Haiti and the Vagaries of Democratization Analysis of the Role That Constitution and Constitutionalism Play in the Making of Polyarchical Rule

R. Fatton Jr. Constitution without constitutionalism : Haiti and the vagaries of democratization Analysis of the role that constitution and constitutionalism play in the making of polyarchical rule. Author also examines their relationship to class power, political institutions, culture, and leadership. He argues that constitution does not make for an effective form of constitutionalism. Concludes that meaningful democratization in Haiti is difficult if class relations do not change drastically and are equalized. In: New West Indian Guide/ Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 74 (2000), no: 1/2, Leiden, 5-32 This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl ROBERT FATTON, JR. CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM: HAITI AND THE VAGARIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION INTRODUCTION This essay analyzes the role that constitution and constitutionalism play in the making of polyarchical rule.1 In addition, it examines their relationship to class power, political institutions, culture, and leadership. The argument is developed in the context of Haiti's difficult process of democratization. The recent rise of the "new constitutionalism" (Elkin & Soltan 1993) has placed the construction of institutions at the center of political science. The assumption is not only that institutions matter, but that they are "the most promising avenue for changing the world" (Soltan 1996:2). According to this view, in periods of regime transition, institutions become determinant in the crafting of "good societies." The establishment of appropriate constitutions is perceived as the critical factor in the making of the democ- racies of the "Third Wave"2 (Huntington 1991:15-16). In turn, the design of 1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Latin American Studies Association, XX International Congress, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997. 2. According to Huntington (1991:15-16): "A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave usually involves liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not become fully democratic. Three waves of democratization have occurred in the modern world. Each wave affected a relatively small number of countries, and during each wave some regime transitions occurred in a nondemocratic direction. In addition, not all transitions to democracy occurred during democratic waves. History is messy and political changes do not sort themselves into neat histori- cal boxes. History is also not unidirectional. Each of the first two waves of democratization was followed by a reverse wave in which some but not all of the countries that had previously made the transitions to democracy reverted to nondemocratic rule." New West Indian Guide I Nieuwe West-Indische Gids vol. 74 no. 1 & 2 (2000): 5-32 6 ROBERT FATTON, JR. such constitutions simultaneously causes the further development of, and is caused by civic virtue. For new constitutionalists, it is this virtue that gen- erates the citizens' skilled and motivated imagination which enables them to trespass their narrow self-interest and embrace the common good. Thus, constitutions simultaneously reflect and create "political culture." Elinor Ostrom (1996:31) describes political culture as a form of "social capital," that is "the shared knowledge, understandings, and patterns of interaction" which are usable for the crafting of institutions. Constraining and molding each other, social capital and institutional design interact in a dialectical way to create the terrain on which citizens can expand, limit, or freeze the "boundaries of the possible." In their preface to The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (1994:xii) argue that from the perspective of the institutionalist paradigm: politics and institutions are viewed as independent variables in their own right, not simply as epiphenomena reflecting underlying economic and social forces. Complex organizations are more than aggregates of individual behavior; they are social structures with their autonomy and logic, affecting and constraining individual behavior and human choice. Political options and decisions are mediated by the rules and structures of the game, rules with closely related formal and informal dimensions. In the eyes of the new constitutionalists, institutions make history, even if they are not independent variables. Institutions are in fact shaped and influ- enced by the dominant habits, norms, and ways of life of the polity. Political culture thus acquires great significance; it supports civic behavior making possible democratic institutions which in turn strengthen such behavior. In a mutually reinforcing relation, political culture creates the foundations on which constitutions rest, and in turn, constitutions define and open up the new social parameters molding political culture itself. To this extent, situations in which civic competence is high are favor- able to the crafting of institutions reflecting the common good, and the establishment of a democratic constitutional order. In this instance, the fundamental premise is that individuals, groups, and classes can detach themselves from their material, political, and social interests to devise a genuine commonwealth. Standing in mid-air, as it were, they can look at the general terrain and build those institutions that will serve as the foundations of the "good" society. Many political scientists make a stronger version of that claim; they per- ceive the implantation and consolidation of democracy as a matter of political "crafting," (Di Palma 1990) and constitutional engineering through charismatic, creative, and talented political leadership. In this perspective, structural constraints and the obdurate opposition of classes are not seen as HAITI AND THE VAGARIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 7 determinant of the outcome; instead, in the words of Youssef Cohen (1994:119-20), [they merely] narrow the possible courses of action in a given situation but always leave available more than one alternative to the actors involved. Although the actors face difficult economic and political prob- lems, they in principle have the choice to act in ways that can prevent the breakdown of democratic institutions. This breakdown is therefore far from inevitable. To this extent, democratization is increasingly viewed as a matter of political design and "constitutional knowledge" (Vanberg & Buchanan 1996). In this perspective, it is not that interests are ignored, but rather that they can be rationally curbed, if not altogether eliminated, by the acquisition of knowledge of constitutional theories. By explaining the operation, norms, and consequences of constitutions and their making, such knowledge facili- tates choices that transcend narrow self-interest and promote "packages" of behavior enhancing democratic governance. A similar argument is advanced by advocates of "deliberative democracy" who place their faith in people's capacity to reach moral principles through collective dialogue. Such a dialogue, in the eyes of deliberative democrats, has the potential to lead to the cultural internalization of the "significance and legitimacy of a constitutional system based on the rule of law" (Stotzky 1997:85). Once this is achieved, the transition to, and the consolidation of democratic government is assured. It is true that new constitutionalists and deliberative democrats acknowledge that class antagonisms, ethnic animosities, and dire poverty may constrain the rise of polyarchy; but in their view, these structural factors do not constitute insurmountable obstacles to democracy's flourishing. Constitutional crafting, moral appeals, and rational deliberations can dissolve self-interest and generate an enlightened consensus for democratic rule. Doh Chull Shin (1994:138-39) has summarized the argument: the establishment of a viable democracy in a nation is no longer seen as the product of higher levels of modernization, illustrated by its wealth, bourgeois class structure, tolerant cultural values, and economic inde- pendence from external actors. Instead, it is seen more as a product of strategic interactions and arrangements among political elites, conscious choices among various types of democratic constitutions, and electoral and party system. What I want to suggest, however, is that while politics can be protean, rup- tures with the existing order of things and choices representing major his- torical alternatives are rarely effected; the structure of power and the bal- ance of class forces are obdurate constraints on such fundamental transformations. It is one thing to argue that political leaders have multiple 8 ROBERT FATTON, JR. choices, it is another to assume that those choices constitute plausible and realistic options. Political leadership, however talented and imaginative, can only be hard put in situations of extreme material scarcity, profound depend- ence on external sources of power, and acute class polarization. This is not to argue that polyarchy is impossible in poor countries,3 but rather that wealth, in so far as it provides rulers with expansive material means, facili- tates their difficult maneuver in the complicated road to democratization. Thus, while constitution-making requires knowledge, engineering skills, and political imagination, such faculties do not obliterate the reality that there

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