Anatomy of NYS’s 2014 Statewide Elections – An Uncertain Future
From: Bruce Gyory Date: April 15, 2015
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP | manatt.com
Synopsis
By historical standards, the Governor Cuomo’s 2014 re-election margin was quite solid (i.e., almost exactly where Rockefeller’s numbers stood in 1962) even as it was not a landslide a la Cuomo’s 2010 election. No Governor of New York has won back to back landslides (defined as combining as both a large absolute numbers lead – over 650,000 votes – and a large outright majority – over 55% of the vote) since Lehman (in 1932 and 1934).
Cuomo’s victory was never in doubt, but the general election’s margin, following his contentious primary win against Teachout by just shy of 2-1, was far closer than the polls projected, leaving an aura of surprise. That Cuomo finished at 54% (a 13% margin) rather than 57% or higher of the vote, was at root a function of a very low turnout in NYC and a tightening of the race Upstate and on Long Island.
The most important factor to note about the 2014 returns, is that almost three quarters of the statewide vote was cast outside of NYC (74%) and that low turnout reduced both the female share of the vote to 51% (from its consistent 53% level over the last decade), and the aggregate minority vote down to a 28% share from 29% in 2010, (but most importantly knocking the minority vote off its long term growth trajectory which should have placed it at a 30 or 31% share in 2014).
Given that, Astorino snared only a third of the Women’s vote and got well under a quarter of the minority vote, that low vote from NYC merely reduced the Democratic margins for the Cuomo led ticket. Astorino did almost nothing to further the GOP’s prospects for once again winning statewide. In the end, the texture of the campaign reduced the impact of overwhelming margins from base Democratic voters for Cuomo, while Astorino failed to advance the Republican reach beyond the dwindling conservative base.
In terms of the 2014 numbers, Comptroller DiNapoli led the Democratic ticket in terms of both percentage of the vote (60% for DiNapoli, to Schneiderman’s 55.7% and Cuomo’s 54.3%) and absolute numbers (DiNapoli 2,233,057 votes to Schneiderman’s 2,069,956 votes and Cuomo’s 2,069,480 votes-almost identical). DiNapoli, alone amongst the Democratic statewide candidates, carried all three regions of the state (Cuomo and Schneiderman failed to carry Upstate).
Moreover, DiNapoli hitting 60% in a near record low statewide turnout was a real achievement (3,930,310 with blanks counted, but only 3,812,708 votes cast for gubernatorial candidates, 3,714,505 for the Attorney General candidates and 3,712,189 for the Comptroller candidates). In turn, that low turnout, left a regional breakdown not at all conducive for Democrats (49% of the vote came from Upstate, only 26% from NYC and 25% from the 4 Suburban Counties).
Synopsis
In a historical anomaly, 2014 was a year with almost no drop-off from the gubernatorial vote to the Comptroller’s vote (2.6%) and the Attorney General’s race (2.57%), with the vote for Attorney General slightly higher than the Comptroller’s vote (by 2,316 votes). Traditionally, that drop off was 4% and sometimes as high as 9 or 10% off the gubernatorial vote (e.g., in 2010 the drop off from the gubernatorial to the Comptroller’s vote was 3.8% and it was 4.5% from the gubernatorial to the AG’s vote) and the vote in the AG’s race was before always slightly below, not ahead of the vote in the Comptroller’s race.
In the wake of the 2014 election returns, neither the Democratic nor the Republican parties have much to cheer about. A fair analysis of these returns reveals that both major parties failed to advance their long-term electoral agendas, leaving themselves with exposed vulnerabilities in future gubernatorial elections.
The Democrats have once again failed to prove any lasting capacity to push their base in New York City toward voting its electoral weight in a gubernatorial race. New York City is 43% of the state’s population, 38% of the state’s registered voters, but only cast 26% of the state’s vote in the 2014 election. This paltry 26% share was not only far below NYC’s registration share, but significantly below the 30% share cast by NYC in 3 of the last 4 gubernatorial elections and dramatically below the 34- 35% share cast by NYC, in the state’s 2008 and 2012 presidential races.
This chronic under voting from NYC (which goes back to the 1980’s), leaves New York’s Democrats vulnerable to a Republican who could hit the following tipping points for victory (60% of the vote from Upstate, 57% from the Suburbs and cracking 30% of the vote from NYC) when the NYC share is under 30% of the statewide total. Meanwhile, in 2014 just like in 2010 and 2006, the GOP came nowhere close to hitting these tipping points in even a single region. Thus, for the GOP in electoral terms, 2014 was a wasted year in the gubernatorial race. The Republicans have not carried the state since Pataki’s third term run in 2002: for President, Governor, US Senate, Comptroller or AG.
While the Democrats are showing signs of retreat from their recent success in carrying Upstate (2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012), particularly amongst conservative Democrats and moderate Independents, the Republicans were blown away Downstate, not only in NYC but losing in the Suburbs as well. The 2014 election was the fifth consecutive statewide election where the Republicans failed the garner even a third of the state’s female majority, while continuing to lose the minority vote by margins of 4-1. Republican strength downstate seems to be lodged only on LI, as the Northern Suburbs (Rockland as well as Westchester) continue a sharp shift to the Democrats in statewide elections.
Consequently, the near future of gubernatorial politics in NYS will be determined by which party can best compensate for these weaknesses (Democrats on turnout and amongst non-liberal voters outside NYC) and Republicans (amongst female and minority voters). If both parties continue to fail in this regard over the next decade, one could see the emergence of a Bloomberg type independent, anchored to neither party, who could be elected Governor powered by the current of vital center voters, especially if such a candidate could capture significant support from 2 of the 3 key minority pillars in the Democrats’ base (Black, Hispanic and Asian voters, with Hispanic and Asian voters being the most likely to pull away from the Democrats). We are not there yet and no such personage is currently looming, but that potential could someday become a magnet for just such a candidate running against both major parties.
Anatomy of NYS’s 2014 Statewide Elections – An Uncertain Future | manatt.com iii Synopsis
In practical terms, the Democrats need to avoid a schism taking hold along the fault lines exposed in the Cuomo – Teachout primary (moderate vs. progressive Democrats), while the Republicans must find a way to garner support from female, Hispanic and Asian voters in general elections.
New York is a Democratic, not a liberal state, especially in lower gubernatorial turnouts. The 2014 exit polls were pretty conclusive, 27% of the state’s voters described themselves as liberals, 29% as conservative, but 44% as moderates. New York’s liberals have reached parity with conservatives in recent decades, not because the liberal share has grown, but because the conservative share of the electorate has shrunk at the expense of a rising tide of moderate voters (e.g., in 1970, Rockefeller’s last election a Yankelovich poll for the Times pegged NYS’ ideological splits at 37% conservative, 33% moderate and 27% liberal; On His own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller by Richard Norton Smith at p. 565).
Meanwhile, the key for continued Democratic success is growing the share cast by the state’s urban cores (where Democratic margins are powered by minority and progressive white voters) while holding the moderate voters so critical in the Suburbs, Upstate as well as Downstate. The Democrats need to do both, it is not sufficient to accomplish just one of those objectives. If an ideological schism takes hold in NYS, within the Democratic Party, the party could become vulnerable in gubernatorial contests, if these independent voters and conservative Democrats bolt (i.e., the political algebra which defined NYS politics from 1942-1972 in the Dewey Rockefeller era).
Alternatively, the Republicans cannot win statewide with a purely conservative coalition in NYS, given the Democrats’ registration advantage and the de facto parity along the ideological divide in NYS. Instead, to win Republicans must relearn the lessons of Dewey, Rockefeller, D’Amato and Pataki: a Republican can win statewide only if they can raid key Democratic blocs. In the past that meant Republicans garnering Jewish and White Catholic voters. Today as women in NYS usually hit the 53% share of the state’s voters and the aggregate minority vote is heading towards a full third of the statewide vote, that means Republicans have to be able to gainer the votes of women, as well as Hispanic and Asian voters. We seem a long way from when D’Amato took 40% of the Jewish vote (1992), Bloomberg took 47% of Hispanics (2001) and Pataki 45% of Hispanics (2002), while Bloomberg and Pataki swept the Asian vote, the Jewish vote and both ran as pro-choice candidates.
If future elections lead to Democratic standard bearers who cannot carry moderate voters (i.e., the Democratic schism leads to far left victories in primaries), while the GOP refuses to break out, succeeding amongst women, particularly women who are Hispanic and Asian, then a vacuum could open at the very center of the state’s electorate. The Democrats need to avoid complacency while the Republicans cannot prevail unless they turn Democratic vulnerability into Republican gains (i.e., potential does not equal victory).
Democrats also have to ask themselves whether a regional turnout pattern is emerging where the Republicans have no chance in presidential election years, but the Democrats could be at risk in gubernatorial years? For Democrats it is a worry if the NYC share of the vote is over 8% less in gubernatorial years than in presidential years (i.e., NYC’s share of the statewide voting share, was 35% in the 2012 presidential but only 26% in the 2014 gubernatorial contest: a 9% gap vs. the traditional 2-4% of the 2000-2010 decade). When you lose close to 10% of the NYC vote from the presidential to the gubernatorial TO pattern, and you are carrying that
Anatomy of NYS’s 2014 Statewide Elections – An Uncertain Future | manatt.com iv Synopsis
vote by 3-1 or better margins, it can change the ball game against the Democrats (i.e., you lose your cushion).
Derivatively, to count out the Republicans from the ability to retake the Governor’s office is premature. That Democratic hope ignores the pendulum of New York State politics: long periods of diaspora preceding a return to viability (e.g., Dewey after the Democrats held the gubernatorial serve from 1922-1942; the Democrats winning 5 terms under Carey and Cuomo after winning only one gubernatorial race from 1942-1970; and Pataki winning three terms, followed by three Democratic wins under Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo, two by landslides). To succeed, the Republicans, like the Democrats after 1970, need to shake off their self-defeating lethargy by fully confronting the ideological and demographic challenges blocking their ability to win statewide.
If the Republicans do not find a way to regain their edge on issues and themes resonating with swing voters, they could find themselves not just lacking viability in running against the Democrats, but vulnerable to a Bloomberg like independent eschewing altogether the GOP banner, running on their own line (i.e., under a self-crafted banner). That kind of campaign would not succeed (or even become competitive) unless both parties simultaneously veered away from confronting these challenges.
These are the electoral trends I see taking out my periscope and peering around the corner, after analyzing this year’s returns. Which major party, if either will have the courage as well as the discipline to maximize its long term prospects for electoral advantage as the precursor to a sustained opportunity to govern in the Empire State? To paraphrase Shakespeare’s Hamlet, that is the question. We will not be able to project the long term future of NYS politics unless and until that question is answered.
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Table of Contents
Analysis ...... 1 1) The Gubernatorial Race 1 2) The Comptroller's Race 11 3) The AG's Race 14
Conclusion ...... 17
Memo
Analysis
1) The Gubernatorial Race:
Any serious analysis of the 2014 election must begin with the near record low turnout in 2014. Historically, a low turnout gubernatorial election was 4.3 million votes, while a moderate turnout was in the 4.5-4.8 million range and high turnout over 5.2 million votes. In 2014, the gubernatorial turnout counting blank, void and scattered (“BVS”) ballots was 3,930,310 votes. Meanwhile, in terms of votes cast for candidates, the gubernatorial turnout in 2014 was only 3,812,708 votes (i.e., in 2010, 4,654,163 votes were cast for gubernatorial candidates).
The 2014 turnout, was therefore NYS’ lowest turnout since 1934, when 3.595 million votes were cast in Lehman’s landslide over Roberts Moses (a 21% margin totaling 807,983 votes).
This near record low 2014 turnout led to a regional skew. In 3 of the last 4 gubernatorial elections (including 2010) the regional splits were 46% of the vote coming from Upstate (everything north and west of Westchester and Rockland), 30% from NYC and 24% from the Suburbs (Long Island, Westchester and Rockland). NYC had begun to climb back from the depths of its low turnout shares in the 1990’s. Keep in mind that in terms of registration: 39% of the state’s registered voters live Upstate; 38% are from NYC and 23% reside in the Suburbs.
Last year’s regional splits including BVS ballots took us back to the 1990 and 1994 levels, reflecting the Indian Summer of Upstate’s electoral ascendency:
Upstate 1,925,705 49% NYC 1,035,932 26% Suburbs 968,673 25% 3,930,310
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Memo
The BVS votes in the gubernatorial race broke down:
Upstate 63,012 53.5% NYC 22,877 19.5% Suburbs 31,713 27% 117,602
Last year’s turnout pattern probably reflected a greater rejection of the gubernatorial race by voters from outside NYC, especially Upstate. Thus, in the gubernatorial race, the vote outside NYC drove the outcome on margin when only the votes for candidates were counted (i.e., casting 73.4% of the total vote).
Upstate 1,862,693 48.8% NYC 1,013,055 26.6% Suburbs 936,960 24.6% 3,812,708
Let’s briefly spotlight the third party votes in the gubernatorial race. Here is how the third party votes broke down and the line placement they secured for the next four years:
Conservative (Astorino): 250,634 6.6% (Column C) Green Party (Hawkins): 184,419 4.8% (Column D) WFP (Cuomo): 126,244 3.3% (Column E) Independence (Cuomo): 77,762 2% (Column F) WEP (Cuomo): 53,802 1.4% (Column G) SCC (Astorino): 51,294 1.3% (Column H)
If you broke it down ideologically, for the major party candidates, the party lines of the right: Conservative + SCC totaled 301,928 (8%) vs. the parties of the left WFP + WEP 180,046 (4.7%). Nevertheless the true measure of the left Green + WFP and WEP 364,465 (9.56%), surpassed the parties of the right.
The Stop Common Core (SCC) party fizzled out, as the Women’s Equality Party line outvoted it in the Suburbs. The SCC line was a bigger factor Upstate, but had only a marginal effect overall on the race (i.e., Astoriano lost his gamble that the SCC line would be a wedge factor in the Suburbs). It is therefore perfectly understandable why Astorino would seek to change the name of the SCC party to the Reform party, but it is utterly unfathomable why Astorino would try to hold onto this line, risking the ire of the Conservative Party which provided Astorino with 250,000, in favor of projecting this new party which netted him a scant 51,294 votes.
That Astorino does not see how and why Mike Long and the Conservative Party would see this SCC line recast as a “Reform” party, as a threat to their political
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Memo
square on the State’s chessboard, is an example of why Astorino’s entire campaign came down to a game of tactical checkers, when a long term chess strategy was what the GOP needed.
If Astorino tries to run for Governor in 2018, instead of going into that race with the Conservative Party at his back, Astorino might face the prospect of an independent candidate on the Conservative line, splintering a conservative base, that is itself too narrow limb upon which to build a statewide majority.
Cuomo won a clear victory, but not the landslide that the polls projected, precisely because his margins in the Suburbs were smaller than expected and Astorino narrowly carried, rather than narrowly lost, Upstate (i.e., the low turnout put a chill on Cuomo’s final numbers especially amongst the 73% plus of the vote coming from outside NYC as this turnout pattern maximized the base Republican vote):
Cuomo Astorino Hawkins Cohn-SAP McDermott- Libertarian Upstate 802,498 936,881 109,951 2,706 10,657 (43.1%) (50.3%) (5.9%) (0.1%) (0.6%) NYC 782,911 177,450 48,084 915 3,695
(77.3%) (17.5%) (4.75%) (0.1%) (0.3%) Suburbs 484,071 422,548 26,384 1,342 2,615 (51.7%) (45%) (2.8%) (0.1%) (0.3%) 2,069,480 1,536,879 184,419 4,963 16,967 (54.3%) (40.3%) (4.8%) (0.1%) (0.5%)
Astorino Margin Upstate 134,383 Cuomo Margin NYC 605,461 Cuomo Margin Suburbs 61,523 Cuomo’s Net Margin 532,601
In terms of Upstate vs. Downstate, Cuomo’s combined margin Downstate of 666,984 trumped Astorino’s margin Upstate of 134,383. Or you could view it as Cuomo’s 605,461 margin in NYC, vaulted over Astorino’s narrow 72,860 vote margin outside of NYC, but not in a landslide. It is also clear from both the primary and general election returns where Cuomo ran much stronger in Hochul’s old congressional district than in other Upstate regions, that picking Kathy Hochul as his LG running-mate was of clear help to the Governor in terms of hard political currency.
The closest historical parallel to Cuomo’s 2014 re-election margin, was Rockefeller’s first re-election against Morgenthau in 1962, where Rockefeller got 53.1% of the vote winning by 529,168 votes.
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Memo
When you overlay exit polls on top of the actual returns, you can easily see what happened. Cuomo’s expected landslide was cut short by two factors. First, the low turnout dropped the women’s share of the total vote to 51% from 53%, of the total vote (women were 53% of NYS’ general election shares in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012) and the steady rise of the minority vote pulled back to a 28% share, after reaching a gubernatorial high of 29% in 2010. Second, Howie Hawkins surged from just over 59,000 votes in 2010 to 184,000 votes just under 5% (according to the exit polls Hawkins snared 10% of liberal voters, 6% of Democrats, 7% of independents, 6% of white women and 8% of voters with post-graduate degrees). This functional loss of 130,000 votes by Cuomo, heavily weighted amongst Upstate’s liberal Democrats (and some on Long Island), kept Cuomo from approaching 60% Statewide (i.e., achieving the back to back landslides which only Lehman has achieved in modern times).
Astorino got the same poor share of women voters Paladino got in 2010 – 33%, but Cuomo dropped to 61% from 67% of women’s votes, due largely to Hawkins getting 5% of female voters. This was key, because exit polls showed male voters were tied at 47-47% between Cuomo and Astorino (Hawkins at 5%). In a word, all of Cuomo’s margin came from women voters (61-33%). Here again, Hochul bringing balance to the Democratic ticket on gender as well as geography, was of clear benefit to the ticket. Had women hit their normal 53% share of the total vote, Cuomo would have crossed 55%.
Amongst minority voters, the Black share of the vote dropped from an 18% share to a 13% share of the total vote, and Cuomo carried it by 82-14% over Astorino (Hawkins at 4% of Black voters) down slightly from his over 90% level in 2010. Cuomo’s highest percentage share of any key voting bloc was amongst Blacks. Hispanics kept a 9% share of the total vote, same as in 2010, but Cuomo carried it by only 69-27%, significantly below his 82-12% margin from 2010. Astorino mined the growing Pentecostal (social conservatives) wing of the Hispanic vote, but even in this low TO pattern Astorino’s effort did not break the mold. In the 2016 presidential vote the focus for NY’s Hispanics will be on the economy, health care, Cuba and immigration and the Republican share amongst Hispanics is likely to sink back towards the 20% level. In 2014, the minority voters who stayed home were probably younger and more progressive accounting for the downtick in Cuomo’s minority splits from 2010.
Imagine for a second if Astorino possessed the common sense based courage of John Cahill, the Republican nominee for AG, who supported the Dream Act. Had Astorino followed suit, especially given his fluency in Spanish, his support for the Dream Act would have probably taken his Hispanic support from 27% to the 35 or even 38% level (e.g., not unlike Pataki breaking with Bush over the Vieques bombing issue) registering as a tangible long term Republican gain. It might also have provided a bridge for the Republican Senate this year to have supported instead of blocking the Dream Act in the recently concluded State Budget negotiations. Had that occurred, the trade the Governor sought between the Dream Act and Cardinal Dolan’s tuition tax credit proposal might have passed in the State Budget.
Policy is neither my forte, nor the purpose of this memo, but if both the Dream Act and the tuition tax credit for private and parochial schools had passed that would have been the most productive governance victory for the Roman Catholic hierarchy since Cardinal Spellman was referred to as the Powerhouse of New York politics.
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Memo
Cardinal Dolan (and his Orthodox Jewish allies – like Agudath Israel), would have then owed Astorino a deep debt. Politically, this trade would have benefited both the older White Catholics committed emotionally to Catholic schools (even as they now serve mostly minority children) and the newer Catholic Hispanic immigrants behind the Dream Act. So this missed opportunity around the Dream Act and tuition tax credits, is but another example of how and why the GOP did not use the 2014 election to advance its long term political needs.
For the GOP to succeed statewide, they not only need to consolidate support from White Catholic voters, who drive the outcomes of elections outside NYC (White Catholics are 50% of the Suburban vote and a little over 40% of Upstate’s vote in general elections), but to once again reach 40% of the Hispanic vote (about to advance from a fifth to a quarter of the NYC vote and towards double digits in the Suburbs in the next 10 years, before exploding to a full third of the NYC vote and approaching 15% of the vote – not population – in the Suburbs with growing pockets of double digit strength in cities like Albany, Syracuse and Rochester between the 2026- 2030 elections).
My point is neither that the Republicans should run away from their conservative base, nor that the Democratic Assembly was wrong to listen to the objections of public school advocates (in opposing the tuition tax credit proposal for that is a policy debate), instead my point is that to carry NYS in statewide elections the Republicans will need Sister Souljah moments. Consequently, looking through the lens of pure politics – this trade of the Dream Act for the Tuition Tax credit from the Republican perspective would have been just what the doctor ordered with both Hispanics and White Catholics (i.e., today 42-44% of the statewide vote, but that aggregate share will likely grow to 50% of the state’s vote over the next 10-15 years).
Not to mention that a seminal long term question for New York politics will become whether Hispanics stay voting in alignment with Black voting trends as they have done over the last decade or will they drift over time towards a small “c” Catholic voting pattern more closely aligned with their White Catholic pew mates (as happened in the NYC mayoral elections of 1985, 1997 and 2001 as well as the gubernatorial election of 2002)? Republican prospects here in NYS, hinge upon a positive answer to that query (e.g., without breaking 40% of the Hispanic vote the GOP can’t crack 30% of the overall vote in NYC today and soon won’t be able to reach 57% of the Suburban vote).
New York’s Republicans would also be wise to adjust to the growing Climate Change Gap. The 2014 exit polls in NYS revealed a fascinating nugget. Last year, 68% of New York voters believed that climate change was a serious problem and that two thirds of the state’s electorate broke for Cuomo by a 73-20% margin (so key in the state’s suburbs both Downstate and Upstate). If this climate gap becomes a fixture of New York and even national politics (e.g., national exit polls showed that 57% of voters in 2014 felt that global warming was a serious problem and they broke for Democrats by 70-29%), the Republicans would wise to remember the pro-environmental line which runs straight from Theodore Roosevelt through Nelson Rockefeller and on to George Pataki in NYS (and includes Presidents Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush nationally).
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Memo
To speak in the brass tacks of politics, when storm surges hit Suburban communities like Long Island’s shores after Sandy, or the river communities in the Hudson and Mohawk river valleys after Irene, that damage often cascades across affluent towns with large numbers of independent voters (not to mention highly educated), the classic definition of bellwether communities. Both parties have work to do on the environmental front both nationally and in New York. Democrats need to find their heart (willing to fight for issues which have become base retention opportunities), while the Republicans need to find their head and end the short sighted blunder adhering to the taint of being perceived as denying climate change (climate change can become their bridge to the growing ranks of highly educated independent voters). This classic political saga of the Tin Man vs. the Scarecrow over the green agenda will become an increasingly important in American politics for as far as the eye can see.
As the aggregate minority vote (Black, Hispanic, Asian and bi-racial) grows to a full third of the statewide electorate (no later than 2022), no Republican can win statewide without getting at least a third of that full third of the statewide electorate. That unassailable math renders any election that does not markedly advance the GOP’s long term prospects amongst minority voters (especially Hispanics and Asians – with Asians likely to break 10% of the NYC vote and just under a 5% share in the Suburbs by 2018 or 2020) a strategic failure.
Perhaps history can be a guide. The GOP in NYS ignored the need to cultivate White Catholic and Jewish voters from 1922-1936, when they were shut out of the Governor’s mansion, but Dewey changed that in narrowly losing to Lehman in 1938, before winning three terms in 1942, 1946 and 1950, leading the charge which Rockefeller, D’Amato and Pataki took up by garnering a majority of White Catholics and at least 40% of Jewish voters in the 1960’s, 1980’s and 1990’s powering Republican revivals in NYS. While it has not been easy to turn around the Republican elephant in NYS, it can be done. In the past, the desire to win after long periods of political diaspora in our state has moved both slow elephants as well as stubborn donkeys in our state’s political history.
The impact of Hawkins on the Green Party line, plus the greater weight in the share of total vote coming from Upstate’s smaller rural counties in a low turnout, who remained angry at Cuomo over the SAFE Act, helped keep Cuomo at 54% instead of approaching the 60% statewide threshold he crossed in 2010. Hawkins’ vote was the balance of power in 8 swing counties: Suffolk plus 7 Counties Upstate (denying Cuomo victories in those Counties and rendering the map graphic in the immediate newspaper stories on how many Counties each candidate carried, shaded in red).
The Green Party is a long term threat to Upstate Democrats. The Green Party has the right to pursue its ideology, but there is a long term consequence to its approach. The Green Party does not seek coalitions in pursuit of victory, instead it seeks to advance the purity of its policy doctrines. The Green Party emerges from the understandable grievances of blue collar workers Upstate, but its votes actually come from highly educated liberal Democrats. To win Upstate, where the Democratic registration margins are actually small (154,000), given the hard core GOP unity, Democrats must carry the lion’s share of unaffiliated or independent voters (numbering 976,000 Upstate).
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Memo
Consequently, if the Green Party’s ultimate political effect is the drain off 6- 10% the Democrats’ liberal base, there are simply not enough moderate independents for Democrats to win Upstate counties (e.g., why Cuomo lost a significant number of Upstate counties). This can also hurt Democratic candidates in key legislative contests Upstate. Not to mention the potential impact of the Green Party opponents pulling Democratic candidates so far left that they cannot then garner sufficient support from moderate independents and conservative Democrats needed to win Upstate.
In effect, the ultimate impact of the Green Party’s rise, coming right out of the energy underlying Teachout’s candidacy in the primary, could open the door to a GOP revival Upstate. If the Green Party can expand on Hawkins’ 6% showing Upstate (i.e., approach 10%) that will reduce from 60% to 55 or 57% the tipping point for victory statewide which a Republican needs from Upstate (a much easier threshold for the GOP to cross). If primary schisms on the Democratic side lead the Democrats to nominate pure left candidates, the Green Party could shrink back to pre 2014 levels, but that would likely doom the Democrats Upstate amongst the huge swath of independent voters. Alternatively, if Democratic primaries nominate moderates, but leaves the liberal wing of Upstate’s Democratic base restive (a la Cuomo in 2014) the Green Party’s capped rise toward double digit votes, will badly hurt Democrats. Either way the ultimate impact of the Green Party could be to brighten the orange underlying Republican orthodoxy Upstate.
Cuomo also underperformed against poll driven expectations in the Suburbs. Cuomo carried Long Island by only 26,408 votes, losing Suffolk by 1,320 votes due to Hawkins snaring 10,327 votes. Ironically, in the Suburbs, Cuomo did best in Westchester County, where Astorino the County Executive lost his home county by 13% (30,576 votes). In the wake of recent elections (2009, 2013 and now 2014), low voter turnout is a real problem for Democrats on LI (i.e., it is Democrats and liberals not Republicans and conservatives, who are staying home non-presidential years on LI).
The Suburbs are therefore worth taking a close look at, with a total vote of 936,960 from the Suburbs for gubernatorial candidates. LI continues its leading role, traditionally casting 68-70% of the 4 County Suburban vote:
Nassau 318,948 Suffolk 323,318 642,266 (68.5% of total Suburban vote)
Westchester 221,988 Rockland 72,706 294,694 (31.5% of the total Suburban vote)
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Memo
Cuomo Astorino Hawkins Cohn-SAP McDermott- Libertarian Nassau 168,570 140,842 7,986 752 798 (53%) (44%) (2.5%) (0.2%) (0.3%) Suffolk 155,031 156,351 10,327 393 1,216
(48%) (48.5%) (3.1%) (0.1%) (0.3%) Total 323,601 297,193 18,313 1,145 2,014 (50.4%) (46.3%) (2.9%) (0.1%) (0.3%) Westchester 123,017 92,441 5,972 128 430 (55%) (42%) (2.7%) (0.1%) (0.2%) Rockland 37,453 32,914 2,099 69 171 (51.5%) (45.3%) (2.9%) (0.1%) (0.2%) Total 160,470 125,355 8,071 197 601 (54.5%) (42.5%) (3%) Suburban 484,071 422,548 26,384 1,342 2,615 Total (51.7%) (45%) (2.8%) (0.1%) (0.4%)
To repeat, by historical standards for a Democrat, Cuomo carrying the Suburbs by 61,523 votes (6.7%) in 2014 was a strong showing, but not compared to the 56-58% level early polls showed was within Cuomo’s grasp. Cuomo’s support faded on Long Island, especially in Suffolk, at the close of the race (here again low turnout hurt Cuomo). Quite frankly, Suffolk has become much tougher turf for the Democrats in both 2012 and 2014.
The long term lesson for the Democrats in NYS, in terms of what to avoid, is a schism between its progressive and moderate wings. The State’s political algebra could not be any clearer, in fact it is irrefutable. Statewide, especially in gubernatorial years, the Democrats cannot win beyond the urban cores – as pure progressives. Statewide elections can only be won by dominating the vital center. There are not enough progressives, as liberals prefer to be called these days, to win Statewide. In turn, the vital center of New York’s politics resides in Suburban towns, Upstate as well as Downstate.
The fulcrum point for victory within this vital center is balanced amongst highly educated, socially moderate but fiscally conservative independents (unaffiliated voters) and blue collar conservative Democratic voters, both groups heavily White Catholic (though most are cultural Catholics, rather than Opus Dei Catholics: in short their faith informs, rather than dominates, their voting patterns). These voters are most interested and supportive of education, infrastructure, the environment, health care, including reproductive health (these voters are consistently pro-choice as well as pro same sex marriage despite being Catholic), but they are also very concerned about taxation in general and property taxes in particular. These voters are tough on crime and can be scared and hence swayed by regional rivalries (as the Senate Republican
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campaigns in State Senate races taught the Democrats in 2014, both on Long Island and Upstate, by successfully running against limousine liberals from NYC).
White Catholics are 33-35% of NYS’ general election statewide vote and Democrats should be concerned that nationally, White Catholics who identified as Democrats throughout the Reagan era, now are measured by Pew Research to self- describe as Republicans not Democrats by 9% (five straight years of a GOP edge; NYT April 11, 2015 at p.A11). The trick for Democrats is to continue the straight line of political success from Schumer (1998, 2004, 2010), Hillary Clinton (2000 and 2006) Spitzer (2006), Andrew Cuomo (2010), Gillibrand (2010 and 2012) and DiNapoli (2014). In brief, the Democrats need to both harness the strength of their progressive oriented urban cores and meld it to resonate with vital center voters outside NYC (particularly holding onto White Catholics registered as Democrats but often drifting toward independent or GOP identification).
If it becomes either/or for Democrats (e.g., as with the Reform-Regular Split amongst the Democrats which allowed the Republicans to dominate the State in the Rockefeller era, after Harriman’s flawed 1958 campaign), that could open the door for Republicans to have the potential for a gubernatorial comeback.
The DeBlasio coalition which works fine in NYC (and in cities like Albany and Rochester), is simply not a viable victory template for the statewide electorate. DeBlasio’s protestations to the contrary on the potency of progressive voters is a dangerous mirage for statewide and national contests. Which does not mean the progressive pulse is unimportant for Democrats, instead the wise approach is to follow the Schumer model of harnessing progressive voices without offending the ears of moderate voters.
Alternatively, Andrew Cuomo must avoid both Averill Harriman’s lack of leadership in allowing an intra-party split between progressives and moderates to become a schism and becoming a mirror to Nelson Rockefeller’s fate of a long term cold war with his party’s dominant flank, if the Democrats are to maintain their recent string of Empire State successes. Unlike Rockefeller, whose cold war with his party’s right wing was lodged in substance, Cuomo’s problems have been cosmetic and tonal. After all, a Democratic Governor who led the way on same sex marriage (the first major state to pass gay marriage legislation), gun control, an increase in the minimum wage, liberal Court of Appeals appointments and a progressive tax reform package in December of 2011, should not be at war with his party’s progressive flank.
Meanwhile, this schism for Democrats is not just in NYS, we saw it hit Rahm Emanuel’s re-election as Mayor of Chicago and is producing turbulence for Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign. Andrew Cuomo and Rahm Emanuel must not dismiss the progressive pulse, they would be wise to woo progressive voters and find constructive avenues for engaging on progressive concerns without losing hold of the vital center. I suspect Hillary Clinton will show the way as that was the essence of the Third Way approach in the 1990’s, which carried the day both in America and in England (i.e., she must bolster her progressive colors, but to lose the center is to lose the 2016 presidential election).
Pragmatic political professionals will paraphrase Al Smith and say let’s look at the record. White progressives are on average 32-35% of the Democrats’ primary
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electorate. Progressives can neither win Democratic primaries without clear minority support, nor can they carry statewide electorates, if they are anathema to vital center voters (e.g., amongst those who reside in places like Upstate New York or Downstate Illinois). This is true not only in Blue states (NYS, Illinois and California), but it is a necessity in the swing purple states (e.g., Virginia, Florida, Ohio, Nevada and Colorado).
Consequently, the need for Democrats adapting the energy of their party’s progressive impulse (to power turnout from the urban cores) without losing contact with the vital center of the electorate (in suburban communities) where independent and conservative Democrats hold the balance of power, should be seen for what it is a political imperative. This synergy thus goes beyond Andrew Cuomo’s Governorship, but his gubernatorial prowess would be enhanced and magnified if he mastered it and used his second term to avoid the party schism that only Hugh Carey and his father Mario Cuomo ended in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
In the final analysis, Andrew Cuomo must not only remember the wisdom of Bill Clinton’s admonition – Democrats need to fall in love [with candidates], while Republicans tend to fall in line [behind the candidates next in line] – he must transform that advice into his governing modus operandi.
To receive love in politics it sure helps to show love (i.e., it would help Andrew Cuomo if he began to show a little love to progressive White and minority voters). Meanwhile, all too often Cuomo’s tone (e.g., his reaction to Occupy Wall Street, his interaction with Mayor DeBlasio and his rhetoric on teachers) got in the way of building a unified party.
Meanwhile, progressive voices as varied as Mayor Bill DeBlasio and Zephyr Teachout need to gauge how their rhetoric and posture will impact the fortunes of Democratic candidates in the hard to win swing counties (e.g., Suffolk, St. Lawrence, Onondaga, Dutchess, Monroe, Niagara and Erie counties). Consequently, to avoid a schism from taking hold amongst Democrats over the long haul, party leaders should study both the state’s electoral math and diplomacy’s best practices.
Correspondingly, Bill DeBlasio needs to consider Stan Greenberg’s years of polling data focusing on the fact that swing voters often agree with liberals on the issues (e.g., minimum wage and paid family leave), but often mistrust liberals as managers: read as Mayors, Governors and Presidents . Overcoming those doubts will only come by sound management and sustained political outreach, not by lecturing voters on a progressive ascendancy which does not in fact exist and hence, does not drive the outcomes in statewide or national elections. If Mayor DeBlasio’s voice is to resonate in Albany, he must stop being tone deaf to the real concerns of Democrats outside NYC.
Too few Democratic politicians are around today who remember the impact of DeSapio ignoring and blocking the Stevensonian Reformers from 1958-1961, which in turn led to the Reform arrogance in the 1970’s all too content with primary victories and general election defeats, which Jimmy Breslin succinctly captured when he cautioned (in 1974) the then Reform umbrella group the NDC, to avoid standing for “November Don’t Count” and support Hugh Carey. The NDC did not listen, but Democratic primary voters did, ushering in not just 5 consecutive Democratic terms, but a template
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for the subsequent success for Democrats statewide. In the end, NYS Democrats have a lot to lose from an ideological schism taking hold.
2) The Comptroller’s Race:
The Comptroller’s vote was remarkable in terms of political math: usually the fall off from the Governor’s race to the Comptroller’s race is anywhere from 4% to as high as 9% (2002 Hevisi Faso race) and the fall off tends to disproportionately come amongst urban minority voters. DiNapoli’s 2010 campaign did just enough to counteract this factor in holding off Harry Wilson’s late surge, by hanging on to minority votes.
Historically, there is almost no fall off from the Comptroller’s to the AG’s race, and the vote in the AG’s race is usually a smidge below the Comptroller’s vote. However, in 2014 this historical precedent on drop off was largely thrown to the side. The drop-off from the total candidate vote in the gubernatorial race to the Comptroller vote for candidates was only 100,519 (2.6%) and the vote for AG was actually 2,316 votes above the Comptroller’s vote (a drop off from the gubernatorial vote of only 2.57%). Contrast this to 2010 which fit the historical template since the drop-off was 178,820 in the Comptroller’s race (3.8%) and 210,740 (4.5%) in the AG’s race.
I can only read this absence of a real drop off as reflecting a lack of enthusiasm last year for a gubernatorial race whose outcome was never in doubt. This assessment is buttressed by the disproportionate splits of the BVS vote coming from Upstate in both the AG’s and the Comptroller’s races.
AG: BVS Breakdown Upstate 118,615 55% NYC 51,968 24% Suburbs 45,222 21% 215,805
Comptroller’s Race: BVS Breakdown Upstate 113,452 52% NYC 60,621 28% Suburbs 44,048 20% 218,121
There was a little more BVS voting in the 2014 Comptroller’s race from NYC and less Upstate and the Suburbs than in the AG’s race. The net effect was the slight but unprecedented 2,316 more votes cast in the AG’s race than in the Comptroller’s race, which was above it in the voting booth (e.g., in 2010 there were 31,920 fewer votes cast in the AG’s race that in the Comptroller’s).
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In 2010, the BVS vote in the Comptroller’s race was 267,364 on a far larger base and it split Upstate 141,395 (53%), NYC 100,718 (38%) and the Suburbs a paltry 25,251 (9%).
In terms of votes cast for candidates, the breakdown in the 2014 Comptroller’s race was:
Upstate 1,812,253 49% NYC 975,311 26% Suburbs 924,625 25% 3,712,189 In 2010, the regional splits in the Comptroller’s race were Upstate 46% (2,065,234), NYC 29% (1,308,888) and the Suburbs 25% (1,101,221). The total vote cast for Comptroller candidates in 2010 was 4,475,343 votes: 763,154 votes more than in 2014. That downshift in turnout should have hurt DiNapoli. Thus, the 2014 returns must have put a wide smile on Comptroller DiNapoli’s face:
DiNapoli Antonacci Portelli-Green Clifton- Libertarian Upstate 955,589 785,551 54,719 16,394 (53%) (43%) (3%) (1%) NYC 765,619 175,950 28,711 5,031 (78.5%) (18%) (3%) (0.5%) Suburbs 511,849 393,142 14,476 5,158 (55%) (43%) (1.5%) (0.5%) Total 2,233,057 1,354,643 97,906 26,583 (60.2%) (36.5%) (2.6%) (0.7%)
DiNapoli’s Upstate Margin 170,038 DiNapoli’s NYC Margin 589,669 DiNapoli’s Suburban Margin 118,707 DiNapoli’s Statewide Margin 878,414
The Comptroller’s ability to carry the Suburbs by 12% and Upstate by 10% in an incredibly low (GOP favorable) turnout was most impressive, especially since DiNapoli held onto a 4-1 margin from NYC voters.
The Suburban vote paints an interesting picture. In low turnout elections, Long Island is much tougher turf for Democrats (especially in Suffolk) than the northern Suburbs – even for a Long Islander.
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DiNapoli Antonacci Portelli Clifton Total Vote Nassau 174,134 136,861 3,950 1,391 316,336 (55%) (45.3%) (1.2%) (0.5%) Suffolk 165,249 148,021 5,768 2,451 321,489 (51%) (46%) (2%) (1%) LI Total 339,383 284,882 9,718 3,842 637,825 (53%) (45%) (1.5%) (0.5%) Westchester 130,146 80,543 3,705 980 215,374 (60%) (37.5%) (2%) (0.5%) Rockland 42,320 27,717 1,053 336 71,426 (59%) (39%) (1.5%) (0.5%) NS Total 172,466 108,260 4,758 1,316 286,800 (60%) (38%) (1.6%) (0.4%) Suburban 511,849 393,142 14,476 5,5158 924,625 Total (55%) (43%) (1.5%) (0.5%)
Some might interpret DiNapoli’s victory as a mere reflection of the Comptroller running against an underfunded candidate leading an almost dormant campaign from Robert Antonacci. But despite spending next to nothing, Antonacci received only 184,347 votes less than John Cahill, the leading Republican vote getter (from the Attorney General’s race), and only 182,236 less than Rob Astorino, who ran an energetic, if ineffective, race for Governor.
Consequently, I think the size of Comptroller DiNapoli’s victory was clearly aided by a weak opponent, but DiNapoli’s electoral strength in 2014 may have been rooted in firmer footing. Unlike Cuomo or Schneiderman, DiNapoli had an error free tenure in his term beginning January 1, 2011, both in terms of policy and politics. DiNapoli ran just as strongly in New York City (78.5 % of NYC’s vote) as Cuomo ( 77%) and Schneiderman (79%), but unlike Schneiderman who lost Long Island (by 5,300 voters) DiNapoli carried Long Island by (54,501 votes). Note that Cuomo carried Long Island by only 26,408 votes. Unlike Cuomo who lost Upstate (by 134,383 votes) and Schneiderman who also lost Upstate (by 122,778 votes), DiNapoli carried Upstate (by 170,038 votes).
Contrast these 2014 returns from the results of the 2010 DiNapoli – Wilson contest: Statewide, 4,475,335 voters were cast and DiNapoli won by 202,475 votes. Wilson carried Upstate by 337,717 votes (56-40%) and the Suburbs by 49,654 votes (51-47%), while DiNapoli carried NYC by 589,846 votes (72-26%) in 2010.
This state’s political picture might be very different today if Harry Wilson had been elected Comptroller in 2010 and certainly, if John Faso had won instead of narrowly losing to Hevesi in 2002. If Faso had defeated Hevesi in 2002, avoided his landslide loss to Spitzer in 2006, by seeking re-election as Comptroller, the
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Republicans might have had a candidate well groomed to run a winning campaign for Governor in 2018. If Faso runs for the Gibson congressional seat in 2016, against McLaughlin in a GOP primary, it will be interesting to see if Republican primary voter, will advance their party’s prestige (picking Faso), or nominate someone who will not advance their statewide prospects (if McLaughlin wins the primary).
To summarize, in 2014, DiNapoli carried the Hudson Valley, the North Country, the Capital District, Central and Western New York, while only narrowly losing the Southern Tier, as well as the Finger Lake’s rural counties, and losing only the GLOW counties by double digits (56-40%). Meanwhile, DiNapoli’s margin from just Tompkins County (9911) completely erased the 8 county Southern Tier deficit (6874) and the Comptroller’s margin from Monroe County (20,614 votes) wiped out with room to spare his combined deficit from the five rural Finger Lakes Counties (4,227) and the so called 4 GLOW Counties (11,759).
Overall, DiNapoli carried Upstate 53-43%, even beating Antonacci in his home county of Onondaga (52.5% - 44% or 11,709 votes). In fact, DiNapoli carried 30 Upstate counties, losing only 23 to Antonacci, while carrying every single major metropolitan county Upstate as well as all 9 Downstate Counties (i.e., DiNapoli carried 39 of the State’s 62 Counties).
By any standard, this a strong showing, particularly Upstate, by Comptroller DiNapoli, given the fact that so many Democratic oriented voters failed to turn out in this extraordinarily low turnout. One suspects that DiNapoli’s inner circle might begin to wonder if the Comptroller rather than the Attorney General, has a clearer path to the Governorship, should Governor Cuomo not seek a third term.
3) The AG’s Race:
The regional breakdown in the AG’s race was virtually identical to the Comptroller’s race:
Upstate 1,807,090 49% NYC 983,964 26% Suburbs 924,451 25% 3,715,505
The vote here was 8,653 votes higher in NYC than in the Comptroller’s race, but 5,163 votes lower Upstate and 1,174 votes lower in the Suburbs than in the Comptroller’s race (net of 2,316 more votes in the AG’s race). On a base of 3.7 million votes, these differences were de minimus, although a clear break with tradition, for usually the AG’s vote is a smidge behind, not ahead, of the Comptroller’s vote, which has a traditional drop off of the 4-7% range from the gubernatorial vote total. This year the drop off was under 3% from the Governor’s race to both the AG (2.57%) and the Comptroller’s race (2.6%). Note that in 2010, the drop off was 3.8% in the Comptroller’s race and 4.5% in the AG’s race.
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This empirical aberration on the fall off from the gubernatorial vote, is probably the consequence of little enthusiasm amidst the near record low turnout in the gubernatorial race and the fact that Schneiderman had a tad more support in NYC, while DiNapoli had a clear advantage outside of NYC, where a full 74% of the statewide vote was cast in the undercard races.
The macro breakdown in the AG’s race was:
Schneiderman 2,069,956 (56%) Cahill 1,538,990 (41%) Jiminez/Green Party 80,813 (2%) Pierson 24,746 (1%)
Cahill Margin Upstate 122,778 votes Schneiderman Margin NYC 606,537 votes Schneiderman Margin Suburbs 47,207 votes Schneiderman Statewide Margin 530,966 votes
Schneiderman Cahill Jimenez Pierson Upstate 813,666 936,444 41,490 15,490 (45%) (52%) (2%) (1%) NYC 779,810 177,273 26,531 4,350 (79%) (18%) (2.6%) (0.4%) Suburbs 476,480 429,273 12,792 4,906 (51.6%) (46.5%) (1.4%) (0.5%) Total 2,069,656 1,538,990 80,813 24,746 (56%) (41%) (2%) (1%)
Cahill narrowly led the GOP ticket in both absolute numbers and (2,111 more votes than Astorino and 184,347 more than Antonacci) and percentage of the vote received (41% for Cahill to 40.3% for Astorino; and 36.5% for Antonacci). Cahill also narrowly carried Long Island, but was soundly beat in the Northern Suburbs in both Westchester and Rockland.
When you parse the numbers in the AG’s race, you can see that while Schneiderman won comfortably, he significantly underperformed when compared to DiNapoli Upstate and in the Suburbs. I think the simple reason is that Schneiderman made mistakes: for example in Monroe County (e.g., the botched press flap in the indictment of Maggie Brocks’s husband), while suffering mildly from press criticism on Moreland and Airnb, left a lingering cloud of skepticism if not opposition amongst voters outside NYC. DiNapoli, on the other hand, had a virtually error free term and picked up more editorial support than Schneiderman (e.g., Newsday and some
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Upstate papers). Finally, DiNapoli clearly benefited from all the time he spent cultivating support Upstate and on Long Island, which Schneiderman simply did not do.
The Suburbs are worth detailing in the AG’s race:
Schneiderman Cahill Jimenez Pierson Total Vote Nassau 156,928 152,702 3,653 1,372 314,655 (50%) (48.5%) (1%) (0.5%) Suffolk 152,180 161,703 4,935 2,343 321,161 (47.4%) (50.4%) (1.5%) (0.7%) LI Total 309,108 314,405 8,588 3,795 635,896 (48.6%) (49.5%) (1.3%) (0.6%)
Westchester 127,338 84,506 3,202 893 215,939 (59%) (39%) (1.5%) (0.5%) Rockland 40,034 30,362 1,002 298 71,696 (56%) (42%) (1.5%) (0.5%) NS Total 167,372 114,868 4,204 1,191 287,635 (58%) (40%) (1.6%) (0.4%) Suburban 476,480 429,273 12,792 4,906 923,451 Total (51.6%) (46.5%) (1.4%) (0.5%)
My best take on this when you distill it all down, is that a Republican strategist would say Schneiderman with 4 more years in office, would be almost impossible to defeat for re-election particularly if Eric Schneiderman could raise $10 million for his re- election campaign, but that in a race for Governor if a GOP candidate could raise at least $35 million, Schneiderman might be quite vulnerable Upstate and on LI.
A GOP strategist might see Monroe, Onondaga and St. Lawrence Counties as foreshadowings. DiNapoli carried Monroe County by 10.5% or 20,614 votes. Schneiderman lost it by 803 votes (95,730 for Cahill; 94,927 for Schneiderman). Similarly in Onondaga, a bellwether county DiNapoli carried, Cahill won by 4,138 votes (65,629 for Cahill; 61,491 for Schneiderman). In St. Lawrence which DiNapoli won comfortably, Cahill won by 1,134 votes (12,064 for Cahill; Schneiderman 10,930).
The Schneiderman camp to its credit has adjusted to these hard facts. The AG has stepped up its press and political outreach since November. Just since January, AG Schneiderman has registered excellent press coverage on many fronts (ethics, not for profit governance, the underpayment of pizza delivery drivers, grand jury reform, lost taxes due to bootlegged cigarette sales, protecting Alzheimer patients, and a settlement with Macy’s on ending racial profiling). They also brought on a talented tactician to join this staff, both in terms of minority outreach and labor relations in Natalia Salgado (formerly of 32BJ) and a skilled communications pro in Eric Soufer.
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One suspects Team Schneiderman saw the 2014 returns as indicting no real threat for re-election in 2018, but that any serious look at running for Governor down the road required a recalibration of the Attorney General’s political positioning. That realistic appraisal speaks well of the Attorney General’s political sagacity.
However, I am not sure the Attorney General was helped by post-election press rumors (albeit anonymous reports) of his interest in running a primary against Governor Cuomo, should the Governor seek to run for a third term in 2018. Eric Schneiderman, if he wants to be a viable candidate for Governor in 2018 or 2022, has a lot of political carpentry to master, especially outside of NYC, which has driven the gubernatorial turnout over the last three decades. It may not help AG Schneiderman, if every time he picks up a hammer and a screw driver to connect those planks, if a political motive is presumed, not to mention Governor Andrew Cuomo’s political team might not take kindly to the appearance of a push bordering on a putsch (i.e., and they are not unskilled at such infighting).
Any real admirer of the Attorney General’s might see the advantage in Schneiderman rowing with muffled oars, waiting to crow about a Governor’s race, until he has secured safe political harbors along Long Island’s shores, the banks of the Hudson and Mohawk river valleys and the Great Lakes’ regions Upstate. In brief, the Attorney General might benefit from building his political ship, before his boosters’ discuss their desire to sail.
If Eric Schneiderman’s capable political team, puts the desired sail before crafting a sturdy political ship, one could foresee a tricky tide forming around the worries of Upstate and Suburban Democrats, concerned that Eric Schneiderman does not understand how to lead the ticket in their regions. That, in turn, could trigger political leaders outside NYC, asking either Senator Gillibrand or Comptroller DiNapoli, who have already built the broad statewide electoral coalitions needed to win a gubernatorial race, to consider sparing the Democratic Party a schism filled contest in 2018, should Andrew Cuomo not seek a third term, particularly if the Republicans appear on the verge of finally finding their sea legs in time for the 2018 campaign.
Yet, AG Schneiderman and his political team are probably too smart to fall into such traps. So, in my view, it is far too soon to count Eric Schneiderman out as gubernatorial timber. To repeat he has had an excellent first quarter in 2015, in terms of generating sustained as well as positive press coverage. Meanwhile, it is a fact that unlike the first terms of Eliot Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo as Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman has not yet built a cross regional political juggernaut to at once sustain and advance his gubernatorial aspirations. Charting Schneiderman’s progress over his second term as AG, on that gubernatorial score, will be worth watching. Conclusion
Cracking the code of the 2014 electoral returns has for me been rewarding. There are troubling problem spots emerging on the horizon for both parties, from the shadows of the 2014 returns.
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It comes down to this, can the Democrats avoid an ideological schism and/or will the Republicans finally begin to confront the mixed conundrum of ideology and demographics? Whichever party does a better job will have the whip hand in 2018 and into the next decade. If both parties fail to confront these challenges with solutions, (both substantive and political) then both parties will be vulnerable to a younger version of Mike Bloomberg running and winning as a true Independent candidate for Governor (perhaps not in 2018, but in the next decade) especially if that candidate were a woman.
Nor would Bloomberg himself be perfectly tapered to this mission (e.g., hindered not only by the political scar tissue of three mayoral terms but the reality that central casting would call for a “third way” candidate more attuned to the corridor linking the Northern Suburbs to the Hudson North region and on to Central and Western New York). Although, the prospect of an independent Bloomberg candidacy for Governor in 2018 would send shivers down the spines of both parties and perhaps even nudge progressives and their labor allies to feel more warmly towards Cuomo running for a third term.
But if both major parties in NYS continue to careen around the political track ignoring their blind spots, the potential for a third party (ideologically neutral) candidate for Governor cannot be dismissed. If that happens, William Randolph Hearst will be rolling over in his grave in rapid revolutions, thinking he burst onto the political scene a century too soon, to realize his dreams of being the Governor of New York.
More important than all the political machinations is the pull of governance. NYS faces real challenges across all three regions of our state and the electorate is not likely to remain loyal to either party, unless and until the parties govern in a way which actually improves the quality of life within each region. Consequently, one senses that the voters soon will demand true transformational change from Albany.
The fundamental issue facing New York State is and will continue to be how to manage the diverse regional challenges of growth. Demographers tell us that after over a century of being a city of just under or just over 8 million people, New York City by mid-century will hold 9 million people. Therefore, the enormous long term test will be housing, transporting and educating the city’s 9 million people, while pursuing sustainability in terms of the environment.
Across Upstate, the challenge is exactly the opposite, as both population and jobs are on the decline. While there are promising shoots of growth in the greater Capital District and Western New York regions, (surrounding Rochester and Buffalo) too much of Upstate remains in Rust Belt decline. The state desperately needs policies which can finally jumpstart the economy across the length and breadth of Upstate. Upstate’s infrastructure is in a state of aging and chronic disrepair and a well- educated work force is essential in our newly flat world.
The Suburbs have more affluence than poverty, although suburban poverty is growing, but the challenge becomes holding onto younger couples too often priced out of the communities they grew up in. The goal becomes preventing generational imbalance from adversely affecting the quality of life in suburban communities.
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Poverty is a core problem within all three regions of our State. The hollowing out of the middle class is an enduring cross regional challenge. The pragmatic approach to economic inequality lies in finding ways to expand the middle class while protecting its purchasing power and the quality of life of those in the middle class.
By necessity, any Governor’s mission in fact all of state government, should be attuned to simultaneously addressing each of these distinct regional challenges. A Governor and a Legislature who can make a lasting impact surmounting this varied growth challenge will carve out an enduring legacy. Governor Andrew Cuomo is both well prepared and well versed to meet this challenge in his second term, but success will probably require political adaptation and purposeful policy-making.
For the foreseeable future, the politics of regionalism will become intertwined with the varied growth challenges in New York State. The major parties and their elected officials, especially whoever sits in the Governor’s office, will not be judged truly effective unless and until they can craft the political architecture to sustain the engineering of governance to surmount these regional growth challenges. It is quite fitting that our state’s politics and government will become judged at this intersection of regional growth.
If the major parties have no long term answer to this conundrum, one can foresee the voters down the road at once demanding and ultimately receiving an alternative approach from an independent third way movement which can appear ready to solve the riddle of both regional politics and growth. If, one of the major parties can provide governing answers they will dominate the state politically. The lesson of the 2014 election is that neither party made real strides in answering these regional riddles, leaving our state’s politics with an uncertain future.
Bruce N. Gyory is a political and strategic consultant, serving as a senior advisor at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP and is an adjunct professor at the University of Albany (SUNY).
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