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AUGUST 2015 Deploying Combined Teams: Lessons Learned from Operational Partnerships in UN Peacekeeping PROVIDING FOR PEACEKEEPING NO. 12 DONALD C. F. DANIEL, PAUL D. WILLIAMS, AND ADAM C. SMITH Cover Photo: 106th IRISHFINN Battalion ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mission Readiness Exercise, 2012. ©Irish Defence Forces/Flickr. DONALD C. F. DANIEL is Milton E. Miles Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the Naval War College. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the authors E-mail: [email protected] and not necessarily those of the International Peace Institute. IPI PAUL D. WILLIAMS is Associate Professor and Associate welcomes consideration of a wide Director of the Security Policy Studies program of the range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington policies and issues in international University, and a Non-Resident Senior Adviser at the affairs. International Peace Institute. IPI Publications E-mail: [email protected] Adam Lupel, Director of Research and Publications ADAM C. SMITH is the former Director of the Brian Marisa McCrone, Assistant Production Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Editor Peace Institute. Suggested Citation: Donald C. F. Daniel, Paul D. Williams, and Adam C. Smith, “Deploying Combined Teams: Lessons Learned ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS from Opera tional Partnerships in UN This report was commissioned by the US Global Peace Peace keeping,” New York: International Peace Institute, August 2015. Operations Initiative (GPOI), which supported the authors’ research, financed the fieldwork for the study, and © by International Peace Institute, 2015 organized a workshop to discuss a draft of the report on All Rights Reserved April 30, 2015. The authors are grateful to all those analysts www.ipinst.org connected to the Providing for Peacekeeping Project, government officials, UN officials, and peacekeepers, especially in Lebanon and Cyprus, who took the time to discuss these issues with them. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors. CONTENTS Abbreviations . iii Executive Summary . 1 Introduction . 3 Varieties of Partnerships in Contemporary UN Peacekeeping Operations . 5 OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS Patterns of Operational Parnerships in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2004 –2014 . 12 Case Studies: Lebanon and Cyprus Missions . 15 UNIFIL UNFICYP Motives for Operational Partnerships . 18 POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY MOTIVES MILITARY MOTIVES Factors for Successful Partnering . .23 Benefits and Challenges of Operational Partnerships . 27 Lessons Learned and Recommendations . 29 Appendix: Methodology . 30 iii Abbreviations ASF African Standby Force AU African Union C-34 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations DFS Department of Field Support DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations EU European Union MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad MINURCAT II United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad II MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MOU Memorandum of Understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization PCC Police-Contributing Country SHIRBRIG Standby High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations TCC Troop-Contributing Country UN United Nations UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia 1 Executive Summary needs of the entire mission; (3) a junior partner can assume static tasks, such as guard duty, that allow a To staff and sustain its many operations around the senior partner to take on time-sensitive kinetic world, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping must activities; (4) the senior partner can take the junior rely on a variety of partnerships, including partner on board and teach it the ropes; (5) the operational partnerships among troop- junior partner may graduate to deploying a larger contributing countries (TCCs). Operational unit on its own; and (6) the more TCCs in a partnerships occur when military units from two or mission, the more diplomatic support the mission more countries combine to deploy as part of a leaders can summon when needed. peacekeeping operation. Between 2004 and 2014, There are immediate benefits for the TCCs forty-one such partnerships occurred in eight UN involved, depending on their role in the partner - operations, most involving units from European ship. Fundamentally, junior partners get to deploy, and South American states. and in a way in which they receive not only The following are four types of partnerships, mentorship but also material and training from the which differ based on command structure and the senior partner. Equal partners also get to deploy in degree of integration of the operational sub-units: a manner that benefits and burdens both partners • Attached: an independent operational unit from to roughly the same degree. In particular, larger Country A works alongside and is under the combined units have greater operational operational command of a larger unit from autonomy, which is valued highly by deployed Country B. personnel. Senior partners could deploy alone, but partnering helps polish their reputations as leaders • Embedded: troops from Country A are integrated and allows them to turn over less attractive static or within existing operational units of Country B to niche tasks to the junior partner. In addition, form mixed units under Country B’s command because unit or mission command in a UN structure. operation often goes to the TCC with the greatest • Co-deployed: distinct operational units from number of deployed troops, a senior partner Country A and Country B operate as part of a benefits when the troop contribution of a junior multinational command structure involving partner fills out its contribution enough to officers from both countries. reinforce the senior partner’s claim on command. • Composite: troops from two or more countries There are also overlapping political benefits for form bi-national or multinational mixed units TCCs. They include (1) enhancing the cohesion that serve under a multinational command and clout of a TCC’s region; (2) cementing structure involving officers from two or more relations with neighbors, affiliates, security guaran - countries. tors, and rising powers; (3) earning recognition as a Partners can be junior, senior, or equal partners, responsible and militarily active international as determined by the size of each country’s contri - citizen; (4) presenting a more attractive interna - bution. A senior partner is responsible for bringing tional profile to neighbors and beyond; (5) proving the junior partner on board. Equal partners one’s worthiness to be a security and/or economic establish a division of labor where they either split partner; and (6) enhancing the international or the duties and personnel contribution evenly or domestic support for a mission that engages one’s rotate contributing the major share of personnel interests. and command. CHALLENGES OF PARTNERING BENEFITS OF PARTNERING The challenges of forming a new operational Partnering benefits and challenges accrue for both partnership can be daunting. One is finding the the UN and the relevant TCCs. At least six benefits right partner; although political motivations might for the UN include the following: (1) a mission may determine specific partnerships, preference should fill a requirement for a unit; (2) a junior provider of be given to countries with similar linguistic, a niche capability such as mine clearing, water cultural, and military attributes, as well as some purification, or medical services can serve the level of geographic proximity to facilitate combined 2 Donald C. F. Daniel, Paul D. Williams, and Adam C. Smith training. A second challenge is preparing for the Composite units (i.e., integrated operational inevitable frictions that arise when troops live units and integrated command structure) together in relatively isolated camps where stress should not be formed below company level, and and boredom are present. A third challenge is the units operating in volatile environments should complexity of performing complex and sensitive not be partnered below battalion level. tasks with someone else rather than alone. Many 4. Frictions between partner personnel can be issues have to be addressed before deployment. mitigated through command attention, leader - When deploying alone, a TCC resolves these issues ship structures, and the encouragement of itself. When partnering, it must consider its cooperative mindsets and trust-building. partner’s concerns. A fourth challenge is addressing 5. The level of danger in a mission and the exposure to the scrutiny that comes with expectations of TCCs are critical to partnership partnering. Fifth, for senior and equal partners, success. Most TCCs in a UN mission are neither deploying as part of a team is costlier and more ready nor willing to act aggressively; if they have time-consuming than deploying alone. Sixth, differing restrictive national caveats, then they partnerships can fracture, and personnel may be should not partner in a mission or a section of a harmed