Policy Briefing
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Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°74 Nairobi/Brussels, 18 May 2010 Somalia’s Divided Islamists Although Al-Shabaab has regained Kismaayo and key I. OVERVIEW towns and villages in the south by routing its rival (and erstwhile ally) Hizb al-Islam, it is now on the defensive The growing internal schisms and factionalism within and feels beleaguered. The movement is forced to fight Somalia’s Islamist movement risk plunging the country on many fronts and to disperse its assets and combatants even deeper into violence and bloodshed, with dangerous through broad swathes of hostile territory, far from its implications for the wider region and beyond. These divi- Jubba and Shabeelle strongholds in the south. But unless sions are also aggravating the political crisis by polarising TFG forces perform significantly better, the balance of groups further along ideological, theological and clan power will not be much altered. lines. However, a limited opportunity may now exist for Somalia’s political actors and the international commu- Al-Shabaab’s military troubles have been compounded by nity to capitalise on these divisions and re-alignments to the steady erosion of its popularity and credibility. The reach out to the increasing numbers of domestic militants attempt to forcefully homogenise Islam and zealously disenchanted with the growing influence of foreign jihadis enforce a harsh interpretation of Sharia, as well as the and extremist elements bent on pursuing a global agenda. general climate of fear and claustrophobia fostered by an authoritarian administrative style, has deeply alienated The divisions have always existed, but remained hidden, large segments of society, even in areas once regarded as largely because of the unifying factor of Ethiopia’s in- solid insurgent territory. Adding to the public disquiet has country military presence since December 2006. The been the movement’s increasing radicalisation and the Ethiopian pullout in early 2009; the formation of a coali- internal coup that has consolidated the influence of ex- tion government led by a prominent Islamist, Sheikh tremists allied to foreign jihadis. The suicide bomb attack Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; and the adoption of Sharia (Islamic in Mogadishu in December 2009, in which over two law) caught hard-line insurgents and groups, especially dozen civilians and officials were killed, caused an un- Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen (Al-Shabaab, Muja- precedented public backlash. The widely-held perception hidin Youth Movement), off guard. Thereafter, they had that it was ordered by foreign jihadis prompted high-level to justify their existence and continued armed opposition defections and seriously undermined Al-Shabaab’s stand- to the Sharif government. Personality and policy frictions ing. Many feel it has irreparably harmed the movement’s escalated within the movement, and the gulf widened be- political prospects. tween those amenable to some form of a political settle- ment and those wedded to al-Qaeda inspired notions of a However, Al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam are far from spent permanent global jihad. forces. They continue to radicalise Somalis at home, in the region and in the diaspora and remain a threat to the The failure of the major offensive by a combined Al- TFG and neighbouring states. Concern especially for their Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam (Islamic Party) force against links to al-Qaeda extends to the U.S. and other leading the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in May 2009, Western states. Consequently, the TFG and its interna- attributable, in large measure, to the decision by the Afri- tional partners should: can Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to mount a pay more attention to, and try to counter-act, the increas- robust defence of the government, catalysed internal dis- ingly extremist ideological evolution of the Islamist sent and fragmentation. The insurgents’ mistakes were movement; their failure to anticipate AMISOM’s reaction and, more crucially, their misjudgement of the international com- step up the battle for the hearts and minds of the Somali munity’s resolve to come to the TFG’s defence. The rise people, including by articulating an argument that the and military gains of a TFG ally, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a radicalisation is largely driven by a unique set of (ASWJ, the Followers of the Prophetic Way and Consen- beliefs that are alien to Somalis and an extremist and sus), composed of groups opposed to Al-Shabaab’s funda- literal interpretation of holy texts; and by presenting a mentalism, have put significant pressure on the hard-line strategy to de-radicalise Somalia’s youth; and insurgency. Somalia’s Divided Islamists Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°74, 18 May 2010 Page 2 place much greater emphasis on reconciliation. The and Islamic charities sprang up in all the major urban cen- TFG should exploit divisions within Al-Shabaab and tres and even in the remote countryside. Thousands of Hizb al-Islam by reaching out to less extreme elements Somali youngsters were brought to Saudi universities – in both organizations. Bans of those organisations or principally Medina and Umm al-Qura – to study Wahhabi their designation as terrorist should not preclude efforts jurisprudence (fiqh) and missionary work (da’wa).4 Run- to talk with and reach understandings with individuals ning parallel with this ambitious educational scheme was and factions amenable to political settlement; the inter- a generous bilateral aid project essentially aimed at weak- national community should insist the TFG do more in ening Somalia’s dependence on the Soviet Union and by this endeavour. extension communist influence.5 Then-President Barre no doubt appreciated this aid but was increasingly irritated by and wary of the overtly Islamist II. FROM ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 6 TO ISLAMISM agenda behind it. In particular, he was concerned about a group of Saudi-connected clerics who were beginning to use the pulpit to organise a public campaign against some Somalis have practised Islam for over 1,000 years. There of his policies. Matters came to a head in early 1975, have always been many branches of Islam in Somalia, when he forced a confrontation with religious conserva- and the various schools of thought and sects have gener- tives over the status of women in Islam.7 A bloody crack- ally coexisted peacefully until recently. Most follow a Shafi’i version of Sunni Islam that incorporates the ven- eration of saints, including the ancestors of many Somali viewed as “the conservative shield”, capable of stopping the clans, and has traditionally been dominated by apolitical march of communism in the Muslim world. Additionally, there Sufi orders.1 was competition with Egypt and its brand of Sunni orthodox Islam promoted by al-Azhar University. Equally significant The emergence of a modern political Islamic conscious- was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, with Shiism replacing ness began to gather momentum in the 1960s, with the communism as the perceived threat. However, Saudi Arabia formation of the Wahdat al-Shabaab al-Islamiyya (the has lost much of the control it once had over the powerful Islamic Youth Union) and the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (the Wahhabi groups it sponsored with the emergence of Salafi ji- Islamic Group), both of which were inspired by Egypt’s hadi groups like al-Qaeda. Today it is itself under threat from Muslim Brotherhood.2 Others were exposed to more con- the so-called al-fi’at al-zala (deviant group) – a codename for the Salafi jihadists. servative Salafi ideas and the militant undercurrents later 4 A critic of this Wahhabi proselytisation project in the 1970s associated with the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. In and 1980s said the scholarship scheme was primarily designed Somalia, a particular orientation of Salafism – Wahhab- to create a Somali elite – mainly Islamic teachers and preachers ism – was aggressively promoted by wealthy local and – whose role was to propagate Wahhabism. The exclusive fo- Gulf groups. cus on Islam, he added, was regrettable, given the crying need for doctors, engineers, administrators and other professionals. Crisis Group telephone interview, Cairo, November 2009. A. WAHHABI PURITANISM AND SALAFI 5 Hundreds of millions of dollars were disbursed to fund infra- JIHADISM structure projects and, more crucially, to enable the Somali government to purchase weapons from Bulgaria, Czechoslova- Saudi Arabia – flush with petro-dollars after the oil shocks kia and other Eastern Bloc states. The aid was especially critical of the 1970s – was particularly instrumental in promoting for efforts to modernise the army in preparation for the 1977 Wahhabism.3 Well-funded madrasas (religious schools) Ogaden War and arguably emboldened President Barre to defy Moscow’s warning against attacking Ethiopia. Crisis Group in- terview, former senior army general, Nairobi, September 2009. 6 A group of Saudi-trained clerics, led by Sheikh Mohamed Ah- 1 Notably the Qaadiriyaa, Ahmediyya and Saalihiyya. Crisis Group med (“Garyare”), began a discreet campaign to organise Islamist Africa Report Nº100, Somalia’s Islamists, 12 December 2005, resistance to Barre. In July 1987, Garyare and his friends p. 1. For an in-depth analysis of the origins and evolution of launched the al-Islah (Reform) movement in Saudi Arabia. It Islam in Somali society, see I.M. Lewis, Saints and Somalis: was accepted as a member of the Islamic Brotherhood (al- Popular Islam in a Clan-Based Society (Lawrenceville, 1998). Ikhwan al-Muslimin) and formed an alliance with two Somali 2 Roland Marchal, “Islamic political dynamics in the Somali armed opposition groups – the SSDF (Somali Salvation and civil war”, in Alex de Waal (ed.), Islamism and Its Enemies in Democratic Front) and USC (United Somali Congress). The the Horn of Africa (Bloomington, 2004), p. 119. alliance broke down after al-Islah failed to dissuade the Somali 3 Crisis Group telephone interview, prominent Somali cleric, rebel groups from getting too close to Ethiopia.