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The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda © Copyright by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace

The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda © Copyright by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace

6 The of Constitution Making in

Aili Mari Tripp

ince 1990, thirty-eight African consti- once was a broad-based government to a tutions have been rewritten, and eight much smaller circle of individuals. As Ann involved major revisions. Uganda re- Mugisha, a member of the opposition, wrote Swrote its constitution in 1995. Many of the in a 2004 Journal of Democracy article, “The constitutional changes witnessed throughout real transition taking place there is from a Africa have to do with individual rights and relatively enlightened and benevolent au- liberties, the rights of traditional authori- thoritarian regime . . . to a textbook case of © Copyrightties, the protection of customary by rights, the is- Endowmententrenched one-man rule.”1 A decade of after sues of land rights, and the rights of women. its passage, 119 amendments to the 1995 These issues were central to the constitution- constitution had been made, some of them themaking United process in Uganda; States however, the un- Institutekey changes to the of earlier Peace constitution. It democratic outcomes in that country dem- was widely acknowledged that 70 percent of onstrate the ways in which these processes parliamentarians were openly bribed to give have often been politicized to serve the in- President the two-thirds terests of those in power. vote needed to alter the constitution to allow Since the 1995 constitution was adopted, him a third term.2 Uganda has slid backward precipitously in How did such undemocratic outcomes respecting civil and political liberties. The emerge from a constitution-making process government increasingly has restricted the that was touted as unprecedented in its par- freedom of association, harassed and intimi- ticipatory character? To understand the prob- dated opposition members and media work- lems with Uganda’s constitution, one needs ers, attempted to ram through undemocratic to examine the broader context within which legislation in Parliament without a quorum, it was drafted, debated, and voted on. It is and narrowed political control from what especially important to look at the relation-

158 Framing the State in Times of Transition 159

ship between the process and the outcomes to the creation of autocratic and unstable because the constituent assembly elections regimes, highly polarized polities, and de- in 1994 marked the end of the broad-based cades of civil strife. In other words, Uganda’s coalition that had characterized the ruling substantive problems with its constitutions National Resistance Movement (NRM) have been related to the procedural frailties and the beginning of the NRM acting as a of constitution making. de facto single party under an increasingly Uganda’s first constitution—the 1962 in- authoritarian regime. President Museveni, dependence constitution—was established in who came to power in 1986, had envisioned the context of a newly formed alliance be- that the NRM—or the Movement, as it is tween ’s Protestant-led Uganda referred to—would encompass all political People’s Congress (UPC) and the interests and parties in Uganda, suppress- party (KY, or King Alone). ing sectarian tendencies in the country and The Baganda are the largest ethnic group in garnering legitimacy for himself. By the mid- Uganda, constituting 18 percent of the popu- 1990s, however, rather than ushering in a pe- lation, and , their area of origin, has riod of greater inclusiveness in the political always been regarded as the largest, wealthi- process as was purported, the constitution- est, and best educated of the country’s king- making process signaled the shrinking of doms. The two parties had come together in political space, as Museveni eliminated the an unlikely and ultimately untenable coali- non-NRM multipartyists from his cabinet tion to challenge the Catholic-led Demo- and other key positions. Later, in the early cratic Party (DP). The DP’s leader, Benedicto 2000s, the circle was to close even further, Kiwanuka, had become chief minister of as Museveni purged some of his staunchest Uganda in 1961. KY was focused on the fate NRM supporters from the cabinet, military, of Buganda and the kingship, rather than the and security agencies when they opposed his entire nation, and its members believed that bid for a third term. Meanwhile, Museveni the DP, though led by a Muganda, was not has strengthened his reliance on Uganda’s interested in the kingship. KY-UPC mem- military. bers outnumbered the DP in the new 1962 parliament, ensuring that Obote could form © Copyright by the Endowmenta government to oversee the transition of to in- Continuities from Past Constitution-Making dependence that same year. theEfforts United States InstituteThe first constitution, of negotiatedPeace in Lon- Many of the problems encountered in mak- don among various parties and interests, ing the 1995 constitution have their origins provided for a Westminster form of govern- in earlier constitution-making efforts and ment. Executive powers were vested in the events. Oliver Furley and James Katalikawe prime minister, who, with his cabinet, was have argued that the prevalent view of draft- . The British Queen re- ing constitutions in Uganda has been that if mained and appointed a gov- one could come up with an adequate consti- ernor until 1963, when the constitution was tution, it would provide a basis for good and to be amended to install a president. Under democratic governance.3 But political, his- this constitution, Uganda instituted a uni- torical, and social conditions have conspired tary system, with Buganda enjoying autono- to create undemocratic and exclusionary pro- mous status—referred to as federal status in cesses for Uganda’s experience with constitu- Uganda—with greater rights and privileges tion making, which in turn has contributed than other districts in Uganda. The country’s 160 Aili Mari Tripp

other three kingdoms, , , and The developments regarding the Lost Toro, enjoyed only quasi-autonomous status. Counties led to the constitutional crisis of Buganda’s Lukiiko (parliament) served as an 1966, in which Obote assumed full executive electoral college for its representatives to the powers and suspended the 1962 constitution, Ugandan national assembly. in direct violation of that document. The king Buganda’s special status became a source sought Buganda’s secession, demanding that of tension after independence, especially af- the central government remove itself from ter Buganda’s kabaka (king), Edward Mutesa, Bugandan soil and appealing to the United became the in 1963, Nations for support. Obote’s forces marched while the UPC head, Milton Obote, served on the Buganda stronghold in Mengo and as prime minister. The kabaka’s dual loyalties brutally suppressed the royalists, killing at least to Buganda and Uganda led to a constitu- two thousand civilians. Mutesa fled to exile tional crisis in 1966.4 in Britain and Obote seized the presidency. The matter came to a head when Uganda On April 15, 1966, parliamentarians found was to decide on the so-called Lost Counties a new draft constitution in their pigeonholes in a 1965 referendum. The issue of the Lost (mail compartments), and Obote, who came Counties arose from the animosity between to Parliament surrounded by troops, forced the Bunyoro and Baganda, who had been the members of Parliament to adopt what enemies throughout much of the nineteenth came to be known as the pigeonhole consti- century. The British had used Buganda to tution. He also ordered the national assembly conquer Bunyoro and rewarded Buganda by to become a constituent assembly; it debated giving it six counties of Bunyoro territory the constitution for three months before its that had particular cultural and historical sig- adoption in in a controlled nificance to Bunyoro. The British preferential process. Obote then imposed the adoption treatment of Buganda created tension among of the new constitution and declared himself Ugandan citizens living outside of Buganda5; president without elections. in the referendum, which allowed the resi- The new constitution established a unitary dents of the Lost Counties to choose between and highly centralized state. It abolished the remaining part of Buganda or returning to position of the prime minister, placing all ©Bunyoro, Copyright the counties voted to by join Bun the­ executive Endowment powers in the hands of the presiof- yoro, leading to a split between the Baganda dent. Moreover, the executive powers were leadership and Obote. The ill-fated anti-DP expanded at the expense of the judiciary and alliancethe between United Buganda’s (KY) States party and legislature. Institute The constitution of also abolishedPeace all Milton Obote’s UPC was already frayed, kingdoms in Uganda, and Buganda’s special but after the referendum, it crumbled. KY status was eliminated. Buganda was divided fell apart, and many of its members joined into four districts, wiping its name from the UPC to support the Buganda faction of the political map, and its parliament building (the UPC that had opposed Obote, who was a ) was transformed into the headquar- Langi from northern Uganda. Mutesa, Bu- ters of Uganda’s Ministry of Defense. The ka- ganda’s king, sought military assistance from baka’s palace at Bamunanika outside the British, but before he and the Buganda became an army barracks. This enraged the faction of UPC could make a move, Obote Baganda; even though many were not enam- arrested five ministers and charged their fac- ored with the king himself, they were loyal to tion with plans to have Buganda secede from the idea of the kingship and the traditions it the rest of Uganda. represented. The new constitution paved the Framing the State in Times of Transition 161

way for further consolidation of the UPC as With 287 articles and seven schedules, the single ruling party, now that the Buganda the 1995 Ugandan constitution is one of the monarchy and the DP were out of the way. longest in the world, several times longer These events set the stage for the reign of ter- than most European constitutions and ten ror experienced under (1971–79) times the length of the U.S. constitution.8 and Obote’s second government (1980–85). This is partly because the Ugandan constitu- This period of Uganda’s history produced the tion addresses many policy issues that gener- abolition of parties in 1969 and, as the rule of ally are not included in constitutions, as they law was abandoned, the use of security forces encumber legislators dealing with new situa- to suppress opposition. tions and contingencies. After the NRM took power in 1986, its leaders felt a need to break with the previous regime of Obote and create a new basis of le- Political Context of Constitution gitimacy for the party by drafting a new con- Making stitution. The new constitution was meant to The 1989–95 constitution-making process delegitimize both the old political parties took place against the backdrop of a number (i.e., the UPC and DP) as well as the idea of of NRM initiatives designed to ensure that multiparty democracy. Simultaneously, the its objectives were met in the exercise. The new constitution was intended to advance first such initiative was a ban on the activi- the goal of bringing about a no-party democ- ties of political parties. When the NRM first racy based on popular consensus.6 The NRM came to power in 1986, it had not taken an embarked on a constitution-writing process antiparty line; it brought the leaders of op- in 1989, having formed a ministry for con- position parties into its leadership coalition stitutional affairs in 1986. Opponents of the and used them to legitimate itself as a broad- new constitution-writing exercise included based movement representing the interests those who wanted to reinstate the model of of all, and to promote itself as a movement Buganda autonomy and federalism embod- opposed to sectarianism. In a bid to consoli- ied in the 1962 independence constitution as date the NRM’s power, however, in 1992 the well as UPC supporters who wanted simply Parliament adopted a resolution suspend- © Copyrightto amend the 1967 constitution. by the Endowmenting political activity. By 1993, the of constit- The process of constitution making was uent assembly statute prohibited parties expensive, long, and drawn out. It was origi- from running candidates in the elections for thenally Unitedplanned to take two Statesyears, beginning in Institutethe assembly established of to adoptPeace a new con- 1989; instead, it took six years to produce a stitution. This kept the playing field tilted in constitution. Some say the NRM extended favor of the NRM. the length of the process as a delaying tac- Critics believe that the constitution- tic to give it more time in power. The entire making process was flawed from the outset constitution-making exercise cost $20 mil- because political parties could not mobilize , 42 percent of which came from the freely. Parties could exist and issue press re- government of Uganda and 58 percent from leases, but they could not hold workshops, foreign donors. The European Union, the conferences, or party congresses. Rallies that United States, the , Japan, were organized were forcibly stopped. Politi- Denmark, and the Develop- cal candidates were forbidden from running ment Programme were among the largest on a party ticket in elections, and had to run contributors to the exercise.7 as individuals. Parties could have national of- 162 Aili Mari Tripp

fices, but they were not permitted to open the north has been part of a cynical and con- branch offices. The NRM justified the ban certed propaganda effort to remind the south based on a purported need to unify the coun- of the ills that would befall the rest of the try through building a no-party movement country should it fall into non-NRM hands, that would represent all interests. The UPC as well as a way to keep the north from be- had been responsible for massive atrocities coming a more cohesive political bloc capable during the second Obote government and of opposing the NRM.10 It has also given the was sufficiently discredited by its past record government a pretext for keeping its defense to allow the NRM to suppress all party ac- budget high. tivity without risk of serious public backlash. But the ban not only curtailed the activities of the UPC; it prevented other parties from The Role of the Constitutional forming and weakened existing parties, most Commission of which were in disarray. Second, the NRM sought to ensure that The Selection of Constitutional Commission the politically and numerically important Members Baganda—one-fifth of the population— Many of the undemocratic characteristics of supported the new constitution. Museveni the 1995 constitution can be traced back to permitted the restoration of the Ugandan undemocratic aspects of the constitution- monarchies and traditional rulers—Buganda, making process itself. Plans to create a new Ankole, Toro, and Bunyoro—as cultural constitution under NRM leadership dated though not political entities, and returned back to the establishment of a Ministry of properties and lands to the kabaka and Constitutional Affairs in 1986. The ministry Baganda royals. did very little until 1989, when a constitu- Third, the NRM initiated a decentral- tional commission was formed.11 The selec- ization program through the 1993 Local tion of members of the constitutional com- Government Statute. The stated goal was to mission was ad hoc and done in batches. devolve planning and budgetary decisions Some members who were appointed by the and deliver services to the districts and their minister for constitutional affairs were not ©subunits. Copyright However, the law was used by later theto approved Endowment by the president, and some wereof invalidate Baganda appeals for federalism appointed by the president without approval because decentralization was said to have al- of the minister, as the Uganda Constitutional readythe succeeded United in bringing services States and ac- Commission Institute Act of 1988 required.of Peace There was countability to the people.9 no nomination process allowing anyone else Finally, the NRM capitalized on the ex- to suggest names.12 istence of continued fighting and instabil- Even though the commission’s compo- ity in the north to remind the southerners, sition was regionally balanced and one DP who enjoyed relative peace, what a return to member sat on the commission, almost to the UPC-Obote days would bring. Most of a person, the body was made up of strong the constituent assembly delegates from the supporters of the Movement system.13 It in- north were opposed to the NRM and sup- cluded both the political commissar of the ported multiparty politics. The government NRM and his counterpart in the National had been working toward a settlement in the Resistance Army (NRA). Not one mem- north but abruptly halted peace negotiations ber of the commission openly opposed the in 1994 for no apparent reason. Critics have Movement system. This left the commission long charged that the lack of settlement in open to criticism that the process of selecting Framing the State in Times of Transition 163

members was not carried out in a sufficiently introduced and explained the constitution- democratic fashion.14 The commission was making process and let people air their views. headed by Justice Ben Odoki, under the di- These seminars were followed by the solicita- rection of the minister of constitutional af- tion of memoranda.18 fairs, and was financed by the government, The constitutional commission claimed which gave the executive additional leverage that the draft constitution it produced was in running the commission. based on people’s views. Critics have been skeptical about how much of the constitu- tion reflected popular views, however, espe- Activities of the Constitutional Commission cially because the commission’s tour empha- With few exceptions, rarely in Africa has one sized educating people about the constitution seen the level of popular engagement in edu- rather than consulting with them. Opposition cation seminars, debates, media discussions, leaders accused the commission of ignoring and submission of opinion memoranda that memoranda that raised contentious issues. was evident in the Ugandan constitution- Moreover, NRM leaders vetted memoranda making process. At least 25,547 separate sub- written at the subcounty level before submit- missions of views were sent to the commis- ting them to the commission. Critics also sion.15 That there was such wide consultation have argued that the commission was part of with the public through formalized meth- NRM designs to persuade the public to sup- ods may itself be seen as a major achieve- port the NRM: While the guiding questions ment. The submissions to the commission that set the framework for the debate allowed included memoranda (10,134); for either a multiparty, one-party, or no-party essay competitions (5,844); seminar reports system, the advantages and disadvantages of from district, subcounty, and various other the multiparty system were listed, while only institutions (899); newspaper opinion arti- the advantages of the other two options were cles (2,763); individual memoranda (2,553); presented. group memoranda (839); and position papers (290).16 The level of involvement of women in the process was unprecedented in Africa Non-Governmental Civic Education © Copyrightand perhaps worldwide. No by other sectorthe of EndowmentThe controlled nature of the civic of education society sent as many memoranda to the com- associated with the constitution-making mission as did women’s groups. pro­cess was underscored by the difficulties theCommission United members States also toured the Institutethat independent non-governmental of Peace organi- country, holding seminars and gathering zations (NGOs) faced in carrying out civic the views of opinion leaders and representa- education activities. Two bodies attempted tives of key organizations in each district. A to supplement the educational activities of draft constitution in the form of guidelines the commission: the Uganda Joint Christian and guiding questions was prepared to elicit Council and the National Organisation for further commentary. Massive numbers of Civic Education and Election Monitoring people attended the seminars and partici- (NOCEM). NOCEM’s experiences exem- pated in debates. John Waliggo, one of the plify some of the ways in which limits on commission members, indicates that about freedom of association for independent or- 30,000 community leaders were engaged in ganizations framed the constitution-making seminars regarding the constitution.17 This process. was followed by seminars in 870 subcounties NOCEM was made up of fourteen human around the country, in which commissioners rights, religious, media, and legal rights asso- 164 Aili Mari Tripp

ciations, in addition to several women’s orga- an independent body. It also argued that in nizations, including Action for Development some cases, the complaints against NOCEM (ACFODE), the Uganda Federation of Busi- had been launched by government officials ness and Professional Women, and the Asso- who were attempting to rig elections in fa- ciation of Uganda Women Lawyers (FIDA). vor of Movement politics by delegitimizing They aimed to carry out civic education and NOCEM’s nonpartisan activities. Eventu- monitor the constituent assembly elections, ally, NOCEM was allowed to operate, but which they did along with other national the experience showed the limits of autono- and international observers. Even though the mous organizations within the process and organization was nonpartisan and included the government’s fear of alternative views members with past and present affiliations regarding the role of political parties. with the NRM, UPC, DP, and Conservative Party, the organization was banned. Prior to this, the president had attacked NOCEM on Key Issues Considered by the Constitutional January 26, 1994, accusing it of being a par- Commission tisan organization. The announcement that The substantive issue at the heart of the NOCEM’s accreditation as an NGO had ­constitution-making process regarded the been withdrawn gave no reason for this dis- nature of the political system in Uganda: qualification.19 Additionally, NOCEM faced Would it be a multiparty democracy or a no- harassment by the parliamentary representa- party Movement system? In its report and tive in Mukono and was banned by both the in draft proposals on the political system, district executive secretary in Bushenyi and the commission set the framework for the the district administrator in . debate over multipartyism in the constit- In an interview at the time with the uent assembly. The most contentious specific chairperson of NOCEM and president of issues that the commission addressed con- the Uganda Law Society—later to become cerned, first, the form of government suitable a High Court judge and a judge of the In- for a democratic Uganda (i.e., multiparty ternational Criminal Tribunal for — versus no-party Movement system), second, Salome Bossa pointed out that NOCEM was the role of political parties, and third, the po- ©a new Copyright organization and faced both by internal the sition Endowment of traditional rulers. of and external problems.20 Internally, the orga- The commission originated the idea of nization made a few innocent mistakes with maintaining the Movement system in the somethe individuals United who had not beenStates screened new Institute constitution, but holding of a referendumPeace properly. Those who were found to - beas on the political system (Movement versus serting partisan positions were expelled im- multipartyism) five years after promulga- mediately.21 One member who was expelled, tion of the constitution. The commission, Amos Muhindo, had been working in Kasese however, did not address issues relating to and was identified as a former UPC Youth the context in which the referendum would Winger who had an allegedly controversial be held. Its proposals did nothing to ensure political record in the early 1980s; UPC that supporters of a multiparty system could Youth Wingers were associated with inflict- articulate their views freely. Instead, party ing random terror on communities under activities that were defined in the commis- Obote’s post-1980 government. NOCEM sion’s draft constitution as incompatible with argued that the problem was partly a result of the Movement system were to remain sus- the NRM’s inexperience in dealing with such pended during the period the system was in Framing the State in Times of Transition 165

place—that is, in the period leading up to the UPC refused to send its two delegates the referendum. This left an unlevel playing in protest against the ban on party activities. field for those who did not want a- Move The Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), ment system. which Museveni had formed in 1980, also did not send delegates because it argued The Constituent Assembly Elections that the NRM was already representing its views.23 This meant that at least 66 of the Constituent Assembly Election Act of 1993 assembly’s delegates were institutionally be- The constituent assembly was the most im- holden to the NRM for their positions. Al- portant body in the constitution-making though they were not a majority, they formed process. The NRM’s original intent was to a major block of NRM supporters that could have the national assembly serve as the con- be counted on to adopt pro-NRM positions stituent assembly, as had been the case in the in addition to the chair and vice chair, who 1967 constitutional deliberations. However, were to be elected from among five presi- many questioned the representativeness of dential nominees. Despite the insistence of the existing Parliament, given its large num- political parties that they be consulted on ber of historicals—NRM members who were these five nominations, no such consulta- given parliamentary seats in recognition of tions took place. Movementist James Wa- their role in the guerrilla war that brought pakhabulo be­came the assembly’s chair, and Museveni into power—as well as presidential the vice-chair went to Professor Victoria nominees, army representatives, and women Mwaka, who mobilized the support of elected by an electoral college that was closely women and the Baganda. Three of the four associated with the NRM. None of these committees established within the assembly members was seen as having the mandate of also were headed by Movementists.24 the people.22 As a result of pressure from po- The Constituent Assembly Election Act of litical parties to have delegates elected freely 1993 was the first opportunity for the NRM from all parts of the country, the idea of us- government to translate its implicit ban on ing the national assembly was dropped. But political party activity into a legal ban, with other crucial efforts to keep the playing field the effects mentioned above. Under the act, © Copyrightunlevel succeeded. by the Endowmentcandidates could not use a political of party af- The constituent assembly statute of 1993 filiation in running for the assembly. They also provided for the special selection of 74 of could only participate in campaign rallies or thethe delegatesUnited in addition Statesto the 214 directly Institutemeetings organized byof the Peacegovernment; no elected from the districts. Of the 74, ten other rallies or any forms of public demon- were to be appointed by the president, ten stration in support of or against a candidate by the NRA, two by the National Organisa- were allowed.25 Political party membership tion of Trade Unions, two by each of the four recruitment, establishment of branch offices, political parties, four by a National Youth party member conferences, and campaign- Council, and one by the National Union of ing under party banners were all forbidden. Disabled Persons of Uganda. In addition, Candidates simply had to run as individuals. 39 women were elected by an electoral col- These provisions of the act violated the 1967 lege of subcounty counselors and members constitution’s guarantees of freedom of asso- of the subcounty Women’s Councils within ciation and of assembly. They also suppressed the district. The actual number of special del- public debate, especially on the draft consti- egates seated in the assembly was only 70, as tution’s more controversial aspects. 166 Aili Mari Tripp

Meanwhile, NRM candidates continued to that were effectively excluded from the public use the media to assert their views, an oppor- debate. As a result, the election process suf- tunity not as available to non-NRM candi- fered, as the differing positions on issues that dates. Candidates participated in the assem- lay at the heart of Uganda’s political conflicts bly elections as though they were contestants were not represented effectively. in a struggle for political power rather than as participants in a constitutional debate, as evidenced by Museveni’s proclamation after The Election Process and Results the assembly elections that “we have won!” All in all, the elections gave every advan- Who was to win if everyone was simply run- tage to the NRM. The fairness of the elec- ning as an individual? By directly and openly tions largely depended on the impartiality supporting Movement candidates, the NRM and integrity of the commissioner running in effect behaved as a political party while not the elections. Museveni appointed his friend allowing others to operate in the same fash- Steven Akabway as commissioner; many ion. As a result, the assembly elections became regarded him as a political flunky and were a turning point, out of which the Movement critical of his appointment.26 emerged as a de facto single ruling party. There were complaints that government The 1993 assembly statute adopted by ministers were holding public rallies before the national assembly was challenged in the the date set for campaigning to begin, on the Constitutional Court by a petition from pretext that they were conducting govern- the UPC, which argued, first, that the ban ment business. Police were called in, but no on party activity suppressed constitutionally one was prosecuted for holding such events. guaranteed rights of free assembly and asso- In many cases, government ministers stand- ciation, and second, that the provisions gov- ing as candidates used so-called official tours erning campaigning adversely affected the to donate large sums of money and goods to right to free expression. In a blatantly politi- local schools and hospitals before and dur- cal decision, the court dismissed the petition ing the election campaign. This was just one on the grounds that the suspension of party way that ministers employed the trappings activity was a temporary measure and that of state power for their campaigns to gain ©such Copyright a measure was necessary to by prevent the a undue Endowment advantage over their rivals. Almost of reversion to the chaos of the past. every minister was accompanied by convoys The effect of the regulations governing of ministerial vehicles, which they used to the assembly United elections was toStates drive parts transport Institute themselves and theirof supporters Peace to of the electoral process underground, with polling stations. One even traveled from his campaign events held at funeral meetings, home less than half a mile from the polling in churches, and at fund-raising events with place in an official helicopter. limited impact. It also shifted the debate from In some cases, NRM candidates initi- a focus on the issues to a focus on personali- ated the giving of gifts, money, alcohol, ties and their relationships to the president. food, and promises of future gains to vot- Not surprisingly, Museveni won the 1996 ers. In other instances, the electorate became and subsequent 2001 and 2006 presidential extortionists.27 Adoko Nekyon, a long-time elections in sweeping victories over opposi- member of Parliament, said that in the forty- tion candidates. In light of the restrictions on three years since the national assembly was campaigning and organized political activity, formed, he had never seen such extensive the electorate could not consider viewpoints buying of votes as he witnessed in the con- Framing the State in Times of Transition 167

stituent assembly elections.28 Such charges federal system, in which the kabaka would are hard to prove or disprove, but there was serve as the constitutional leader of Buganda; ample anecdotal evidence to support them. the National Caucus for Democracy to pro- Voter turnout in the constituent assembly mote multipartyism, political pluralism, and election was very high, ranging from 66 per- freedom of association; and the Women’s 29 cent in Karamoja to 97 percent in Kabale. Caucus, which cut across party and NRM In the election, 84 percent of the national lines and promoted the cause of women’s assembly members ran in the constituent rights. These caucuses formed around key assembly elections, and despite the NRM’s controversial issues being debated and thus many advantages, 51 percent of the parlia- featured prominently in the constituent as- mentary candidates who ran for the constit- sembly’s deliberations. uent assembly lost. The largest number who lost overall were in the east (60 percent of parliamentary candidates) and the north (67 Future of the Political System percent). There were also significant losses One of the most controversial issues ad- for the NRM in the north and east—areas of dressed in the assembly deliberations was the opposition where citizens were frustrated by future of the political system, that is, whether continued conflict and lack of development the country should adopt a no-party Move- in their regions. Thus, the NRM remained ment system, a multiparty system, or some the dominant political force in the western other type of democratic and representative and central regions, while multiparty advo- system. There were several dramatic standoffs cates held sway in the eastern and northern between the Movementists and supporters regions.30 of a multiparty system around this issue. Because political parties could not field The multipartyists wanted the constitu- candidates or carry out campaigns, it is dif- tion to provide for freedom of association ficult to know to what extent the outcome and the creation of an interim government of the elections reflected real political senti- ments rather than the capacity of candidates composed of all political parties that would to hand out material inducements. Ethnic govern the country for three years until the © Copyrightallegiances were an additional by factor inthe many Endowmentnew constitution would come into offorce. The of the races. But in many ways, the elections Movementists felt that the country was not also tested the strength of existing political ready for multipartyism and that it would theorganizations. United Finally, the States elections reflected Institutefracture the country ofirreparably. Peace In the end, support for the NRM among the Baganda in the assembly’s decisions reinforced the rec- the south, who by this point had been per- ommendations of the constitutional com- suaded to endorse the Movement after the mission that the Movement system should restoration of their kingship in 1993.31 continue in power for another five years, after which a referendum should be held to determine whether or not to transition to Constituent Assembly Deliberations a multiparty political system. Its advocates Several caucuses formed in the process of deemed the Movement system to be broad- deliberation on the draft constitution pro- based, inclusive of all people, nonsectarian, duced by the constitutional commission: the and hence, nonpartisan. Using a referendum National Resistance Movement Caucus; the was seen as enhancing democracy and popu- Buganda Caucus, to promote the idea of a lar participation, allowing people to have a 168 Aili Mari Tripp

say in deciding on which political system called for a rapid return to multiparty poli- should govern them. tics, saying that “it is almost immoral to want Ultimately, the constituent assembly reaf- another free extension of five years to make firmed the monopoly on political power held it twenty” years of NRM rule.33 The NRM by the NRM and banned “any activities” that forced him to apologize, retract his com- might “interfere with the movement political ments, and promise to seek guidance from system” (Article 269 of the 1995 constitution). the army before expressing an opinion on the The crucial debate over the future of multi- constitution. partyism in the constituent assembly was re- Multipartyists and Movementists clashed solved in July 1995 after four days of delib- on other points as well. Dick Nyai, a UPC erations and a walkout by multiparty forces. assembly member, wanted presidential and The NRM prevailed with 199 votes in favor parliamentary elections to be held on the of continued no-party rule, 68 opposed, and same day, on the grounds of expense, logistics, 2 abstentions. Multipartyists argued against and practicality. This proposal was rejected, enshrining the Movement political system in even though it seemed reasonable to many, the constitution because it would constrain purely because a multipartyist had presented Ugandans’ ability to alter their own political it. Many observers were incredulous that this system. Multipartyists also argued that using move was defeated. Many multipartyists felt periodic referendums to change the political that if the elections were split and the presi- system would create instability and could be dential elections held first, a large Museveni easily manipulated by whoever was in power. victory would demoralize multipartyist sup- The constituent assembly rejected these- ar porters and convince some of those who were guments and voted down the multipartyists’ wavering to join the Movementists. Similarly, proposals. the Movementists reasoned that a successful The no-party Movement system not only presidential victory would guarantee them a circumscribed the activity of opposition par- victory in the upcoming parliamentary elec- ties, it also gave the NRM—because it was tions as well. theoretically to be a movement representing the entire citizenry—a rationale not to insti- ©tutionalize Copyright itself as an internally democraticby the Federalism Endowment and the Status of Buganda of political party. This left key elements of po- Another major conflict erupted over feder- litical control highly centralized within the alism and the governance of Buganda. Bu- NRM.the Power United within the NRM States continues to gandan Institute royalists had sought of to Peace reestablish be concentrated at the top. The NRM has Buganda’s pre-1966 autonomous status, un- never held elections for any of its leaders, nor der which all districts in the kingdom paid has it convened any popularly elected body taxes to the Mengo government rather than to vote on policies.32 This has led to disaffec- central government. The royalists proposed tion within the Movement, although signs that the kabaka should administer Buganda of such dissatisfaction were already evident while serving primarily as a titular head. during the assembly deliberations. Some wanted the name of Uganda At one point in the constituent assem- changed to Sovereign State of Uganda. The bly discussions, Major-General Tinyefuza, a constituent assembly resolved this by calling high-ranking army delegate, ignored Move- Uganda a sovereign state and a republic. ment discipline and openly criticized the The Buganda parliament (the Lukiiko) extension of the Movement system through promoted the creation of fourteen federal the period leading up to the referendum. He states in Uganda to gain greater acceptance Framing the State in Times of Transition 169

for a federal structure. Within the constituent ended up hurting both as they tried to use assembly, however, the Baganda representa- one another.35 tives had mixed feelings about federalism The issue of federalism continued to and, while many supported the recognition Ugandan politics in the years after the consti- of Baganda culture, they were not ready to tution’s enactment. Continuing pressure for a give up Uganda’s republican identity. Many federal system from Buganda resulted in a also feared that Buganda’s federalism was the government proposal for regional parliaments first step toward secession. They were wary in a federal system for Buganda, , Toro, of the Lukiiko’s authority and of attempts to and Bunyoro. With waning political backing undermine their legitimacy as elected repre- nationwide, Museveni was eager to shore up sentatives of districts within Buganda. his support among the kingdoms, especially Prior to the constituent assembly, the Buganda, before the 2006 presidential elec- UPC and DP both endorsed Buganda’s de- tions. Having been granted symbolic cultural mands for federalism. This was a dramatic recognition in the 1995 constitution, the change from their earlier positions. As ex- kingdoms continued to press for greater po- plained above, the UPC abolished Buganda’s litical power and a more public role. In 2005, special status when it replaced the 1962 con- a constitutional amendment was passed to stitution. The NRM sought to preempt the create regional tiers throughout the country assembly’s debate on the subject by passing as a layer of administration above the exist- a Traditional Rulers Statute in 1993, which ing district system funded by the central allowed for the restoration of traditional rul- government. Regional leaders would be un- ers as cultural leaders.34 In addition, fearing able to tax the population, yet they were to an alliance among the opposition parties and be accountable to them. The regional bodies the Buganda leadership in Mengo, the NRM were to be in charge of secondary education, met with the Mengo government and agreed referral hospitals, cultural matters, interdis- that Buganda would form a regional govern- trict roads, water and sanitation, and agricul- ment under the new constitution. ture monitoring. A few days before the 2006 In the end, Mengo gambled and lost presidential elections, the Buganda leadership © Copyrightits bid for federalism. It agreed by to supportthe Endowmentin Mengo rejected the regional tier of arrange - NRM positions on antidemocratic aspects of ment, opting instead for their own version of the constitution in exchange for federalism. autonomy, referred to commonly as federo. theBut theUnited NRM reneged on States its end of this per- Institute of Peace ceived bargain. The majority of the -assem bly delegates took the view that federalism Outcomes of the Constitution-Making would undermine the unity of the country. Process They agreed to recognize Buganda as a dis- Overall, the constituent assembly’s delibera- tinct entity, but instead of federalism, they tions lasted twenty-nine months from the opted for decentralization and devolution of time the assembly opened in February 16, power from the center to the district level, 1993, to its conclusion on August 25, 1995, a policy that was already in place before the when the 284-member assembly adopted the assembly convened. The constituent assem- new constitution in toto. The constitution bly rejected the NRM’s agreement on fed- was enacted on September 22 and promul- eralism and other promises made to Mengo gated on October 8, 1995, by the president. before the assembly’s deliberations. Oppor- The NRM tried to use the constitution- tunism by Mengo and the multiparty caucus making process to give its Movement system 170 Aili Mari Tripp

greater legitimacy and entrench its control. passed a highly controversial Movement Act, This may have worked in the short run, but requiring all adult Ugandans to belong to the it soon began to cost the NRM politically as Movement system, even those who opposed it became apparent that the Movement was it. Multipartyists and many prodemocracy not interested in furthering the democratiza- advocates opposed the bill on the grounds tion process. All democratization measures that it was unconstitutional. They feared it have been controlled by the regime, which would destroy freedom of association by mak- has been limiting political space and cen- ing membership in the Movement manda- tralizing power since the mid-1990s, both tory. It was seen as enhancing the authority within the Movement itself and within the of the executive and reducing the already country. The resulting system has kept one limited powers of the legislature. It was person in power for over twenty years with also seen as a ploy to turn the five-tiered lo- limited possibilities for the development of cal governance system into branches of the a truly competitive electoral system and loyal Movement.36 An earlier version of the bill, opposition. promoted by the NRM leadership, was even The early broad-based NRM government more undemocratic. It declared the president that had sought to incorporate a wide spec- of Uganda to be the chair of the Movement, trum of political, ethnic, religious, and other making the election of the NRM leader un- interests through political appointments and necessary. It also made all members of Parlia- processes of consensus building was replaced ment ex officio members of the NRM na- by the time the constitution was adopted by tional conference, whether they chose to join a smaller clique of loyalists, whose activities or not. Although a majority of the Parliament are cloaked in secrecy. The internal division were Movement supporters, they rejected that emerged within the Movement after the this version of the bill in favor of a modified adoption of the 1995 constitution was one of one. When the first national Movement con- the most striking developments. Some of the ference was finally held in July 1998, unsur- sharpest criticisms of the lack of democracy prisingly, Museveni ran unopposed and was have come from within the Movement itself, elected chair of the Movement; similarly, the including some of Museveni’s closest confi- vice chair and the national political commis- ©dantes Copyright and political appointees: Colonelby Kithe- sar wereEndowment elected unopposed. of iza Besigye, Miria Matembe, Jaberi Bidandi At the eleventh hour, the NRM brought Ssali, Eriya Kategaya, , and the referendum bill to the Parliament in 1999 Augustinethe UnitedRuzindana. Stateswith Institute little time for debate. Theof passagePeace of the A series of legislative acts since the con- act paved the way for a constitutionally man- stitution was adopted entrenched Movement dated referendum that was held in 2000. The dominance, transforming what was to be a referendum was meant to determine whether no-party system into one-party hegemony. Uganda would have a Movement, multi- Some of these bills were passed without the party, or some other kind of political system. required quorum or were speedily pushed The bill was steamrolled through Parlia- through under pressure from the executive. ment, and Museveni signed it even though The new constitution gave the Parliament the the required ninety-member quorum was power to create the organs of the Movement not reached, as only fifty members of Parlia- political system and required that the system ment voted on the bill. The referendum was be democratic, accountable, and transparent, held on July 1, 2000; the Movement system and give all citizens access to positions of won with 94.3 percent of the vote. However, leadership. In 1997, however, the Parliament turnout for the referendum was exception- Framing the State in Times of Transition 171

ally low by Ugandan standards: Only about In an about-face in 2005, multiparty- 50 percent of registered voters turned out. In ism suddenly became acceptable in a quid some areas, the turnout was as low as 11 per- pro quo arrangement that allowed Muse­ cent. This contrasted sharply with the 1996 veni to stay in power. In December 2004, presidential elections, in which 73 percent the government presented Parliament with 37 of registered voters participated. The ma- 119 constitutional amendments, including jor opposition parties, the Uganda People’s amendments that would lift limits on the Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party president’s service of two terms (Article (DP), boycotted the referendum, refusing to 105.2), lift the restriction on political parties lend legitimacy to the process. (Article 269), change the political system to Yet another controversial piece of legis- a multiparty system (Articles 69–74), and lation—the Political Parties and Organisa- impose sanctions on cultural leaders (kings tions Bill—was introduced and withdrawn and chiefs) who violated the constitution. At numerous times in Parliament as a result of the same time, Museveni openly bribed 213 sharp disagreements over its content. Af- of the 305 (70 percent) members of Parlia- ter many years of debate, the act was finally ment with 5 million shillings ($3,000) each passed on June 7, 2002. The resulting act did in exchange for supporting his attempt to not allow parties to operate at the local level, remove term limits on the presidency. Ten prohibited them from holding more than others signed up to receive the funds. The one national conference a year, banned public government needs two-thirds of Parliament meetings of parties except for national meet- to approve amendments to the constitution, ings, and provided for the imprisonment of such as an amendment to remove term lim- party leaders should the act be violated. Leg- 39 its on the presidency. The constitutional islation such as this could be directly traced commission had incorporated the provision back to the constitution-making process’s of two five-year term limits on the presi- failure to achieve a genuine popular consen- dency because of the fear of unrestrained sus regarding Uganda’s political system. power that has had such detrimental ef- Many of the above controversial acts were 40 challenged in the Constitutional Court. In fects on postcolonial politics in Africa. In © CopyrightMarch 2003, in Ssemogerere by and Othersthe v. Endowmentrecent years, civil societies and legislaturesof Attorney-General Constitutional Petition No. have fought bitterly over attempts to lift ex- 5, the court struck down sections of the Po- ecutive term limits and succeeded in keep- thelitical United Parties and Organisations States Act that Instituteing them in Nigeria, of Zambia, Peace and , suppressed activities of opposition political but failed in Togo, Burkina Faso, Gabon, parties. In Ssemogerere and Others v. Attorney- Guinea, Chad, Tunisia, and Uganda. Term General Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2000, limits were removed in Uganda in June the court supported the contention that the 2005, paving the way for Museveni to run Referendum Act in 1999 was unconstitu- for president in 2006. tional; a third ruling in Ssemogerere and Olum In the 2006 elections, Museveni won by a v. Attorney-General Constitutional Petition 22 percent margin over his opponent, Kizza No. 3 of 2000 found that the Referendum Besigye; however, the opposition contested Act of 2000 was unconstitutional and that the 59 percent of the votes that he claimed. the referendum itself, which sanctioned the Even Uganda’s supreme court found evi- continuation of the Movement system, was dence of irregularities, intimidation, and vio- invalid. The supreme court, however, over- lence, but a 4–3 majority of judges narrowly turned this latter ruling.38 rejected Besigye’s request for a recount on 172 Aili Mari Tripp

grounds that it was unlikely to overturn the and many others, who condemned the siege final outcome. of the courts as undermining the rule of law. The opposition has come under increasing Over three hundred lawyers went on strike repression since 2000. It has not been un- to protest the military’s interference in the common for treason and sedition charges to judiciary’s independence. be brought against people who voice opposi- tion to the government through the media or in other fora. Often such charges have been Lessons of Uganda’s Constitution- used as a pretext to detain people without Making Experiences bail indefinitely, only later to have the charges The 1995 constitution needs to be under- dropped. Political prisoners have numbered stood in light of the broader context within in the thousands, extralegal killings of op- which it was written, including the NRM’s position party members have been reported, bargaining with the Bugandan leadership and torture has been carried out and widely and the recognition given the kingdoms acknowledged, even by the Parliament and before the adoption of the constitution; the government-appointed commissions. Pre- restrictions on party and associational ac- election harassment and intimidation of the tivities; control over appointments to the opposition were widespread in the 2001 and constitutional commission and constituent 2006 elections.41 assembly; bribing of voters during the con- The more recent move toward multipar- stituent assembly elections; and, more gener- tyism thus needs to be understood in light ally, the role of patronage and corruption in of Museveni’s bid for a third term. Popular the political process. discontent with the Movement system made At no time was Uganda’s constitution- it untenable as a political system, but the way making exercise a neutral and open process, in which multipartyism was introduced— free of manipulation; the entire exercise was and in particular, its link to Museveni’s quest part of a broader political agenda of those in for a third term—raises questions about the power who sought to use the new constitu- Movement’s interest in fundamental change. tion to remain in power at all costs. From the Moreover, the harassment, intimidation, and outset, this limited what could be accom- ©violence Copyright directed at opposition parties by in thethe plished Endowment through the process of adopting of a 2006 election raises serious doubts about the new constitution. Though the level of popu- government’s commitment to democratiza- lar engagement in the process was unprec- tionthe and multipartyism.United On NovemberStates 16, edented, Institute that engagement of had littlePeace impact 2005, —the key opposition on the substance of the constitution and may leader of the Forum for Democratic Change have lent unwarranted legitimacy to the more (FDC)—was arrested on charges of treason undemocratic aspects of the process and the and rape. The day he was to be brought to the resulting constitution, giving the Movement High Court to be released on bail, a Black more time to entrench itself. Mamba armed security squad had been de- It is important to look at which constit- ployed at the court to rearrest him in an ex- uencies were appeased in the process and to tralegal action. This prompted protests from what end. Was there a quid pro quo negoti- the High Court judges, Chief Justice Odoki ated through the constitution-making pro- (who had been the head of the constitutional cess that led to undemocratic outcomes? commission), the inspector general of gov- Women, for example, were very pleased ernment, leaders of the Uganda Law Society, with the extensive constitutional recognition the government’s human rights commission, of women’s rights and gave the Movement Framing the State in Times of Transition 173

considerable electoral support in subsequent and free deliberations. They underestimated elections. Women also were very active in the the extent to which the entire exercise was entire process of the constituent assembly, subject to political manipulation and the carrying out civic education programs and ways in which an unlevel playing field would submitting memoranda to the constitutional influence the outcomes. Museveni used con- commission. Yet when it came to legislation tinued donor support for his government that would have concretely advanced wom- to justify the continuation of NRM domi- en’s rights, such as key amendments to the nance. This became even more evident after 1998 Land Act, Museveni refused support. September 11, 2001, when Museveni could Similarly, the promised equal opportunities more easily get away with characterizing po- commission, which, according to the con- litical opposition, especially the widespread stitution, was to oversee the enforcement of opposition to him in the northern part of women’s rights, never materialized. A decade Uganda, as linked to terrorist activity. later, the very same supporters of the positive The situation in Uganda today is fraught constitutional measures regarding women with contradictions. Uganda has a consti- have joined forces under the rubric of the tution that provides for the protection of advocacy and lobbying coalition Uganda political and civil rights. Yet there has been Women’s Network (UWONET) to protest increased repression of the opposition and the proposed lifting of presidential term greater limits on civil and political liber- limits. In a very brave initiative, given the ties since the constitution was adopted. The levels of repression in the country, eighteen 1995 constitution expands the powers of high-profile women activists went to -Par Parliament and potentially allows it to check liament in December 2004 to express their executive excesses. Parliament is to approve opposition to the constitutional amendment presidential appointments of the vice presi- pertaining to presidential terms, referred to dent, cabinet ministers, judges of the High in Uganda as kisanja (dry banana leaves).42 Court, justices of the Court of Appeal and Kisanja is also the Kiganda word for giving Supreme Court, and heads of key commis- someone a second chance. sions. Yet the executive has been able to push All the controversial issues in which the undemocratic legislation through Parliament © Copyrightmajority voted down the minorityby opposithe- Endowmentwithout a quorum, despite constitutional of tion in the constituent assembly have come limitations on executive powers. During the back to haunt Uganda’s political leaders in debate over term limits, Museveni threat- thesubsequent United years and have States been fought out Instituteened to weaken Parliament of furtherPeace by elimi- politically in the legislature. But the execu- nating its powers of censure and dissolving it tive has more direct control over the process altogether if it disagreed with him. Although in the legislature than it did in the assembly, the constitutional review committee rejected and the possibilities for real change are even Museveni’s efforts to abolish the two-term more limited. limit on the presidency, he openly bribed Uganda’s experience also shows that do- members of Parliament to vote for lifting nor support for constitution-making pro- the limit and won the 2006 presidential elec- cesses needs to be considered carefully. Many tions. This means that by 2011, when his citizens interpreted international donor sup- term ends, he will have been president for port for the process in Uganda as support for twenty-five years. To fully understand what Museveni and his agenda. Donors believed happened in the 1995 constitution-making they were supporting a neutral process in exercise in Uganda, it is necessary to account which the outcome was contingent on open for the political dimensions of constitution 174 Aili Mari Tripp

making and consider the broader political 11. J. Katorobo, “Electoral Choices in the agendas at work within the country. Constituent Assembly Elections,” in From Chaos to Order, p. 117. 12. Furley and Katalikawe, “Constitutional Notes Reform in Uganda,” pp. 247–51. 13. J. Oloka-Onyango, “New Wine or New 1. A. Mugisha, “Museveni’s Machinations,” Bottles? Movement Politics and One-Partyism in Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 2 (2004), p. 140. Uganda,” in No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths 2. “A new element was introduced into our and Realities, ed. J. Mugaju and J. Oloka-Onyango parliamentary methods of work, whereby the legis- (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2000), p. 45. lators of a particular persuasion, namely the NRM, 14. Barya, The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Con- were given large sums of money outside their nor- stitution, p. 17. mal remuneration in order to ‘facilitate’ their vot- 15. Republic of Uganda, Constituent Assembly ing for some proposals, particularly the removal of Proceedings. presidential term limits.” See “Constitution Has 16. Mukholi, A Complete Guide, 30. Become a Temporary Document!” editorial, , August 23, 2005; “When the Loan Shark 17. J.M. Waliggo, “Constitution-Making and Comes Knocking, Even MPs Have a Price,” The the Politics of Democratisation in Uganda,” in From Chaos to Order, pp. 18–40. East African, August 15, 2005. 18. Waliggo, “Constitution-Making,” pp. 3. See O. Furley and J. Katalikawe, “Consti- 26–27. tutional Reform in Uganda: The New Approach,” African Affairs, vol. 96, no. 383 (April 1997), 19. Ofwono Opondo, “Akabway Rejects pp. 243–61. NOCEM,” New Vision, February 13, 1994. 20. Salome Bossa, interview by the author, 4. P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A July 4, 1995. Story of Unfulfilled Hopes (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1992), p. 58. 21. John Nzinjah, “NOCEM Man Sacked,” New Vision, February 24, 1994. 5. See generally M. Doornbos and F. Mwesigye, “The New Politics of Kingmaking,” in 22. Mukholi, A Complete Guide, p. 35. From Chaos to Order: The Politics of Constitution- 23. Ibid., p. 37. Making in Uganda, ed. H.B. Hansen and M. Twad- 24. The business committee was responsible dle (Kampala and Oxford: Fountain Publishers and for organizing and managing the schedule of the James Currey, 1995); D. Mukholi, A Complete Guide assembly. It was headed by the chair, James Wapak- to Uganda’s Fourth Constitution: History, Politics, and habulo, together with his deputy Victoria Mwaka, ©the LawCopyright (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, by 1995); the both Endowment Movementists. The legal and drafting of com- Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence. mittee was charged with overseeing the content and wording of the constitution. The rules and orders 6. Uganda Constitutional Commission, The committee was to advise the chairman on the order Reportthe of theUnited Uganda Constitutional States Commission Institute of Peace of business. The privileges, discipline, and welfare (Kampala: Uganda Constitutional Commission, committee was charged with handling matters per- 1993); J.J. Barya, The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Con- taining to the welfare of the delegates and general stitution: Achieving Consensus by Law (Kampala: discipline. Centre for Basic Research, 2000), p. 46. 25. Barya, The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Con- 7. Mukholi, A Complete Guide, pp. 42, 99. stitution, p. 22. 8. Furley and Katalikawe, “Constitutional ­ 26. Furley and Katalikawe, “Constitutional Reform in Uganda,” p. 257. Reform in Uganda,” p. 252. 9. Barya, J.J., The Making of Uganda’s 1995 27. J. Geist, “Political Significance of the Constitution, Working Paper no. 57 (Kampala: Constituent Assembly elections,” in From Chaos to Centre for Basic Research, 2000), p. 42. Order, p. 97. 10. Barya, The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Con- 28. “Museveni Rigging Worse than Obote, stitution, pp. 14–15. says Nekyon,” The Monitor, March 21, 2001. Framing the State in Times of Transition 175

29. Katorobo, “Electoral Choices,” p. 131; and 37. Okello Jabweli, Felix Osike, and Simon Geist, “Political Significance,” p. 99. Kaheru, “Movement in Big Lead,” New Vision, 30. Katorobo, “Electoral Choices,” p. 121. July 1, 2000. 31. N. Kasfir, “Ugandan Politics and the Con- 38. Erica Bussey, “Constitutional Dialogue stituent Assembly Elections,” in From Chaos to Or- in Uganda,” Journal of African Law, vol. 49, no. 1 der, pp. 171–76. (2005), pp. 2–23. 32. Ibid., p. 61. 39. “223 MPs Got Shs5m Cash,” The Moni- 33. Robert Kabushenga, “Tinyefuze Owes tor, November 16, 2004. Ugandans an Explanation,” New Vision, Novem- 40. Odoki Commission Report 1993, avail- ber 7, 1999. able at www.federo.com/pages/odoki_report_1993. 34. Mukholi, A Complete Guide, p. 33. htm (accessed July 18, 2009). 35. Barya, The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Con- 41. “Observers Declare Poll Peaceful Despite stitution, p. 42. Vote-Buying and Violence,” The East African, Feb- ruary 28, 2006; Patrick Onyango, “Poll Violence 36. “Critics Tear Up NRM Bill,” The Moni- Team Lines Up Museveni,” The Monitor, March 2, tor, February 15, 1997; “Prof. Mujaju Slams Mu- 2002. seveni’s Praise Singers,” The Monitor, February 8, 1997; “Fireworks Expected as NRM Bill Moves to 42. “Women Activists Say No to Kisanja,” House,” The Monitor, February 13, 1997. New Vision, December 2, 2004.

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