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Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice

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Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice GETTING MAD: NUCLEAR MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, ITS ORIGINS AND PRACTICE Edited by Henry D. Sokolski November 2004 Visit our website for other free publication downloads Strategic Studies Institute Home To rate this publication click here. ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This the fifth in a series of books the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) has published in cooperation with the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). As with the previous NPEC-SSI volumes, this received the backing of the U.S. Air Force’s Institute for National Security Studies. Besides the contributions of the chapters’ authors, Getting MAD would not have been possible without the editorial and administrative support of Carly Kinsella and Anne Hainsworth of NPEC. In addition, the assistance of Vance Serchuk of the American Enterprise Institute, Ed Petersen of NPEC, and Marianne Cowling of SSI were critical to the volume’s completion. To all who helped make this book possible, NPEC and SSI are indebted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at [email protected] ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http:// www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-172-5 ii CONTENTS Preface Henry D. Sokolski .......................................................................................... v Introduction Henry S. Rowen ............................................................................................ 1 Part I. The Origins of MAD Thinking ......................................................... 13 1. The Origins of MAD: A Short History of City-Busting Richard R. Muller ....................................................................................... 15 2. Destruction Assurée: The Origins and Development of French Nuclear Strategy, 1945-81 Bruno Tertrais ............................................................................................ 51 3. The U.S. Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Program and Finite Deterrence Harvey M. Sapolsky .................................................................................. 123 4. MAD and U.S. Strategy Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. ........................................................................... 137 Part II. MAD in Practice ................................................................................ 149 5. Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The Post-Cold War Interviews John A. Battilega ....................................................................................... 151 6. The Origins and Design of Presidential Decision-59: A Memoir William E. Odom ...................................................................................... 175 7. France’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: Concepts and Operational Implementation David S. Yost ............................................................................................ 197 8. Chinese and Mutually Assured Destruction: Is China Getting MAD? James Mulvenon ........................................................................................ 239 9. The British Experience Michael Quinlan ....................................................................................... 261 iii Part III. Moving Beyond MAD ................................................................... 275 10. Small Nuclear Powers Mark T. Clark ........................................................................................... 277 11. Nuclear and Other Retaliation after Deterrence Fails Tod Lindberg ............................................................................................. 317 12. Taking Proliferation Seriously Henry D. Sokolski ...................................................................................... 341 About the Authors ......................................................................................... 357 iv PREFACE Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration’s desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries’ cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one’s own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israel is surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel’s retention of a significant nuclear capability totally “understandable.” Then, there is the case of India and Pakistan, two countries allied with the United States in its war against terror. Regarding these countries’ nuclear arsenals, U.S. experts argue, is to help these nations secure their nuclear capabilities against theft. To help “stabilize” the delicate nuclear balance between India and Pakistan, they argue, it might be useful for the United States to help enhance each country’s nuclear command and control systems. Yet, U.S. officials have opposed these two nations’ efforts to perfect their arsenals for battlefield applications and nuclear war-fighting use. Instead, U.S. officials have urged both India and Pakistan to keep their forces to the lowest possible levels and develop them only for deterrent purposes. This is understood to mean only targeting each others’ major cities. Implicit to all this talk is the assumption that a nation’s security is, in fact, enhanced by acquiring a relatively modest but secure nuclear arsenal (i.e., one most likely to be used only to strike large, soft targets, such as cities). Certainly, the underlying premise of MAD thinking―that small v nuclear states can deter aggression by large nuclear states―is still popular. Iraq, we are told, might have held America off in 1991 or 2001 had it actually possessed nuclear arms. Similarly, the contrast between U.S. and allied generosity toward North Korea and the harsh treatment doled out to Saddam is usually explained by referring to the likelihood of North Korea having nuclear weapons and of Iraq clearly not. Why should we care about such MAD-inspired notions? They make U.S. and allied efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons much more difficult. If, as MAD thinking contends, nations can deter aggression by having the ability to successfully launch a nuclear attack against a significant number of innocent civilians, acquiring a nuclear arsenal will increasingly be seen as the best way for states to protect themselves. Aggravating this inclination is the relaxation of Cold War alliance constraints. Without the threat of global nuclear war and the guarantees of security from blocs of large powerful nations, traditional security alliances are weaker. As a result, the desire of nations to go their own way has increased. MAD thinking has only egged them on. As more and more nations become nuclear-ready or armed, our own leaders, finally, will want to downplay such developments insisting that a kind of mutually deterred peace among such nations is actually plausible. The link between MAD-inspired thinking and nuclear proliferation, though, does not stop here. MAD assumptions are also at the root of what has become a nuclear technology sharing prone reading of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Because nuclear weapons can deter aggression, nations have a right to them. It follows that nations should be compensated for not exercising this right by giving them the freest possible access to nuclear technology under occasional nuclear inspections―i.e., access to all that nations need to come within weeks of acquiring a nuclear
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