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ISHM: September 16 ­ 22, 2016 ­ EPIC 9/23/2016 ISHM: September 16 ­ 22, 2016 ­ EPIC Press Blog Podcast Subscribe to our Newsletter WHO WE ARE WHAT WE DO GET INVOLVED DONATE CHAIKHANA Serving all the latest news from EPIC ISHM: SEPTEMBER 16 – 22, 2016 September 22, 2016 EPIC Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis Key Takeaways: Following a three day surge of military operations, Iraqi Security Forces assisted by U.S.-led international coalition successfully cleared ISIS militants from Sharqat on September 22. Sharqat is a strategically important city that has served as a major transportation and smuggling hub for the so-called Islamic State into Mosul. During the same period, U.S. defense officials reported that a rocket or mortar shell containing a “mustard agent” was launched by ISIS militants on the joint operations base at Qayyarah, 30 kilometers south of Sharqat. According to initial reports, there were no casualties as a result of the chemical weapon attack. As previously reported in ISHM, ISIS has used chemical weapons in greater quantities as recently as April 2016 and there have been 20 documented instances of ISIS using chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga. On September 21, following allegations on charges of corruption, Iraq’s Parliament voted by secret ballot to oust Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari, 158 to 77 with 14 abstentions and 79 Members of Parliament not in attendance. At a press conference the following day, the ousted Zebari vehemently denied any wrongdoing and said he will prove his innocence. Zebari accused Member of Parliament and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of trying to “collapse” the government and exploiting rifts among Kurdish voting blocs. At the time of his ouster, Zebari was working to finalize critical IMF loan agreements to bolster Iraq’s monetary system, raising serious concerns about the economic consequences of his abrupt departure. Parliament’s action. Parliament announced that they will question Foreign Minister Ibrahim al- Jaafari, Agriculture Minister Falah Hassan Zeidan and Education Minister Mohammed Iqbal in upcoming sessions. Last month, Parliament ousted the Defense Minister while the Interior Minister resigned in July. Those positions remain vacant as Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi looks for their replacements. The Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights released a report outlining the deteriorating humanitarian conditions inside of Hawija where upwards of 100 thousand citizens remain trapped, and condemned the Iraqi Government for not mobilizing security forces to clear the city of ISIS militants. According to the report, ISIS has forbidden citizens to leave and may be receiving ISIS militants fleeing from Sharqat. PMUs and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga met with Governor of Kirkuk Najmaddin Karim to plan an effort to clear the predominantly Sunni-Arab city. Iraqi Security Forces continued efforts to clear western Anbar Province of ISIS militants. Operations in Ramadi, Hit, al-Baghdadi, and Qa’im are seeking to clear the thoroughfare from Syria and secure the western border. In addition, 10 members of ISIS were arrested when they tried to enter Garma, just east of Fallujah, alongside returning displaced families. The Anbar Provincial Council claims that 60% of Fallujah’s rehabilitation projects have been completed, including the restoration of water services and opening of roads. Despite the alleged progress and pleas from the Council for residents to repopulate the city center, residents are refusing. Only 17 families have returned to the center of Fallujah since it began welcoming returnees on September 17. The reluctance of families to return is hardly surprising given the identification of more than 12,000 IEDs in and around the city, location of at least one ISIS militant hiding out in the town by Anbar Police, and the discovery by the ISF of four suicide belts intended to be used in Fallujah in recent days. Rumors are circulating among IDPs that individuals returning to Fallujah are not being permitted to leave, despite denials by the Anbar Council. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 3.34 million people across Iraq have been displaced since January 2014 and for the same period, approximately 850 thousand have returned. As security operations continue their race toward Mosul in an attempt to clear the city of ISIS militants by the end of the year, relief efforts are unable to keep pace with the number of displacements and many fear that they will be unprepared for the aftermath of operations in Mosul. UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Lise Grande released a statement admitting that “we’re very worried that we won’t be able to prepare in time. With time running out, funding needs to go to the right agencies–to the ones building the emergency camps and providing the latrines, water and health services for these camps. We can’t wait any longer to get ready. We http://www.epic­usa.org/ishm79/ 1/12 9/23/2016 ISHM: September 16 ­ 22, 2016 ­ EPIC have to move now.” The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that 12 to 13 million people in Iraq will likely need humanitarian aid by the end of 2016 and Iraqi Parliament’s Committee on Women, Family and Children reported that there may be over one million widows and one million orphans across the country by the end of the year, due in large part to the increase in violence that will come from the struggle to retake Mosul. Over the past week, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi was in New York for the UN General Assembly. During meetings with nearly a dozen other heads of government, al- Abadi reiterated the need for humanitarian relief and reconstruction funding. Following their meeting, U.S. President Barack Obama stressed “the importance of not just driving [ISIS] out of Mosul, but making sure…that we are prepared to help provide rapid humanitarian assistance, and that we can rebuild the city in a way that assures not only [ISIS] does not come back, but extremist ideologies born out of desperation do not return.” Iraq has agreed not to dramatically increase oil production at the request of OPEC, but is seeking ways to attract foreign investors to help improve refining capability – a capacity that was severely diminished due to attacks on refineries by ISIS militants. As reported in last week’s ISHM, the Kirkuk pipelines reopened in September after months of negotiations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Iraq is OPEC’s second biggest oil producer after Saudi Arabia. ISF Clears Sharqat as ISIS Resorts to Desperate Measures On September 16, security forces in the Kirkuk Province reported that a U.S.-led international coalition airstrike targeted and destroyed a chemical weapons factory that was manufacturing missiles carrying mustard and chlorine gas in Zab, 75 kilometers southwest of Kirkuk. The same report indicated that there were also strikes conducted by the U.S.-led international coalition against targets in Rashad and Riyadh, 45 kilometers southwest of Kirkuk, killing 15 Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants and wounded seven others. On September 16, Commander for the Liberation of Ninewa Major General Najim al-Jabouri reported that a U.S.-led international coalition airstrike targeted a gathering of ISIS militants in the villages of Telol al baj, 14 kilometers southeast of Sharqat. The strikes resulted in the death of 12 ISIS militants and the destruction of an important ISIS headquarters in the region. On September 16, Command for the Liberation of Ninewa Major General Najim al-Jabouri reported that a U.S.-led international coalition airstrike targeted three mortar detachments and rocket launchers in villages around Qayyarah, 30 kilometers north of Sharqat. On September 16, Command for the Liberation of Ninewa reported that a U.S.-led international coalition airstrike targeted an ISIS cache of weapons and ammunition in the Seaoanah villages near Qayyarah. The strike also resulted in the death of “numerous [ISIS militants]. On September 16, an anonymous local source reported that ISIS implemented a ban on people “roaming” and on Friday prayers in Sharqat, 120 kilometers west of Tikrit, due to increased “security concerns” as joint security forces prepared to launch an invasion of Sharqat in early October. The ban is in response to the increase of armed groups attacking ISIS commanders in Sharqat. On September 17, the Federal Police Headquarters reported that security forces targeted a convoy of ISIS militants in the Makhoul Mountains, 60 kilometers north of Tikrit. During the operation a vehicle owned by ISIS was destroyed and four ISIS militants were killed. On September 18, the PUK reported that a U.S.-led international coalition airstrike killed the ISIS leader in charge of the “Army of the Resolute” known as Abu Hadi Saudi at a police station in west Mosul. The source reported no other information. On September 19, Command for the Liberation of Ninewa reported that U.S.-led international coalition airstrikes targeted a headquarters of ISIS militants in the village Telol al-Baj, 100 kilometers north of Tikrit. During the operation, 12 ISIS militants were killed. On September 18, an anonymous source in Ninewa Province reported that the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga were able to repel an attack by ISIS militants in Jabal Ba’shiqah, 20 kilometers east of Mosul. The attack led to the death of 11 ISIS militants and the destruction of two vehicles belonging to ISIS. On September 18, an anonymous source reported that security forces discovered ammunition, explosives, and missiles in an orchard in Taji, north of Baghdad. It was reported that 38 “sticks” of TNT, 16 rocket launchers with two BE4 missiles, and 18 propellant charged RPG7s were found during the operation. On September 19, an anonymous source reported that Iraqi military jets targeted two ISIS militant sites in the Sharqat District, 120 kilometers north of Tikrit.
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