Volume 30, December, 1984 Chad, Page 33310 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved

Effects of worsening famine

The widespread drought affecting all of Sahelian Africa during 1984 had particularly severe effects on Chad, including the cotton producing areas in the south of the country, which were normally free from famine. The resultant problems of food shortages and the breakdown of farming communities were exacerbated by continuing fighting between government and pro-GUNT rebel forces in the south, with the result that thousands fled from their homes to refugee camps in Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR).

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated on Oct. 11 that up to 30,000 Chadians had crossed into Sudan to escape from the effects of the drought. Appealing for international food aid, the Ministry of Natural Disasters on Sept. 8 spoke of ‘countless’ people and cattle dying from starvation and the consumption of poisonous roots and plants, while a representative of the British Red Cross warned in early November that Chad was facing a famine crisis of potentially more disastrous proportions than that suffered by Ethiopia, since massive transport and logistical problems would need to be surmounted before any major relief operation could be launched.

Continued fighting in south

At the end of June, Radio Bardai claimed that renewed clashes were currently taking place south of the capital, Ndjaména, between government forces and ‘commandos’ of the National Liberation Army (NLA—set up under the ‘National Peace Government’ established by eight of the original GUNT factions in October 1982-see page 32104).

The official Libyan news agency, JANA, announced that NLA guerrillas had captured ‘important centres’ near Moundou [see map on page 31677] on July 30, while in further fighting in early September rebel forces claimed to have taken the towns of Maro and Moitels near the border with the CAR. The regional delegate of the UNHCR reported at this time that a further 2,000 refugees had fled across the border with the CAR to escape from the fighting. A GUNT communiqué issued on Oct. 8 claimed that 53 government soldiers had been killed in recent clashes near Moundou, and further rebel victories were reported in the middle of the month. Radio Bardai announced on Nov. 7 that NLA forces had succeeded in surrounding government troops in the town of Sarh after capturing a number of positions in the vicinity.

A report published on Nov. 8 by Amnesty International, the human rights monitoring organization, accused the government of carrying out hundreds of ‘summary executions’ in southern Chad of people suspected of giving assistance to rebel forces. The report cited in particular reports of incidents in the Moyen Chari region where farmers had been gunned down in their fields and, in one instance, a group of villagers had been burned alive after taking refuge in a church in the Logone area. The government denied the allegations, and invited Amnesty representatives to visit Chad.

Franco-Libyan withdrawal agreement The possibility of a mutual withdrawal of French and Libyan forces from Chad had first been raised by Col. Moamer al Kadhafi, the Libyan leader, at the end of April[see page 33008]. Amidst further discussion of such a withdrawal, M Charles Hernu, the French Defence Minister, warned on Aug. 8 that ‘we will not leave Chad as long as there is one Libyan soldier remaining south of the Aouzou strip’ (a uranium-rich area along the Libyan border which had been annexed by Libya in 1973 [-see 28136 B; 31677 A; 32104 A-] but which President Habré continued to insist was part of Chad). For his part, Col. Kadhafi reiterated Libyan support for Mr Oueddei on Sept. 1, when he warned that Libya was ‘ready to place our forces at his disposal and to join him in the battle to liberate Chad and Africa’.

Prospects of an agreement, however, increased after the conclusion of the Moroccan-Libyan federation treaty [see 33246 A], particularly following several days of talks between President Mitterrand of France and King Hassan of Morocco which were widely seen as representing an attempt by the French government to secure Moroccan mediation with Libya over the Chad issue.

The French presidential special envoy, M Guy Georgy, visited Libya on Sept. 5 and held talks on the possibility of mutual withdrawal with Maj. Abdul Salem Jalloud, the Libyan ‘number two’. After three days of further talks between Col. Kadhafi and M Claude Cheysson, the French Foreign Minister, it was announced on Sept. 17 that the two sides had agreed to a mutual withdrawal of their troops from Chad, which would commence on Sept. 25 under the observation of representatives from neutral African states. (France subsequently nominated Senegal to act as observer, while Libya nominated Benin.)

Questioned as to whether there were any guarantees attached to the agreement, M Cheysson stated that there was no need for such provisions, since ‘if they leave, we will leave; if they stay, then we will stay also’. The agreement also made no reference to the question of the Aouzou strip, although M Hernu subsequently stated that the area was not included in the withdrawal, but that its future sovereignty was a matter for the UN.

The initial reaction of the Chadian government, which had not been consulted during negotiations prior to the agreement, was one of surprise and also scepticism as to Libyan intentions.

Capt. Lassou stated on Sept. 17 that he believed the Libyans would only ‘retreat in order to spring forward again’, while other Chadian government officials subsequently suggested that Libya would merely feign a withdrawal until such time as all the French had departed.

The agreement was however welcomed by the GUNT, who depicted it as providing for the simultaneous withdrawal of French and Zairean forces from Chad, as well as ‘Libyan technicians living in Chad at the request of the GUNT’. (Zairean troops had entered Chad at the request of the Habré government in mid-1983-see 32591A) The Tunisian and Algerian governments also expressed their support for the agreement.

After the Chadian government had expressed its unwillingness to allow observers into the country, particularly from Benin which it described as ‘a satellite of Libya’, it was announced on Sept. 25 that the withdrawal would be monitored by a Franco-Libyan mixed commission, which was based at Kano (Nigeria) pending formal approval of the agreement by the Chadian government. This Chadian approval was eventually given on Oct. 10, following a joint meeting of the Cabinet and the UNIR executive bureau, and after Mr Habré had visited Paris on Oct. 4–5.

In Paris President Habré held talks with senior French officials and also participated in what was described as a ‘mini-summit’, involving himself, President Mitterrand, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, President Houphouét-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Omar Bongo of Gabon. Stating afterwards that he had told President Mitterrand of his displeasure at not having been consulted prior to the withdrawal agreement, President Habré said that he was now ‘very satisfied’ with the arrangement and that he believed the Libyans would withdraw. He added that he would be prepared to negotiate over the future of the Aouzou strip. A French government spokesman stated that co-operation between France and Chad would continue following the withdrawal, and that in particular French arms would continue to be supplied to the Chadian Army (this assurance being denounced by a GUNT spokesman as a violation of the withdrawal agreement).

A meeting of the Franco-Chadian co-operation committee took place in Ndjaména on Nov. 13–-14, with the French delegation being led by M Christian Nucci, Minister of Co-operation and Development.

The Zairean government announced on Oct. 12 that its forces would also shortly withdraw from Chad, although a number of advisers would remain to assist with training.

French troops began to evacuate forward positions on Sept. 25. There were conflicting reports as to whether the Libyans were also withdrawing, but French aerial and radar surveillance revealed that they had pulled out of the major northern bases of Fada and Faya-Largeau at the end of September. Although the Chadian government repeatedly expressed doubts as to the reality of the Libyan withdrawal, a joint Franco-Libyan communiqué issued on Nov. 10 stated that the withdrawal had been completed by both sides, and that this had been confirmed by observations of the mixed commission. Much of the French force was reportedly transferred to bases in the CAR and Cameroon, while both sides were said to have consigned some of their best equipment to their respective Chadian allies.

Against a background of reported assertions by the Chadian government and other sources, including the US State Department, that Libyan forces remained in Chad, President Mitterrand held a meeting with Col. Kadhafi on the island of Crete (Greece) on Nov. 15. The talks were reported by Greek radio as having been ‘a great success’, with the two men reaching ‘absolute agreement’ that not ‘a single Libyan or Frenchman’ should remain in Chad. On Nov. 16 France Inter radio quoted President Mitterrand as stating that there remained a Libyan presence in Chad which was ‘less than reported by some foreign sources’ but ‘more than it should be’. The President also confirmed reports that he had ‘no objection, a priori’ to a future visit to France by Col. Kadhafi.

After French reconnaissance aircraft had overflown northern Chad on Nov. 18, M Cheysson accused Libya of breaking the agreement by failing to complete the withdrawal of its troops. On the same day, M Hernu and Gen. Jeannou Lacaze, the French Chief of Staff, arrived in Ndjaména on an unscheduled visit.

Libération, the French left-wing daily, published on Nov. 21 what it claimed was a confidential ‘note of information’ from the General Secretariat of National Defence to President Mitterrand which reported that Libyan forces in northern Chad were actually being reinforced, and that they now included 3,000 troops with 57 tanks, seven helicopters and several missile batteries. A spokesman for the Defence Ministry dismissed the figures as ‘ridiculous’. In a statement to the National Assembly (French parliament) the same day, M Laurent Fabius, the Prime Minister, said that France would take all necessary measures ‘to ensure the absolute respect of the Franco-Libyan pact’.

Dr Ali Abdessalem at Turayki, the Libyan Secretary for Foreign Liaison, stated during the course of a visit to Greece on Nov. 22 that the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad had been delayed, although it was now proceeding properly. Chadian government press sources claimed at this time that the French government had given Libya ‘one to two weeks’ to complete the troop withdrawal, and that in the meantime French forces based in the CAR had been placed on alert.

Failure of Brazzaville reconciliation talks

Following the unsuccessful attempt to convene reconciliation talks in Addis Ababa (the Ethiopian capital) in January [see page 330077], diplomatic efforts concentrated on a proposed session in Brazzaville, the Congolese capital. Initial attempts by Ethiopian and other African mediators to secure agreement on the holding of the talks were hampered by preconditions imposed by both the GUNT and the Habré government.

In particular, the government refused to meet the opposition on equal terms, while the GUNT demanded that the talks should include meetings on this basis between Mr Habré and Mr Oueddei. After contacts between the Congolese government on the one hand and the government, GUNT and independent factions such as CAC and the RFP on the other, the talks were eventually opened in Brazzaville on Oct. 20.

The following delegations attended the talks: the Chadian government (represented by a group led by Capt. Lassou); the Mouvement populaire et revolutionnaire du Tchad (MPRT´led by Lt.-Col. Kamougue, who also attended as part of the FAT section of the GUNT delegation); the CAC; the RFP; the Groupe de démocrates et patriotes (an independent faction); and the GUNT itself, which on this occasion comprised representatives of the FAP, FAT, Premiére armée (led by Mr Faid), the FAO (including the Mouvement populaire pour la liberation du Tchad), and the pro-Oueddei factions of the CDR and the UND.

By common agreement of all participating groups, delegations from the Libyan and Algerian governments which had expressed a wish to attend the talks were denied admittance.

There was little substantial discussion between the rival groupings since neither the GUNT nor government delegations agreed to suspend their preconditions, in spite of strenuous Congolese mediation efforts. Mr Adoum Yacoub, the leader of the GUNT delegation, objected to the presence of other opposition factions and reiterated earlier demands for a meeting between Mr Oueddei and Mr Habre as equals under OAU auspices. The government delegation, on the other hand, declared its willingness to negotiate with all opposition groups ‘except the ghost-like GUNT’, but it rejected suggestions by Lt.-Col. Kamougue for a solution on the basis of a federal state or a state composed of ‘semi-autonomous military areas’.

The talks were declared ‘suspended’ on Oct. 27, when the Congolese government expressed the hope that further meetings would be convened after ‘a temporary separation’. Capt. Lassou stated that, by comparison with failure of the proposed Addis Ababa session, the ‘ Brazzaville meeting was marked by a certain progress towards reconciliation’.-(Le Monde BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Times - International Herald Tribune - Financial Times - Guardian - West Africa - Africa Confidential - Africa Economic Digest) (prev. rep. 33006 A)