UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Modern Japan, Episode Zero:

Japan's Struggle for Diplomatic Equality, 1859-1894

by

Yu Suzuki

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

AUGUST, 2010

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••• Canada Abstract

From 1858 to 1894, Japan was not an independent state, because of the unequal treaties. These treaties forbid the Japanese to possess the freedom to set the tariff rate as they wished, and also the Western nationals in Japan were immune from Japanese laws. Naturally, Japanese elites resented the unequal treaties, and considered this as the most important diplomatic problem that they had to solve. Since the British were the most powerful Western nation that was against treaty revision, negotiation with them was prioritized. From 1858 to 1885, Japan was seen as a semi-civilized nation that did not deserve equal diplomatic status, but from the mid-1880s this started to change. Japan's successful Westernization impressed British decision makers, and by 1890 they concluded that Japan had become a nation that was more civilized than any other non-Western nation, and consequently decided to sign a treaty on equal terms in 1894.

I Dedication

To my family.

11 Acknowledgement

First of all, I would like to thank Dr. John Ferris and Dr. David Wright, who kindly offered their time to supervise me throughout my Master's program. It was not until I had an opportunity to attend to the classes that they held during my undergraduate years that I became interested in the world of academia, and therefore they opened my eyes to the new horizon. They offered me professional advices and kind encouragements throughout my undergraduate and graduate years, and offered their time to look over the draft of this thesis as well. Without them, it was impossible to complete this thesis at the quality that it is presented. Next, I would like to thank the entire History Department of the University of Calgary. I studied under numerous professors of the department from the days when I was an undergraduate student, offering precious experience to expand my knowledge. Also, I would like to thank Ms. Brenda Oslawsky, Ms. Lori Somner and Ms. Marion McSheffrey for their help on administrative issues. Especially Ms. Oslawsky helped me on numerous occasions, and patiently walked me through some of the important administrative issues, such as application for funding. The department offered great funding, which enabled me to focus on my study. Lastly, I would like to thank the fellow graduate students, who I took seminars together with. Seminars offered me a precious opportunity to debate over important issues with intelligent colleagues, which introduced me to new perspectives. The History Department offered me an ideal environment to expand my knowledge, and therefore this thesis owes a lot to the entire department. It is an honour that I was accepted into the graduate program, which offered me an opportunity to work with great professors, helpful staff and intelligent fellow graduates, and would like to thank the graduate committee under Dr. Frank Towers, for approving me into the program in 2008. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my family. Without their support and understanding, it was impossible for me to come thus far. I am thankful that I have such an understanding family, and I was fortunate that I was surrounded by so many people who helped me to expand my knowledge.

Calgary, 23 July 2010 Yu Suzuki

m Table of Contents

Abstract i Dedication ii Acknowledgement iii Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Japan's Initiation into the Western Order, 1858-1882 15 - Japan's Modernization and Effect on its Power 17 - British Perception of Japan: A Remote "Elf-Land" 26 - Unsuccessful Negotiation 34 Chapter 2: Moving toward Revision, 1882-1890 41 - 1882-1888: Close, but not yet 41 - 1888-1890: Real Step towards Treaty Revision 50 Chapter 3: The Last Stage of Negotiation, 1890-1894 65 - 1890 to 1893: Crisis from Within 67 - Final Negotiations, September 1893 to July 1894 76 Conclusion 87 - Treaty Revision: Its Significance and Consequences 92 Bibliography 97

Lists of Figures

Table 1: Government Ordinary Revenue and Investment 26 Table 2: Comparison of present British Fleet with Japanese 85

IV Introduction

Japan faced several diplomatic problems after the Meiji Restoration, but the issue of unequal treaties ranked among the greatest of them. In 1858, Japan signed the American-Japanese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. Other Western nations quickly signed treaties with Japan on the same terms. These treaties had two important characteristics: Tariff dependence and extraterritoriality. Under the clause on tariff dependence, Japan was forbidden from raising the tariff rate without the consent of the Western counterparts. Western nations set a tariff rate that favoured their interests. Tariff rates went no higher than 15% whereas the highest tariff rate in the West was around 30%; commodities considered "vital to British commercial interest" such as textile goods were kept as low as 5%. Japanese industries faced threats from cheap imports, and tariff dependence could potentially lead to a mass outflow of specie, and also restrict the government's source of revenue. Also, there was a clause on extraterritoriality, which meant that foreign residents accused of crimes were not subject to Japanese laws; instead, the consulate courts had the right to try them under the laws of their home countries. In the nineteenth century, extraterritoriality was carried out in non-Western nations through consular jurisdiction and the treaty port system. Under the consular jurisdiction system, foreign criminals in Japan were to be brought not to a Japanese court but instead to the consulate of the criminal's native country, and their Minister Resident would act as a judge. The Minister Resident was a diplomat, not a legal specialist, so decisions were usually more lenient towards Western defendants. An example is the case of British cargo ship "Normanton" in 1886. The ship, which was carrying 25 Japanese passengers, sank in Japanese waters. While the crew (mostly Britons) survived, all 25 Japanese passengers drowned, and the crew came under strong suspicion for not fulfilling their obligation to save their passengers. However, the Consular Court declared that the crews were not guilty. Under strong pressure from the Japanese government, the British Consular Court reopened the trial, but the change of outcome was minimal, as only the captain was held responsible for the issue and was sentenced only to three months of probation.2 This incident demonstrated the potential danger that extraterritorial rights posed towards Japanese sovereignty. If these foreign residents, protected with extraterritoriality, could travel freely into Japanese territory,

1 Gaimusho (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) eds, Joyaku Kaisei Mondai Nihon Gaiko Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents Related to Treaty Revision Issues), vol. 1, (Tokyo: Gennando, 1936), 340-2. 2 For Normanton Incident, see Yuichi Inouye, "From Unequal Treaty to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1867-1902," in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol. V The Political-Diplomatic Relationship, 1600-1930, eds. by Ian H. Nish and Yoichi Kibata, (London: MacMillan, 2000): 141-2. 1 they could potentially cause damage to Japanese citizens and property without being adequately punished. Therefore, these residents were restrained to a district known as treaty ports, which were port cities that existed as residential districts for foreigners. Here, these cities acted almost like an independent unit, immune from Japanese intervention, and Japanese citizens had to possess permission to enter these cities. But in return foreigners had to possess passes to get out of the treaty ports and into Japanese territory. Through the treaty port system and consular jurisdiction, Western nations enjoyed their extraterritorial privileges. In the early Meiji era, extraterritoriality and tariff dependence significantly restrained the independence of the Japanese state. Extraterritoriality prohibited Japanese officials from punishing foreign residents who violated Japanese law, allowed foreign diplomats to intervene in Japanese domestic issues, and forced Japanese to settle disputes with foreigners in courts run by Westerners under their legal systems. Tariff dependence prohibited Japan from protecting its industry from inexpensive imports and also restrained its ability to raise revenues. Japanese elites understood the danger of these restrictions; Western nations had imposed similar treaties on China after two Anglo-Chinese wars in the mid-nineteenth century and reduced that country to semi-colonial status. In China, British merchants established the Maritime Customs, which they used in essence to regulate trade under the rules of the unequal treaties. This bureau in essence took over the duty of regulating trade from the Chinese Empire, and it benefitted from the Maritime Customs as its Inspector General Robert Hart was quite sympathetic to China. It provided fixed amounts of revenue to the Chinese Empire and also made a thorough attempt to crack down on various forms of smuggling, including opium.3 However, the objective of the Maritime Customs was to regulate trade conducted under the rules regulated by an unequal treaty, and therefore it also worked closely together with the British Minister Resident in China to uphold the unequal treaties. British merchants imposed a tariff rate that was favourable for Western merchants, causing an outflow of wealth from China, and the Chinese government had a difficult time limiting this outflow because foreign merchants were protected by extraterritoriality. Western nations did not intrude into Japanese domestic issues as they did in China, but had they chosen to do so, Japan would have had little chance to resist them, given the restriction of the unequal treaties, especially until the late 1880s. Moreover, the unequal treaties were a symbol of Japanese subordination, and therefore Japanese elites were determined to

3 John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Ports, 1842-1854, vol. 1, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 462. Despite the fact that this book was written 57 years ago, it remains to be one of the best works on China under unequal treaties. 4 Ibid, 463. 2 revising the unequal treaties. These issues are important, but little studied. The diplomatic history of Japan in the late nineteenth century is an understudied field for English-speaking historians. Few of them study Japanese history to begin with, and most of them tend to focus their attention on the years around the Pacific War. As a result, the historiography of the Japanese diplomacy in late nineteenth century lacks the intense debate that surrounds the Pacific War. That struggle leads historians of the Pacific War to refine their arguments and makes their discussion more sophisticated. These characteristics are not to be found in diplomatic history of late nineteenth century. Many elements of that field require closer examination then they have received. The unequal treaty issue is one of those matters. This thesis will seek to seek to fill this hole in the historiography. It also will tackle another problem within the historiography, which arises from the overconcentration of historians on the Pacific War. This concentration has led to fascinating debates, sophisticated arguments, and a thorough understanding of these events, but it also has led historians to ignore earlier, but related events.5 So characteristically writers focus on the 1930s and early 1940s while ignoring longer-term political, social and economic events which provided the context for the eventful decades. Few historians, such as Akira Iriye and John W. Dower, have focused on such long-term studies.6 This approach is problematic, because many of the Japanese social institutions that existed in the 1930s were created in the late nineteenth century. After Western states forced the opening of Japan in 1854, Japanese elites realized that they must strengthen their country quickly if they wanted to maintain independence. They concluded that

5 In the English language historiography, historians of the American-Japanese relationship were dominant up until 1970s. Leading examples of these literatures are Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto with Dale K. A. Finlayson eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). James W. Morley translated the five-book series called The Road to the Pacific War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976-1994), semi-official compiled articles about this theme written by Japanese-speaking historians (two of them were commissioned by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Most recently, historians have been focusing on other topics, such as Japan's relationship with the East Asian peoples, and with the Western colonial powers like Britain. Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936-41 (London: Routledge, 1995) is an example of this trend. 6 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); Akira Iriye, Nihon no Gaiko-Meiji Ishin kara Gendaimade (Diplomacy of Japan'- From Meiji Restoration to Current Day), (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1966). Dower argues that a unique cultural characteristic of the Japanese people, which emphasizes obedience, was the key to the success of rapid democratization of the Japanese nation after World War II. In order to make this argument, he thoroughly analyzes that characteristic. Iriye's book is a long-term survey of the influence of cultural perception on diplomatic decision making. 3 this aim could best be achieved through learning modern industrial technology. They also realized that Western political and economic systems were the most efficient means to administer an industrialized society. After political power was restored to the Meiji Emperor in 1868, the government declared that Japan would engage in a wholesale Westernization of the entire nation. As a result, the Japanese economic system turned from semi-feudal to capitalist; its political system changed from absolutism to constitutional monarchy; Japan adopted Western military administration with a General Staff and universal male conscription, discarding the previous model which relied on the warrior class for military affairs.7 These developments shaped Japan until 1945. Another institutional development of this period involved change in diplomatic conduct, and again, the institutions which emerged during this time continued until the 1930s. Before the arrival of the American Commodore Matthew C. Perry, the Japanese adhered to what historians like Key-Hiuk Kim call "the East Asian model of international relations." For Japan, international relations rested on a hierarchy between nations, with their country on top, a drastically different model than the Western one, with its theoretical principle that every state possesses equal o sovereignty. For centuries, Japan closed itself from diplomatic relationship with "lesser countries," with only the exceptions of the Netherlands and Korea. When Western nations opened a diplomatic relationship through gunboat diplomacy, the Japanese initially reverted to that isolationist policy, under the slogan of joi (expel the barbarians), which they believed would sustain the purity of their country. When Japanese leaders finally understood Western power and determination, and realized that a policy of joi would be counterproductive, they accepted the Western model of diplomacy. Japan allowed Western diplomats to reside in their capital, and in return sent their representatives to Western nations. This harsh introduction to Western power and diplomacy taught Japan lessons in power politics. In order to remain independent, a state had to be shrewd and powerful. It is therefore not surprising that the Japanese developed the feeling that the Western international system was based on an assumption that might was right. Japanese elites engaged in Westernization, believing that to be the most effective measure for increasing Japan's power and wealth. Also, they attempted to strengthen their nation by subjugating weaker countries, just as Western nations did.

7 Marius B. Jansen ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) is the best English language source for the Japanese social system before 1868. 8 Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order- Korea, Japan and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980): 328. 4 This is not to say that gunboat diplomacy was the only reason to behind Japan's xenophobia and aggressive expansionism of the 1930s. At the same time, however, it is quite difficult to argue that the harsh initiation into Western diplomacy in the mid-nineteenth century had no repercussions on the worldview of the Japanese people at that time and those in the subsequent generations. Thus, research on the unequal treaty issue will not only fill in a hole within the historiography of late nineteenth century Japanese diplomatic history, but it also will have repercussions on the historiography of later generations, as it is important in understanding the perception of the Japanese people not only of the nineteenth century but also of later generations.

Historiography, Thesis and Research Methodology

Despite its importance, few historians have studied the issues of treaty revision. In the English-language historiography, most arguments on this topic are limited to articles. Louis G Perez is the only historian who has written a book on this topic.9 Perez wrote his doctoral dissertation on this topic in 1987, which was elaborated into a book in 1999. He follows the negotiations between British and Japanese diplomats from 1892 to 1894, from the moment Mutsu Munemitsu became Minister of Foreign Affairs until he signed the revised treaty with Britain, and this overlaps significantly with the period in which this thesis focuses.10 However, some qualitative problems derive from the methodology used by Perez. He focuses primarily on the diplomacy, and on record of negotiations between the Japanese and British diplomats without accounting for other Anglo-Japanese interactions that influenced these negotiations. Yet these other interactions, and matters such as economics, power and perception, were fundamental to diplomacy. Britons were the most numerous foreign residents in Japan, and no other group of Western citizens could match their trade with Japan. British Ministers in Japan, whose main interest was to protect their trade, naturally were unwilling to revise treaties which gave their merchants privileges in their commercial relationship with the Japanese. This stubbornness was backed by British naval power, the greatest in the world, well able to provide protection to their subjects in Japan. Britain used its position not merely to check the Japanese but also to

9 Examples of articles on treaty revision issue are; James Hoare, "The Era of Unequal Treaties, 1858-1899," and Inouye, "From Unequal Treaty to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1867-1902," both in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol. V The Political-Diplomatic Relationship, 1600-1930, eds. by Ian H. Nish and Yoichi Kibata, (London: MacMillan, 2000): 103-130 and 131-158. Also, Kenneth Pyle wrote a chapter about treaty revision issue in his book The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1895, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 99-117. 10 Louis G. Perez, Japan Comes of Age-' Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision of the Unequal Treaties, (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1999). 5 ensure that other powers would not sign separate revised treaties. This stance in turn forced Japan to negotiate with all the treaty powers at once, which made negotiations more difficult. Not until the 1890s did decision makers in London pay much attention to diplomatic relations with Japan. Until then, they were happy to let to their Ministers and merchants, who wished to sustain their privileged position, guide Britain's policy towards Japan. Not until the 1890s did non-commercial interests start to emerge within the Anglo-Japanese relationship, and was Whitehall willing to overrule the opinion of merchants. Thus, the British stubbornly resisted the treaty revision until the summer of 1890. When they finally agreed to negotiate on an equal treaty, Aoki Shuzo, the Foreign Minister at that time, could not hide his surprise. Until that moment, Britons had been unwilling even to negotiate on the treaty revision issue, and to establish an equal treaty in the near future seemed impossible. When Aoki became Foreign Minister on 24 December, 1889, he wrote in his diary that,

The British government showed no sign of even willingness to negotiate on the terms of Okuma's (previous Foreign Minister) draft of revised treaties, even though he showed willingness to compromise in that draft.... It seems almost impossible to gain the understanding of the British government on this issue and sign a treaty on equal terms.11

From that moment until 15 July 1890, the day the British government officially expressed a willingness to negotiate for an equal treaty, there were no serious diplomatic negotiations on the issue. This indicates that Whitehall's decisions were not based simply on discussions between diplomats. Failure to appreciate this fact, and to explore its ramifications, consequently limits the approach of Perez. Much has been written on Mutsu Munemitsu by Japanese-language historians, because of his long and eventful career, but they tend to employ the same methodology as Perez, thus imposing on their arguments the same limitation as Perez's. Also, because of Mutsu's eventful career, the issue of treaty revision tends to be treated as an episode in Mutsu's life. During his tenure as a Foreign Minister, he had to deal with the treaty revision and the First Sino-Japanese War; he also was a political activist during the 1860s and a leading liberal in Japan after the Meiji Restoration, who actually was imprisoned in the late 1870s for alleged association with a plot to overthrow the government which was dominated by oligarchs.12 This

11 Yoshihisa Sakane, Meiji Gaiko to Aoki Shuzo (Meiji Diplomacy and Aoki Shuzo), (Tokyo: Tosui Shobo, 1985), 116. Japanese names will be written in the order that is common in Japan, family name first, given name last. 12 Marius B. Jansen, "Mutsu Munemitsu," in Personality in Japanese History, eds. by Albert M. Craig and Donald H. Shively (Berkeley: University of California Press, 6 long career has contributed to an abundance of studies about Mutsu, both by English- and Japanese-speaking historians, but few study Mutsu and treaty revision.1 So too many Japanese-language works focus on Mutsu Munemitsu or the unequal treaty issue but few study Mutsu and that matter. Most of works on Mutsu tend to be biographical accounts, in which the negotiation on the treaty revision tends to receive only a few chapters worth of attention; likewise, the literature on treaty revision devotes only a few chapters to diplomacy under Mutsu.14 There also are some historians who argue that treaty revision was a legal issue. This argument derives from historians who focus primarily on diplomacy and on the records of negotiations between Japanese and British diplomats. The Japanese continually pushed for treaty revision from 1869, but in the 1870s and 1880s British diplomats refused on the grounds that Japanese legal modernization was not complete. A lot of historians picked this up and argued that it was because Whitehall became confident in the Japanese legal system in 1894 that they agreed to revise treaty.15 But this argument too faces problems, when one considers the fact that Japan's modern legal and civil codes were not issued until 1898; the draft, drawn up with the help of French legal advisors, was supposed to be issued in 1890, but it faced fierce public opposition as they criticized it for being too liberal and not incorporating Japanese tradition adequately.16 Japanese elites also attended various international conferences of Western jurists since they started its nationwide modernization in 1869,

1970): 313, 322, 325, 326. 13 Examples of the English-written literatures are! Nobutoshi Hagihara, "Mutsu Munemitsu in Europe, 1884-85: The Intellectual in Search of an Ideology," in Japan in Transition: Thought and Action in the Meiji Era, 1868-1912, eds. by Hilary Conroy, Sandra T. W. Davis and Wayne Patterson (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1984): 235-255; Jansen, "Mutsu Munemitsu," 309-334. Japanese-written counterparts are! Nobutoshi Hagihara, Mutsu Munemitsu, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1997); Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku to Sono Sekai (The World of Kenkenroku), (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2006); Seizaburo Shinobu, Mutsu Munemitsu (Tokyo: Hakuyosha, 1938) was the first academic study to focus on Mutsu. Ikujiro Watanabe, Mutsu Munemitsu Den (Biography of Mutsu Munemitsu), (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1934), the first biography of Mutsu, was compiled by individuals who were patronized by Mutsu, and therefore lacks objectiveness. 14 Examples are; Morinosuke Kajima, Nichiei Gaikoshi (History of Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyujo, 1959); Yoshitake Oka, Reimeiki no Meiji Nihon: Nichiei Koshoshi no Shikaku ni Oite (Meiji Japan at its Dawn-' From the Perspective of Anglo-Japanese Negotiation), (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964); Yoshihisa Sakane, Meiji Gaiko to Aoki Shuzo (Meiji Diplomacy andAoki Shuzo)'(Tokyo: Tosui Shobo, 1985). 15 See, for example, Akihisa Fujiwara, Nihon Joyaku Kaiseishi no Kenkyu- Inoue, Okuma no Kaisei Kosho to Obei Rekkyo (Study of the History of Japanese Treaty Revision: Negotiation of Inoue and Okuma, and Western Powers), (Tokyo: Yushodo, 2004). 16 Noboru Umetani, Oyatoi Gaikokujin-Meiji Nihon no Wakiyakutachi (Hired Foreigners: Hidden Contributors of Meiji Japan), (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2007; originally published by Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1965), 90. 7 and by 1880 these Western jurists started to be so impressed by the progress of Japanese modernization that they were confident that "they are ready for at least a partial lifting of unequal treaties."17 However, Whitehall did not make such a move; as a matter of fact, it is highly unlikely that it paid much attention to these conferences. Whitehall's decisions with regards to the unequal treaty issue were quite independent from Japan's legal modernization. Modernization, including not only the judicial but also political, economic and military systems, was important because through this Japan acquired power that enabled it to pursue its diplomatic goals, but this was not a goal in and of itself. Until the 1890s, Japan mattered little to decision makers in London; as affairs in East Asia had little repercussion on the economic or strategic well-being of the British Empire, they were willing to let the commercial interests of local merchants dictate their policy. Meanwhile, despite its distance from East Asia, Britain could project great power (both naval and economic) toward the region, which Japan could not resist. By the 1890s, however, the situation started to change. Japan was very successful in its nationwide modernization project, and British public and decision makers were starting to appreciate this point. At the same time, East Asia acquired significant influence on international relations in Europe, while other European nations started to expand their empires across the globe, challenging Britain's status as a global power. East Asia became a field of contest among imperial powers. British decision makers were determined not to let the other states expand their influence at the expense of British interests, as East Asia was within a British sphere of influence. It was in this context that Britain decided to sign a treaty with Japan on equal terms; it seemed a wise choice to improve its relationship with Japan, which was becoming increasingly powerful and independent by 1890, so that Britain could use Japan as a means to sustain the status quo in the Far East and prevent any other nation from challenging Britain's position there. Challenge to the status of British Empire and its reconsideration of its world policy, changed its attitudes toward treaty revision with Japan. Japan shaped this process by making itself powerful, and convincing Britain it was a serious and civilized state, with something to offer British interests. The topic of treaty revision involves many factors other than negotiations between diplomats. The main diplomatic objective of the Japanese elites at this time was to make Western nations acknowledge that Japan was fully sovereign, which they thought was impossible without making the state powerful and wealthy. Domestic reforms were motivated by diplomatic incentives. The power and wealth that the

17 Gaimusho, Joyaku Kaisei Mondai Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol. 2, (Tokyo: Gennando, 1942), 667-70. 8 Japanese nation accumulated through rapid Westernization became a critical bargaining chip for their negotiations, which ultimately produced success in treaty revision. So complex is this process that this thesis cannot thoroughly address all of its aspects. For this reason, this thesis will focus on the Anglo-Japanese diplomatic relationship addressing realist perspectives of power and politics, and emphasize the gradual change in the power balance between Britain and Japan, from 1860 to 1894. As indicated earlier, Britain was the most powerful country that signed unequal treaties with Japan, and the one which most resisted treaty revision, and therefore it is worth close attention. Topics such as the relationship between treaty revision and Japanese Westernization will be addressed, only insofar as they serve the purpose of clarifying the Anglo-Japanese power relations. The main primary sources for this thesis are the documents of the British Foreign Office and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This thesis explores only those primary sources that are related to the diplomatic relationship between these countries; the author did not conduct primary research on Japanese Westernization, or reports on the progress of industrialization or improvement in the trade relationships. However, many secondary works, written both by English- and Japanese-speaking historians, provide excellent accounts of these issues and how they shaped Japan's gradual accumulation of power in the late nineteenth century. Though this paper explores the unequal treaty problem from a different angle than previous historians have done, the author is indebted to their works and hopes that his thesis will strengthen that tradition. Japanese-speaking historians correctly argue that the Meiji oligarchs decided to engage in the Westernization of society so that they could achieve security, revise the unequal treaties, and end their status as a semi-independent state. Many works examine the relationship between the unequal treaty issue and Japan's modernization. However, Japanese-language historians tend to assess both Westernization and power from micro-analytical perspectives, focusing on specific themes rather than taking a holistic approach. Thus, Fujiwara Akihisa explored the relationship between the unequal treaty issue and Japan's Westernization of the legal system; Fujiwara Akira focused specifically on the Westernization of military technology and administration; and Ishii Kanji's addressed economic Westernization.18 While these historians make valuable observations about their respective subfields, each of them addresses only

18 A few examples of literatures that attempt thematic analysis on Japanese Westernization are; Akihisa Fujiwara, Nihon Joyaku Kaiseishi no Kenkyu-Inoue, Okuma no Kaisei Kosho to Obei Rekkyo (Study of the History of Japanese Treaty Revision'- Negotiation of Inoue and Okuma, and Western Powers), (Tokyo- Yushodo, 2004); Akira Fujiwara, Nihon Gunjishi (History of Japanese Military) 2 vols. (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1987); Kanji Ishii, Kindai Nihon Kinyushi Josetsu (Introduction to Modern Japanese Financial History) (Tokyo'- University of Tokyo Press, 1999). 9 part of the power of a state. The micro-analytical approach has limitations in assessing the vital issue at hand. In turn, this approach obscures the way by which the Meiji political oligarchs achieved their aim of creating a "rich country, strong army." English-speaking historians are more accustomed to taking more holistic approach. For example, the five volume series, The History of Anglo-Japanese Relationship, compiles articles that are related to various elements of the Anglo-Japanese relationship. The third volume of this series explores the military dimension, the fourth one investigates the business relationship, and the fifth digs into the cultural interaction between Britons and Japanese.19 While Grace Fox's book Britain and Japan is fifty years old and covers only the period from 1858 to 1883, it remains one of the best books on the early Meiji Anglo-Japanese relationship, covering a wide range of elements such as diplomatic, economic and strategic, and cultural interactions. 20 Olive Checkland offered a comprehensive survey of the Anglo-Japanese relationship from 1868 to 1912. Although not as thorough as Fox's book, the chronological range of Checkland's book overlaps with the topic of this thesis, and it does explore various factors related to the unequal treaty issue. However, little has been written in English about this topic of treaty revision. The lack of debate has led to a lack of sophisticated arguments; the English-language literature on the Anglo-Japanese relationship of the late nineteenth century suffers from the same problem as Japanese historiography as a whole. Also, no English-language study on Mutsu's treaty revision negotiation employed the realist perspective, which is the perspective employed by this thesis, and both Japanese and English secondary sources makes micro-analytical research into Japan's Westernization. This thesis is unusual in treating treaty revision as a significant topic in its own right, and unique in treating it as a matter which combines power and diplomacy, international and strategic history. This thesis will analyze the progress of Japanese modernization and its effect on the process of revision negotiation by focusing on three different time periods. It will do so by synthesising the arguments of English- and Japanese-language historians and placing them in a strategic context. Though the assessment of the reality as power is important, equally one must understand how British decision makers perceived the matter, and therefore these issues will be examined carefully in every period. The first period is from 1858 to 1887, when Japanese power, both real and

19 Ian H. Nish and Chihiro Hosoya as general editors, The History of Anglo-Japanese Relationship, 5 vols., (London: Macmillan, 2000-2002). 20 Grace Fox, Britain and Japan, 1858-1883, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). 21 Olive Checkland, Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868-1912, (London: Macmillan, 1989). 10 perceived, was so inferior to the British that the Japanese could not push their will against their counterparts. When the Western powers imposed unequal treaties on Japan through gunboat diplomacy, there was widespread reaction from the samurai, the Japanese elite warrior class. They perceived unequal treaties as a great threat to the Japanese independence, as they knew how Western nations utilized them to reduce China to semi-colonial status. Initially, the samurai resorted to xenophobic violence against Western residents in Japan, but after the Western powers succeeded in retaliatory military campaigns in the early 1860s, Japanese elites realized that premodern militaries were inferior against modern ones. While they remained determined to prevent their country from being colonized and still perceived unequal treaties as a threat to Japan's independence, they also realized that it was impossible to drive the Westerners out through xenophobic violence. The conclusion of the Japanese elites was to acquire power by engaging in modernization. Japan quickly entered into a civil war, but after its conclusion in 1868 the newly established Japanese government engaged in a nationwide modernization project, not only of its military but also of its political and social institutions. The British impression of Japan was not unanimous, and the British merchants in Japan did not think that the Japanese were ready to receive full sovereignty even around 1900 because these individuals had witnessed assaults by xenophobic Japanese in 1860s and feared the loss of the legal protection that extraterritoriality guaranteed. However, by and large it was positive especially after the Meiji Restoration, and even Sir Harry S. Parkes, the British Minister in Japan who adamantly opposed treaty revision until his departure from the office in 1882, appreciated of the progress of Japanese Westernization. Most Britons appreciated that the Japanese were engaged in a project of modernization, and were succeeding in that effort to make their society more Western, and "civilized." However, until the mid-1880s they did not think Japan deserved to be recognized as a diplomatic equal. Japan's power, both military and economic, was far inferior to that of Britain. For the Japanese elites, the 1870s was a period to build infrastructure and train specialists, and also it had to deal with numerous reactionary rebellions against the new government. Therefore, the government could not expect much from its modernization project during this decade, and it remained inferior to Britain. Additionally, Japan during 1870s was so remote from Britain that it could not affect the strategic well-being of the British Empire. This remoteness led to the lack of incentive on the British side to make an objective examination of Japan. As a result, Britons held an image of Japan as an exotic nation where fairy tales became real, an "elf-land" where people were small and free from the drab and busy life of the industrialized world. Until the mid-1880s, Japan did not possess power to push its

11 interests, and it also was not seen as an important nation from the British point of view. There was no incentive on the British side to alter the existing treaty, and the Japanese were not powerful enough to push their will against the British. This situation started to change in the latter half of the 1880s as Japan's modernization project started to bear fruit. By this time, Japanese manufacturers were starting to increase their share in the domestic market, which was dominated by imports in the previous decade. British diplomats became aware of this situation, and as a result Japan possessed some power that could affect British decision making. Since Russia did not start its eastward expansion until the late 1880s, and thus East Asia was not yet a field of contest between the European imperialist powers, the core of the Anglo-Japanese relationship in the mid-1880s remained trade, and the Japanese were starting to become increasingly competent in the economic sector. The power advantage that Britain held over Japan diminished. This made the British decision makers handle the Anglo-Japanese relationship more sensitively than they did in the previous decade. This circumstance set the ground for the Britons to consider treaty revision for the first time ever. The British diplomats in Japan were constantly pushing the Japanese to allow foreigners to travel freely outside treaty ports so that there would be a bigger commercial opportunities for their merchants, but they realized that the Japanese would not allow that to happen if the foreigners remained protected by extraterritoriality. Additionally, by the mid-18 80s British diplomats were finding it increasingly difficult to form a united front with the other Western powers against treaty revision, which Parkes did so effectively during the 1870s. The Minister Residents who succeeded Parkes, Sir Francis Plunkett and Hugh Fraser, were unwilling to deal with the Japanese in the heavy-handed manner that their predecessors did, and Japanese diplomats were also successful in preventing the formulation of such a front. Meanwhile, by the late-1880s East Asia became the stage of contest between European imperial powers as Russia started to show interest in expanding into the region. Since Britain had established its commercial and imperial interest in this region, its decision makers were determined to confront this threat, and therefore there emerged an incentive to examine the potential for Japan to cooperate in achieving this goal through analyzing the real power and interests of Japan. This incentive led George Curzon to visit Japan to analyze the success of its modernization, and not to write the exotic travel accounts that travellers of previous decades did. Curzon's impression of Japanese modernization was positive, and he concluded that Japan was successful in its modernization project, had acquired significant amount of power over the past twenty years, and would continue to grow. This perspective was shared by many British elites, both political and military. While Japan in the 1890s was seen only as a second rank power, it nonetheless was

12 seen as a nation that could throw some weight around in East Asia, where Western powers could exercise only a limited power because of the region's remoteness. Since 1868, the Japanese demanded that Britain recognize them as a diplomatic equal, and by 1890 they had acquired sufficient power to deserve that treatment. Further delay to recognize Japan as a diplomatic equal would potentially jeopardize its good will, in which case Britain would have to expect a resistance against British interests from a power that could not be underestimated. British decision makers concluded that the unequal treaty was no longer worth upholding, especially when East Asia was becoming the field of struggle against Russia, and therefore they informed the Japanese on 15 July 1890 that they were ready to renegotiate the treaty revision. However, for another four years the revised treaty, Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, was not signed. This delay occurred partly because Whitehall was reluctant to use cable for communication because of its expense, and therefore most diplomatic correspondence was shipped; at this time, it took five to six weeks for a letter to reach London from Tokyo, which provided a significant delay of the negotiation. But domestic and international political crises had greater impact on this four-year delay in the signing of a revised treaty. A series of anti-government activities, both violent and non-violent, provided political crises which forced the Japanese government to concentrate its attention on dealing with these political activists. Also, as Japan made steady progress toward Westernization, there was rising public awareness on political issues and, consequently, by the late 1880s increasing public frustration against the slow progress of treaty revision. Some activists resorted to violence to express their frustration. As a result of the assassination attempt by a xenophobic Japanese against the Crown Prince Nicholas of Russia (the Ohzu Incident), Japan and Britain had to postpone the treaty negotiation. Not until September 1894 could the Japanese government restrain the domestic crisis and reopen the revision negotiation. The revised treaty was signed on 16 July 1894. Japanese elites shared a genuine fear that British decision makers would suspend revision negotiations if they became convinced that the Japanese modernization was not yet complete. This is why the Japanese elites were driven to despair when the Ohzu Incident broke out, fearing that this might force Britons to change their views of Japan and conclude that the Japanese people could not restrain their premodern and barbaric nature that they showed during the 1860s, and thus were still unworthy of equal diplomatic status. There were cases, especially in late 1893 to early 1894, when British diplomats in East Asia were irritated by the Japanese. There were several incidents when Japanese thugs attacked British residents in Japan during this period, and diplomats were also frustrated by the Japanese, whom they thought were pushing the Sino-Japanese crisis to the verge of war. Britain's East Asian policy was

13 to sustain the status quo, as it had already established commercial interest there, and therefore Britons wanted to see no disorder that might open an opportunity for Russia to penetrate the region. During this period, Lord Rosebery, the Prime Minister, delayed the process of negotiation to show Britain's frustration toward the Japanese, in December 1893 and July 1894. However, this was only to be a temporary suspension, not a permanent one. Rosebery was determined to protect the British imperial interest through minimal commitment and he did not think that the Japanese pushed the issue to the point that the British had to take an action against them. While Rosebery did identify that Japan was pushing the Sino-Japanese crisis toward war, he also thought that its decision makers were doing so to protect Korea, which was a vital strategic centre for Japan. Also, he did not think that the Japanese were pursuing this course in a manner that violated international law and he concluded that Britain could not justify its intervention in the Sino-Japanese crisis. After British decision makers told their Japanese counterparts in 1890 that they were ready to negotiate the treaty revision, British decision makers never considered permanently suspending the negotiation. Nonetheless, events between 1890 and 1894 were important because, first, they affected the timing of the signing of revised treaty, and second, they also were good examples on how British perceptions of Japan had changed from the 1870s, and therefore they deserve a chapter for analysis.

14 Chapter 1: Japan's Initiation into the Western Order, 1858-82

The unequal treaties that Japan signed with Western states were extremely unpopular amongst the samurai, or the warrior-class. During the 1850s and 1860s, this class was marked by widespread xenophobia. They also recognized how Western states were exploiting China as government officials learned about the Opium War through reports submitted by Dutch merchants, the only Western people permitted to trade with Japan.22 Takasugi Shinsaku, who accompanied the Japanese mission to Shanghai in 1863, lamented in his diary after his return that Shanghai was a "colony of the Westerners. Chinese lived in streets, and were being treated as if they were dogs or cats." 23 Many Japanese shared this view, and were determined not to let their nation to follow the same fate. At the same time, Japanese political elites recognized that opening their country to the foreigners was inevitable. After learning of the disastrous defeats that China suffered against the Western nations, led by Britain, Japanese realized that the Western powers were determined to open up eastern markets, by force if necessary. Westerners believed that free trade was a human right that no organization or state should be able to stop individuals from pursuing.24 Western merchants across the world expected their home nation to facilitate free trade Western nations, under Britain's lead, protected their merchants, and used their military power to open up eastern market.25 By the mid-nineteenth century, Western nations possessed weapons superior to those of non-industrialized societies, and so could overwhelm premodern societies with little sacrifice.26 The Opium Wars indicated this point clearly. The Japanese elites acutely understood this military inferiority. The Japanese elites decided to open up their country to foreigners despite their repugnance toward the idea; this was a humiliation, but at least it avoided the destruction of their country. 7 The Japanese knew that the root of their problem was military inferiority. This weakness forced them to accept Western terms which compromised their sovereignty. The solution to this problem seemed obvious. Western warships had superior armour, were faster, and mounted many gun, more powerful than any weapons the Japanese possessed. Hence, technological modernization was the necessary step to

22 William G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858, (London: Luzac and Company, 1951), 39, 41; Fox, Britain and Japan, 31. 23 Toru Umihara, Takasugi Shinsaku: Ugokeba Raiden no Gotoku (Takasugi Shinsaku'-Acting as if He was a Thunderbolt), (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 2007), 117. 24 Beasley, Great Britain, 46; Fox, Britain and Japan, 8. 25 Fox, Britain and Japan, 8. ™ Ibid. 27 Ibid, 36; Beasley, Great Britain, 110. 15 take. However, a feudal political-economic structure prevented Japan from industrializing efficiently. By 1854, Japan had established a nationwide merchant network and some factorized textile manufacturing was developing in some regions of Japan; also, there were institutions called ton'ya which acted as quasi-banks, where customers could receive currency by banking their rice stipends. Despite being an agriculture-based society, Japanese society before 1854 cannot be categorized as a simple feudal society, as there were some commercial, financial and industrial institutions that resembled those of the industrialized world. This was one of the major factors why Japan was rapid and successful in turning its society from premodern to modern. However, the Japanese society was feudal in a sense that feudal lords controlled their domains and prevented the central government from creating any nationwide policy. In order to efficiently industrialize and reform their military, Japan needed to replace its feudal political and socioeconomic systems with counterparts on Western lines. After a brief civil war in the late 1860s, Japan abolished its feudal political structure, and declared that it would learn and adopt Western institutions as much as possible. Japan was quite successful in this aim; by 1894, the Japanese military was using modern weapons and tactics; railroad networks connected the nation, and shipping industries used steamships built in Japanese shipyards; cotton industries were flourishing, supplying domestic demand; trading companies were opening offices around the world, and Japanese banks were financing them. This was a significant change, considering that just twenty-five years before Japan was an agricultural society whose industry depended almost entirely on animal power. This chapter will follow Japan's experience under the unequal treaties between 1858 and 1885. This was Japan's period of initiation into the Western social order. It was a period of transition from premodern to modern, when the Japanese built infrastructures and educated technicians, and it was not a period when the Japanese could expect a large industrial output. This made the Japanese military and economy inferior to that of Britain, and therefore Japanese power remained inferior. During this period, issues in Japan and East Asia remained relatively unimportant for Whitehall, as Britain had established its position in the region. Gradual expansion of British merchants into East Asia enabled them to develop a network of free trade, and

28 E. Sydney Crawcour, "Economic Change in the Nineteenth Century," in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5- The Nineteenth Century, ed. by Marius B. Jansen, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 569; Gilbert Rozman, "Social Change," in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5'- The Nineteenth Century, ed. by Marius B. Jansen, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 507. 29 William G. Beasley, "Meiji Political Institutions," in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5- The Nineteenth Century, ed. by Marius B. Jansen, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 618-9. 16 the British government was determined to protect it through its naval power, which was the strongest in the world at the time. No Western nation could challenge the British dominance in East Asia (they did not try to challenge it during this period), and the region posed no threat to the strategic well-being of the British Empire. As a result, there were no incentives on the British side to change the existing treaty that regulated the Anglo-Japanese relationship. Since Japan was unimportant, there also were no incentives for Britons to explore the real image of Japan, and therefore they saw Japan as an "elf-land," where every object and people are so small, a world that existed only in fairy tales and preserved a joyful life which the interest-driven and fast-paced industrialized world had lost forever. It was seen as exotic and surreal and not seen as a nation that existed under the same international order with the Western world. Negotiation on treaty revision inevitably suffered from this point, and the Britons refused for the most part even to come to the negotiating table.

Japanese Modernization and Effect on its Power

From 1600 to 1868, Japan was ruled by the Tokugawa family, a powerful warrior-class clan which, in 1600, ended a civil war that had lasted for about one hundred and fifty years. They established a political-economic system known as "centralized feudalism," which essentially created a loose national state which also granted feudal lords political authority within their domain, as long as they did not challenge the Tokugawa regime {bakufu). Diplomatically, the Tokugawa bakufu established a seclusion policy (sakoku) from the mid-seventeenth century, and allowed only limited and strictly supervised trade with Korea, China and the Netherlands.30 Historically Japan had developed a strong sense of admiration toward China, a civilization that developed a rich culture a thousand years before it did. As a result, the Japanese worldview was strongly influenced by the Chinese one. The Chinese observed that every organism had a role within nature and so long as they performed their task, the order of the universe would be sustained. For example, trees and grasses grow from soil and rain and their leaves feed herbivores, which become a food for carnivores; when carnivores die, their flesh decomposes, so enriching the soil, and keeping the order of nature going. Chinese called this process the "Order of Heaven (tian)." Tian possesses a rational intelligence which enables it to manage the cosmic order. Just as every organism has its role within a nature, so every human

30 For the establishment of Tokugawa political and diplomatic structure, John W. Hall, "The bakuhan system" and Jurgis Elisonas, "Christianity and the daimyo" both in The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 4: Early Modern Japan, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 128-182 and 301-372. 17 has a position within their society. A few wise individuals would become rulers, while the rest engage in productive activities, such as agriculture, craftsmanship, and so on. When rulers failed to fulfil their role as leaders of society, disorder would follow, indicating that they must be replaced by new ones.31 Japanese, as a vigorous student of Chinese civilization, accepted this worldview, with one exception. Whereas the Chinese assume that an imperial family can be overthrown when they were not fulfilling their role, Japanese considered that emperors should not be overthrown. According to the legends recorded in Kojiki and Nihon Shoki, the emperor was a descendant of Amaterasu the sun goddess, and a daughter of Izanami and Izanagi, the deities that created the Japanese islands. Therefore, the emperor, the descendent of creator deities, claimed inviolable authority over the Japanese islands. As the people of an island country which experienced only limited intervention from outside, the Japanese people developed a sense of cultural uniqueness while retaining admiration for the Chinese civilization. Not until the two hundred and seventy years of peace during the Tokugawa period, when Japan experienced significant economic growth, social stability and a maturation of Japanese intellectuals, did this sense of cultural uniqueness elevated to cultural superiority. During the Tokugawa period, a group of scholars known as the nationalists {kokugaku) argued that due to Japan's divine origin, and the fact it was ruled by an emperor who was the descendent of creator deities, Japanese were unique and superior to other peoples. Kokugaku scholars claimed that the emperor was not a mere figurehead who could be ignored; he was the sovereign of the Japanese islands, the core of Japanese uniqueness, and therefore to be revered.33 Consequently, kokugaku scholars claimed only the emperor and his people could reside in his territory, not inferior peoples; increasingly, the Japanese sense of cultural superiority changed into xenophobism. Given this background, naturally many Japanese individuals, including samurai, despised the Tokugawa bakufu's decision to end the seclusion policy. Their dissatisfaction was enhanced when they learned that Komei Emperor also opposed the decision to open the country to the foreign "barbarians," as he publicly refused to ratify the draft treaty of 1858, because the "provisional treaty now proposed would

31 For the Chinese worldview, see Burton Watson, David S. Nivison and Irene Bloom, "Classical Sources of Chinese Tradition," in Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2nd ed„ vol. 1, eds. by William Theodore De Bary and Irene Bloom, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999): 24-40. 32 For Japanese worldview, see chapter 4 of Sources of Japanese Tradition, 2nd ed., Volume l: From Earliest Times to 1600, eds. by William Theodore De Bary and Yoshiko Kurata Dykstra, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001): 63-99. 33 On Kokugaku, see chapter 33 and 34 of Sources of Japanese Tradition, 2nd ed., 2nd vol., part 1 (1600-1868) eds. by William Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck and Arthur E. Tiedemann, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006): 484-529. 18 make impossible the preservation of national honour." The bakufu, however, fearing a military confrontation with Western states, signed the treaty without imperial ratification. This move infuriated Komei Emperor and his samurai supporters. The latter became convinced that it was their mission to serve their emperor's will by expelling the barbarians from his divine land, in place of the bakufu which was too incompetent to do so.35 Under the slogan of "Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians {sonno joi)," many samurai, especially from the feudal domains of Satsuma and Choshu, engaged in an anti-foreign (and anti-Tokugawa) campaign. The sonno joi movement reached its peak between 1860 and 1863, when activists tried to expel foreigners through the use of violence. They began by attacking private foreigners in Japan, but their actions quickly escalated to assaults on foreign diplomatic representatives in Yokohama, the enclave near the bakufu capital of Edo where Westerners were allowed to reside. Henry Heusken, the secretary of the American legation, fell victim to the assault of sonno joi activists on 15 January 1861.36 The first organized attack on Britons happened in July of 1861, against the legation in the Buddhist temple called Tozenji; four British officials were wounded while seventeen Japanese guards were killed. The legation again was attacked a year later, this time leaving two British officials dead. Also on 14 September 1862, four unarmed British merchants were assaulted by samurai from Satsuma in the midst of their afternoon stroll, three of whom eventually died. From 25 June 1863, samurai from Choshu started bombarding foreign commercial ships that were trying to go through their waters.39 These activities unnerved Western residents in Japan. Ernest Satow, at this time a student interpreter in the British legation, recalled in his memoir that,

Japan became known as a country where the foreigner carried his life in his hand, and the dread of incurring the fate of which so many examples had already occurred became general among the residents. [...] Consequently, I bought a revolver, with a due supply of powder, bullets and caps. The trade to Japan in these weapons must have been very great in those days, as everyone wore a pistol whenever he ventured beyond the limits of the foreign settlement, and constantly slept with one under his

34 "Imperial Court to Hotta Masayoshi, 3 May 1858" in Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853-1868, ed. by William G. Beasley, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960):180"1. 35 Jansen, "The Meiji Restoration," 320-325. 36 Fox, Britain and Japan, 84.' Ernest Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, (London: Seeley, Service and Co., 1921), 46-47. 37 Fox, Britain and Japan, 86; Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, 47. 38 Fox, Britain and Japan, 98; Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, 51-2. 39 Fox, Britain and Japan, 113. 19 pillow.'

After living in this nerve-racking environment, Western residents in Japan became convinced that retaliation was necessary. Britain's first retaliatory campaign was conducted by sea against Satsuma on 13 August, 1863. Satsuma, equipped with obsolete weapons, was no match for the Royal Navy. By 17 August, its battery was destroyed, the British inflicted heavy casualties on their foes and burned half of the castle city.41 British, French, American and Dutch men-of-war jointly bombarded Choshu's batteries on 5 September, which were neutralized within three days.42 Britain extracted indemnities from both domains, and made them promise to refrain from interfering with the foreign trade; Choshu also was obliged not to build any more batteries. From this point, both bakufu and feudal domains took every measure to prevent violence against foreigners, and to punish those who did. Choshu individuals never again dared to fire at commercial ships. When two British army officers were killed by xenophobic Japanese samurai on 20 November 1863, the bakufu captured and executed the assassins within a month.43 These military activities were a wake-up call for the Japanese; they convinced every samurai of the overwhelming superiority of the West and of the impossibility of expelling the barbarians through violence, or a quick return to the days of seclusion. However, Japanese elites did not all of a sudden become friendly to Westerners. They knew what Western states had done in China, they were acutely aware of an imperialist threat, and were suspicious of the foreigners. Moreover, after learning that their military was far inferior to Western ones, the Japanese wished to acquire modern industrial technology, strategic organization and training, which they correctly identified as the core of Western military superiority. The bakufu, which led the Japanese diplomatic relations with the Western states, was first to realize the gap in military technology, and started an institution to adopt it by the mid-1850s. In 1855, the Bakufu purchased a wooden steam-driven sloop from the Netherlands, the only Western country with which Japan had permanent diplomatic relations throughout the Tokugawa era, and established a naval school in Nagasaki by hiring Dutch naval officers as instructors. A Dutch naval officer called Hendrik Hardes also helped the bakufu's plan to build a steel factory, which was founded in 1861.44 Amongst the feudal domains, Satsuma was the first to understand the need to learn Western

40 Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, 47. 41 Fox, Britain and Japan, 115. "2 Ibid, 137-9; Satow, Diplomat in Japan, 102-115. 43 Fox, Britain and Japan, 147-8; Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, 134-140. 44 Umetani, Oyatoi Gaikokujin, 38-46. 20 technology. It embarked on a steamship building program in the mid-1850s, and built its own vessel in 1854.45 The Japanese, however, became more active in learning Western technology in the 1860s, after their humiliating defeats by Western militaries. The Japanese replaced Dutch technical advisors with Britons and Frenchmen, as they realized that the Netherlands was not a leading global power with knowledge of cutting-edge technology. The Bakufu relied on French specialists to develop a new steel factory in Yokosuka, which later became the first shipyard in Japan, and also to serve as the instructors at the newly established army school. Unlike the French, who were more inclined towards supporting the Tokugawa regime, the British acted upon contracts. While some individuals worked as instructors of the bakufu's navy school, others also aided anti-Tokugawa factions, as there were some British technicians working in Satsuma's textile factory, while merchants such as Thomas B. Glover and Edward H. Hunter brokered arms trades between British arms manufacturers and the Satsuma-Choshu (Satcho) alliance. Several British schools and firms also accepted students and apprentices from the Satcho alliance, as both domains became interested in acquiring their own technicians by the mid-1860s.47 However, the Japanese modernization bore little fruit during the 1860s. Centralized feudalism prevented nationwide modernization, because the feudal domains acted as independent territories. The bakufu acted as the overlord of these domains, but had no control over their internal actions. Even when they wished to modernize, the Japanese factions had limited budgets and could not provide sufficient currency to fund the modernization enterprise. Additionally, Japan was ravaged by the political struggle between pro- and anti-Tokugawa factions which escalated into a civil war (Boshin War) in 1867. After the conclusion of this war in 1869, however, the Tokugawa regime fell and political authority returned to the hands of the emperor for the first time in 670 years. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan could finally set its way for a nationwide modernization. However, at this time only a few individuals had been abroad and even fewer understood how the Western economic, industrial, and social institutions worked. They were not sure what kind of socio-political structure to establish. They merely

45 Ibid, 35-36, 51-53. 46 Ibid, 47; Fox, Britain and Japan, 253-7. 47 Checkland, Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 139; Janet Hunter and Shinya Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations in Historical Perspective, 1600-2000: Trade and Industry, Finance, Technology and the Industrial Challenge," in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, vol. 4- Economic and Business Relations, eds. by Janet E. Hunter and Shinya Sugiyama, (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002):i2-4. 48 Crawcour, "Economic Change in the nineteenth Century," 605. 21 had a vague idea that they must establish some kind of centralized state, as opposed to centralized feudalism. The following is the Charter Oath, an imperial declaration of five articles that Emperor Meiji made on 6 April 1868;

1. An assembly widely convoked shall be established and all matters of state shall be decided by public discussion. 2. All classes high and low shall unite in vigorously promoting the economy and welfare of nation. 3. All civil and military officials and The common people as well shall be allowed to fulfil their aspirations, so that there may be no discontent among them. 4. Base customs of former times shall be abandoned and all actions shall conform to the principles of international justice. 5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world and thus shall be strengthened the foundation of the imperial polity.49

The vagueness of the Charter Oath represents the mindset of Japanese elites immediately after the Restoration. They were uncertain with which course they should take. Therefore, in 1871 the Meiji government decided to send a mission, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iwakura Tomomi, to the United States and Europe, to observe modern society.50 This mission marked the first time that Japan attempted to raise the issue of the revising the unequal treaties. Aoki Shuzo recalled in his memoir that "the failure of treaty revision negotiation of the Iwakura Mission reiterated the point that the Western nations would not revise treaties unless Japan could show them that it is a civilized nation."51 Okubo Toshimichi, one of the leaders in the Meiji government who accompanied the Iwakura Mission, noted "at present all the countries in the world are directing all their efforts toward propagating teachings of 'civilization and enlightenment,' and they lack for nothing. Hence we must imitate them in these respects."52 Japanese elites were convinced that they must "impress" Western people; not only through military power, but also by showing that they could accept a Western social order including a legal system and

49 Translation of the Charter Oath from Ryosuke Ishii, Japanese Legislation in the Meiji Era, (Tokyo, Toyo Bunko, 1969), 145. 50 Sukehiro Hirakawa, "Japan's Turn to the West," trans, by Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5- The Nineteenth Century, ed. by Marius B. Jansen, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 462. 51 Shuzo Aoki, Aoki Shuzo Jiden (Autobiography of Aoki Shuzo), footnotes by Yoshihisa Sakane, (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1970), 34. 52 Toshimichi Okubo, "Seifu no Teisai ni Kansuru Kangensho (Recommendation on the structure of new government)" in Okubo Toshimichi Monjo (Documents Related to Okubo Toshimichi), eds. by Kagoshima Prefectural Historical Document Center, vol. 3, (Kagoshima: Shuendo and Gennando, 1988), 11. 22 socio-political institutions and become a decent competitor within the international system. Even before despatching the Iwakura Mission, the Meiji Government recognized that it must establish a firm jurisdiction throughout the Japanese islands. They knew that Japanese attempts to modernize their industry during the Tokugawa period had failed because the country was fragmented. The Meiji government moved fast to establish a centralized state while the mission was abroad; the government confiscated control of the land from feudal lords in 1871, and established a universal agricultural tax rate in 1873.53 The return of the mission in 1873, however, multiplied the government's sense of the need to impress Westerners and to possess sufficient power to be considered as a diplomatic equal. Therefore, Japanese leaders concluded that a wholesale restructuring of their society was necessary, not only in the industrial and economic sectors but also in social institutions. After the Meiji elites secured a stable source of revenue, they embarked on extensive investment in the industries which were considered essential to national power. Among these was the building of infrastructure, including railways, telegraphs and lighthouses. Others included steel and shipbuilding, and coal mining. Japanese leaders also saw a potential for exports in the cotton textile industry, which had a long tradition in Japan, and which might become a decent competitor in international markets.5 Since Japanese technical experts were few, Japan had to rely on foreigners to supervise these projects and train apprentices; many Western technicians were invited to Japanese schools to instruct technical experts. Development of a modern monetary and financial system also was important; the Meiji government had to ensure a sound and effective currency and develop a banking system in order to finance infrastructure building. 5 Foreign advisors in the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and various private individuals also played a role in establishing schools in Japan.56 For Japan, the 1870s were a period of acquiring the skills necessary to build a modern society, with significant effects. Due to the government-funded project of building infrastructure, railroads connected the towns, gas lamps lighted cities and more and better ships sailed in Japanese waters than ever before. However, Japanese industry still was immature, and outclassed by foreign imports in both cost and quality.

53 Beasley, "Meiji Political Institutions," 633-4, 636. 54 Crawcour, "Economic Change," 611-612; Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), 69. 55 Olive Gheckland and Norio Tamaki, "Alexander Allan Shand, 1844-1930 - a Banker the Japanese Could Trust," in Britain and Japan'- Biographical Portraits, vol. II, ed. by Ian Nish, (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Society Publications, 1997): 67. 56 Umetani, Oyatoi Gaikokujin, chapter 2 (64-172). 23 As a matter of fact, the 1870s were the heyday for British merchants in Japan. Imports still held a large share of the Japanese domestic market for many goods, including textiles. Despite the government's effort to enhance the industry, cotton imports peaked in 1879, when 97 million yards were imported into Japan (compared to 23.5 million in 1869); these imports held well over 25 percent of the Japanese domestic market throughout the decade.57 The sugar industry, hit by increased competition after the opening of the trade, suffered heavily from the influx of British imports. In 1870, Japanese produced 618 million piculs of sugar and imported 617 million; in 1875, Japan produced 740 while the British imported 739 million.58 Naturally, the number of British firms in Japan peaked during this period, hovering around 110 throughout the decade.5 Meanwhile, Japan had to pay a very high tuition for foreign technical experts. For most Westerners, Japan was a distant and unknown nation, and Japan could attract them only through a high salary. Therefore, the salaries of foreign personnel exceeded that of many high-ranked government officials. The highest paid foreign employee in 1874, Thomas W. Kinder of the Mint, received ¥1,045 per month, while the Prime Minister Sanjo Sanetomi (the highest paid government official) received ¥800; no foreign advisors employed by various Japanese ministries were paid less than ¥400; those who taught at government-funded schools received around ¥250 to ¥350, and sometimes more (Henry Dyer, who was hired as principal of the Imperial College of Engineering, received ¥650), while the standard monthly pay for a Japanese minister was ¥400 and ¥300 for vice-minister.60 In 1874, when the number of the foreign employees peaked, the sum of the salaries for foreign employees (¥760,000) took up one-third of the budget of the Ministry of Industry (¥2.3 million).61 The Meiji government was cash-strapped not only because of the expensive salaries of foreign employees, but for equally significant reasons. Domestic unrest occurred continuously throughout the 1870s, and kept the Meiji elites busy. Internal unrest was caused by peasants and the former samurai class, both dissatisfied by the policies of new regime, especially in the latter half of the 1870s.62 Peasants usually

57 British Parliamentary Papers, Japan, Part 7- Embassy and Consular Commercial Reports, 1882-87, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971): 581; Hunter and Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations," 28. 58 Hunter and Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations," 30. Authors used two economic primary sources, Nihon boeki seiran (Records of the Japanese Trade) and Noshomu tokeihyo (Statistic chart of the Ministry of Agriculture). 59 Ibid, 9. so Ibid, 238. si Ibid. 62 Steven Vlastos, "Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885," in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5- The Nineteenth Century, (New York: Cambridge 24 rebelled against the new tax rate that the Meiji government established, thinking it too high. Samurai, the privileged class during the Tokugawa period, were dissatisfied as their status declined continuously throughout the 1870s. These samurai led the biggest insurrection during the 1870s, which eventually led to a full-scale war between rebels and the army in 1877, the Satsuma Rebellion. Also, when the government overthrew the Tokugawa bakufu and abolished the feudal domains, they took over the debts that their predecessors had carried, which became an additional burden. Table 1 explains the financial difficulty that the Meiji government faced in the 1870s. The new agricultural taxation system of 1873 drastically improved the ordinary revenue (revenues from taxation, including land, corporate and tariff duties), but that was offset by expenditures to suppress internal rebellions and expensive foreign employees. The amount of government investment in civilian industry steadily increased in the 1870s (except during October 1870-September 1871), until it plummeted in 1875, when protests became too strong.63 It recovered next in the two years, but during and after the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 industrial investment plummeted again for two years. The government government spent ¥42 million to suppress the rebellion, equalling 84 percent of ordinary revenue. This requirement forced Japan to issue national debt, which reached to ¥77 million in 1881.65 For Japan, the 1870s were the years to lay the ground for future expansion. They rebuilt their socio-political structure, suppressed domestic rebellions and invested in capital equipment and human resources, so that they eventually could catch up with Britain, which had the upper hand on trade. Naturally, the Meiji government concentrated its investment on domestic issues, and accumulating debt further restricted its ability to think of anything else. Japan did make some expeditions to Taiwan (1874) and Korea (1876), but they were small-scale. The expedition to Taiwan was intended as a retaliatory expedition against the native Taiwanese tribes who massacred shipwrecked Ryukyu fishermen. The Korean expedition was intended to open a diplomatic relationship, but not to be the ambitious colonization project that some political activists desired. Those who advocated colonial expansion to Korea were ousted from government in 1873. Efforts of treaty negotiation suffered from the same restriction; Japan was too small to be observed by Whitehall.

University Press, 1989): 367-402. 63 Ibid," 376. e4 Ibid, 398. 65 Crawcour, "Economic Change," 611. 66 Fox, Britain and Japan, 280-2. 25 Table 1: Government Ordinary Revenue and Investment Period of Time Ordinary Revenue Government Military Investment Investment Dec. 1867-Dec. 1868 ¥3,664,780 ¥276,728 Jan. 1869-Sept. 1869 ¥4,666,055 ¥367,620 Oct. 1869-Sept. 1870 ¥10,043,627 ¥1,928,277 Oct. 1870-Sept. 1871 ¥15,340,922 ¥1,565,542 Oct. 1871-Dec. 1872 ¥25,522,742 ¥3,251,443 Jan. 1873 -Dec. 1873 ¥70,561,687 ¥4,310,240 Jan. 1874-Dec.l874 ¥71,090,481 ¥5,209,129 Jan. 1875-June 1875 ¥83,080,574 ¥1,740,417 July 1875-June 1876 ¥69,482,676 ¥3,434,138 ¥9,785,678 July 1876-June 1877 ¥55,684,996 ¥3,149,792 ¥10,329,825 July 1877-June 1878 ¥49,967,722 ¥1,370,016 ¥9,203,452 July 1878-June 1879 ¥53,558,117 ¥1,409,576 ¥9,213,024 July 1879-June 1880 ¥57,716,323 ¥2,933,586 ¥10,846,778 July 1880-June 1881 ¥58,036,573 ¥3,706,957 ¥11,599,751

British Perception of Japan: A Remote "Elf-Land"

In 1860s, when the Japanese were engaged in sonno joi activity, images of Japanese as uncivilized people prevailed among Westerners. The British military officers who fought against Japanese xenophobes described them as "barbaric."68 The British community in Japan shared this view. Ernest Satow's memoir and Newspaper articles at the time clearly express widespread anxiety within the foreign community in Yokohama after the Richardson Incident, and the newspaper articles at the time clearly express their frustration towards the Japanese.69 The Yokohama community fully supported the expedition against Satsuma and Choshu. Sir

67 Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development, 71, 72, 74. Smith uses Meiji Zaisei Keizai Shiryo Shusei (Collection of Documents on Meiji Economy and Finance) as a source. Before July 1877, government statics did not differentiate capital and human investment. Smith does not provide the annual breakdown of military investment from December 1867 to July 1875, but they spent ¥47,820,674 altogether during that period of time. Meiji government invested total of ¥66,470,070 for both civilian and military investment of that time, out of ordinary revenue of ¥282,870,871 (23.5%). 68 British Parliamentary Papers, Japan, Part 2'- General Affairs, Sessions, 1864-1870, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 13. 69 Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, 47; "The Murder of Mr. Richardson in Japan (Excerpt from The Japan Herald" The Times, 28 November, 1862. 26 Rutherford Alcock, the first British Minister Resident to Japan, was one of those Britons. After Japanese xenophobes attacked the British legation in 1863, he, with assassination of Richardson on his mind, recalled that "[i]t carrie[d] the mind back to the feudal times of Europe, when the streets and throughfares of every capital were scenes of daily bloodshed and murder." Strong suspicions about the Japanese took deep root. This sense of fear was shared by Westerners in Yokohama for years afterwards, regardless of their nationality; Clara Whitney, a fifteen year old American girl who accompanied her father that as he worked as teacher in Japan, wrote in her diary on 14 October, 1875, "I hope we are in no danger although it may be, for rumor says that hundreds of samurai, or nobles, are meeting in Osaka and Tokyo to take measures for the expulsion of foreigners and a restoration of ancient customs. If it be true, may Heaven protect us, for these people are most treacherous friends and cruel enemies."71 The Yokohama community was the interest group that opposed to treaty revision most adamantly. It expressed fear of the Japanese even in the late nineteenth century, when Britain and Japan agreed to abolish the unequal treaty. In the 1860s, residents in treaty ports reported home any case of anti-foreign violence, perhaps because they wanted to justify their perception of the Japanese and of the need to deal with them through demonstrations of force. Excerpts of the Japan Herald's article about the Richardson Incident appeared in The Times.12 However, the views of Yokohama community were not shared by compatriots at home, where Japan received little attention. Rarely did articles about Japan showed up in newspapers at Britain in first place, and these few editorials or opinions did not favour the opinions of British residents in Japan. 74 This is The limes editorial immediately after the British expedition to Satsuma;

Our relationships with Japan are steadily passing through all the successive stages which seem to be necessary preparation to the free intercourse between a Western and Eastern people. The Japanese possess industrious habits and commercial instincts,

70 Sir Rutherford Alcock, The Capital of the Tycoon: A Narrative of a Three Years' Residence in Japan, (London: Longmans, Greens and Roberts, 1863), 353. 71 Clara A. N. Whitney, Claras Diary: An American Girl in Meiji Japan, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979), 43. 72 Checkland, Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 104. 73 "The Murder of Mr. Richardson in Japan (Excerpt from The Japan Herald)," The Times, 28 November, 1862. Examples of the reports on anti-foreign violence in Japan in the British Home Islands are>' "Murder of British Officers in Japan (Excerpt from The Globe)," 24 January, 1864; "Another Murder in Japan (Private Letter)," 15 February, 1865, both from The Times. 74 From The Times Digital Archives, 1785-1985, http://infotrac.galegroup.com.ezproxv.hb.ucalgarv.ca/itw/infomark/440/986/110626045 w!6/purl=rc6 TTDA&dvn=47!start et?sw aep=ucalgary (Accessed 27 May, 2010). 27 but live under the constraint of jealous and absolute masters.... We must push our commerce, and we must protect our people.... All of this had not been accomplished, however, without the occurrence of some circumstances which weigh upon our national conscience, and which are to be discussed by our House of Commons to-night [i.e. the bombardment of Satsuma and Choshu].... [These events were] very much to be deplored, but we can see nothing in it to be condemned.... [Sjhells fell into the city (Kagoshima) than into the batteries, many wooden huts were blazing... [n]o doubt immense damage was done to innocent persons. Every death... which was not the death of fighting men is greatly to be deplored... [but] we can see nothing in this event which would justify us in laying any blame upon any individual engaged in it.75

This article indicates significant public reactions about the Royal Navy's campaign against Satsuma, and ultimately justifies the campaign by claiming that it was a necessary evil in order to open Japan for foreign trade and support civilization. However, the article does not deny that the Royal Navy burned down the town of Kagoshima, and that it was a matter of regret that it damaged the property of Japan. In the 1840s, elements of the public had criticized the British government when it learned that the Royal Navy had started a war against China over opium smuggling, and thus many Britons were unwilling to support their government when they thought that its actions were immoral or illegal.7 Various agencies, including the Peace Society, expressed the opinion through its mass media to conduct their diplomacy toward Japan without war.77 As the Japanese withdrew from anti-foreign violence after the mid-1860s, the image of Japanese as barbarians, warlike and irrational, remained powerful among British residents in Japan, including Alcock. This was the most powerful British image of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, but concentrated among only one group of them. These views did not dominate views at home, where other voices emerged. Many foreign visitors portrayed Japan in a positive manner. Lawrence Oliphant, who accompanied Lord Elgin's mission to sign the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce, was impressed by "an infinite amount of practical, shrewd common sense" showed by his negotiating counterparts, and was also impressed by the polite and cheerful nature of Japanese officials.78 During the mission's stroll through the city of Edo, Oliphant was impressed by the disciplined curiosity shown by the

75 "Our Relations with Japan are Steadily Passing," The Times, 9 February, 1864. 76 Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 46-7. 77 "The Peace Society and Our Relations with Japan," The Times, 25 Aug, 1863. 78 Lawrence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, '58, '59, vol. II, (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859), 105, 162. 28 Japanese public: "[T]he inhabitants of every cross street and lane poured out to see us pass.... Not that the people were the least disorderly, they laughed and stared and ran parallel with us, till stopped by a barrier, for the Japanese are perfect in the management of crowds"79 This impression was shared not only by Elgin's mission, but also by Francis L. Hawks, the official historian of Matthew C. Perry's mission, which in 1854 became the first Western mission to sign a treaty with Japan. Hawks remarked that the "[Japanese showed] extreme suspicion and caution [in negotiating this treaty]... but [Japanese negotiators said that they] are unlike the Chinese; they are averse to change; and when they make a compact of any kind they intend it shall endure for a thousand years."80 Hawks concluded that "[p]robably nothing but the exercise of the most perfect truthfulness and patience would ever have succeeded in making with them a treaty at all."81 The members of Perry's squadron were impressed even more when they had a chance to socialize with Japanese, who they saw as polite, cheerful, and curious. They were particularly impressed by the curiosity that Japanese showed towards Western goods. Hawks recalled that Japanese showed "gentle and graceful charity" as hosts to their visit, and they "always evinced an inordinate curiosity, for the gratification of which the various articles of strange fabric, and the pieces of mechanism, of ingenious and novel invention, brought from the United States, gave them a full opportunity."82 Many early Western diplomats saw Japanese as intelligent, polite and cheerful, and curious. After these diplomats had opened Japan, the number of Westerners in that country increased. Most of them were merchants, who viewed the Japanese with suspicion, but many were simple visitors or were foreign employees of the Japanese government. These Westerners tended to be quite critical of the merchants in Yokohama, and saw Japan as Hawks and Oliphant had. When visitors from the West arrived at Yokohama, typically they were first astonished by the picturesque natural scenery that they observed from the decks of their ship, and then by how orderly the houses were arranged in Japanese cities, and even more by how well the Japanese maintained hygiene in them.83 Many Westerners found it easy to socialize with Japanese, who

™ Ibid, 112, 162. 80 Francis L. Hawks, Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the years 1852, 1853, and 1854, Under the Command of Commodore M. C.Perry, United States Navy, by order of the Government of the United States. (Washington: A. 0. P. Nicholson, 1856),384-6. si Ibid, 386. 82 Ibid, 358, 360. 83 Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission, vol. II, 2-4; Alexander F. Von Hubner, Osutoria Gaikokan no Meiji Shuyuki (Travel Records of an Austrian Diplomat, the Japanese translation of Promenade Autour de Monde), trans, by Shin'ichi Ichikawa and Masahiro Matsumoto, (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Oraisha, 1988), 23-4; Whitney, Diary, 25. 29 as they saw as polite and cheerful.84 They also considered the Japanese curious and intelligent, especially because of their deep interest and speed in acquiring technology. Westerners observed that Japanese society emphasized order and discipline. Clara Whitney commented on Japan's custom of bowing in her diary:

Japanese are naturally polished and are "guides to etiquette" in themselves. They know how to make them feel at ease. But the low bows are too much for me. [Hosts to a banquet] kneeled down on the floor and touched the matting with her forehead when she bade them good-bye. But how could a freeborn daughter of America practice such slavish, humiliating customs? So, I merely bowed an American bow, and with no more than American politeness cheerfully said my "Sayonara," and, while they were all lyin prostrate in the dust, I stepped out to my jinrikisha (carriage) and let them lie.85

While Whitney's observations of these rituals were critical about these customs, Britons perceived them positively. They understood that Japanese customs in part were conducted to demonstrate the place of a person within society, because British society too emphasized the importance of freedom within rule of law. Freedom was valued, but not so much as to sacrifice the order of society. On 26 March 1868, Parkes had an audience with Meiji Emperor, who had just ascended to the throne, and reported to Whitehall that the court ritual was similar to that in the West. Parkes entered the imperial chamber with a fanfare of music, bowing three times before he stood in front of the Emperor; two servants stood on both sides of his throne, and the Emperor spoke through his servants rather than directly, in order to uphold his dignity.86 Parkes reported that he was satisfied by the dignity and respect the Emperor had shown.87 Britons were equally impressed by the fact that there were very few jobless strollers in cities, concluding that Japanese were industrious and disciplined people who accept their place within society and worked hard to fulfil their role.88 Even seppuku, a Japanese ritual which forced criminals to execute themselves by stabbing a knife into their own stomach, was seen as admirable etiquette by some Britons. Many Westerners saw this act as grotesque; some Britons, including Alcock, described seppuku as a proof that Japanese still were uncivilized

84 Von Hubner, Osutoria Gaikokan, 12; Whitney, Diary, 39. 85 Whitney, Diary, 44. 86 Ernest Satow, Diplomat in Japan, 359*62. 87 John Breen, "The Rituals of Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy: Imperial Audiences in Early Meiji," in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 5- Social and Cultural Perspectives, eds. by Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 60. 88 Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission, vol. II, 113. 30 people who could not restrain their violent nature. However, Algernon Mitford, who served both Alcock and Parkes a significant term as an interpreter, offered a different perspective. He portrayed samurai as gentlemen, and he emphasized the "extreme dignity and punctiliousness" of this ritual rather than its violence and inhumanity.90 Seppuku, moreover, showed the seriousness of individual Japanese quality of revealing courage, self sacrifice and earnestness, which appealed to Victorians. British views of Japanese customs were mixed, but from 1865 they were more positive than negative. Meanwhile, a new set of images arose about the Japanese, which affected the issue of treaty revision until the 1880s. Japan remained a remote, exotic nation. This is the first impression of Alexander F. von Hiibner, an Austrian diplomat who visited Japan during his world tour in 1867, when he first observed the Japanese landscape from his ship:

For past twelve years, Europeans have written numerous accounts of their impression towards Japan.... However, they still do not adequately tell how beautiful this country is. Any European that first arrived at Japan become mesmerized. After every step that they take into this country, they start to question whether if they are dreaming, they are warped into a fairy tale, into a story of the Arabian Night. Sceneries that await them are unbelievably beautiful that they fear that they might suddenly vanish in front of them.

After his visit to Kyoto, he noted:

A sort of mysterious awe still hangs about the deserted palaces, once the abode of the descendant of the gods; and Kiyotofszc] is still the seat of the best productions of Japanese art and industry, if it has ceased to be the abode of rank and fashion.

Hiibner's comment represents the perspectives of many European visitors. The remoteness of Japan allowed them to hold an image of a nation that was free from the

89 Georges Bousquet, Nihon Kenbunki (Travel Account on Japan, a Japanese translation of Le Japon de nos Jours) trans, by Yoshiyuki Noda and Keiichiro Hisano, (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1977), 67. 90 Gordon Daniels, "Elites, Governments and Citizens: Some British Perceptions of Japan, 1850-2000," in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 5: Social and Cultural Perspectives, eds. by Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 5. For a source, Daniels used Algernon B. Mitford, "The Execution by Hara Kiri," The CornhillMagazine, vol. 20 (1869): 549-54. 91 Von Hiibner, Osutoria Gaikokan, 9. 92 Toshio Yokoyama, Japan in Victorian Britain Mind: A Study of Stereotyped Image of a Nation, 1850S0, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1987), 153. dry, interest-driven and fast-paced life of the industrialized world, a lifestyle that existed only in fairy tales for the Westerners. David Wedderburn recalled after that after he visited Japan that he felt like he was in an "elf-land," remarking "the smallness of the [Japanese] people, their incessant laughing chatter, and their funny gestures," and Charles Dilke agreed with Wedderburn, reminiscing the "[t]rim little gardens, some not much larger than a table cloth, exhibit the fondness of the Japanese for flowers and dwarfed shrubs; and each garden has its tiny pond full of goldfish." Captain Cyprian Bridge of the Royal Navy also recalled from his visit to rural Japan in 1875, that he was,

.. .brought face to face with the Middle Ages. Three years and a half only have passed since the abolition of the feudal tenures and dominion. The retainers still bear upon their sleeves the cognizance of their feudal lords... Those long white buildings witiiin the castle walls must have re-echoed time after time to the tramp and hum of armed vasals and retainers of samurai and yaconins [yakunin, i.e. officials].... Chubby children and rosy maidens crowded the village streets, happier than their peers in those more "civilized" countries in which women and child must labour in the fields.94

While Bridge does not describe the Japanese countryside with quite the mystical rhetoric of Hiibner, still he romanticized Japan as a nation that existed in the past, retaining elements that the Western civilizations lost after the Industrial Revolution, playing to a Victorian cult of the medieval era. Along the same lines, many Western accounts of Japan focused on describing exotic customs, just like Whitney did with bowing and Mitford on seppuku. This trend had several roots. Japan was a remote country which mattered little to Britain, and one about which little was known. In Britain, publishers wanted to sell more books, and exotic travel accounts served this aim. Lawrence Oliphant understood this point: his accounts of service with Lord Elgin's mission contains numerous depictions of Japanese people, cities and sceneries, decorated by coloured drawings, which were available in print by mid-nineteenth century.95 There also was a rising demand for Japanese art, the trend known as Japonisme. Japanese art was introduced to Europe by merchants after the opening of trade, and caught the attention

93 Ibid, 154, 158. Yokoyama used David Wedderburn, Fortnight Review, vol. xviii, new series, 418; and Charles W. Dilke, Fortnight Review, vol. xx, new series, 443. 94 Ibid, 152. Yokoyama used "The Mediterranean of Japan," Fortnight Review, vol. xviii, new series (1875): 214-5, and "The city of Kioto," Fraser Magazine, vol. xvii, new series (1876): 61, both by C. A. G. Bridge. 95 Daniels, "Elites Governments and Citizens," 4! Yokoyama, Japan in Victorian Mind, 28. 32 of the British and European public when Japanese vases and bowls were introduced in the World Exhibition at London in 1862. These exotic designs and decoration of were accepted by the British public. As the decade proceeded, these items were increasing in demand; as were Ukiyoe (woodblock paintings).96 Some artists and art critiques lamented that Japan was becoming civilized, fearing that it might lose "delicate perception... [and] the beauty of the soft-toned hues that dwell in the fleecy cloud or on the surface of the waving stem." To some extent, Japan caught attention in Britain because of its exoticism, because it was not Westernized, or civilized in a diminutive form. When they evaluated the Japanese people, some Britons viewed their customs in a negative manner. The xenophobic violence that Westerners witnessed in the 1860s left a long-lasting fear towards the Japanese. Not until mid-1870s did the Japanese start to abolish traditions that were considered as barbaric, such as torture, duel and revenge. Westerners also were astonished by the fact that the Japanese had no sense of taboo regarding public nudity, and also frowned upon their custom of polygamy. Many Western residents in Japan such as Ernest Satow, alone in a nation so far from home, decided to take Japanese mistresses despite experiencing a great moral dilemma; however, many Western observers, especially missionaries, frowned on the fact that many Japanese men had multiple mistresses." Also, since Japanese modernization was incomplete until around 1890, their understanding of Western customs was not thorough. Whitney was disturbed frequently by the lack of table manners of the Japanese at banquets, as they slurped soup and were clumsy with knives and forks.100 Georges Bousquet, the French jurist who was hired by the Japanese Ministry of Justice as an advisor for legal modernization, recalled that,

Today, Japanese government officials, especially the higher-ranked ones, dress in European style.... Those who studied or worked in Europe in past know how to dress themselves in Western clothing, but they are exceptions. Most of these officials wear Flannel shirts with paper collars, and use face towels as mufflers.... They look uncomfortable, and yet the state had made it a rule to dress Western clothing during their service.... The purpose of this decision was to show both foreign observers and

96 Yuko Kikuchi and Toshio Watanabe, "The British Discovery of Japanese Art," in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, vol. 5- Social and Cultural Perspectives, eds. by Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 147-59. 97 Yokoyama, Japan in Victorian Mind, 167. Yokoyama used Bridge, Fortnight Review, vol. xx, new series, 66. 98 Umetani, Oyatoi Gaikokujin, 86. 99 Bousquet, Nihon Kenbunroku, 94; Whitney, Diary, 38. ioo Whitney, Diary, 46. 33 their nationals that they were determined to succeed in their nationwide modernization project,... [but] this mimicking is going too far to the extreme that they are becoming laughable.

Even until the mid-1880s, Japanese made determined effort to adopt Western customs, which eventually led to the opening of Rokumeikan, Japan's first ballroom, in 1883. These developments, however, led to resentment by Japanese conservatives, while 1 09 foreign guests noted that few Japanese could dance, dress or use cutlery properly. Between 1850 and 1890, British perceptions toward Japan were not negative. Briefly, Britons, both in Japan and at home, considered Japanese as violent and barbaric people. However, this image gradually became submerged especially at home. Subsequently, Japanese were seen quite favourably by the Western people as curious, intelligent, industrious, polite and disciplined. However, Japan remained a distant and remote nation. It mattered little to Whitehall, and lacked the power to push its interests; Whitehall was therefore willing to let its countrymen in Japan, who retained substantial prejudices about Japan. Within Britain, no one cared seriously to examine Japan's power while the exotic element of its culture became emphasized. As an exotic nation, Japan was not considered to be a diplomatic equal of Britain.

Unsuccessful Negotiation

Japan remained a distant and remote nation in the first fifteen years under unequal treaties. It mattered little to Whitehall, and lacked the power to push its interests. Within Britain, no one cared seriously to examine Japan's power while the exotic element of its culture became emphasized. Under this situation, Japan's attempts to revise the unequal treaty inevitably failed. Since Whitehall had little diplomatic interest in Japan, its primary interest was to maintain its trade relationship with Japan, which gave British merchants in Japan much influence. Equally, the legation in Japan, which acted as a spokesman for their interests to Whitehall, had significant influence in policy making. The experiences of xenophobic violence in the early 1860s were still fresh in the memories of British merchants from 1858 to 1885, and they retained strong suspicion about Japan's ability to modernize. They feared that abolishing extraterritoriality would put the security of British residents in Japan at risk and also feared that Japan would revert to the seclusion policy that it adhered to during the Tokugawa era if it was allowed to set tariff rates independently. The Japanese government told Western legations in Japan of their desire to revise its

101 Bousquet, Nihon Kenbunki, 61. 102 Umetani, Oyatoi Gaikokujin, 82-3. 34 unequal treaties immediately after the Meiji Restoration, on 4 February 1869.103 However, the reaction from the British side was not positive. Abel Gower, the Consul of Hyogo (modern day Kobe), reported to his superior in Tokyo on 31 January 1872 that,

I endorse fully the leading opinion common to all the four papers (by officials of the British Chambers of Commerce in Osaka and Hyogo) herewith enclosed..., that what is most urgently required in the interest of foreign trade with Japan, is not so much amendment of principles of the present Treaty as the faithful carrying out of its stipulations into practice. ...I have so often had occasion in my previous despatches to report the various forms which official interference [on free trade] has assumed at this port.... [Considerable pains were taken by officials to preserve secrecy in their operations.... It is scarcely possible to over-estimate the restrictive effect of this interference on trade with such a class as the Japanese merchants, who, in general, entertain a deep and well-founded dislike of coming across the path of their numerous and meddlesome officials....104

There was a shared feeling among British residents in Japan that Japanese were reluctant to engage in trade with foreign merchants and feared that they might revert to the seclusion policy that the Tokugawa regime had adopted for two hundred years. F. Adams, the British Charge d'Affairs in Tokyo, sent a copy of this report to London on 5 February 1872, three months before the Iwakura Mission departed Yokohama.105 As a result, the mission met up with an extremely cautious counterpart London, who was unwilling to negotiate on anything related to treaty revision. The Minister Resident in Japan, who acted as a spokesman for their interests to Whitehall, had significant influence in policy making. The Resident Minister from 1865 to 1883 was Sir Harry Parkes, who was determined to protect British merchants and their rights. He was one of the young British merchants who came to China to make his fortune during the nineteenth century, and was arrested by the Chinese in 1860 during the Arrow War, which as the Consul of Canton he played some part in starting. This experience convinced him that the Chinese were a cunning and unscrupulous people who did not hesitate to break promise unless Britain constantly

103 Gaimusho ed., Joyaku Kaisei Kankei Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol. 1, 1. 104 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Japan and Great Britain, 1872-1878, Consul Gower to Mr. Adams, 31 January 1872, FO 410/14. 105 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Japan and Great Britain, 1872-1878, Correspondence from Mr. Adams to Lord Granville, 5 February 1872, FO 410/14. 106 Gaimusho ed., Joyaku Kaisei Kankei Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol. 1, 229-33. 35 reminded them of the consequences. Parkes brought this perception to Japan, and treated the Japanese in the same manner as he did to the Chinese. He negotiated with the Japanese in ways that never would have been acceptable if he was negotiating with Western diplomats; he treated them as pupils, constantly scolding or threatening the use of force. Ernest Satow's memoir offers an example of how Parkes treated Japanese in 1865, when he was enquiring about the murder of a British individual. Parkes thought a samurai from Tosa was a suspect, and so had to talk to both Bakufu and Tosa officials:

Hirayama (the bakufii's chief commissioner) made an appearance; a long and stormy interview took place, in the course of which he heard a good deal of strong language, and was told that he was no more use than a common messenger.... The next morning I saw Goto (official from Tosa) again, who renewed his protestations, and complained of Sir Harry's rough language and demeanour, which he felt sure would some day cause a terrible row. I was myself rather sick of being made the intermediary of the overbearing language to which the chief habitually resorted, and told Goto to remonstrate with him, if he really thought this.... A visit from Hirayama and his colleagues came next. The evidence taken was discussed, and Sir Harry said the inquiry must now be removed to Nagasaki, and that Hirayama ought to proceed thither to conduct it. Hirayama objected strongly, offering to send his two fellow commissioners, but it would not do, and he was finally forced to consent.... Poor old Hirayama was made quite ill by the struggle he had had with the chief.

Parkes acted firmly over this issue so to impress Japanese, as this incident occurred in 1865, with the memories of xenophobic violence still fresh. However, he continued to treat the Japanese in that manner until he left office in 1883; he threatened the use of force whenever he felt that the Japanese were violating their rights protected by the unequal treaty. Parkes was frequently upset by what he perceived as the Japanese government's deliberate rejection of hiring British advisors for their modernization project. He even wondered if the Japanese were conspiring with European powers to isolate Britain, and warned Tokyo of serious consequence if they should do so.1 In reality, the Japanese were not taking such a course, but they were afraid of over-reliance on one country as a source for technical advisors. They knew how British control of the Maritime Customs Service put Chinese tariff revenue at their mercy. Therefore, after the Restoration, the new government wanted to hire a

107 Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, 265-7. 108 Gordon Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes^ British Representative in Japan, 1865S3, (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1996), 101. 36 balanced number of advisors from every Western nation, and partly this purpose was achieved. They hired French jurists, Bousquet and his successor Gustave Boissonade de Fonterabie, to develop civil and criminal codes. Numerous Americans entered Japan under private contract as teachers or to establish schools, while advisors in the army increased from the late 1870s, as the Germans replaced French ones, and the German jurist Hermann Roesler aided the Japanese on the constitution.109 However, as a result of Parkes's pressure, Britons constituted an overwhelming majority of the total foreign advisors. The Royal Navy educated Japanese seamen and officers, while British advisors dominated the Ministry of Industry, with significant effect.110 Britons under contract undertook most of Japan's early industrialization projects, including railroads, telegraphs, lighthouses, shipyards and mines.111 The fact that most of the infrastructures and communication networks were built under British supervision made Japanese anxious that Britons were trying to control Japan's lifeline. As Gordon Daniels demonstrates through his research in British diplomatic documents, although Parkes constantly threatened the use of force against Japan, he never seriously considered that option. He thought, by and large, that the Japanese government was doing a fair job in opening economic opportunities to his countrymen, and was impressed by Japan's rapid modernization.11 However, he denied that, at least in the near future, Japan could drive its civilization to the same level as Western ones, as he commented that "we of course hope for [Japan's] improvement but great social and moral evils are only met by moral cures which unfortunately are plants of slow growth."113 Therefore, he considered it necessary to treat Japan as Britain's pupil, and made efforts to influence Whitehall in agreeing to that direction. By the late 1870s, Britons finally agreed that there should be some amendments in the existing treaty system. The main reason was that from the late 1870s to the early 1880s, the Japanese economy was showing signs that its modernization project was finally bearing fruit. Its economy and industry were becoming increasingly competent (this factor will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter), and it was therefore necessary to find new ways to deal with this power. On 9 July 1879 the Committee of the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce made the following statement to Parkes: "Japan herself has entered to a considerable extent into the spirit of Western advancement and civilization, and may well be congratulated on the progress."114

109 Umetani, Oyatoi Gaikokujin, 92, 103. "o Ibid, 110. 111 Checkland, Britain's Encounter with Japan, 42, 58. H2 Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes, 99. us Ibid, 102. 114 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Japan and Great Britain, Part II, 1878-1879, Report of the Yokohama 37 Under such circumstances, diplomatic representatives of Western states in Japan agreed to hold a conference on treaty revision in Tokyo in 1881. Japan was finally offered a chance to present its proposal for treaty revision in front of Western diplomatic representatives. However, the consensus among British residents in Japan was that the situation was still premature for them to consider the abolition of unequal treaties. In its report to Parkes, the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce added that "[a]s respects the existing Tariff, the Committee have to suggest, as already said, only minor changes... [which are necessary to adjust to the fact that] [v]alues and circumstances have altered since 1866, and thus some readjustment [in mutual tariff agreement] is called for."115 Merchants advocated readjusting the tariff rate to one which the Japanese and British governments had previously agreed, but not the abolition of the unequal treaty itself. Merchants were dissatisfied with the proposal the Japanese put forward, which they saw as too sharp an increase in import tariffs.116 British merchants continued to sense that they were blocked from Japanese markets by Japanese officials, and therefore retained their suspicion toward them.117 Parkes was a tough customer for Japan, not only because of his heavy-handed attitude but also because he was an able diplomat. Parkes managed to prevent the Japanese from achieving their goal, the abolition of unequal treaties, through several means. He continued to send Whitehall correspondence that begged for cautious dealing in the revision issue, and this significantly influenced the perspectives of 1 1 O British decision makers. Also, he was successful in creating a united front of Western powers against the Japanese, resisted Japanese pressure for abolition of unequal treaties jointly by all Western powers, and kept a close eye on other legations so that other Western powers would not break away. In 1878, Japan signed a commercial treaty with the United States that agreed to abolish Japan's tariff dependence, but this was not ratified because of joint diplomatic pressure from Britain,

General Chamber of Commerce in Respect to the Proposed Revision of the Existing Treaties between Japan and the Treaty Powers, in response to an Invitation from Her Britannic Majesty's Minister; Presented to a General Meeting of the Chamber, July 8 1879, FO 410/16. us Ibid. 116 Ibid; British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Japan and Great Britain, Part II, 1878-1879, The Hiogo and Osaka Chambers of Commerce to Sir Harry Parkes, 11 July 1879, FO 410/16. m British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty, Part II, 1878-1879, Report of the Yokohama General Chamber of Commerce, July 8 1879, FO 410/16. n8 Memorandum by Sir Harry Parkes, February 13 1880; Letter to the Lord of Salisbury of the 10th March inclosing Correspondence with Japanese Minister Relative to the New Tariff, both from British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty, Part III, 1879-1880, FO 410/17. 38 Germany, and France.119 Also, Parkes managed to make the Japanese agree that no new treaty could be drawn until the draft would be approved by the conference. This agreement put the Japanese in a difficult position, because now they had to draw up a draft that would be approved by all the treaty powers, which had different opinions 190 and interests among themselves. Merchants in the British home islands also pressured the Foreign Office not to abolish the unequal treaties, and there was increased domestic opposition to the terms of its draft proposals that the conference had agreed upon. As a result, Japan could not achieve its goal of treaty revision at the conference, neither in the preliminary round of 1882 nor in official negotiations that took place in 1886 and 1887. For Japan, the period between 1860 and 1885 was a period of initiation into Western social systems and investment for future expansion, and its investment did not bear fruit until the mid-1880s, although Japanese modernization progressed with impressive speed. The Japanese were fortunate that they could learn from the experience of China, which taught them what not to do against the Western powers, and Japan suffered far less damage from military conflicts in the 1860s and 1870s than did China. Britain attacked the regional forces of Satsuma and Choshu; the Boshin War and the various rebellions of the 1870s were nowhere near the magnitude of the Taiping Rebellion. Also, considering Japan's dependence on Britain in the 1860s and 1870s, Britain had every chance to exploit its power in an aggressive and selfish fashion, but they did not. British leaders had ambivalent attitudes toward opening foreign markets through the use of force, and once Japan followed the rules they defined, they had no wish to bully it.122 Public opinion at home did not demand that such actions happen, and neither did the decision makers. The Japanese were cautious not to drive Western countries to return to the rule of power, nor to be dependent on one nation for advisors, as overreliance on British financial advisors allowed them to dominate the Chinese Maritime Customs Service.123 Events often could have taken a worse form than they did, which would have hampered the revision negotiations. Through a mixture of hard work, discretion on the part of Britain, and fortunate turns of events, the Japanese were able to acquire power that led to some change of attitude on the British side by the early-1880s. Nonetheless, 119 Gaimusho ed., Joyaku KaiseiMondaiNihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol. 2, 586-9. 120 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty, Part III, 1879-1880, Telegraph from the Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Kennedy, February 18 1880, FO 410/17. 121 British Foreign Office, Correspondence with Chambers of Commerce and Mercantile Firms in England in Regard to the Revision of Treaties with Japan, FO 410/20; Gaimusho ed., Joyaku Kaisei Mondai Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol. 2, 583. 122 Beasley, Great Britain, 202; William C. Costin, Great Britain and China, 1833-1860, (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 343. 123 Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, vol. 1, 463. 39 Britons were still determined to prevent the abolition of the unequal treaties, but Japanese power kept on growing in the 1880s, and by the latter half of the decade Britain was no longer able to ignore the pressure from Japan.

40 Chapter 2: Moving toward Revision, 1882-1890

Negotiations on treaty revision did not bear real fruit before the mid-1880s, but nonetheless there were signs of change in British perceptions of Japan. The Japanese were successful in their modernization project and Britons recognised it. Whereas the British representatives in Japan did not think it necessary even to come to the negotiating table over the revision issue in the 1870s, they regarded that as a necessity by 1880, as they saw that Anglo-Japanese relations had changed drastically from twenty years earlier. While this change of perception did not immediately lead to the abolition of unequal treaties, Japan continued to gain more power through its modernization project. By 1887 British diplomats concluded that Japan had become too strong for their country to continue ignoring its demands. They perceived that failure to win the good will of Japanese would damage the commercial relationship between Japan and Britain, because Japan had become too strong for Britain to deal with in the high-handed manner of the previous decade. It was under such circumstances that Britons started to consider yielding to the Japanese demands over the issue of treaty revision. Because of the potential threat that the unequal treaty posed to Japanese sovereignty, the Japanese were not willing to allow foreigners to travel and engage in free commercial intercourse throughout the entire nation. While the Japanese side had nothing to offer Britain in return for abolishing the unequal treaty, revision boded well for future intercourse between Britain and Japan. This became the incentive for Britain to seriously consider revision. Whitehall officially informed the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 July 1890 that it was ready to negotiate treaty revision, with the prospect of abolishing extraterritoriality and granting tariff autonomy. This chapter will follow the further success of Japan's Westernization throughout the 1880s, shifting British perceptions of Japan, and its effect on the process of treaty negotiation.

1882-88: Close, but not yet

Whereas Japan was strongly dependent on foreign products and advisors in the 1870s, by the early 1880s its industry developed to the extent that it slowly drove British goods from the domestic market. By the late 1880s, Japan no longer had to rely on imports for cotton goods and sugar, which were dominated by imports in the previous decade. The share of British imports in the Japanese market was 29.6 percent in 1875, 21% in 1880, and 12.7% by 1890.124 The quantity of British cotton imports into Japan started dropping in 1883, where it reached 47 million yards,

124 Hunter and Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations," 28. 41 compared to 74 million yards in the previous year. As a consequence, the number of British firms in Japan dropped 20 percent from 1880 to 1885, from 108 to 86.126 The British legation took this decline seriously. In 1886 it reported on the cause.

[I]n 1869, [...] Japanese who bought [British] shirtings [...] had no reason to regret doing so, as what was wanting in quality was made up in appearance, and, as compared with the price paid for their own productions, in cheapness. [...] Coming down now to the last seven or eight years, [...] Japanese moka (shirts) will wear for years and years, stand washing witiiout tearing or shrinking, and, when useless for further wear, can be cut up and utilised for household purposes. [British shirts] tear rapidly, they will not stand a single washing, and when their use as linings is at an end, their condition is such that they cannot be applied even to the household purposes for which moka is available. 7

Increasingly, Japanese cotton manufacturers could offer goods that were cheaper and higher in quality than the British competitors, as Britons in Japan increasingly appreciated. During the 1880s, Japanese businesses also started to operate abroad. In the 1870s, British merchants brought manufactured goods produced in their country to Japan, and thus took extra money from Japan as a brokering fee. Japanese elites, concerned about this point, thought it beneficial to develop trading companies that would take over the role of these British merchants. Japanese trading companies, led by government-funded Mitsui and Mitsubishi, increased their share of Anglo-Japanese trade, rising from 13.4 percent in 1880 to 38.1 percent in 1900.128 Also, Japanese shipping companies, led by the Mitsubishi affiliate Nihon Yusen Kisen (NYK), offered cheaper shipping prices within Japanese waters, and the lines moving to and from the Japanese ports; not only did it benefit from the passenger business, it also helped the Japanese cotton industry by being able to transfer raw cotton from India cheaper than before.129 Not only were the Japanese becoming competent industrially, also they were becoming efficient business competitors. Aside from economic progress, Japan made strides towards the establishment of constitutional government. In 1881, the government announced that it would open

125 British Parliamentary Papers, Commercial Reports, 581. 126 Hunter and Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations," 28. 127 British Parliamentary Papers, Commercial Reports, 582. 128 Kanji Ishii, "British-Japanese Rivalry in Trading and Banking," in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol. 4'- Economic and Business Relations, eds. by Janet E. Hunter and Shinya Sugiyama, (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 110. 129 Hunter and Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations," 33-35. 42 the National Diet and issue a constitution. It also was making rapid progress in the establishment of a civil code.1 Little by little, the Japanese were adjusting their society to fit the Western international political-economic system, reaching high levels of competence. Japan's position vis-a-vis British business competitors improved for many reasons. One reason, of course, was the maturation of the Japanese modernization project. Japanese social reforms finally were bearing fruit; Japanese were becoming increasingly competent with industrial technologies, and skilful with management and political administration. Financially, the establishment of the Yokohama Specie Bank in 1880 was an important development. In the 1870s, Japanese did not have a reputable bank which could guarantee its merchants a stable source of currency. No bank could accumulate enough specie to guarantee the quality of paper money, and hence they had to rely extensively on foreign currency and banks, which caused a continuing outflow of wealth from Japan. To solve this problem, the Yokohama Specie Bank was established, and thus made they yen a reputable coinage.131 Since Japan lacked an adequate amount of gold reserves, the yen was put on the silver standard. This made the yen cheaper than the Western currencies which were on the gold standard, but this in turn helped/the Japanese export trade while putting foreign importers into a tougher position. The fact that the price of silver relative to gold was continuously being depreciated during the late nineteenth century enhanced this trend as well, by keeping Japanese prices low.133 In order to understand Japan's success, one should also not forget the disadvantages from which the British merchants suffered. Japan was competing on its own home ground, where its costs for labour and transportation were lower than those for goods produced in Britain and shipped halfway across the world, while Japanese producers also had a better idea of the demands of the market. British merchants in East Asia usually were not those who were flourishing in Europe; they were young and ambitious individuals who were seeking a fortune in any market available to them. They started out with very small amounts of capital. Even in the 1860s and 1870s, they experienced a very high mortality rate: 60 percent of British merchants in Japan experienced bankruptcy; as Japanese industrialization progressed in the 1880s, and British merchants found it harder to keep up with the competition. However, Japan had not acquired sufficient power to enable it to abolish the unequal treaties. Whereas the Japanese economy and industry were becoming

130 George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 3-4; Umetani, Oyatoi Gaikokujin, 86-90. 131 Ishii, "British-Japanese Rivalry in Trading and Banking," 116-9. 132 Hunter and Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations," 18-20. 133 Ibid. i3* Ibid, 10. 43 increasingly competent, from a military perspective Japan showed deficiencies, which seriously limited Japan's national power. Japanese industry was unable to develop, or even to produce under licence, sophisticated weapons. The Japanese navy remained quite weak throughout the 1870s, equipped with obsolete ships, officers promoted through their personal connections with politicians rather than merit, and poor organization. The navy's general staff was not independent from that of the army until 1893. Japan did not engage in serious military reorganization until 1882, when it noticed the rapid naval expansion of China. In the 1880s China, recovering from the destruction caused by two Anglo-Chinese wars and the Taiping Rebellion, acquired some good turret ships like Dingyuan and Zhenyuan which were considered to be the best warships in East Asia at that time. Also, Japan suffered a military setback against China in the early 1880s, over the suppression of insurrections in Korea.1 6 The Imo Mutiny broke out in 1882 as a consequence of political struggle between the conservatives (led by Queen Min and her family) who advocated that they should sustain the tributary relationship with China, and progressives, led by Daewongun, the father of King Kojong, who advocated following the Japanese example and strengthening the country through modernization in order to sustain the independence of Korea. On 23 July 1882, Daewongun launched a coup d'etat (known as the Imo Mutiny) against the conservatives, utilizing his progressive supporters within the army, and the progressives initially succeeded in driving the Min family out of the court. However, Queen Min managed to escape the coup and begged Yuan Shikai, the Chinese representative in Korea, to suppress the progressives. The Chinese army was dispatched to Korea and succeeded in arresting Daewongun. Meanwhile, a portion of the Korean army, joined by bands of rogues, raided the Japanese legation in Korea, killing seventeen members and burning the building. The Japanese government sent an army to protect Japanese residents in Korea and pressured the Korean government to concede some Korean territories as an apology. Japanese eventually backed down because of a joint naval demonstration by China and the United States and agreed to close the case if the Korean government would pay reparations and allow Japan to sustain some military garrisons to protect its legation. But when another insurrection, the Gapsin Coup, broke out in 1884, the Japanese and Chinese armies confronted each other from close quarters. After the Imo Mutiny, Daewongun was taken by the Chinese army to Tianjin and

135 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun- Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997): 19. 136 For the incidents related to Korean insurrections, see Kim, The Last Phase of the Asian World Order, 316-327; C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 33-60. 44 was put under house arrest, and the progressives tried to influence King Kojong directly for support. King Kojong replied favourably to the progressives because he was becoming increasingly disturbed by bis queen's family members taking control of his country, and decided to launch another coup against the conservatives in December 1884. Progressives also secured the support of the Japanese legation and its garrison troops and managed to storm the court. But the Chinese government, which recently lost a war against France over Indochina, mobilized its army to prevent further losses of its sphere of influence, and the conservatives managed to retain the court once again, forcing Japanese troops to withdraw. The Japanese eventually managed to sign the Treaty of Tianjin with China on 1885, which promised that neither Japan nor China would send any military personnel to Korea unless absolutely necessary, and that in such a case both parties were obliged to inform their counterpart before doing so. However, this incident was a setback for Japan, as its military was forced to withdraw in the face of the military superiority of China, and it served as a wake-up call for Japan, making it aware of its strategic inferiority vis-a-vis China. From the early 1880s, Japan worked hard to train officers, reorganize the navy's structure, and purchase more warships, but this did not materialize until the 1890s. The army received a better budget than the navy until 1880s and therefore had better armaments, but its officers suffered from a lack of understanding of the importance of strategic and operational coordination. During the civil war and the domestic insurrections of the 1860s and 1870s, this problem did not cause serious effects, because the foes were small and ill-equipped. As the army acknowledged that China was a formidable threat, however, it started to address this issue; as with the navy, the army's restructuring did not bear fruit until the 1890s. Also, during the 1880s Japanese elites faced an increasingly strong conservative opposition, which managed to weaken the Meiji government to some extent. During the 1870s, Japanese were convinced that in order to modernize their industry, they must recast their entire society. Liberalism was popular, as it was believed to be an ideology that would help Japanese to abandon their feudalist legacy and become modern. However, by the 1880s many Japanese were criticizing the "blind admiration of Western civilizations." As they learned more about the West, Japanese people realized that what they previously had perceived as a single civilization had many variations, which were not always consistent. Particularly important was their increased understanding of Germany. As Germany was peripheral to maritime trade, the Western states that Japan encountered during the 1860s were predominantly Britain, France and the United States, all with parliamentary political system. As the

137 Edward Drea, Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009): 19. 45 Japanese started to send students to Europe in 1870s and learned more about Germany, they found an example of a Western state with an authoritarian socio-political structure. This experience convinced conservatives that a modern society could be based on traditions. They also thought that the liberal philosophy which emphasizes individualism contradicted traditional Japanese virtues of obedience and adherence to society. Japanese conservatives were not advocating a reversion to the feudal era, because they knew that would impede economic modernization, but they thought that Japan should pick and choose those features in Western societies which fit the 1 ^8 Japanese tradition. While the primary goal for conservatives was to reform the domestic social situation, they also raised vocal opposition against the foreign policy of the government over treaty revision. Inoue Kaoru, who became the minister in 1879, concluded from his previous experience that Japan could not achieve the revision of unequal treaties in the near future, and therefore should strive for partial abolition of extraterritoriality and tariff dependence. His proposal for treaty revision, submitted and approved by the government in 1882, advocated that the powers "abolish extraterritoriality, under compromise that they allow foreign judges into the Japanese court." Also, Inoue asked Western negotiators why they thought Japan was not ready for tariff autonomy yet, and asked permission to raise the import tariff rate in order to increase Japan's revenue and protect its domestic market. Representatives of Western nations did not think this demand would have any effect on the Japanese economy. Trade with Japan did not create a huge amount of profit for any Western nation, and by the 1880s Japanese industries were already outcompeting imports. However, Western representatives thought that this situation could become a bargaining chip to gain what they had been demanding from the Japanese government throughout the past decade, namely, approval for foreigners to travel freely outside of the treaty ports and pursue commercial opportunities in the Japanese domestic market. Inoue was not willing to grant full freedom of travel until extraterritoriality was abolished, but he was willing to grant every foreigner the freedom to travel within the interior for a fixed period of time as a compromise. Inoue hoped gradually to achieve treaty revision and put this proposal forward to the Conference on Treaty Revision, which began in 1886. However, conservatives, who already were frustrated by the nation's submission to the West, resented this draft. Conservatives demanded that their government take a tougher stance against the Western powers, including an absolute and immediate 138 Kenneth B. Pyle, "Meiji Conservatism," in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5- The Nineteenth Century, ed. by Marius B. Jansen, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 684. 139 Gaimusho ed., Joyaku KaiseiKankei Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol.2, 2-3, 472. 46 abolition of unequal treaties; some of them wanted unilaterally to denounce the unequal treaties if Western nations would not agree.140 Conservatives rejected Inoue's proposal to grant foreigners partial freedom of travel in the interior as a compromise to raise its import tariff, stating that it would enable foreigners to seize the Japanese economy, while the Japanese tradition would be destroyed if foreigners were allowed to live freely outside the treaty ports.141 This stance did not represent the consensus of the public, but nonetheless some people thought that Japan was not yet ready to open its domestic market completely to foreigners, and therefore, the conservative agenda attracted significant support. 142 Their anti-government activity bore fruit as Tani Tateki, the Minister of Agricultural Affairs and a conservative sympathizer, publicly criticized Inoue's stance for being too compromising; this opposition forced Inoue to resign, and the Japanese government, which could no longer uphold the proposal it had initially proposed, had to end the conference. Okuma Shigenobu, who succeeded Inoue and continued his negotiation tactics, was physically assaulted by conservative extremists; he survived, but lost his leg and resigned his position.143 This was not a simple dispute between government and public, as the conservative opposition was helped by a significant division of opinion within the government. Aoki Shuzo, who succeeded Okuma as Foreign Minister, therefore was forced to accommodate some of the conservative agenda, and dropped the clause to abolish extraterritoriality under the condition of allowing foreign judges into Japanese courts.144 Aoki knew that this new proposal would not be viewed favourably by Western representatives, as it demanded that they abandon extraterritoriality without anything in return, but he had no other choice than to adopt it in order to avoid being assaulted again.145 The link between foreign and internal politics prevented Japanese political elites either from handling the conservatives or foreign powers. In case of Inoue's resignation, the ultimate deathblow came from his colleague in the

140 Richard T. Chang, "The Question of Unilateral Denunciation and the Meiji Government, 1888-92," in Japan in Transition: Thought and Action in the Meiji Era, 1868-1912, (eds. by Hilary Conroy, Sandra T. W. Davis and Wayne Patterson, (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984), 176; Pyle, "Meiji Conservatism," 689-90. 141 Mitsusada Inoue, Keiji Nagahara, Kota Kodama and Toshiaki Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei (The Mainstream of Japanese History), Revised Ed. Vol. 4'-Meiji Kenpo Taiseino Tenkai (Development of Meiji Constitutional System), (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1996), 33; Takashi Sasaki, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. 2i:Meijijin noRikiryo, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2010), 109. 142 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 34; Sasaki, Meijijin noRikiryo, 110. 143 Sakane, Meiji Gaiko to Aoki Shuzo, 110. 144 Ibid, 111. 145 Ibid, 115. 47 government. Facing Japan's successful modernization, there were some signs of changes in British perspectives during the early 1880s. However, most Britons still did not depart from the perceptions that were common in the 1870s, and Japan remained a remote, exotic nation. This is the introductory paragraph of Unbeaten Tracks in Japan, written by Isabella L. Bird in 1880:

This is not a "Book on Japan," but a narrative of travels in Japan, and an attempt to contribute something to the sum of knowledge of the present condition of the country.... From Nikko northwards my route was altogether off the beaten track, and had never been traversed in its entirety by any European. I lived among the Japanese, and saw their mode of living, in regions unaffected by European contact. ...[M]y experiences differed more or less widely from those of preceding travellers; and I am able to offer a fuller account of the aborigines of Yezo, obtained by actual acquaintance with them, than has hitherto been given.... Some of the Letters give a less pleasing picture of the condition of the peasantry than the one popularly presented, and it is possible that some readers may wish that it had been less realistically painted; but as the scenes are strictly representative, and I neither made them nor went in search for them, I offer them in the interests of truth, for they illustrate the nature of a large portion of the material with which the Japanese Government has to work in building up the New Civilisation.14

Bird's work was written in a period when British perceptions of Japan were changing. Bird's travel account, written in 1878, is different from the ones written earlier in the decade because, critical of the fairy tale-like stories about Japan that floated around in British views, she toured the country in order to discover the "real Japan." Her analysis was critical and distinct from some earlier Western perspectives of Japan, which makes her one of the first Britons to depart from an exotic depiction of the Japanese. Whereas Bridge described Japanese peasants as "happier than their peers in those more 'civilized' countries," Bird offered a grimmer depiction. The villagers were "filthy and squalid beyond description..., 'quiver' of poverty so very full... [and] children devoured by vermin."147 Bird was one of the first Britons that to depart from the comforts of cities, enter the "most atrocious trail[s]... with big grey snake, with red spots... [and] large frog," and live under "constant disturbances by heat, mosquitoes and heavy rains." Consequently, she was one of the first not to

146 Isabella L. Bird, Unbeaten Tracks in Japan: An Account of Travels in the Interior, Including Visits to the Aborigines of Yezo and the Shrines of Nikko and Ise, vol. I, (London: John Murray, 1880), vii, ix. i« Ibid, 163. 48 offer a romanticized view of Japan. Bird focused more on a depiction of the real life of rural Japan, than on an evaluation on the success the Japanese were in their modernization project, though she concluded that Japan was on the right track to becoming a civilized nation. 49 In the early 1880s, British perspectives still focused on the exotic elements of Japan, and could not completely discard the older perceptions, as exemplified in the opening song of The Mikado, an operetta by Arthur Sullivan and William S. Gilbert:

If you want to know who we are, We are gentlemen of Japan: On many a vase and jar— On many a screen and fan, We figure in lively paint: Our attitudes' queer and quaint— You're wrong if you think it ain't, oh!

If you think we are worked by strings, Like a Japanese marionette, You don't understand these things: It is simply Court etiquette. Perhaps you suppose this throng Can't keep it up all day long? If that's your idea, you're wrong, oh, oh! If that's your idea, you're wrong.

If you want to know who we are, We are gentlemen of Japan: On vase and jar— On screen and fan, On many, many, many, many, many, many, many, many, ajar, oh! oh! oh! oh! On vase and jar, On screen and fan.150

Even in 1885, the year that this operetta first was performed, such a perspective prevailed, and ordinary Britons at home rarely contacted Japan except "on vase and

148 Ibid, 148, 355. lis Ibid, vol. II, 347. 150 William S. Gilbert and Sir Arthur Sullivan, The Mikado: Or, the Town ofTitipu, (London: George Bell, 1911), 1. 49 jar, on screen and fan." Japan continued to be treated as an exotic nation, and this perception discouraged Britons from treating it as a diplomatic equal.

1888-1890: Real Steps towards Treaty Revision

However, British representatives in Japan started seriously considering treaty revision in 1888. John H. Gubbins, the secretary of the British legation in Tokyo, charged with developing expert knowledge of local issues, wrote to London on 3 January 1888 that,

The shape which... an arrangement [between Japan and Western nations] might take might be...made as a free gift, in recognition of Japan's progress and as an earnest of what may be conceded later on. ...It is true that, as the largest importers, we should suffer most by this proposal, nor must we shut our eyes to the fact that we would gain no immediate or material political advantage; but that we should, in some sense, reap the benefit of our liberality is hardly to be disputed, for while the arrangement, if concluded, would relieve the tension of the situation for Japan, and palliate the sense of injury, more fancied perhaps than real, under which she is smarting, and also pave the way for the creation of a better feeling between Japanese and foreigners, the Power that that proposed it would establish a claim to the goodwill of a nation whose future contains possibilities which cannot be ignored. 5

This memorandum was widely circulated within the British Foreign Office, and Gubbins became an influential figure in official British views of Japan, and treaty revision until the latter was completed. Also, Gubbins's memorandum marks the moment that the Foreign Office started to move towards abolishing the unequal treaty with Japan. Hence, his views merit attention. While Gubbins was more sympathetic to the Japanese in the issue of treaty revision, he nonetheless was a member of the British Foreign Office, who was trained to protect the national interests of Great Britain. From this standpoint, he was examining critically how treaty revision could serve British interests. Gubbins recognized that Japan was not offering anything in return for abolishing the unequal treaty. He correctly argued that this unwillingness derived from the fact that the

151 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, 1888, Memorandum by Mr. Gubbins, January 3 1888, FO 811/5773. 152 Marquis of Salisbury to the Earl of Lytton, April 1888,' Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet, April 1888; Marquis of Salisbury to Sir L. West, March 31 1888. All from British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, 1888, FO 811/5773. Japanese government was too weak to suppress the pressure from conservatives, which Gubbins described as attributable to "the merchant class, [who held a] strong feeling against the admission of foreigners into the interior on any terms whatever, a feeling due...by in large measures to the consciousness of an inability to compete against foreign capital, energy and skill."153 While Gubbins was satisfied by Japan's success on its modernization project, he still thought that its political administration had much room to be improved, and therefore he suggested his superiors in London to remain cautious over the negotiation, not to sign a treaty until they were confident that the government in charge was strong enough to uphold its agreement with Britain. However, despite raising these shortcomings, Gubbins was nonetheless impressed by the overall progress of Japan's modernization, and therefore was willing to start negotiating with the Japanese over abolition of the unequal treaty. His view reflected the growing British recognition of the increase of power in the Japanese side, as Japanese firms were driving foreign competitors out of their domestic market. British merchants hoped that they could change this situation by gaining free access to the Japanese domestic market. Considering the development of the Japanese domestic economy, probably there were few untapped markets for these merchants to find. However, British merchants, striving to survive Japanese competition, saw free access to the domestic market as a key objective. Gubbins, looking for a way to achieve this aim, realized that the Japanese government would not accept such steps until Western nations agreed to abolish extraterritoriality.155 British merchants in Japan remained unwilling to see their government revise unequal treaties, but diplomats from Western nations were becoming increasingly aware that they could not deal with the Japanese in a heavy-handed manner; in order to win concessions from Japan, they had to offer something in return. Gubbins thought that Japan would remain extremely suspicious toward Britain if it would continue to regulate its relationship with Japan through the unequal treaty, and that would cause great inconvenience to Britain in the future, especially because he predicted that Japan's power would continue to grow in the future. Gaining the good will of such a country would be beneficial for long-term interests and failure to do so would cause inconvenience in the future. By the late 1880s, Britons were becoming impressed by Japan's success in modernization to the extent that many of them were departing from seeing Japan as a

153 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, 1888, Memorandum by Mr. Gubbins, Treaty Revision—Part 2, December 30, 1887, FO 811/5773. !54 Ibid. 155 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, 1888, Memorandum by Mr. Gubbins, Treaty Revision - Part I, 30 December 1887, FO 811/5773. 51 remote and exotic nation. An examination on how Britons perceived Japan's progress in modernization requires a study both of evidence on the topic and of theories about inter-cultural perception, particularly in the age of imperialism. Edward W. Said's Orientalism is perhaps the most influential work in this genre. Said essentially argues that all Western people, regardless of their nationality or social background, have historically seen all Oriental cultures and peoples as one, as inferior, and as unchanging. The Orient is not completely a creation of the imagination, and there is in fact a region east of Europe where people's customs are drastically different from those of the west. However, Said argues that Westerners oversimplify these "different" Oriental cultures as inferior, and then distinguish themselves from it, by turning the Orient into an "other." This sense of superiority is shared by social elites, be they political, economic or academic, who possess both real and perceived power within their societies, and can spread this discourse throughout their societies and suppress opinions that do not support their own. These attitudes and ideas coincided with the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, which enabled the West physically to subordinate Asian countries through power, and reinforced those views. Thus, Said argues, over the course of time Westerners started to see all non-Western peoples who possess different physical characteristics and different sets of cultural norms as inferior; a sense of superiority, whether racial or cultural, developed within the Western perception.156 Said's argument attracted widespread attention throughout academia. Many historians who studied inter-cultural interactions applied Orientalism to their field of study, and tested its usefulness. Rotem Kowner, for example, applied Said's theory to his study of Western perceptions of Japan. Kowner argues that Western perspective on non-Western peoples were influenced by a racial discourse, a division of all the peoples of the world into racial groups, especially Caucasian, Mongoloid and Negroid, and the assumption that Caucasians were inherently superior to other peoples with different physical characteristics, such as skin colour. The more similar a non-Caucasian people were to the physical characteristics to Caucasians, the more they were able to act in a civilized manner. Westerners, however, found it difficult to define where the Japanese stood within the rank of races. While their physical characteristics were similar to those of other Mongoloids, none of these Asian peoples were as zealous and efficient in learning Western technologies and customs as the Japanese. This problem increased when the Japanese started to adopt Western technologies and customs. Numerous anthropologists studying the correlation between the Japanese and Caucasian crania concluded that the Japanese had physical

156 This paragraph is a brief summary of Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 52 features similar to Westerners, which explained their ability to acquire some Western technologies and customs. Yet, Westerners did not consider Japan as completely Western. Their physical characteristics were definitely more Asian than Caucasian. The Japanese understood Western customs and technologies well, but they also tended to rely on political violence to solve political problems instead of respecting the rule of law which, the Westerners thought, was a characteristic of the Mongoloid race (but not theirs). Therefore, Kowner concluded that the Japanese were seen as a race "lighter than yellow, but not enough." They were better than many or most non-Western peoples, but not as good as the Caucasian race, and therefore was still a race that should be subordinated by Westerners.157 The argument of Said, and especially Kowner, are of some use in explaining how Britons saw Japanese in the nineteenth century. In the 1860s, when the Japanese were engaged in sonno joi activity, Britons saw Japanese as uncivilized people and British military officers who fought against the Japanese xenophobes described them as "barbarians."158 This image, however, was submerged from the late 1860s, as Japanese withdrew from sonno joi activity. However, Japan mattered little to people in the United Kingdom, who viewed it as a small and exotic nation; not necessarily barbaric, but exotic where people and buildings were small, just like in toyland. Everything in Japan seemed so surreal that Britons did not consider Japan as part of their world. Additionally, Parkes was an old China hand who believed he should treat Japanese as pupils. He often scolded and threatened Japanese decision makers as he would students or children, when he thought they were acting contrary to the British interest. Inevitably, Whitehall's impression of Japan was skewed by his reports-notably, these views began to change after he retired. Japan was seen as a nation decidedly inferior to Britain. However, close examination of the evidence of British perceptions on Japan in the late-1880s exposes the weakness of arguments by Said and Kowner. Where their arguments assume that there was only one unchanging British view of Japan, these opinions in fact changed over this period. While Britons did see Japan as an inferior nation in the 1860s and the 1870s, the perspectives of British decision makers changed after they witnessed the rapid success of Japan's nationwide modernization. In the introduction to Problems of the Far East, Conservative politician George N.

157 This paragraph is a summery of Rotem Kowner's argument on how the Westerners saw Japanese, presented in '"Lighter than Yellow, but not Enough': Western Discourse on the Japanese 'Race,' 1854-1904" The HistoricalJournal, 43:1 (Mar., 2001): 103-131; and "Skin as a Metaphor: Early European Racial Views on Japan, 1548-1853," Ethnohistory 51:4 (Fall, 2004): 751-778. 158 British Parliamentary Papers, Japan, General Affairs, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 13. 159 Yokoyama, Japan in the Victorian Mind, passim. 53 Curzon, who came to Japan in 1887 and 1892, described the purpose of this book as follows:

The work of which I here publish the first part, though the outcome of two journeys round the world in 1887-8 and 1892-3, does not pretend to be a book of travel. Rather is it an attempt to examine, in a comparative light, the political, social and economic conditions of the kingdoms and principalities of the Far East.... In the case of Japan I must confess to having departed widely from the accepted model of treatment. There will be found nothing in these pages of the Japan of temples, tea-houses, and bric-a-brac - that infinitesimal segment of the national existence which the traveller is so prone to mistake for the whole.... [T]hese volumes are part of that scheme of work, ... which ten years ago I first set before myself in the examination of the different aspects of the Asiatic problem..., [in other words,] Russia[n] [expansion] in Far East.160

Curzon toured Japan in order to examine its power, with a clear sense of threat over Russian expansion into the Far East; clearly he did not see Japan as a remote and exotic country. As a Member of Parliament, Curzon's opinion was influential, and therefore his book merits close attention. It starts off by remarking on the industrial progress of Japan by emphasizing that "it is possible to travel by rail within a single day from Tokio to Kioto," that there are "gas flames in some of the principle highways and the electric light is uniformly employed in the public buildings." Curzon assessed the military service, which had faced humiliation earlier in the decade and had never been tested against a foreign power, favourably as well. He was impressed by the navy which totalled forty vessels and 150,000 tons, served by disciplined and efficient seamen and officers.162 He was appreciative of the army as well, quoting Colonel E. G. Barrow who claimed that "[t]he army is not a paper sham, but a complete living organisation, framed on the best models, and as a rule thoroughly adapted to the requirements of the country."163 Curzon, unlike some of the Japanophiles in Britain, did not like every element of Japanese society. He criticised Japan's lack of a parliamentary system, which he thought as the best method to peacefully reconcile the political disputes between interest groups.1 The government would remain weak unless it could adopt a

160 Honorable George N. Curzon, Problems of the Far East, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1894), vii, ix, xi-xii. 161 Ibid, 16. !62 Ibid, 45-6. 163 Ibid, 47. !64 Ibid, 23. 54 parliamentary system. Curzon therefore considered that the National Diet, which opened in 1890, must develop into an effective institution that could resolve political disputes in a peaceful manner.1 5 However, Curzon was not seeing Japan as his countrymen did in the 1860s and 1870s, when Japan was seen as a land where fairy-tales came true and where every resident were so happy and cheerful. Curzon realized that Japanese society faced problems, but nonetheless appreciated Japan's potential and thought that it would become more powerful in future. Curzon summarized Japan's power as following:

Her nimble-witted and light-hearted people, the romantic environment of her past, and the astonishing rapidity with which she is assimilating all that the West has to teach her, have been praised with an indiscriminate prodigality that has already begun to pall, and has not been without its bad effects upon herself... [but] Japan is sure enough of a distinguished and even brilliant future, without being told that she has exhausted the sum of all human excellences in the present. Moreover, a time of internal fermentation lies before her....

Curzon was not in a minority, as many other individuals also made an objective evaluation of Japanese power and concluded that Japan had made a significant accomplishment in transforming into a modernized nation in mere thirty years. Henry Dyer was one of them. He published a book, Dai Nippon, to evaluate Japan's success in modernization, reflecting his experiences as the principal of the Imperial College of Engineering in Tokyo from 1873 to 1882. Dyer published his book in 1904, when the Anglo-Japanese relationship reached its peak after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and when the Japanese were on the verge of war against Russia, but had not yet achieved the stunning successes which changed general opinions. Dyer's comments represent British sympathy towards Japan, an ally that was close to fighting their common enemy, and his comments were perhaps overly appreciative of Japan. However, this book was not written solely to say what the British public wanted to hear. Dyer was sincerely surprised by the pace of Japanese modernization, which he had witnessed himself, and he did think Britain could learn some things from Japan. In preface of his book Dai Nippon, he wrote the purpose of his book as following:

My object in the following pages has not been to give a history of modern Japan or detailed statistics of recent developments... it was rather been to indicate the forces

!65 Ibid. lee Ibid, 394. 55 which have been at work in bringing about what is admitted to be the wonder of the latter half of the nineteenth century; namely, the rise of Japan as a member of the comity of nations, and to note some of the chief results.

Dyer was more appreciative of Japan than Curzon. In the conclusion, he said:

In Japan, as other countries, the developments of industry and commerce have started forces which are causing many serious problems, not only of an economic but also of a social and moral nature, which will require very careful consideration.... My satisfaction at the great success which has attended the work of the students of the Imperial College of Engineering has been damped when I ponder over the problems which lie before Japan, but my consolation has come when I recognise that without that work Japan as a separate nationality would probably have disappeared under the aggression of Foreign Powers.... My own ideas with regard to that future are decidedly optimistic..., Britain should not be above learning a few lessons from Japan.... Those who have had the advantage of them have been fitted to take an active and intelligent part in the great developments which have taken place.... The chief lesson to be learnt from Japan is the need for a truly national spirit for the accomplishment of great ends...168

Where Said and Kowner argue that Westerners viewed all Asians as inferior without exception, the evidence of British perceptions of Japan indicates otherwise. Said reduces all these instances of perception to one case only, a monolithic West observing a monolithic East, without any change in that perception, and with Western attitudes toward all Asians for all time being identical. His model has some power when assessing Western views of Arabs in the nineteenth century, but is less good when extended elsewhere. In particular, it works badly when compared to the evidence oF Western views of Japan. Japan was seen as an inferior nation until the late 1880s, but from that time this image changed, from being an inferior nation to a nation that could take part in the Western system of international relations. Some individuals did continue to see Japan as an inferior nation. British merchants in Japan remained suspicious of Japan's ability to modernize itself and some individuals considered Japan's military expansion in the 1880s as an indication of the people's inability to restrain their violent nature.169 However, there were people who disagreed with that opinion as well. The British perception of non-Western peoples

167 Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, the Britain of the East: A Study in National Evolution, (London: Blackie and Son, 1904), vii. 168 Ibid, viii-ix, 425-6, 428. 169 Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 395. 56 was complex, but Said's model is so rigid that it does not allow any formula other than the "West subordinated the Orientals," and cannot accommodate any complexities. Similarly, Kowner uses the concept of "racism" in a problematical way. Racial discourse did not influence the British perception in a simple fashion. The ideas of some Britons were heavily influenced by racism, others less so, nor were ideas of race uniform. John Ferris and David Cannadine offer better alternatives to Said and Kowner. Ferris argues that a fine line must be drawn between "race" and "national characteristics." Racism must involve a belief that a certain ethnic group possesses physical characteristics, drawn from genetics, which make them superior over those of other races. In British thinking, however, the term race was applied not just to groups like "Caucasians" or "Mongoloids", but also to "French", "Russian and "Welsh". That is, they routinely used the word "race," as a euphemism for "nation." What sound like racist arguments often merely are comments on supposed national characteristics, defined by culture. Although most Britons loosely believed that "race" was real and had some impact on behaviour, generally they explained other people through cultural explanations. Their great problem was cultural ethnocentrism, rather than racism. As a result, they believed that the characteristics, behaviour of people could change. Therefore, they were open to believing that the Japanese could modernize. They were willing to see the outcome of the Japanese project and to change their views on Japan.170 British views of Japan changed over time. Moreover, at any one time there could be many different views of Japan—for British perceptions were not monolithic, but rather varied with different groups. The greatest characteristic of these views was the strong and negative opinions based on extrapolations from real Japanese behaviour in the 1860s, which marked the opinions of British merchants in Japan, who were the only Britons who mattered on Japanese issues down to 1885. Their opinions, however, did not dominate ideas at home. Instead, most Britons had no fixed ideas about Japan at all, and thus were open to developing positive views. Cannadine argues that Britons thought that they belonged in an unequal world characterized as a single hierarchy with layered gradations. His model does not have Said's rigid bipolar worldview, where inferior peoples were to be subjugated and could not become a part of a superior Western society. Cannadine does not deny that racism existed in nineteenth-century Britain; he argues that many Britons placed themselves on top of this hierarchy of peoples, because they believed themselves

170 John R. Ferris, "Turning Japanese: British Observation of the Russo-Japanese War" in Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, Vol. II' The Nichinan Papers, eds. by John W. M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba, (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007): 121. 57 superior to others. However, Cannadine argues, while Britons did consider some nations (mostly Sub-Saharan Africans) as so inferior that they could not be considered anywhere equal to their own, Britons did not dismiss most non-Western nations as irredeemably inferior. They were placed within the lower echelon of the hierarchy of peoples but nonetheless some individuals could emerge from those nations and rise to the higher echelons of the hierarchy; and so too, a nation as a whole could move up 1 71 the hierarchy. Ferris agrees with Cannadine that Britons in the nineteenth century saw the peoples of the world as standing in a single hierarchy, though his argument is slightly different from Cannadine's in a sense that Ferris argues that Britons thought nations could move up and down this hierarchy. The British impression toward Japan's position within their hierarchy also changed significantly throughout the course of the nineteenth century. In the 1860s, when Britons were terrified by xenophobic violence of the Japanese, Britons saw Japanese more as barbarians; however, from the 1870s, this negative image was submerged, and until the late 1880s, Japan was seen as a remote and exotic nation. By the 1890s, that this impression was replaced by a perspective that Japan deserved to be treated as a diplomatic equal. British perceptions of non-Western people usually swung between positive and negative poles, and possessed multiple images of certain nations, both positive and negative. When the positive images prevailed over the negative ones, then the image of a nation would shift toward the positive pole, and consequently up the hierarchy, and vice versa when negative images prevailed.172 These images always were shaped by empirical observations, and experiences. British perceptions of non-Western peoples could change over time, and by the late 1880s the British were convinced that Japan was ready for abolition of unequal treaties. On 19 July 1889, the Foreign Office reported to the cabinet that they supported the move for the following reasons:

The Chinese government would certainly be unwilling to make the changes in their laws and customs which must necessarily precede the abolition of Consular jurisdiction in China. They are anxious to avoid greater contact with the foreigner, and have none of the Japanese craving for being placed on a footing of equality with European natives. They consider that by doing so they would lowering, not raising,

171 This paragraph is a summery and critique of David Cannadine, Ornamentalism'- How the British Saw Their Empire, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 172 This paragraph is a summery and critique of John R. Ferris, "Turning Japanese: British Observation of the Russo-Japanese War" in Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, Vol. II' The Nichinan Papers, eds. by John W. M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba, (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007): 119-134. 58 their position. On these grounds, it has not been thought that the abolition of Consular jurisdiction in Japan would lead to a demand from China for its abolition there.173

Not only did Britons think that Japan had modernized itself so significantly that it deserved to be treated as a diplomatic equal, they also thought that Japan's successful modernization enabled it to distance itself from other East Asian nations. China had not made an effort to raise itself to the same level as Japan and therefore British negotiations with Japan would had no repercussions in the British relationship with China. Also, by the late 1880s, it became more difficult for the individuals who opposed treaty revision to win its sympathy of the decision makers in the Foreign Office and Whitehall. Whereas the anti-revision advocates could find their spokesman to the Foreign Office in Parkes in the 1860s and the 1870s, his successors, Sir Francis Plunkett and Hugh Fraser, were unwilling to treat the Japanese like pupils, as their predecessor had done. Shortly after Plunkett succeeded Parkes, he told the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government was upholding extraterritoriality for the protection of British residents in Japan and therefore was willing to abolish it if the Japanese judicial system could be capable of doing so. While much of this statement was diplomatic lip-service to the Japanese, it nonetheless marked an important change in perceptions. For the first time since the Japanese signed unequal treaties with Britain there was a Resident Minister who had confidence in Japan's capability to modernize itself. Plunkett's predecessors, Parkes and Sir Rutherford Alcock, had both remained extremely doubtful about Japan's potential to do so. Hugh Fraser, who succeeded Plunkett in 1899, was even more convinced that Japan's modernization had prepared it to be treated as a diplomatic equal. He and his wife Mary disliked the "crass ignorance displayed in English accounts of Japan and its history." They argued that,

The English newspapers seem to be as bad as the venerable educating firm; for they are handing round an idiotic story of how the Emperor (they call him the Mikado, a term which is never used here) keeps a beautiful jewelled sword, which he sends to turbulent Ministers when he wishes to have them commit hara-kiri, and take themselves out of his way.... Japanese history is as complicated as Japanese customs, ...[a]nd yet no one in Europe will teach you anything.174

173 British Foreign Office, Japanese Treaty Revision, Provisions of Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction, June 19, 1889, FO 410/27. 174 Mary Fraser, A Diplomatist's Wife in Japan: Sketches at the Turn of the Century, ed. by Hugh Cortazzi, (Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1982; Originally by London: Hutchinson, 59 The Frasers no longer saw Japan as a preserve for exotic customs, but as a nation which changed with complex social composition, just like any nation in the world. The same thing could be said about Gubbins, who served both Plunkett and Fraser as a secretary and believed that Japan had acquired a significant amount of power by 1888 and would continue to do so in the future. Japanese officials and bureaucrats were happy to see an individual with such views as the British Minister, and developed close relations with the Frasers. Thus, Aoki and his wife became friends with the Frasers and Gubbins.175 Fraser fell ill and died in Tokyo two months before Britain and Japan signed the revised treaty, but he had sent Gubbins, to London to support revision of the treaty.176 Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shinbun, a Japanese newspaper, wrote this obituary for Fraser:

The singularly just and impartial views taken by him on all occasions were erroneously supposed by these narrow-minded persons to be unwarrantably friendlyt o Japan.. .unswervingly true to the maintenance of the rights of his country, and in the discharge of his duties, he was always heedless of what outsiders might say about him.. .In private life, he was kind, modest, and reserved, winning the respect and love of everybody, bodi Japanese and foreign, that came into close contact with him. A man of firm resolution, he was never moved from the path of duty by the clamours of his nationals in the settlements...I77

This obituary showed that Japanese thought Frasers' sympathy for Japan affected treaty revision. While it is unclear how influential Fraser was in decisions in Whitehall, his reports definitely were different than those of Parkes. Plunkett and Fraser did not consider that the heavy-handed manner Parkes employed to deal with Japan suited their circumstances. The unwillingness of the British Legation, and subsequently the Foreign Office, to act in a heavy-handed manner made it difficult for the Western nations to act as cohesively against Japan on issues of treaty revision as they had done when Parkes was in office. Other Western nations were finding fewer incentives to maintain a united front, and the Japanese were becoming efficient in exploiting this weakness as

1899), 30. 175 Ian Nish, "John Harrington Gubbins, 1852-1929," in Britain and Japan, Biographical Portraits, vol. II, ed. by Ian Nish, (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Society Publications, 1997), 108. 176 Ibid, 109. 177 Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shinbun, 6 June 1894. Extracted from Sir Hugh Cortazzi, "Hugh Fraser, Minister to Japan, 1889-94" in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, vol. 4, (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library Publications, 2002): Chapter 4. 60 well. The Japanese disliked the inconvenience of negotiating with all Western representatives at once during the Tokyo Conference, and thus Japanese Foreign Ministers told their ministers abroad to negotiate with each nation separately, which strengthened its bargaining position. Inoue was already advocating this approach in 1881. Although his attempt was unsuccessful due to Parkes's determination to sustain a united front, it became increasingly problematic for Britain after his departure. France, for example, informed the Japanese government on 31 August 1883 that it was ready to consider treaty revision if Japan would support the French military campaign in Annam (present day Vietnam).178 This suggestion was put forward partly because France was having a tough time defeating the coalition of Vietnamese and Chinese armies, but the French withdrew the suggestion after they prevailed in Vietnam.179 However, this example showed that there were differences of interests among Western nations. Other Western nations involved in East Asian politics to a lesser extent than France had little incentive in opposing treaty revision, as once had been the case when Parkes was in Tokyo. Once he left Tokyo and was succeeded by much more pro-Japanese ministers, there was no reason for them to pursue the same attitude. When the Japanese government announced to foreign legations that they would like to reopen the negotiation on treaty revision on 28 January 1889, the American, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian ministers replied almost immediately that they were ready to do so on the basis of the draft Japan had presented; in the case of the United States, they went as far as promising to sign the draft as a treaty if all other Western powers would agree to do so.180 Germany was somewhat more cautious, as its decision makers had reservations about Western powers negotiating separately with Japan, but nonetheless they were not against the draft proposal itself. Germany eventually decided to negotiate on its own, and agreed on 11 June to sign the draft proposal as a treaty if Britain would do so.181 The perceptions of the British elites were changing, by the late 1880s, and fewer individuals were willing to treat Japan in a heavy-handed manner as they did in previous decades. This change of perspective had several roots. One reason was

178 Gaimusho ed., Joyaku Kaisei Kankei Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol.2, 301-2. i™ Ibid. 180 British Foreign Office, Japanese Treaty Revision, Provisions of Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction, June 19, 1889, FO 410/27; British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, December 1888,and January to December 1889, The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Trench, January 28, 1889, FO 410/28. 181 British Foreign Office, Japanese Treaty Revision, Provisions of Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction, June 19, 1889, FO 410/27; British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, December 1888,and January to December 1889, Mr. Fraser to the Marquis of Salisbury, June 13, 1889, FO 410/28. 61 that by the late 1880s Britons at home knew more about Japan than they did in the past. In the 1860s and the 1870s, Britain remained a remote nation. There were very few Japanese in Western nations; and they were unfamiliar with Western social customs, which left many Westerners to see Japanese as uncivilized people. However, by the late 1880s, many Japanese, including diplomats, students and businessmen, lived in Europe, and showed refined manners. Of course, as Bousquet remarked, these individuals were exceptions rather than the rule; the Japanese at home were less familiar with Western customs and less refined in Western social manners as their countrymen abroad. However, these refined individuals could impress the British at closer quarters: For example, Aoki Shuzo married Elisabeth von Rhade, daughter of a German noble, when he was the Japanese Minister to Germany, and 1 89 therefore became familiar with many German aristocrats. Many Japanese were in Britain, as it was the most important trading partner of Japan. Companies such as Mitsui Bussan already opened offices in London by the late 1870s, and by the 1880s Japanese businessmen increasingly worked in London as their trading companies started to work in the world; outcompeting some British competitors, these businessmen were received positively by British society. The Japanese appreciated their hospitality, and also the fact that many British factories and shipyards took Japanese apprentices, who later played important roles in their nation's modernization. Before the late 1880s, Japanese apprentices and students of both companies and schools often were ridiculed for their lack of understanding of Western customs; by the late 1880s, as Japanese became familiar with the West, these criticisms withered away.184 Westerners in Europe slowly started to treat Japanese as people who understand their norms. Nonetheless the biggest cause for the change in British perspectives toward Japan came from changing international circumstances. While Japanese power had improved significantly because of nationwide modernization, it was still weak compared to Britain and Japan could not achieve treaty revision against British will. These bilateral relations were affected by a multilateral context. Russians began territorial expansion into East Asia from the late 1880s. Britain considered this development as a threat to its interests in this region, and started to consider Japan as a potential partner that could cooperate against this threat. They started to examine Japan's power to influence Far Eastern diplomacy rather than its exotic culture, and concluded that Japan had acquired power through its modernization. This view was

182 Ottmar von Mohl, Doitsu Kizoku no Meiji Kyuteiki (A Diary of German Aristocrat in Meiji Court, the Japanese Translation of Am Japanischen Hofe), trans, by Seiya Kanamori, (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Oraisha, 1988), 3. 183 Hunter and Sugiyama, "Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations," 22-3. 184 Checkland, Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 135, 152.161, 169. 62 shared by the Royal Navy. Captain John Ingles, who was sent from the Royal Navy to Japan from 1887 to 1893 as the naval advisor, was critical about the limitations of the officers in tactics. However, he was satisfied at how efficiently Japanese seamen 1 R^ used modern weapons, and also noted that their capability in tactics had improved. Britons, both decision makers and the public, were impressed by Japanese progress in political, military and economic elements. In the 1870s, Britons were pressed by Japan's exotic aestheticism; from the late 1880s, they started to examine its potential as a power, and Japan received a favourable evaluation in this realm as well. Britain did not see Japan as a great power in East Asia; it was seen merely as a nation that was still moving into second rate status even on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War. However, Britons saw that the Japanese were sufficiently powerful to be able to affect British interests in Far East. Japan no longer was seen as a nation that could and should be subordinated. These attitudes shaped Whitehall's willingness to negotiate treaty revision on 15 July 1890. The unequal treaties were supported by Westerners until the latter half of the 1880s, when the memories of xenophobic violence were still fresh in their minds. There was strong suspicion towards the Japanese, and Western governments feared that the abolition of extraterritoriality might threaten the security of foreign residents in Japan. This fear made Britons reluctant to revise the treaties. However, from about 1888, Britons started to perceive the unequal treaties as a liability for the Anglo-Japanese relationship, as hampering British commercial interests, and also a broader Anglo-Japanese relationship. Due to the potential harm that unequal treaties posed towards Japanese sovereignty, Japanese decision makers were determined not to allow Westerners out of treaty ports until the unequal treaties were abolished, which limited British merchants' access to the domestic Japanese market. Even more, the Japanese retained strong suspicion towards Britain as long as it tried to regulate the Anglo-Japanese relationship through unequal treaties. The Japanese had nothing to offer Western nations in return for abolishing unequal treaties, but British decision makers nonetheless started to consider abolition to be worthwhile, because it would change attitudes in the long run. By the 1880s, western ideas were changing toward Japan in three different areas; its acquisition of western civilization, its economic performance, and its military power. These matters, of course, were not absolutely distinct—all three, for example, were affected by the Japanese ability to acquire and use modern technology. Moreover, the most important of these changes of ideas occurred in the minds of just 185 Michio Asakawa, "Anglo-Japanese Military Relations, 1800-1900," in The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 3' The Military Dimension, eds. by Ian Gow and Yoichi Hirama with John Chapman, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 25; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 13, 18. 63 a few people, essentially British diplomats in East Asia and strategic decision makers at home. By 1885, Japan clearly had adopted many customs which westerners thought were essential for civilisation, and shed others that seemed barbaric. Compared not merely to non-Western countries, but even to many Western ones, Japan was an ordered, cultured, lawful and peaceful country. Its economic performance also was notable, both as a market and a competitor, while western experts increasingly thought that its military services were good, certainly by non-Western standards. Together, these developments boosted Japan's power, and also its bargaining position on the issue of tariff reform.

64 Chapter 3: The Last Stage of Negotiation, 1890-1894

Her Majesty's Government expressed its willingness to negotiate the treaty with Japan on 15 July 1890. By this stage, Britons were sincere in their willingness to abolish the unequal treaty, as they indicated they were willing to abolish extraterritoriality and tariff dependence in draft proposals that they handed to the Japanese. This change in attitude stemmed from the fact that British decision makers were impressed by the success of Japanese modernization, but that was not the only reason. The maturation of Japanese power coincided with the beginning of renewed Russian expansion into the Far East. After signing the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1891, Russia showed signs of interest in expanding its empire eastward, such as its proposal to build the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Yet, Britain had established interests in East Asia by protecting a free trade network with unequal treaties and the Royal Navy. Many British decision makers saw Russian expansion into East Asia as a challenge to their interests. As Whitehall was determined to resist this challenge, East Asia became a field of confrontation between Britain and Russia. Since Japan already had acquired a significant amount of strength through its successful modernization and was a regional power of note, it had some influence in Britain's global policy.186 Yet, after Britain's offer of 1890 for the equal treaty, it took another four years until the equal treaty, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, was signed. Part of this delay stemmed from the time lag caused by slow communication. The British legation in Tokyo and London were connected by cable, but the Foreign Office usually discouraged its use in order to minimize costs. Since treaty revision was neither a high priority issue for the Foreign Office nor one requiring speedy action in 1890, London and Tokyo communicated through mail, which took five to six weeks to reach its destination one way.187 This delay, however, was attributable mostly to the series of political crises that the Japanese government faced in the early 1890s. These crises first confused the ability of the government to pursue any policy at all, and then made treaty revision into a matter of domestic politics. From 1890 to 1893, the Japanese government was busy dealing with opposition from within the newly

186 T. G. Otte is the historian who has conducted the most recent research on British Far Eastern policy. See, for example, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905, (London: Oxford University Press, 2007). L. K. Young, British Policy in China, 1895-1902'(London: Oxford University Press, 1970) and William C. Costin, Great Britain and China, 1833-1860, (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), retain some value. 187 Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance^ The Diplomacy of Two Island Nations, (London: Athlone Press, 1966), 6; British Parliamentary Papers, Japan, Part 3'- General Affairs, Sessions 1871-99, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971). 65 opened National Diet, which caused the resignation of the Yamagata and Matsukata cabinets. Additionally, public opinion was showing increased resentment of the slow progress of revision negotiation. On 11 May 1891 this frustration exploded when Crown Prince Nicholas of Russia (later Tsar Nicholas II), who was visiting Japan, was assaulted during a parade at the city of Ohzu by the Japanese guard. After the Ohzu Incident, the Japanese government requested an indefinite postponement of negotiations over revision, as Japanese decision makers thought that it could be resumed only after settling domestic opposition. It took until December of 1893 for the Japanese government to weather this opposition. Japanese decision makers feared that Britain would reconsider its decision to revise the unequal treaty, if it felt that Japan was too barbaric to remove extraterritorial legal protection from foreign residents. This fear made Aoki Shuzo lament in his diary that "twenty years of hard work on treaty revision might have been ruined by this instant," when he learned about the Ohzu Incident.188 However, British decision makers never considered their policy on treaty revision after 15 July 1890. The closest they came to taking such actions were in December 1893 and July 1894, when they decided temporarily to delay negotiations, because of news that British nationals were harassed by Japanese. However, the intent was to convey a message to Japan, rather than to abandon negotiation on treaty revision. These negotiations were concluded on 16 July 1894 when the revised treaty was signed. Events between 1890 and 1894 forced Japan and Britain to delay negotiation on revision, as Japanese had to prioritize other political issues, namely, dealing with domestic opposition, over that topic. These events, however, also indicate how important the issue of treaty revision was to the Japanese public, and also illustrate how British perspectives about Japan had changed. Japanese politicians, both in government and the opposition, knew that to achieve treaty revision, they must convince the Western world that their society had made a transition from traditional to modern. Political disputes between the government and opposition between 1890 and 1894 were fierce, but by and large the debate was conducted in an orderly fashion, so as not to make Western observers think that Japanese could not respect the rule of law. Meanwhile, by 1894 Whitehall no longer saw Japan in an Orientalist manner, as it had done in previous decades. British decision makers did not consider Japan a major power, but they did see it as a state with some influence in regional politics. Their views of Japan were not entirely favourable, but that was because they offered a critical analysis of what Japan could and could not do, rather than because they saw Japanese as inherently inferior. Their positive assessment of Japanese capabilities and modernization was the major reason Britons agreed to sign a treaty with Japan on

!88 Sakane, Meiji Gaiko to Aoki Shuzo, 88. 66 an equal basis.

1890 to 1893: Crisis from Within

The Japanese government of the Meiji era was dominated by the oligarchs who led the political struggle that overthrew the Tokugawa regime in 1868. From the mid-1870s, however, there were increased opposition to this political system dominated by a few individuals, who demanded that the government open itself up to other, non-oligarch leaders. This movement developed into Jiyu Minken Undo (Liberal and People's Right Movement).189 As nationwide modernization progressed in 1880s, the literacy rate in Japan steadily increased, alongside the number of newspapers. These developments led to an increased public awareness of political issues, which put pressure on the government. Both Inoue Kaoru and Okuma Shigenobu had to resign in the face of public pressure and, in Okuma's case, of personal attack by a political activist. The Meiji oligarchs knew that they faced a threat, and needed some means to avert it. Hence in 1890 the government issued a constitution and opened the National Diet. The constitution guaranteed freedom and equality under the rule of law to every citizen, rich or poor.190 The Diet gave the public an avenue to express their political opinions through representatives chosen through election. This system could not be called democracy. Only men who paid more than fifteen yen of annual tax were eligible to vote, and less than five percent of the population fitted into this category.191 Also, the Diet had limited authority. Under the constitution, the emperor had the last word in every political dispute, while he and the government, which was to assist his decision making, were more powerful than the Diet; the Diet was to be opened only after the Emperor decided to do so, and he could disband it when he thought necessary; every proposed law passed by the Diet had to be approved by the emperor and cabinet; the cabinet had to have the Diet's approval to pass the regular budget, but article 67 of the constitution declared that the Diet could not object to special budgets issued under imperial approval.192 From the perspectives of the Meiji oligarchs, the purpose of opening the Diet was to strike a compromise with the public, providing an avenue for other people to express their voice in politics, so that they would not challenge the rest of the system. While the power that the Diet possessed vis-a-vis the government at this time was far weaker than that which Westminster had in Britain, still the Japanese government had to deal sensitively with the Diet if it wanted

!89 Vlastos, "Opposition Movement," 402, 406, 408. 19° Beasley, "Meiji Political Institutions," 664. i9i Ibid, 665. 192 Ibid. 67 to avoid a public outrage. In fact, the government was quite vulnerable to the Diet's demands, especially in the first sessions, when it lacked experience in dealing with political opposition. As a result of the first general election on 1 July 1890, 171 out of 300 seats in the Lower House were won by Jiyuto (Liberal Party) and Kaishinto (Progressive Party), two parties that advocated Minryoku Kyuyo, which meant "nourish power by giving the people a rest." Since the Meiji Restoration, the government had financed its nationwide modernization project through heavy taxation. These two parties argued that the people were on the verge of exhaustion. Jiyuto and Kaishinto emphasized the need to give the people a break and nourish their power by cutting taxation. In order to do so, they stressed the need to cut national revenue and expenditure.193 However, the government, engaging in projects for military expansion to counter the threat of China, could not accept the Diet's request to cut revenue. Soon after the first Diet session opened on 29 November 1890, Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo and Financial Minister Matsukata Masayoshi made speeches, which emphasized the need to bolster the defence budget so to counter the threat of China and Russia.194 Meanwhile, Diet politicians established a Budget Committee, which proposed cutbacks of 11 percent from the demands of Yamagata and Matsukata.195 This proposal was put to the Diet on 8 January 1891. On the next day Matsukata responded that the government could not approve this proposal. The budget question developed into a political battle between the government and Diet, especially over the interpretation of article 67, as some Meiji oligarchs considered the option of putting military spending under the category of "special budget." Article 67 read:

Those already fixed expenditures based by the constitution upon the power appertaining to the emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet, without the concurrence of the

t 196 government.

The Diet could not reject or reduce special budgets, or "fixed expenditures" that "may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the government," without the consent of the government. However, the constitution did not clarify what kind of budget fit this category. After lengthy debate on the topic,

193 Sasaki, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. 21, 64. 194 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, Revised Ed. Vol. 4, 5. 195 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 11. 196 Translation of constitution article 67 from ibid. 68 the Diet and the government struck a compromise that the executive possessed the right to designate an extraordinary budget from the draft proposals prepared by each house of the legislature. While this compromise did not mean that Diet politicians would agree with what the government designated as extraordinary expenditure, at least they could agree on what to debate about. In this first session, the debate over the budget did not cause a political crisis, as the Diet and government reached a compromise. While the government accepted a cutback in its demands, the Diet agreed to limit the reduction to a mere ¥6,510,000, instead of the ¥8,880,000 yen that it initially proposed.197 This compromise had several roots. Not all the Diet politicians were hardliners. Although both Jiyuto and Kaishinto advocated a cutback of taxation, not all their members thought that cutting revenue was needed to achieve this goal. Some members of Jiyuto argued that the budget itself was not the cause for the exhaustion of the people; instead, the current level of taxation stemmed from the extravagant spending of the government. If that extravagance was ended, tax reduction could naturally be achieved.198 This faction distanced itself from their hardline colleagues and accepted the government's proposals. Hardliners criticized this faction for betrayal. Certainly, part of the reason these moderates swung their support to the government was because they were bribed by the government; this faction later left Jiyuto and established a new party, the Jiyu Club (Liberal Club), which the government utilized to pass their resolutions passed through the Diet.1 However, these hardliners did not necessarily represent the mainstream of Jiyuto and Kaishinto either. Many members knew that the government could not accept their initial proposal for cutbacks, and did not even think it was necessary. Most members of the Diet were willing to uphold the military budget that the government requested, as they recognized the need for military expansion to counter the threat of China, which could not be achieved if they pursued their initial proposal for cutbacks.200 Significant parts of the Jiyuto and Kaishinto parties did sympathize with Jiyu Club's conciliatory approach, which would enable them to maintain the military budget while gaining a partial success for their agenda on a reduction of taxation.201 Another reason for compromise was that both the Diet and government wanted to avoid dissolution of the session. If Jiyuto and Kaishinto insisted on the initial proposal, then the government might dissolve the Diet, which would have achieved

197 Ibid, 80; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 68. 198 Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 64-5. 199 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 86. 200 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 5. 201 Ibid, 9. 69 nothing in its first session. Party politicians agreed with the government that Western observers were watching Japan's experiment with the Diet, to see whether if it would become the first non-Western nation to succeed in such a task. The Ottoman Empire was the first Asian nation to draw a constitution in 1876, but suspended it when the Russo-Turkish War broke out two years later. Japanese politicians, both in the Diet and government, feared that dissolution might convince the West that Japan was just another Oriental nation, unable to modernize. Kaneko Kentaro, a protege of Meiji oligarch Ito Hirobumi, recalled about the first Diet session:

Then certain European people ridiculed the idea of Japan adopting a constitutional government, saying that a constitutional government is suitable only for the cool-headed people of northern Europe.... So it was thought that if the Diet was dissolved in its very first session, unpleasant comments would be made by foreign critics. And, in consequence, a compromise was effected between the government and the Diet.202

Kono Hironaka, the president of Jiyuto, agreed with Kaneko:

[The relationship between the Diet and government in the first Diet session] can be described as something similar to that of two beautiful women trying to attract a handsome man. Two beauties (i.e. Diet and government) hated each other, but since they did not want to lose the favour of a handsome man, they did not let their mutual hatred to show. Who was this handsome man? It was the Westerners.

Many Japanese politicians thought that dissolution of the Diet would leave a negative image for Westerners, which would hamper efforts to achieve their diplomatic goal of winning complete independence. Although Yamagata managed to strike a compromise with the Diet, still he was shocked by the fact that the government had been forced to yield to public opinion. He resigned his position on 6 May 1891. The Emperor asked Ito, the most influential Meiji oligarch, to succeed Yamagata. However, Ito refused this request. He predicted that the next government could not last long, and would exist essentially as an interim administration for the following one. Ito had many political rivals, including some who wanted to assassinate him, which would cause an immense political crisis as when Okuma was attacked. He did not think that running the next

202 Excerpt from Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 84. 203 Excerpt from Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 69. 70 government was worth that risk. Saigo Tsugumichi and Yamada Akiyoshi, the other notable oligarchs, also refused that post, lacking confidence that they could manage the Diet. 205 This left no other option but to appoint Matsukata as the Prime Minister. While Matsukata was known to be one of the best financial specialists among the oligarchs, many of his colleagues questioned his competence as a politician. He often was criticized for lacking firmness and being easily influenced by his colleagues.206 Additionally, five days after Matsukata ascended to his position, the Ohzu Incident shook the nation. On 11 May 1891, Crown Prince Nicholas was assaulted by a Japanese policeman who was supposed to be guarding him. For the Japanese government, which wanted to show that it was civilized, this incident was a scandal. It also led to a significant diplomatic crisis with Russia. The nation was terrified by the prospect that the Russia would attack Japan; this danger was averted but Aoki Shuzo, who was foreign minister in the Matsukata government, had to resign his post. Thus the Matsukata government started out in a difficult situation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Whitehall that negotiation on treaty revision would be postponed indefinitely. The government also was plagued by internal conflict after the settlement of the Ohzu Incident. Given their lack of confidence in Matsukata, many Meiji oligarchs turned down the offer to enter his cabinet. As a result, it was filled by individuals with little experience as politicians, whereas big names like Ito and Yamagata remained outside. The government became vulnerable to the influence of individuals outside the government, and in particular had to rely on behind-the-scene advice from Ito.207 The lack of strong leadership caused confusion within the cabinet. On 12 August, Ito decided to establish a Political Affairs Bureau, which would possess authority on matters of policing, censorship, and intelligence.208 Previously, these roles had been undertaken by the Ministry of Interior, but by the 1890s each department in Japan developed into an institution of professional bureaucrats, which were independent from external intervention.209 Ministers, including the Minister of Interior Shinagawa Yajiro, increasingly acted as the spokesmen of bureaucracy in cabinet, which increasingly became a field for

204 Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 70. 205 Ibid, 71. 2°e Ibid. 2°? Ibid, 73. 208 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 94,' Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 77. 209 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 93>' Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol 4, Revised Ed., 14; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 77-8; Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 14. 71 inter-bureaucratic rivalry. Ito, considering this situation dangerous, hoped to overcome it through the Political Affairs Bureau.210 However, this decision caused a significant resentment from the Ministry of Interior, which had to yield its powers over policing, censorship and espionage to the Political Bureau, especially when Ito made Mutsu Munemitsu, the Minister of Agricultural Affairs, head of the bureau. 2U Significant tension emerged between Shinagawa and Mutsu as a result of this relationship. They also fought over another debate that rose within the government, regarding the interpretation of constitution article 67. Since the previous government had held the defence budget to the amount it wished, Matsukata thought that it should be presented to the next Diet session as part of the regular budget; Ito agreed, as did Mutsu, his protege.212 However, Yamagata argued that since the government had agreed to cut budget expenses, it should request the Diet to place defence matters under the category of the special budget. Since Shinagawa was a protege of Yamagata, another round of confrontation commenced between Mutsu and Shinagawa.213 The feud exposed Matsukata's lack of political skill. He decided not to take an active role in this struggle, which Ito took as a betrayal. Therefore he withdrew his support from the government right before the opening of the second Diet session.214 Meanwhile, Jiyuto and Kaishinto created a unified front; they took a less conciliatory approach, and advocated a drastic reduction of taxation.215 Since the pro-government parties in the Diet were fragmenting, they could not effectively check Jiyuto and Kaishinto.216 Therefore, the government had to expect a more hostile environment in the second Diet session. The government also took a harder attitude toward the Diet, thinking that its earlier approach had been too soft. The second session attracted less international interest than had the first session, and therefore both the Diet and government were less fearful of dissolution. 7 The second Diet session began on 1 December 1891 and was dissolved on 25 December. The Diet and government took uncompromising attitudes toward each other. The third session, which was to replace the previous session that ended

210 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 94; Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 14; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 77-8. 211 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 14; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 77-8. 212 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 14. 213 Ibid. 214 Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 78. 215 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 98; Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 15. 216 Ibid. ™ Ibid, 12, 16. 72 prematurely, opened on 2 May, 1892. However, the government under the leadership of Shinagawa was accused of intervening in the general election before this session to influence the outcome. Many members of anti-government parties were arrested, harassed, or killed; 83 people died and 388 were injured.218 While this purge enabled pro-government parties to win a majority of seats, it also led to a polarization of opinion.219 Even some members of pro-government parties started to show sympathy toward the opposition. Mutsu and Goto Shojiro, the Minister of Communication, claimed that the government could sustain the public support only by fully investigating this issue and punishing those responsible for this fiasco. Under these circumstances, the Japanese government could not pass the proposed additional budget for naval expansion. After the third session, Matsukata resigned on30Julyl892.221 After Matsukata's failure to control the party politicians, the oligarchs concluded that they must end the polarization between government and Diet. The government feared that continued marginalization of the Diet would produce a serious crisis, and a loss of popular support; however, it also felt the need to crack down on the Diet, which was stalling progress on the government's project to create "strong army, wealthy nation."222 It held that sensitive use of carrots and sticks were needed to control the Diet, and that the intra-cabinet feud that had emerged within the Matsukata cabinet could not be repeated. The oligarchs concluded that only Ito could achieve these ends, and Ito agreed to become Prime Minister on condition that all the Meiji oligarchs entered the cabinet and shared responsibility with him. The oligarchs agreed to do so. All the oligarchs who had refused to join the Matsukata cabinet, including Oyama Iwao, Kuroda Kiyotaka and Inoue Kaoru, joined Ito's cabinet; even Yamagata, Ito's political rival (and paradoxically, close friend) agreed to serve the cabinet as Minister of the Army. After Ito strengthened the cabinet, he turned his attention to the Diet. Ito believed that the anti-government attitude of Jiyuto and Kaishinto derived in part from a desire to meet the demand of their supporters, but also because party leaders wanted to enter the government.224 Until then they would act without compromise. Ito showed

218 Ibid, 19;Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 98. 219 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 98, 100; Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 19; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 81. 220 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed.,19', Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 81. 221 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 15. 22. 222 Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 99. 223 Ibid, 94. 224 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 73 some willingness to meet the demands of party politicians, and faced oligarchs and bureaucrats opposed to this idea less than before, as the government's attempt to take a tougher stance toward the Diet clearly had backfired. He fired the bureaucrats who were responsible for violence during the general election preceding the third Diet session, and also considered the idea of establishing a political party to act as a mediator between government and anti-government parties in the Diet (although this plan did not materialize until later in the 1890s).225 This softening of attitude was sensed by the party politicians, whose attitude toward the government also was modified. In the party assembly held on 15 November 1892, Itagaki Taisuke, the president of Jiyuto, declared that while his party would continue to challenge the government and bureaucracy on issues of extravagant budgets, it would not attack government policies themselves, as "policies on the people's livelihood, education, diplomacy and defence are national interests, and should transcend politics."226 Nonetheless, in the fourth Diet session, which opened on 29 December 1892, the Diet refused to approve the government's request for an additional naval budget until it tackled the issue of corruption that plagued the navy administration.227 As the Diet did not yield on this issue, the government asked the emperor to mediate this issue. The Meiji Emperor declared the "Decree of Mediation," which placed military spending under the category of the special budget, but required the government to reduce the number of bureaucrats so to reduce expenses.228 By this imperial decree, the interpretation of constitution article 67 became undisputable, and the government secured the military budget, not only for this Diet session, but also for future ones. Meanwhile, Diet politicians gained some objectives, as this decree ordered the government to restructure the bureaucracy. Additionally, Jiyuto leaders appreciated the government's willingness to compromise, which increased their chances to enter , 229 the government. While the government was able to compromise with Jiyuto, new anti-government parties emerged by the fifth Diet session, which opened on 28 November 1893. Japan restarted treaty negotiation with Britain in September 1893, but its proposals

24. 225 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 108; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 99. 226 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 23; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 99. 227 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 19; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 100. 228 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 108! Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 19Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 103. 229 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 26; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 103-4. 74 did not sit well with the domestic conservatives. As part of treaty revision, Japan offered to guarantee freedom of residence and travel of foreigners across the country. Conservatives rejected this compromise, stating that it would enable foreigners to seize control of the Japanese economy, while the Japanese tradition would be destroyed if foreigners could live freely outside the treaty ports.230 These conservatives established several political parties, including Dai Nihon Kyokai (Great Japanese Association), to push this agenda in Diet, and Kaishinto also moved towards this direction. ' This stance did not represent the consensus of the public, but nonetheless some people thought that Japan was not yet ready to open its domestic market completely to foreigners, and therefore, the conservative agenda attracted many votes.232 If this agenda passed the Diet, it would reduce Britain's willingness to renegotiate the treaty and also leave the impression that the Japanese government was weak. Thus diplomatic issues and domestic politics became intertwined. The government's objective in the fifth Diet session was largely to prevent it from supporting the conservative agendas. In December 1893, British public opinion was concerned when newspapers reported that a British missionary had been harassed by a mob in Japan, raising the issue of the personal security of Westerners in that country.233 Aoki ShuzS, who was serving as Minister to London, warned Mutsu that the government must crack down on anti-foreign rallies and press in Japan. 234 Mutsu agreed with this recommendation and consulted Ito, who had the Ministry of the Interior and the Political Affairs Bureau warn off these movements, and prepare police forces to halt further such actions.235 While this cabinet and bureaucracy were determined, the parties could not muster a united front as they had during the second and third Diet sessions. Jiyuto already had moderated its policy, and was further massaged by Mutsu Munemitsu and Goto Shqjiro, the Foreign and Agricultural Ministers, who knew party leaders from their experience as Jiyu Minken Undo activists; Mutsu and Goto both believed they could lead their former colleagues to prevent the

230 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 33; Sasaki, Meijijin noRikiryo, 109._ 231 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 33; Sasaki, Meijijin noRikiryo, 110-1. 232 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 34; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryo, 110._ 233 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 34; Perez, Japan Comes of Age, 113^4. 234 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 35! Perez, Japan Comes of Age, 95. 235 Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 35; Perez, Japan Comes of Age, 95. 75 conservatives from passing their agenda. The conservative parties, with only 130 out of 300 seats in the Lower House, could not mount an effective lobby.237 The government was able to block their pressure throughout 1894, which created space in which it could negotiate treaty revision. The Ohzu Incident of May 1891 forced the Japanese government to suspend negotiations over treaty revision, and domestic politics did not allow it to lift that suspension until September 1893. During this period, however, the issue of treaty revision significantly influenced Japanese politics. Although the government and Diet fought intensely over the budget in the first three Diet sessions, they did so with restraint, for many reasons. Some party leaders who started out in the opposition moderated their policy because they were bribed, or hoped that would open an opportunity to enter the government. The oligarchs knew that they must retain popular support, and understood the danger of a political crisis that might arise as a result of the marginalization of the people, as the hostile populace and the Diet plagued the Matsukata administration. All of these actions, however, were shaped by a desire not to lead Westerners to believe that Japan disrespected the rule of law, and therefore to reject an equal treaty. Despite significant splits between the government and the Diet over the draft proposal of the revised treaty, all agreed that revision of the treaties was necessary. By 1894, the political polarization between the government and Diet was softened, and produced an atmosphere that favoured compromise. As domestic politics became quiet in June 1894, the government could shift its attention to diplomatic issues.

Final Negotiations, September 1893 to July 1894

Although Japanese politicians, in the Diet and the government, feared that Britain would reconsider its decision to revise the unequal treaty if they were convinced that Japan was not civilized enough to justify that action, there is no evidence that British decision makers considered such a course. From May 1891 to September 1893, during the time the Japanese government suspended negotiations, the Foreign Office often contacted the legation in Tokyo about this issue. However, Whitehall never entertained the idea of reconsidering its decision to revise the unequal treaty throughout this period of moratorium.238 When the Foreign Office pressed the

236 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 109; Perez, Japan Comes of Age, 100. 237 Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 113; Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama and Okubo, Nihon Rekishi Taikei, vol. 4, Revised Ed., 52. 238 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Britain and Japan, 1892, FO410/31, passim. 76 legation regarding when negotiations on treaty revision could be resumed, Hugh Fraser, the acting British Minister Resident, replied on 27 January 1892 that "since Japan is now passing through a crisis in home affairs, and Treaty revision [is] a matter on which cannot risk another failure, it would be wisest to defer the negotiation a little longer."239 In September 1893, when the Japanese stated that it was ready to restart the negotiation on treaty revision, the British government did not object to this request. However, in December 1893 a British missionary was assaulted by a Japanese mob, Lord Rosebery, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decided to postpone negotiation of treaty revision. According to reports, Chaplain Shaw of the Anglican mission was assaulted by a group of drunken Japanese, and Japanese police did not intervene to help him despite being present at the scene.240 Rosebery wrote "I could not entertain or even look at them (the draft of revised treaty) at a time when Europeans were subjected to such treatment as had been undergone by the Chaplain of Her Majesty's Legation at Tokyo."241 However, he did not consider the option of permanently suspending the negotiations on treaty revision, nor even maintain his hard line for long. On 11 July 1894, Rosebery asked M. de Bunsen, the British Charge d'Affaires in Tokyo, whether the situation was suitable to end his adjournment of discussions. This step was taken voluntarily, before Japanese contacted the Foreign Office for resumption of negotiations, which indicates that he did not wish to make the adjournment permanent. De Bunsen answered in the affirmative to Rosebery, and Francis Bertie, the Undersecretary of Foreign Office who handled most of the negotiations with Japanese representatives, agreed with him. They both thought that continued adjournment of negotiations on treaty revision would produce another rise of anti-foreign sentiment in Japan, and a loss of good will of the Japanese people.243 De Bunsen further reported that the Japanese government had suppressed anti-foreign and anti-governmental agitation successfully, and was much stronger than

239 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Britain and Japan, 1892, Mr. Fraser to the Marquis of Salisbury, January 27, 1892, FO410/31. 240 Perez, Japan Comes of Age, 124. 241 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Britain and Japan, 1894, The Earl of Rosebery to Sir E. Malet, January 9 1894, FO410/33. 242 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Britain and Japan, 1894, The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. de Bunsen, January 11 1894, FO410/33. 243 Mr. de Bunsen to the Earl of Rosebery, January 12 1894; Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, with Minute, January 12 1894. Both from British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Britain and Japan, 1894, FO410/33. 77 since 1890. Thus, the situation was ideal for Whitehall to reopen the negotiation. Significantly, signs of anti-foreign sentiment in Japan, combined with government's efforts to control it, led Whitehall to continue pursuit of a policy of equal status with Japan, which, it hoped, would foster support for Western values and British sympathies in that country. From March 1894, negotiations between Japan and Britain were undertaken at the Foreign Office, where there was less risk of draft proposals leaking to the Japanese media and provoking a public outcry. Aoki Shuzo, the Japanese Minister Resident to Britain, was appointed as the chief negotiator by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mutsu Munemitsu. Aoki expected that he and Bertie could define some form of draft proposal on 25 May, only to be disappointed when Bertie stated that no such agreement could be reached until the Board of Trade had examined its proposed terms, and Aoki became suspicious that the British decision makers were trying to delay the negotiation.245 However, there is no evidence that British decision makers intended to take such course.246 As the Anglo-Japanese treaty regulated commercial activities, it was natural for the Board of Trade to examine the draft. However, Japanese actions during the Sino-Japanese crisis did frustrate British officials in East Asia. The anti-government Donghak party in Korea led poor peasants to a rebellion in April 1894, which developed into an international crisis in June 1894, when the Korean government, unable to suppress the rising, asked China to dispatch troops in order to restore order. However, the Japanese, who considered Korea a vital strategic centre that could not fall into the control of another country, could not ignore the movement of Chinese forces. Japan dispatched its troops to Korea on 2 June, to counterbalance the Chinese army in the peninsula.247 Suddenly, the Donghak Rebellion escalated into a crisis, in which Chinese and Japanese armies watched each other anxiously at close quarters. British press correspondents in Korea, whom Whitehall regarded as reliable sources of information, blamed Japan for escalating the Donghak Rebellion into the Sino-Japanese confrontation.248 While the

244 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Britain and Japan, 1894, Mr. de Bunsen to the Earl of Rosebery, January 12 1894, FO410/33. 245 Munemitsu Mutsu, Kenkenroku: Nisshin Senso Gaiko Hiroku (Kenkenroku: The Hidden Record of the First Sino-Japanese War), footnotes by Akira Nakatsuka, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), 117-8; Perez, Japan Comes of Age, 146, 150. 246 British Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Britain and Japan, 1894, Mr. de Bunsen to the Earl of Rosebery, January 12 1894, FO410/33. 247 Perez, Japan Conies of Age, 152; S. C. M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895- Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Mutsu, Kenkenroku, 37. 248 National Library of Scotland, Lord Rosebery Papers, Correspondence from Rosebery to Kimberley, 6 April, 1895, MS10070; Mutsu Kenkenroku, 44. 78 Chinese army entered Korea at the request of its government, the Japanese did not. The Chinese entered Korea to suppress the rebellion and restore order, but the Japanese did so simply to sustain their interests, not those of the host government.249 To these correspondents, Japan looked selfish and provocative. British diplomats in the region shared that view. British policy in East Asia sought to prevent outbreaks of disorder that could jeopardize the flow of free trade that Britons had protected and enjoyed there since 1840 and force Britain to increase its commitments there. The biggest challenge to these British interests was Russia, which Rosebery was unwilling to challenge with military means, unless absolutely necessary. He knew how difficult it was to contain Russia militarily, because it expanded eastward on land across Siberia, beyond the reach of the Royal Navy. Another problem was the political weakness of the Chinese Empire, ruled by Manchus from Northeast China. China had experienced a continuous decline of power ever since Britain forcefully opened it to free trade in the 1840s. This did not cause a power vacuum as in the case of Africa, and the Chinese Empire did pull itself together after the devastating civil war with the Taipings. Still, the Chinese Empire did not possess unquestioned control over its vast and multiethnic empire. Ernest Satow, who was the British Minister Resident to Tokyo and Beijing between 1895 and 1906, later described the state of China as follows:

China is not a centralized state of modern type, but rather a congeries of semi-autonomous satrapies, a confederacy of territories each possessing separate financial, military, naval and judicial organizations, in fact a sort of "Home rule all round" system, presided over by a central committee [i.e. Manchu dynasty] for deciding questions referred to it by the provincial authorities.250

This fragility of China further discouraged Rosebery from resorting to military activity in the Far East, which he feared might trigger disorder that the Manchu dynasty could not handle. Britain's interest was to prevent any disorder that could produce disintegration in the Chinese Empire. However, when Japan dispatched its troops to the Korean Peninsula and confronted Chinese soldiers, they transformed a local rebellion to international crisis. During the negotiation of the revised treaty on 7 June, just five days after Japan sent its troops to Korea, Lord Kimberley, the Foreign

249 "The Rising in Korea," The Times, 26 June, 1894; Mutsu, Kenkenroku, AA, 77-8. 250 Ian Nish, The Origins of Russo-Japanese War, (Essex: Longman Group, 1985), 13. Nish uses Public Record Office, London, Sir Edward Grey Papers, Correspondence from Sir Ernest Satow to Sir Edward Grey, 31 Mar, 1906 (FO 800/89). For Chinese political situation at that time, also see Otte, The China Question, 27; Young, British Policy in China, 5. 79 Secretary came to meet Aoki, and then inquired about Japan's stance on the Korean crisis. Aoki answered that it was not in Japan's interest to cause excessive disorder that might open the door to the Russian expansion in the region, which would pose security concerns for Japan.251 However, Aoki continued, a Chinese presence in Korea also was a serious threat that Japan could not allow, over which it would go to war if necessary.252 In order to maintain the independence of Korea without resorting to the use of military force, he emphasized, Japan and China signed a treaty in 1885 which stated that neither state would send troops to Korea unless absolutely necessary, and must inform the counterpart beforehand if they were compelled to send troops. The Chinese had broken this promise by sending their troops without the consent of the Japanese government, or even informing it. Japan had to dispatch its own troops not because it wanted to create uncertainty or a war, but because it was compelled to do so by Chinese provocations. British diplomats in East Asia remained frustrated by Japanese behaviour in Korea, and looked for ways to change it. When N. R. O'Conor, the British Minister in Beijing, learned that Japan had sent troops to Korea, he feared that this action could lead to the disintegration of the Chinese Empire, and open opportunities for Russia to penetrate into East Asia. Since he thought that Japan was escalating the Donghak Rebellion, he wanted to make them stop, and proposed a joint military demonstration with other Western powers against them.254 Diplomats in Korea were also unimpressed by the Japanese behaviour in Korea, especially after their troops arrived. W. H. Wickinson, the British Vice-Consul in the Korean treaty port of Jemulpo (present day Inchon), expressed dissatisfaction to his superior in Seoul when he realized that Japanese troops were being stationed there. He argued that Japanese troops caused anxiety among foreign residents of the port, and requested Chris Gardner, his superior and the Consul-General in Seoul to ask his Japanese diplomatic counterpart to move troops from the city.255 Diplomats in Korea tried to do so by having all Western representatives make a joint declaration against Japan, and they also asked for Foreign Office pressure on Japan in conjunction with other Western powers.256 Kimberley did entertain this idea, and contacted foreign ambassadors

251 Gaimusho, Joyaku Kaisei Kankei Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol. 4, (Tokyo: Gennando, 1950), 177-80. 252 Mutsu, Kenkenroku, 35. 253 Ibid, 37. 254 National Library of Scotland, Lord Kimberly Papers, Minute by Lord Rosebery, 30 July 1894, MS10243. 255 British Foreign Office, Telegram from Mr. Wickinson to Mr. Gardner, June 16 1894, F0228/1168. 256 For example, British Foreign Office, Telegram from Mr. Gardner to Mr. O'Conor, June 25 1894, F0228/1168. 80 whether if they would make joint declaration against Japan. The merchant community in Japan also remained hostile to treaty revision, as they questioned Japan's ability to modernize itself, and wished to preserve their special privileges. However, the only moment when Korean affairs affected the treaty negotiations occurred when O'Conor reported that Otori Keisuke, the Japanese Minister Resident in Seoul, demanded Lieutenant Callwell of the Royal Navy, a naval advisor to the Korean court, leave his office. Information was sent from Gardner to O'Conor on 12 July 1894 and O'Conor to London on the 14th.258 Kimberley and Aoki was supposed to sign the revised treaty on the 15th, but when Aoki arrived at the Foreign Office at the morning Kimberley told Aoki about the news from O'Conor and refused to sign a treaty until the issue was settled.259 Mutsu questioned Otori at once, who reported that there no such incident had occurred. Mutsu and he wired that immediately to British Charge d'Affaires and Aoki; thus they were able to sign a treaty on 16 July 1894.261 After receiving Mutsu's message, Britain did not even pursue more information on the Callwell Incident. These attitudes indicate a determination to defend British interests against new forms of Japanese encroachment, but not to mistrust Japan. Much the same is true of other instances of Anglo-Japanese friction in coming weeks. On the same day that the revised treaty was signed, Gardner reported to O'Conor that he and his wife had been assaulted by Japanese soldiers during a stroll in the outskirts of Seoul.262 The Foreign Office demanded the Admiralty send a warship to Korea and investigate the case, but it did

257 For example, The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. Phipps, July 25 1894," The Earl of Kimberley to Count Tornielli, July 27 1894; Sir Julian Paunceforte to the Earl of Kimberley, July 28 1894; All from British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, F0881/6594. 258 British Foreign Office, Telegram from Mr. Gardner to Mr. O'Conor, June 16 1894, F0228/1168; British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, Telegram from Mr. O'Conor to the Earl of Kimberley, June 14 1894, F0881/6594. 259 Telegram from the Earl of Kimberley to Mr. Paget, July 14 1894," Telegram from Mr. Paget to the Earl of Kimberley, July 15 1894; Both from British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, F0881/6594," Mutsu, Kenkenroku, 123-4; Gaimusho ed., Joyaku Kaisei Kankei Nihon GaikoBunsho, vol. 4, 213-4. 260 British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, Telegraph from Mr. Paget to the Earl of Kimberley, 15 July 1894 F0881/6594. 261 British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, Telegraph from Mr. Paget to the Earl of Kimberley, 15 July 1894, F0881/6594. 262 British Foreign Office, Telegram from Mr. Gardner to Mr. O'Conor, 25 June 1894, F0228/1168; British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, Telegram from Mr. O'Conor to the Earl of Kimberley, 17 July 1894, F0881/6594. 81 not consider the case serious enough to overturn their decision to sign the treaty, especially after the case had already become a fait accompli. After the Japanese admitted that the case had happened, punished the offender and offered an official apology to Gardner and his wife, the Foreign Office called the case closed. Gardner reported several more cases of harassment by Japanese soldiers of Western residents in Korea, but these reports did not make Whitehall reconsider treaty revision.264 On 19 July, Mutsu protested against the Foreign Office that Gardner was making constant anti-Japanese reports to O'Conor, his superior, and O'Conor told to Gardner not to blame Japan unless he had clear evidence.265 After settling the complaints from Gardner, another report of Japanese violence against British property and individuals arrived, when the "Kowshing," a ship that was transporting Chinese soldiers to Korea under the British flag and with Western crews, was sunk by the Japanese navy on 22 July.266 The British government made a formal complaint on the matter, and Japan offered full reparations to the victims, to avoid a diplomatic crisis between Britain.267 Again, Britain called the case closed. While the Foreign Office had made up their mind to revising the treaty with Japan, until late July 1894 it looked for ways to intervene actively so to change Japanese behaviour toward Korea and China, on the lines of making joint declaration against Japan. Rosebery, however, was able to overrule the opinions of the Foreign Office on this issue, as he had become Prime Minister of the Liberal government in May. British decision making toward Japan during 1894 cannot be understood without assessing the foreign policy of Rosebery. His foreign policy followed what is known as the Liberal imperialist tradition, a policy advocated by one important segment of that party but rejected by others. This tradition advocated the sustenance of empire through minimal commitment. Rosebery, like most British elites during the Victorian era, was an imperialist, determined to protect the British Empire and the international system that Britain had built over the last half century. While he was determined to resist anyone who would disrupt order within the British Empire, however, he also advocated doing so with as small and cheap a commitment as possible, establishing a firm hold over territories of vital importance. On other

263 Foreign Office to Admiralty, July 20 1894; Vice-Admiral E. Fremantle to Admiralty, July 23 1894. Both in British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, F0881/6594. 264 For example, Correspondence from Mr. Wickinson to Mr. 0'Conor,21 and 24 July 1894; Both From British Foreign Office, F0228/1168. 265 Private Letter from Mr. O'Conor to Mr. Gardner, undated; Correspondence from Mr. O'Conor to Mr. Gardner, 2 August; Both From British Foreign Office, F0228/1168. 266 From British Consulate, Chefoo, to Mr. O'Conor, 27 July 1894; From Admiralty to Sir E. Fremantle, 11 August 1894; Both from British Foreign Office, ADM125/112. 267 British Foreign Office, From Admiralty to Sir E. Fremantle, 11 August 1894, ADM125/112. 82 issues, Rosebery argued that over-commitment on local issues could escalate petty problems into crises and expensive conflicts, such as the Afghan and Boer Wars. Therefore, in 1876 he criticized the Benjamin Disraeli Conservative government when it gave the Queen of England the title of Empress of India. Disraeli justified this step as an appropriate move to deter a Russian threat to India, and to build British prestige there, Rosebery criticized it as producing the opposite outcome, by raising tensions between Russia and India. Later, in 1882, when Gladstone's government decided to intervene during a political upheaval in Egypt, Rosebery argued that since Egypt was located in the sea lanes between Britain and India, "we cannot leave Egypt without having established there a government stable and strong as regards the country itself, independent and respectable as regards other states." Failure to do so, he argued, would force Britain to make further commitments whenever Egypt erupted into political disorder.270 Rosebery's strategy always revolved around how to maintain the integrity of the empire with as minimal a commitment to local issues as possible. In 1894, Rosebery did not think that Japan's action in Korea and China justified British interference as it had done in Egypt during 1882. While Rosebery and the Foreign Office agreed that they did not want any disturbances to occur in East Asia at all, and preferred that Japan pursue a quieter course, they also realized that Korea was of strategic concern of Japan, which was not unreasonable in risking war against any foreign country that might try to dominate that peninsula. To prevent this circumstance in 1885, Japan signed the Treaty of Tianjin with China, which stated that neither country could send troops to Korea before informing the counterpart. In 1894, Chinese broke this treaty when it sent troops before informing Japan. When entering Korea in response, Japan was not violating international law, and when it did so in often the cases as with Gardner and Kowshing, it offered full reparation and apologies to victims. Additionally, from the early stages of the Sino-Japanese crisis, Japan made it clear to Whitehall that they were not interested in interfering with British interests, as when Aoki discussed Japan's stance over the crisis with Kimberley on 7 June.271 Their objective was simply to prevent Korea from falling into Chinese hands, not to destroy the Chinese Empire. Also, when the British Charge d'Affaires to Japan inquired what Japan would do regarding British concessions in China such as Shanghai, the Japanese government explicitly stated on

268 George Martel, Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and Failure of Foreign Policy, (London: Mansell Publishing, 1986), 13. 269 Ibid, 12. 270 Ibid, 17. Martel uses British Library, London, Gladstone Papers, Private Correspondence from Rosebery to Gladstone, 11 November 1884, 44288 f.214. 271 Gaimusho, Joyaku Kaisei Kankei Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, vol. 4, 177-80. 83 23 July that it would not make military actions against the city or Western merchant ships.272 If Rosebery nonetheless wanted to restrain the Japanese from escalating the crisis with Korea to one with China, he had the option of making a joint diplomatic declaration with other Western powers to condemn Japanese behaviour. O'Conor supported a joint military demonstration to restrain Japan, and Queen Victoria supported this idea.273 However, these projects did not materialize, as no common interest bound the Western nations. Rosebery likewise did not like the idea of a joint military demonstration, because, as an advocate of minimum commitment, he "distrusted] all demonstrations, unless you are prepared to go to all lengths."275 On 30 July, on the eve of the outbreak the Sino-Japanese War, Rosebery summarized his policy towards Japan as following.

My view of the China-Japan imbroglio is simple enough.... It seems to me that on the letter of the Agreement of 1885 the Japanese have not gone much beyond their right, certainly not so much as to give us a case for violent interference. Again I am quite sure that Japan is determined on war. If then we take action, it must be in reality against Japan. Would this be politic on our part? In my opinion it would not.276

This comment, made to explain his decision to remain neutral in the upcoming Sino-Japanese War, also reflects Rosebery's policy toward Japan in general, including the issue of treaty revision. While he did think that Japan had pushed the issue toward war, he also thought that they were proceeding in a manner that did not violate international law, and had not gone so far as to justify coercive intervention. Moreover, he believed that if Britons decided nonetheless to push the issue, they must expect resistance from Japan, whose power could not be ignored. Rosebery saw that Japan as "a nation of forty millions, warlike, ambitious, and intoxicated with victory will not restrain its demands except under compulsion, which would meet from the Japanese stubborn, bloody, and skilled resistance." Ten months earlier, his

272 British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, Telegram from Mr. Paget to the Earl of Kimberley, 23 July 1894, F0881/6594. 273 National Library of Scotland, Lord Kimberly Papers, Minute by Lord Rosebery, 30 July 1894, MS10243; Otte, The China Question, 35. 274 Otte, The China Question, 35. 275 National Library of Scotland, Lord Kimberly Papers, Minute by Lord Rosebery, 30 July 1894, MS 10243. 276 National Library of Scotland, Lord Kimberly Papers, Correspondence from Rosebery to Kimberly, 10 April, 1895, MS10243. 277 Ibid. 84 opinion no doubt was less favourable, but still rested on respect for Japan. The Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the War Office agreed that Japan had greater military power than China, although the latter had better ships and armaments and more soldiers. Naval and army intelligence officers both reported that the Japanese services were trained and disciplined under Western methods; the Chinese services had more soldiers and warships, but they were divided into provincial divisions which acted more like independent units than members of a single Chinese military, while the quality of the individual soldiers was inferior to Japan's.278 Both Rosebery and the First Lord of Admiralty were confident that the Royal Navy could comfortably handle the Imperial Japanese Navy if the situation compelled it to do so.279 The total tonnage and number of guns that the Japanese could concentrate in East Asian seas were superior to that of the Royal Navy (Table 2). Yet, the British Admiralty was confident that the quality of their ships, officers and crews could overcome such a quantitative shortage, as it could concentrate several warships that "should alone if well handled and with good sea room be able to account for two or three 'Matsushimas (the Japanese flagship).'"280

Table 2: Comparison of present British Fleet with Japanese Total Number of Guns Weight of Broadside (lbs) Japanese Fleet 175 9,908 British Fleet 152 6,346 British Fleet (Reinforced) 220 9,119

However, Rosebery's note in July 1894 clearly indicates respect for the Japanese. He saw Japan as militarily more powerful than China, and comparable to European forces in the region. Rosebery thought that the Japanese could pose significant resistance if he antagonized them. Rosebery thought upcoming Sino-Japanese War would not change the fundamentals of the Far Eastern situation, that it was unlikely that the Manchus could miraculously pull the empire under their full control, and that it was unlikely that the Russians would restrain their ambitions towards the Far

278 Admiralty to Foreign Office, 16 July 1894; Intelligence Division to Foreign Office, 16 July 1894," Both from British Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Corea and the War between China and Japan, F0881/6594. 279 National Library of Scotland, Lord Rosebery Papers, Correspondence from Kimberley to Rosebery, 30 September, 1894, MS 10069. 280 British Foreign Office, Comparison between British and Japanese Fleets, 15 October 1894, ADM125/112. 281 British Foreign Office, Comparison between British and Japanese Fleets, 24 November 1894, ADM125/112. 85 East. The Far East would remain volatile and Japan would have significant influence in the region. Britons could forcefully restrain Japan with the Royal Navy if it wished, but would antagonize Japan and damage relations with it. In July, Rosebery did not consider that the Japanese had pushed the issue to the extent that he needed to take that risk. Under such circumstances, Rosebery considered neutrality Britain's best policy. He would make a formal assurance to Japan, but neither would he stand in its way. The events between 15 July 1890 and 16 July 1894 affected the timing of the signing of the revised treaty, and also illustrate how British decision makers saw Japan. Whereas the Japanese feared that British decision makers would reconsider their decision to abolish the unequal treaty if they were convinced that the Japanese were not civilized, nothing suggests that Britons entertained such an option. From 1890, Britons no longer saw Japan as an uncivilized and inferior nation that could and should not be treated as an equal power. They did not consider Japan a great power, but nonetheless as one with sufficient weight to affect the international politics of the Far East and British interests in that region. Even when domestic political opposition and the Ohzu Incident forced Japan to postpone negotiations over revision, never did Britain consider abandoning treaty revision; rather, they constantly asked Japan when they could resume negotiation, which indicates that a revised treaty could have been signed earlier had there been no domestic oppositions. For British decision makers between 1885 and 1890, the rapid development of the Japanese economy drove them to accept treaty revision, with military or strategic issues a tertiary concern, if even that. By the time of the final negotiations in 1894, however, British attitudes had changed, focusing foremost on strategic issues such as Japanese military power and the Russian challenge in Asia, with parochial commercial concerns a secondary matter, though the significance of recognition of Japanese westernization retained the importance it had held in 1890.

282 National Library of Scotland, Lord Kimberly Papers, Minute by Lord Rosebery, 30 July 1894, MS10243. 86 Conclusion

For the Japanese in the late nineteenth century, treaty revision was a central political issue. It combined domestic and diplomatic realms. Diplomatically, the unequal treaties put the nation in a semi-independent status; Western residents in Japan were immune from Japanese law, and its government could not set a tariff rate without the consent of exporting countries. These tariff rates were set at a low rate, which left Japanese industries and its market vulnerable to cheap imports, and also produced the danger of a mass outflow of specie. The extraterritoriality clause legally prevented the Japanese authorities from punishing foreign residents, which meant that they could cause damage to Japanese citizens and property without being adequately punished, as in the case of Normanton Incident. Britain had imposed an unequal treaty in China seventeen years before it did to Japan, and Japanese elites understood the danger of this system. Britain, for example, established the Maritime Customs Service on China, which in essence took over the duty of regulating trade from the Chinese Empire and extracting tariffs for it. While Inspector General Robert Hart felt a sense of duty toward the Chinese government, still its tariff revenue was controlled by the Maritime Customs Service; Hart worked closely with the British Minister in China to uphold the unequal treaty, Britain imposed a tariff rate that was favourable to Western merchants, while the Chinese government had a difficult time limiting an outflow of wealth, because foreign merchants were protected by extraterritoriality. Japanese elites were terrified by this prospect. The Japanese elites resented the unequal treaties, from both an emotional and a realistic standpoint. However, when the Japanese resorted to xenophobic violence as a means to drive the foreigners out in the early 1860s, the Western nations replied with superior military technology. Defeats taught Japanese that it was impossible to drive the foreigners out by force, but they did not abandon their will to achieve independence. They were determined to end their semi-independent status, but decided to do so by different means than xenophobic violence. Japanese leaders concluded that their root problem was that Japan was powerless militarily. This weakness enabled Western nations to bully Japan, which Japanese had to accept no matter the demand. They correctly identified the core of Western power as being its superior military technology and training, and tried to acquire it. However, their society, based on agriculture was in no position to finance an expensive modern military. There was an extensive merchant network throughout Japan by the mid-nineteenth century, and some institutions such as ton'ya, which served like banks; also, some textile manufacturing industries existed. Japan was not a simple agricultural society, as it had some advanced institutions. However, Japan's

87 division between feudal domains divided its economic and financial capacity. Japanese realized that in order to modernize their military, they must first do so with their entire society, including political administrations and economic institutions. Divisions over these issues and factions within Japan led to civil war in the late 1860s. Fortunately for Japan, these events did not cause destruction like that which China experienced during the Taiping Rebellion, and its victors, the anti-Bakufu faction, started building a modern centralized state. The issues of the unequal treaty and weakness in power served as main motives for domestic reforms. Japan aimed to Westernize itself, so that it could end the semi-independent status. After the return of the Iwakura Mission in 1873, Meiji oligarchs concluded that industry (both heavy and light) was the core of Western power supremacy, and decided make industrial modernization their priority. By bolstering the domestic industries, the oligarchs wished to establish a "wealthy nation, strong military." Numerous shipyards, factories and coalmines were established; also, railroads, telegraphs and lighthouses were built to provide better communication and transportation for commercial activities. Japanese students went abroad, and foreign specialists in various fields were hired to instruct Japanese at schools, trading firms, banks, factories, shipyards, and in government bureaucracies. However, in the 1870s these investments did not produce the industrial output that would enable Japan to outcompete foreign competitors. The Japanese military remained weak until the late 1880s, because of its limited industrial base and the lack of tactical understanding by officers, and economically too, it remained immature, and allowed imports to penetrate Japanese markets. The Japanese modernization program also was handcuffed by various rebellions, mostly caused by samurai and peasants who were dissatisfied by the policies of the new government. However, this situation started to change in the 1880s, as Japanese were becoming increasingly competent. Japanese manufactured goods started to replace imports during this decade, and they were also becoming efficient in various services such as shipping and banking, which were essential to bolster Japan's trade. British perceptions of Japan changed as Japan's Westernization proceeded. The xenophobic violence of the early-1860s made Britons consider the Japanese as barbarians. When the Japanese ceased xenophobic violence after the Meiji Restoration, the British opinion of Japan changed somewhat favourably, but it essentially remained as a country that was remote, exotic and unimportant. The British perspective on Japan is represented by the opening verse of The Mikado, which described Japan as a nation that exists "in lively paint, on many a vase and jar, on many a screen and fan." Britons viewed Japan from grossly romanticized perspectives, as British visitors often described Japan as a nation that existed only in

88 fairy tales, an "elf-land" where every person and object was small. Britons saw Japan as an exotic nation. Japan had a market precisely because of its exoticism; various forms of Japanese arts with exotic decorations found demand in Western world as Japonisme. Since it was unimportant, decision makers in London were willing to let British residents in Japan to dictate the policy toward that country. These residents, who experienced the xenophobic violence in the early-1860s, held a long-lasting fear within the minds of British residents in Japan, remained suspicious of Japan's ability to become a civilized nation, and therefore was stubbornly against signing a treaty with Japan on equal basis. However, these perspectives started to change in the mid-1880s. Japan's rapid modernization continued to impress British observers, and British decision makers started to recognize that Japan could no longer be treated as an inferior nation. It was from the mid-1880s that British observers started to examine the real image of Japan instead of the romanticized one. There also was a strategic incentive on the British side to examine Japan's real power, as the British power monopoly in East Asia faced a challenge from Russia from the late 1880s, and Britain therefore had to examine Japan's potential as a partner to counter this threat. The examples of the individuals who did this were John H. Gubbins, the secretary in the British Legation in Tokyo, and George Curzon, the acting Member of Parliament, and both of them were impressed by Japan's successful modernization, and thought that its power would continue to grow in future. Under such circumstance, Gubbins wrote a memorandum in 1888, suggesting that Britain should move toward treaty revision. He knew that such a move would not grant any short term gain for Britain, but he argued that Japanese would remain suspicious of Western nations if they tried to maintain unequal treaties. Treaty revision offered the long-term benefit of winning goodwill and improving the relationship with an increasingly powerful nation. With this recommendation, Britain told Japan that it was ready to start the negotiation on treaty revision on 15 July 1890. Japan's successful modernization resulted in the increase of its power, and British perceptions on Japan improved accordingly. It is true that Japan's successful modernization was not the only reason that it managed to accomplish treaty revision. Even in the 1890s, there still were some individuals, such as British merchants in Japan, who remained suspicious of Japan's ability to modernize itself, and consequently argued against treaty revision. Therefore, it is true that Japan was fortunate that those individuals were not in charge of the decision making process over this issue. However, it must also be said that by the late 1880s, British merchants were finding much less sympathizers at home than they did before the 1880s, because more Britons were becoming impressed by Japan's successful modernization. Sir Francis Plunkett and Hugh Fraser, the Minister

89 Residents in the British Legation in Tokyo in the 1880s, agreed with Gubbins that Britain should continue to regulate its relationship with Japan through the unequal treaty. Francis Bertie, the Undersecretary of State on Foreign Affairs, agreed with the legation in Tokyo, and so did Lord Rosebery, who played a significant role in the issue of treaty revision as a member of the Liberal government in 1893 and 1894. Japan's successful modernization impressed many Britons, both elite and public, and therefore the pro-revision camp represented majority of the Foreign Office and Whitehall. While Japan's rapid modernization is not the only reason for its success in treaty revision, it must be considered as the key factor that brought the success. Japan's success in acquiring power stemmed primarily from hard work of its people, but that was not all that was involved. The Japanese were fortunate that they had managed to leave their military activities in the 1860s and 1870s with much less damage than China had suffered, although their cost was not cheap. Also, forbearance on the British side must not be ignored. Considering Japan's dependence on Britain during the 1860s and 1870s, the latter had every chance to exploit its power; but did not, because Britain thought such actions unnecessary, expensive and bad form. Through a combination of hard work, fortune and British attitudes, Japan acquired power at a surprisingly fast pace. Although Whitehall agreed to negotiate treaty revision in 1890, it took another four years for Britain and Japan finally to sign the revised, equal treaty, because domestic opposition against the Japanese government forced it to suspend the negotiation. In 1890, Japan opened the National Diet. Its real power against the government was not strong, but the Meiji oligarchs understood potential danger of marginalizing public opinions from previous experience. Inoue Kaoru and Okuma Shigenobu, the two Foreign Ministers who had been willing to let foreign judges enter the Japanese Supreme Court as a condition to abolish extraterritoriality, were forced to resign because of intensive public opposition. This forced the government to be sensitive in its management of the Diet, which increased the Diet's influence on the government. The biggest difficulty for the government was the Diet's drastic cutback of budgets, which could not be accepted when it was bolster its military strength. In the first Diet session, which opened on 29 November 1890, the battle over budget produced compromise. However, Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo resigned from his post, shocked by the reality that his government had to yield to Diet's demand. The succeeding cabinet led by Matsukata Masayoshi faced series of difficulties. Only five days after he came into power, on 11 May 1891, a mob attacked the Russian Crown Prince Nicholas in the city of Ohzu, and spent much of the year struggling desperately to prevent diplomatic crisis with Russia. Then the cabinet had to handle

90 a renewed attack by the Diet. Neither Diet politicians nor government bureaucrats wanted to compromise as they did in the first session, and the cabinet was plagued by internal disunity and external interventions. Matsukata dissolved the Diet in its second session on 25 December 1891 over the issue of budget. During the election for the third Diet session, which was to open on 2 July 1892, it was revealed that the Ministry of Interior and its minister Shinagawa Yajiro had tried to affect the outcome through use of police force. This resulted in the deaths of 83 anti-government party politicians and another 388 injured, resulting in polarization of opposition. After Matsukata's budget proposal, which included significant amount of defence spending, was rejected in the third Diet session, he was forced to resign from his post. Both oligarchs and bureaucrats learned lessons from Matsukata's failure. They could not let the Diet attempt to cut back the budget as it did in the first three Diet sessions, because that crippled defence projects. However, the government could not accomplish this goal simply by purging the opposition. Oligarchs were convinced that Ito Hirobumi alone was qualified for this sensitive task. Ito agreed to become the Prime Minister, and built a strong government that would not be plagued with the problems that the previous government had experienced. After securing support from oligarchs, Ito started his action against the Diet. He showed some willingness to compromise with party politicians by showing a readiness to allow them into government positions, if they would keep their hands out of military budgets. When Ito realized that party politicians were not willing to compromise, he begged the Meiji Emperor to issue a Decree of Mediation, which placed military spending under the category of special budget, which could not be put under the debate in Diet, while also restructuring the bureaucracy so to cut some budgets back. By this time, the Diet was too fragmented to push any anti-government agendas, and thus Ito managed to create domestic political stability. This allowed the government to finally focus on revision negotiation. Japanese elites feared that Britons would reconsider their decision to negotiate a revised treaty if they thought that Japanese were not yet civilized. However, there is no evidence that British decision makers considered such a step. The Foreign Office waited to resume negotiation even after the Ohzu Incident and the purge that the Matsukata government executed against opposition parties. After the Japanese government asked the Foreign Office to restart negotiations in September 1893, the equal treaty, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, was signed on 16 July 1894. The closest that British decision makers came to realizing the fear of Japanese elites was when they decided temporarily to suspend negotiations in December 1893 and July 1894, when they heard that British residents in East Asia were being harassed by Japanese. However, these suspensions were meant not to be

91 permanent, and intended only as signals to show their frustrations toward the Japanese government over these incidents. The negotiations over the revised treaty coincided with the start of a new age in Anglo-Japanese relations, with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, yet these two issues essentially remained distinct. Rosebery, who supported the idea of protecting British imperial interest through minimal commitment, concluded that while the Japanese were pushing the Korean question to the verge of war, they were doing this for legitimate reasons, and were not violating international law at practice, or challenging direct British interests. Rosebery therefore decided not to intervene against Japanese actions, not only in terms of the now-inevitable Sino-Japanese War but in general affairs including treaty revision question. The period between 1890 and 1894 was a time of transition, when Britons stopped seeing Japan as an inferior country and started to see them as an equal. British decision makers never treated Japan as an inferior nation after the equal treaty was signed, and thus the transition to the diplomatic equal was completed.

Treaty Revision: Its Significance and Consequences

Treaty revision was the first major diplomatic issue that the modern Japanese state faced, and Japanese elites were relieved when they managed to achieve that aim. This step also was significant from the British perspective. In the nineteenth century, Japan was the only non-Western nation with which the Britain agreed to abolish unequal treaties; neither the Ottoman nor Chinese Empire could accomplish this aim. Japan, a nation that was seen as barbaric in 1860, was recognized as a diplomatic equal in the Western dominated international system only thirty five years later. Yet, its significance of this step must also be qualified. In 1894, Japan was recognized by Britain as a normal country, a growing one, but not as a great power. 1894 was Japan's year zero, but nothing further. The signing of the equal treaty was received anticlimactically even in Japan, as public opinion focused on the now-inevitable Sino-Japanese War, which broke out two weeks later. The Japanese government chose not to disclose to its public the information that Japan and Britain had signed an equal treaty until it was ratified in Tokyo on 25 August, when the major battles of the Sino-Japanese War were about to occur in Pyongyang and the Yellow Sea, and therefore received minimal press attention.283 In hindsight, 15 July 1890, the day when Britain informed Japan it was ready to revise the unequal treaty, was the turning point for the Anglo-Japanese relationship that gradually improved through the 1890s, and reached its peak around 1902 to 1904, from the signing of Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the Russo-Japanese War. However, the future course of Anglo-Japanese

283 Perez, Japan Comes of Age, 169. 92 relations was uncertain in July 1894, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance far from inevitable. Rosebery kept a close eye on the Sino-Japanese War, which immediately followed the signing of the revised treaty, and his already favourable impression of Japan improved as the war progressed. The victory of the Imperial Japanese Army in Pyongyang on 15 September and the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Yellow Sea on 17 September convinced O'Conor that "Japan probably can advance to Mukden or Peking, It[sic] is doubtful how far Central Government could stand strain," an analysis that Rosebery and others in the decision making circles believed was true.284 Whitehall realized that Japan had managed a remarkable victory over China in a mere month and a half from the beginning of the engagement. This development forced Rosebery to re-examine the course that Britain should take against the Japanese, as Japan's gains put Shanghai and Hong Kong under a greater threat than ever before, while the Japanese were in a position where they could march into Beijing and perhaps shatter China. These concerns led Lord Spencer, the First Lord of Admiralty, and Lord Kimberly, to advocate that Whitehall should at least increase the number of warships stationed at Shanghai; however, while the Japanese marched swiftly into Manchuria, and the Liaodong and Shandong Peninsulas, they kept away from the British concessions and Beijing. Rosebery therefore decided not to follow Spencer and Kimberly's advices.285 For the same reason, Rosebery chose not to participate in the Triple Intervention, a joint diplomatic pressure by Germany, France and Russia to prevent Japan from taking the Liaodong Peninsula from China as a prize for its victory in the war, although these three countries asked Britain to take part.286 No one in Whitehall saw Japan as a great power, and there was a consensus that the Royal Navy easily could defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy if the situation compels it to do so. However, Rosebery saw Japan as "a nation of forty millions, warlike, ambitious, and intoxicated with victory will not restrain its demands except under compulsion, which would meet from the Japanese stubborn, bloody, and skilled resistance."287 Japan was a power that was still growing and would increase its weight in East Asian regional politics. Rosebery wanted to be able to work with Japan.

284 National Library of Scotland, Lord Kimberly Papers, Telegrams sent and received, from N. R. O'Conor, the Minister Resident in Beijing, to Lord Kimberly, 10 to 16 September, 1894, MS 10243. 285 National Library of Scotland, Lord Rosebery Papers, Correspondences between Lord Rosebery and Lord Kimberly, 30 September, 2 October, 3 October, 1894, and 6 April 1895, all MS10069. 286 National Library of Scotland, Lord Kimberly Papers, Correspondence from Rosebery to Kimberly, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 28 April 1895, all MS10243. 287 National Library of Scotland, Lord Kimberly Papers, Correspondence from Rosebery to Kimberly, 10 April, 1895, MS10243. 93 However, the Liberals lost the election in June 1895, and the long-time Conservative leader, Lord Salisbury, returned to the post of Prime Minister for the third and the last time in his career. Salisbury was more pessimistic than Rosebery about the future of Japan. He considered it a bubble power, which could rise and fall in short period of time; yet as a diplomat in the Bismarckian manner, who acted to protect British national interest through a series of give-and-take relations with other TOO states, he too treated Japan as a normal and significant state. Like Rosebery, Salisbury was not willing to let Russia threaten British interest in East Asia, and he also saw the Triple Alliance as the best deterrent to Russia's eastward expansion. However, over the course of the 1890s, Germany showed an increasing interest in directing Russia towards the Far East rather than to Europe. Germany's participation in the Triple Intervention on 23 April 1895 indicated this intent, as it acted jointly with France and Russia to prevent Japan from taking the Liaodong Peninsula from China.289 Salisbury became increasingly discouraged with the possibility of cooperation with Germany, and then started considering the option of coming to closer terms with Japan. Around the turn of the century, Russia's increased power in China worried both Britons and Japanese. As a result of the Boxer Rebellion, Russian troops entered Manchuria and did not withdraw even after the incident was settled; also, Russian influence in Korea was increasing, as many anti-Japanese factions within the court favoured closer relations with St. Petersburg. ° Britain and Japan, whose interests faced a threat from the common enemy, signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. Like most of the Westerners, British decision makers did not believe that Japan could defeat Russia if war broke out, and the alliance was intended to help the Japanese stand firm, rather than go to war. However, the Japanese public, military officers and bureaucrats were determined to fight any power that threatened to control Korea, and they eventually edged out opposition from some Meiji oligarchs, including Ito Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru, who advocated a cautious approach against the Russians.291 Whitehall did not want this war to break out because it doubted that Japan was powerful enough to win, but its public opinion swung toward the Japanese as their fellow island nation moved to fight the common enemy. This led Britons to see Japan from a favourable perspective.

288 Otte, The China Question, 19. 289 Gerhard Krebs, "German Policy and the Russo-Japanese War," in Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, vol. II' The Nichinan Papers, eds. by John W. M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba, (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 89. 29° Ibid. 291 Yukio Ito, "The Emperor Meiji and the Russo-Japanese War," in Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, vol. II- The Nichinan Papers, eds. by John W. M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba, (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 6; Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War, 10. 94 Many of them shared the view of Henry Dyer, who, as indicated in the second chapter, believed that there were some things that they could learn from the Japanese. The unequal treaty question also affected Japanese society in the longer term. Meiji politicians usually receive low marks from modern historians (especially those who worked in the 1950s and 1960s), as they had experienced the Second World War and sought the roots of why they had to endure hardships. Meiji politicians often are seen as undemocratic despots who brutally suppressed the Jiyu Minken Undo and thus the seeds of democracy in Japan and as builders of a political system that could not keep ultranationalistic military officers from driving the nation and the Asian continent towards destruction.292 However the Meiji political system was not as simple as these historians argue. Japan had been a nation that emphasized the subordination of individuals to common social interest for much of its history, and many individuals in late nineteenth century, not only elites but also non-elites, resented the individualistic liberal influence that entered Japan after the Meiji Restoration. The early diplomatic experience of Japan and other Western nations also had important consequences. Even before the arrival of Perry, Japan knew that the Britons had used their superior military power to open trade with China. The subsequent process of treaty revision offered a rough initiation to Western diplomacy, which operated primarily through power and interest. Not surprisingly, the Japanese developed a sense that the Western international system was based on the assumption that might is right. The powerful will exploit the powerless to become stronger, and the weak must succumb to the demands of strong no matter how resentful they are. The Japanese state of the late nineteenth century was struggling for national survival, and in order to accomplish this goal it needed a strong government. The government feared that infighting between parties might cause political stagnation, which could be exploited by Western imperialists. The Japanese industry and economy were planned, patronized and funded by the government to serve national power, so that it could counter the imperialist threat, which was prioritized over pursuit of individual fortunes. The Meiji institutions were natural outcomes of the pressure that the government faced in the nineteenth century. Some historians, most notably Iriye Akira, also argue that the Japanese conviction about the policy of might is right, led them not to restrict the use of their power once they acquired it, which resulted in it becoming one of the most brutal imperialist nations in the world. Their atrocities of the 1930s were justified under the conviction that they would be conquered by stronger powers unless they acquired

292 Examples of this are, Joseph Pittau, Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1889, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Akira Tanaka, Meiji Ishin, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000). 95 power by exploiting weaker ones. Western imperialism was not the only cause of these outcomes, but it was one of them. Historians who study Japanese history tend to focus on the Pacific War, which has led to an elaborate historiography within that field. Japanese history before the 1930s is important in understanding the Pacific War, or later events, and yet few historians spend time studying and debating this issue. If this thesis convinces some readers to direct their attention toward Japanese history before World War II, then the author could be satisfied for making a slight contribution to historiography.

293 Example is Iriye, Nihon no Gaiko, 19-20. 96 Bibliography

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