The London School of Economics and Political Science the Extremes It
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The London School of Economics and Political Science The Extremes it Takes to Survive: Tajikistan and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1992 IsaaC McKean Scarborough A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics and PolitiCal ScienCe for the deGree of DoCtor of Philosophy, London, May 2018. Declaration I Certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD deGree of the London SChool of EConomiCs and PolitiCal SCienCe is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which Case the extent of any work Carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full aCknowledGement is made. This thesis may not be reproduCed without my prior written Consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infrinGe the rights of any third party. I deClare that my thesis Consists of 103,112 words. 2 Abstract This dissertation reevaluates the Collapse of the USSR and the reform projeCt of “perestroika” that preCeded it from the perspeCtive of Tajikistan. As one of the most peripheral republiCs in the Soviet Union, Tajikistan found its eConomy and soCiety shaken to the Core by the eConomiC and politiCal reforms passed between 1985 and 1991. TraCkinG the development of Soviet reform leGislation in Moscow and its implementation in Tajikistan, this dissertation shows how perestroika was intimately linked to the breakdown of eConomiC order and soCial ties that oCCurred during the final years of the USSR. Rejecting narratives focused on rising nationalism and lonG-suppressed regional frustrations, this dissertation outlines how Moscow-desiGned marketizinG reforms were the main driver of strife in the Tajik SSR. As the eConomy disinteGrated, so did the fabriC of soCiety: by February 1990 Tajikistan’s Capital was subsumed by riot, and by May 1992 the entire Country was aflame with Civil war. By reorienting the history of the Soviet collapse to a peripheral republic that was enGulfed by eConomiC disorder and seCtarian war, moreover, this dissertation problematizes the established historiCal disCourse about the end of the USSR. Rather than the wave of demoCratization and free speeCh seen from the perspeCtive of MosCow and Eastern Europe, for many millions of Soviet Citizens the collapse of the USSR was a deeply friGhteninG and violent event. Crime rates rose aCross the former USSR; loCal ConfliCts sprunG up; wars flared in more than one republiC. MuCh more than an outlier, Tajikistan was simply one extreme alonG this speCtrum, and its experienCe of eConomiC Collapse leadinG to Civil war CompliCates simple arGuments about how Glasnost led to the peaCeful end of the USSR. This dissertation demonstrates that eConomiCs remained at the heart of the Soviet collapse and the violence that followed. 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 6 Note on Spelling and Names .............................................................................................. 8 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................... 9 List of Figures and Tables ................................................................................................ 10 Chapter One. Introduction .............................................................................................. 11 Chapter Two. Tajikistan’s Peripheral View of Soviet Prosperity ....................... 32 I. EConomiC Growth ........................................................................................................................ 34 II. Under the Surface: the Fragility of the Tajik EConomy .............................................. 40 III. Perestroika’s First Stirrings ................................................................................................. 53 Chapter Three. The Statistics Must be Lying: Moscow’s Case for Structural Reform ................................................................................................................................... 61 I. False StatistiCs ............................................................................................................................... 64 II. The Origins of Urban Elite Dissatisfaction in the USSR ............................................. 67 III. EConometriCs and Perestroika’s TheoretiCal BaCkinG .............................................. 80 Chapter Four. Building a “Socialist” Market: Gorbachev’s Economic Reforms .................................................................................................................................................. 90 I. 1987 Law on Enterprises ......................................................................................................... 98 II. Cooperatives .............................................................................................................................. 101 III. The Initial Consequences of Reform ............................................................................. 104 IV. (More) Cooperatives ............................................................................................................. 109 Chapter Five. National in Form, Imitation in Content? Glasnost and Democratization in Tajikistan ..................................................................................... 119 I. Glasnost ......................................................................................................................................... 122 II. DemoCratization ....................................................................................................................... 127 III. Glasnost and DemoCratization’s Delayed Arrival in Tajikistan .......................... 132 IV. DemoCratization’s (Brief) Foray into the Dushanbe Streets ................................ 137 V. PromotinG Glasnost from Above ....................................................................................... 140 VI. Conclusion: Rastokhez and Political Mobilization in Dushanbe ........................ 145 Chapter Six. The Harsh Reckoning of February 1990 .......................................... 150 I. Riots in Need of An Explanation ......................................................................................... 150 II. The Unfolding Unrest ............................................................................................................. 153 III. Unfinished Investigations and Unclear Explanations ............................................. 164 IV. Reconsidering the Results of February 1990 ............................................................. 171 Chapter Seven. The “Calm” Before the Storm: March 1990-July 1991 ........... 177 I. Political Struggles in Moscow and Dushanbe ................................................................ 179 II. From Bad to Worse: EConomiC Collapse ........................................................................ 194 III. State and Social Paralysis ................................................................................................... 201 Chapter Eight. Slouching Towards Independence ................................................ 205 I. The StruGGle to Remain in MosCow’s Shadow .............................................................. 208 II. AcCeptinG the Inevitable ....................................................................................................... 220 Chapter Nine. Empty Coffers and Populist Justice: The Final Road to Civil War ................................................................................................................................................ 230 I. A SearCh For SCapeGoats ......................................................................................................... 233 II. The 201st Motorized Division ............................................................................................ 243 4 III. The Conflict Grows Violent ............................................................................................... 248 Chapter Ten. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 256 Appendix I: Cotton Taxes and “Subsidies” ............................................................... 264 I. Monetary Transfers and the "Real" Value of Cotton ................................................. 264 II. ImpliCations ................................................................................................................................ 271 Appendix II: Hierarchical Structure of the Communist Party ........................... 272 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 273 5 Acknowledgements All of the followinG individuals were instrumental to this dissertation, which, like all large endeavors, required the help of innumerable hands. The late Prof. Shokhrat Kadyrov was lonG adamant that I pursue doctoral studies, a factor that played a siGnifiCant role in my ultimate deCision to do so. Later, the oriGinal idea for this thesis Grew out of an artiCle published by Dr. AbduGhani Mamadazimov and subsequent Conversations with him; the idea was fleshed out into a proposal with the extensive