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Master Europa Catalog Master Europa Catalog Distributed By: Tom Johnson Games Tom Johnson 3704 West Country Club Lane Altoona, WI 54720 USA Revised: July 29, 2009 GAME MODULES MASTER EUROPA is a complete set of rules and charts replacing those in the GRD Games series Europa™. You must have the maps and counters provided with these games. MASTER EUROPA rules and charts bring the game into line with historical norms (movement, and combat results) while simplifying play in many areas. A. MASTER EUROPA Eastern Front This module covers the games "Fire in the East", "Scorched Earth", & "Urals". It contains 8 new counters for use with the logistics system. Catalog MOD-101 - $22.00 Western Invasion This module covers the game "Second Front". It contains 143 new counters for use with the logistics system. Catalog MOD-102 - $22.00 Western Front Blitzkrieg - This module covers the games "Fall of France" & "Their Finest Hour". It contains 19 new counters for use with the logistics system, 3 for the German OOB, and 49 for use with the naval system . It also includes Orders Of Battle (OOB) that allow a scenario showing the Western Front from Sept. 1939 on to be explored. Catalog MOD-103 - $22.00 Southern Front This module covers the game "War in the Desert" (Or the older "Torch"), "Western Desert". And "Near East" games. It contains 122 new counters for use with the logistics system. Catalog MOD-104 - $22.00 Southeastern Front This module covers the game "Balkan Front". It contains 47 new counters for use with the logistics system and 1 each for the German and Italian OOB. Catalog MOD-105 - $22.00 First Front This module covers the game "First to Fight". It contains no counters. Catalog MOD-106 - $22.00 Northern Fronts This module covers the games "Narvik" & "Storm over Scandinavia". It contains 39 new counters for use with the logistics system, and 1 for use with the naval system. Catalog MOD-107 - $22.00 Red Army This module provides the player with all the materials needed to make use of the latest research available on the entire Soviet military during the years 1939 - 1945. Over 6,000 counters provide a complete replacement Soviet military and production structure. These counters will work with the existing GRD products, but avoid the "gaps" where the new games have not filled in. A special set of rules allows this module to be integrated into either 101 or 102 without difficulty. Catalog MOD-108 - $110.00 Partisan! This module provides the player with a complete set of rules, Orders of Appearances, and counters to allow the player to simulate the underground war in the West and Balkans from 1940 - 1945. It contains 570 counters for use with the system. Catalog MOD-109 - $22.00 Page 1 Strategic Air War This module provides the entire German production system, Orders Of Battle and counters presenting the RAF (and its commonwealth country counterparts), the Luftwaffe from 1939 - 1945, and the United States Army Air Force in Mediterranean and Northern European Theaters from 1942 - 1945. It contains 1,909 counters; 625 Luftwaffe, 650 RAF, 514 USAAF, and 124 target and special markers for the Germans. Catalog MOD-110 - $40.00 War At Sea This module provides a comprehensive naval system for all of Master Europa, and includes a map showing the full Atlantic, and Indian oceans. The module contains 'ship cards showing the fleets of every European nation, the US Atlantic fleet, Brazil, India, and the Japanese fast carrier fleet. The module covers from Sept. 1939 - June 1945. It contains 1046 shipcards, and 887 new counters; 195 showing the carrier and land based aircraft, 189 coastal defense positions, 146 Task force Markers, and 357 for use in the interlocking convoy system. Catalog MOD-111 - $40.00 Grand Master Europa This module provides a consolidated and unified set of rules (General and National) and charts to allow all games in the series to be united and played as a single mass. You must have the other modules (Except 108) for this to be used. Catalog MOD-112 - $22.00 Shipping charges for MASTER EUROPA modules Shipping for the MASTER EUROPA modules are $4.80 for the first module. Add $1.80 for each additional module ordered. For module A108 - add $15.60. For modules A110 or A111 - add $7.20. Add $30 for international orders. DVD's of the talks given at the "E" series conventions. *E2007* HMS DVD-2007SetA - Full Set (3 DVDs) - $12.00 DVD-2007A1 - Production status and German Order of Battle changes. (1 DVD) - $5.00 DVD-2007A2 - German Order of Battle changes and Rob Brown on Partizan. (1 DVD) - $5.00 DVD-2007A3 - Further Discussion on German Order of Battle (1 DVD) - $5.00 David Glantz DVD-2007SetB - Full Set (7 DVDs) - $45.00 DVD-2007B1 - Overview of Soviet prewar planning and major operations during the war. (2 DVDs) - $12.00 DVD-2007B2 - The Border Battles 1941. (2 DVDs) - $12.00 DVD-2007B3 - The offensive to Moscow 1941 (1 DVD) -$10.00 DVD-2007B4 - Operations Blau & the fighting in Stalingrad. (2 DVDs) - $15.00 Pau Rich Banner DVD-2007SetC - Full Set (3 DVDs) – $15.00 DVD-2007C1 – GDW design and unit ratings, part 1. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2007C2 – GDW design and unit ratings, part 2. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2007C3 – GDW design and unit ratings, part 3. (1 DVD) - $8.00 Tom Johnson DVD-2007D – Master Europa status and future projects. (1 DVD) - $5.00 *E2006* HMS DVD-2006SetA - Full Set (4 DVDs) - $30.00 DVD-2006A1 - Total War rules, and the future rules for the set. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2006A2 - HMS and the future. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2006A3 - HMS plans -short and long range also Rob Brown on Partizan! Delays on TEM 88. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2006A4 - The pacific and other series, plans and hopes. (1 DVD) - $8.00 Page 2 David Glantz DVD-2006SetB - Full Set (4 DVDs) - $50.00 DVD-2006B1 - Kiev 1941 P1 (2 hours) - $15.00 DVD-2006B2 - Kiev 1941 P2 (2 hours) - $15.00 DVD-2006B3 - Kiev 1941 P3 (2 hours) - $15.00 DVD-2006B4 - Lvov-Sandomirz 1944 (2 hours) - $15.00 Jon House DVD-2006SetC - Full Set (4 DVDs) - $35.00 DVD-2006C1 - The Operational level of War. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2006C2 - Okinawa 1945 (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2006C3 - Air-Ground operations (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2006C4 - Sicily 1943 (1 DVD) - $10.00 Walter Dunn DVD-2006SetD - Full Set (2 DVDs) - $15.00 DVD-2006D1 - “Stalin’s Keys to Victory”, Part 1. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2006D2 - “Stalin’s Keys to Victory”, Part 2. (1 DVD) - $10.00 Rich Banner DVD-2006SetE - Full Set (2 DVDs) - $15.00 DVD-2006E1 - The history of GDW & Europa up to the parting with GDW (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2006E2 - Historical insights continued with thought regarding the future. (1 DVD) - $8.00 Tom Johnson DVD-2006F - Status of Master, and planning for the future, 1/2 hour. (1 DVD) - $5.00 2005 - 2003 no events were held. *E2002* Charles Sharp DVD-2002SetA – Full Set (4 DVDs) - $35.00 DVD-2002A1 - The Red Army prewar & Europa. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2002A2 - The Red Army 1941 & Europa. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2002A3 - The Red Army weapons, production, & Europa. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2002A4 - The Red Army prewar plans and possibilities & Europa. (1 DVD) - $10.00 Walter Dunn DVD-2002SetB – Full Set (4 DVDs) - $25.00 DVD-2002B1 - Hero’s or Traitors Part 1. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2002B2 - Hero’s or Traitors Part 2. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2002B3 - Hero’s or Traitors Part 3. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2002B4 - Hero’s or Traitors Part 4. (1 DVD) - $8.00 David Glantz DVD-2002SetC – Full Set (4 DVDs) - $35.00 DVD-2002C1 - The Eastern Front 1944, Part 1. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2002C2 - Clearing the Ukraine 1944, Part 2. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2002C2 - Prokirov - Cherkovski 1944, Part 3. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2002C4 - Clearing the right bank in the Ukraine, 1944. (1 DVD) - Part 4 $10.00 *E2001* Charles Stolp DVD-2001SetA – Full Set (4 DVDs) - $25.00 DVD-2001A1 - The Red Army – Europa, Order of Battle, Part 1. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2001A2 - The Red Army – Europa, Order of Battle, Part 2. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2001A3 -The Red Army – Europa, Order of Battle, Part 3. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2001A4 - The Red Army – Europa, Order of Battle, Part 4. (1 DVD) - $8.00 Page 3 David Glantz DVD-2001SetB – Full Set (4 DVDs) - $35.00 DVD-2001B1 - Keiv 1943 - 44 Part 1. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2001B2 - Keiv 1943 - 44 Part 2. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2001B3 - Keiv 1943 - 44 Part 3. (1 DVD) - $10.00 DVD-2001B4 - Keiv 1943 - 44 Part 4. (1 DVD) - $10.00 Walter Dunn DVD-2001SetC – Full Set (4 DVDs) - $25.00 DVD-2001C1 - Second Front 1943 Part 1. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2001C2 - Second Front 1943 Part 2. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2001C3 - Second Front 1943 Part 3. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2001C4 - Second Front 1943 Part 4. (1 DVD) - $8.00 Jason Long* DVD-2001D - Checkoslovakia “Peace in our Time” Europa Scenario. (1 DVD) - $8.00 Tom Johnson* DVD-2001E - Master Europa status and plans. $5.00 (1 DVD) - $5.00 *E2000* Walter Dunn DVD-2000SetA – Full Set (4 DVDs) - $25.00 DVD-2000A1 - Hitler’s Nemesis. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2000A2 - Second Front Now 1943. (1 DVD) - $8.00 DVD-2000A3 - Kursk.
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