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Compassion and Courage
Compassion and courage Australian doctors and dentists in the Great War Medical History Museum, University of Melbourne War has long brought about great change and discovery in medicine and dentistry, due mainly to necessity and the urgency and severity of the injuries, disease and other hardships confronting patients and practitioners. Much of this innovation has taken place in the field, in makeshift hospitals, under conditions of poor Compassion hygiene and with inadequate equipment and supplies. During World War I, servicemen lived in appalling conditions in the trenches and were and subjected to the effects of horrific new weapons courage such as mustard gas. Doctors and dentists fought a courageous battle against the havoc caused by AUSTRALIAN DOCTORS AND DENTISTS war wounds, poor sanitation and disease. IN THE REAT AR Compassion and courage: Australian doctors G W and dentists in the Great War explores the physical injury, disease, chemical warfare and psychological trauma of World War I, the personnel involved and the resulting medical and dental breakthroughs. The book and exhibition draw upon the museums, archives and library of the University of Melbourne, as well as public and private collections in Australia and internationally, Edited by and bring together the research of historians, doctors, dentists, curators and other experts. Jacqueline Healy Front cover (left to right): Lafayette-Sarony, Sir James Barrett, 1919; cat. 247: Yvonne Rosetti, Captain Arthur Poole Lawrence, 1919; cat. 43: [Algernon] Darge, Dr Gordon Clunes McKay Mathison, 1914. Medical History Museum Back cover: cat. 19: Memorial plaque for Captain Melville Rule Hughes, 1922. University of Melbourne Inside front cover: cat. -
Imperial Nostalgia: Victorian Values, History and Teenage Fiction in Britain
RONALD PAUL Imperial Nostalgia: Victorian Values, History and Teenage Fiction in Britain In his pamphlet, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, on the seizure of French government power in 1851 by Napoleon’s grandson, Louis, Karl Marx makes the following famous comment about the way in which political leaders often dress up their own ideological motives and actions in the guise of the past in order to give them greater historical legitimacy: The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, bat- tle-cries, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.1 One historically contentious term that has been recycled in recent years in the public debate in Britain is that of “Victorian values”. For most of the 20th century, the word “Victorian” was associated with negative connotations of hypercritical morality, brutal industrial exploitation and colonial oppression. However, it was Mrs Thatcher who first gave the word a more positive political spin in the 1980s with her unabashed celebration of Victorian laissez-faire capitalism and patriotic fervour. This piece of historical obfuscation was aimed at disguising the grim reality of her neoliberal policies of economic privatisation, anti-trade union legislation, cut backs in the so-called “Nanny” Welfare State and the gunboat diplomacy of the Falklands War. -
The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict by Jorge O
Lessons from Failure: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict by Jorge O. Laucirica The dispute between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands1 led to the only major war between two Western countries since World War II. It is an interesting case for the study of preventive diplomacy and conflict management, as it involves a cross-section of international relations. The conflict involved (a) a major power, Great Britain; (b) an active U.S. role, first as a mediator and then as an ally to one of the parties; (c) a subcontinental power, albeit a “minor” player in a broader context, Argentina; (d) a global intergovernmental organization, the United Nations; and (e) a regional intergovernmental organization, the Organization of American States (OAS). The Falklands/Malvinas territory encompasses two large islands, East and West Falkland—or Soledad and Gran Malvina, according to the Argentine denomination— as well as some 200 smaller islands, all of them scattered in a 7,500-mile area situated about 500 miles northeast of Cape Horn and 300 miles east of the Argentine coast- line. The population of the Falklands is 2,221, according to the territorial census of 1996.2 Argentina formally brought the dispute over sovereignty to the attention of the UN, in the context of decolonization, in 1965. A process including resolutions, griev- ances, and bilateral negotiations carried on for seventeen years, culminating in the 1982 South Atlantic war. Eighteen years after the confrontation, and despite the lat- est changes in the status quo (commercial flights between the islands and Argentina were reestablished in 1999), the conflict remains open, with Argentina still clinging to its claims of sovereignty over Malvinas and the South Georgia, South Orcadas, South Shetland, and South Sandwich Islands, all of them located in the South Atlan- tic and administered by the United Kingdom. -
Sir Michael Quinlan on RAF Policy 1962-65
ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 24 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. Copyright 2001: Royal Air Force Historical Society First published in the UK in 2001 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361-4231 Typeset by Creative Associates 115 Magdalen Road Oxford OX4 1RS Printed by Professional Book Supplies Ltd 8 Station Yard Steventon Nr Abingdon OX13 6RX 3 CONTENTS ‘THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN TRANSITION, 1962- 5 1965’: Address by Sir Michael Quinlan at the AGM held on 28th June 2000. BOSNIA 1992-1995 – A CASE STUDY IN THE 12 DENIAL OF THE ADVANTAGE CONFERRED BY AIR SUPERIORITY. A winning British Two Air Forces Award paper by Sqn Ldr S Harpum RAF. THE INFLUENCE OF SPACE POWER ON HISTORY 21 (1944-1998). A winning American Two Air Forces Award paper by Capt John Shaw USAF. THE DE HAVILLAND VENOM WITH No 8 SQN IN 36 THE MIDDLE EAST by Air Vice-Marshal L W Phipps. SQN LDR G D GRAHAM DSO MBE by Frank Card. 46 THE RAF HERALDRY TRUST. 56 SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE 60 FOURTEENTH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE CLUB ON 28 JUNE 2000. FEEDBACK 64 BOOK REVIEWS. -
Dentistry and the British Army: 1661 to 1921
Military dentistry GENErAL Dentistry and the British Army: 1661 to 1921 Quentin Anderson1 Key points Provides an overview of dentistry in Britain and Provides an overview of the concerns of the dental Illustrates some of the measures taken to provide its relation to the British Army from 1661 to 1921. profession over the lack of dedicated dental dental care to the Army in the twentieth century provision for the Army from the latter half of the before 1921 and the formation of the Army nineteenth century. Dental Corps. Abstract Between 1661 and 1921, Britain witnessed signifcant changes in the prevalence of dental caries and its treatment. This period saw the formation of the standing British Army and its changing oral health needs. This paper seeks to identify these changes in the Army and its dental needs, and place them in the context of the changing disease prevalence and dental advances of the time. The rapidly changing military and oral health landscapes of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century bring recognition of the Army’s growing dental problems. It is not, however, without years of campaigning by members of the profession, huge dental morbidity rates on campaign and the outbreak of a global confict that the War Ofce resource a solution. This culminates in 1921 with, for the frst time in 260 years, the establishment of a professional Corps within the Army for the dental care of its soldiers; the Army Dental Corps is formed. Introduction Seventeenth century site; caries at contact areas was rare. In the seventeenth century, however, the overall This paper sets out to illustrate the links At the Restoration in 1660, Britain had three prevalence increased, including the frequency between dentistry and the British Army over armies:1 the Army raised by Charles II in of lesions at contact areas and in occlusal the 260 years between the Royal Warrant exile, the Dunkirk garrison and the main fssures.3 In contrast, it is suggested by Kerr of Charles II establishing today’s Army Commonwealth army. -
Falkland Islands War: Diplomatic Failure in April 1982
The Falkland Islands War: Diplomatic Failure in April 1982 By Joseph Mauro Wake Forest University The fate of over 1,000 souls was decided in April 1982. On April 2, Argentine Special Forces invaded and occupied the British Falkland Islands. For the next month, Britain and Argentina tried to resolve the conflict diplomatically. United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig served as mediator, shuttling multiple times between London and Buenos Aires. Haig and his team tried to develop a document to which both the Argentine military junta, led by President Leopoldo Galtieri, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher could agree. However, despite long hours in negotiations and a genuine desire of both sides to avoid war, agreement was never reached. The British counterattacked on May 1, and the fighting that resulted saw 1,054 soldiers and seamen die.1 Diplomacy in the Falkland Islands failed for a number of reasons. First, the negotiations were flawed, both in Haig’s uneasy position as mediator and the junta’s unreliable decision- making process. In addition, each side misunderstood the other. The Argentines never believed the British would counterattack and the British struggled to believe that Argentina wanted a peaceful solution. The possibility of oil under the islands also may have played a role. However, the most important impediment to diplomatic success was the fact that neither side was able to compromise enough to prevent war. The main reasons for this inflexibility were two-fold: both leaders needed to appear strong to remain in power, and the political climate at the time, especially in terms of diplomatic principles relating to the Cold War, prevented the British from yielding to the minimum Argentine demands. -
War and Media: Constancy and Convulsion
Volume 87 Number 860 December 2005 War and media: Constancy and convulsion Arnaud Mercier* Arnaud Mercier is professor at the university Paul Verlaine, Metz (France) and director of the Laboratory “Communication and Politics” at the French National Center for Scientifi c Research (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifi que, CNRS). Abstract To consider the relationship between war and the media is to look at the way in which the media are involved in conflict, either as targets (war on the media) or as an auxiliary (war thanks to the media). On the basis of this distinction, four major developments may be cited that today combine to make war above all a media spectacle: photography, which opened the door to manipulation through stage-management; live technologies, which raise the question of journalists’ critical distance vis-à-vis the material they broadcast and which can facilitate the process of using them; pressure on the media and media globalization, which have led to a change in the way the political and military authorities go about making propaganda; and, finally, the fact that censorship has increasingly come into disrepute, which has prompted the authorities to think of novel ways of controlling journalists. : : : : : : : The military has long integrated into its operational planning the principles of the information society and of a world wrapped into a tight network of infor- mation media. Controlling the way war is represented has acquired the same strategic importance as the ability to disrupt the enemies’ communications.1 The “rescue” of Private Jessica Lynch, which was filmed by the US Army on 1 April 2003, is a textbook example, even if the lies surrounding Private Lynch’s * This contribution is an adapted version of the article “Guerre et médias: permanences et mutations”, Raisons politiques, N° 13, février 2004, pp. -
Lmc'renakt-Geciehal SIR Artiluh SLOGGETT, K .N.B., K.C.1-J.G., K.E.V.O
J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-54-01-01 on 1 January 1930. Downloaded from Protected by copyright. http://militaryhealth.bmj.com/ on October 2, 2021 by guest. [Photo hy Dorcth?/ WtldiJlg LmC'rENAKT-GECiEHAL SIR ARTIlUH SLOGGETT, K .n.B., K.C.1-J.G., K.e.v.o. J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-54-01-01 on 1 January 1930. Downloaded from VOL. LIV. JANUARY, 1930. No. 1. Authors are alone responsible for the statements made and the opinions expressed in their papers. ~tlurnal of tb' ~bituar\? LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ARTHUR SLOGGETT, K.C.B., Protected by copyright. K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O. SIR ARl'HUR SLOGGEl'l' was the son of Inspector-General W. H. Sloggett, R.N., and was born at Stoke Damerel, Devon, on November 24, 1857. He was educated' at King's College, London, of which he was subsequently elected a Fellow. He obtained the M.R.C.S.England and L.R.C.P.Edinburgh in 1880, and on February 5, 1881, was commissioned as Surgeon in the Medical Staff. In his batch were several men who afterwards attained distinction as administrators, the most eminent among them being the late Sir William Babtie. Sir Arthur Sloggett will be chiefly remembered as a wise administrator, his savoir-faire, knowledge of the world and of men, enabled him to succeed where other men, though http://militaryhealth.bmj.com/ well versed in Regulations, would have failed. Sir Arthur saw much active service ana was senior medical officer with British troops in' the Dongola expedition, 1896; he was mentioned in dispatches, received the Egyptian medal with two clasps, the Order of the Osmanieh and was promoted Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel. -
Political and Diplomatic Lessons of the Falklands War
Political and Diplomatic Lessons of the Falklands War Ken Kotani Introduction This paper focuses on the Thatcher administration’s foreign diplomacy and conduct of war during the Falklands War. Full-fledged research on the history of this war has been facilitated by the publication of a detailed official history of the Falklands War by Professor Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London, along with the release of previously closed documents and other material by the British National Archives in December 2012.1 Leaving the details of the Falklands War to Freedman’s official history, this paper shall examine the Thatcher administration’s conduct of war, specifically: (1) the extent to which the Thatcher administration was aware of the situation before the war; and (2) the Thatcher administration’s foreign diplomacy and conduct of war. 1. Did Prime Minister Thatcher have a grasp of the situation? When unraveling the history of the Falklands War, the issues which always become the focus of debate are whether Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was adequately aware of the situation regarding the Falklands before the war, and if so, the degree to which she did and the reasons why she did not take earlier action. The Thatcher administration’s handling of the Falklands issue is often compared with the policy of deterrence adopted by James Callaghan’s Labour Party administration in 1977. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Cabinet Office estimated in October 1977 that Argentine forces were plotting a landing on the South Sandwich Islands, which was British territory. Prime Minister Callaghan accordingly made the risky decision to prepare for any contingency by sending a British fleet to stand by in the vicinity of the Falklands.2 Compared to the action taken by the Callaghan administration, the Thatcher administration’s actions in 1982 seem to lack a sense of urgency. -
Raising Professional Confidence: the Influence of the Anglo-Boer War (1899 – 1902) on the Development and Recognition of Nursing As a Profession
Raising professional confidence: The influence of the Anglo-Boer War (1899 – 1902) on the development and recognition of nursing as a profession A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Nursing in the Faculty of Medical and Human Sciences. 2013 Charlotte Dale School of Nursing, Midwifery and Social Work 2 Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 Declaration ........................................................................................................................................................... 6 Copyright Statement ......................................................................................................................................... 7 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................... 8 The Author ............................................................................................................................................................ 9 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 10 Chapter One ........................................................................................................................................................ 17 Nursing, War and the late Nineteenth Century -
15 Fortin AC
Cercles 28 (2013) THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE A COLONIAL ISSUE ? THIERRY FORTIN Université de Strasbourg Introduction The 180-year-long dispute between Argentina and the UK is back in the foreground with the 30th anniversary of the conflict and a revival of tension between the two nations following the oil drilling works undertaken by Britain since 2010 and the refusal to negotiate anything expressed by London. The Falklands case is an interesting one since it may slightly alter the classic vision of a smooth decolonisation process for Britain, as advocated by Clement Attlee in 1946 about the independence of India. The Falkland Islands, an archipelago of over 700 islands located at about 300 miles from the Argentine coast but unfortunately for London at about 8,000 miles from the British Isles, were seen from the beginning as a potential naval base in the South Atlantic with a possibility to control access between the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. Even if the islands were allegedly first discovered by John Davis in August 1592, the first claim, although not entirely official, was expressed by London in 1690, just after the first recorded discovery of the islands by Captain John Strong. But since the first permanent settlement seems to have been established by the French in 1764, followed by a British settlement a few months later (with the Spanish being worried about both), Paris could also claim sovereignty over the islands, which could cause even more escalation to an already sensitive subject. As Lowell Steven Gustafson explained, no one occupied or in any way used the islands until the French did in 1764 – 172 years after the alleged British discovery. -
Defence Mobilisation Planning Comparative
AUSTRALIA JOANNE NICHOLSON, PETER DORTMANS, MARIGOLD BLACK, MARTA KEPE, SARAH GRAND CLEMENT, ERIK SILFVERSTEN, JAMES BLACK, THEODORA OGDEN, LIVIA DEWAELE, PAU ALONSO GARCIA-BODE Defence Mobilisation Planning Comparative Study An Examination of Overseas Planning The research described in this RAND Australia report was prepared for Australian Department of Defence and was conducted within RAND Australia under Contract SON2901652. About RAND Australia RAND Australia’s mission is to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. To learn more about RAND Australia, visit www.rand.org/australia Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Australia R® is a registered trademark. For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA1179-1 Preface The Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF) has established a small Directorate within Force Design Division in response to significant changes in Australia’s strategic outlook, to ensure a contemporary mobilisation planning framework across Defence. This mobilisation planning process will be conducted over two and a half years and will include several research activities. In June 2020, RAND Australia was engaged by the Australian Department of Defence to undertake a series of material studies and analysis activities. RAND Australia was asked to undertake a comparative study of mobilisation planning in selected countries to discern principles for mobilisation planning. For this a comprehensive international literature review was undertaken spanning the United States, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Singapore. To present the results so that they could be readily compared against each other, a research framework was constructed comprising examination of four areas: Planning Model, Activation, Attributes and Principles, and Forecast Trends.