Third WorldQuarterly, Vol21, No 5, pp 7 25 – 738, 2000 Waitingf orCincinnatus: the role o f Pinochetin post-authoritarian Chile GREGORYWEEKS ABSTRACT This article explains the persistent inuence of GeneralAugusto Pinochetin Chileanpolitics. After leavingthe presidency in 1990,hemanaged to fuse his personalposition with that notonly of the institution of the armybut of the armedforces as awhole,making Pinochet and the military almost indistinguishable.By doingso Pinochetsought to equateany attack onhimwith anattack onthe institution. Themilitary, in turn,accepted him as its spokesman anddefender. He viewed his role asthat of Cincinnatus,an emperortwice called to save ancientRome. Throughout the 1990sPinochetrepresented aserious obstacle to democratisation.With his intimate ties to the military institution, his inuence— perhaps even after death—can never bediscounted. InChile the transition frommilitary to civilian rule in March1990 did not erase the presenceof the armedforces in political life.The Commander in Chief of the army,General Augusto Pinochet, who had quickly taken control of the military junta installed on11 September 1973 ,becamethe self-proclaimed President ofthe Republicthe followingyear and remained in that position until hehanded the presidential sash to newlyelected Patricio Aylwin.Pinochet remainedthe headof the army,a position grantedhim foreight moreyears by laws passed in the last daysof the dictatorship. Whenhis retirement fromthe armedforces nally came to pass on10March 1998 Pinochet’ s national role still didnot end. He becamea ‘senator forli fe’( senadorvitalicio )in accordwith the 1980Constitution. Article 45provided any ex-president who had served for at least six years the right to alifetime seat in the senate. Pinochet’s presenceas armychief hada tremendousimpact oncivil – military relations in the 1990s, as at times heresorted to showsof force to extract concessions fromcivilian policymakers andto protect ‘his men’f romjudgment onhumanrights abuses. 1 After retirement, fromhis ascension to the senate to his arrest in the UKin October1998, he remained a highlyvisible andpolarising national gure.His verypresence in Chilean politics (evenwhen under house arrest in the UK)created anadversarial atmosphere.Pinochet effectively impededefforts to establish civilian supremacyof the armedforces, thus representinga major obstacle to the process ofdemocratic consolidationin Chile. Howcan we explain this phenomenonof an ex-dictator successfully remain- ingat the centre ofnational politics with aposition ofin uence? A pointof Gregory Weeks isAssistantProfessor at theDepartment of Political Science, University ofNorth Carolina at Charlotte,9201 University City Boulevard,Charlotte, NC 28223-0001,USA. ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 00/050725-14 Ó 2000 ThirdWorld Quarterly 725 GREGORY WEEKS departureis KarenRemmer’ s conceptof neopatrimonialism. Inan analysis ofthe military regime in Chile, she posited that Pinochethad managed to concentrate powerin his ownhands rather thanin the military as aninstitution. Usingthe intelligence agency( DINA)andbasing career advancementf orloyalists on personalrelationships allowedhim to establish whatshe terms ‘neopatrimonial’ relations. As opposedto patrimonialism, whichsuggests amorebackward society, neopatrimonialism is a‘formof patrimonial rule that coexists with a professional military, technocratic administrative staff, andall the otherelements ofa comparativelymodernized and industrialized society’. 2 Accordingto Remmer,Pinochet distanced himself fromthe military insti- tution byreducing the autonomousvoice of the ofcer corps.The Commander in Chief himself wouldresolve pendingissues, purgingof cers (evenin other branches)who opposed his policies. Yet as his presidencydrew to aclose, Pinochetbegan changing that strategy, drawinghimself closer to the institution andemphasising his leadership qualities, whichaccording to him wouldpreserve the military’s integrity in atime ofuncertainty. Nearly17 years ofrule, during which Pinochet far surpassed the averageage ofa general(normally, generals are compelledto retire after 37total years of service andPinochet was rst commissioned in 1937),ensured that bythe 1980s noneof his peers remainedin active duty. 3 As aresult hebecame a revered gurewithin the ranks,untouchable in terms ofyears ofduty and dedication to the ‘bien comu´n’(commongood). With neopatrimonialrule, Pinochet ensured that hewould not fade away after the transition. Thecontention of this article is that onceout of power, Pinochet used the fruits ofthese previouseff orts to his advantage,managing ultimately to fuse his personalposition with that notonly of the institution ofthe armybut of the armedforces as awhole,making Pinochet and the military almost indistinguish- able.No longer the chief executive,Pinochet lost neopatrimonialcontrol over the air forceand navy, yet managedto garnersupport that providedhim with a highlevel ofleverage vis-a`-vis the government. Embodyingthe military institution entailed extolling the virtues ofthe military regime,publicly protecting military ofcers frompolitical judgment,and defend- ingthe role ofthe armedforces in ademocratic context.By doing so, Pinochet soughtto equateany attack onhim with anattack onthe institution. Suchan assault wouldbe met with whateverf orceor threat off orcewas necessary to repel it, thus simultaneously protectinghis ownposition andincreasing the unity ofthe military against whatit viewed(and continues to view)as the onslaughts ofirresponsible andvindictive politicians. Theirony of this situation is that Pinochet,whose public statements embodythe conceptof ‘ antipolitics’, em- ployedconsiderable political acumento becomeone with the institution ofthe Chilean armedforces. 4 Thegeneral’ s efforts representeda major obstacle to civilian supremacy. While Commanderin Chief,Pinochet pressured the civilian governmentto changea variety ofpolicies related to the military. Theseeff orts weresuccessful largely becausethe governmentwas forcedto accept the fact that Pinochet’s actions andwords carried enormousweight. Any endeavor to ignoreor repudiate 726 THE ROLE OFPINOCHET INPOST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE him wouldresonate amongthe ofcer corpsas awhole,the effect ofwhich wouldtherefore have serious repercussions. In1988 Pinochet granted an interview to Le Monde in whichhe compared himself to the Romanemperor Cincinnatus, an allusion that wouldrecur in numeroussubsequent interviews. 5 Inancient Romethe senate, whenfaced with crisis, wouldperiodically grantdictatorial powersto certain individuals who wereconsidered upstanding citizens. Cincinnatus was onesuch person, who was called fromhis ploughto save the Republic,then quickly returned to his farm. WhenRome was attacked againyears later, hewas soughtout and, as anold man,saved the empire oncemore. Pinochet’s identication with Cincinnatus is especially striking becausethe populationfeared the Romandictator. Livywrites that, after beingchosen, Cincinnatus ‘was thenescorted to his residence throughstreets lined with great crowdsof common folk who, be it said, wereby no means pleased to see the newDictator, astheythought his powerexcessive anddreaded the wayin which hewould likely use it’. 6 Simply put,for Pinochet the conceptsof ‘ duty’and ‘obligation’(as hede ned them) weremore important thanpopularity. Metaphor,backed by both statements andactions, left nodoubt about Pinochet’s attitude. Thearmed forces hadnot saved the countryand recon- structed its institutions fornothing. If theywere put at risk andhe was ‘called’, thenhe would drop his ploughimmediately andsolve the problemby force.If hebelieved action was necessary,he would not allow dissenting voices to dissuade him. Pinochetthus fusedhimself with the military as aninstitution, makinghimsel f its spokesmanand defender. He wanted to ensurethat political attacks onhim, whichhe expected once he was nolonger president andfreer speechwas reinstated, wouldbe considered as anattack onthe entire institution. InApril 1989he spoke to bothhigh-ranking and low-ranking of cers andasked them to supporthim as hefought what he said werethe the governingcoalition’ s (the Concertacio´n )attempts to cut the size andfunding of the armedforces. Thearmy’ s Public Relations Departmentalso issued astatement expressing the highcommand’ s concernabout comments madeby the political opposition against Pinochet,which ‘ affect the dignityand future situation ofHis Excellency the President ofthe Republicand Commander in Chief ofthe Army… andare perceivedas directed against eachand every one of the members ofthe institution’. 7 Bymid-1989 he asserted that ‘Iam preparedfor everything. My enemies, however,shouldn’ t forgetsomething: the Armywill always protect my back’.8 The rootof Pinochet’ s support Themilitary left powerwith twofundamental political beliefs. First, that it had savedthe nationfrom the chaosfostered bypoliticians andMarxists. Inthis view,military action in 1973was essential foravoiding both national disinte- grationand Soviet domination. 9 Second,it believedit haddesigned a new political system that wouldserve to avert anysuch problems in the future.This system was enshrinedin the 1980constitution. 727 GREGORY WEEKS Pride in their role as saviourof the nationexists amongall three military branchesand is clear fromtheir respective journals.An editorial in the navy’s Revista deMarina sums upthe sentiment: ‘the ArmedForces andPolice of Chile togethershare the satisfaction ofa dutyful lled andthat the citizenry appreciate the