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Graf GDR Paneur1970s-Workshop Desire, Dependence and Demarcation: The GDR and the West in the “long 1970s”1 Maximilian Graf I. Aims and Scope of this project When researching the GDR’s dealing with the West in the “long 1970s”2 one initially must admit that he is not going to rewrite the whole story, which regarding the cornerstones is comparatively well researched. The Soviet Union and West Germany will remain in the center of attention when locating East Germany between East and West. Politically and economically those two were the by far most important partners and opponents. However, the existing common narrative on the East German concept of détente and East German economics within the international context is a bit too narrow. Not only West Germany, but the West in general was an object of desire on which the GDR continuously became more and more dependent. Thus, fearing the repercussions of the subsequently unavoidable opening-up, the East German leadership aimed at demarcation – far more regarding West Germany than the rest of the West. Hence, this project will explicitly aim at broadening our understanding of the East German rationale and actions by widening the perspective to a pan-European view. Before going into detail, it needs to be clarified what can be considered the East German “long 1970s.” Period under consideration In my view they can be described as the period from 1971 to 1984 – although the endpoint is more randomly picked than the starting point. In 1971, after a quarrelsome power struggle over his Germany policy and economic reforms, Walter Ulbricht was ousted from power. The Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) elected Erich Honecker as its new First Secretary. The VIII Party Congress of the SED later that year adopted the concept of “Unity of Economic and Social Policy.” A second reason for picking 1971 is that only by the early 1970s diplomatic recognition of the GDR in the West was underway, allowing East Germany to pursue a foreign policy beyond the limited Socialist scope. When Honecker rose to power hardly any state outside the Communist world had diplomatically recognized the GDR, however, things were changing due to the more flexible West German Ostpolitik. In 1971 the quadripartite agreement on Berlin was signed and marked an important step towards the 1 This is a very first outline of my planned contribution on the GDR in the framework of PANEUR1970s, open for discussion and reshaping. I am looking forward to your comments and advice. Please note that I have joined the project in September 2017 only and still have to catch up with reading and research. The results presented in the case study are, thus, only a very first sketch of what needs much more in-depth investigation to reach a broader understanding of the GDR’s dealing with the West and West European integration in the “long 1970s.” 2 Poul Villaume/Rasmus Mariager/Helle Porsdam (eds.), The “Long 1970s”. Human Rights, East-West Détente and Transnational Relations (London: Routledge, 2016). On the understanding of the “long 1970s” in the framework of this project, see Romano, Angela/Federico Romero (eds.), “Special Issue: European Socialist Regimes Facing Globalisation and European Cooperation: Dilemmas and Responses,” European Review of History/Revue européenne d’histoire 21 (2014) 2. 1 normalization of German-German relations in 1972. Given these facts one can take “1971” as a “cipher” for the beginning of the GDR’s “long 1970s.” Not only international interactions started to multiply, but also a new era in economic and domestic politics, shaped by Honecker, began. Both the leading figure as well as the fatally costly policy concept “Unity of Economic and Social Policy” continued to shape the GDR until its very end. East Germany’s indebtedness had grown throughout the 1970s and in 1982 the regime faced bankruptcy, avoided only by Soviet help, secret financial operations and an Austrian loan preceding the “Strauß loans” of 1983/84. At that point, East German dependence on West Germany had reached a new level with direct links to the decline of the SED regime, not least because of the humanitarian concessions it had to accept in return for the convertible currencies desperately needed. In this regard, 1984 and the second “Strauß loan” can be taken as an endpoint to the “long 1970s.” Moscow’s support for the GDR had decreased throughout the 1970s, but due to the last peak of the Cold War the Kremlin’s strict control over relations between East and West Germany had prevailed. Finally, the advent of Gorbachev’s perestroika initiated a process of estrangement in Soviet-East German relations. In the end, Gorbachev’s reforms, economic decline, resulting not only in growing debt, but also in societal dissatisfaction, growing dependence on West Germany (and often forgotten West-Berlin), as well as the contributions of European détente and the CSCE to overcoming the “Iron Curtain,” culminated in the collapse of the East German regime and rapid German unification – but this is beyond the scope of this project. Economic elites and conflicts The period 1971–84 must be considered in a broader perspective. At the outset one has to be aware to what extent the East German “long 1970s” were shaped by earlier developments – not only by the division of Germany, but also in other fields. In economics, continuities from the 1960s existed. André Steiner has demonstrated that even the reform period of the second half of the 1960s with the “New Economic System” (which included some free market elements) had remained within the concept of a centrally planned economy. It failed and was finally abandoned in 1970/71.3 Ralf Ahrens has highlighted that regarding foreign trade and indebtedness to the West, continuities from the reform period predominated.4 In fact, the GDR had started borrowing from the West in order to invest in its economy and to improve the 3 André Steiner, Die DDR-Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre. Konflikt zwischen Effizienz- und Machtkalkül (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999). 4 Ralf Ahrens, “Außenwirtschaft zwischen Ostintegration und Westverschuldung,” in Dierk Hoffmann (ed.), Die zentrale Wirtschaftsverwaltung in der SBZ/DDR. Akteure, Strukturen, Verwaltungspraxis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 510–590, 561; and idem, “Debt, Cooperation, and Collapse. East German Foreign Trade in the Honecker Years,” in Hartmut Berghoff/Uta Andrea Balbier (eds.), The East German Economy, 1945–2010. Falling Behind or Catching Up? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 161–176, 168. 2 standard of living before 1971, however, now it became the official economic policy of the SED. Immediately, the East German state planning commission (headed by Gerhard Schürer), central bankers and in later years also the Ministry of State Security as well as the Soviets (goaded by information from Honecker’s opponents) warned about the potential consequences of increasing debts. However, the domestic political rationale was to keep people satisfied (at least to a certain extent). Hence, the policy remained unchanged even when the situation dramatically worsened from the mid-1970s onwards. Towards the end of the decade, this led to the fatal situation that the GDR faced bankruptcy and even more Western loans were needed to keep the GDR solvent. In comparison to other CMEA countries, the economic history of the GDR is especially well researched. It is well-known who the economic decision-makers were and even the conflicts about economic policies have been studied in detail.5 Economic decision-making was dominated by Erich Honecker’s “inner-circle” stubbornly continuing the “Unity of Economic and Social Policy.” The most remarkable figure of this circle was Politburo member and SED Secretary for Economics Günter Mittag who also headed the economic commission of the Politburo and the working group on the balance of payments (both created in 1976 as “crisis managements bodies”). Although formally part of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski’s Commercial Coordination department (KoKo) was also under Mittag’s direct control. It gained importance in the latter half of the 1970s when the need to create foreign currency revenue increased. While KoKo substantially contributed to endure the acute payment crises, in the long-run its unplanned trade activities with the West also caused further debts.6 Indebtedness to the West and especially growing dependence on West Germany was at the heart of the conflicts about the economic7 and Germany8 policies of the SED leadership. Recent 5 André Steiner, The Plans that Failed. An Economic History of the GDR (New York: Berghahn, 2010; originally published in German Munich: DVA, 2004); idem (ed.), Überholen ohne einzuholen. Die DDR-Wirtschaft als Fußnote der deutschen Geschichte? (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2006); Hartmut Berghoff/Uta Andrea Balbier (eds.), The East German Economy, 1945–2010. Falling Behind or Catching Up? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Dierk Hoffmann (ed.), Die zentrale Wirtschaftsverwaltung in der SBZ/DDR. Akteure, Strukturen, Verwaltungspraxis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016). On the GDR in the CMEA with a special focus on foreign trade, see Ralf Ahrens, Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe? Die DDR im RGW. Strukturen und handelspolitische Strategien 1963–1976 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000). For an early study on the crises, see Hermann Hertle, “Die Diskussion der ökonomischen Krisen in der Führungsspitze der SED,” in Theo Pirker/M. Rainer Lepsius/Rainer Weinert/Hans- Hermann Hertle (eds.), Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR. Gespräche und Analysen (Opalden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), 309–345. 6 Matthias Judt, Der Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung. Das DDR-Wirtschaftsimperium des Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski – Mythos und Realität (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2013). In the mid-1980s (without inner-German trade) KoKo’s share of the entire East German trade volume with the West amounted to more than 40%. Cf. Ahrens, “Außenwirtschaft zwischen Ostintegration und Westverschuldung,” 576.
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