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P12 Layout 1 INTERNATIONAL TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2016 Obama heads to Laos - signs of a tilt away from China First US sitting president to visit Laos VIENTIANE: The secretive communist gov- more closely towards another neighbor, one of the world’s longest rivers, the increasingly seen as a Chinese satellite. cally before 2014, according to figures ernment of Laos, a country with a popula- Vietnam, whose dispute with China over Mekong, aims to become “the battery of “The US strategic interest in Laos is to from China’s Ministry of Commerce and tion of less than 7 million, rarely causes a the South China Sea has pushed it into a Asia” by selling power to its neighbors. see the country be able to exert a certain state-run media. For the United States, ripple on the diplomatic circuit. And yet its deepening alliance with the United States. degree of strategic autonomy because impoverished Laos is not a strong invest- sleepy capital will spring to life next week “The new government is more influenced Shifting policy you don’t want ... (to) have something akin ment draw. “In Laos, we bring 7-8 compa- when global leaders arrive for an Asian by the Vietnamese than the Chinese,” said It is difficult to read policy in Laos to the relationship between China and nies to the table compared with 30-40 summit. Barack Obama will be among a Western diplomat in Southeast Asia.” “It’s because its leaders are so uncommunica- Cambodia,” said Phuong Nguyen of the companies that Vietnam brings. But them, making the last push of his presiden- never too late for a US president to visit.” tive, but Western diplomats have detected Washington-based Center for Strategic China- that’s a totally different ball game,” cy to ‘rebalance’ Washington’s foreign poli- Obama will become the first sitting US some shifts. First, deputy Prime Minister and International Studies think-tank. A said Anthony Nelson, director of the US- cy towards Asia, a strategy widely seen as a president to visit landlocked Laos, where Somsavat Lengsavad - who ran the steer- defense official in Washington did not ASEAN business council. response to China’s economic and military the United States waged a “secret war” ing panel for a $7 billion Chinese rail proj- comment on wider strategic issues but “So there’s no coincidence that the muscle-flexing across the region. The might while fighting in Vietnam, dropping an ect - retired. The project is now believed to described Laos as “an important partner.” A countries with the lowest levels of devel- of Laos’ giant neighbor to the north is hard estimated two million tons of bombs on be on hold because Laos is unhappy with China foreign ministry spokesman said opment, Laos and Cambodia, are the most to miss in Vientiane: wealthy Chinese driv- the country. About 30 percent of the ord- the terms of the deal. Officials of Prime “we welcome any country, including those willing to advocate for China’s position in ing SUVs overtake tuk-tuks sputtering nance failed to explode, leaving a danger- Minister Thongloun Sisoulith’s new gov- inside and outside this region, developing international discussions.” But the Lao are along the roads and Chinese-backed hotels ous and costly legacy. Laos has strategic ernment, many of them educated in constructive relations, as long as these ties closer culturally to Vietnam than they are sprout from noisy construction sites in one importance to both Vietnam and China. Vietnam, have visited Hanoi en masse in are really beneficial to regional peace, sta- to China. Their businesses use Lao lan- of Asia’s most low-rise cities. Vietnam has a long land border with Laos recent weeks, their first foreign trip. At two bility and prosperity.” guage signs and mixed Lao-Vietnamese But diplomats say Obama could be that gives it access to markets in Thailand of the past meetings of the Association of families incorporate local customs, while pushing on an open door in Laos, thanks and beyond. For China, Laos is a key gate- Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is Long-term battle Lao-Chinese families tend to be isolated. to a change of government there in April. way to Southeast Asia in its “new Silk currently chaired by Laos, Vientiane has Beijing has invested around $1 billion “We are a bit frustrated with (China). They They say the country’s new leaders appear Road” trade strategy. Laos, which is devel- taken a more nuanced stance on Beijing annually in Laos in 2014 and 2015, a step create their own eco-system,” a Lao busi- ready to tilt away from Beijing and lean oping a series of hydropower plants along than neighboring Cambodia, which is up from the $4.5 billion invested histori- nessman said. — Reuters Maharashtra to give women slum dwellers joint ownership rights MUMBAI: The Indian state of Maharashtra will Fadnavis last week said Nagpur’s lead may be give women slum dwellers equal ownership applied to slums across the state. rights with men, the first such move by the While Indian law gives women equal own- state where millions live in the very poor neigh- ership rights to land and property, women are borhoods. About 55 slums in the city of Nagpur seldom aware of their rights and are often will be regularized under a plan to recognize denied access, said Shivani Chaudhry, execu- the more than 25,000 families who live there as tive director of advocacy group Housing and legal residents. Each family will be given a land Land Rights Network in India. “We welcome title that gives joint ownership to the man and this move to give joint ownership titles, but woman, a senior official said. “We have given while these rights exist on paper, in reality land titles in the past to slum dwellers, but this women aren’t allowed to access these rights,” time the titles will have the name of the said Chaudhry. woman as well,” said Shrawan Hardikar, com- “These steps need to be accompanied by missioner at the Nagpur municipal corporation. ways to increase women’s awareness of their “We wish to empower women with equal rights and some measure of protection of rights to property as men. Especially for the these rights. Implementation also needs to be poorest of the poor who live in slums, land monitored to ensure women are really able to and property are a means of security,” he told access these rights,” she said. India ranked 59 the Thomson Reuters Foundation. Hundreds of 128 countries in the International Property of millions of people live in slums in Indian Rights Index 2016. The index measures factors cities because they cannot afford to buy or including the legal and political environment, rent a home. They are often migrant workers physical property rights and intellectual prop- who move in search of better economic erty rights. India fared particularly badly in opportunities. Many live in shacks with no areas such as gender equality that measured running water or toilets, under the constant women’s access to land and to bank loans for threat of eviction or displacement. property, as well as inheritance rights for wid- Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra ows and daughters. — Reuters HANGZHOU: Clay figures made by a female artist Wu Xiaoli (front role from right) feature US President Barack Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and other G20 leaders is on display at a shop in Hangzhou in east China’s Zhejiang province. China will host the G20 Summit in Hangzhou on Sept 4-5. — AP China President reshuffles key party posts ahead of congress Xi places his men in key positions BEIJING: Chinese President Xi Jinping has Hunan, Du Jiahao had assumed the party’s top violence in a region with a large ethnic minority reshuffled three top provincial-level Communist job, Xinhua said. Both Chen and Du worked with Muslim population. The current party boss, Party posts as he seeks to place his men in key Xi when he ran China’s commercial capital, Zhang Chunxian, is expected to move to Beijing positions ahead of a once-every-five-years con- Shanghai, as its Communist Party chief for a year to take over a senior role in a party building com- KATHMANDU: Indira Adhikari (left) and Suman Adhikari are seen at their home in gress next year, and more new appointments are in 2007, according to their resumes. “Xi is close to mittee that Xi is overseeing as part of his efforts Kathmandu, Nepal. The mother and son have very little hope of getting justice for likely soon. The party congress, expected to be both of them due to their time together in to instill greater discipline in the corruption- Muktinath Adhikari, who was dragged out of a classroom he was teaching, tied to a held next autumn, will see Xi further cement his Shanghai,” a source with ties to the leadership racked party, the source added. Xinhua said tree and riddled with bullets by alleged Maoists for refusing to part with a portion of hold on power by appointing close allies into told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity. Zhang would be given another post, but did not his salary to fuel their rebellion. — AP the party’s ruling inner core, the 25-member Tibet, considered one of the country’s most say what. A second source said the governor in Politburo and the seven-member Politburo politically sensitive positions due to periodic Shanxi, a coal-rich northern province beset by Survivors of Nepal’s insurgency Standing Committee. anti-Chinese unrest in the devoutly Buddhist corruption scandals, would move to Beijing to Xi, who doubles as Communist Party and mil- Himalayan region, also has a new party chief, take over as transport minister.
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