Anatomy of NYS’s 2014 Statewide Elections – An Uncertain Future From: Bruce Gyory Date: April 15, 2015 Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP | manatt.com Synopsis By historical standards, the Governor Cuomo’s 2014 re-election margin was quite solid (i.e., almost exactly where Rockefeller’s numbers stood in 1962) even as it was not a landslide a la Cuomo’s 2010 election. No Governor of New York has won back to back landslides (defined as combining as both a large absolute numbers lead – over 650,000 votes – and a large outright majority – over 55% of the vote) since Lehman (in 1932 and 1934). Cuomo’s victory was never in doubt, but the general election’s margin, following his contentious primary win against Teachout by just shy of 2-1, was far closer than the polls projected, leaving an aura of surprise. That Cuomo finished at 54% (a 13% margin) rather than 57% or higher of the vote, was at root a function of a very low turnout in NYC and a tightening of the race Upstate and on Long Island. The most important factor to note about the 2014 returns, is that almost three quarters of the statewide vote was cast outside of NYC (74%) and that low turnout reduced both the female share of the vote to 51% (from its consistent 53% level over the last decade), and the aggregate minority vote down to a 28% share from 29% in 2010, (but most importantly knocking the minority vote off its long term growth trajectory which should have placed it at a 30 or 31% share in 2014). Given that, Astorino snared only a third of the Women’s vote and got well under a quarter of the minority vote, that low vote from NYC merely reduced the Democratic margins for the Cuomo led ticket. Astorino did almost nothing to further the GOP’s prospects for once again winning statewide. In the end, the texture of the campaign reduced the impact of overwhelming margins from base Democratic voters for Cuomo, while Astorino failed to advance the Republican reach beyond the dwindling conservative base. In terms of the 2014 numbers, Comptroller DiNapoli led the Democratic ticket in terms of both percentage of the vote (60% for DiNapoli, to Schneiderman’s 55.7% and Cuomo’s 54.3%) and absolute numbers (DiNapoli 2,233,057 votes to Schneiderman’s 2,069,956 votes and Cuomo’s 2,069,480 votes-almost identical). DiNapoli, alone amongst the Democratic statewide candidates, carried all three regions of the state (Cuomo and Schneiderman failed to carry Upstate). Moreover, DiNapoli hitting 60% in a near record low statewide turnout was a real achievement (3,930,310 with blanks counted, but only 3,812,708 votes cast for gubernatorial candidates, 3,714,505 for the Attorney General candidates and 3,712,189 for the Comptroller candidates). In turn, that low turnout, left a regional breakdown not at all conducive for Democrats (49% of the vote came from Upstate, only 26% from NYC and 25% from the 4 Suburban Counties). Synopsis In a historical anomaly, 2014 was a year with almost no drop-off from the gubernatorial vote to the Comptroller’s vote (2.6%) and the Attorney General’s race (2.57%), with the vote for Attorney General slightly higher than the Comptroller’s vote (by 2,316 votes). Traditionally, that drop off was 4% and sometimes as high as 9 or 10% off the gubernatorial vote (e.g., in 2010 the drop off from the gubernatorial to the Comptroller’s vote was 3.8% and it was 4.5% from the gubernatorial to the AG’s vote) and the vote in the AG’s race was before always slightly below, not ahead of the vote in the Comptroller’s race. In the wake of the 2014 election returns, neither the Democratic nor the Republican parties have much to cheer about. A fair analysis of these returns reveals that both major parties failed to advance their long-term electoral agendas, leaving themselves with exposed vulnerabilities in future gubernatorial elections. The Democrats have once again failed to prove any lasting capacity to push their base in New York City toward voting its electoral weight in a gubernatorial race. New York City is 43% of the state’s population, 38% of the state’s registered voters, but only cast 26% of the state’s vote in the 2014 election. This paltry 26% share was not only far below NYC’s registration share, but significantly below the 30% share cast by NYC in 3 of the last 4 gubernatorial elections and dramatically below the 34- 35% share cast by NYC, in the state’s 2008 and 2012 presidential races. This chronic under voting from NYC (which goes back to the 1980’s), leaves New York’s Democrats vulnerable to a Republican who could hit the following tipping points for victory (60% of the vote from Upstate, 57% from the Suburbs and cracking 30% of the vote from NYC) when the NYC share is under 30% of the statewide total. Meanwhile, in 2014 just like in 2010 and 2006, the GOP came nowhere close to hitting these tipping points in even a single region. Thus, for the GOP in electoral terms, 2014 was a wasted year in the gubernatorial race. The Republicans have not carried the state since Pataki’s third term run in 2002: for President, Governor, US Senate, Comptroller or AG. While the Democrats are showing signs of retreat from their recent success in carrying Upstate (2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012), particularly amongst conservative Democrats and moderate Independents, the Republicans were blown away Downstate, not only in NYC but losing in the Suburbs as well. The 2014 election was the fifth consecutive statewide election where the Republicans failed the garner even a third of the state’s female majority, while continuing to lose the minority vote by margins of 4-1. Republican strength downstate seems to be lodged only on LI, as the Northern Suburbs (Rockland as well as Westchester) continue a sharp shift to the Democrats in statewide elections. Consequently, the near future of gubernatorial politics in NYS will be determined by which party can best compensate for these weaknesses (Democrats on turnout and amongst non-liberal voters outside NYC) and Republicans (amongst female and minority voters). If both parties continue to fail in this regard over the next decade, one could see the emergence of a Bloomberg type independent, anchored to neither party, who could be elected Governor powered by the current of vital center voters, especially if such a candidate could capture significant support from 2 of the 3 key minority pillars in the Democrats’ base (Black, Hispanic and Asian voters, with Hispanic and Asian voters being the most likely to pull away from the Democrats). We are not there yet and no such personage is currently looming, but that potential could someday become a magnet for just such a candidate running against both major parties. Anatomy of NYS’s 2014 Statewide Elections – An Uncertain Future | manatt.com iii Synopsis In practical terms, the Democrats need to avoid a schism taking hold along the fault lines exposed in the Cuomo – Teachout primary (moderate vs. progressive Democrats), while the Republicans must find a way to garner support from female, Hispanic and Asian voters in general elections. New York is a Democratic, not a liberal state, especially in lower gubernatorial turnouts. The 2014 exit polls were pretty conclusive, 27% of the state’s voters described themselves as liberals, 29% as conservative, but 44% as moderates. New York’s liberals have reached parity with conservatives in recent decades, not because the liberal share has grown, but because the conservative share of the electorate has shrunk at the expense of a rising tide of moderate voters (e.g., in 1970, Rockefeller’s last election a Yankelovich poll for the Times pegged NYS’ ideological splits at 37% conservative, 33% moderate and 27% liberal; On His own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller by Richard Norton Smith at p. 565). Meanwhile, the key for continued Democratic success is growing the share cast by the state’s urban cores (where Democratic margins are powered by minority and progressive white voters) while holding the moderate voters so critical in the Suburbs, Upstate as well as Downstate. The Democrats need to do both, it is not sufficient to accomplish just one of those objectives. If an ideological schism takes hold in NYS, within the Democratic Party, the party could become vulnerable in gubernatorial contests, if these independent voters and conservative Democrats bolt (i.e., the political algebra which defined NYS politics from 1942-1972 in the Dewey Rockefeller era). Alternatively, the Republicans cannot win statewide with a purely conservative coalition in NYS, given the Democrats’ registration advantage and the de facto parity along the ideological divide in NYS. Instead, to win Republicans must relearn the lessons of Dewey, Rockefeller, D’Amato and Pataki: a Republican can win statewide only if they can raid key Democratic blocs. In the past that meant Republicans garnering Jewish and White Catholic voters. Today as women in NYS usually hit the 53% share of the state’s voters and the aggregate minority vote is heading towards a full third of the statewide vote, that means Republicans have to be able to gainer the votes of women, as well as Hispanic and Asian voters. We seem a long way from when D’Amato took 40% of the Jewish vote (1992), Bloomberg took 47% of Hispanics (2001) and Pataki 45% of Hispanics (2002), while Bloomberg and Pataki swept the Asian vote, the Jewish vote and both ran as pro-choice candidates.