TWO REVOLUTIONS COMPARED: AND VENEZUELA

Silvia Pedraza and Carlos A. Romero

While scholars who study revolutions have long helm of government, supported by Raúl Castro’s called for cross-national comparisons (e.g., Skocpol control at the helm of the military. 1979; Goldstone 1982), few comparative analyses A strong opposition began to develop after the mas- have been carried out, and those that do exist have sive nationalizations that took place in the early mostly focused on European cases, seldom centering 1960s of all the large industries and institutions con- on the developing world. Thus, our attempt to com- trolled by the U.S. and Cuba’s elites. Particularly the pare the Cuban and Venezuelan revolutions is novel failure of the exile-led invasion at Bay of Pigs in 1961 (Pedraza and Romero 2017). caused the massive exodus of Cubans leaving the is- Yet it is not easy to compare the Cuban and the Boli- land to begin to take place, an exodus that now con- varian revolutions, as their origins, processes, and sists of five distinct waves, and has never ceased (Pe- outcomes were rather different (cf. Tilly 1981). The draza 2007; Amaro 1977). When the failure at Bay political propaganda tries to render them equal: both of Pigs consolidated the revolution, de- from those who see them as the result of an inevitable clared himself to have always been a Marxist-Lenin- world-wide revolutionary dynamic and from those ist, contrary to his earlier assertions that the revolu- who denounce them for their similarities. The effort tion was not red but “green as the palm trees of to compare these two processes analytically— Cuba” (Castro 1959). Cuba then shifted its econom- whether motivated by the wish to applaud or criti- ic and political allegiance from the U.S. to the Soviet cize the Venezuelan-Cuban connection—is often Union. tainted by particular interests and political ideologies. With the and Eastern European coun- Here we strive for a less ideologically-driven analysis, tries as its economic lifeline and benefactor for the comparing them according to their similarities and next 30 years, the modeled itself differences. on the blueprint of their communist institutions. By contrast, Hugo Chávez was also a charismatic figure SIMILARITIES but he gained the presidency in Venezuela in 1998 Regarding their similarities, both were revolutions in through the electoral system, which has always re- that they entailed a fundamental break with the past, mained standing, and the revolution he sparked was though the social transformations went far deeper in originally characterized, rather ambiguously, as “the Cuba. Issuing from an armed struggle in the mid- Bolivarian revolution.” Under the charismatic leader- 1950s that sought to depose the unyielding dictator, ship of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela became a different , the Cuban revolution initially gar- political model, rooted in caudillismo and in the anti- nered enormous support across all social classes and elite thrust of populism. It was based on a redistribu- races. For over half a century, Cuba relied on the tion-oriented oil policy, involving the synchroniza- twin leadership of the two Castro brothers: the char- tion of the civic and the military, and dependent on ismatic, paternalistic figure of Fidel Castro at the the exercise of the electoral majority. It gradually be-

88 Two Revolutions Compared: Cuba and Venezuela came transformed into the deeper vision of “the so- equally speak to and for the hearts and minds of the cialism of the 21st century” after several electoral suc- people (Raúl Castro in Cuba, Nicolás Maduro in cesses (Corrales and Penfold 2015). Venezuela). While the leadership transition from Fi- del to Raúl and Chávez to Maduro was effected, in Through a process of nationalizations and strong both cases the actual death of the leader was really popular support, both revolutions also featured the mourned. Fidel Castro’s death, in particular, in displacement of the old elites by new elites willing to 2016, captured the imagination of the world and carry out its socialist vision for the future. Both en- marked the end of an era in Latin America. As Pedra- tailed the state’s control of the society. Both revolu- za (2016) underscored, “He was the young, bearded tions were an expression of populism (cf. Müller revolutionary from a small island who took on the 2015). They both enjoyed enormous popular sup- enormous Goliath of U.S. capitalism and American port from those they sought to represent and benefit: hegemony. That is the stuff of dreams.” But it was the poor, the working class, peasants, women, and ra- not a dream for everyone, and real disagreements re- cial minorities. Both generated enormous opposition main as to whether he was David or Goliath. from those most affected and dispossessed, particu- larly the middle and upper classes, including those Both revolutions relied on each other to deepen the who did not believe in their promises. Both railed social transformations effected. From Chávez’s victo- against the United States and established an anti- ry in 1998 on, the historical link between Venezuela American foreign policy, while seeking new interna- and the United States was gradually replaced by a tional partnerships. As Slater and Fenner (2011:1) strong link between Venezuela and Cuba. The strong pointed out, both regimes became stable and sus- friendship and alliance between Fidel Castro and tained their rule by similar means: coercing rivals; ex- Hugo Chávez served to buoy up the island. This not tracting revenues; turning citizens into Party mili- only entailed military collaboration and training, but tants; and cultivating dependence. also the exchange of services of Cuban doctors and Both revolutions undermined dissent by persecuting other health personnel for Venezuelan oil. The enor- their opponents, including jailing them as political mous hardships created by “the special period,” as prisoners; exerting pressure on the courts; and taking Castro characterized the deep economic and political over the independent institutions of civil society, in crisis that took place in Cuba after the collapse of Cuba, or stifling the news media, in Venezuela. The communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe opposition to Fidel and Raúl Castro in the early in 1989–1990, resulted in a contraction of GDP in 1960s took on the form of armed struggle; from the Cuba of about 35% in the early 1990s. The result in mid-1980s on, it became a non-violent dissident the island was both an economic and a political crisis. movement inspired by glasnost and perestroika in the After a few years, Venezuela stepped in to replace the Eastern European communist world. While it con- Soviet Union as the island’s benefactor. Cuba traded tinues to exist today, expressed in groups such as the its doctors for oil. The oil—90,000 barrels a day— Damas de Blanco (the Ladies in White) as well as kept Cuba from the persistent losses of electric power UNPACU (Patriotic Union of Cuba), they continue it had been suffering, making the expansion of the to lack strong popular support as they are the object tourist sector more viable. While Cuba’s historical of severe repression. mainstay as a nation had been sugar, faced with the After the initial rule that consolidated the social and lack of productivity of the sugar sector, Fidel Castro economic changes the revolutions effected, both rev- ordered closed nearly half of the sugar mills. Thus, olutions have recently experienced a transition from a among Raúl’s pragmatic reforms after the 6th and 7th strong, charismatic leader at its forefront—the father Party Congresses, was turning to tourism as the of the nation (Fidel Castro in Cuba, Hugo Chávez in mainstay of the economy and its only dynamic sec- Venezuela)—to another far less charismatic leader tor. Cuba’s social services, particularly education and that inherited their hold on power but who does not public health, whose extension had proved para-

89 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2019 mount in the success of the revolution, continued to the oil revenues, do not depend mostly on external steadily deteriorate. Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López aid. (2005) concluded that, although external factors The military also had different origins and played contributed to an economic slowdown, its root cause different roles in both countries. Cuba’s armed was the “politically motivated paralysis of essential forces—Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR)— structural reforms” (2005:xiii). Cuba began export- were created after the demise of Batista’s armed forc- ing its medical doctors, nurses, and ophthalmologists es; in effect, they set aside the traditional army and to Venezuela, to work as part of the new program started from nothing; particularly from the 1970s on, called Barrio Adentro, to serve the poor and also to they functioned rather autonomously. The military garner their political support. The Cuban doctors went on to play a major economic role, as they creat- also enabled Chávez to establish his program of “so- ed a major logistical apparatus with respect to their cial missions” to benefit the poor in the inner cities military goods and services. As an economic enter- and rural shanty towns (cf. Fernandes 2010). Their prise, they were also very capable, more so than the health and well-being were in the hands of the nearly rest of the Cuban bureaucracy. As a political enter- 50,000 Cuban health personnel working in Venezue- prise, they earned enormous prestige not only for the la. Both revolutions, then, were mutually dependent role they played within Cuba but also for their effica- and kept each other afloat. cy in the international military campaigns they DIFFERENCES waged overseas (Domínguez 1978a, 1978b; Brenner et al. 2015). Today the Cuban military leadership A revolution entails the rise of some and the downfall may be living its best moment as Raúl Castro, for of others, as well as the exile of many. In short, it is a many years Minister of Defense, just recently ended process with winners and losers. In Cuba, the society his tenure as the President of Cuba and still retains a became polarized due to both internal (the opposi- great deal of influence as Head of the Cuban Com- tion) and external (the U.S., the USSR) factors; in munist Party, while high ranking military leaders also Venezuela, the polarization of the society is solely the occupy key positions with the Party (Veiga González result of internal factors. Nonetheless, most recently 2013). President Trump seems quite willing to play the role “el imperio” (the empire) that Nicolás Maduro con- In Venezuela, the armed forces were gradually con- stantly tries to attribute to him. The fact remains that trolled by the new leadership that took power in nothing equivalent to the exile invasion of Cuba or- 1999. The first step taken by Hugo Chávez, whose ganized by the Americans has occurred in Venezuela. roots were in the Venezuelan army, in politics was to re-incorporate those officials and troops that had sid- Two consequences flow from these issues. First, Cu- ed with him in the military insurrection of 1992 into ba’s internal opposition rapidly lost the importance it the new government, as well as to invite some retired originally had. This was not the case in Venezuela. army officers to participate in Venezuelan politics as The Venezuelan opposition largely remained inside members of parliament, councilmen, ministers, di- the country and continuously challenged the revolu- rectors, leaders of public institutions, and as mem- tionary leadership through organized party politics bers of his government, and to join the Movimiento and its electoral base. Second, Cuban leaders Quinta República he founded, which afterwards was achieved complete political control of the state but re-baptized as the Partido Socialista Unido de Vene- were and still remain totally dependent on foreign zuela (PSUV) (Langue 2002). aid—originally from the Soviet Union and the East- ern European countries, most recently, from Venezu- Thus, from the moment of Chávez’s arrival to power, ela (for cooperation, trade, subsidy, investment, re- there was an avalanche of military personnel, active mittances). This has not been the case in Venezuela, and retired, who joined the leadership of the Bolivar- whose leaders have retained a large but not total po- ian revolution, although over 500 of over 3,000 offi- litical control of the public sector and who, due to cials refused to support the political and military ini-

90 Two Revolutions Compared: Cuba and Venezuela tiatives of the new government: some remained Cuban revolution, the international scene played a neutral, others left, and still others joined a conspira- critical role in sustaining the regime due both to the cy against the government. Some of the latter offi- strong support of the Soviet Union and also to the cials took up arms in 2002 and lent their support to close diplomatic ties established with other socialist the military coup led by the businessman Pedro Car- experiences, in Europe and the Third World, and mona, while another group joined a public rebellion with several revolutionary movements across the in the Plaza Altamira in Caracas, which went on for a world, as the citizen-soldier developed in the island few months in 2003. These forms of opposition (Mesa-Lago 1971; Domínguez 1978a). came to an end with the persecution, detention, and expulsion of over 200 military officers. Thus, the By contrast, the first decade of Chávez’s Bolivarian government controls the military institutions, which revolution took place in the context of changing benefitted from massive military expenditures and world dynamics: globalization together with a far less from higher benefits than the rest of the state bureau- rigid, post-Cold War international scenario. In par- cracy. At the same time, a program of ideological ticular, while relations between Venezuela and the training began, which departed from the neutral and United States deteriorated, this did not result in a apolitical nature that had characterized the military new bilateral alliance with a different power, as was previously (Romero 2011). the case when Cuba shifted its traditional alliance with the U.S. for a new alliance with the USSR (Cor- In both countries the legal process was used to trans- rales and Romero 2012). In fact, there was no longer form constitutional power. At the triumph of the a Soviet Union that could intrude, support, assist, or revolution in 1959, the Cuban revolution inherited demand, nor was there a U.S. effort to redirect or the 1940 Constitution; through interpretations and stop the revolutionary process, as had been the case other schemes, the extant constitution was subverted with Cuba. Although Venezuela’s revolution had the until the passage of the 1976 Constitution, after the support of the international Left, they had also Cuban Communist Party had held its First changed, becoming more diverse and less controlled Congress—fully 17 years after being in power by Moscow than in the past. Thus, there was not a (Domínguez 1978a). By contrast, in Venezuela, the definitive break between Venezuela and the United new revolutionary regime ipso facto established its States. own constitution. Chávez inherited the 1961 Consti- tution, which gave way to the 1999 Constitution, Regionally, when Cuba established its alliance with though the latter hardly constituted a socialist consti- the USSR, it found great resistance in Latin America tution. This one was also reinterpreted and overtaken and the Caribbean, as expressed in the hemispheric after 2006. trade embargo and the exclusion of Cuba from re- gional associations, such as the Organization of In the international arena, profound contrasts also American States (OAS). Thus, Cuba isolated itself obtain. The Cuban revolution developed within the from and was isolated by other countries in its hemi- context of the Cold War, while Venezuela’s took sphere. By contrast, Venezuela did not find the sup- place in a different theater—after the end of the port for its revolutionary process limited in the re- Cold War, at the time of the collapse of communism gion. Neither did it find strong opposition from in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European coun- Washington, despite the political conflicts between tries. To consolidate its revolution, Cuba established the two nations (Alzugaray Treto 2009; Domínguez a strong alliance with the Soviet Union; its foreign 1978b). With the exception of the attempted civil- policy goals were shaped by that alliance. This alli- military coup against Chávez in April 2002, in its ance replaced the power vacuum left by the break be- first 15 years, the Venezuelan regime did not experi- tween Havana and Washington and it became a cor- ence a serious threat, either from other governments, nerstone for the survival of the new regime (Blasier multilateral actors, or from civil society, including 1976; Domínguez 1978b). In the first decade of the the media and other social networks. That may well

91 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2019 have changed now that the Venezuelan opposition society weak. Thus, with enormous speed, in a very has grown large, both inside Parliament and on the short time, Cuba was able to eliminate the institu- streets, where violence is manifested daily and some tions of the old regime and put in place a centralized international bodies and other governments have be- state with a minimal private sector (Amaro 1977). gun to openly criticize the political and economic be- In the first decade, the Cuban government engaged havior of Maduro´s government, its growing tenden- in two waves of nationalizations. The first, in 1960– cy to violate human rights, and its intent to reduce 61, involved the big industries of the bourgeoisie and the spaces for democracy. the latifundios (large landed estates), owned both by Therefore, in the international arena, Venezuela op- Americans and Cubans, as well as the medium-size erated with a great deal more flexibility and suffered businesses owned by the middle class and profession- far less antagonism than Cuba. Venezuela simply did als. The second, in 1968, called the “revolutionary not experience the political and economic war with offensive,” involved state take-over of the small busi- the U.S. that resulted in broken diplomatic and com- nesses, owned mostly by the self-employed petite mercial relations; the economic embargo; the threats bourgeoisie. Thus, at the end of the first decade of of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962; the expulsion revolution Cuba had only a few remnants of a capi- from the OAS in 1964; or a Bay of Pigs invasion, an talist economy and a larger proportion of state- exile expeditionary force backed by the Americans. owned enterprises than anywhere in the Eastern Eu- Venezuela simply did not experience a direct con- ropean communist world (Mesa-Lago 1971). frontation with the West. By contrast, the Bolivarian revolution emerged from Last, but not least, Cuba was una nación asediada (a a long democratic experience of 40 years, involving nation besieged), as its strong supporters inside the the transition from a democratic polity to an author- island felt; always under the pressure of an economic itarian regime. Moreover, capitalism survived to a embargo. In our view, the U.S. embargo served both very different extent than in Cuba. While Venezuela to undermine and strengthen the Cuban revolution. developed a centralized state and controlled the mili- It undermined the revolution because it cut commer- tary, the capitalist economy was not eliminated and cial, trade, and diplomatic relations with the U.S. the private sector continued to play an important and the many other nations that followed suit, ren- role (Corrales and Penfold 2011). As Wright et al. dering Cuban industry unprofitable. It strengthened (2012:29) phrased it, “In fact, it may also be easier the revolution because its leaders were never account- for autocratic regimes to use increasing levels of oil able for the mistakes they made, for their failed poli- wealth, whether caused by price increases or new dis- cies, which could always be blamed on the embargo coveries, to co-opt challengers in the officer corps by (Pedraza 2007). Venezuela, on the contrary, has not buying new weapons, raising military wages, and suffered an economic embargo like the one the U.S. providing other benefits than to develop the kinds of imposed on Cuba (Corrales and Romero 2012). institutions needed to reach masses of citizens with sufficient benefits to deter demands for democracy.” Domestically, the contrasts in politics loom large. The Cuban revolution emerged from a dictatorship: Venezuela went through a process of legal transfor- Fulgencio Batista’s. It involved the transition from mation through constitutional reform; the practical an authoritarian regime to a totalitarian regime by enactment of laws and regulations; and Supreme the implementation of a communist regime whose Court decisions (Brewer-Carías 2012). The changes characteristics were economic statism, one-Party rule, aimed at keeping Chávez in power without constitu- lack of an autonomous civil society, and lack of free- tional limitations and to control the rest of the State dom. While Kirkpatrick (1979) made a valid distinc- powers and the conduct of elections. In spite of that, tion between authoritarian and totalitarian societies, the opposition, through its coalition of the Mesa de la in Cuba the one made the other more possible. Batis- Unidad Democrática (MUD), won the legislative ta’s dictatorship had rendered the institutions of civil elections of December 2015 and took control of the

92 Two Revolutions Compared: Cuba and Venezuela

Asamblea Nacional, the legislative branch of the Ven- Bay of Pigs as well as over the internal counterrevolu- ezuelan state. President Maduro and the PSUV re- tion in the central mountains of El Escambray, the fused to recognize the opposition’s victory and began political opposition was decimated very early on. to manipulate the legislative body through the judi- By contrast, in Venezuela today, even though many ciary, the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, eliminating people consider that they are in the presence of an some legislative functions of the Asamblea Nacional. odd case of electoral authoritarianism turning into In mid-2017, Maduro called for the establishment of corporate authoritarianism, the opposition has not an Asamblea Nacional Constituyente to write a new been outlawed. In fact, in recent years it has contin- constitution that would express socialist programs ued to grow in size and importance due to Nicolás and policies and keep him in power. As Flores and Maduro’s inept control of the political and economic Nooruddin (2016:95) pointed out, when conditions system and the growing economic crisis. Rather, the make it hard or even impossible for those in power to opposition participates in elections; it is represented govern, many governments resort to electoral mal- in the National Assembly; and it is legally organized practice to secure re-election—an electoral authori- in political parties. Nonetheless, freedom of expres- tarianism. Democracy thus stagnates or suffers. sion is somewhat limited and there is a significant Party politics also entailed profound differences in human rights deficit (Corrales and Romero 2012). the two countries. In Cuba the democratic system of There are real obstacles to the exercise of democracy elections and parties collapsed almost immediately, in Venezuela. The new elites that have governed the under the weight of Fidel Castro’s charisma and the nation since 1998 have developed some novel mech- weak civil society left behind by seven years of dicta- anisms of political control, such as the formation of torship. In a speech on May 1, 1960, at a massive Comunas, ideologically-oriented social groups work- May Day demonstration at the Plaza de la Revolu- ing in poor urban and rural areas allied with the ción, Fidel underscored that elections were unneces- PSUV, the partisan control of the government, and sary because the people had already chosen: “This is the strong influence of the Executive on the other democracy. The Cuban revolution is democracy… branches of the State: the legislative branch (con- Our enemies, our detractors, ask us about elections. trolled by the opposition since 2015), the electoral … The presence of such a large crowd is the best council, and the judicial branch. However, Venezue- proof that the revolution has fought for the people” la has not been able to establish a one-Party regime (Castro 1960). To members of the opposition, for (Corrales and Romero 2012). As Ezrow and Frantz example those organized in the universities as the Di- (2011:1) expressed it, the Venezuelan regime relied rectorio Estudiantil, the legal order—the notion of on democratic institutions such as political parties political rights as the normative underpinning of and legislatures and tried “to maintain control of the society—had collapsed (Pedraza 2007). Thus, an op- state. Parties and legislatures provide a means position that could continue to operate through which dictatorships co-opt potential oppo- democratically—i.e., through the legal framework of nents, distribute rents to supporters, and mitigate elections based on universal and secret vote for plural elite conflicts.” political parties, recognizing the autonomy of the op- position and the government—ceased to exist, as did With respect to the economic arena, despite some also the legal recognition of dissent. The result was a similarities, differences abound. In Cuba, in just a one-Party system. And the merger between the Cu- few years, the government took control of the na- ban Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Cuba, tion’s economy. The nationalization of foreign and PCC) and the Cuban state itself expressed in the sin- local companies rendered the role of private enter- gle figure of Fidel (Pérez-Stable 1999). Thus the po- prise and free trade minimal. The highly centralized litical system took on the features of Eastern Europe- Soviet economic model provided the blueprint for an communism. With the Cuban government’s Cuba. The economic system took on the features of military victories over the external exile invasion at Eastern European communism. Thus, the state cen-

93 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2019 tralized all the key economic activities—such as the dence was assured by its oil revenues. In Cuba, the budget, public spending, private consumption (via la Soviet economic bailout had both positive and nega- libreta, the rationing book), the licit forms of em- tive consequences. On the positive side, it ensured ployment, the wage structure, investment, the ex- the survival of the revolution; on the negative side, it change rate policy, and the external debt (Pérez Villa- shaped the formation of an economically weak state nueva 2009; Mesa-Lago 1978). with a downward trend in both production and dis- tribution (Blasier and Mesa-Lago 1979; Mesa-Lago By contrast, in the first decade of the Bolivarian revo- 2009). Moreover, it also kept the Cuban government lution, the Venezuelan government did not exert full from facing up to its policy errors that resulted in the control over the Venezuelan economy. From 2006 disaffection of large sectors of the population, whose on the government did make strides in developing a “dream” became to leave the country. socialist economy through the nationalization of many big enterprises, such as the telephone company Over the course of the Cuban revolution—now well CANTV (Compañía Anónima Nacional de Teléfonos over half a century old—few vestiges of capitalism de Venezuela), the central bank Banco de Venezuela, remained. By contrast, in Venezuela, economic inde- and the steel and iron company SIDOR (Siderúrgica pendence shaped an economically strong state with de Orinoco C.A.), the creation of many social services an upward trend in both production and distribu- enterprises, the expropriation of private enterprises tion. Today, over 60% of Venezuela’s imports are like the agricultural supply company Agroisleña, and handled by private companies. This is not, however, the creation of communal enterprises and other the case for exports, 95% of which are handled by forms of a socialized economy. But it is also true that the state oil company PDVSA. In its first decade, the most of the private sector and the foreign private in- Bolivarian revolution tried to control the economy vestment sector remain untouched (Corrales and and private enterprises but without success. There- Romero 2012). fore, one must conclude that the Venezuelan econo- my still remains capitalist (Corrales and Penfold The economic growth performance of the two na- 2009). tions contrasts sharply. When we look at macro-eco- nomic indicators—such as GDP, the availability of The exodus of massive numbers of people is a critical material resources, and currency reserves—we can difference. Both social processes involved the sharp see that in Cuba the various economic cycles were political polarization of the population. In Cuba, very pronounced, with relatively few years of eco- that polarization entailed the exclusion of legitimate nomic expansion compared to many more of stagna- forms of opposition, of people who could no longer tion and very low growth and overall low and declin- participate, neither politically nor economically. This ing per capita income (Mesa-Lago 1978; Pérez resulted in a massive exodus of over five waves by Villanueva 2009; Domínguez 1978a). By contrast, now, particularly the emigration of the upper and with the exception of the first few years of his govern- middle classes between 1959 and 1965. In the first ment and his last year (2013), Chávez’s regime most- 10 years of the revolution, the United States alone re- ly showed positive economic indicators and signifi- ceived over 8% of the Cuban population, with other cant economic growth, as a result of the high countries also receiving a large numbers of émigrés, revenues generated by Venezuelan crude oil exports. particularly Spain, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. At But it is the case that after Chávez’s death, from 2013 present, Cuban statistics put the estimate of the exo- on, the Venezuelan economy began a steep economic dus at 20% of the population (Pedraza 2007). decline. The impact of such a massive exodus was two-fold Moreover, in Cuba the economy was mostly depen- (Pedraza-Bailey 1985). On the one hand, it entailed dent on the generous Soviet subsidy that lasted for 30 the externalization of dissent, which enabled the rev- years. Such dependence on another nation did not olutionary government to achieve greater legitimacy mark Venezuela’s course, as its economic indepen- and grow politically stronger. Fidel Castro was well

94 Two Revolutions Compared: Cuba and Venezuela aware of this function. As quoted in , the of- its importance in exercising a genuine democracy ficial newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, (Flores and Nooruddin 2016). during the massive flotilla exodus from the harbor of In Venezuela, such a massive exodus did not take Camarioca in 1965, he explained: “In this country, place. According to Venezuelan analysts, around 4 when we say to someone, ‘Íf you want to leave, we ar- million Venezuelans are now living abroad, about en’t going to stop you; you are free to leave,’ this 5% of the total population (Dávila 2017). Approxi- country doesn’t lose a citizen. Why? Because that cit- mately 360,000 are living in the U.S.; 500, 000 in izen could never be considered—from our revolu- Latin America, 50,000 in Canada; 20,000 in Austra- tionary point of view, from our Marxist point of lia; and over 400,000 in the European Union. U.S. view—a citizen of this country” (Granma, 8 Novem- Census data show that the population born in Vene- ber 1965). As on many other occasions, when faced zuela living in the U.S. increased dramatically: from with the exodus of 125,000 Cubans from the harbor 48,513 in 1990, to 107,031 in 2000, to 192,291 in of Mariel in 1980, Castro explained the benefit of ex- 2011 (including )—nearly doubling in ternalizing dissent: “I think that those of them re- that decade. Taken from 2000 to 2011, roughly maining here are people with whom we can work Chávez’s years, it doubled. While those numbers are better, much better! … So we need not worry if we far below those for Cuba and constitute a much low- lose some flab. We are left with the muscle and bone er proportion of its population, the dramatic growth of the people. We are left with the strong parts” is impressive (U.S. Census Bureau 2000a and b; (Granma, 22 June 1980). American Community Survey 2011a and b). On the other hand, such a massive exodus also en- As the figures on the immigration of Venezuelans to tailed serious losses. First, it meant the loss of the tal- the U.S. show, in the first dozen years of the Bolivar- ent and skills that define middle class professionals ian revolution, most of the opposition remained in who upon leaving would no longer contribute to the the country, as both democratic politics and the cap- development of Cuba’s economy and society. In- italist economy survived. These yielded both business stead, they went on to make their contribution else- opportunities and rising personal incomes and living where, in the U.S. (particularly in greater Miami and standards: the economy was healthy at least until the the rest of Florida, and the state of New Jersey), the year 2013. By contrast, Cuba was a society that island of Puerto Rico, and other countries, particu- lacked oil, or another coveted economic resource that larly Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Spain. Cuba’s gov- could allow it to remain economically autonomous. ernment often barred doctors—as well as other tech- Its dependence on the Soviet Union turned the Cu- nical and professional people—from leaving the ban revolution as a communist revolution and al- country. As Castro underscored: “We have only lowed Cuba to circumvent the United States’ eco- contempt—which they merit—for all those who nomic embargo. However, coupled with the loss of desert the honorable ranks of our doctors” (New York the middle class, such survival came at the cost of its Times, 24 December 1965). Similarly in 1980, when living standard, which declined to very low levels, the “scum” of the Marielitos (as he called them) left making it a society whose socialism meant the spread Cuba, Castro assailed the Americans: “In the past, of poverty. By contrast, Venezuela was a society with they used to take away our doctors, engineers, teach- oil at a time in world history when it was arguably ers, all highly qualified personnel. Now it was their the most prized possession of any nation. Hugo Chávez hoped this would result in “a socialism with- turn to take away our lumpen” (Granma, 22 June out poverty.” Since 2013, that dream has not come 1980). Second, it meant the loss of the salutary chal- true. lenge and prompting of a dynamic for change that a legitimate opposition can bring, even when they fail In this context, the future of the relationship between to win in electoral politics (Pedraza 2007). Such is Venezuela and Cuba can develop along three scenari- the meaning of the concept of “loyal opposition” and os:

95 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2019

In a first scenario, the relationship will continue to search for new international alliances. Yet the differ- expand, based on the key elements of this alliance: ences between the two loom larger than the similari- economic complementarity, energy cooperation, and ties. In the first dozen or so years of his Bolivarian political agreements based on a combination of hard revolution Chávez was able to leave a strong print on power (political and military assistance and economic Venezuelan society. However, a vigorous opposition cooperation), soft power (ideological promotion), and that expressed itself mainly through electoral politics social power (social aid). was able to check some of his policies. A second scenario would involve an eventual political Some analysts believe that revolutions cannot be pre- and economic opening in Cuba, with both govern- dicted. Goldstone (1993), analyzing the revolutions ments moving apart from each other. It could con- that took place in the USSR and the Eastern Europe- tribute to expand a debate in Cuba regarding the alli- an countries between 1989 and 1993, underlined ance with Venezuela and its relationship with some that we should have been able to predict them, if we economic and social policies under criticism. Havana had used “a conjunctural process-based theory of rev- would then depend less on Caracas, curbing the olution” (1993:132). His theory of the origins of rev- worst consequences of the cooperation between the olutions focused not so much on the causes of revo- two countries. These consequences are the result of lution but on the historical processes and events Venezuela’s intention to influence Cuba’s internal through which they cumulatively developed. In pre- politics, the impact of Venezuela’s revenue-depen- dicting the origin of these revolutions, he identified dency on the dislocations in Cuban society as in- three basic conditions that converged: equality there continues to grow, the corruption gen- 1. the loss of effectiveness by the state, in its ability erated in cooperation management, the accruing of to command resources or obedience; Cuba’s financial debt to Venezuela, and the creation 2. the alienation of the elites and intellectuals from of social inequalities within Cuban society due to the state; and Venezuela’s aid. At the same time, Cuba could seek 3. the mobilization of the population for protest ac- to strengthen energy, trade and financial relations tions. with other countries, such as Algeria, Angola, Brazil, We concur that all three of these conditions were Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Mexico, and the United present at the onset of the Cuban and Venezuelan States. Venezuela could also reduce the subsidized oil revolutions. But our own comparative analysis of sales to Cuba if the prices of oil or its production these two revolutions leads us to add that, particular- were to drop considerably. ly in Third World countries, for a revolution to be- A third scenario could arise from internal changes in come established as the new status quo and to con- the orientation of the Venezuelan or Cuban process- tinue surviving as revolutions, two other factors are es, which would lead to a reconsideration of the basis also critical: and the means for strategic cooperation that, to date, 4. the role of the international context, that served has been based on the common commitment to as a foil against which the revolutions defined build socialism and to promote an anti-imperialist themselves, and foreign policy. 5. the exodus of the opposition, that served to ex- ternalize dissent. THE FUTURE OF BOTH REVOLUTIONS Our comparison of the two revolutionary processes PRESENT TRAJECTORY leads us to conclude that there are important similar- Among the many differences between the Cuban and ities between the two: the sharp break with the past; Venezuelan revolutions is their present trajectory. the displacement of the old elites by the new; the Cuba has already began the transition from a totali- growth of government centralization; a government tarian society to an authoritarian society (Domínguez in tune with the popular feeling of the masses; the 2006), allowing the formation of a small civil society. anti-Americanism of its foreign policy; and the Venezuela has left behind a democratic society and is

96 Two Revolutions Compared: Cuba and Venezuela moving toward an authoritarian society, as the room of the one-Party system, which remained unchal- for a strong civil society progressively narrows. lengeable (Castro Ruz 2016). He was persuaded that “If they manage someday to fragment us,” in the Since 2013, both revolutions have been changing in name of bourgeois democracy, “it would be the be- a very important way. Fidel Castro left power in ginning of the end” (in Pérez 2014:353). 2006 for health reasons and died in November 2016. Since Raúl Castro became President of Cuba, some However, since Donald Trump’s arrival to the U.S. reforms have taken place in the Cuban economy that presidency in 2017, he has sought to dismantle aim to create a modest capitalist market: an increased Obama’s legacy on all fronts: domestic and interna- opening of small businesses, the semi-free circulation tional both. On June16, 2017 Trump announced of the American dollar and the European euro, and that he was cancelling the Obama administration’s substantially less control over the flows of labor and policies toward Cuba, expressing that a new and bet- remittances. However, despite those new policies, the ter deal could be negotiated. Yet his new policy ini- Cuban economy has continued to stagnate and dete- tially did not dismantle much of Obama’s policies. riorate in the last few years. Some observers have stip- Trump kept the re-established diplomatic relations ulated that due to the decline in oil prices and the re- achieved under Obama, as well as the newly re- duced payment to Cuba for its health personnel opened embassies in Havana and in Washington working in Venezuela, the Venezuelan economic cri- D.C. He also continued to allow travel to Cuba, as sis has hit the Cuban economy through its reduced well as the sending of family remittances. However, economic assistance to the island. Other analysts he did restrict travel, returning to the practice of lim- point out that the Cuban economic situation is—in iting group travel, only for people who have serious large part—the failure of Raúl Castro’s timid and in- reasons to travel there, such as students, professors, complete economic policies, the lack of labor incen- or religious personnel. tives, and the lack of investment (Mesa-Lago 2011, But despite all the aspects of Obama’s policy that he 2008). kept, his actions have constituted a political attack on Cuba. Trump’s has set out that he would not ask It is very important to take into account the turning Congress to end the commercial sanctions on Cuba point in the history of the relations between Cuba until the political prisoners were liberated and free and the United States, with the restoration of the elections held. As was to be expected, Cuba’s Presi- diplomatic relations under President Obama, rela- dent Raúl Castro insisted that Cuba would not allow tions which were severed in 1961 during the Cold itself to be pressured and would not make political War—over half a century earlier. The re-establish- reforms to negotiate on economic issues with the ment of diplomatic relations in July 2015 was greet- U.S. Thus, both countries returned to the chess game ed with much hope by Cubans in the island, and that for many years was frozen in these two positions, some on the U.S. mainland. U.S. Secretary of State with the chess pieces unable to move. John Kerry underscored that “U.S. policy is not the anvil on which Cuba’s future will be forged” since Another key difference between the two revolution- Cuba’s future is for Cubans to shape. But he stressed ary processes lies in the size and role of the Cuban ex- that “We remain convinced that the people of Cuba ile community in the U.S., its ability to lobby Con- would be best served by genuine democracy, where gress and to influence life in the island. Over the people are free to choose their leaders, express their course of the half century since the triumph of the ideas, practice their faith; where the commitment to Cuban revolution, over 20% of Cuba’s population economic and social justice is realized more fully; left the island for other lands, most of it settling in where institutions are answerable to those they serve; the U.S. Given its large size, and particularly the and where civil society is independent and allowed to large number of people that have left the island since flourish” (U.S. Embassy in Uruguay 2015). As he has the beginning of “the special period,” flows of remit- repeatedly done, Raúl Castro defended the primacy tances increasingly flowed back to the island as those

97 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2019 who left sought to help the family left behind. These resulted in their becoming gravely ill. Insisting that remittances aggravated the division between the races Cuba was at least responsible for allowing this to in the island, since Black Cubans did not have as happen, President Trump took a tough stance de- many family living abroad to help them. By contrast, manding that Cuba stop the practice and moreover since the Venezuelan revolution is far more recent inform the U.S. and the public about what had hap- and has entailed far less of an exodus, such a sizable pened. Thus, the lively two-way flow of communica- Diaspora community has not yet emerged and the tion that had been established in recent years among number of Venezuelans who have become U.S. citi- relatives and friends on both sides of the Gulf has zens is low. Thus, the influence of this community now been impeded. on U.S. politics as well as on the homeland is far less, particularly at a time when President Trump has Raúl Castro ceased to be Cuban president when he made visible his anti-Hispanic biases. Yet Trump has was replaced by Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez in been quite able to court the Cuban-American vote. 2018. It was the first time since the triumph of the Although all Cuban-Americans want the return of revolution in 1959 that the Cuban leadership did not derive its legitimacy from having fought in the democracy and elections to Cuba, in addition to the mountains of the Sierra Maestra against Batista’s dic- free expression of opinions and free association, this tatorship (Rodríguez 2017). community has always been divided between “the in- transigents” (those who do not believe that one In Venezuela, since Hugo Chávez passed away in should give an inch to Cuba’s communist govern- 2013 and was replaced by Nicolás Maduro, the gov- ment) and “the moderates” (those who think that ernment has confronted at least four major problems: through dialogue and negotiation one may attain (1) the deterioration of the Venezuelan economy due more). The former identify with the Republican Par- to the declining prices of oil, together with hyper-in- ty; the latter, with the Democratic Party. Without flation and scarcity of goods and services; (2) strong doubt Trump’s support within the Cuban-American criticisms by more than half the Venezuelan popula- community comes from “the intransigents” and the tion regarding the Chavista regime and Maduro´s job former political prisoners. in the presidency; (3) the increasingly negative opin- ion in which other governments, multilateral organi- In our view, Cuba deserves to have a system of free zations, NGO´s, the mass media, and social media elections, more than one political Party, and the ex- hold the Venezuelan regime and Chavismo; and (4) pression of parliamentary conflicts and disagreements the significant growth of the Venezuelan opposition, that we understand constitute democracy in practice. through the leadership of the MUD and civil society To many Cubans from a moderate persuasion, in the organizations confronting Chavismo in many ways. negotiations regarding the re-establishment of rela- tions, Obama did not ask enough from Raúl, al- POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR CUBA AND though he did open the door to a new relationship VENEZUELA that means a great deal to the Cuban people in the is- land and that even Trump does not want to shut out. What are the possible scenarios for Cuba and Vene- It is also possible that Trump is asking too much zuela at this juncture? For Cuba, a first scenario rests from Raúl. In the middle are the people of Cuba who on the idea of the continuation of the current situa- continue to suffer from the system under which they tion in which the highly centralized state and the live, despite the efforts and the courage of so many power of the Communist Party maintain the same political prisoners. format that was implanted in Cuba in the 1970s. The objective would remain to develop a socialist so- Strangely, late in the summer of 2016, a sizable num- ciety, controlling domestic politics, and being sup- ber of personnel in the American Embassy in Hava- ported by unconditional international allies, such as na, as well as a few in the Canadian Embassy, report- Venezuela, to maintain the status quo inherited from ed that they were victims of “sonic attacks” that had Fidel and Raúl Castro.

98 Two Revolutions Compared: Cuba and Venezuela

A second scenario projects structural changes in the the deepening of the internal crisis, the conditions Cuban economy but without regime change accom- would exist for a change of regime. The majority of panying it. The Cuban government and the Com- citizens would call for Maduro’s resignation as the munist Party would conclude that economic reforms government continues to lose its internal and exter- must be deepened, allowing private foreign invest- nal support. In this scenario Maduro’s government ment and self-employment, cuentapropismo, and a would agree to negotiate, fully recognizing the oppo- small amount of private property in home owner- sition while stopping it from corroding the political ship, so as to diversify the market of goods and ser- life, with the support of the international communi- vices on the island. However, a political reform ty. would not be contemplated. In a polarized society two different narratives exist re- A third scenario projects the Cuban revolution as garding the current events in Venezuela. To the ad- emerging from the current economic crisis with a vocates of the Venezuelan revolution, the United leadership vacuum on the part of the Cuban govern- States, the oligarchy and the Venezuelan Right, to- ment and the Communist Party (Pedraza 2018). gether with the Latin American and European Right, This would be accompanied by strong social criti- have not let up in their attempt to destroy the enor- cism, a social explosion in which the majority of Cu- mous achievements accomplished by the Bolivarian ban citizens would join protests, asking for regime Revolution and Maduro’s government. The enemies change and an open economy, with strong interna- of the Bolivarian Revolution see it at one of its lowest tional backing from sectors that promote democracy points since Chávez´s electoral victory in 1998. After worldwide. This would bring about the end of the the defeat in the December 2015 National Assembly Cuban revolution as such. elections, the worsening of the economic situation is For Venezuela, a first scenario would foresee the pos- having an impact on the working people, who are the sibility of less violence, but a deepening of the hege- revolution’s base. At present the clash between the monic project. The regime might reach greater stabil- government and the opposition has become quite vi- ity and negotiate a call for elections with the olent and has flowed into the streets. opposition, albeit within a framework of increasing authoritarianism and declining international criti- Flores and Nooruddin (2016) stress the importance cism of the Venezuelan government. of a nation’s “democratic stock”: elections are more likely to succeed, to bring about future democracy, in A second scenario rests on the possibility that the in- countries with a longer past experience of democracy. ternal situation would continue to deteriorate, and Cuba’s democratic stock is very shallow. Electoral de- the tension between the democratic capacities of the mocracy has not been practiced for over half a centu- country and the growing democratic regression of the ry under communism. Even more, historically, prior Venezuelan state will continue, as the law and coer- to the revolution, the periods of electoral democracy cive mechanisms are applied illegitimately, without were few and brief. Cuba’s lack of acquaintance with the possibility of change in the short term. In other democratic electoral processes does not augur well for words, the government would become stable and the future. It is, thus, entirely possible that if the would continue to manage the public agenda with present economic crisis were to continue and a new strong military support, despite growing political, so- political crisis were to develop, a situation of conflict cial, and international opposition, leading to a re- and violence might unfold that might call for the as- pressive reaction from the government or to its early sistance of international actors, such as the United implosion. This is the present trend. Nations. Of course, that remains to be seen. By con- A third scenario rests on the uncertainty of a present trast, Venezuela’s democratic stock runs deeper: 40 that has been characterized as ni paz ni pan (neither years of parliamentary democracy prior to Chávez’s peace nor bread) (Romero 2017). Together with the arrival, and the continuation of elections under both rigid and strained international situation, as well as Chávez and Maduro. Thus, we expect that in due

99 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2019 time Venezuela will find its way back to the electoral America, and of the success and failure of social revo- solution of its social problems, perhaps improving on lutions, more generally. We stress that particularly its past performance, having developed a stronger when considering revolutions in the developing “loyal opposition.” That remains to be seen. world, analysts need to seriously consider the key We hope this analytical exercise comparing both rev- roles the international context and an exodus can olutions will enable a better understanding of both play. social processes, as these continue to unfold in Latin

REFERENCES

Amaro, Nelson. 1977. “Mass and Class in the Ori- Castro, Fidel. 1959. Television Interview on Meet the gins of the Cuban Revolution.” In Cuban Com- Press, Washington, D. C., April 19. Princeton munism, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. New University, Carlos Franqui Collection: Speeches, Brunswick, NJ: Transaction: 221–51. Press Conferences, and Declarations of Fidel American Community Survey. 2011 a. “Place of Castro-Ruz from March 1959—October 1970. Birth for the Foreign-Born Population in the Castro, Fidel. 1960. “This is Democracy.” In Fidel United States.” 1-Year Estimates. Accessed No- Castro Speeches, vol. 2: Our Power is that of the vember 9, 2012. Working People Building Socialism in Cuba, ed. American Community Survey. 2011 b. “Place of Michael Taber, 25–37. New York, NY: Path- Birth for the Foreign-Born Population in Puerto finder Press, 1981. Rico.” 1-Year Estimates. Accessed November 9, Castro, Fidel. 2013. 1980. “Informe del Primer Se- 2012. cretario Fidel Castro, en ocasión del 2do Con- Blasier, Cole. 1976. The Hovering Giant: U.S Re- greso del Partido Comunista de Cuba.” Granma, sponses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America. 17 de Diciembre. Pittsburgh, PA. University of Pittsburgh Press. Castro Ruz, Raúl. 2016. “Central Report to the 7th Blasier, Cole. 1983. The USSR and Latin America. Congress of the Cuban Communist Party Pittsburgh, PA. University of Pittsburgh Press. (PCC).” CubaDebate, August 30 (English). http://en.cubadebate.cu/news/2016/04/18. Blasier, Cole and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, editors. 1979. Cuba in the World. Pittsburgh, PA. University of Corrales, Javier and Michael Penfold. 2015. Dragon Pittsburgh Press. in the Tropics: Venezuela and the Legacy of Hugo Chávez. Second Edition. Washington, D.C.: Brenner, Philip, Marguerite Rose Jiménez, John M. Brookings Press. Kirk, and William M. LeoGrande, editors. 2015. The Revolution under Raúl Castro: A Contempo- Corrales, Javier and Carlos A. Romero. 2012. U.S.- rary Cuban Reader. Lahman, MD: Rowman & Venezuela Relations since the 1990s: Coping with Littlefield. Mid-Level Security Threats. New York, NY: Routledge. Brewer-Carías, Allan. 2012. Práctica y Distorsión de la Justicia Constitucional de Venezuela. Caracas: Dávila, Luis. 2013. La situación actual de la Industria Colección Justicia No. 3, Acceso a la Justicia. Energética de Venezuela. Caracas, Venezuela: In- Caracas, Venezuela: Academia de Ciencias vesp. Manuscrito. Políticas y Sociales, Universidad Metropolitana, Dávila, Luis. 2017. Aproximaciones al cambio hemisfé- Editorial Jurídica Venezolana. rico. Caracas, Venezuela: Invesp, Manuscrito.

100 Two Revolutions Compared: Cuba and Venezuela

Domínguez, Jorge I. 1978a. Cuba: Order and Revolu- cambio y las opciones de Raúl. Real Instituto Elca- tion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, no. Documento de Trabajo/ Working Paper 17– Belknap Press. 2007, 23 de Abril. Domínguez, Jorge I. 1978b. “Cuban Foreign Poli- Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 2011. “Social Services in Cu- cy.” Foreign Affairs (Fall) vol.57, no.1:83–108. ba: Antecedents, Quality, Financial Sustainabili- Domínguez, Jorge I. 2006. Cuba Hoy. Analizando su ty, and Policies for the Future.” In The Cuban pasado, imaginando su futuro. Madrid, España: Economy: Recent Trends, edited by José Raúl Pe- Editorial Colibrí. rales. Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson In- ternational Center for Scholars, Center Reports Ezrow, Natacha and Erica Frantz. 2011. “State Insti- on the Americas. tutions and the Survival of Dictatorships.” The Journal of International Relations 65 no 1 (Fall/ Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and Jorge F. Pérez-López. Winter): 1–13. 2005. Cuba’s Aborted Reform: Socioeconomic Ef- fects, International Comparisons, and Transition Fernandes, Sujatha. 2010. Who Can Stop the Drums? Policies. Florida: University Press of Florida. Urban Social Movements in Chávez’s Venezuela. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and Jorge F. Pérez-López. 2013. Cuba under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Re- Flores, Thomas Edward, and Irfan Nooruddin. forms. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2016. Elections in Hard Times:Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century. New York, NY: Müller, Jan-Werner. 2015. “Parsing Populism: Who Cambridge University Press, in association with is and is not a Populist These Days?” Juncture Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C. 22, no. 2:80–89. Goldstone, Jack A. 1982. “The Comparative and Pedraza, Silvia. 2007. Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Historical Study of Revolutions.” Annual Review Revolution and Exodus. New York, NY: Cam- of Sociology 8:187–207. bridge University Press. Goldstone, Jack A. 1993. “Predicting Revolutions: Pedraza, Silvia. 2016. “Fidel Castro: Was he David Why We Could (and Should) Have Foreseen the or Goliath?” CNN.Com Opinions, December 4, Revolutions of 1989–1991 in the U.S.S.R. and 2015. Eastern Europe.” Contention 2 No. 2 (Winter): Pedraza, Silvia. Forthcoming. “Revolution Defined: 127–152. When did the Cuban Revolution End?” In Gre- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. 1979. “Dictatorships and Dou- nier, Yvon, Jorge Domínguez, Julio César ble-Standards.” Commentary 68, No. 5, Novem- Guanche, Jennifer Lambe, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ber: 34–45. Silvia Pedraza, and Rafael Rojas. 2018. “¿Cuán- Langue, Fredérique. 2002. Hugo Chávez et le Venezu- do terminó la Revolución Cubana? Una Dis- ela. Un Action Politique au Pays de Bolívar. París, cusión.” Cuban Studies 47. France: Le Harmattan. Pedraza, Silvia, and Carlos A. Romero. 2017. Cuba Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, ed. 1971. Revolutionary and Venezuela: Revolution and Exodus. Manu- Change in Cuba. Pittsburgh, PA: University of script. Book in process. Pittsburgh Press. Pedraza-Bailey, Silvia. 1985. Political and Economic Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 1978. Cuba in the 1970s: Prag- Migrants in America: Cubans and Mexicans. Aus- matism and Institutionalization. Albuquerque, tin, Texas: University of Texas Press. NM: University of New Mexico Press. Pérez, Jr., Louis A. 2014. Cuba: Between Reform and Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 2008. La economía cubana en Revolution. New York, NY: Oxford University la encrucijada: el legado de Fidel, el debate sobre el Press.

101 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2019

Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. 1999. The Cuban Revolution: Tilly, Charles. 1981. As Sociology Meets History. New Origins, Course, and Legacy. New York, NY: Ox- York, NY : Academic Press. ford University Press. U. S. Census Bureau. 2000a. “Region and Country or Pérez Villanueva, Omar Everleny 2009. La estrategia Area of Birth of the Foreign-Born Population: económica cubana: medio siglo de socialismo. La 2000.” Census 2000. Summary File 3 (SF 3)— Habana, Cuba: Manuscrito. Sample Data. Rodríguez, Raúl. 2017. “Back to the Future: What is U. S. Census Bureau. 2000b. “Census 2000 Special New in Trump’s New Cuba Policy?” Paper pre- Tabulations, Table FB P-1 Profile of Selected sented at the University of Michigan, School of Demographic and Social Characteristics for the Public Policy, Annenberg Auditorium, October Foreign-Born Population. 19. U.S. Embassy in Uruguay. 2015. “Secretary Kerry’s Romero, Carlos A. 2017. “Venezuela: ni paz ni pan.” Remarks at Flag Raising Ceremony,” August 14. Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica 17, no. 3: 36–42. www.fal.itam.mx Veiga González, Roberto. 2013. “Las FAR: Ante los Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions. retos de una nueva realidad nacional.” Espacio New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Laical 224 (Marzo). http://espaciolaical.org/con- tens/esp/sd_224.pdf Slater, Dan and Sofía Fenner. 2011. “State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms Wright, Joseph, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes. and Authoritarian Durability.” The Journal of In- 2012. Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival. Manu- ternational Relations 65 No 1 (Fall /Winter): 15– script. Pennsylvania State University, Bridgewa- 29. ter State University, and UCLA.

102