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Supplemental Material Table 1A Supplementary material J Epidemiol Community Health Supplemental material Table 1A. Main party classification by country Social democratic Traditional Conservative Far right and right-wing populist Austria • Sozialdemokratische • ÖVP • The Freedom Party Partei Österreichs (Freiheitliche Partei (SPÖ), Social Österreichs, or FPÖ) Team Democratic Party of Stronach for Austria Austria Belgium • PS (Parti Socialiste) • Christen-Democratisch • Vlaams Belang Socialist Party en Vlaams: CD&V • Front National • PS (Parti Socialiste) - (Centre démocrate • N-VA Socialist Party humaniste: cdH Czech • Česká strana socialně • TOP 09 (Tradition • ANO, Civic Democratic Republic demokratická (ČSSD) - Responsibility Party (ODS) Czech Social Prosperity 09) Democratic Part • The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Estonia • Sotsiaaldemokraatlik • The Union of Pro • Conservative People's Party Erakond - Social Patria and Res of Estonia (Estonian: Eesti Democratic Party Publica (Estonian: Konservatiivne • The Estonian United Isamaa ja Res Publica Rahvaerakond, EKRE), Left Party Liit, IRL) • Estonian Independence • The Estonian Free Party (Estonian: Eesti Party (Estonian: Eesti Iseseisvuspartei, EIP) Vabaerakond) France • PS (PARTI • MPV - mouvement • French Front National (FN) SOCIALISTE) PS - pour la France Socialist Party • Ump • PG (Parti de Gauche) - • Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Left Part Erakond - Social • FDG (Front de Democratic Party Gauche) - Left Front • LR (Les Républicains) - The Republicans Germany • SPD - Social • CDU & CSU • AfD: The AfD ("Alternative Democratic Party - für Deutschland") • Die Linke - The Left • NPD: National Democratic Party. Hungary • Demokratikus Koalíció • Együtt2014 - • Fidesz – Magyar Polgári (DK) - Democratic Together2014 Szövetség Coalition • Christian Democratic • Jobbik (Jobbik • Munkáspárt (Magyar People's Party Magyarországért Kommunista (Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom) - Jobbik Munkáspárt Néppárt, KDNP) Movement for a Better HUngaryKereszténydemokr ata Néppárt Ireland • Social Democrats • Fine Gael (FG) • not present • Socialist Party - United Left Alliance Italy • Partito Democratico • Unione di Centro • Lega Nord, Lega Nord or (PD), Democratic Party (UDC), Union of the Northern League • Sinistra Ecologia e Centre • La Destra, The Right - Libertà (SEL), Left • Popolo della Libertà • Fratelli d'Italia, Brothers of Ecology Freedom (PdL), The People of Italy Freedom Backhaus I, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2019; 0:1116ÿý1121. doi: 10.1136/jech-2018-211995 Supplementary material J Epidemiol Community Health Lithuania • Lietuvos • Homeland Union- TS- • Party 'Young Lithuania' (JL socialdemokratų partija LKD (center-right) • Justice (TT) is a major - Lithuanian Social • Electoral Action of rightist Democratic Party Poles in Lithuania – (nationalist/conservative) (LSDP) Christian Families Lithuanian party Alliance (EAPL–CFA) • Political Party 'The Way of Courage' (DK) Netherlands • Partij van de Arbeid, • People's Party • Pvv – party for freedom PvdA - Labour Party for Freedom and • Socialistische Partij, SP Democracy (Volksparti - Socialist Party j voor Vrijheid en Democratie) Poland • Partia Razem • Platforma • KORWiN – now Wolność [Together Party] Obywatelska - PO [Liberty] (center-right) • Kukiz'15 • Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ( • Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) Portugal • PS - Partido Socialista • Partido Democrático • The National Renewal Party Socialist Party Republicano • Partido Popular Democrático/Partido Social Democrata • Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular Slovenia • SD, socialni demokrati • Nova slovenija - • People’s Party-Our Slovakia - Social Democrats krščanski demokrati (Ľudová strana – Naše • DeSUS, demokratična • Lovenska Slovensko, ĽSNS) stranka upokojencev demokratska stranka - slovenije - Democratic sds Party of Pensioners of • Smc stranka mira Slovenia cerarja • Zavezništvo alenke bratušek • Koalicija združena levica (dsd, ids in stranka Spain • Partido Socialista • Partido Popular (PP) - • not present Obrero Español People's Party (PSOE) - Spanish • Ciudadanos/Ciutadans Socialist Workers' Party • Unidos Podemos • Podemos • Izquierda Unida (IU) - United Left Sweden • Socialdemokraterna - • Moderate • Sverigedemokraterna/Swed Social democrats Party (Moderata en democrats samlingspartiet, MSP • Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, KD (center-right) Backhaus I, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2019; 0:1116ÿý1121. doi: 10.1136/jech-2018-211995 Supplementary material J Epidemiol Community Health United • Social Democratic and • Cons (conservative) • UK Independence Party Kingdom Labour Party • UUP (NI) (UKIP) • Scottish National Party (conservative • Plaid Cymru Table 2A. Results for the sensitivity analysis displaying adjusted odds-ratios* (OR) (95% CI) for reporting fair/poor health by political ideology excluding countries without right-wing populist parties Null Model Model 1 Model 2 OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) Individual-level variables Political ideology Conservative (ref) 1.00 1.00 1.00 Social democrat 1.41 (1.22 to 1.64) 1.42 (1.22 to 1.66) 1.28 (1.10 to 1.50) Right-wing populist 1.53 (1.30 to 1.80) 1.61 (1.36 to 1.90) 1.36 (1.14 to 1.61) Paid work Paid work (ref) 1.00 1.00 No paid work 4.57 (4.01 to 5.21) 3.93 (3.43 to 4.49) Years of education Less than compulsory years (ref) 1.00 1.00 Compulsory years 0.61 (0.53 to 0.70) 0.68 (0.58 to 0.78) More than compulsory years 0.55 (0.48 to 0.62) 0.68 (0.59 to 0.78) Marital status Not married/separated/widowed 1.00 1.00 (ref) Married 0.94 (0.83 to 1.05) 0.94 (0.83 to 1.05) Living with a partner No (ref) 1.00 Yes 0.98 (0.87 to 1.09) Person to discuss personal matters with None (ref) 1.00 1 0.98 (0.76 to 1.25) 2 0.87 (0.68 to 1.11) 3 0.96 (0.75 to 1.23) 4-6 0.93 (0.73 to 1.20) 7-9 0.76 (0.53 to 1.10) 10 or more 1.41 (0.99 to 1.95) Social capital: generalized trust No trust (ref) 1.00 Trust 0.85 (0.76 to 0.96) Social capital: frequency of social meetings Never (ref) 1.00 Less than once a month 0.55 (0.40 to 0.76) Once a month 0.39 (0.28 to 0.54) Several times a month 0.40 (0.29 to 0.55) Once a week 0.40 (0.29 to 0.56) Several times a week 0.34 (0.24 to 0.46) Every day 0.44 (0.31 to 0.62) Belonging to a particular religion/denomination Yes (ref) 1.00 No 1.08 (0.96 to 1.22) Feeling about income Enough money to live (ref) 1.00 Backhaus I, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2019; 0:1116ÿý1121. doi: 10.1136/jech-2018-211995 Supplementary material J Epidemiol Community Health Difficult to live with money available 1.67 (1.47 to 1.90) Happiness Unhappy (ref) 1.00 Neither happy nor unhappy 0.40 (0.33 to 0.48) Happy 0.18 (0.15 to 0.22) Interclass Correlation Coefficient 0.05 0.04 0.02 Table 3A. Results for binary logistic, multilevel models, displaying odds-ratios (or) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for reporting poor health by political ideology using the un-imputed dataset Model 1 Model 2 OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) Individual-level variables Gender Male (ref) 1.00 1.00 Female 1.14 0.94 to 1.37 1.14 0.84 to1.53 Age 1.00 1.00 to 1.00 1.00 1.00 to 1.00 Years of education Less than compulsory years (ref) 1.00 1.00 Compulsory years 1.03 0.82 to 1.28 1.24 0.84 to 1.82 More than compulsory years 0.58 0.46 to 0.75 0.65 0.47 to 0.90 Paid work Paid work (ref) 1.00 1.00 No paid work 4.05 2.98 to 5.51 4.47 3.18 to 6.30 Household income 1.00 1.00 to 1.00 0.99 1.00 to 1.00 Political ideology Conservative (ref) 1.00 Social democrat 1.42 1.04 to 1.95 1.72 1.35 to 2.23 Right-wing populist 1.61 1.19 to 2.16 1.68 1.29 to 2.18 Marital status Not married/separated/widowed (ref) 1.00 Married 1.60 1.21 to 2.11 Living with a partner No (ref) 1.00 Yes 0.92 0.79 to 1.08 Person to discuss personal matters with None (ref) 1.00 1 0.94 0.57 to 1.59 2 1.11 0.74 to 1.67 3 1.17 0.69 to 1.99 4-6 0.90 0.62 to 1.32 7-9 0.64 0.31 to 1.32 10 or more 0.96 0.37 to 2.44 Social capital: generalized trust No trust (ref) 1.00 Trust 0.92 0.71 to 1.19 Social capital: informal network/ freQuency of social meetings Never (ref) 1.00 Less than once a month 0.36 0.23 to 0.57 Once a month 0.27 0.14 to 0.53 Backhaus I, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2019; 0:1116ÿý1121. doi: 10.1136/jech-2018-211995 Supplementary material J Epidemiol Community Health Several times a month 0.33 0.19 to 0.60 Once a week 0.29 0.17 to 0.50 Several times a week 0.22 0.12 to 0.40 Every day 0.31 0.15 to 0.64 Belonging to a particular religion/denomination Yes (ref) 1.00 No 1.12 0.79 to 1.58 Feeling about income Enough money to live (ref) 1.00 Difficult to live with money available 1.36 0.86 to 2.15 Happiness Unhappy (ref) 1.00 Neither happy nor unhappy 0.33 0.22 to 0.51 Happy 0.12 0.08 to 0.19 Interclass Correlation Coefficient 0.04 0.03 Table 4A. Results for binary logistic, multilevel models, displaying odds-ratios (or) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for reporting poor health by political ideology using social democrats at the reference group Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Individual-level variables OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI Gender Male (ref) 1.00 1.00 1.00 Female 1.08 0.98 to 1.20 1.10 1.00 to 1.21 1.09 0.98 to 1.21 Age 1.00 1.00 to 1.00 1.00 1.00 to 1.00 1.00 1.00 to 1.00 Years of education Less than compulsory years (ref) 1.00 1.00 1.00 Compulsory years 0.90 0.76 to 1.07 0.96 0.81 to 1.15 0.96 0.81 to 1.15 More than compulsory years 0.52 0.46 to 0.60 0.63 0.55 to 0.73 0.63 0.55 to 0.73 Paid work Paid work (ref) 1.00 1.00 1.00 No paid work 4.52 4.00 to 5.10 3.84 3.39 to 4.35 3.84 3.39 to 4.35 Household income 1.00 1.00 to 1.00 1.00 0.99 to 1.00 1.00 1.00 to 1.00 Political ideology Social democrats (ref) 1.00 1.00 1.00 Conservative 0.75 0.66 to 0.86 0.83 0.73 to 0.96 0.84 0.73 to 0.96 Right-wing populist 1.10 0.95 to 1.22 1.01 0.89 to 1.16 1.01 0.89 to 1.15 Marital status Not married/separated/widowed (ref) 1.00 1.00 Married 0.93 0.84 to 1.04 0.93 0.83 to 1.04 Living with a partner No (ref) 1.00 1.00 Yes 0.97 0.88 to 1.08 0.97 0.88 to 1.08 Person to discuss personal matters with None (ref) 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.77 to 1.21 1.00 0.80 to 1.26 2 0.93 0.73 to 1.17 0.93 0.73 to 1.17 3 0.96 0.76 to 1.22 0.96 0.76 to 1.22 4-6 0.94 0.74 to 1.19 0.94 0.74 to 1.19 Backhaus I, et al.
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