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Small Nation, Big Difference How the Norwegian Armed Forces Should Conduct Counterinsurgency Operations

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Small Nation, Big Difference How the Norwegian Armed Forces Should Conduct Counterinsurgency Operations Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection 2009-06 Small nation, big difference how the Norwegian Armed Forces should conduct counterinsurgency operations Pedersen, Hans-Marius. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4712 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS SMALL NATION, BIG DIFFERENCE: HOW THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES SHOULD CONDUCT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS by Trond Gimmingsrud Hans-Marius Pedersen June 2009 Thesis Advisor: David Tucker Second Reader: Hy S Rothstein Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2009 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Small Nation, Big Difference: How the Norwegian 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Armed Forces Should Conduct Counterinsurgency Operations 6. AUTHOR(S) Trond Gimmingsrud and Hans-Marius Pedersen 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) \ This thesis postulates the need for the Norwegian Armed Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations into the future and attempts to answer the question of how such operations should be conducted. First, the fundamental dynamics of an insurgency and a counterinsurgency are described using a generic model. The following chapter then discusses the role and importance of information operations in such conflicts. Next, the process of nation-building is discussed with the aim of extracting implications for military forces. After having established a theoretical foundation through discussing insurgencies, information operations, and nation- building, the thesis turns to a discussion of the relevant capabilities under the control of the Norwegian government in order to elicit important possibilities and limitations. Finally, the thesis suggests both missions and important priorities for the Norwegian Armed Forces in a counterinsurgency operation based upon theoretical foundation and the means available. The thesis concludes that while the Norwegian Armed Forces should be considered to be suitable for counterinsurgency operations, there is a significant need for education and understanding of such conflicts. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Norwegian Armed Forces, NAF, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency Operations, 15. NUMBER OF COIN, Information Operations, Nation building PAGES 157 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited SMALL NATION, BIG DIFFERENCE: HOW THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES SHOULD CONDUCT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS Trond Gimmingsrud Lieutenant, Royal Norwegian Navy Norwegian Naval Academy, 1997 Hans-Marius Pedersen Captain, Royal Norwegian Army Norwegian Military Academy, 1996 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS and MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2009 Authors: Trond Gimmingsrud Hans-Marius Pedersen Approved by: David Tucker Thesis Advisor Hy S Rothstein Second Reader Gordon McCormick Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT This thesis postulates the need for the Norwegian Armed Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations into the future and attempts to answer the question of how such operations should be conducted. First, the fundamental dynamics of an insurgency and a counterinsurgency are described using a generic model. The following chapter then discusses the role and importance of information operations in such conflicts. Next, the process of nation- building is discussed with the aim of extracting implications for military forces. After having established a theoretical foundation through discussing insurgencies, information operations, and nation-building, the thesis turns to a discussion of the relevant capabilities under the control of the Norwegian government in order to elicit important possibilities and limitations. Finally, the thesis suggests both missions and important priorities for the Norwegian Armed Forces in a counterinsurgency operation based upon theoretical foundation and the means available. The thesis concludes that while the Norwegian Armed Forces should be considered to be suitable for counterinsurgency operations, there is a significant need for education and understanding of such conflicts. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE.................................................................................4 C. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................8 II. INSURGENCIES .......................................................................................................11 A. WHAT IS AN INSURGENCY? ...................................................................11 1. Causes of Insurgencies.......................................................................13 2. Types and Characteristics of Insurgencies......................................14 3. An Insurgency is not a Low-Intensity Variant of a Conventional High-Intensity Conflict..............................................17 B. THE DIAMOND MODEL............................................................................19 1. Underlying Principles ........................................................................19 2. The Actors in the Diamond Model ...................................................20 3. Strategies and Options.......................................................................21 a. The Population’s Choices.......................................................21 b. State Strategies ........................................................................23 c. Counter-state Strategies..........................................................24 d. The Importance of International Actors................................24 e. Sequence of Strategies ............................................................25 C. CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCIES.......................................................26 1. Characteristics of Contemporary Insurgencies ..............................26 2. Implications for Contemporary Counterinsurgency......................28 3. How Does Contemporary Counterinsurgency Relate to the Diamond Model?................................................................................30 D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................32 III. INFORMATION OPERATIONS: MAKING SURE THAT THE GOOD GUYS FINISH FIRST...............................................................................................33 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................33 B. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN INSURGENCY CONFLICTS ..................................................................................................33 1. The General Target Audiences for Information Operations in Insurgency Conflicts ..........................................................................36 2. Information Operations: from the Perspective of the Insurgent...37 3. Information Operations: from the Perspective of the Counterinsurgent ...............................................................................40 a. Why Use Information Operations? ........................................42 C. IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES .......................................................................43 D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES: MAJOR CHALLENGES ..............................................................................44 vii E. INFORMATION OPERATIONS
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