Office of the Secretary of Defense § 158.9

‘‘ELINT,’’ ‘‘electronic security,’’ ‘‘en- (r) Forward Area Alerting Radar cipher,’’ ‘‘encode,’’ ‘‘encrypt,’’ ‘‘inter- (FAAR) System. cept,’’ ‘‘key book,’’ ‘‘signals intel- (s) Ground laser designators. ligence’’ or ‘‘SIGINT,’’ ‘‘signal secu- (t) Hawk Guided Missile System. rity,’’ and ‘‘TEMPEST.’’ (u) Heliborne, Laser, Air Defense Suppression and Fire and Forget Guid- § 158.8 Categories of information that ed Missile System (HELLFIRE). require review before declassification: Department of the Army sys- (v) Honest John Missile System. tems. (w) Lance Field Artillery Missile System. The following categories of Army in- (x) Land Combat Support System formation shall be reviewed systemati- (LCSS). cally for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this (y) M22 (SS–11 ATGM) Guided Missile part. System, Helicopter Armament Sub- (a) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. missile information, including the (z) Guided Missile System, Air De- principle of operation of warheads fense (NIKE HERCULES with Improved (fuzing, arming, and destruct oper- Capabilities with HIPAR and ations); quality or reliability require- ANTIJAM Improvement). ments; threat data; vulnerability; ECM (aa) Patriot Air Defense Missile Sys- and ECCM); details of design, assem- tem. bly, and construction; and principle of (bb) Pershing IA Guided Missile Sys- operations. tem. (b) BMD systems data, including the (cc) Pershing II Guided Missile Sys- concept definition (tentative roles, tem. threat definition, and analysis and ef- (dd) Guided Missile System, Inter- fectiveness); detailed quantitative cept Aerial M41 (REDEYE) and Associ- technical system description-revealing ated Equipment. capabilities or unique weaknesses that (ee) U.S. Roland Missile System. are exploitable; overall assessment of (ff) Sergeant Missile System (less specific threat-revealing vulnerability warhead) (as pertains to electronics or capability; discrimination tech- and penetration aids only). nology; and details of operational con- (gg) Shillelagh Missile System. cepts. (hh) Stinger/Stinger-Post Guided (c) BMD optics information that may Missile System (FIM–92A). provide signature characteristics of (ii) Terminally Guided Warhead U.S. and United Kingdom ballistic (TWG) for Multiple Launch Rocket weapons. System (MLRS). (d) Shaped-charge technology. (jj) TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon (e) Fleshettes. System. (f) M380 Beehive round. (kk) Viper Light Antitank/Assault (g) Electromagnetic propulsion tech- Weapon System. nology. (h) Space weapons concepts. § 158.9 Categories of information that (i) Radar-fuzing programs. require review before declassifica- (j) Guided projectiles technology. tion: Department of the Navy sys- (k) ECM and ECCM to weapons systems. tems. The following categories of Navy in- (l) Armor materials concepts, de- formation shall be reviewed systemati- signs, or research. cally for declassification by designated (m) 2.75-inch Rocket System. DoD reviewers in accordance with this (n) Air Defense Command and Coordi- part. nation System (AN/TSQ–51). (a) Naval nuclear propulsion informa- (o) Airborne Target Acquisition and tion. Fire Control System. (b) Conventional surface ship infor- (p) Chaparral Missile System. mation: (q) Dragon Guided Missile System (1) Vulnerabilities of protective sys- Surface Attack, M47. tems, specifically:

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VerDate Jul<25>2002 15:04 Jul 31, 2002 Jkt 197117 PO 00000 Frm 00583 Fmt 8010 Sfmt 8010 Y:\SGML\197117T.XXX pfrm15 PsN: 197117T § 158.10 32 CFR Ch. I (7–1–02 Edition)

(i) Passive protection information (2) Tactical performance, tactical concerning ballistic torpedo and under- doctrine, and vulnerability to counter- bottom protective systems. measures. (ii) Weapon protection requirement (i) Design performance and func- levels for conventional, nuclear, bio- tional characteristics of guided mis- logical, or chemical weapons. siles, guided projectiles, sonars, radars, (iii) General arrangements, drawings, acoustic equipments, and fire control and booklets of general plans (applica- systems. ble to carriers only). (2) Ship-silencing information rel- § 158.10 Categories of information that ative to: require review before declassifica- (i) Signatures (acoustic, seismic, in- tion: Department of the Air Force frared, magnetic (including alternating systems. magnetic (AM)), pressure, and under- The Department of the Air Force has water electric potential (UEP)). determined that the categories identi- (ii) Procedures and techniques for fied in § 158.7 of this part shall apply to noise reduction pertaining to an indi- Air Force information. vidual ship’s component. (iii) Vibration data relating to hull § 158.11 Declassification consider- and machinery. ations. (3) Operational characteristics re- (a) Technological developments; lated to performance as follows: widespread public knowledge of the (i) Endurance or total fuel capacity. subject matter; changes in military (ii) Tactical information, such as plans, operations, systems, or equip- times for ship turning, zero to max- ment; changes in the foreign relations imum speed, and maximum to zero or defense commitments of the United speed. States; and similar events may bear (c) All information that is uniquely upon the determination of whether in- applicable to nuclear-powered surface formation should be declassified. If the ships or submarines. responsible DoD reviewer decides that, (d) Information concerning diesel in view of such circumstances, the pub- submarines as follows: lic disclosure of the information being (1) Ship-silencing data or acoustic reviewed no longer would result in warfare systems relative to: damage to the national security, the (i) Overside, platform, and sonar information shall be declassified. noise signature. (b) The following are examples of (ii) Radiated noise and echo response. considerations that may be appropriate (iii) All vibration data. in deciding whether information in the (iv) Seismic, magnetic (including categories listed in §§ 158.7 through AM), pressure, and UEP signature data. 158.10 may be declassified when it is re- (2) Details of operational assign- viewed: ments, that is, war plans, antisub- (1) The information no longer pro- marine warfare (ASW), and surveil- vides the United States a scientific, en- lance tasks. gineering, technical, operational, intel- (3) General arrangements, drawings, ligence, strategic, or tactical advan- and plans of SS563 class submarine tage over other nations. hulls. (2) The operational military capa- (e) Sound Surveillance System bility of the United States revealed by (SOSUS) data. the information no longer constitutes a (f) Information concerning mine war- limitation on the effectiveness of the fare, mine sweeping, and mine counter- Armed Forces. measures. (3) The information is pertinent to a (g) ECM or ECCM features and capa- system that no longer is used or relied bilities of any electronic equipment. on for the defense of the United States (h) Torpedo information as follows: or its allies and does not disclose the (1) Torpedo countermeasures devices: capabilities or vulnerabilities of exist- T–MK6 (FANFARE) and NAE beacons. ing operational systems.

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