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Home , Asaf Ali, Kailash Nath Katju, Tej Bahadur Sapru

The and Subhash Bose

Bose before INA: Militant streak and departure from the Gandhian methods

Subhash Chandra Bose was an intrepid man. He had always shown a militant streak and reacted violently to any insult of Indians by the Europeans. He passed the Indian Civil Services examination securing fourth position but resigned from the service in 1921 to join the struggle for freedom by becoming a member of the Congress. His political guru was . He became mayor of Calcutta in 1923. He was jailed many times by the British. Once it became clear to Subhash Chandra Bose that he could not follow Gandhi’s way but that the Congress was determined to follow Gandhi, Bose decided to go his own way to fight for independence.

Escape from the House Arrest towards the INA

1. In January 1941, Bose escaped from the House arrest. On January 26, 1941, he reached Peshawar under the pseudo name’ Ziauddin, helped by Bhagat Ram. 2. Later it was heard that he had left “to supplement from outside the struggle going on at home”. He was reported to have approached Russia for help in the Indian struggle for freedom from Britain. But, in June 1941, Russia joined the Allies in the war, which disappointed Bose. He then went to Germany. 3. Bose met Hitler under the pseudo name, Orlando Mazzotta. With the help of Hitler, the Freedom Army was formed which consisted ​ ​ of all the prisoners of war of Indian origin captured by Germany and Italy. 4. Dresden, Germany was made the office of the Freedom Army. Bose came to be called ‘Netaji’ by the people of Germany. 5. He gave the famous slogan, ‘Jai Hind’ from the Free India Centre, Germany. He began regular broadcasts from Berlin radio in January 1942, which enthused Indians. 6. In early 1943, he left Germany and travelled by German and later by Japanese submarines to reach Japan and then Singapore in July of the same year. 7. He was to take over command of the Indian independence movement from Rashbehari Bose, but that was the second phase of the Indian National Army.

Origin and First Phase of the Indian National Army

1. The idea of creating an army out of the Indian prisoners of war (POWs) was originally that of , an Indian army officer who had decided not to join the retreating British army in Malaya. 2. He decided to turn to the Japanese for help. The Japanese handed over the Indian prisoners of war to Mohan Singh who tried to recruit them into an Indian National Army. 3. After the fall of Singapore, several POWs were ready to join Mohan Singh. By the end of 1942, 40,000 men were ready to join the INA. It was intended that the INA would go into action only on the invitation of the and the people of India. 4. The INA got a boost with the outbreak of the in India. In September 1942, the first division of the INA was formed with 16,300 men. 5. With the Japanese contemplating an Indian invasion, the idea of an armed wing of INA seemed more relevant to them. But soon, serious differences emerged between the Indian Army officers led by Mohan Singh and the Japanese over the role to be played by the INA. 6. Actually, the Japanese wanted a token force of 2,000 only while Mohan Singh wanted to raise a much larger army. Mohan Singh was taken into custody by the Japanese.

The second phase 1. The second phase began with the arrival of Subhash Bose in Singapore. But before that in June 1943, Subhash Chandra Bose (under pseudo name Abid Hussain) reached Tokyo; met the Japanese prime minister, Tojo. 2. Subhash Bose became Supreme Commander of the INA on August 25. On October 21, 1943, Subhash Bose formed the Provisional Government for Free India at Singapore. The famous slogan—“Give me blood, I will give you freedom” was given in Malaya. 3. This provisional government declared war on Britain and the United States and was recognised by the Axis powers. Recruits were trained and funds collected for the INA. A women’s regiment called the Rani Jhansi Regiment was also formed. 4. The INA headquarters was shifted to Rangoon in January 1944, and the army recruits were to march from there with the war cry “Chalo Delhi!” on their lips. 5. On November 6, 1943, Andaman and Nicobar islands was given by the Japanese army to the INA; the islands were renamed as Shahid Dweep and Dweep respectively. 6. On July 6, 1944, Subhas Bose addressed as ‘Father of Nation’—from the Radio (the first person to call Gandhi, ‘Father of Nation’). He asked for Gandhi’s blessings for “India’s last war of independence”. 7. One INA battalion commanded by Shah Nawaz was allowed to accompany the Japanese Army to the Indo-Burma front and participate in the Imphal campaign. 8. However, the Indians received discriminatory treatment from the Japanese, which included being denied rations and arms and being made to do menial work for the Japanese units, and this disgusted and demoralised the INA units. 9. On August 15 1945, the in the Second World War took place and with this, the INA also surrendered. On August 18, 1945, reportedly, Subhash Bose died mysteriously in an air-crash at Taipei (Taiwan). 10. But when the INA POWs were brought back to India after the war to be court-martialled, a powerful movement emerged in their defence.

Rasbehari Bose and INA

1. The role of Rasbehari Bose, another great freedom fighter, should also be acknowledged here. He had fled to Japan in 1915 following the failed revolutionary activities. 2. In Japan, Rashbehari Bose eventually became a naturalised citizen. He made a lot of effort in getting the Japanese interested in the Indian independence movement. 3. He became active in Pan-Asian circles, founded the Indian Club of Tokyo, and gave lectures on the evils of Western imperialism. Very early itself he was impressed by Subhash Chandra Bose. 4. When the Indian National Army was formed by Mohan Singh in Singapore, Rashbehari Bose was greatly excited and left Tokyo for Southeast Asia. 5. It was at a conference in Bangkok (also under Japanese occupation at the time) that it was decided to place the INA under an Indian Independence League whose chairman would be Rashbehari Bose himself. He had created the League in 1942 in Tokyo. 6. When Subhash Bose was sought by the Japanese to lead the INA, he was ready for it. He went to Singapore and met Rashbehari Bose and the latter happily transferred the control and leadership of the Indian Independence League and the INA to Subhash in July 1943. 7. It must be noted that it was on the organisational spadework done by Rashbehari Bose that Subhas Bose could build up the Indian National Army.

Post-War National Scenario

Political Context: Two basic strands of national upsurge can be identified during the last two years of British rule— 1. Tortuous negotiations involving the government, Congress and Muslim League, increasingly accompanied by communal violence and culminating in freedom and the partition. 2. Sporadic, localised and often extremely militant and united mass action by workers, peasants and states’ peoples which took the form of a countrywide strike wave. This kind of activity was occasioned by the INA Release Movement, Royal Indian Navy (RIN) revolt, Tebhaga movement, Worli revolt, Punjab Kisan Morchas, Travancore peoples’ struggle and the Telangana peasant revolt. 3. When the government lifted the ban on the Congress and released the Congress leaders in June 1945, they expected to find a demoralised people. Instead, they found tumultuous crowds impatient to do something. Popular energy resurfaced after three years of repression. People’s expectations were heightened by the release of their leaders. 4. The Wavell Plan backed by the Conservative government in Britain failed to break the constitutional deadlock. 5. In July 1945, the Labour Party formed the government in Britain. Clement Attlee took over as the new prime minister and Pethick Lawrence as the new secretary of state for India. 6. In August 1945, elections to central and provincial assemblies were announced. In September 1945, it was announced that a constituent assembly would be convened after the elections and that the government was working according to the spirit of the Cripps Offer.

Why a Change in Government’s Attitude 1. The end of the war resulted in a change in the balance of global power—the UK was no more a big power while the USA and USSR emerged as superpowers, both of which favoured freedom for India. 2. The new Labour government was more sympathetic to Indian demands. Throughout Europe, there was a wave of socialist radical governments. 3. British soldiers were weary and tired and the British economy lay shattered. 4. There was an anti-imperialist wave in South-East Asia—in Vietnam and Indonesia—resisting efforts to replant French and Dutch rule there. 5. Officials feared another Congress revolt, a revival of the 1942 situation but much more dangerous because of a likely combination of attacks on communications, agrarian revolts, labour trouble, army disaffection joined by government officials and the police in the presence of INA men with some military experience. 6. Elections were inevitable once the war ended since the last elections had been held in 1934 for the Centre and in 1937 for the provinces. 7. The British would have had to retreat; the Labour government only quickened the process somewhat.

Congress Election Campaign 1. Election Campaign for Nationalistic Aims: The most significant feature of the election campaign was that it sought to mobilise the Indians against the British; it did not just appeal to the people for votes. 2. The election campaign expressed the nationalist sentiments against the state repression of the 1942 Quit India upsurge. This was done by glorifying martyrs and condemning officials. 3. Mass pressure against the trial of INA POWs, sometimes described as “an edge of a volcano”, brought about a decisive shift in the government’s policy.

Congress Support for INA Prisoners 1. At the first post-War Congress session in September 1945 at Bombay, a strong resolution was adopted declaring Congress support for the INA cause. 2. Defence of INA prisoners in the court was organised by , , , and . 3. INA Relief and Enquiry Committee distributed small sums of money and food and helped arrange employment for the affected. Fund collection was organised.

The INA Agitation—A Landmark on Many Counts 1. The high pitch and intensity at which the campaign for the release of INA prisoners was conducted was unprecedented. 2. The agitation got wide publicity through extensive press coverage with daily editorials, distribution of pamphlets often containing threats of revenge, Grafitti conveying similar messages, holding of public meetings and celebrations of INA Day (November 12, 1945) and INA week (November 5-11). 3. The campaign spread over a wide area of the country and witnessed the participation of diverse social groups and political parties. While the nerve centres of the agitation were Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, United Provinces towns and Punjab, the campaign spread to distant places such as Coorg, Baluchistan and Assam. 4. The forms of participation included fund contributions made by many people—from film stars, municipal committees, Indians living abroad and gurudwaras to Tongawallas; participation in meetings; shopkeepers closing shops; political groups demanding the release of prisoners; contributing to INA funds; student meetings and boycott of classes; organising Kisan conferences, and All India Women’s Conference demanding the release of INA prisoners. 5. Those who supported the INA cause in varying degrees, apart from the Congress, included the Muslim League, Communist Party, Unionists, Akalis, Justice Party, Ahrars in Rawalpindi, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh League. 6. Pro-INA sentiments surfaced in traditional bulwarks of the Raj. Government employees collected funds. The loyalists—the gentlemen with titles—appealed to the government to abandon the trials for good Indo-British relations. 7. Men of the armed forces were unexpectedly sympathetic and attended meetings, received those released (often in uniforms) and contributed funds. 8. The central theme became the questioning of Britain’s right to decide a matter concerning Indians. Britain realised the political significance of the INA issue, which with each day assumed more and more of an ‘Indian versus British’ colour.

Three Upsurges—Winter of 1945-46 The nationalist sentiment which reached a crescendo around the INA trials developed into violent confrontations with the authority in the winter of 1945-46. There were three major upsurges— 1. November 21, 1945—in Calcutta over the INA trials. 2. February 11, 1946—in Calcutta against the seven-year sentence to INA officer Rashid Ali. 3. February 18, 1946—in Bombay, the strike by the Royal Indian Navy ratings.

Three-Stage Pattern All three upsurges showed a similar three-stage pattern. Stage I. When a Group Defies Authority and is Repressed Stage II. When the City People Join In Stage III. When People in Other Parts of the Country Express Sympathy and Solidarity

Evaluation of Potential and Impact of the Three Upsurges The three upsurges were significant in many ways: 1. Fearless action by the masses was an expression of militancy in the popular mind. 2. Revolt in the armed forces had a great liberating effect on the minds of people. 3. The RIN revolt was seen as an event marking the end of British rule. 4. These upsurges prompted the British to extend some concessions: a. On December 1, 1946, the government announced that only those INA members accused of murder or brutal treatment of fellow prisoners would be brought to trial. b. The decision to send Cabinet Mission was taken in January 1946.

Election Results Elections were held in the winter of 1945-46. Performance of the Congress 1. It got 91 per cent of non-Muslim votes. It captured 57 out of 102 seats in the Central Assembly. 2. In the provincial elections, it got a majority in most provinces except in Bengal, Sindh and Punjab. The Congress majority provinces included the NWFP and Assam which were being claimed for . Muslim League’s Performance ​ 1. It got 86.6 per cent of the Muslim votes. It captured the 30 reserved seats in the Central Assembly. 2. In the provincial elections, it got a majority in Bengal and Sindh. 3. Unlike in 1937, now the League clearly established itself as the dominant party among Muslims. In Punjab A Unionist-Congress-Akali coalition under Khizr Hayat Khan assumed power.

Significant Features of Elections The elections witnessed communal voting in contrast to the strong anti-British unity shown in various upsurges due to 1. separate electorates; and 2. limited franchise—for the provinces, less than 10 per cent of the population could vote and for the Central Assembly, less than 1 per cent of the population was eligible.

The Cabinet Mission

The Attlee government announced in February 1946 the decision to send a high-powered mission of three British cabinet members (Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State for India; Stafford Cripps, and A.V. Alexander) to India to find out ways and means for a negotiated, peaceful transfer of power to India. Pethick Lawrence was the chairman of the mission.

Political Context: 1. The success of nationalist forces in the struggle for hegemony was fairly evident by the end of the War. Nationalism had penetrated into hitherto untouched sections and areas. 2. There was a demonstration in favour of nationalism among the bureaucracy and the loyalist sections; because the paucity of European ICS recruits and a policy of Indianisation had ended the British domination of the ICS as early as the First World War and by 1939, there existed a British-Indian parity. 3. The long war had caused weariness and economic worries. Now only a depleted, war-weary bureaucracy battered by the 1942 events remained. 4. The British strategy of conciliation and repression had its limitations and contradictions. a. After the Cripps’ Offer, there was little left to offer for conciliation except full freedom. b. When non-violent resistance was repressed with force, the naked force behind the government stood exposed, while if the government did not clamp down on ‘sedition’ or made offers for a truce, it was seen to be unable to wield authority and its prestige suffered. c. Efforts to woo the Congress dismayed the loyalists. This policy of an unclear mix presented a dilemma for the services, who nevertheless had to implement it. The prospect of Congress ministries coming to power in the provinces further compounded this dilemma. 5. Constitutionalism or Congress Raj had proved to be a big morale-booster and helped in deeper penetration of patriotic sentiments among the masses. 6. Demands of leniency for INA prisoners from within the Army and the revolt of the RIN ratings had raised fears that the armed forces may not be as reliable if the Congress started a 1942-type mass movement, this time aided by the provincial ministries. 7. The only alternative to an all-out repression of a mass movement was an entirely official rule which seemed impossible now because the necessary numbers and efficient officials were not available. 8. The government realised that a settlement was necessary for burying the ghost of a mass movement and for good future Indo-British relations.

Now the overarching aim of the British policy-makers was a graceful withdrawal, after a settlement on the modalities of the transfer of power and nature of post-imperial IndiaBritain relations.

Reversal of British Policy: Efforts for a United India

1. The Congress demanded that power be transferred to one centre and that minorities’ demands are worked out in a framework ranging from autonomy to Muslim-majority provinces to self-determination or secession from the Indian Union—but, only after the British left. 2. The British bid for a united and friendly India and an active partner in defence of the Commonwealth, because a divided India would lack in defence and would be a blot on Britain’s diplomacy. 3. The British policy in 1946 clearly reflected a preference for a united India, in sharp contrast to earlier declarations. 4. On March 15, 1946, the Prime Minister of Britain, Clement Attlee said: “...though mindful of the rights of minorities… cannot allow a minority to place their veto on the advance of the majority.” This was a far cry from the Shimla Conference where Wavell had allowed Jinnah to wreck the conference.

Cabinet Mission Arrives The Cabinet Mission reached Delhi on March 24, 1946. It had prolonged discussions with Indian leaders of all parties and groups on the issues of 1. interim government; 2. principles and procedures for framing a new constitution giving freedom to India.

As the Congress and the League could not come to any agreement on the fundamental issue of the unity or partition of India, the mission put forward its own plan for the solution of the constitutional problem in May 1946.

Cabinet Mission Plan—Main Points 1. Rejection of the demand for a full-fledged Pakistan, because a. the Pakistan so formed would include a large non-Muslim population b. the very principle of communal self-determination would claim separation of Hindu-majority western Bengal and Sikh- and Hindu-dominated Ambala and Jullundur divisions of Punjab c. deep-seated regional ties would be disturbed if Bengal and Punjab were partitioned; d. partition would entail economic and administrative problems, for instance, the problem of communication between the western and eastern parts of Pakistan; and e. the division of the armed forces would be dangerous. 2. Grouping of existing provincial assemblies into three sections: Section-A: Madras, Bombay, Central Provinces, United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa (Hindu-majority provinces) Section-B: Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Sindh (Muslim-majority provinces) Section-C: Bengal and Assam (Muslim-majority provinces). 3. Three-tier executive and legislature at provincial, section and union levels. 4. A constituent assembly was to be elected by provincial assemblies by proportional representation (voting in three groups—General, Muslims, Sikhs). This constituent assembly would be a 389-member body with provincial assemblies sending 292, chief commissioner’s provinces sending 4, and princely states sending 93 members. 5. In the constituent assembly, members from groups A B and C were to sit separately to decide the constitution for provinces and if possible, for the groups also. Then, the whole constituent assembly (all three sections A, B and C combined) would sit together to formulate the union constitution. 6. A common centre would control defence, communication and external affairs. A federal structure was envisaged for India. 7. Communal questions in the central legislature were to be decided by a simple majority of both communities present and voting. 8. Provinces were to have full autonomy and residual powers. 9. Princely states were no longer to be under the paramountcy of the British government. They would be free to enter into an arrangement with successor governments or the British government. 10. After the first general elections, a province was to be free to come out of a group and after 10 years, a province was to be free to call for a reconsideration of the group or the union constitution. 11. Meanwhile, an interim government was to be formed from the constituent assembly.

Acceptance and Rejection 1. The Muslim League on June 6 and the Congress on June 24, 1946, accepted the long-term plan put forward by the Cabinet Mission. 2. July 1946 Elections were held in provincial assemblies for the Constituent Assembly. 3. July 10, 1946, Nehru stated, “We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly (implying that the Constituent Assembly was sovereign and would decide the rules of procedure). The big probability is that there would be no grouping as NWFP and Assam would have objections to joining sections B and C.” 4. July 29, 1946, The League withdrew its acceptance of the long-term plan in response to Nehru’s statement and gave a call for “direct action” from August 16 to achieve Pakistan.

Communal Holocaust and the Interim Government 1. From August 16, 1946, the Indian scene was rapidly transformed. There were communal riots on an unprecedented scale, which left around several thousands dead. The worst-hit areas were Calcutta, Bombay, Noakhali, Bihar and Garhmukteshwar (United Provinces). 2. Changed Government Priorities: Wavell was now eager to somehow get the Congress into the Interim Government, even if the League stayed out. 3. Fearing mass action by the Congress, a Congress-dominated Interim Government headed by Nehru was sworn in on September 2, 1946, with Nehru continuing to insist on his party’s opposition to the compulsory grouping. 4. Wavell quietly brought the Muslim League into the Interim Government on October 26, 1946.

Obstructionist Approach and Ulterior Motives of League 1. The League did not attend the Constituent Assembly which had its first meeting on December 9, 1946. 2. Consequently, the Assembly had to confine itself to passing a general ‘Objectives Resolution’ drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru stating the ideals of an independent sovereign republic with autonomous units, adequate minority safeguards and social, political and economic democracy. 3. The League refused to attend informal meetings of the cabinet to take decisions. The League questioned the decisions and appointments made by the Congress members. 4. Liaqat Ali Khan as the finance minister restricted and encumbered the efficient functioning of other ministries. The League had only sought a foothold in the government to fight for Pakistan.

Independence with Partition

Attlee’s Statement of February 20, 1947

Context: Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, sensing the trouble all around made an announcement on February 20, 1947. The British House of Commons declared the British intention of leaving the Indian subcontinent.

Main Points of Attlee’s Statement 1. A deadline of June 30, 1948, was fixed for transfer of power even if the Indian politicians had not agreed by that time on the constitution. 2. The British would relinquish power either to some form of central government or in some areas to the existing provincial governments if the constituent assembly was not fully representative, i.e., if the Muslim majority provinces did not join. 3. British powers and obligations vis-a-vis the princely states would lapse with the transfer of power, but these would not be transferred to any successor government in British India. 4. Mountbatten would replace Wavell as the viceroy. The statement contained clear hints of partition and even Balkanisation of the country into numerous states and was, in essence, a reversion of the Cripps Offer.

Mountbatten Plan, June 3, 1947 The freedom-with-partition formula was coming to be widely accepted well before Mountbatten arrived in India. One major innovation (actually suggested by V.P. Menon) was the immediate transfer of power on the basis of the grant of dominion status (with a right of secession), thus obviating the need to wait for an agreement in the constituent assembly on a new political structure.

Main Points The important points of the plan were as follows. 1. Punjab and Bengal Legislative Assemblies would meet in two groups, Hindus and Muslims, to vote for partition. If a simple majority of either group voted for partition, then these provinces would be partitioned. 2. In case of partition, two dominions and two constituent assemblies would be created. 3. Sindh would take its own decision. Referendums in NWFP and Sylhet district of Bengal would decide the fate of these areas. 4. Since the Congress had conceded a unified India, all their other points would be met, namely, a. independence for princely states ruled out—they would join either India or Pakistan; b. independence for Bengal ruled out; c. accession of Hyderabad to Pakistan ruled out (Mountbatten supported the Congress on this); d. freedom to come on August 15, 1947; and e. a boundary commission to be set up if the partition was to be effected.

Thus, the League’s demand was conceded to the extent that Pakistan would be created and the Congress’ position on unity was taken into account to make Pakistan as small as possible. Mountbatten’s formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity.

Why Congress Accepted Dominion Status The Congress was willing to accept dominion status despite its being against the Congress (1929) spirit because 1. it would ensure a peaceful and quick transfer of power; 2. it was more important for the Congress to assume the authority to check the explosive situation; and 3. it would allow for some much-needed continuity in the bureaucracy and the army. For Britain, the dominion status offered a chance to keep India in the Commonwealth, even if temporarily, considering the economic strength, defence potential and greater value of trade and investment in India.

Indian Independence Act 1. On July 5, 1947 the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act which was based on the Mountbatten Plan, and the Act got royal assent on June 18, 1947. The Act was implemented on August 15, 1947. 2. The Act provided for the creation of two independent dominions of India and Pakistan with effect from August 15, 1947. 3. Each dominion was to have a governor-general to be responsible for the effective operation of the Act. The constituent assembly of each new dominion was to exercise the powers of the legislature of that dominion, and the existing Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of States were to be automatically dissolved. 4. For the transitional period, i.e., until a new constitution was adopted by each dominion, the governments of the two dominions were to be carried on in accordance with the Act, 1935. 5. As per the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, Pakistan became independent on August 14 while India got its freedom on August 15, 1947. M.A. Jinnah became the first Governor-General of Pakistan. India, however, decided to request Lord Mountbatten to continue as the Governor-General of India.

Integration of States

Political Context: During 1946-47 there was a new upsurge of the State People’s Movement demanding political rights and elective representation in the Constituent Assembly. Nehru presided over the All India State People’s Conference sessions in Udaipur (1945) and Gwalior (April 1947). He declared that the states refusing to join the Constituent Assembly would be treated as hostile. In July 1947, took charge of the new States Department. Under Patel, the incorporation of Indian states took place in two phases with a skilful combination of baits and threats of mass pressure in both.

Phase I: By August 15, 1947, all states except Kashmir, Hyderabad and ​ Junagarh had signed an instrument of accession with the Indian government, acknowledging the central authority over the defence, external affairs and communication. The princes agreed to this fairly easily because 1. they were ‘surrendering’ only what they never had as these three functions had been a part of the British paramountcy 2. there was no change in the internal political structure.

Phase II: The second phase involved a much more difficult process of ​ ‘integration’ of states with neighbouring provinces or into new units like the Kathiawar Union, Vindhya and , Rajasthan or Himachal Pradesh along with internal constitutional changes in states which for some years retained their old boundaries (Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, Cochin). This phase was accomplished within a year. The principal bait offered was a generous privy purse while some princes were made governors and Rajpramukhs in free India. This rapid political unification of the country after independence was Patel’s greatest achievement.

Inevitability of Partition

Why Congress Accepted Partition 1. The Congress was only accepting the inevitable due to the long-term failure to draw the Muslim masses into the national movement. 2. The partition reflects the success-failure dichotomy of the Congress-led anti-imperialist movement. The Congress had a two-fold task— a. structuring diverse classes, communities, groups and regions into a nation, and b. securing independence for this nation. 3. While the Congress succeeded in building up sufficient national consciousness to exert pressure on the British to quit India, it failed to complete the task of welding the nation, especially in integrating the Muslims into the nation. 4. Only an immediate transfer of power could forestall the spread of ‘direct action’ and communal violence. The virtual collapse of the Interim Government also made the notion of Pakistan appear unavoidable. 5. The partition plan ruled out independence for the princely states which could have been a greater danger to Indian unity as it would have meant Balkanisation of the country. 6. Acceptance of partition was only a final act of the process of step-by-step concessions to the League’s championing of a separate Muslim state. a. During Cripps Mission (1942), autonomy of Muslim majority provinces was accepted. b. During Gandhi-Jinnah talks (1944), Gandhi accepted the right of self-determination of Muslim-majority provinces. c. After the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946) Congress conceded the possibility of Muslim majority provinces setting up a separate constituent assembly. d. Later, the Congress accepted, without demur, that grouping was compulsory (December 1946). e. With the 3rd June Plan, Congress accepted partition. 7. While loudly asserting the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly, the Congress quietly accepted compulsory grouping and accepted the partition most of all because it could not stop the communal riots. 8. The communalism of the 1920s and the 1930s was different from that of the 1940s. Now it was an all-out effort for an assertive ‘Muslim nation’. Congress leadership underestimated the potential of this type of communalism.

Gandhi’s Helplessness Gandhi felt helpless because there had been a communalisation of the people. He had no option but to accept partition because the people wanted it. How could there be a movement to fight communalism involving a communalised people? He asked the Congressmen, however, not to accept it in their hearts.