Military Intervention in Theory and Practice: French Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1960
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Military intervention in theory and practice: French policy in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960 Mel William Edward McNulty A thesis submitted in part-fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Portsmouth 1999 LIBRARY 1 Military intervention in theory and practice: French policy in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960 Abstract French military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960 has operated according to a bilateral dynamic independent of - although often influenced by and justified in terms of - global ideological or bloc alignments. It has been characterised by mechanical responses to perceived intervention stimuli. It has frequently disregarded international law and contradicted France's self-image as homeland and promoter of human rights. It reached its nadir as a result of French support for the genocidal regime in Rwanda. Accordingly, this study advances two principal arguments: French military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa has been driven by a unique French or Franco-African dynamic which has operated largely independently of global bloc politics and geostrategy; and the first failure of French intervention - in Rwanda from 1990 up to and including 1994 - marked a watershed in the practice, and the beginning of a military retreat from the continent more forced than voluntary. International Relations intervention theory has typically disregarded the Franco African interventionary system, although France acts in defence of its allies and interests as Realism tells us it will, in an interventionary sphere of influence comparable to that of the US in Latin America. This study considers France's legitimisation for its interventions through claimed derogations from the non intervention norm, and identifies France's unique interventionary dynamic which arose from its regular activation of mechanical responses to perceived intervention stimuli. 2 The context for these responses may be found in France's unique role in Africa since decolonisation. Throughout the Cold War, France was given carte blanche by the West to intervene in its exclusive African sphere, often in breach of those states' sovereignty. This derogation from international norms was made possible by the French-controlled creation of the new states to emerge from decolonisation, the sovereignty of which was deliberately circumscribed by military accords so that intervention frequently became an automatic feature of interstate relations along the Franco-African axis. This study's empirical focus - the uniqueness of this axis in the international system - was demonstrated by the continuity of French interventionary behaviour in the early 1990s, with no immediate change correspondent to the global shift in the balance of power and in the use and justification of military intervention. A perceived need to rework the legitimisation of French intervention only came about in 1994, during preparation for Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, following the first failure of intervention (and the collapse of a French-backed army and regime) in France's African sphere. Although the justificatory discourse of French military intervention was changed at this time to embrace a humanitarian agenda under a UN mandate, its practice changed - to a reluctant observance of the nonintervention norm - against France's will, and only as a result of the transformation since 1994 of the political and military environment in central Africa. 3 Table of contents Abstract Page 1 Preface PageS Introduction PageS Chapter 1 Page 20 Theory of military intervention Chapter 2 Page 58 The creation of France's interventionary sphere in Africa Chapter 3 Page 92 French interventionary practice in the pre carre, 1960-90 Chapter 4 Page 138 Major interventions in the Cold War context Chapter 5 Page 177 French military intervention in Rwanda I Chapter 6 Page 223 French military intervention in Rwanda II Conclusion Page 264 Bibliography Page 273 List of interviewees Page 289 Maps Appendices Page 291 & 4 Tables p98: Figure 1: French military interventions in French ex-colonial states since 1960 Maps p291: L' Afrique 1999 p292: Carte des pays d' Afrique en assistance militaire avec la France - from Agir ici/Survie, Dossiers noirs de la politique africaine de la France 1-6, Paris: L'Harmattan 1996 p293: Chad p294: Zaire p295: Rwanda Appendices p296: 'Les soldats fran<;ais ne tenaient pas de machettes!' - from La Nouvelle Releve, Kigali, November 1996 p297: Accord de cooperation militaire technique entre la Republique jran9aise et la Republique togolaise du 23 mars 1976 (revision of 1960 accord) p309: Accord de cooperation militaire technique entre le gouvernement de la Republique franfaise et le gouvernment de la Republique du Tcahd du 6 mars 1976 (revision of 1960 accord) p315: Accord particulier d'assitance militaire franco-rwandais (1975) - confidential (retrieved from Rwandan Defence Ministry, July 1994) until its publication in Quiles Commission report 1998 p320: Avenant l'accord particulier d'assistance militaire entre le gouvernement de la a Republique rwandaise et le gouvernement de la Republiquefranfaise signe Kigali le 18 a juillet 1975 p321: 'Document no.1' (from Colette Braeckman) - minutes of Franco-Rwandan military cooperation meeting, May 1994 p334: 'Document 71', UN Security Council Resolution 929, 22 June 1994 5 Preface The focus of this project, military intervention as the most explicit manifestation of France's enduring post-colonial involvement in Africa, was the result of numerous meetings and informal conversations with friends and colleagues at the University of Portsmouth, where I arrived with only the most general appreciation of Franco-African relations, and next to no knowledge of those states which, as the theatre of French interventions in Africa, were to be key aspects of this study. Research for this project, initially proposed in March 1994, was swiftly overtaken by Rwanda's 'dark Spring' of that year and the controversy which surrounded France's re-intervention there in June. Fieldwork in Rwanda in 1996 led me to question the relevance and value of doctoral research on military intervention in light of the scale of that country's suffering and the urgency of its post-conflict crises. It was only the resultant Za'irean war and overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko which seemed to demonstate that criticism of earlier interventions, from members of the academic community among others1 could help forestall further inappropriate interventionary responses. Many people have helped, in a variety of ways. Special thanks are due to (in Rwanda) M. Jean Carbonare, James-Bernard Bizimungu and family Froduald, Germaine, Mama Germaine and Frank (born 1995); Mr Denis Polisi, Secretary General and M. Vianney Ruyunbyana, Librarian, RPF secretariat Kigali; Mr Claude Dusaidi, Major-General Paul Kagame and his secretary Yvonne Karera at the Defence Ministry1 Mr Tito Rutaramera and M. Jacques Bihozagara; staff and students of the Universite Nationale du Rwanda and Faculte de Theologie Protestante de Butare, notably Philibert Kagabo and Elisee Munyamukweli; in Uganda, Hon. Grace Akello MP, Mr Dixon Kamukama and all colleagues in the Faculties of Arts and Law at Makerere University. 6 I would also like to express my gratitude to (in Nottingham), colleagues Dr Martin O'Shaughnessy and Professor Stephen Chan, and the libraries of the Universities of Nottingham and Nottingham Trent; Professor Richard Little of Bristol University and Professor Christopher Clapham at Lancaster; friends and colleagues at King's College London, notably Dr 'Funmi Olonisakin; Professor John Peel of SOAS and the African Studies Association of the UK; in Portsmouth, Professor Brian Jenkins, Dr Moussa Dieng, friends and colleagues; and above all Dr Tony Chafer, without whose guidance, support and saintly patience, this project would never have seen completion. On a more personal note, I would like to express my love and thanks to my family and especially my wife Alexandra, who was most frequently exposed to the variable pressures on time and personality the prolonged completion of a thesis entails. And for what it may be worth, I would like to dedicate this project to the Bizimungu and Munyakayanzi families of Nyamirambo, Kigali, and to those family-members, victims of their country's recent crises, whom I could not meet. Declaration The thesis, notably Chapters 4, 5 and 6, contains material which has already appeared in the following publications: - 'France's Rwanda Debacle', War Studies Journal 2:2, Spring 1997, pp3-22 - 'France's Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention: A Double Discrediting', International Peacekeeping 4:3, Autumn 1997, pp24-44 - 'Media Ethnicization and the International Response to War and Genocide in Rwanda' in Tim Allen and Jean Seaton eds., The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence, London: Zed Books 1999, pp268-286 7 - 'The Militarisation of Ethnicity and the Emergence of Warlordism, Rwanda 1990-94' in Paul Rich ed., Weapons States and Warlords, London: Macmillan 1999 - 'The Collapse of Zaire: implosion, revolution or external sabotage?'. The Journal of Modern African Studies 37:1, March 1999 8 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: FRENCH POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SINCE 1960 Introduction An abundant literature, including recent volumes of memoirs and interviews by former eminences grises of France's African policy-making Guy Penne1 and the late Jacques Foccart2, allied with a shift in official discourse most apparent