Desire, Dependence and Demarcation: The GDR and the West in the “long 1970s”1 Maximilian Graf I. Aims and Scope of this project When researching the GDR’s dealing with the West in the “long 1970s”2 one initially must admit that he is not going to rewrite the whole story, which regarding the cornerstones is comparatively well researched. The Soviet Union and West Germany will remain in the center of attention when locating East Germany between East and West. Politically and economically those two were the by far most important partners and opponents. However, the existing common narrative on the East German concept of détente and East German economics within the international context is a bit too narrow. Not only West Germany, but the West in general was an object of desire on which the GDR continuously became more and more dependent. Thus, fearing the repercussions of the subsequently unavoidable opening-up, the East German leadership aimed at demarcation – far more regarding West Germany than the rest of the West. Hence, this project will explicitly aim at broadening our understanding of the East German rationale and actions by widening the perspective to a pan-European view. Before going into detail, it needs to be clarified what can be considered the East German “long 1970s.”

Period under consideration In my view they can be described as the period from 1971 to 1984 – although the endpoint is more randomly picked than the starting point. In 1971, after a quarrelsome power struggle over his Germany policy and economic reforms, Walter Ulbricht was ousted from power. The Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) elected Erich Honecker as its new First Secretary. The VIII Party Congress of the SED later that year adopted the concept of “Unity of Economic and Social Policy.” A second reason for picking 1971 is that only by the early 1970s diplomatic recognition of the GDR in the West was underway, allowing East Germany to pursue a foreign policy beyond the limited Socialist scope. When Honecker rose to power hardly any state outside the Communist world had diplomatically recognized the GDR, however, things were changing due to the more flexible West German Ostpolitik. In 1971 the quadripartite agreement on Berlin was signed and marked an important step towards the

1 This is a very first outline of my planned contribution on the GDR in the framework of PANEUR1970s, open for discussion and reshaping. I am looking forward to your comments and advice. Please note that I have joined the project in September 2017 only and still have to catch up with reading and research. The results presented in the case study are, thus, only a very first sketch of what needs much more in-depth investigation to reach a broader understanding of the GDR’s dealing with the West and West European integration in the “long 1970s.” 2 Poul Villaume/Rasmus Mariager/Helle Porsdam (eds.), The “Long 1970s”. Human Rights, East-West Détente and Transnational Relations (London: Routledge, 2016). On the understanding of the “long 1970s” in the framework of this project, see Romano, Angela/Federico Romero (eds.), “Special Issue: European Socialist Regimes Facing Globalisation and European Cooperation: Dilemmas and Responses,” European Review of History/Revue européenne d’histoire 21 (2014) 2. 1 normalization of German-German relations in 1972. Given these facts one can take “1971” as a “cipher” for the beginning of the GDR’s “long 1970s.” Not only international interactions started to multiply, but also a new era in economic and domestic politics, shaped by Honecker, began. Both the leading figure as well as the fatally costly policy concept “Unity of Economic and Social Policy” continued to shape the GDR until its very end. East Germany’s indebtedness had grown throughout the 1970s and in 1982 the regime faced bankruptcy, avoided only by Soviet help, secret financial operations and an Austrian loan preceding the “Strauß loans” of 1983/84. At that point, East German dependence on West Germany had reached a new level with direct links to the decline of the SED regime, not least because of the humanitarian concessions it had to accept in return for the convertible currencies desperately needed. In this regard, 1984 and the second “Strauß loan” can be taken as an endpoint to the “long 1970s.” Moscow’s support for the GDR had decreased throughout the 1970s, but due to the last peak of the Cold War the Kremlin’s strict control over relations between East and West Germany had prevailed. Finally, the advent of Gorbachev’s perestroika initiated a process of estrangement in Soviet-East German relations. In the end, Gorbachev’s reforms, economic decline, resulting not only in growing debt, but also in societal dissatisfaction, growing dependence on West Germany (and often forgotten West-Berlin), as well as the contributions of European détente and the CSCE to overcoming the “Iron Curtain,” culminated in the collapse of the East German regime and rapid German unification – but this is beyond the scope of this project.

Economic elites and conflicts The period 1971–84 must be considered in a broader perspective. At the outset one has to be aware to what extent the East German “long 1970s” were shaped by earlier developments – not only by the division of Germany, but also in other fields. In economics, continuities from the 1960s existed. André Steiner has demonstrated that even the reform period of the second half of the 1960s with the “New Economic System” (which included some free market elements) had remained within the concept of a centrally planned economy. It failed and was finally abandoned in 1970/71.3 Ralf Ahrens has highlighted that regarding foreign trade and indebtedness to the West, continuities from the reform period predominated.4 In fact, the GDR had started borrowing from the West in order to invest in its economy and to improve the

3 André Steiner, Die DDR-Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre. Konflikt zwischen Effizienz- und Machtkalkül (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999). 4 Ralf Ahrens, “Außenwirtschaft zwischen Ostintegration und Westverschuldung,” in Dierk Hoffmann (ed.), Die zentrale Wirtschaftsverwaltung in der SBZ/DDR. Akteure, Strukturen, Verwaltungspraxis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 510–590, 561; and idem, “Debt, Cooperation, and Collapse. East German Foreign Trade in the Honecker Years,” in Hartmut Berghoff/Uta Andrea Balbier (eds.), The East German Economy, 1945–2010. Falling Behind or Catching Up? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 161–176, 168. 2 standard of living before 1971, however, now it became the official economic policy of the SED. Immediately, the East German state planning commission (headed by Gerhard Schürer), central bankers and in later years also the Ministry of State Security as well as the Soviets (goaded by information from Honecker’s opponents) warned about the potential consequences of increasing debts. However, the domestic political rationale was to keep people satisfied (at least to a certain extent). Hence, the policy remained unchanged even when the situation dramatically worsened from the mid-1970s onwards. Towards the end of the decade, this led to the fatal situation that the GDR faced bankruptcy and even more Western loans were needed to keep the GDR solvent. In comparison to other CMEA countries, the economic history of the GDR is especially well researched. It is well-known who the economic decision-makers were and even the conflicts about economic policies have been studied in detail.5 Economic decision-making was dominated by Erich Honecker’s “inner-circle” stubbornly continuing the “Unity of Economic and Social Policy.” The most remarkable figure of this circle was Politburo member and SED Secretary for Economics Günter Mittag who also headed the economic commission of the Politburo and the working group on the balance of payments (both created in 1976 as “crisis managements bodies”). Although formally part of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski’s Commercial Coordination department (KoKo) was also under Mittag’s direct control. It gained importance in the latter half of the 1970s when the need to create foreign currency revenue increased. While KoKo substantially contributed to endure the acute payment crises, in the long-run its unplanned trade activities with the West also caused further debts.6 Indebtedness to the West and especially growing dependence on West Germany was at the heart of the conflicts about the economic7 and Germany8 policies of the SED leadership. Recent

5 André Steiner, The Plans that Failed. An Economic History of the GDR (New York: Berghahn, 2010; originally published in German Munich: DVA, 2004); idem (ed.), Überholen ohne einzuholen. Die DDR-Wirtschaft als Fußnote der deutschen Geschichte? (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2006); Hartmut Berghoff/Uta Andrea Balbier (eds.), The East German Economy, 1945–2010. Falling Behind or Catching Up? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Dierk Hoffmann (ed.), Die zentrale Wirtschaftsverwaltung in der SBZ/DDR. Akteure, Strukturen, Verwaltungspraxis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016). On the GDR in the CMEA with a special focus on foreign trade, see Ralf Ahrens, Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe? Die DDR im RGW. Strukturen und handelspolitische Strategien 1963–1976 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000). For an early study on the crises, see Hermann Hertle, “Die Diskussion der ökonomischen Krisen in der Führungsspitze der SED,” in Theo Pirker/M. Rainer Lepsius/Rainer Weinert/Hans- Hermann Hertle (eds.), Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR. Gespräche und Analysen (Opalden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), 309–345. 6 Matthias Judt, Der Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung. Das DDR-Wirtschaftsimperium des Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski – Mythos und Realität (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2013). In the mid-1980s (without inner-German trade) KoKo’s share of the entire East German trade volume with the West amounted to more than 40%. Cf. Ahrens, “Außenwirtschaft zwischen Ostintegration und Westverschuldung,” 576. 7 Andreas Malycha, Die SED in der Ära Honecker, Machtstrukturen, Entscheidungsmechanismen und Konfliktfelder in der Staatspartei 1971–1989 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014), 177–322. 8 On the internal conflicts about the SED Germany policy, see recently Heike Amos, Die SED-Deutschlandpolitik 1961–1989. Ziele, Aktivitäten und Konflikte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 2016), 347–362. 3 publications made extensive use of State Security (Stasi)-files and the materials of the Politburo-trials of the 1990s. Hence, we know a lot about how things were perceived and how – due to the nature of the GDR – policy was made against all evidence that it was highly problematic. However, specific countries other than the Soviet Union and West Germany were usually not addressed when economic problems were discussed. The rest of the West was rather addressed in general terms only, namely that growing indebtment was a problem and the exports to the West had to be increased to counteract this development. The same holds true for the EEC and its effects on the GDR’s foreign trade policy. Nevertheless, when aiming at modernizing the East German economy at best possible financial conditions, and when it came to counteracting the most severe crises at the turn of the 1980s, several Western countries came into play.

The place of the West in the East German “long 1970s” In case of the GDR, the “long 1970s” brought not only the normalization of German-German relations, but long-desired international recognition and the sudden multiplication of international relations. Despite the centrality of Bonn in the East German concept of the West, this led to a far more pan-European approach than the common narrative suggests. The GDR’s leadership devoted a lot of energy to develop relations with the rest of Western Europe. This was not only owed to its desire for international reputation. A driving force for the diversification of the East German political and economic approach to the West was the aim to reduce the GDR’s dependency on the FRG. Additionally, the West Germans were unwilling to engage beyond a certain extent (without at least symbolic concessions regarding humanitarian questions in return), while the Soviet Union was less and less willing and able to provide everything the GDR needed.9 Over the past two decades countless studies on bilateral relations of the GDR appeared.10 Unfortunately, they are often lost in bilateralism and fail to address the relevance of the studied country for East German foreign policy in general.11 Many of these books are devoted to diplomatic and political history (or in recent years to cultural relations), without paying

9 For example, see Hans-Hermann Hertle/Konrad H. Jarausch (eds.), Risse im Bruderbund. Die Gespräche Honecker – Breshnew 1974 bis 1982 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2006). On the origins of this tendency in the 1960s, see Dierk Hoffmann/Andreas Malycha (eds.), Erdöl, Mais und Devisen. Die ostdeutsch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1951–1967. Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016). 10 For an overview in the first generation of scholarship, see Ulrich Pfeil (ed.), Die DDR und der Westen. Transnationale Beziehungen 1949–1989 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2001). 11 For the best synthesis albeit devoting only limited space to the West beyond the FRG, see Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949–1989 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007). Also, see Joachim Scholtyseck, Die Außenpolitik der DDR (Munichen: Oldenbourg, 2003); Benno-Eide Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR 1976–1989. Strategien und Grenzen (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999). 4 sufficient attention to economics. Thus, the broader picture has remained incomplete.12 Even though, the pan-European policy of the GDR was not at all limited to the states of the integrated West,13 this project will focus on the role European integration and the EEC countries played in East Berlin’s foreign and economic policy. Among them, considering international prestige and economic relations, France and Italy became preferred partners.14 Not only bilateral approaches in historiography, but also the East German bilateralism in its foreign policy towards the West has shaped the current picture. I will aim at shedding new light on the question whether strict bilateralism prevailed or at least the integrated part of the West was increasingly seen as a whole and to what extent European integration affected the GDR’s dealing with the West. The 1970s brought not only a Common Commercial Policy (CCP), but also an ever-closer coordination of the EEC members’ foreign policies.15 So far, no satisfying study on the GDR and Western European integration in general exists.16 Not even the question to what extent the GDR can be considered a “not-so-secret member” of the EEC (as the common assumption was and is) has sufficiently been addressed.17

12 Unfortunately, many of the studies on bilateral relations of the GDR still end with diplomatic recognition, however, in recent years the situation has improved. For the most recent ones regarding the countries in discussion and addressing the 1970s, see on France: Christian Wenkel, Auf der Suche nach einem „anderen Deutschland“. Das Verhältnis Frankreichs zur DDR im Spannungsfeld von Perzeption und Diplomatie (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014); Ulrich Pfeil, Die „anderen“ deutsch-französischen Beziehungen. Die DDR und Frankreich 1949–1990 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004); on Italy: the notable exception regarding economic relations is Laura Fasanaro, La DDR e l’Italia. Politica, commercio e ideologia nell’Europa del cambiamento (1973–1985) (Rome: Carocci, 2016), also see Charis Pöthig, Italien und die DDR. Die politischen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Beziehungen von 1949 bis 1980 (Francfort: Peter Lang, 2000); on cultural relations, see Magda Martini, La cultura all’ombra del muro. Relazioni culturali tra Italie e DDR (1949–1989) (Bologna: Mulino, 2007); on Great Britain: Stefan Berger/Norman LaPorte, Friendly Enemies. Britain and the GDR, 1949–1990 (Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), on the Netherlands: Jacco Pekelder, Die Niederlande und die DDR. Bildformung und Beziehungen 1949–1989 (Munster: Agenda, 2002). 13 Especially the neutrals Austria and Finland played an important role exceeding the one played by smaller EEC states. Cf. Maximilian Graf, Österreich und die DDR 1949–1990. Politik und Wirtschaft im Schatten der deutschen Teilung (Vienna: ÖAW, 2016); less detailed and without sufficient attention to economics: Seppo Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten. Finnland und Deutschland im Kalten Krieg (Berlin: BWV, 2006). 14 Even though his writings on German-German relations must be handled with care, this straightforward assessment stands the test of actual numbers and is to the point: “Die Hauptpartner im Westhandel der DDR waren neben Bonn die Nicht-EG-Mitglieder Österreich und Japan sowie Finnland, nennenswerte EG-Partner nur Frankreich und Italien, mit denen man sich zu arrangieren verstand.” Jürgen Nitz, Länderspiel. Ein Insider-Report (Berlin: edition ost, 1995), 102. 15 As demonstrated by Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009). 16 The studies available focus much more on the East German perception of and official position towards European integration, rather than on the actual dealing with the EEC. The crucial economic dimension which enforced interaction plays hardly any role in those analyses. See Jana Wüstenhagen, “Blick durch den Vorhang”: Die SBZ/DDR und die Integration Westeuropas (1946–1972) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001); Klaus-Peter Schmidt, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft aus Sicht der DDR (1957–1989) (Hamburg: Kovač, ²1995). 17 The common assumption (of contemporaries and existing scholarship) that the GDR was a “secret member” has been challenged by Detelf Nakath. It is true that the GDR via inner-German trade had some sort of “freeway” into the Common Market, but the FRG had to inform the EEC about the imports. According to West German estimates only less than one per cent of the overall volume of inner-German trade were re-exported into the Common Market, amounting only 0,02 per cent of the overall West German exports to the EEC market. Additionally, (at least after recognition) the GDR was treated as a third country by all other EEC member states. Detlef Nakath, “Die DDR – 5

Given the fact, that the FRG was at the center of East German policy towards the West and inner-German trade represented the largest share of the GDR’s Western trade,18 it seems that the relevance of other Western states had its limits. Nevertheless, with regard to its demarcation policy and foreign policy aims towards the FRG,19 the GDR aimed at instrumentalizing the rest of the West. Economically, the East German regime tried to create at least some counterbalance to the dependence on the FRG. For economic concessions beyond the already high level (favorable conditions in inner-German trade, annual lump sums for transit and communications, etc.), West Germany demanded concessions in other fields in return. Hence, other Western countries gained importance when it came to loans, the modernization of East German industries (in which compensation deals mattered a lot), and the import of consumer goods. This is one of the things that will be at the heart of my project. Ralf Ahrens has demonstrated that an integrated history of the GDR’s Eastern and Western trade is necessary.20 The same holds true for policies towards East and West. Hence, I will have a closer look at interactions within the Socialist bloc. How were détente and economic East– West relations discussed, not only in the multilateral framework of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, but also on the bilateral level, where leaders at least sometimes spoke more frankly. I have already discovered some fascinating documents regarding discussions about the EEC. Even though the sources of the SED (and of KoKo) remain of primary importance, research on economic relations with the West also demands a focus on the state apparatus – especially the foreign ministry and the ministry of foreign trade. There are some less known actors of the East German economic and financial dealing with the West, first and foremost Gerhard Beil21 from

‘heimliches Mitglied’ der Europäischen Gemeinschaft? Zur Entwicklung des innerdeutschen Handels vor dem Hintergrund der westeuropäischen Integration,” in Franz Knipping/Matthias Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969–1984 (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2004), 451–473. This project will aim at clarifying whether the “secret member”-thesis holds true beyond the West German part of the Common Market and detailing how the GDR rationalized and quantified its profits from inner- German trade and (if applicable) beyond. 18 Even though, due to limited validity of East German statistics resulting among other things from the permanent undervaluation of the Deutsche Mark (D-Mark) in relation to the GDR Mark, no exact figures exist. The “least bad figures” (Ralf Ahrens) show that trade with the FRG had a share of at least more than 30 up to 40 or occasionally even more per cent of the overall trade volume with the West. Cf. Ahrens, “Außenwirtschaft zwischen Ostintegration und Westverschuldung,” 568. 19 Which also included continuous dialogue based on the assumption that the division of Germany was infinite. Cf. Amos, SED-Deutschlandpolitik, 273–329. Also, see Oliver Bange, “‘Keeping detente alive’: Inner-German relations under Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker, 1974-1982,” in Leopoldo Nuti (ed.) The Crisis of Detente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 (London: Routledge, 2009), 230–243. 20 Ahrens, “Außenwirtschaft zwischen Ostintegration und Westverschuldung”. 21 In the Ministry of Foreign Trade Gerhard Beil served as head of the Western Europe section (1961–1965), he became State Secretary in 1969, advanced to Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade (1976–1986) and finally Minister of Foreign Trade (1986–1990) He was continuously involved in Western trade and from the 1970s onwards also in inner-German trade. 6 the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Ministerial elites shaped day-to-day business with the West. The same holds true for central bankers like Werner Polze. Since PANEUR1970s devotes special attention to economic elites, there is also the question of whether economic “think tanks” existed and if, in how far their knowledge influenced politics. In case of the GDR research institutes like the Institute of International Politics and Economics (IPW) and to a lesser extent the Institute of International Relations in Potsdam-Babelsberg must be considered. Regarding the EEC, the IPW was of utmost importance. Founded in 1971, it primarily focused on West Germany, but right from the start European integration was also on its research agenda. Because of scientific contacts to the West and analyses based on Western materials, the IPW was something special within the GDR, however, at least in the first few years it remained an “ideological think tank” presenting results according to the official party line.22 Over the years, the IPW’s analyses improved and presented a more realistic picture of the EEC. This will be demonstrated in the following case study, where among a great variety of other sources, the information materials prepared by the IPW for the SED Politburo are discussed. It is impossible to judge their actual influence on the leadership’s views on European integration (which has been doubted), so far, we do not even know if they were read at all. I hope that my research will also shed at least some light on the question how ordinary people perceived the EEC beyond the propagandistic picture displayed by SED-media.23 Relations to the West were a matter massively communicated in the party media: Whenever a foreign statesman visited the GDR the newspapers were full of it and the regime aimed at showing the domestic political audience that it had become a respected international actor. How did dealing with the West affect the East Germans attitude towards the West and West European Integration? Estimates of 1989 suggest that on the one hand idealized images of the West largely shaped by the consumption of Western media were omnipresent, but on the other hand hardly anybody had a concrete idea what the EEC was.24

22 On the early years of the IPW, see Michael B. Klein, Das Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft der DDR in seiner Gründungsphase 1971 bis 1974 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999). 23 Maybe the Stasi information for the leadership (ZAIG-Informationen) will shed new light on this question. 24 “In 1989/90, there was hardly anyone in East Germany who had a concrete knowledge about the integration process in Western Europe. 81 per cent of young people aged 15 to 24 felt inadequately prepared for the European Union.” Jana Wüstenhagen, “Communist Europeanism. A Case Study of the GDR,” in Dieter Goesewinekl (ed.), Anti-liberal Europe. A neglected Story of Europeanization (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 157–178, 165. On the otherwise stated “turn” or “leaning toward Europe,” see Christian Domnitz, Hinwendung nach Europa. Öffentlichkeitswandel im Staatssozialismus 1975–1989 (Bochum: Verlag Dr. Dieter Winkler, 2015).

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II. The Failure of Non-recognition: East Germany and West European Integration in the “long 1970s” The following case study represents a first assessment of the GDR’s attitude towards the EEC in the “long 1970s.” Even though, the East German “economy was neatly export-oriented, and […] the GDR imports from and exports to the Common Market enjoyed a sort of freeway via West Germany” and thus East Berlin seemed “perfectly equipped to resist and even ignore the EEC’s expanding competence,” in several cases it had to accept the developing new realities in trading with the West.25 Thus, this paper argues that throughout the 1970s the formally upheld policy of non-recognition of the EEC had in fact already failed and the SED leadership knew it, albeit not officially admitting it. Additionally, it will be shown how the actual uncensored East German perceptions of European integration changed during this period. Finally, a brief outlook on how the GDR (against all predictions) became part of the European Community (EC), as the first former Socialist state, will be given. The reason for this was the solution of the German question through unification in 1990. During the partition, the West German insistence on the continuous existence of Germany as a whole had created the “special role” of the GDR in its relations with the EEC and the division of Germany had shaped the East German view on European integration right from the start.

The origins of denial In the first two postwar decades, the East German leadership opposed and denounced every form of Western European Integration whether it was the Marshall plan, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Defense Community or the European Economic Community. The arguments produced were interchangeable and some even inconsistent. European integration could appear as a project of US imperialism subjugating Europe as well as an endeavor of German imperialism aiming at dominating the continent and preparing war against Eastern Europe. In any case, it was directed against the Socialist camp. However, there were also some continuities in the East German propagandistic rejection of Western European integration. It was consistently argued that the whole project would fail anyway due to the “contradictions of imperialism.” So far, the GDR’s view did not differ a lot from the rest of the Soviet bloc. A specific East German allegation against the emergence and development of the EEC was that Western European integration fostered the division of Germany. Indeed, deep into the 1960s, the GDR’s EEC policy remained a function of its Germany policy.26

25 Angela Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” in Cold War History 14 (2014) 2, 153–174, (pages cited in this paper according to available PDF) 17. 26 Cf. Wüstenhagen, “Blick durch den Vorhang”, 107–141; Schmidt, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft aus Sicht der DDR, 101–147. 8

Until the early 1960s, even the ministerial bureaucracy undertook hardly any in-depth analysis of European integration. Thereafter, in the state and party apparatus of the GDR, a more nuanced approach to the EEC gradually evolved.27 Especially in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign and inner-German Trade more realism ensued. Nevertheless, their first joint analysis of the Community still predicted its “unavoidable failure.” Despite the continued use of over-ideologized language and categories of analysis, within a couple of years, they understood quite well that the EEC would not collapse as official propaganda and party documents still suggested.28 The rather limited attention dedicated to the economic significance of the emerging EEC originated at least to a certain extent from the division of Germany. In its initial stages, the EEC hardly affected the GDR. All its member stated refused diplomatic recognition of the “second German state,” thus preventing any interaction. Through no fault of one’s own, trade with the other half of Germany continued as before. This was secured by the FRG via the annexed protocol to the Rome Treaties of 1957. In accordance with the FRG’s Basic Law, the EEC founding members accepted that trade between the two Germanies was inner-German trade which did not require certificates of origin for products traded between FRG and GDR and furthermore was not subject to customs. Even though the history of inner- German trade is not sufficiently researched beyond the 1960s,29 the basics are clear. Inner- German trade developed out of exchanges between the occupation zones. It was first regulated in 1949 and then through the indefinite Berlin agreement on trade between the currency zones of East and West Germany signed on 20 September 1951, which, with certain modifications, remained in force until German unification. Exchanges of goods was operated and deducted in “clearing units” (Verrechnungseinheiten, hereafter VE). Even though trade between FRG and GDR was acknowledged as being of specific character already, the Haute Autorité of the ECSC had to be informed about inner-German exchanges of goods related to the treaty. In the EEC, the FRG had to inform the other member states about trade beyond the scope of the Basic Law. Form a West German perspective, inner-German trade was never foreign trade and indeed

27 Jana Wüstenhagen, “Zwischen Parteidoktrin und Realpolitik: Die DDR und die westeuropäische Integration 1957–1989,” in Mareike König/Matthias Schulz (eds.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung 1949 – 2000. Politische Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und international Erfahrungen. Festschrift für Wolf D. Gruner zum 60. Geburtstag (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 204), 495–509, 496. 28 For details on this process, see Wüstenhagen, “Blick durch den Vorhang” 222–292; Schmidt, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft aus Sicht der DDR, 149–238. 29 See first and foremost Peter E. Fäßler, Durch den „Eisernen Vorhang“. Die deutsch-deutschen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1949–1969 (Köln: Böhlau, 2006) and furthermore Michael Kruse, Politik und deutsch- deutsche Wirtschaftsbeziehungen von 1945 bis 1989 (Berlin: Köster, 2005); Peter Krewer, Geschäfte mit dem Klassenfeind. Die DDR im innerdeutschen Handel 1949–1989 (Trier: Kliomedia, 2008); Detelf Nakath, Deutsch- deutsche Grundlagen. Zur Geschichte der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der Bundesrepublik in den Jahren 1969 bis 1982 (Schkeuditz: Scheudtzer Buchverlag, 2002), 322–360. Studies on specific aspects of inner-German trade and works published before 1990 cannot be mentioned here. 9 actually never really put into question, since it also served the FRG’s economic interest of privileged access to the GDR market. Over the decades, this advantage was occasionally challenged by other EEC members. On the other side of the “Iron Curtain,” CMEA members regularly alluded to the privileged position of the GDR. In East Germany, officially the Ministry of Foreign and Inner-German Trade and after 1967 Ministry of Foreign Trade (with its changing names) was responsible, however, the Politburo member responsible for economics was decisive. Due to its nature, inner-German trade meant considerable economic benefits for the GDR. Besides the fact that there were tax benefits and no customs, West Germany provided an interest-free swing. After an initial decline in the first half of the 1960s, due to the East German policy of “Störfreimachung”, aiming at a reduction of economic dependence on the FRG, the trade volume increased towards the end of the 1960s. This development resulted at least in part from several easements the FRG offered and which can be regarded as the economic precursors of the new Ostpolitik. For example, Bonn had enabled loan-financed investments in the GDR secured through federal guarantees in 1967 and introduced a “dynamic swing” in 1968 (with a dimension of up to 25 per cent of the overall volume of inner-German trade which the East Germans immediately started to outbid). While Intra-German trade intensified towards the end of the 1960s, the CMEA’s dealing with the EEC and its growing economic strength became an issue of intra-bloc discussions.30 Being least affected by European integration, Moscow’s and East Berlin’s interests converged: while the USSR aimed at demonstrating the unanimity of the Socialist bloc, the GDR primarily had West Germany in mind and its position sometimes brought it on the brink of isolation within the Socialist camp.31 Within the CMEA and in the course of bilateral meetings, the East Germans pressed for mutual information and coordination of the Socialist states dealings with the EEC, especially regarding imports.32 Talking to Walter Ulbricht in May 1964, János Kádár agreed that consultations had to be intensified. In his view, problems had to be solved conjointly and decision-making processes needed to speed up. Underlining his argument, he compared the situation of the CMEA with the EEC: “With regard to the same problems everybody is agonizing about what needs to be done and we are unable to reach accordance in our steps. This also applies to the EEC. Back then, we have condemned the EEC, but it functions and works, and they agree on their steps, but we don’t.”33 It took almost two decades until an East German

30 On this in every detail, see Suvi Kansikas, Socialist Countries Face the European Community: Soviet-bloc Controversies over East-West Trade (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2014). 31 Jana Wüstenhagen, “RGW und EWG. Die DDR zwischen Ost- und Westintegration,” in Ulrich Pfeil (ed.), Die DDR und der Westen. Transnationale Beziehungen 1949–1989 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2001), 135–149, 139. 32 Report on Ubricht’s visit to Hungary in May 1964, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1030. 33 Conversation Kádár – Ulbricht, 11 May 1964, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/11484, Bl. 53–93, here 86. 10 leader undertook a similar comparison of the EEC and the CMEA in a conversation with a Hungarian party official. Even though the first realistic East German estimates about the EEC and its repercussions on global economic relations can be traced back to the mid-1960s, there was still no deeper understanding of the integration process and on top of it, no sufficient explanation why it developed despite all prophesy about its “unavoidable failure.”34 The mid-1960s integration setback symbolized by the “Empty Chair Crisis” 1965/66, offered respite from this dilemma and was right from the start seen as proof that “progressing integration increased difficulties and discrepancies among the member states.”35 Unpredicted by East German diplomats, disputes were overcome in the “Luxembourg compromise” and in the following years the EEC made decisive progress in becoming a customs union. With the The Hague summit in December 1969, the EEC agreed on enlargement as part of its ambitious agenda of deepening integration including the widening of the Community’s competencies regarding foreign policy and foreign trade. The creation of a customs union posed a threat to the export oriented CMEA states. Additionally, the emerging European Political Cooperation (EPC) refused “any agreement likely to strengthen the Soviet hold on its allies, such as the establishment of EEC–COMECON relations.”36 On the other side of the “Iron Curtain,” the Soviet Union pressed for deeper integration of the CMEA and joint opposition to recognizing the EEC. Intra-CMEA conflicts were unavoidable and Romania led the way by pursuing and independent policy. Hence, what can be regarded “as an economic part of the Brezhnev doctrine”37 was doomed to fail in the long run. It was perforated already at the turn of the 1970s, the very moment Moscow aimed at imposing it. The CMEA negotiations on the Comprehensive Program implemented in 1971, aiming at deeper integration, became intertwined with how to deal with the EEC. Already in January 1969 Romania had refused to accept that the CMEA members policies towards the EEC had to be coordinated and should solely aim at the continuation of bilateral relations towards the member states of the Common Market. In 1971 Romania even vetoed the CMEA Comprehensive Program as a binding document. Facing EEC “protectionism,” not only Romania, but Hungary, Poland, and in fact also Bulgaria had hardly any other option than dealing with the EEC to

34 Siegfried Schwarz, “Das Verhältnis der DDR zur westeuropäischen Integration. Phasen der Wahrnehmung – Umdenken – Annäherung an die Realität (1950–1990),” in Heiner Timmermann (ed.), Die DDR in Deutschland. Ein Rückblick auf 50 Jahre (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 140–157, 144. 35 Zu den Auseinandersetzungen in der EWG. Information by the MfAA, Berlin, 15 July 1965, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2J/1473. 36 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” 9. 37 Suvi Kansikas, “Room to manoeuvre? National interests and coalition-building in the CMEA, 1969–74,” in Sari Autio-Sarasmo/Katalin Miklóssy (eds.), Reassessing Cold War Europe (London: Routledge, 2011), 193–209, 197. 11 maintain the quantity of their exports. Hence, the “EEC question” became a major issue in the CMEA discussions in which Romania, Poland and Hungary aimed at a more flexible policy, while the Soviet Union and the GDR advocated strict non-recognition of the EEC.38 Against the backdrop of growing trade deficits and increasing indebtment since the mid-1960s, the East German leadership acknowledged the economic motivations of those countries, especially regarding the export of agricultural products (which had made certain contacts necessary since the EEC’s introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1962). Custom duties were reducing desperately needed profits for the modernization of industries. Nevertheless, the SED Politburo aimed at counteracting a comprehensive EEC trade policy towards the Socialist states and avoiding the economic repercussions of the deepening and enlargement of the Common Market. Since any separate action would harm and weaken the CMEA’s position regarding the desired global agreement with the EEC, all initiatives should be coordinated. Perhaps there was some hope that the European Security Conference desired by the Soviets would also result in a favorable solution of the various pending economic East– West questions. Yet, for the time being non-recognition of the EEC was the GDR’s stance.39

Recognition of the GDR and Non-recognition of the EEC Whether intending to facilitate Soviet détente goals,40 or due to the unanimous discussions in the CMEA41 the Soviet position towards the EEC seemingly changed. On 20 March 1972, Leonid I. Brezhnev gave a speech indicating recognition of the EEC. There are good arguments for both interpretations42 and maybe the timing and message was directed at the West Germans, while the meaning of the announcement served intra-bloc needs. After Brezhnev’s speech the new “mantra” (Angela Romano) was that after a thorough assessment of the EEC’s development and its repercussions on the Socialist bloc, a common standpoint should be developed for future political negotiations between the CMEA and the EEC, once political

38 Ibd., 200–202. In more detail, see Kansikas, Socialist Countries Face the European Community. 39 See the materials for the meeting of the SED Politburo on 29 February 1972, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1578, Bl. 4, 113–122 and 1579, Bl. 1–29. 40 Wolfgang Mueller, “Recognition in Return for Détente. Brezhnev, the EEC, and the Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970–1973,” in Journal of Cold War Studies 13 (2011) 4, 79–100. 41 Kansikas, Socialist Countries Face the European Community, 110–115. 42 An argument in favor of the détente explanation (which convinces me more, without, however, doubting that Moscow due to the dicsussions in the CMEA recognized the need for a new strategy and was on the way to developing its new position) that has been spared from the discussion so far is the Sino-Soviet conflict (which has been pushed forward by scholars of Soviet foreign policy in the last decade arguing that détente in Europe was also aimed at having a relief in Europe while struggling with the Chinese). From this perspective Mueller’s argument is more convincing, since a negative vote of the Bundestag would have endangered the whole détente process. Be it as it may, probably the findings of our project will contribute to an even deeper understanding of the Soviet move. It is always fascinating to see how much Kremlinology is still needed in the twenty-first century. 12 conditions were ripe for such a step.43 The GDR was satisfied that the fifty-eight meeting of the CMEA Executive committee had accepted the Soviet enforced common standpoint. On the one hand, East Berlin acknowledged the different economic interests of CMEA countries, especially regarding agricultural exports and showed understanding for the desired easements. On the other hand, it considered their expectations “illusory.” Since export structures and strategies were only changeable in the long-run, the East Germans were aware that those countries would continue to strive for negotiations with the EEC, but the risk of separate uncoordinated action seemed to be banned for the time being.44 The East German leadership was conscious of the Socialist states’ need for Western technology, which obviously had to be paid by exports to the West, however, it did not expect any easements in this regard from the EEC. On the contrary, it expected things getting worse and hence demanded deeper integration of the CMEA and a coordinated policy towards the EEC. In preparing for the future dealing with the question of relations towards the EEC, which were apparently interconnected with relations to the FRG, the SED Politburo demanded a thorough analysis of East German trade with the EEC members and West Germany.45 Unfortunately, I have not yet found its conclusions. Whatever the intentions of Brezhnev’s March 1972 speech were, at that time the East German leadership was preoccupied with Soviet détente policies, German–German negotiations and progress on the path to international recognition by the West.46 Facing the changes in political relations, the future of inner-German trade was thoroughly discussed in both German states in 1969/70. Obviously, from an East German perspective it was questionable if the goal of recognition by West Germany was compatible with the prolongation of inner-German trade, but the question of a bilateral trade treaty was only seldom raised. It once came up in the negotiations on the Basic Treaty, which had also been complicated regarding economic relations, due to the GDR’s extensive use of the new swing modalities. In the end, the status quo was confirmed, and the EEC members, for whom the GDR had become a third state, accepted this due to political reasons (as one of the remaining things counteracting the division of Germany). In an interview with the New York Times on 25 November 1972 even Erich Honecker spoke about inner-German trade as “one of the few remaining specialties” of

43 CMEA and EEC negotiations were commenced in 1974, but soon deadlocked, finally suspended in 1981 and only resumed in 1986 after Mikhail S. Gorbachev had revised the Soviet EEC policy in 1985. I will largely spare this from this paper, since the GDR consequently upheld its position largely identical with the Soviet Union’s. 44 Information über die 58. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees des RGW, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1601. 45 Sitzung des SED-Politbüros am 6. 6. 1972, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1601, Bl. 7, 1–36. 46 Mary E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 13

German-German relations.47 The prevalence of economic benefits prevailed over political considerations: It “also serves the economic interests of the GDR,” stated the decision of the SED Politburo, without however detailing or quantifying them.48 Even though both German states were interested in inner-German trade, it was far more important to the GDR. The FRG was by far the most important Western trading partner and even second most important after the Soviet Union. My research aims at revealing the extent to which the East German leadership rationalized how much it profited from inner-German trade and how they saw it interconnected with the EEC, when for example in the late 1970s oil products (hardly qualifiable as of East German origin) were exported to West Berlin. While inner-German trade at least in numbers doubled during the 1970s, on the political level, the GDR aimed at a demarcation from the FRG.49 East Berlin refused any change of the border regime and doubled the minimum exchange of Deutschmark for West German visitors in 1973, only economic pressure undermined this strategy. In 1974, after lengthy and quarrelsome negotiations, the East German regime accepted some easements of the travel regime in order to get a prolongation of the ever more favorable interest free dynamic swing granted since 1968, which in 1976 was capped at a maximum of 850 million VE. Does the same paradigm hold true for the EEC’s dealing with the GDR? Angela Romano has argued: “Indeed, the East German government was deeply concerned with resisting Western penetration for the sake of its own very existence, and thus favoured bloc action.”50 Indeed, East German analyses of the EEC concluded that the West German integration concept aimed at increasing the “effectiveness” of Western integration and making it “more attractive and appealing” to the Socialist states.51 Even though there was a rather realistic assessment of the growing economic power of the EEC, not only by deepening integration and enlarging, but also by concluding association agreements with other countries in Western Europe (like the neutrals who at that time were negotiating their free trade agreements with the EEC), North Africa, the Middle East and the Commonwealth and thus binding them closer to the Common Market, traditional ideological patterns of analyzing capitalism still prevailed. The 1972 East German assessment of the EEC approved by the Politburo did not doubt the further progress of integration, but it expected enlargement (in 1973 Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the

47 Cf. Nakath, “Die DDR – ‘heimliches Mitglied’ der Europäischen Gemeinschaft? Zur Entwicklung des innerdeutschen Handels vor dem Hintergrund der westeuropäischen Integration,” 462–466. 48 Direktive beschlossen in der Sitzung des Politbüros vom 31. Oktober 1972, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2/1420. 49 Cf. Nakath, “Die DDR – ‘heimliches Mitglied’ der Europäischen Gemeinschaft? Zur Entwicklung des innerdeutschen Handels vor dem Hintergrund der westeuropäischen Integration,” 467–470. 50 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” 10. 51 Information für das SED-Politbüro. IPW. Zu einigen Aspekten der gegenwärtigen Erweiterung und der künftigen Entwicklung der EWG, Berlin, 26 January 1972, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2J/3932. 14

EEC) to cause conflicts among the main capitalist powers which would be enforced by “cyclical crisis of capitalism.”52 And in the first half of the 1970s it seemed that global economic and financial developments would prove this assessment right. The monetary crisis following the end of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the first “oil shock” of 1973 troubled Western economies. Under these conditions the first attempt to implement an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU, here the “Werner plan”) failed and the crisis – at least in an East German view – seemed to endanger the cohesion of the EEC. The dictum of the “chronic contradictions of the imperialistic system” was en vouge again.53 At the same time the progress of CMEA integration was overvalued. The “experts” who smugly analyzed the “crisis of the West,” did not know how much these developments also affected the GDR. Only a very small circle had the necessary information and realized where these things were about to lead.54 Despite all the crisis rhetoric about the West and the existing general and crisis-related discrepancies among its member states, the EEC increasingly managed to coordinate its policy towards the East.55 Even the GDR had to acknowledge that the Community (although with some delays) had at least successfully implemented its CCP with the beginning of 1973. From that very moment on, its member states were not allowed to conclude any new bilateral trade agreements and the duration of those existing was limited to the end of 1974. In November 1974 the EEC Commission formally informed the CMEA states that from 1975 onwards no more bilateral trade agreements would be signed or renewed. Instead trade negotiations with the Commission were offered. The GDR saw this as a test to the unanimity of the CMEA member states and an attempt to continue a policy of differentiation between them, aimed at getting recognition from them. The GDR did not acknowledge possible positive effects of trade agreements with the EEC, but considered them as a “trojan horse” based on false promises regarding liberalization (potentially undermining liberalizations already guaranteed on the

52 Kurze Einschätzung der EWG appendix to Sitzung des SED-Politbüros am 29. 2. 1972, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1578, Bl. 4, 113–122 und 1579, Bl. 1–29. Especially in the analyses of the 1973 enlargement round, when Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the EEC traditional ideological patterns predicting growing conflicts prevailed. Additionally, the results of the referendum in Norway, where a majority voted against membership, or the fact that in Britain no referendum took place were interpreted as proof of the people’s opposition towards the EEC. Information für das SED-Politbüro. IPW. Die Erweiterung der EWG – Ausgangspunkt imperialistischer Interessenkonflikte im Jahre 1973, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2J/4473. 53 Information über die aktuelle Lage der Entwicklung der kapitalistischen Währungskrise für das SED-Politbüro, Berlin, 12 February 1973, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2J/4555; Information für das SED-Politbüro. IPW. Zu einigen Entwicklungstedenzen der Wirtschaft in den kapitalistischen Hauptländern 1974, Februar 1974, SAPMO- BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2J/5198; Information für das SED-Politbüro. IPW. Aktuelle Probleme der imperialistischen Integration in der EWG, März 1974, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2J/5232; Information für das SED-Politbüro. IPW. Zur gegenwärtigen Lage der Wirtschaft in den kapitalistischen Hauptländern, Mai 1974, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2J/5319. 54 Regarding rising oil prices and the repercussions, see André Steiner, “‘Common sense is necessary:’ East German reactions to the oils crises of the 1970s,” in Historical Social Research 39 (2014) 4, 231–250. 55 Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. 15 bilateral level) and high demands in return (like breaking the state monopoly on foreign trade through direct contacts with producers and technicians, access to raw materials, etc.). Additionally, future loan policies seemed uncertain. Expecting controversies about the EEC’s handling of Eastern trade among its member stats, East Berlin opted for not replying to the Commission’s letter and decided for a wait-and-see attitude. There were several reasons for this reaction: First, even though the GDR was now entirely part of the EEC’s trade policy towards the Socialist states, inner-German trade was once again not affected. It was still organized according to the regulations included into the Basic Treaty. Second, due to the Western policy of non-recognition, the GDR had never concluded trade agreements with any of the EEC states, hence, in this regard nothing had changed. Third, it was well noted that governmental agreements on economic, industrial and technical cooperation (which the GDR had concluded with all EEC member states, bar Ireland and the FRG, for the duration of ten years) would become a matter of consultation within the EEC, but were not subject to the CCP: “Even though those treaties do not regulate fundamental questions of trade” we have “governmental agreements in the economic field.” Hence, the aim was to use all negotiations in the direction of bilateralism to avoid any worsening of the current trade regime. This also became the GDR’s standpoint in the CMEA’s Permanent Commission on Foreign Trade. Looking ahead, it was concluded: “Because of the economic interests of the individual member states of the EEC, the fact that the GDR will not conclude a trade agreement with the EEC as a bloc, will not lead to a significant change in the exchange of goods with those countries.” The Politburo decreed that, even if trade agreements cannot be concluded, the planned trade for 1975 must be secured in bilateral negotiations.56 Maybe this approach was in part owed to an expected crisis-related instability and disunity among the EEC member states, but with the full implementation of the CCP this soon turned out to be illusory.

Facing the Common Market Since the CMEA states did not reply to the Commission’s letter, the EEC council acted unilaterally. It established quotas and other checks for imports which were subject to quantitative restrictions revised every year. Against the backdrop of “the economic crisis hitting Western European economies, this arrangement promised no better deals for the East.”57 In 1972 the Kremlin had managed to (re)impose control over the CMEA’s policies towards the EEC through the party and Warsaw Pact level. However, despite aiming at an agreement between the EEC and the CMEA, the diverse attitudes of the latter’s member states had become

56 Sitzung des SED-Politbüros am 17. 12. 1974, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1845, Bl. 8, 54–67. 57 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” 12. 16 visible and certain contacts were not prohibited. The clue was to qualify them as “technical contacts,” which in official Soviet interpretation did not imply recognition of the EEC and at least to some extent satisfied the interests of the CMEA member states relying on exports of agricultural or manufactured goods to the Common Market. This was already approved on by the twenty-seventh meeting of the CMEA Council in June 1973. The agreements reached in those “technical contacts” effectively counteracted dumping prices and freed the CMEA exporters from additional fees on their goods sold to the Common Market. While Poland had already approached the EEC with regard to a trade agreement in summer 1974,58 the GDR even avoided “technical contacts” until desperately recognizing that they were unavoidable and ignoring the EEC showed first repercussions on agricultural exports. When additional charges hit the export of pigs and pork to Italy and France and immediately caused export losses, the East German Ministry of Foreign Trade recommended to commence “technical contacts” early in 1975.59 In advance they gathered detailed information about the modus operandi from the Hungarians. After consultation with the responsible party units, the SED-Politburo regretfully concluded that a concerted action of the CMEA was not possible anymore and the GDR could only follow the path of other member states. Hence, to avoid economic losses, it accepted the advice from the state bureaucracy and approved the establishment of “technical contacts of companies and institutions of the GDR to the EEC organs.” The Politburo further decreed that before every contact the minister of foreign trade had to consult his Soviet counterpart, however, the final decision became his responsibility. The “strict rejection” of a trade agreement remained unchanged, thus being in accordance with Moscow.60 Nevertheless, as soon as some of their core interests were affected the dogma of demanding official CMEA–EEC relations and not negotiating with the Community was not even sustainable for the Soviet Union nor the GDR. After the EEC had adopted its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in January 1977, “the EEC council requested interested Comecon states (Poland, the GDR, and the USSR) either communicate the size of their fishing fleet and negotiate fishing quotas with the Community or withdraw their fleets from the EEC 200-mile common pound.”61 Talking to Erich Honecker on 27 February 1977, the Frist Secretary of the Polish United Worker’s Party (PUWP) Edward Gierek expressed his worries about the future of fishing since Poland’s most important fishing areas were within the 200-mile zone and informed that the Minister of Foreign Trade had commenced negotiations in Brussels. Honecker did not touch

58 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” 11. 59 Wüstenhagen, “Blick durch den Vorhang,” 284–285. 60 Sitzung des SED-Politbüros am 7. 3. 1975, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1864, Bl. 65–75. 61 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” 17. 17 upon this issue, instead he portrayed the GDR’s relations to the West as developing well.62 Even before Poland, the Soviet Union had agreed to talk with the EEC on fisheries, though, insisting that these negotiations would not imply recognition. The same attitude was adopted by the East German leadership. Even though the GDR’s fishing quotas in the North Sea or “German Ocean” and the North Atlantic represented only 15 per cent of its total (and thus lower than Poland’s), its economic interests were nevertheless impaired. Given the official East Germany position on relations to the EEC, the SED Politburo came to a remarkably pragmatic decision. Due to the GDR’s “substantial economic interest in continuing its fisheries within the fishing zones of the EEC member states” it decreed on 1 March that an agreement between the GDR and the EEC can be concluded and that the expected license fees had to be accepted. The East German delegation for the negotiations was instructed to insist on long-term guaranteed quotas in accordance with the “traditional” GDR’s activities in these fishing zones.63 However, the Soviet and Polish experiences of their first rounds of negotiations promised a bleak outlook. The Soviet Minister of Fish Industry Aleksandr Ishkov held the position that the EEC aimed at continuously reducing the quotas for Poland and the GDR year after year, because they had nothing to offer in return. According to a Polish information, the reference to “traditional fishing rights” did not matter a lot, since the fishing activities of the EEC members would most probably leave no surplus for third countries in the future. Only countries who could guarantee fishing rights in their territorial waters in return (which both the GDR and Poland could not) would be granted privileged access.64 During the negotiations these depressing perspectives turned out to be the actual condition and no concessions regarding quotas were made by Brussels. Nevertheless, the GDR engaged in several rounds of negotiations to achieve at least something for its fishing industry.65 Indeed, they were even willing to accept several compromises regarding the formulation of the treaty, but they were not willing to compromise when it came to the question of the “Berlin clause” on which the EEC insisted. In East German perspective the hardening of the EEC’s position on the level of the agreement and the “Berlin clause” after the EC Council of 3/4 May 1977 was a result of West German insistence.66 Soon negotiations deadlocked because the Soviets were not willing to accept the “Berlin clause,” which in their view was incompatible with the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.67

62 Conversations Honecker – Gierek, 26/27 February 1977, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/2047. 63 Sitzung des Politbüros am 1. März 1977, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/2047. 64 Information in Ergänzung der Vorlage für das Politbüro des ZK der SED betr. Aufnahme von Verhandlungen mit der EG über den Abschluß eines Fischereiabkommens, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/2047. 65 On the first two rounds of negotiations, see BArch, DC 20/4320, Bl. 26–35. 66 Information on the third round of negotiations. Stoph to Honecker, Berlin 19 May 1977, BArch, DC 20/4320, Bl. 2. 67 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” 18. 18

Even effective economic consequences did not change or maybe even reinforced the general East German attitude of demanding EEC–CMEA relations in which no compromises on the non-inclusion of West Berlin to any possible agreement should be made. This stance was unflinchingly upheld by the GDR in the intra-CMEA dealings with the EEC.68 Instead, the East German leadership still aimed at avoiding recognition by maintaining bilateralism and capitalizing on diverging economic interests of the EEC members. Angela Romano has stated: “It is usually claimed that the EEC’s chances to get recognition from the East were undermined by its member states, for these latter tended to circumvent the CCP by means of cooperation agreements, in which some trade provisions were aptly camouflaged. […] However, this interpretation is grounded in an incorrect understanding or superficial assessment of the situation, which does not stand scrutiny of actual EEC functioning and decisions. To start with, raw materials, technology transfers and credits – which featured massively in East–West economic exchanges – still fell outside EEC competence, and were therefore legitimate objects of member states’ cooperation agreements. The actual case in point relates to exports towards East, where coordination was indeed lacking. It was in this field that EEC member states competed, and ‘used’ cooperation agreements to pursue interests. This was not only due to some willingness to keep a national leverage on East–West relations, but also very much due to the economic crisis and growing unemployment rates that Western economies were facing in the 1970s.”69 Even though “specific mechanisms were put in place to check the content of member states’ cooperation agreements” and at least since 1976 the “commission had the power to open procedures against member states for violation of EEC rules” which it obviously made use of as “an impressive monitoring activity” shows,70 this was precisely the framework in which the GDR aimed at muddling through without recognizing the EEC. The GDR’s assessment of the economic situation in Western Europe and the resonance East German bilateralism had in various countries seems to have encouraged its economic elite to pursue this path.71 I will have to detail, how the East German state traders tried to use compensation deals especially (in which their Western business partners were interested a lot) to create loopholes and the Historical Archives of the European Union will hopefully reveal if any concessions were made or how the

68 Position on negotiations with the EEC, 1978, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3241, Bl. 164. 69 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” 14. 70 Ibd. 71 For example, see Information über Beratungen von Genossen Dr. Gerhard Beil mit Vertretern der französischen Regierung und der französischen Wirtschaft in Paris, gez. Beil, Berlin, 25. November 1976, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1271, Bl. 129–133. 19 various East German (in their view successful) attempts to reach higher quotas for several goods through bilateral deals were dealt with. But this is a task for my further research. The full implementation of the CCP for imports from CMEA countries regulated their access to the Common Market. Angela Romano has stressed: “In this field, the competence was legally and actually of the Community. Despite the limits of CCP implementation, the Community was therefore well-equipped to make its weight felt on communist countries and induce them to take a more realistic attitude. Indeed, a series of EEC Council decisions proved the Community’s determination and effectiveness in changing the CMEA countries’ attitude.”72 The next moves followed in December 1977 on the textile and steel sectors. To avoid the loss of their export opportunities to the Common Market, the countries affected had to negotiate bilateral agreements with the EEC, which almost all of them did. A detailed look at the steel sector illustrates the East German dealing with it. On 19/20 December the EEC Council had “decided that all countries exporting steel to the EEC” had to conclude bilateral agreements so that the EEC “could impose price discipline.”73 The GDR received Étienne Davignon’s letter calling for negotiations on the future import of steel to the Common Market via its Brussels embassy on 30 December 1977.74 In an East German perspective, the commissions’ move was another attempt to impose import restrictions on “third countries, especially on the Socialist states” and to force them into bilateral relations with the EEC, which the GDR still strictly ruled out. Since the regulations went into force with the beginning of 1978, the East German Ministry of Foreign Trade immediately assessed the potential consequences of this step. It was well aware that the implementation of import contingents or anti-dumping measures would most probably affect the East German exports, not least because the EEC had made an example of preventing the import of the GDR’s metallurgic imports in the first days of the year. Indeed, varying from country to country up to 100 per cent of the East German steel exports seemed to be endangered.75 Because of the potential repercussions on his country’s exports, the Czechoslovakian ambassador to Brussels Vladimír Koucký had sought contact with Davignon and came to know that no discrimination of exports from Socialist states nor specific contingents were intended, but future prices for imported steel had to be at maximum 6–7 per cent below the EEC level. The Koucký confided

72 Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” 15. 73 Ibd. 74 Abschrift der Verbalnote, Brüssel, 30. 12. 1977, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1276, Bl. 74–75. 75 Information über die Auswirkungen der EWG-Maßnahmen auf metallurgischem Gebiet für die DDR (Stand: 5.1.1978), erstellt vom Ministerium für Außenhandel, Berlin, 5.1.1978, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1276, Bl. 77– 80. On the example of the refusal to let East German metallurgic products into the Common Market on 2 January 1978, see the paper by Pavel Szobi. 20 to his GDR colleagues that according to Davignon, the EEC would potentially not insist on contractual regulations and an “exchange of letters without territorial clauses” could suffice.76 Despite this, once again right from the start, the East German order of the day was to call for intra-CMEA coordination towards the EEC measures, but it was already expected that the EEC would reach its goal to play the socialist states off against each other.77 At the fifty-first meeting of the CMEA Executive Committee’s Permanent Commission on Foreign Trade on 11–13 January 1979 in Moscow, the East German Foreign Trade Minister, Horst Sölle, proposed to consider if the threat or actual shifting of the CMEA’s steel imports from the Common Market to other suppliers outside the EEC could be used as a means of commercial policy. Seemingly, no one agreed with this idea, but all CMEA members were convinced that regulations for further export goods would follow soon. Hence, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia spoke out against unilateral negotiations, the Polish, Romanian and Hungarian representatives, who according to Western information were already willing to negotiate, did not even reveal their position. In the end, no concrete commitment was agreed upon.78 Interestingly enough, it was Prague who within four months became the first to conclude an agreement with Brussels, soon followed by Hungary, Romania and Poland. The East Germans did not hold back with their dislike of those agreements. As the Soviet Union, the GDR refused to enter negotiations and had to face the consequences. Several EEC countries announced restrictive measures for the East German steel exports. Great Britain imposed an import contingent of 43 kilotons per year, thus leaving roughly 15 per cent of planned exports unfulfilled. Things seemed to become even worse because the GDR had imported loan-financed steel plants and other industrial complexes from EEC member states at grand-scale in recent years. Most of those “big deals” were concluded as countertrades and predominantly had to be refinanced by metallurgic exports. The last resort was good will of EEC member states in bilateral negotiations, an alternative strategy (which would have meant to find new sales markets outside the Common Market) did not yet exist. At least it seems, that State Secretary Gerhard Beil, by successfully negotiating with the Italian authorities, had secured the planned refinancing exports and there was some hope that it would be possible to reach similar results with other countries.79

76 Beil to Mittag, 17 January 1978, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1276, Bl. 98–99. 77 Information über die Auswirkungen der EWG-Maßnahmen auf metallurgischem Gebiet für die DDR, Ministerium für Außenhandel, Berlin, 5 January 1978, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1276, Bl. 77–80. 78 Information über eine Ministerberatung während der 51. Tagung der SKAH zur Abstimmung des weiteren Vorgehens der ML/RGW gegen neue protektionistische Maßnahmen der EWG auf dem Gebiet des Handels, übersandt von Sölle an Honecker, Berlin, 4 April 1978, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1276, Bl. 199–203. 79 G. Tautenhahn (Abteilung Maschinenbau und Metallurgie) to Mittag, 21 September 1979, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1277, Bl. 249–250. It seems that Beil had managed to secure the import contingents needed for the 21

According to East German sources it was the “Davignon Plan for Europe’s Steel” of 1977 that led to the establishment of permanent “working contacts” of the CMEA member’s embassies in Brussels with the EEC (most probably the East Germans were not briefed about earlier contacts). As seen by the commercial department of the GDR’s embassy in the Belgian capital, those contacts aimed at “securing the individual economic interests” of those countries. All Eastern embassies had increased their personnel and the standard of information on the EEC improved. However, despite intensive cooperation among the CMEA’s diplomats, for the East Germans “their knowledge was only of limited use.” The reason for this was that the official standpoint towards the EEC had not changed, despite the rational acting of others and the resulting appealing incentives, which some EEC member states illustrated to the GDR. For example, Belgian interlocutors openly stated that the GDR would be in “a far better position, if it would be willing to negotiate with the EEC.” It would profit from various advantages, like higher contingents and guaranteed growth rates as well as increased competitiveness by being granted the possibility to underbid certain minimum prices. Instead the GDR had to face several anti-dumping measures by the Commission.80 My future research on the sources of the East German Foreign Ministry will hopefully reveal how those diplomatic interactions in Brussels affected the GDR’s dealing with the EEC and at least at the level of state bureaucracy re-shaped the image of European integration, thereby contributing to the hindsight that relations to the Common Market could be promising (as they were perceived elsewhere). In this regard it will be of extraordinary interest if and how those things were reported to decisive economic elites or if it rather remained a matter of those who had to carry out the day-to-day business with the West. My impression from the documents I have seen so far is that they understood how things developed and reported accordingly. At least some of these reports even made it up to the SED’s top level, which, however, failed to react or was reluctant to do so and instead went on as before (as it did in other regards).

Interrelations between Socialist decline and growing realism regarding the EEC? As shown in this paper, despite inner-German trade (and thus privileged access to at least the economically strongest part of the Common Market), the GDR on several occasions had to face

refinancing of compensation deals with Italy, not least because the Italian Foreign Trade Minister Rinaldo Ossola was lobbying for another big steel work order by the GDR. Beil to Mittag, Berlin, 1 March 1979, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1279, Bl. 58–59; Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Mitglieds des Politbüros und Sekretärs des Zentralkomitees der SED, Genossen Dr. G. Mittag, mit dem Minister für Außenhandel Italiens, Herrn Rinaldo Ossola, Leipzig, 12 March1979, (initialed by Honecker on 14 March 1979), SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1279, Bl. 113–115; Information über den Aufenthalt des Staatssekretärs im Ministerium für Außenhandel der DDR, Gen. Gerhard Beil, vom 1. bis 3. Oktober 1979 in Italien, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1281, Bl. 144–148. 80 Betr.: Beziehungen ML/RGW – EWG. Nur für den Dienstgebrauch, gez. Schicktanz, Brussels, 5 December 1979, SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1281, Bl. 278–279. 22 the economic strength and power of the EEC. Even though, the GDR stuck to its political dogmas regarding dialogue and relations with the EEC, it is obvious that the image of a growing and deeper integrated Community had undergone a certain change throughout the 1970s. Even though the GDR still aimed at playing on the “irreconcilable antagonisms” of capitalism it had propagated in the decades before, gradually the Western (especially the EEC’s) ability to compromise in political decision-making processes was recognized.81 How far this reassessment already went by the mid-1970s became visible in the East German analysis of the Tindemans report of 1976. Since the report had in fact no immediate political consequences, but consisted of many suggestions which much later materialized in treaties on the way to the establishment of the European Union, the East German view is even more remarkable. In the IPW material forwarded to the SED Politburo it was well noted that, even though earlier decisions of the EC had determined the realization of the EMU until 1980, the report did not mention a specific date on which the union should materialize. Not surprisingly, some of the former perceptions branding the whole project as an instrument of coordinating anti-Socialist politics (among other things) aiming at forcing them to recognize the EC “as a unity” prevailed. Additionally, economic and political antagonisms among the member states were mentioned once again, however, the report was perceived as an – even tough coerced – attempt to find a strategy to overcome what the East Germans perceived as a crisis of the West and the “so far severest crisis” of its integration. Instead of predicting a foreseeable failure, this time the East German analysis acknowledged the will and the ability of the EEC to overcome crises. It noted the shift from the economic to the political level of integration (aiming at a stronger politically tying of the “nine”) and even conceded the ambition to overcome social contradictions in Western Europe. Interestingly, progresses on the way to a common foreign policy were given the best chances for realization (maybe a result of the East German experiences with those efforts?). In a more traditional view, the plans of Tindemans’ report were regarded as being especially in the interest of the FRG and its social democratic government. The conclusion of the assessment stated: “Altogether, it can be expected that due to the mentioned contradictions the proposals of the ‘Tindemans report’ will be subject to multiple trade-offs and in most cases only compromises on the least common denominator will materialize. However, in the basic direction, certain enhancements of West European integration will take place.”82 In hindsight: Remarkably to the point.

81 Cf. Schwarz, “Das Verhältnis der DDR zur westeuropäischen Integration. Phasen der Wahrnehmung – Umdenken – Annäherung an die Realität (1950–1990),” 144–148. Schmidt, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft aus Sicht der DDR, 309–403. 82 Information für das SED-Politbüro. IPW. Zum “Tindemans-Bericht” über die Entwicklung der “Europäischen Gemeinschaft” zur “Europäischen Union,” Anfang Februar 1976, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2J/7124. 23

There is a distinct proof that (probably enforced by experiencing Socialist decline) a certain realism also found its way to the top-level of the SED. The latter half of the 1970s saw a multitude of external and self-inflicted challenges for the GDR (to name but a few: setbacks of détente, the second “oil shock,” the “Polish Crisis,” etc.) and in the early 1980s the GDR was on the brink of economic collapse. The East German leadership was aware of this, but it usually did not admit it openly. Apart from the Soviets, General Secretary Honecker hardly ever admitted any of the most pressing East German problems in his conversations with other East European leaders. However, in March 1983 he conceded some problems in a conversation with the Hungarian Politburo member Gőrgy Aczél. After proudly reporting about the GDR’s achievements to counter the campaign on “the alleged insolvency of the GDR,” which, though, had not yet ended the Western “credit freeze.” Honecker stated: “We have reached this result by increasing exports and reducing imports.” He was also proud of having secured stability of real earnings which should now grow again. To Honecker, this was “an important element in the competition with the imperialism of the FRG.” Considering the domestic situation, he was well aware that pointing to the millions of unemployed people in West Germany was insufficient and that the East Germans were comparing the standard of living. Hence the GDR was “forced,” as the Secretary General stated, “to import from the West” and this constituted “a burden of mortgage to the national economy.” Additionally, the “wanderlust” of his citizens “distressed” him. While West Berliner could meanwhile easily fly out to Málaga and other destinations, Honecker lamented, that the “Socialist world was getting smaller and smaller.” Due to growing prices in other CMEA countries (which Honecker decried)83 and the disability of the East German leadership to secure sufficient foreign currency reserves (for example in Hungarian Forint), the GDR had reduced the daily foreign currency allowances and the maximum duration of stays abroad. The acquisition of additional foreign currency would have demanded additional East German exports requested by other CMEA states, but those goods were needed for export to the West to earn hard currency.84 To Honecker this was “a problem of economic integration,” which the West had obviously overcome, and he intended to address this at the next economic summit of the Eastern bloc. Then, the East German head of state had one of his seldom outbursts outside the inner circle of the SED and openly spoke about the differences between the CMEA and the EEC. Frustrated with stagnating CMEA integration he pointed to the fact, that “despite unemployment, the EC functions better than the CMEA. In

83 Gedächtnisprotokoll Honecker – Aczél, Berlin, 10 March 1983, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/2551. 84 I am working on a paper on the quadrangular tourism triangle consisting of Austria, FRG, GDR, and Hungary from the 1960s to 1989 which among many other things will address how state planned economies were unable to cope with unplannable individual tourism. 24 principle, the CMEA is based on bilateral relations and does not fulfill the tasks, which the EC accomplishes. The EC has a council of ministers, commissions, a parliament, that indeed has not much say, though, the Socialist world is separated into single states.” Towards the end of his remarks he resigningly stated that in the CMEA “not even the carriage of goods works smoothly. Recently, there was a traffic jam at one of the stations at the Soviet border, in which trains with 650 wagons were caught. There was a tailback to the factories. There are no such incidents in the EC. North-South traffic does not run smoothly as well. Fruits from Bulgaria are stopped en route at closed frontiers and then arrive in Berlin rotten.”85 Shortly thereafter, in June 1983, the first “Strauß loan” in the amount of a billion D-Mark relieved the GDR form the Western “credit freeze,”86 a second billion D-Mark loan followed in 1984. Even though this meant short-term economic and financial relief, dependence on the West had increased further and in the long-run concessions and an opening were unavoidable.

Outlook and Conclusions Despite further changes of the East German perception of the EEC, which allegedly in the course of the 1980s was increasingly regarded as a potential partner, it still needed the next change of Soviet policy towards the EEC in 1985 to alter the East German attitude towards relations with the Community. Expert talks with the Commission started in November 1986, a delegation of the European Parliament paid a visit to the GDR’s “People’s Chamber” in 1987 and after Mikhail Gorbachev had done so, the GDR recognized the EEC and in August 1988 opened an embassy at the EC headed by the “veteran diplomat” Ingo Öser who in the 1960s had been one of Ulbricht’s emissaries pleading for recognition in Western Europe. Negotiations on a trade agreement were commenced, but they were soon overtaken by the collapse of the East German regime.87 Among the CMEA members, the GDR was an absolute latecomer in relations with the EEC, ironically, due to the revolutions of 1989 and rapid unification the East Germans were the first to become part of the EC88 and citizens of the European Union, while even the neutrals – released from their Cold War (self)restrictions – had to wait until the completion of the Common Market and the former Socialist states of Eastern Europe even until the “Eastern enlargements” of 2004/07.

85 Gedächtnisprotokoll Honecker – Aczél, Berlin, 10 March 1983, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/2551. 86 For the most recent account on this, see Stephan Kieninger, “‘Niemand will einen Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg’ Franz Josef Strauß, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski und der Milliardenkredit für die DDR 1983,” in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 65 (2017) 4, 352–371. 87 For a summary, see Schwarz, “Das Verhältnis der DDR zur westeuropäischen Integration. Phasen der Wahrnehmung – Umdenken – Annäherung an die Realität (1950–1990),” 148–157. 88 For example, see Carsten Meyer, Die Eingliederung der DDR in die EG (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1993); Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), Osterweiterung der EG. Die Einziehung der ehemaligen DDR in die Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991). A study based on archival sources is much desired. 25

Despite having strongly desired recognition and acceptance by, as well as engaging in developing political and economic relations with the West, the confrontational pattern prevailed on the outset of the 1970s. Also, the GDR was “looking West” in the “long 1970s,” however, it was rather the East German population (and maybe the medium level state and party elite) that actually “looked West.” The leadership had a different view. Despite détente, not least due to the nature of the “second German state,” to the SED bosses the “long 1970s” were much more about “facing the West.” Even though the prosperous FRG remained the main challenge, the EEC mattered at least more than they admitted. Western economic leverage weighed heavily on East Germany and its leaders rationalized it. Nevertheless, the East German regime, for the sake of the existence of the GDR, pursued a policy of demarcation (towards West Germany) and non-recognition (towards the EEC). As this paper has shown, they failed in consistently standing this attitude and in various ways had to deal with what they officially ignored. Moreover, they had to face the consequences of their refusal to negotiate with the Community and paid an economic price for it. Nevertheless, they managed to muddle through the “long 1970s” with its drastic global economic changes that had severe repercussions not only for the West who in the end mastered these challenges, but also for the East. By being a “special case” among the CMEA states with privileged economic relations to West Germany and by to some extent successfully instrumentalizing Western economic interests, they managed to avoid bankruptcy when others (like Poland and Romania) failed in the early 1980s. However, this was only possible at the cost of an indebtment to the West that in the long-run massively contributed to the downfall of the SED regime. Despite being aware of the fatal economic situation of the GDR, East German leaders saw no other option to the continuity of the “Unity of Social and Economic Policy” aiming at keeping people satisfied as far as possible89 and remaining able to effectively suppress opposition throughout the 1970s. At the same time, they were great actors who managed to create the image of an allegedly successful and stable GDR in which many Western leaders and observers believed. However, when economic decline caused an (especially in comparison to the West) increasingly desperate standard of living, when the constantly growing economic dependency forced the regime to accept more concessions to open-up, especially in the humanitarian field, and when finally the changing international environment (détente, perestroika, abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine) created the conditions for departures from the Socialist bloc via transitions and revolutions, also the East German “cardboard castle” collapsed and within a year the GDR ceased to exist.

89 On the example of state price policy, see André Steiner, “State Price policy in the German Democratic Republic in the 1970s and 1980s,” in Michel-Pierre Chélini/Laurent Warlouzet (eds.), Calmer les prix. L’inflation en Europe dans les années 1970 (Paris: Presse de Sciences Po, 2016), 169–189. 26