Turkey's Air Defense Umbrella and S-400

Report No: 213, September 2017

TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400

ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

ORSAM

Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12-B Çankaya / Ankara Tel: 0 (312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48 www.orsam.org.tr, [email protected] TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400

ORSAM Report No: 213

September 2017

ISBN: 978-605-9157-23-0

Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2017 Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or republished without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM. Prepared by: Sertaç Canalp KORKMAZ, Research Assistant, ORSAM Arda MEVLÜTOĞLU, Defense Policy Researcher

ORSAM 2 Report No: 213, September 2017 Contents

PREFACE...... 5 INTRODUCTION...... 7 1. AIR DEFENSE: BASIC CONCEPTS AND COMPOUNDS ...... 8 1.1. Types of Targets ...... 8 2.1. Compounds of Air Defense Systems ...... 11 2. TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY ...... 14 3. TURKEY’S NEED FOR AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ...... 15 4. S-400 SYSTEM ...... 18 ASSESSMENTS ...... 19 NOTES ...... 21

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 3 Figures, Tables and Graphs

Table 1: Ballistic missile classification based on ranges ...... 10

Figure 1: Air defense instruments and phases ...... 11

Table 2: Categorization of air defense systems according to their range and altitude ...... 12

Figure 2: Air defense layers ...... 13

Figure 3: Integrated Air Defense Command Control System developed by ASELSAN and

Its Compounds ASELSAN (Source: ASELSAN) ...... 16

Figure-4: S-400 Air Defense System (Source: The Aviationist) ...... 19

ORSAM 4 Report No: 213, September 2017 PREFACE

Due to the particular geographical region Turkey is located in, Turkey faces various threats to its national security. Turkey is both a country directly neighboring the Middle East and at the exact center of the three continents, which gives it a lot of advantages but also can drag it into crises and threats.

Besides the technological advancements, ongoing arms race on the regional level has also resulted in the rise of threats from air space. The increase in the number of unmanned aerial vehicles, the missile programs of the countries in the region and the missiles at various ranges in their inventory have pushed Turkey to take necessary measures in the field of air defense.

Lacking high altitude air defense capability for years, Turkey started to address this inca- pability after the Gulf War. However, it could take some steps to compensate for it only in the following years, with the T-LORAMIDS tender. Even though Turkey decided to initiate the negotiations with the Chinese firm CPMIEC, following the tender, certain problems surfaced in the following era, which resulted in the cancellation of the project, and, thus, no progress in this realm has been realized.

Both the developments triggered by the Arab Spring in the Middle East and the energy issue coming forth in the Eastern Mediterranean led Turkey to take necessary steps in the field of air defense. Currently, an agreement has been reached in the negotiations with Russian Federation on the purchase of S-400 air defense system. However, the step taken by Turkey to compensate for its shortcomings in the high-altitude air defense field has started to be questioned by the USA and some European countries.

This study, conducted by Defense Policy Researcher Arda Mevlütoğlu and ORSAM Re- search Assistant Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz, has put emphasis both on the technical dimension of the issue and on the reasons why such a system is needed in Turkey.

I believe this study will make significant contributions to the literature regarding ongoing debates on S-400 issue and I wish that it will be an enlightening piece for all readers.

Assoc. Prof. Şaban Kardaş President of ORSAM

ORSAM Report No: 213, Sptember 2017 5

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 ORSAM ORSAM ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ

Project Team: Sertaç Canalp KORKMAZ, Research Assistant, ORSAM Arda MEVLÜTOĞLU, Defense Policy Researcher

TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400

INTRODUCTION Turkey has faced rocket and missile at- and the projects it conducts and has suc- tacks in various cities on the Syrian bor- ceed in bringing to the final stages are der during the Syrian civil war, which promising in terms of producing air de- has brought the issue of air and missile fense systems which are more advanced defense to the public agenda again. Con- and show higher performance levels by sidering that this issue was on the public using national capabilities. agenda during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980- 1988, the First Gulf War of 1991, and the However, there are considerable weak- Gulf War of 2003, the lack of an effective nesses in the air defense capacity of Tur- key, which faces crisis and threats in great air and missile defense structure is even numbers and of various natures, making more striking. the achievement of this capability is vital Almost all of the neighboring countries of for the protection of its national interests. There is not still an adequate and efficient Turkey have advanced ballistic and cruise system in the inventory for the protection missiles. The country, thus, has searched of the air space of the country. In this re- for the supply of modern air and missile gard, it is significant to specify and meet defense systems since the beginning of the urgent needs. However, such an evalu- the 1990s. In order to satisfy this, need ation should be carried out in cooperation the efforts were previously focused on with some other fields such as foreign pol- direct procurement. Gradually, however, icy, economics and defense industry. a model targeting the development of such systems through national capabilities This study analyzes the present capacity of has gained importance due to the confi- Turkey and what it requires after drawing dence provided by the progress made in a general framework regarding air defense the domestic defense industry for several systems and makes assessments and rec- decades. The products of the domestic ommendations in the light of the current defense industry in the field of air defense developments.

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 7 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

1. AIR DEFENSE: BASIC CONCEPTS AND COMPOUNDS

The use of hot air balloons in the recon- as an umbrella which should be built and naissance and surveillance missions in the kept up-to-date against various threats. mid-19th century led to the emergence of the concept of air defense. Anti-aircraft The most important element giving a weapons and tactics came to the agenda strategic dimension to the importance of with the Turco-Italian War in 1911 when air defense and thus air defense systems the aircraft developed at the beginning of is that cities, industrial zones, infrastruc- the following century were first used for tures and military factions seen as front- military missions. lines have also become the target of air offensives. The primary target of the air- The warring factions in the World War I craft in the World War I was the enemy provided air defense largely through the troops in the battlefield. With the World weapons obtained by modifying small War II, cities and industrial plants became arms and field howitzers. Towards the end the new targets of intense bombarding. of the war, anti-aircraft guns for direct use Indeed, V-1 and V-2 missiles hit the cit- against the aircraft were developed based ies at the end of the war. This transforma- on the experience in this field. In this tion triggered by technological advances sense, the period between two wars was a caused modern wars to go beyond the maturation period for tactics, techniques battlefields and to expand and cover all and weapons. warring countries.

The World War II also witnessed the Therefore, it was necessary, from then increase in the efficiency and range of onwards, to protect not only the troops anti-aircraft weapons in parallel with the fighting in the frontlines but also the sup- developments regarding the performance ply lines supporting these troops and the and capabilities of the aircraft. Within this economic and industrial infrastructure of process, air defense was matured as a sep- the country against the air attacks. From arate category and a separate doctrine. In this viewpoint, air defense systems not the last stage of the war, Germany started only constituted as a part of combatant using V-1 and V-2 missiles targeting the units, but also started to be shaped as a allied cities, thus giving a new meaning to means that protect strategically impor- the air defense concept. tant plants, campuses and zones. Having regard to this feature, air defense umbrel- With the rapid technological advances in la can be described as a system which is the Cold War, the inurement of long-range comprised of interwoven layers and in- high-performance bombardment aircraft cludes systems which are quite complicat- flying at high altitude, ballistic missiles, ed to fictionalize, establish and maintain. high performance jet aircraft, cruise missiles and finally, stealth bomber aircraft 1.1. Types of Targets led to the development of defense arms which would detect and intercept such The most important reason why air de- systems. Therefore, air defense acts today fense systems are comprised of interwo-

ORSAM 8 Report No: 213, September 2017 TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400 ORSAM ven layers is that air threats have different Apache helicopters hit an Iraqi air defense types and features. Therefore, it is benefi- radar base with their AGM-114 Hellfire cial to examine these targets as the first missiles, opening a safe corridor to the co- step in the analysis of the strategic impor- alition aircraft approaching to attack.1 tance of the development, provision and use of an air defense system. Unmanned Air Vehicles: Although works were initiated in the World War I Fixed Wing Aircraft: The aircraft is used concerning pilotless aircraft, unmanned for military purposes in a wide range of air vehicles (UAV) started to be used com- missions. These can be categorized sim- monly and effectively in the battlefield in ply as air-to-air combat, attack on surface the last quarter of the 20th century, as a re- targets (bombarding), transport, recon- sult of the developments in the electronic naissance-surveillance, airborne early and software industries. Having been ini- warning and command-control as well tially used for target acquisition and fire as electronic war. All these different mis- adjustment of artillery units, the UAVs sions require different performance char- were adapted in time for various missions acteristics and capabilities in terms of air- such as electronic warfare, armed attack craft design. For instance, an interceptor and naval surveillance. Today, UAVs are aircraft, which is primarily designed for produced and used in various dimensions combating enemy aircraft, is supposed to and with flight performance and mission have higher maneuverability, rate of climb equipment as a result of the developments and acceleration values. A fighter aircraft regarding engines, materials and electron- which is designed to provide close air sup- ics. In this field, Israel was first to use UAVs port should have good survival capabil- intensely to destroy Syrian air defense bat- ity against ground fire. Heavy transport teries in Beqaa Valley in the 1982 Lebanon aircrafts generally fly at high altitude and War.2 The UAVs which are already armed constant speed and thus, are not supposed are used rather for missions to attack land to have high maneuver capabilities. targets by using precision-guided arms. However, jet engined UAVs will be used Rotary Wing Aircraft (Helicopters): in different missions such as air-to-air and Helicopters have become the most funda- air-to-ground missions in the near future mental instruments in the battlefield since especially in order to suppress and destroy the Korean War in which they were com- the air defense of the enemy when the monly used for the first time. They are projects conducted in the USA, Europe used largely in transport, reconnaissance- and China are put into practice.3 surveillance and attack/close air support missions. When compared to fixed wing Cruise Missile: Cruise missiles can be aircraft, the most distinct difference is simply defined as guided munitions which their flying speed and altitude. Further- approach their targets through level flight. more, especially light and medium class Many cruise missiles fly at low altitude helicopters have very high maneuverabili- and at constant speed during the majority ty. Notably attack helicopters are designed of their flight and carry out the necessary to fly at very low altitude and at relatively off course correction maneuvers via auto- high speed. matic pilot. There are different guidance and navigation systems and technologies The most important advantage of mod- that cruise missiles use for the precision ern attack helicopters is that they can fire detection of their positions and targets. precision-guided missiles without being detected. Indeed, AH-64 Apache helicop- In modern sense, the first cruise mis- ters of the US Land Forces launched the sile was V-1 used by Germany against first attacks in the 1991 Gulf War and nine the United Kingdom towards the end of

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 9 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

the World War II. Significant progress China, France, India. In parallel with the was made for the arms of such category developments in electronic, computer and together with the rapidly developing engine technologies, cruise missiles which electronic technologies after the war. In- have a range of 2.000-3.000 kilometers deed, especially upon the development of and fly a few times faster than sound (hy- precision navigation, cruising and guide- personic), came forth. control systems, the land-borne, airborne and seaborne long-range cruise missiles Ballistic Missiles: Ballistic missiles are became one of the major strategic weap- munitions reaching the target by following a ballistic orbit with the effect of the ons system of the US and the Soviet Union aerodynamic forces after being launched as of the 1980s. at a vertical or near vertical angle. The The power and efficiency of cruise missiles speed gained as a result of the operation in the modern battlefield first came to the of the rocket motor continuing for a while after launching is used for the rest of the world public agenda in the 1991 Gulf War. flight after the fuel is exhausted and the The precision and the destructive power engine stops. After the phase of free flight of Tomahawk cruise missiles fired by the called mid-course, the missile starts de- USA against the Iraqi army occupying scending towards the target. At this phase Kuwait showed that such weapons made called terminal phase, if there is such a it possible to attack remotely at a strate- system in the missile, the last orbit cor- gic scale without risking the allied units. rection maneuvers are carried out. At this Indeed, the main instruments of almost phase, the descending angle is close to 90 all the US military operations and point degrees, thus the kinetic energy becomes attacks were Tomahawk missiles. Today, extremely high.4 development projects are conducted in order to fire cruise missiles from differ- Ballistic missiles can be categorized in ent platforms (aircraft, submarine, surface various forms according to the ranges and ship, land battery) in a great number of the launching platforms. A roughly-draft- countries, notably like the USA, Russia, ed categorization is shown below.

Table 1: Ballistic missile classification based on ranges5

Type of Missile Range

Short Range Ballistic Missile; SRBM <1.000 km

Medium Range Ballistic Missile; MRBM 1.000-3.000 km

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile; IRBM 3.000-5.500 km

Inter Continental Ballistic Missile; ICBM > 5.500 km

ORSAM 10 Report No: 213, September 2017 TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400 ORSAM

Ballistic missiles have some advantages iii. It is extremely difficult to detect due to their flight characteristics. These mobile launching systems and the can be summarized as follows:6 ballistic missiles. In this sense, the submarine launched ballistic missiles i. High flying speed: Thanks to this, the (SLBM) are of great strategic impor- missile can reach the target in a rela- tance. tively short time, leaving the defense systems insufficient reaction time 2.1. Compounds of Air Defense Systems for the, determination, detection and protection. Due to this feature, ballis- As summarized above, there are various tic missiles are especially important air threats. A swift and efficient defense in crisis period since it causes time umbrella should be built in order to de- pressure on the enemy states. tect, determine, track and intercept these targets which have flight characteristics ii. The high speed of ballistic missiles and capabilities seriously different than at the terminal phase causes the neu- each other before they pose any threat. tralization of air defense systems de- Such an umbrella will be comprised of veloped against the conventionally detecting systems and arms systems developed aircraft and helicopters. which will prevent them through contact Letting aside preventing them, it be- and command-control network connect- comes even impossible to determine ing these systems. Simply speaking, air especially ballistic missiles of MRBM defense umbrella is indeed a system of and superior categories through systems. A complete, incessant and rapid conventional target determination- communication and coordination is oblig- detection systems since they cruise in atory among all the sub-systems so that the mid-course phase outside the at- this process from detection to destruction mosphere (in space) and enter the at- can function properly (See Figure 1). mosphere during the terminal phase at a very high speed.

Figure 1: Air defense instruments and phases7

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The major role of the target detection, detect various types of threats. Further- identification and tracking systems in the more, they should also be designed with air defense domain is to create informa- an eye on the above-mentioned character- tion necessary for the detection, track- istics of flexibility and adaptability. Due to ing and prevention of the threat. Certain these factors, it becomes obligatory to fo- systems used within this scope are land- cus on all the stages regarding the produc- borne early warning radars, airborne early tion and improvement of air defense sys- warning systems, early warning satellites tems, from identification of requirements etc. The data collected through various to development and supply, through a platforms and systems are transferred to long-term and rigorous planning process. command control centers by means of the infrastructure of the communications Arms systems used for air defense can systems; they are gathered, classified and be generally classified into two main cat- assessed here. Therefore, the integrated egories: barreled and non-barreled arms picture helps the decision-making mecha- systems. Barreled air defense systems are nism with the selection of the most appro- widely known as anti-aircraft guns. These priate measures, procedures and methods are divided into two sub-groups such as in order to detect and prevent the threat towed systems, that is, systems led by a early. vehicle towing them, and self-propelled systems. The capabilities and performances of the above-mentioned threats rapidly improve Non-barreled air defense systems can be in the modern battlefield. This obliges the categorized as air defense missiles and adoption of an approach which is flexible high-energy weapon systems (such as in the installation of air defense architec- laser systems) which have been put into ture, which can be easily updated on the practice in recent years. There are dif- basis of the advancing technology and ferent categories of air defense missiles which can easily internalize new systems in terms of the platform used, maximum and technologies. It is highly costly to de- range and altitude. An example of such velop and manage the systems which can categorization is shown below.

Table 2: Categorization of air defense systems according to their range and altitude8

Altitude Categorization

Very Low Altitude 0-3.000 m

Low Altitude 3.000-5.000 m

Medium Altitude 5.000-10.000 m

High Altitude > 10.000 m

Range Categorization

Very Short Range 0-6.000 m

Short Range 6.000-15.000 m

Middle Range 15.000-40.000 m

Long Range > 40.000 m

ORSAM 12 Report No: 213, September 2017 TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400 ORSAM

The infrastructure, the main lines of of target. Therefore, an incessantly-func- which are mentioned above, should functioning and rigid defense umbrella is built tion properly and rapidly in order for the through systems supplementing and sup- air defense systems including different porting each other in a wide geography. ranges and altitude layers to ensure effec- Thus, the gaps which might occur in the tive defense in crisis and conflicts. Each fields of inclusiveness and/or prevention system and instrument in this structure serves with a complementary and sup- for reasons such as the roundness of the portive nature. So, there is no definite dis- Earth, rough terrain, natural and artificial tinction between target-based sensors and obstacles, electronic battle or bombard- type of arms. There are common points ing of the enemy would be eliminated (See between the altitudes, ranges and types Figure 2).

Figure 2: Air defense layers.9

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 13 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

2. TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY

Turkish Air Force Command (HvKK) is Turkey’s air defense command control responsible for the protection of Turkey’s system infrastructure is comprised of ra- air space. Combat Air Force and Air Mis- dar systems deployed in more than 30 sile Defense Command formed under regions and Control Warning Centers HvKK on 5 August 2014 perform this duty functioning in seven different regions as together with combat and support units 10 well as Combined Air Operations Centers under it. (BHHM) in Eskişehir and Diyarbakır. In addition to land-borne radars, four E-7T There is not currently a long-range high- altitude air defense missile system used Peace Eagle airborne early warning and by Turkey. The only systems provided control (HEİK) planes received in 2014- so far in this category have been MIM-3 2015 are also used in early warning and Nike Ajax missile transferred from the target detection missions in a wide geog- USA in 1955 and Nike Hercules missile raphy. All this architecture functions in an transferred in 1959. Among these systems integrated form with NATO’s air defense developed for the prevention of remote command control network and carries out heavy bombarding aircraft fleets flying two-way data exchange.12 The air defense at high altitude, Nike Hercules missiles command control infrastructure has been 11 underwent modernization in 1985. The established on tactical level, through Air most developed land-borne air defense Defense Early Warning and Command missile system which is still at service is Control System (HERİKKS) developed by the MIM-23 HAWK system provided as ASELSAN.13 a second-hand system from the USA in early 2000. These systems which have a US-made AN/FPS-117 and AN/MPQ-64 nearly 40-50 km range underwent launch- Sentinel and Italy-made RAT-31SL/DL ing control and radar modernization. are among the land-borne early warning Apart from this, Rapier B1 X systems and radar systems. In addition to 14 TRS- Atılgan and Zıpkın systems which use Stinger anti-aircraft missiles effective at 22XX long-range radars supplied within short range and low altitude and which the first half of the 1990s, the Kalkan ra- are developed by ASELSAN constitute the dar developed by ASELSAN is at service air defense missile capabilities. Therefore, as well. ASELSAN also develops three- nearly 240 F-16 fighters aircraft in the in- dimensional long-range early warning ventory of HvKK constitute the backbone radar called Early Warning Radar System of air defense capabilities. (EİRS), through a contract signed in 2016.

ORSAM 14 Report No: 213, September 2017 TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400 ORSAM

3. TURKEY’S NEED FOR AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Turkey is a country which has been un- By establishing the T-LORAMIDS, it was der the threat of ballistic missiles since planned to provide the majority of the the 1960s. FROG and SCUD type missiles 12-battery air defense system in the pack- started to be widely used for the first time ages of four through by means of direct in this period. In addition to the War- procurement. As a result of the project, saw Pact members Bulgaria and the So- it was aimed at building a protective um- viet Union, Iraq and Syria also equipped brella against air breathing targets (air- their army with these missiles. Indeed, craft, cruise missiles etc.) and tactical bal- Syria used these missiles against Israel in listic missiles.15 the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Iran and Iraq has started to invest in missile tech- Following the publication of the Request nologies intensely since the 1980s. Both for Information Document (RfI) by the countries launched a lot of tactical ballis- Undersecretariat of Defense Industries tic missiles to the cities of the other side (SSM) in March 2007 and the collection of in the particular phase of the war called responses, the Request for Proposal (RfP) “War of the Cities”, in the Iran-Iraq War. was published on 8 April 2009. Within the Both countries started to develop their scope of this request, the period given to own missiles by taking SCUD missiles as submit the requests was extended several the basis, with the technical support of times and the candidate companies finally countries like Russia, North Korea, and submitted their requests on 1 March 2010. Libya in the second half of the 1980s.14 Chinese company CPMIEC FD-2000 and US companies Raytheon and Lockheed Iraq launched a great number of ballistic took part in the competition with the missiles against Saudi Arabia and Israel Patriot PAC III Configuration III System in order to cause fear and panic in the (PAC II GEM-T/PAC III missiles) as well other side and terror among the public as the Russian company Rosoboronek- in the 1991 Gulf War. The prevention of sport Antey 2500 and French-Italian EU- some of these missiles by the Patriot air ROSAM consortium SAMP/T (Aster 30 defense batteries brought the importance Block 1 missile). After a long assessment of air defense systems to the public agen- period, contract negotiations were initi- da. Indeed, Turkey put the necessity of a ated between the SSİK and the CPMIEC measure against them in its agenda in this Company on 26 September 2013.16 period since it did not have any defense system against ballistic missiles. Many After this decision was announced, Turkey works and initiatives undertaken in this faced intense diplomatic pressure from sense remained fruitless. NATO. In response to the concern that it would not be possible to integrate a Chi- After a long process of changing military, nese system into the air defense network political, and economic factors, uncer- of Turkey which is completely integrated tainty and indecisiveness, the Defense into NATO due to security reasons, Tur- Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) key argued that the system would be in- finally decided to initiate the project of tegrated through an “Integration Server” long-range air and missile defense sys- which will be developed domestically. On tem (T-LORAMIDS) on 30 June 2006. the other hand, the then Undersecretary

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 15 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

Murad Bayar held a press conference on reflected in the defense press. Finally, the October 3, 2013, where he stated that the negotiations on the purchase of the S-400 mentioned tender was initiated to meet system were initiated with Russia in Oc- Turkey’s urgent needs and it was planned tober 2016 and a memorandum of under- to develop a national long-range air de- standing was signed to develop the air and fense system in the long term with the missile defense system jointly between experience and knowledge to be obtained EUROSAM and Turkish industry in July from the project. 2017.17

The project was suspended in the Sum- Domestic solutions continue to be devel- mer of 2015 after long-lasting negotia- oped concerning the bottom layers of the tions and it was cancelled by the decision air defense umbrella: the development of taken by SSİK on November 13, 2015 on anti-aircraft artillery system with Korkut the grounds of the disagreements regard- Kundağı engine developed by ASELSAN ing technology transfer. In the statement has been completed and mass produc- of the Ministry of National Defense (MSB) of 17 November 2015 declaring this deci- tion has been initiated. Development and sion, it was also indicated that the efforts test activities of low and medium altitude to meet the mentioned needs by national air defense systems Hisar A and Hisar O 18 means would continue. With ASELSAN still continue. All the air defense sen- and ROKETSAN acting as prime contrac- sors, command control and arms systems tors, as the efforts to develop a national under development will function in a col- long-range air defense system continued, lective structure called “Integrated Air the news announcing that the SAMP/T, Defense Command Control System” and Patriot and MEADS systems have come to in cooperation with NATO instruments the agenda to meet the urgent needs were (See Figure 3).

Figure 3: Integrated Air Defense Command Control System developed by ASELSAN and Its Compounds ASELSAN (Source: ASELSAN)

While these works continue for the de- made to temporarily eliminate the current velopment of air defense, efforts are also weakness of capabilities and achieve de-

ORSAM 16 Report No: 213, September 2017 TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400 ORSAM terrence through the joint air defense sys- will witness an armed conflict in the long tem batteries deployed upon the request term, Turkey will increasingly need to cre- of NATO in crisis periods. Within this ate an A2/AD range not only in the sea scope, PATRIOT batteries were deployed but also in the Mediterranean air space, in Turkey by the allied states during the as a response to Egypt’s investments in the 1991 and 2003 Gulf wars. Lastly, air de- naval forces within the last years and the fense systems were transferred to Turkey policies followed by Greece and Greek Cy- within the scope of the “Active Fence” op- priot Administration of Southern Cyprus. eration in the Syrian civil war, upon Tur- key’s request.19 Although Turkey will temporarily meet its needs with S-400 which is planned to On the other hand, in this period in be purchased from Russia on the axis of which Turkey tries to build its own inte- ongoing negotiations, it will have to trans- grated air defense umbrella, its neighbor form its high-altitude/long-range air de- Iran has obtained Secil, Ghadr ve Shahab fense to a nationally produced system in families which have a range of over 2.000 the long run. The reason for this is that the kilometers by developing the CSS-8 mis- A2/AD strategy to be followed by Turkey siles with a range of 150 kilometers sup- may also require the prevention of Rus- 20 plied from China at the end of the 1980s. sia in the following years due to Russia’s Having received ATACMS type tactical increasing influence in the Eastern Medi- ballistic missiles from the USA, Greece terranean. Therefore, both naval and land also purchased from France SCALP-EG forces should work considerably closely cruise missiles launched from Mirage 21 in the A2/AD strategy to be developed by 2000 warcraft. Israel’s ballistic missile Turkey. Within this framework, Turkey’s power reached the range of 5.000 kilo- A2/AD strategy brings about a central meters with the latest Jericho 3 models.22 joint planning since it is not possible to In accordance with the strategy of Anti follow a one-dimensional A2/AD strategy Access/Area Denial in practice (A2/AD), in the geography in which Turkey is locat- Russia deployed Iskander (NATO code ed and it will fail to eliminate the possible SS-26 “Stone”) tactical ballistic missiles in threats. However, regarding the ongoing Crimea annexed in 2014.23 Armenia also negotiations with Russia concerning the purchased such missiles.24 purchase of S-400 and the objection of The energy issue which has been recently NATO in terms of these negotiations, it one of the significant headlines in Turkey becomes impossible for Turkey to follow is closely related to Turkey’s air defense a common policy in the A2/AD strategy it umbrella. It will be necessary to protect will implement in Eastern Mediterranean. Akkuyu Nuclear Plant which is expected This might lead to a rupture between the to enter into service in the mid-2020s in naval and land forces in a crisis which will terms of critical infrastructure and plants. break out in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the ongoing conflicts in the geography in which Turkey is located, the Therefore, as of autumn 2016 when the crisis and the capacity that terrorist orga- negotiations were initiated for the sup- nizations have reached will push Turkey ply of S-400 air defense system with Rus- to take measures in this field. However, sia, Turkey’s air defense umbrella appears the energy issue does not only come forth to depend almost completely on tactical within the scope of the critical infrastruc- warcraft and on the assistance of allies in ture and plant security of nuclear plants. crisis. If S-400 air system is purchased, an important gap will be filled in Turkish air Even though it is difficult to predict al- defense but certain problems will inevi- ready whether the Eastern Mediterranean tably rise in the particular regions where which has become a strategic geography two-dimensional A2/AD (naval-air) strat- in terms of energy within the last few years egy should be followed.

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 17 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

4. S-400 SYSTEM

The S-400 (NATO code SA-21 “Growler”) control unit and 91N6E search radar, the air defense system which is the subject maximum range of which is indicated to of Turkey-Russia negotiations is the new be around 600 kilometers in many sourc- generation version of the S-300 (NATO es, in the 30K6E battle management unit. code SA-10 “Grumble”) air defense sys- The threats detected by 91N6E radar tem which started to be developed in the are tracked by 92N6E engagement and 1970s. S-400 is still the most modern and launching control radar. In open sources, powerful air defense arms in the inventory it is stated that the range of 92N6E radar is of Russian Air Forces.25 around 340 kilometers.27

Cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, Different launching vehicles and launch- stealth aircraft and AWACS and electronic ers can be used in the system. These are warcraft are defined as the primary targets 5PE85TE2 towed launcher and 5PE85SE2 of S-400 which started to be developed in systems mounted on MAZ-7910 model the 1980. The project faced several issues vehicle, 5P90S systems mounted on BAZ- due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 6909-022 model vehicle and 5P90TMU and ensued economic drawbacks. The launching systems mounted on BAZ- first test-launching of the system was car- 64022 model vehicle. Similarly, missiles ried out in 1999 and the first battery of- of various types can be used according ficially came into service in 2007. 26 to the nature of threats and targets. Ac- cording to open sources, these are 48N6E As its predecessor S-300, S-400 is also a and 48N6E2 models of 150-200 kilome- semi-mobile system. Different platforms ter range, 48N6E3 model of 250 kilome- and launching vehicles in the system are ter range, 40N6E model of 400 kilometer carried by trucks. They are deployed and range and 9M96E model of 40 kilometer installed at an appropriate position to range used against ballistic missiles and start operating. A system comprised of 9M96E2 model of 120 kilometer range. these different platforms can be integrat- The 9M96E family is known to be based ed into the air defense command control on the “hit-to-kill” principle which means network, to share the target data obtained that the target is destroyed through physi- and use the information from it. cal hitting.28

An S-400 battery is comprised of a 30K6E Together with the S-400 system, it is also battle command system, maximum 6 stated that 59N6E radars which are said to 98J6E launching units including maxi- have a range of up to 600 kilometers and mum 12 launchers each and a 30Ts6E tridimensional 1L119 radars operating on supply unit. There is a 55K6E command VHF band can be used as an option.

ORSAM 18 Report No: 213, September 2017 TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400 ORSAM

Figure-4: S-400 Air Defense System (Source: The Aviationist)

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 19 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

ASSESSMENTS

Especially high-altitude and long-range comes. In order to prevent this weakness, air defense systems covering a wide ge- geographically widespread land-borne ography are significant instruments not and airborne radars (HEİK aircraft) are only in military terms but also in political, used: The data collected by all these in- economic and technological terms. The struments are combined and processed production, development, supply or sales at command control systems and they are of such systems of specific strategic grav- distributed to air defense systems. There- ity is not limited to the military-technical fore, an air defense battery benefits from context. These issues also have political, not only its own radar but also the target economic, technological and even psy- information obtained by all other radars chological dimensions. In the T-LORA- and prevents the target. This principle is MIDS tender, the selection of the Chinese vital for especially defense against cruise system and the following process is a good missiles and aircraft flying at low altitude. example of this phenomenon. A similar case is seen for ballistic missiles Air defense needs to be approached holis- as well. In order to prevent tactical bal- tically since radars and different percep- listic missiles completing all the phases tive systems, command control systems of flight beginning from the launching and barreled and non-barreled air defense in the atmosphere, the early detection of systems function in cooperation and that the target and the calculation of the orbit is comprised of interwoven layers. All with considerable sensitivity are neces- the compounds, from the shortest to the sary. This is similarly possible with the co- longest-range arms systems constitut- operation of widespread land-borne and ing the whole function within a network airborne sensors. Space-borne sensors are structure. At this point, having regard to also involved in the equation for ballistic the above-mentioned energy issue in the missiles of MRBM or higher categories Eastern Mediterranean and the rejection that complete their flight largely outside to integrate the S-400 system into NATO the atmosphere, that is, in space. There- systems, certain problems of productivity fore, the effectiveness of an individually will indispensably rise among naval and used air defense battery in comparison air instruments in the A2/AD strategy to with ballistic missiles is limited for short- be applied by Turkey. range / tactical ballistic missiles and is close to zero for missiles of longer range. Due to the roundness of the earth, the maximum range of a radar system falls as Considering the supply of the S-400 sys- the altitude decreases. This value called tem, Turkey declared that the system “Radar Horizon” depends on the height at would not be integrated into the national which the radar antenna is deployed, the air defense system, that is NATO air de- conditions of roughness of the adjacent fense network and it would be used inde- land and the performance of the radar.29 pendently. In this case, S-400 will be ef- The lower the altitude of the target is, that ficient majorly against fixed wing aircraft is, it is closer to the ground, the shorter flying at medium and high altitude and the detection distance of that target be- partially tactical ballistic missiles and its

ORSAM 20 Report No: 213, September 2017 TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400 ORSAM

Especially high-altitude and long-range not only its own radar but also the target air defense systems covering a wide ge- information obtained by all other radars ography are significant instruments not and prevents the target. This principle is only in military terms but also in political, vital for especially defense against cruise economic and technological terms. The missiles and aircraft flying at low altitude. production, development, supply or sales of such systems of specific strategic grav- A similar case is seen for ballistic missiles ity is not limited to the military-technical as well. In order to prevent tactical bal- context. These issues also have political, listic missiles completing all the phases economic, technological and even psy- of flight beginning from the launching chological dimensions. In the T-LORA- in the atmosphere, the early detection of MIDS tender, the selection of the Chinese the target and the calculation of the orbit system and the following process is a good with considerable sensitivity are neces- example of this phenomenon. sary. This is similarly possible with the cooperation of widespread land-borne and Air defense needs to be approached holis- airborne sensors. Space-borne sensors are tically since radars and different percep- also involved in the equation for ballistic tive systems, command control systems missiles of MRBM or higher categories and barreled and non-barreled air defense that complete their flight largely outside systems function in cooperation and that the atmosphere, that is, in space. There- is comprised of interwoven layers. All fore, the effectiveness of an individually the compounds, from the shortest to the used air defense battery in comparison longest-range arms systems constitut- with ballistic missiles is limited for short- ing the whole function within a network range / tactical ballistic missiles and is structure. At this point, having regard to close to zero for missiles of longer range. the above-mentioned energy issue in the Eastern Mediterranean and the rejection Considering the supply of the S-400 sys- to integrate the S-400 system into NATO tem, Turkey declared that the system systems, certain problems of productivity would not be integrated into the national will indispensably rise among naval and air defense system, that is NATO air de- air instruments in the A2/AD strategy to fense network and it would be used inde- be applied by Turkey. pendently. In this case, S-400 will be efficient majorly against fixed wing aircraft Due to the roundness of the earth, the flying at medium and high altitude and maximum range of a radar system falls as partially tactical ballistic missiles and its the altitude decreases. This value called efficiency will remain quite limited against “Radar Horizon” depends on the height at cruise missiles, low flying aircraft and he- which the radar antenna is deployed, the licopters and many ballistic missiles. conditions of roughness of the adjacent land and the performance of the radar.29 It is costly to develop and supply the air The lower the altitude of the target is, that and missile defense systems. The tech- is, it is closer to the ground, the shorter nologies concerning the development the detection distance of that target be- and production of such strategic systems comes. In order to prevent this weakness, are of critical importance. It is not pos- geographically widespread land-borne sible to share or transfer them due to their and airborne radars (HEİK aircraft) are strategic importance. However, as seen in used: The data collected by all these in- the examples of France-Italy partnership struments are combined and processed EUROSAM SAMP/T or US-Germany at command control systems and they are partnership MEADS, there are common distributed to air defense systems. There- development projects on the basis of risk fore, an air defense battery benefits from and cost-sharing. Another example is KM-

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 21 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

SAM middle range air defense system de- USA has provided considerable financial veloped through the technology and sys- and technological support since 1988.30 tems provided by Russia. As seen in these With all these US contributions, Israel examples, either the models of business was able to build its air defense within 30 and risk sharing or those of know-how ac- years, including all the layers of altitude quisition are widespread. The implemen- and range against air breathing and bal- tation of such is the result of long-term listic missiles. Facing air threats as much comprehensive diplomatic, technical, ad- as Israel, Turkey should be able to prepare ministrative and financial negotiations. a roadmap including not only military- technical dimensions but also economic, As one of the countries which make the political, psychological and industrial most intense investments in air and mis- dimensions while making such strategic sile defense, Israel completed the installa- moves and should focus on long-term tion of a multi-layer air defense umbrella strategies instead of measures which are it initiated in the 1980s, upon the official palliative and can only save the day. launching of the highest Arrow 3 layers on 18 January 2017. Within this process, the

ORSAM 22 Report No: 213, September 2017 TURKEY’S AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA AND S-400 ORSAM

NOTES

1 Robert Dorr. “Task Force Normandy Fired the Opening Shots of Desert Storm” http://www.defen- semedianetwork.com/stories/task-force-normandy-fired-the-opening-shots-of-desert-storm/ (Ac- cessed on 15 August 2017)

2 Rebecca Grant. “The Bekaa Valley War”. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pag- es/2002/June%202002/0602bekaa.aspx (Accessed on 15 August 2017)

3 Metehan Yayla, Ümit Ergin, Talha Mutlu ve Dilek Funda Kurtuluş. “Bir Muharip İnsansız Uçak Siste- mi için Performans Gereksinimlerinin Belirlenmesi” (Determination of Performance Requirements for A Combat Drone System). (2014): 18-19.

4 Sıtkı Egeli. “Füze Tehdidi ve NATO Füze Kalkanı: Türkiye Açısından Bir Değerlendirme” (Missile Threat and NATO Missile Shield: An Assessment from Turkey’s Viewpoint). International Relations/ Uluslararasi Iliskiler X/ 40 (2014).

5 Merve Seren. “Türkiye’nin Füze Savunma Sistemi: İhale Süreci, Temel Dinamikler ve Aktörler” (Tur- key’s Missile Defense System: Tender Process, Fundamental Dynamics and Actors). SETA. 2015

6 Sıtkı Egeli. “Türkiye’nin Balistik Füze Programı” (Turkey’s Ballistic Missile Program). Ortadogu Anal- iz V/ 58 (2013)

7 Hasan Ali Soğancı. “Türkiye’de Entegre Hava Savunma” (Integrated Air Defense in Turkey). HITEK 2014 (2014).

8 Şaban Karakaya. “Karaya Konuşlu Hava ve Füze Savunma Sistemleri” (Surface-based Air and Missile Defense Systems). Land Systems Seminar, Ankara (2014).

9 Karakaya. “Karaya Konuşlu Hava ve Füze Savunma Sistemleri” (Surface-based Air and Missile De- fense Systems).

10 “Teşkilât”. https://www.hvkk.tsk.tr/tr-tr/T%C3%BCrk_Hava_Kuvvetleri/Hakk%C4%B1m%C4% B1z- da/Te%C5%9Fkil%C3%A2t/MuhHvKv_ve_HvFzSvnKl%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1 (Accessed on 16 August 2017)

11 İbrahim Sünnetçi. “T-LORAMIDS Bir Kez Daha İptal!” (T-LORAMIDS is cancelled once again!). Savunma ve Havacılık (Defense and Aviation) 170, p. 7.

12 “Türk Hava Sahasının 7/24 Yılmaz Bekçisi: Muharip Hava Kuvveti ve Hava Füze Savunma Komutanlığı” (7/24 Unflagging Watcher of Turkish Air Space: Combat Air Forces and Air Missile Defense Command). Savunma ve Havacılık (Defense and Aviation) 168. p. 46-67

13 Çağatayhan Çolakoğlu. “Tactical command and control systems and network centric warfare”. Jour- nal of Military and Information Science II/ 3 (2014): 70-76.

14 Sıtkı Egeli. “Füze Tehdidi ve NATO Füze Kalkanı: Türkiye Açısından Bir Değerlendirme” (Missile Threat and NATO Missile Shield: An Assessment from Turkey’s Viewpoint). International Relations 40 (2014).

ORSAM Report No: 213, September 2017 23 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

15 Arda Mevlütoğlu. “Siyah Gri Beyaz: Yüksek İrtifa, Uzun Menzil, Karışık Kafalar-II.” (Black Grey White: High Altitude, Long Range, Confused Minds-II) http://www.siyahgribeyaz.com/2013/10/ yuksek-irtifa-uzun-menzil-karsk-kafalar.html (Accessed on 15 August 2017).

16 Sünnetçi. “T-LORAMIDS Bir Kez Daha İptal!” (T-LORAMIDS is cancelled once again!), p. 7.

17 “Türkiye, Hava ve Füze Savunma Sistemi için Fransa ve İtalya ile İş Birliği Yapacak” (Turkey will Cooperate with France and Italy for Air and Missile Defense System). http://www.milscint.com/tr/ turkiye-hava-ve-fuze-savunma-sistemi-icin-fransa-ve-italya-ile-is-birligi-yapacak/ (Accessed on 15 August 2017)

18 “Orta İrtifa Hava Savunma Füze Sistemi Projesi” (Middle-range Air Defense Missile System Project). http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/projeler/Sayfalar/proje.aspx?projeID=130 (Accessed on 14 August 2017)

19 Sıtkı Egeli. “S-400 alımı, hava savunması, füze savunması, NATO: Mitler ve Gerçekler” (S-400 Pur- chase, air defense, missile defense, NATO: Myths and Facts). http://www.kokpit.aero/s400-sitki-egeli (Accessed on 15 August 2017)

20 Serdar Erdurmaz. “İran’ın Balistik Füze Üretim Kabiliyetleri ve Üretim Yeteneği Hakkında Değerlendirme” (An Assessment on the Capabilities of Iran to Produce Ballistic Missiles and Its Pro- duction Ability”. http://türksam.org/tr/a2163. (Accessed on 16 August 2017).

21 Armağan Kuloğlu. “Füze Savunma Sistemi Projesi ve Türkiye” (Missile Defense System Project and Turkey). Ortadoğu Analiz II/23 (2010).

22 Barış Çağlar. “Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and Turkey’s security concerns”. PhD Dissertation. Bilkent University, 2001.

23 Arda Mevlütoğlu. “Peshrev over the Black Sea: The silent competition between Turkey and Russia”. http://blog.ihs.com/peshrev-over-the-black-sea-the-silent-competition-between-turkey-and-russia (Accessed on 14 August 2017)

24 Sıtkı Egeli. “Türkiye’nin Balistik Füze Programı” (Turkey’s Ballistic Missile Program). Ortadogu Anal- iz V/58 (2013).

25 Carlo Kopp. SAM System Mobility/Russian and PLA Air Defence System Vehicles. No. APA- TR-2008-0601. Air Power Australia, 2008.

26 Stephan Frühling ve Guillaume Lasconjarias. “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge”. Sur- vival LVIII/2 (2016): 95-116.

27 Carlo Kopp. Almaz S-300P/PT/PS/PMU/PMU1/PMU2/Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf/SA-10/20/21 Grumble/Gargoyle. No. APA-TR-2006-1201. Air Power Australia, 2006.

28 Christopher Harmer. “The Strategic Impact of the S-300 in Iran”. Critical Threats Project: August (2016).

29 “Radar Line of Sight”. http://www.radartutorial.eu/07.waves/wa16.en.html (Accessed on 14 August 2017)

30 Duncan L. Clarke. “The Arrow Missile: The United States, Israel and Strategic Cooperation”. Middle East Journal XLVIII/3 (1994): 475-491.

ORSAM 24 Report No: 213, September 2017