ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol21, No 5, pp 7 25 – 738, 2000

Waitingf orCincinnatus: the role o f Pinochetin post-authoritarian Chile

GREGORYWEEKS

ABSTRACT This article explains the persistent inuence of General Augusto Pinochetin Chileanpolitics. After leavingthe presidency in 1990,hemanaged to fuse his personalposition with thatnot only of the institution of the armybut ofthe armedforces as awhole,making Pinochet and the military almost indistinguishable.By doingso Pinochetsought to equate any attack onhimwith anattack onthe institution. Themilitary, inturn, accepted him as its spokesman anddefender. He viewed his role asthat ofCincinnatus, an emperortwice called to save ancientRome. Throughout the 1990sPinochetrepresented aserious obstacle to democratisation.With his intimate ties to the military institution, his inuence— perhaps even after death—can never bediscounted.

InChile the transition frommilitary tocivilian rule in March1990 did not erase the presenceof the armedforces in political life.The Commander in Chief of the army,General Augusto Pinochet, who had quickly taken control of the military junta installed on11 September 1973 ,becamethe self-proclaimed President ofthe Republicthe followingyear and remained in that position until hehanded the presidential sash to newlyelected Patricio Aylwin.Pinochet remainedthe headof the army,a position grantedhim for eight moreyears by laws passed in the last daysof the dictatorship. Whenhis retirement fromthe armedforces Žnally came to pass on10March 1998 Pinochet’ s national role still didnot end. He becamea ‘senator forli fe’( senadorvitalicio )inaccord with the 1980Constitution. Article 45provided any ex-president who had served for at least six years the right toa lifetime seat inthe senate. Pinochet’s presenceas armychief hada tremendousimpact oncivil – military relations inthe 1990s, as at times heresorted toshows of force to extract concessions fromcivilian policymakers andto protect ‘his men’f romjudgment onhumanrights abuses. 1 After retirement, fromhis ascension to the senate to his arrest in the UKinOctober 1998, he remained a highlyvisible andpolarising national Žgure.His verypresence in Chilean politics (evenwhen under house arrest in the UK)created anadversarial atmosphere.Pinochet effectively impededefforts to establish civilian supremacyof the armedforces, thus representinga major obstacle to the process ofdemocratic consolidationin Chile. Howcan we explain this phenomenonof an ex-dictator successfully remain- ingat the centre ofnational politics with aposition ofin uence? A pointof

Gregory Weeks isAssistantProfessor at theDepartment of Political Science, University ofNorth Carolina at Charlotte,9201 University City Boulevard,Charlotte, NC 28223-0001,USA.

ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 00/050725-14 Ó 2000 ThirdWorld Quarterly 725 GREGORY WEEKS departureis KarenRemmer’ s conceptof neopatrimonialism. Inan analysis ofthe military regime in Chile, she posited that Pinochethad managed to concentrate powerin his ownhands rather thanin the military as aninstitution. Usingthe intelligence agency( DINA)andbasing career advancementf orloyalists on personalrelationships allowedhim to establish whatshe terms ‘neopatrimonial’ relations. As opposedto patrimonialism, whichsuggests amorebackward society, neopatrimonialism is a‘formof patrimonial rule that coexists with a professional military, technocratic administrative staff, andall the otherelements ofa comparativelymodernized and industrialized society’. 2 Accordingto Remmer, Pinochet distanced himself fromthe military insti- tutionby reducing the autonomousvoice of the ofŽcer corps.The Commander in Chief himself wouldresolve pendingissues, purgingofŽ cers (evenin other branches)who opposed his policies. Yet as his presidencydrew to a close, Pinochetbegan changing that strategy, drawinghimself closer to the institution andemphasising his leadership qualities, whichaccording to him wouldpreserve the military’s integrity ina time ofuncertainty. Nearly17 years ofrule, during which Pinochet far surpassed the averageage ofa general(normally, generals are compelledto retire after 37total years of service andPinochet was Žrst commissioned in193 7),ensured that bythe 1980s noneof his peers remainedin active duty. 3 As aresult hebecame a revered Žgurewithin the ranks,untouchable in terms ofyears ofduty and dedication to the ‘bien comu´n’(commongood). With neopatrimonialrule, Pinochet ensured that hewould not fade away after the transition. Thecontention of this article is that onceout of power, Pinochet used the fruits ofthese previouseff orts to his advantage,managing ultimately tofuse his personalposition with that notonly of the institution ofthe armybut of the armedforces as awhole,making Pinochet and the military almost indistinguish- able.No longer the chief executive,Pinochet lost neopatrimonialcontrol over the air forceand navy, yet managedto garnersupport that providedhim with a highlevel ofleverage vis-a`-vis the government. Embodyingthe military institution entailed extolling the virtues ofthe military regime,publicly protecting military ofŽcers frompolitical judgment,and defend- ingthe role ofthe armedforces in ademocratic context.By doing so, Pinochet soughtto equateany attack onhim with anattack onthe institution. Suchan assault wouldbe met with whateverf orceor threat off orcewas necessary to repel it, thus simultaneously protectinghis ownposition and increasing the unity ofthe military against whatit viewed(and continues to view)as the onslaughts ofirresponsible andvindictive politicians. Theirony of this situation is that Pinochet,whose public statements embodythe conceptof ‘ antipolitics’, em- ployedconsiderable political acumento become one with the institution ofthe Chilean armedforces. 4 Thegeneral’ s efforts representeda major obstacle to civilian supremacy. While Commanderin Chief,Pinochet pressured the civilian governmentto changea variety ofpolicies related tothe military. Theseeff orts weresuccessful largely becausethe governmentwas forcedto accept the fact that Pinochet’s actions andwords carried enormousweight. Any endeavor to ignore or repudiate 726 THE ROLE OFPINOCHET INPOST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE him wouldresonate amongthe ofŽcer corpsas awhole,the effect ofwhich wouldtherefore have serious repercussions. In1988 Pinochet granted an interview to Le Monde in whichhe compared himself to the Romanemperor Cincinnatus, an allusion that wouldrecur in numeroussubsequent interviews. 5 Inancient Romethe senate, whenfaced with crisis, wouldperiodically grantdictatorial powersto certain individuals who wereconsidered upstanding citizens. Cincinnatus was onesuch person, who was called fromhis ploughto save the Republic,then quickly returned to his farm. WhenRome was attacked againyears later, hewas soughtout and, as anold man,saved the empire oncemore. Pinochet’s identiŽcation with Cincinnatus is especially striking becausethe populationfeared the Romandictator. Livywrites that, after beingchosen, Cincinnatus ‘was thenescorted to his residence throughstreets lined with great crowdsof common folk who, be it said, wereby no means pleased tosee the newDictator, astheythought his powerexcessive anddreaded the wayin which hewould likely use it’. 6 Simplyput, for Pinochet the conceptsof ‘ duty’and ‘obligation’(as hedeŽ ned them) weremore important thanpopularity. Metaphor,backed by both statements andactions, left nodoubt about Pinochet’s attitude. Thearmed forces hadnot saved the countryand recon- structed its institutions fornothing. If theywere put at risk andhe was ‘called’, thenhe would drop his ploughimmediately andsolve the problemby force.If hebelieved action was necessary,he would not allow dissenting voices to dissuade him. Pinochetthus fusedhimself withthe military as aninstitution, makinghimsel f its spokesmanand defender. He wanted to ensure that political attacks onhim, whichhe expected once he was nolonger president andfreer speechwas reinstated, wouldbe considered as anattack onthe entire institution. InApril 1989he spoke to bothhigh-ranking and low-ranking of Žcers andasked them to supporthim as hefought what he said werethe the governingcoalition’ s (the Concertacio´n )attempts tocut the size andfunding of the armedforces. Thearmy’ s Public Relations Departmentalso issued astatement expressing the highcommand’ s concernabout comments madeby the political opposition against Pinochet,which ‘ affect the dignityand future situation ofHis Excellency the President ofthe Republicand Commander in Chief ofthe Army… andare perceivedas directed against eachand every one of the members ofthe institution’. 7 Bymid-1989 he asserted that ‘Iam preparedfor everything. My enemies, however,shouldn’ t forgetsomething: the Armywill always protect my back’.8

Theroot of Pinochet’ s support Themilitary left powerwith twofundamental political beliefs. First, that it had savedthe nationfrom the chaosfostered bypoliticians andMarxists. Inthis view,military action in 1973was essential foravoiding both national disinte- grationand Soviet domination. 9 Second,it believedit haddesigned a new political system that wouldserve to avert anysuch problems in the future.This system was enshrinedin the 1980constitution. 727 GREGORY WEEKS

Pride in their role as saviourof the nationexists amongall three military branchesand is clear fromtheir respective journals.An editorial inthe navy’s Revista deMarina sums upthe sentiment: ‘the ArmedForces andPolice of Chile togethershare the satisfaction ofa dutyfulŽ lled andthat the citizenry appreciate the valueof their unyieldingcommitment to the essential values of nationality.’10 Fromthat perspective,Pinochet’ s leadership hadbeen instrumen- tal inguiding the nationaway from the destructive andcorrupt past forwhich inept civilians wereresponsible. Themilitary also maintains the strongbelief that it created astronger,more effective institutional order.The constitution was written andratiŽ ed during the military regime,and what many civilians considerelements ofa ‘protected’ democracyare seen bythe military as guaranteesof stability. Inparticular, the armedforces considerthe National Security Councila major improvementover the past since it gives the military avoicein issues involvingnational security. 11 Inthe wordsof one army intellectual (andactive dutygeneral), the constitution providesthe military with ‘anirreplaceable role in the promotionof national development’. 12 All three branchesshare these sentiments, albeit todiff eringdegrees. Not surprisingly,the armyhas beenthe most vocalin expressingthem. Under Pinochet’s direction it quicklydominated the military junta andconsequently the country’s political development.For this reasonit hada tremendousstake in preservingand lauding its achievements.The navy was also verysupportive. Historically aconservativeinstitution, it hadbeen instrumental inplanning the coupand although its institutional stake was smaller it believedthat dismantling the military regime’s accomplishments wouldbe a returnto political chaos. Theair force’s beliefs strayed the furthest. It hadplayed an important role in the coup,especially bybombing the presidential palace.Yet within afewyears its Commanderin Chief ,GeneralGustavo Leigh, openly mused about the desirability ofa transition backto civilian rule.That led tohis ouster in1978, avirtual internal coupthat consolidatedPinochet’ s dominantposition. Then duringthe 1988plebiscite that initiated the transition, Commanderin Chief FernandoMatthei sealed the opposition’s victorywith alate-night, public recognitionthat the ‘No’vote had won the plebiscite, therebyrejecting another eight years ofPinochet’ s rule. Nonetheless,the air forceapproved of the military regime’s transformation of Chilean politics andtheref orehad no incentive to contradict the stronger statements andactions takenby the navyand army. No less thanthe other branches,the air forcebelieved the military hadsaved the countryand that it continuedto represent the ‘moral reserve ofthe Fatherland’. 13 Moreover,it agreedwholeheartedly with the idea that politicians weredangerous. As one colonelput it, political parties nevertackle anyproblem that might involvea political cost, so ‘theyintroduce in the soul ofthe peoplea sense offrustration anddespair that fosters hate andthen violence’ . 14 Since the armywas the most active politically, bothPatricio Aylwin(1990 – 94)and Eduardo Frei (1994 – 2000),along with their defenceministers, focused muchof their energyon establishing civilian supremacyover that branch. Relations with the navyand air forcewere proper, i fnotinitially amiable. By 728 THE ROLE OFPINOCHET INPOST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE andlarge, policy makers didnot believe those brancheswould cause political conict. Thegovernment’ s primaryproblem was assessing the degreeto which the otherarmed forces andnational police wouldsupport Pinochet and the army, especially in times ofpolitical crisis. Duringthe early civil –military conicts, the Aylwinadministration soonrealised that, eveni fthe otherbranches did not actively supportthe army’s actions, theywould be silent partners andwould not issue anynegative judgments. Pinochet’ s ability to fuse himself tothe institution asawholethereby thwarted government efforts atasserting civilian supremacy overthe armedforces. Bythe endof 1990 the armyhad made its views aboutPinochet quite clear. Its supportwas Žrmandunquestioned. Meanwhile, the generalwas resisting all civilian initiatives toenact reformor to bringofŽ cers to justice incivilian courts. His supportwithin the ofŽcer corpslent credenceto the threats heperiodically made.He stated publiclyon morethan one occasion that, ifthe countrysuffered anothercrisis like 1973,hewould take the same steps to deal withthe problem. 15 Theoverall message couldhardly be misinterpreted. Pinochetwould oversee the politicians at workwhile the armyprotected him. Military supportfor Pinochet’ s personalagenda and his successful fusionof Pinochet,the individual,with Pinochet, the military commander,constituted an essential element inhis continuedin uence in the post-authoritarian era.He was able to achievethis fusionbecause of his owncredibility. Hewas widely respected byfellow ofŽcers (in all branches)and was thereforesuccessful in convincingthem that hewould vigorously protect them fromthe machinations ofpoliticians. Inturn, when he negotiatedwith the newadministration hecould conŽdently assert that his views wereshared by the entire military. Inthis effort Pinochetwould emit comments that madeeven the civilian right uneasy.In 1989he stated, ‘Theday they touch one of my men, the state oflaw [estadode Derecho ]will beover. I havesaid this onetime andI won’t repeat it anymore,but know that it will beso.’ 16 However,Pinochet’ s wordswere aimed moreat the military ranksthan at civilians—once again, he was sending strongsignals that hewould be both spokesman and protector. Civilian opportunitiesfor signiŽ cant changerevolved around prising him apart fromthe institution, whichwould have two simultaneous consequences.First, the separation wouldallow him to bejudgedand removed without a highlevel ofarmy backlash. Second, his exit fromthe armywould open the doorto bringingin ayoungercommander in chief whoperhaps would be more accommodating.However, attempts duringthe 1990sto forcethat separation resulted inserious civil – military conict.

Government– armycon icts duringthe Aylwingovernment TheŽ rst major civil – military conict ofthe post-authoritarian era tookplace in December1990. It was sparkedby a congressionalinvestigation intoa cheque fraudscheme involvingGeneral Pinochet’ s son,Augusto Pinochet Hiriart. The so-called ‘Pinocheques’appeared to offer the perfect mechanism forseparating Pinochetf romthe military institution as awhole,since proofof impropriety wouldalmost certainly leave Pinochetno choice but to resign.The controversy 729 GREGORY WEEKS centredaround whether Pinochet’ s sonhad beneŽ ted Žnancially frominsider deals withthe army.A congressionalcommission beganto investigate the matter in October1990 . Atthe same time, DefenceMinister Patricio Rojas was particularly interested inforcing Pinochet’ s resignation.In a meeting with the general,he sought to achievethat end,with the result ofprovoking Pinochet. Civil – military dialogue abruptlyended as Pinochetcalled the armyto its barracks,a manoeuver commonlyassociated with becomingcombat-ready (the so-called ‘exercise of security, readiness andcoordination’ , or ejercicio deseguridad, alistamiento y enlace).17 Onlya series ofbehind the scenes discussions betweenadministration ofŽcials andsenior ofŽcers defusedthe crisis. Thesemeetings includedan agreementto shelve the ‘Pinocheques’investigation. Later inPresident Aylwin’s term, the Subsecretaryof War (the cabinet ofŽcer within the Ministry ofDefence who interacts speciŽcally with the army)was slow toprocess anumberof promotions and duty assignments. Thearmy also interpreted otherbureaucratic delays as deliberate efforts bythe governmentto harass Pinochetand signal to the armythat onlywith anewcommander would conditionsimprove. Army of Žcers perceivedthis as aneffort to create discontent within the ranksand to put pressure onPinochet to resign. Thearmy distrusted DefenceMinister Rojas. Inany case, the ministry had beenviewed historically as anadministrative channel,not a place wheredefence andsecurity policywas decided.The Ministry ofDefence had been irrelevant to policymaking during the military regime,and Pinochet did not feel that he neededa bureaucraticintermediary betweenhimself andthe president.In addition,Rojas was oftenthe most vocalcabinet memberwithin the Aylwin administration arguingf orPinochet’ s retirement. Pinochet,along with his AdvisoryCommittee, grewincreasingly disgusted.OfŽ cers didnot distinguish betweenslights against the armyand against Pinochet. Inthe midst ofthis discontent,the government’s newspaper( La Nacio´n) reportedthat the chequecase was beingreopened. The result was the ‘boinazo’, as soldiers wearingberets ( boinas)came intothe street onSantiago’ s main thoroughfare,ostensibly toprotect the meeting ofgenerals goingon inside army headquarters,the EdiŽcio delas Fuerzas Armadas. 18 Theirpresence left nodoubt that the armywould protect the general’s honourby force if necessary.Once more,prolonged discussions betweenofŽ cers andselected administration ofŽcials produceda solution,which in this case includedthe formationof a workinggroup intended to address the military’s concernabout its treatment. The boinazo occurredwith Aylwinon a visit to Europe,embarrassing the president ona tourthat celebrated the restoration ofdemocracy in Chile. Pinochetand his advisors couldnot have misunderstood the seriousness ofthis slap in Aylwin’s face,while the civilian governmentcould not misunderstand the message: anattack onPinochet would mobilise the armedforces in his support. Neither the navynor the air forceindicated that their supportf orPinochet as armycommander in chief hadchanged during these conicts, oras aresult of them.No matter their opinionregarding the tactics Pinochetemployed, neither branchadvocated allowing the civilian governmentto relieve himof his post. The1980 constitution hadtaken the right toŽ re commandersin chief awayfrom 730 THE ROLE OFPINOCHET INPOST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE presidents in orderto remove‘ politics’from that decision as muchas possible. Furthermore,such a concessioncould eventually have repercussions within their owninstitutions, speciŽcally aloss ofinstitutional autonomy,thus leavingthe respective commandersin chief unitedin oppositionto grantingthe government that prerogative. WhenAylwin left ofŽce in199 4civil – military relations weretense. Friction hadbecome the norm.The mere presenceof a formerdictator as army commandermade that situation virtually unavoidable,but the government’s efforts to forcePinochet’ s retirement causedsigniŽ cant backlash.Furthermore, the army’s refusal to channelcivil – military relations throughthe Ministry of Defencegave Pinochet more leverage as headvancedthe cause ofhis followers within the ranks.

Attemptsto ‘ normalise’relations: the Frei government President EduardoFrei Ruiz-Taglerepresented a notablechange from the anti-Pinochet rhetoric ofthe Aylwingovernment. Although he never criticised Aylwinor his policies, Frei didnot publicly question whether or not Pinochet shouldremain as commanderin chief.Theissue ofhuman rights was de- emphasised andin generalhis strategy was to accept that Pinochethad a part to playin the evolutionof post-authoritarian civil – military relations. Infact, during civil–military crises President Frei soughtto quietenthe morevocally anti- Pinochetmembers ofthe Concertacio´n ,therebyratcheting downthe civil – military rhetoric.These efforts werelargely unsuccessful,since toomany members ofcongress and society hopedto bringPinochet to justice in some manneror at least toprevent his social impunityi fcriminal sanction couldnot beachieved. TheŽ rst civil – military crisis ofthe Frei administration occurredwhen the SupremeCourt ruled against retired General(and former intelligence chief) ManuelContreras in 1995f orthe murderof Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC.Letelier was aformerambassador to the USAduringthe Allendeadminis- tration. Contreras spent monthsin a navalhospital, complainingof a hernia problemand ref usingto accedeto the civilian courtorder for his detention, Žnally emergingand entering prison after Pinochetextracted numerousconces- sions fromthe government,including a payraise. Yet evenContreras’ move- ments weremeant to remindcivilians ofthe military’s power,as soldiers came to collect himin an armed helicopter ina publicshow of force. Inthe midst ofthe Contreras crisis Frei called fornational reconciliation as the controversythreatened to hardenthe rightist opposition’s responseto any bills putforth by the government.He also assured the army—which had been protesting publiclyin solidarity— that the governmentwould not make the pursuit offurther cases apriority.The agreement included the cases against Pinochethimself, whichFrei endedby presidential decree. Themere fact that Contreras eventuallywent, against his will, tolive in ajail cell was animportant landmarkfor the civilian judicial system. Nonetheless, onceagain Pinochet demonstrated his ability to extract beneŽts forthe military. Evenas Pinochet’s term as Commanderin Chief grewshort, his supporthad not 731 GREGORY WEEKS waned.At the same time, despite Frei’s efforts to downplaycivil – military discord,he could not restrain members ofhis ownparty from launching a constitutional accusation against Pinochetin January1998. Such an accusation, whichis similar to impeachment,has manyprecedents and deep historical roots in Chile.19 Theaccusation was aŽnal endeavourto separate himfrom the military institution, to judgehim personallywithout implicating the entire ofŽcer corps. Suchefforts hadproved futile inthe past and,especially inthe case ofthe ‘ejercicio deenlace ,’broughtthe armedforces behindPinochet in support.The accusation was carefully constructedso that it clearly impugnedPinochet alone anddid not seek to cast doubton the integrity ofthe armedforces as awhole. Its Žrst section asserted that ‘it is necessary to state precisely that weare not accusingthe Army,but rather oneof its retired generals.The facts that constitute the groundsof the accusation that weattribute are personal; theywere commit- ted bythe accused,not by the institution that hecommanded … [I]nthe same mannerthat toaccuse aMinister ofState is notto accuse the entire government, toaccuse ageneralis notto accuse the institution towhich he belonged.’ 20 In this manner,its authorshoped that the armedforces wouldallow it to go forward. Ina major sign ofarmy discontent, as the congressionalhearings progressed, the ArmyCorps of Generals announcedthat theyhad proclaimed Pinochet to be Commanderin Chief ‘Beneme´rito ’.Toincrease the impact ofthe decision,the armydid not inform the Ministry ofDef ence,but rather leakedit to the CNN International TVstation shortly beforeGeneral Villaroel madethe announce- ment speech. 21 Thenew title meant that, althoughPinochet would be a senator forlife after retiring as armycommander, in the eyes ofthe armyhe would always beseen as Commanderin Chief.The government summoned constitutional scholars to determine the juridical contentof the newtitle, andconcluded that it was purely honorary.It was aterm datingback to the Middle Ages,and neither the 1980 constitution northe organiclaws ofthe armedforces referredto it. 22 The only referenceto be found was in the 1823constitution, wherecitizens couldbe grantedthe title ‘patriotabeneme ´rito engrado heroico ’torecognise their contributionsto the nation,but it didnot provide those citizens with anyspecial privileges orimmunities. Insum, even though Pinochet was retiring fromthe army,the institution still supportedhim f ully.The army’ s supportwas madeas explicit aspossible, with asenior generalstating that the army’s intention was ‘toshow in this waythe obligationof gratitude, backing, and support forever’ . 23 Theconstitutional accusation’s attempt to separate him fromthe rankswas notsucceeding. In fact, the army’s primaryreaction was toreafŽ rm its close identiŽcation with the retired general.The institution wouldnot accept whatit believedto bea smear campaignagainst its leader. Congressionaldebate on the matter includedreference to Pinochet’s self- proclaimedrole as the Chilean Cincinnatus.Socialist Camilo Escalonaref erred to the ‘deteriorating caudillo’and mocked Pinochet’ s association with the Romanemperor: ‘ Nothingin Pinochet’s life compareswith that [Roman] 732 THE ROLE OFPINOCHET INPOST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE example.If onedug deeply into Romanhistory with rigor,one would associate him withanother Ž gure.With respect to that Žgure,don Augusto is acloneas perfect as Dolly,the clonedsheep. I refer to Caligula …’24 This enragedthe RN and UDI partymembers tothe pointwhere they left the chamberin the middle ofthe discussion. Ultimately, the accusation failed. Formerpresident Aylwindid not support it andseveral formercabinet ministers actively lobbiedagainst passage,particu- larly since it wouldrepresent anegativejudgment on the administration’s civil–military policies. Thedebate created schisms within the Concertacio´n and led spokespersonsfor the right to declare that Frei was so ineffective that he couldnot control his ownparty. 25 Eventsduring the 1990s, cappedby the unsuccessful constitutional accusation, demonstratedthat Pinochetcould not easily bejudged within Chile. Given institutional constraints, publicopinion and political alignments, his protected status in Chilean politics appearedassured. He was 82whenthe accusation was voteddown, and there was everyreason to believe that hewould end his long life inChile as a senadorvitalicio .

Pinochet’s arrest andits effects The term ‘beneme´rito ’showedclearly that the armyconsidered Pinochet its permanentleader, even when he was nolonger an active ofŽcer. When he was arrested on16October 1998 in the UKonthe ordersof Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzo´n,the armyresponded immediately with apublicstatement. It afŽrmed that GeneralPinochet maintained the ‘permanentsupport and solidarity ofthe Institution’and that the situation ‘constitutes anunusual and unacceptable fact forthe members ofthe Institution’. 26 Retired GeneralAlejandro Medina, who hadplayed the role ofunof Žcial armyspokesman for a decade,remarked that ‘if this keepsup, victims will start falling onall sides’. 27 TheChilean senate respondedwith astatement protesting atthe actions ofthe British government. 28 Meanwhile,in the Chamberof Deputies the twoparties of the right (UDI andalso the centre-right Renovacio´nNacional)left the chamber to register their protest against the ‘kidnapping’of a fellow congressional member.29 Eventhe Chilean publicshowed concern about the arrest, as a plurality (42%)believed that the arrest dividedChileans. Only3 5%of respon- dents favouredthe British detainment ofthe general. 30 Themilitary’ s response, therefore,was notbeing taken in apolitical vacuum.Many Chileans sharedthe armedforces’ belief that their leader was beingtreated improperly,and that the British decision offendedChilean honour. TheFrei administration madepublic its oppositionto the arrest andpossibility ofextradition as well, stating that the decision damagedChilean sovereignty. 31 Frei foundhimself againin the middle ofa crossŽre notof his ownmaking. He hadbeen much more careful thanAylwin to cultivate apositive working relationship with the armedforces, which had culminated in the lengthydebate andsplit votingon the impeachmentissue. TheFrei governmenthad not pursued Aylwin’ s strategy ofseeking to separate Pinochetfrom the institution. After the arrest it continuedto call forhis release. 733 GREGORY WEEKS

This stance was harshlycriticised bythe leftas onceagain caving in to military pressure.Sociologist Toma´sMouliandescribed the government’s reaction as ‘knee-jerk’, asserting that it was ‘repeatingthe same pattern off earful behavior that markedthe administration ofPatricio Aylwinwhen it facedsaber-rattling fromthe army’. 3 2 Yet Frei was criticised fromthe right as well forfailing to applysufŽ cient political pressure tothe British government. Thegovernment’ s inability tosecure Pinochet’s release putGeneral Izurieta in adifŽcult position.Already, Pinochet’ s immense shadowrepresented a challengeto his leadership andto the army’s relationship with the Frei adminis- tration. Thearrest forcedhim into a confrontationalposition that also necessi- tated his continuedvocal support of Pinochet. Izurieta assured politicians andthe ranksalike that hewould not rest until Pinochetwas broughtback to Chile. As the British courts andHouse of Lords afŽrmed the extradition inthe face ofappeals, the armyexplicitly repeatedits belief that Pinochetwas anational herobecause he had saved the country: TheChilean army reiterates its support for itsex-Commander in Chief as well as thevalues and principles that the military government maintained; in that historic period,the citizens and armed forces established a newinstitutionality. They created thenecessary conditions for sustainabledevelopment and they recovered democracy for Chile,after the worst crisis of its history. 33 Thenavy followed suit, afŽrming its ‘fraternal support’for the armyas well as its absolute supportfor the military government,‘ whosegigantic workof national recuperationcannot be tarnished bya thousandlies’ . 34 Finally, the Commanderin Chief ofthe Air Forcestated that the democratic transition ‘is beingthreatened by aclimate ofdivision similar to that whichwe lived through in that sad phaseof our national history’. 35 Tomake certain that suchviews didnot escape anyone,members ofthe rightist parties, particularly from UDI,spokef orthe armyas well. 36 InApril 1999 Izurieta visited Pinochetin London,and a UDI senator indicated that the visit ‘reafŽrms veryclearly that the institution gives its full plain supportto the general’.37 As the military haddone, the senator continuedto notethe import- anceof the military’s interventionin the political system, stating that Izurieta’s trip was ‘areafŽrmation almost twenty-six years later ofwhat occurred then’ . 38 Pinochet’s returnto Chile inMarch 2 000reafŽ rmed the army’s position.To the government’s chagrin,he was receivedwith apublicwelcome. General Izurieta issued astatement throughthe army’s press ofŽce,afŽ rming that ‘the institution will continuelending its permanentsupport and solidarity to Captain GeneralAugusto Pinochet… ’39 Neither arrest norexile diminished the insti- tution’s viewof the general. As hereturned, political activists werealready initiating legal efforts to strip him ofhis senatorial immunity( fuero).The armed forces, both active and retired, immediately closed ranks.The Commander in Chief ofthe Navy remarkedthat there was ‘disquiet’( inquietud)within the ranksof each branch asaresult ofthe desafuero process.40 InMay 2 000the commandersin chief of everybranch (including the national police) hada publicmeeting in aSantiago restaurant to demonstrate their unityregarding Pinochet’ s fate, the courtcases 734 THE ROLE OFPINOCHET INPOST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE involvingother ofŽ cers, andthe nascent discussions ofthe civil – military roundtable( mesade dia ´logo ).41 Theyleft nodoubt about their continuedŽ rm supportfor the ‘beneme´rito ’.

Conclusion Oneof the waysin whichwe can appreciate the degreeof Pinochet’ s inuence inpost-authoritarian Chile comes inthe formof language. A newverb has come into being:‘ pinochetizar’means ‘to makePinochet an issue’ . 42 Evenduring the dictatorship the general’s namehad international legal repercussions.In 1978 an Italian policemanwas sanctionedf orhaving referred to several fellow ofŽcers as ‘Pinochets’. Thetribunal deemedthat the term ‘has anelement ofidentiŽ cation andat the same time aninjurious label; it indicates notonly that oneis the head ofan organization, but also that the governmentof that organizationadopts methodsof an authoritarian andrepressive nature’. 43 Pinochetbecame more than a dictator. Heremains aphenomenon,a larger- than-life Žgurewho embodies for different groupsthe best andworst of humanity.Whether monster orsaviour, he has perseveredas acentral Žgurein Chilean politics andeven international relations. His namealone conjures up images ofabuse, honour, betrayal, courage, repression andleadership. Pinochethas cultivated anintensely loyal following.His neopatrimonial controlover the military government,plus nearlya decadeof acting as de facto military protectorand spokesman, put him in auniqueand symbolic position. Forthe armedforces negativejudgment on the manequates to the general defamation oftheir historic role insaving the Fatherland. Theinternational actions takenagainst Pinochetcertainly complicated Chilean civil–military relations. 44 His fusionwith the military institution meant that the effects ofhis case werefelt deeplywithin the ranks.For the armedf orces, Pinochetrepresents the saviourof the country,the ofŽcer whotook a stand to pull Chile outof socialist chaos.From the military’s perspective he‘ exalts the noblemilitary tradition andwithout doubt will serve as anexample to the soldiers ofthe future’. 45 Just beforehe was arrested, Pinochetnoted that, ‘Lamentably,almost every- onein the worldtoday is aMarxist—even if theydon’ t knowit themselves. Theycontinue to have Marxist ideas.’46 ForPinochet the military’s presencein politics remains crucial as abulwarkagainst socialist backsliding.He and his military disciples havenot wavered in these beliefs. Forthem GeneralPinochet deserves praise, notsanction. His detentionhas solidiŽed his exalted position andfurther convinced his supportersthat heis beingjudged unfairly. In a public letter amonthafter his arrest, hewrote that ‘those whopromoted and preached to ourpeople the sinister ideologyof Marxist socialism are those whotoday act as myjudges’ . 47 TheChilean senate furtheradvanced these ideas. Accordingto designated Senator(and former Vice Commanderin Chief )Julio Canessa, the calls for Pinochet’s extradition ‘comef romthe political sector that in the past also opted to favoran internationalist ideologyand a foreignpower— “Big Brother”— tothe detriment ofChile’ s generalinterest andthe peaceand well-being of its 735 GREGORY WEEKS population’. 48 Forthe military andthe right,his arrest reafŽrmed the belief that Pinochetwas agreat leader andthat his opponentswere bitter Marxists lashing outin frustration at their ideological defeat. Pinochet’s success in fostering these ideas means that his presenceand words will continueto resonate throughoutthe military institution. As aChilean historian has noted,Pinochet is fundamentallya survivor andtheref orethe countrycontinues to revolvearound him to acertain degree. 49 Nowwell overthe octogenarianmark, Cincinnatus will probablynot leave his ploughagain, but with his intimate ties to the military institution, his inuence— perhaps even after death—can never be discounted. His successor certainly echoesmany of the sentiments that Pinochethas iterated somany times. Ina speechto the Academy ofMilitary History in late 1999,General Izurieta excoriatedthose whofacilitated Pinochet’s detentionand asserted that ‘wehave lost ourconŽ dence in the juridical pathas analternative solution’. 50 Givenhis advancedage and health problems,Chile might bewaiting forGodot rather thana Romanemperor, but with his stature within the military, the legacyand memory of the Chilean Cincinnatus will notsoon diminish.

Notes Theauthor would like to thank Elizabeth Hutchison and Brian Loveman for their very useful comments. In addition,the Center forLatin American Studiesat SanDiego State Universityand the Hewlett Foundation providedme withassistance andfunding. 1 Foran extensive analysis of Chilean civil— military relations, see GWeeks,‘ TheLong Road to Civilian SupremacyOver theMilitary: Chile, 1988 –1998’. PhDdissertation University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1999. 2 KRemmer, ‘Neopatrimonialism:the politics of military rule in Chile’ , ComparativePolitics ,21(2),1989, p165.Hartlyn offers adifferentdeŽ nition of neopatrimonialism, especially withregard to the ‘ blurringof publicand private interests andpurposes within the administration’ . JHartlyn, TheStruggle for Democratic Politicsin the Dominican Republic ,ChapelHill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1998,p 14. Withoutengaging in lengthy terminological debate, for the purposes of this article thekey deŽ nitional aspect is ‘thecentralization of power in the hands of the ruler who seeks toreduce theautonomy of his followersby generatingties ofloyalty and dependence, commonly through complex patron – clientlinkages’ (ibid). 3 See GArriagada, Pinochet:The Politics of Power ,Boston,MA: UnwinHyman, 1988, esp ch14, for a discussionof Pinochet’ s manipulationof promotions during the dictatorship. For example, by 1984only two generals outof a totalof 50 were commissionedwithin 10 years ofPinochet. 4 Fora discussionof the Latin American military’s antipoliticalbeliefs, see BLoveman& TDavies, Jr, ‘Militaryantipolitics and the Latin American tradition’in Loveman & Davies (eds), ThePolitics of Antipolitics:The Military in Latin America ,Wilmington,DE: ScholarlyResources, 1997.‘ One widelyheld assumptionof Latin American militaryofŽ cers, andone also shared by many conservative civilian groups, was that“ politics”was largelyresponsible for the poverty, instability, and economic backwardness of their nations’(pp 4 – 5). 5 Forexample, see ‘Que´trama el general?’, Hoy, 9–15January 1988. 6 See Livy, TheEarly History ofRome ,London:Penguin Books, 1960, p 197. 7 ‘Aquie´napuntalo´el Eje´rcito’, Hoy, 17– 23April 1989. 8 ‘Me ire´al cielo’, Hoy, 10–16July 1989. 9 There are countlessexamples ofthis attitude. A former Army Vice Commanderin Chief offers thefollowing assessment ofthe military regime: ‘Its resultscan besynthesized into the motto “ missionaccomplished!” Overcomingmany difŽ culties, la patria was restored.The people, shackled by narrow ideological conceptions,were returnedtheir liberty.’ J Canessa &FBalart, Pinochety larestauraci ´ondel consenso nacional,Santiago:Geniart, 1998, p 372. 10 Editorial,‘ Una Patria librey pro´spera’, Revistade Marina ,106(793),1989, p 593. 736 THE ROLE OFPINOCHET INPOST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE

11 Itis composedof four civilians, including the president, and the Commanders inChief of the three branches as well as theNational Police. Since it can beconvoked by any two members themilitary can force a meetingeven if civilians oppose it. 12 CMolina,‘ Las Fuerzas Armadas ysupapel en la sociedad’, Memorialdel Eje ´rcitode Chile , 439, 1992, p 4. 13 JFritz,‘ Elmando, arte professionaldel oŽ cial’ , Minerva,XI(31),1993, p 24. 14 CRomero,‘ Trilogi´a: subversio´n,terrorismo y drogasen Iberoame ´rica’, Minerva,VII(19),1989, p 46. 15 ‘General Pinochetdijo que en situacio ´nsimilar al an˜o73actuari ´adela misma forma’, El Mercurio, 12 September1990. 16 ‘Que´haydetra ´sdelas amenazas’, Hoy 23– 29October 1989. 17 Fora discussionof the ‘ ejercicio deenlace ’as well as themilitary’ s discourse,see CFuentes, El discurso militaren la transicio ´nchilena ,Santiago:Nueva Serie FLACSO, 1996. 18 Fora narrativeof the events surrounding the ‘ boinazo’,see ROtano, Cro´nicade la transicio ´n , Santiago: Planeta,1995, pp 306 –320. 19 Fora historicalsurvey of the use ofthe constitutional accusation in Chilean politics, see BLoveman& E Lira, Lasacusaciones constitucionales en Chile, Una perspectiva histo ´rica , Santiago: LOM-FLACSO, 2000. 20 ‘Textocompleto: acusacio ´nconstitucionalen contra de AugustoPinochet Ugarte’ , La Hora,17March 1998. 21 See ‘La recta Žnal’, Que´ Pasa,14March 1998. Roughly translated, the term means ‘emeritus’. 22 ‘Fromthe very heart ofthe Spanish Middle Ages there hadbeen derived the profound conviction that the conquistadorwho had rendered signal service, the beneme´rito ,especially theone who had served a su costa y mincio´n,withoutplacing any Ž nancialburden on the king, had a prescriptiveright to a reward inthe lands hehad conquered.’ Quoted in M Go´ngora, Studiesin the Colonial History ofSpanish America , London: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1975,p 21. 23 ‘Pinochet,comandante beneme ´ritodel Eje ´rcito’, La Epoca,7March1998. 24 Ca´mara deDiputados, Boleti´ndeSesiones ,Sesio´n26,14 January 1998. 25 ‘Derecha: DC “le quito´el piso”a Frei’, La Epoca,11March 1998. 26 ComunicadooŽ cial del Eje ´rcitode Chile ,Eje´rcitode Chile, Comandancia en Jefe, Departamento Comuni- cacional,17 October 1998. 27 Quotedin L Salinas, TheLondon Clinic ,Santiago:Ediciones Lom, 1999, p 87. 28 Senadode Chile, Legislatura Extraordinara 339, Sesio ´n2,20 October 1998. 29 Ca´mara deDiputados de Chile, Legislatura Extraordinaria 3 41,Sesio ´n7,20 October 1998. 30 ‘De amor ydeodio’ , Que´ Pasa, 26 October– 2November1998. In addition, 39% labelled themselves as Pinochetsupporters, versus only 3% who placed themselves inthe opposition. 31 Fora discussionof the arrest, see GWeeks,‘ Autumnof the general: Pinochet and the search forjustice in Chile’, Hemisphere,9(2),2000, pp 6 –8. 32 TMoulian,‘ Thearrest andits aftermath’ , NACLA Reporton the Americas ,XXXII(6),1999, p 15. 33 ‘Declaracio´noŽcial del Eje ´rcitode Chile ’,Eje´rcitode Chile, Comandancia en Jefe, Departamento Comunicacional,9 December 1998. 34 ComunicadoOŽ cial de Prensa ,Serviciode Relaciones Pu´blicas dela Armada deChile,10 December 1998. 35 ‘DiŽ´cil peri´odode Rojas Vender’ , La Tercera,30July 1999. 36 Withregard to UDI makingpronouncements on behalf of the army, Garreto ´nnotesthat the Pinochet case made evidentthat ‘ thepolitical right is nothingother than the faithful expression of Pinochetism and that all ideas,projects or positions within it are subordinateto this essential truth’. MGarreto´n,‘ Chile 1997– 1998:the revenge of incomplete democratization’ , InternationalAffairs ,75(2),1999, p 266. 37 ‘Urenda:visita de Izurieta aPinochetdemuestra apoyodel Eje ´rcito’, La Tercera,20April 1999. 38 Ibid. 39 ComunicadooŽ cial del Eje ´rcitode Chile ,Eje´rcitode Chile, Comandancia en Jefe, Departamento Comuni- cacional,3 March2000. 40 ‘FF.AA.maniŽ estan inquietudal interiorde sus Ž las porproceso de desafuero de Pinochet’ , La Tercera, 27April 2000. 41 ‘Lagosmolesto por reunio ´ndejefes militares’, La Tercera,16May 2000. 42 Forexample, see ‘Se Pinochetizo´La Cumbre’, La Hora,15November 1999; ‘ Se Pinochetizo´la eleccio´n’, La Hora,12January2000. 43 Quotedin P Azo´car, Pinochet:EpitaŽ o paraun tirano ,Santiago:Editorial Cuarto Propio, 1999, pp 202– 203. 44 Althoughthey are beyondthe scope of this paper, other issues havealso entered into the civil –military equation.The Chilean courts have ruled that a ‘disappeared’person who cannot be ruleddeceased doesnot fall underthe 1978 amnesty, meaning that ofŽ cers are beingordered to stand trial. For example, see ‘Sen˜ales para unamnisticio’ , Que´ Pasa 21– 28June 1999. In addition, Defence MinisterEdumundo Pe ´rez Yoma convokeda ‘roundtabledialogue’ ( mesa dedia ´logo )tobring the military and various civilian experts togetherto discuss pending human rights issues. On the latter, see forexample ‘Pe´rez Yoma satisfecho con nuevasesio ´n’, La Tercera,5December 1999. 737 GREGORY WEEKS

45 Canessa &Balart, Pinochety larestauraci ´ondel consenso nacional , p 381. 46 JAnderson,‘ ProŽle: thedictator’ , TheNew Yorker ,19October 1998, p 44. 47 ‘La carta queenvio ´Pinochet’, La Tercera,11December 1998.Even conservatives in the USA agreed with thisstatement. A WallStreet Journal editorialcalled thecase a‘personalvendetta’ and noted that one of theSpanish lawyers workingfor Judge Garzo ´nwas JoanGarce ´s,who had been an advisor to Salvador Allende.‘ Prosecutionor persecution?’ , WallStreet Journal ,19April 1999. 48 Senadode Chile, Legislatura 339 Extraordinaria, Sesio ´n11,15 December 1998. 49 AJocelyn-Holt, ElChile perplejo ,Santiago:Planeta/ Ariel,1998, p 319. 50 ‘Discursode agradecimiento del Comandante en Jefe delEje ´rcito,Teniente General RicardoIzurieta Caffarena, conmotivo del homenaje por parte dela Academia deHistoria Militar’ , Comunicadode Prensa, Eje´rcitode Chile ,9November1999.

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