Special Report Examines the Modernization Program of the Chinese People’S “China’S Growing Maritime Liberation Army (PLA)
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DECEMBER 2006 AsiaSPECIAL Program REPORT No. 135 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army: LITAI XUE “China’s People’s Liberation Should the United States Be Worried? Army: Party Control and Military Decision Making” EDITED BY MARK MOHR PAGE 5 ABSTRACT BERNARD D. COLE This Special Report examines the modernization program of the Chinese People’s “China’s Growing Maritime Liberation Army (PLA). The essayists conclude that while this program bears watching, the Power: Implications for the U.S. military, assuming it too continues to modernize, will be able to maintain its lead in United States” overall capability. Litai Xue of Stanford University emphasizes communist party control of PAGE 12 the military, and describes a case study in 1969 where the country went on full nuclear DENNIS J. BLASKO alert—without much organizational control. Bernard D. Cole of the National War College “PLA Ground Forces: The View from Beijing … or Heilongjiang states the primary concern of the Chinese navy is Taiwan, but downplays the idea that … or Xinjiang” China intends to compete with the U.S. navy to defend sea lines of communication. Den- PAGE 17 nis J. Blasko, U.S. Army (ret.), points out that Chinese military planners themselves say the KRISTEN A. GUNNESS modernization process for the army will not be completed until 2020. Kristen A. Gunness “China’s New Civil-Military of the CNA Corporation describes the problems that civil society in China is creating for Dynamic: Challenges and the military, noting, for example, that as Chinese society becomes “grayer,” this puts more Opportunities for PLA Modernization” pressure on the military budget to pay for a growing number of retirees. PAGE 25 INTRODUCTION September 9, 2006, symposium at the Woodrow MARK MOHR Wilson International Center for Scholars, analyze ith China becoming an ever-stron- China’s military modernization program, espe- ger economic power, and with that cially over the last decade, and seek to draw con- Wgrowing economic clout being clusions about the degree to which the United translated into an increasing military capability, States should be worried about China’s People’s there is natural concern that such burgeoning Liberation Army (PLA). military strength will eventually be able to chal- The first essay, by Litai Xue, research asso- lenge the military position of the United States. ciate at the Center for International Security For example, the Department of Defense, in this and Cooperation, Stanford University, makes the year’s Quadrennial Defense Review Report, states: point that the PLA is under the control of the “Of the emerging powers, China has the greatest Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and that this potential to compete militarily with the United is true for strategic (nuclear) forces as well. In States and field disruptive military technologies times of peace, it is the Politburo (33 members) that could over time offset traditional U.S. mili- and its Standing Committee (9 members) which tary advantages absent U.S. counter strategies.” are in overall charge of the work of the entire The essays that follow, originally presented at a political-military system in China. The reality is Mark Mohr is program associate with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. that the Standing Committee acts as the ultimate thinks that an overall catching up with U.S. forces national authority. Once war is declared, how- is an “impossible” objective for the PLA in the ever, the burden of command authority passes to foreseeable future. the Party’s Central Military Commission, which is In the second essay, Bernard D. Cole, professor dominated by senior PLA officers.T hus, there is of international history at the National War Col- tight Party control over the military. lege, writes specifically on the PLA navy (PLAN). Xue offers a case study concerning the only time He notes that one of its main missions is to deal in the history of the People’s Republic of China with a Taiwan contingency. The naval moderniza- (PRC) when the country went to full nuclear alert. tion so prominently funded by Beijing during the At that time, there was not such tight collective past 15 years, and especially since the Taiwan Strait Party control over the military. In 1969, the Sino- crisis of 1995-1996, has been focused on preparing Soviet split was so severe that the Chinese were for possible armed conflict over the island’s status. bracing for a possible nuclear attack from the Soviet Second only to Taiwan as a strategic maritime Union. In October 1969, a secret report allegedly issue, states Cole, is Beijing’s concern about future originating in Moscow stated that Russian techni- Japanese interference with China’s sovereignty cians had begun retrofitting the plane carrying a claims in the East China Sea. This in turn ties directly Soviet delegation to Beijing with nuclear-tipped to the more general, increasing worry about secur- air-to-surface missiles. ing the sea lines of communication (SLOC) upon In response, on October 18, Defense Minis- which increasing amounts of China’s imported ter Lin Biao dictated a six-point message to the energy resources depend. The SLOC-defense mis- General Staff ordering preparations against a sur- sion, says Cole, probably remains ill-defined for the prise attack. The strategic missile forces were to be PLAN, as Beijing wrestles with decisions such as placed on full alert, and all PLA units were ordered whether to continue relying on the U.S. Navy for to assume full-time combat readiness with their defending those maritime highways, or allocating personnel confined to their bases. While Lin sub- the extensive resources required to build a navy sequently informed Chairman Mao Zedong of even partially capable of defending China’s very his order, there is no evidence he asked for Mao’s long SLOCs to southwest Asia and eastern Africa. approval. Today, the Standing Committee of the China’s navy today, states Cole, has the most Politburo would have to approve such an order. capable conventionally powered submarine force Regarding the question of how much the U.S. in the world, a large and capable surface warship should be concerned over China’s growing mili- force, and a strong and modernizing naval aviation tary strength, Xue believes that the Chinese them- force. Does this force pose a threat to the United selves recognize the wide gap that exists between States, asks Cole? Clearly, the PLAN is not capa- their weaponry and that of their potential adver- ble of defeating the U.S. Navy one on one, and saries, particularly the United States. While it is the odds against the PLAN would increase with true that the gap in strategic weaponry has nar- the addition to the U.S. side of likely Japanese rowed between China and the United States, he and Australian force augmentation. However, on THE ASIA PROGRAM The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposition that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can begin to understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldest regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical and cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s capital. In ASia PROGRam STAFF seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences, Robert M. Hathaway, Program Director prominent scholars of Asia interact with one Mark Mohr, Program Associate another and with policy practitioners to further Bhumika Muchhala, Program Associate understanding of the peoples, traditions, and Michael Kugelman, Program Assistant 2 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT behaviors of the world’s most populous continent. any given day, American naval forces in the West- Korea—which have had an overt “military first” ern Pacific may be surprisingly weak, depending policy, China is not diverting so many resources on maintenance status and on commitments in to the PLA that other parts of the society and the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Windows of economy suffer. opportunity would be available for Beijing to As it modernizes, however, many PLA efforts benefit from its new naval power, even should the will be focused on countering the types of advanced United States intervene in a Taiwan scenario. But capabilities the U.S. military has proven effective there is little indication that Beijing desires any in combat on numerous occasions since 1991. On such maritime confrontation. the other hand, development of such capabilities Thus, concludes Cole, China’s modernizing does not in itself reflect a strategic political intent navy is already in a position to hinder U.S. naval to challenge the position of the United States in operations in some scenarios involving Taiwan, Asia or globally. Blasko argues that with a generally although its main strategy in this area seems to positive international environment, a long-term be to deter the involvement of U.S. forces. The approach to military modernization, and the need PLAN is certainly not able to pose a significant for continued economic development and social threat to open-ocean naval operations by the U.S. stability, Beijing is focused more on preventing the Navy, either in the East China Sea or over the long occurrence of negative events (i.e., deterrence) SLOCs from that sea, through the South China than on compelling certain events to occur by the Sea and Malacca Strait, across the Indian Ocean overt use of military force. to the Persian Gulf. The United States does, how- There is, however, an inherent danger, according ever, need to increase the ability of its navy to to Blasko. In order to achieve their strategic goals maintain the presence and capability to safeguard through deterrence, Chinese leaders believe they national maritime interests in East Asia. must demonstrate both their improving military Dennis J.