2.1 2.1 NATO - Total Canada 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 United States 5.6 6.0 4.7 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 North America 5.3 5.6 4.4 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9 1995 NATO - Total 4.5 4.5 3.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 | 2.6 2.5 2000e The complete financial and economic data relating to NATO defence can be found at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-107e.htm.

34 NATO review Spring 2001 KOSOVO - ONE YEAR ON - Achievement and Challenge Report by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson

N S A T I O G A N I T Y O R T R E A N T I C A T L A N O R T H N O R T H A T L A N T I C T R E A T Y O R G A N I S A T I O N

N O R T H A T L A N T I C T R E A T Y O R G A N I S A T I O N NATOndNATObook Ha Handbook The NATO Handbook - 50th Anniversary edition NATO Han A comprehensive guide to NATO’s aims and activities, dbook its current policies and structures; a chronology of the first N IO IT D 50 years of Alliance history and a compilation of key policy E RY SA ER IV documents and juridical texts N N th A 50 ION th ANNIVERSARY EDITION IT ED 50 ARY ERS NIV th AN 50 Economics Colloquium 1999 Proceedings of the November 1999 colloquium on economic developments and reforms in Partner countries

The Reader’s Guide to the Washington Summit Compilation of all official texts and declarations issued at NATO’s summit in Washington in April 1999, including background information on Alliance programmes and activities

Extending Security : The Role of NATO and its Partner Countries Comprehensive illustrated booklet which describes how NATO works and covers policy development in key areas of Alliance activity

NATO at 50 Introductory leaflet on the history of the Alliance, giving an overview of key topics on NATO’s current agenda

NATO Topics Visual presentation of the Alliance outlining milestones in NATO’s development and key issues on its current agenda (electronic edition only: www.nato.int/docu/topics/2000/home.htm)

NATO Update Weekly information sheet which covers NATO activities and events in brief, giving a broad overview of Alliance initiatives (electronic edition only: www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm)

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