Reducing Accountability to Accounting: Exploring the Practices of Accountability in the Australian

Home , Always Accountable

REDUCING ACCOUNTABILITY TO ACCOUNTING: EXPLORING THE PRACTICES OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE AUSTRALIAN

PUBLIC SECTOR

TAREK RANA

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Business

UNSW Canberra

University of New South Wales

October 2015

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’

iii

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents for their unconditional love and continuous support from the day I was born. It was their dream that inspired me to pursue a PhD at my age, though they never had such an opportunity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The construction and organisation of this thesis has been a long, tedious but mostly enjoyable process in my life. During the course of preparing and writing this thesis I have incurred an enormous number of debts to people who deserve my gratitude and appreciation. First, to Him who makes the impossible possible and shows us the right way to discover understanding. I also wish to acknowledge the following people and institutions for their help and guidance which made this thesis possible.

I am particularly grateful to Professor Kerry Jacobs for his inspirational vision and supervision of this thesis. Without his continuous support and confidence, this thesis would not have been possible. His love of interdisciplinary, critical and practice research inspired me to embark on this project. His helpful suggestions and criticisms shaped the direction of the thesis. From day one, he has subjected the ideas of the research to very careful scrutiny and shared the pain of turning those ideas into a thesis. I have learnt a great deal from his persistent queries about the ‘logic of things’ and warnings about the ‘things of logic’. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor Dr David Lacey for his suggestions and encouragement of my work.

I am highly indebted to Mr Pat Barrett AO, Commonwealth Auditor General (1995- 2005) and Senior Research Fellow, Australian National University, for his excellent guidance and support over the duration of my candidature. He has been instrumental in securing access for field studies within the Australian Public Sector (APS). I am also grateful to Dr. Wendy Jarvie, Professorial Fellow, UNSW Canberra, who helped me to secure some valuable interviews across the APS. I wish to thank all my anonymous interviewees and their staff for their valuable co-operation and making space in their busy schedules and sharing their everyday practices of accountability.

I wish to acknowledge the substantial care of Professor Michael O’Donnell, Head of the School, and the continuous support of Dr Keiran Sharpe, HDR Coordinator, in producing this thesis on time. I would also like to thank all of the administrative staff in the School of Business for their generous time in answering all my inquiries. I acknowledge my good colleagues and friends Peter Graves and Luke Forau for all their v

positive encouragements and supports during my time at the UNSW. I also wish to acknowledge the generous support of UNSW Canberra for the University College Postgraduate Research Scholarship (UCPRS) and the Department of Education for the Australian Postgraduate Award (APA).

To this end, my wife Afsana has endured my research over the duration of this PhD project. For her support, tolerance, encouragement, and love I am extremely grateful. Lots of love to our boys (Sabir and Jabir), who have sacrificed countless opportunities to spend time with their dad while this thesis was in the making. They will continue to be a great source of inspiration for the rest of my life. Finally, but importantly, during the past four years that I have spent on this thesis, I drew heavily on the moral support and encouragement of my parents, siblings, family, friends and colleagues. To all of them, I remain obliged.

ABSTRACT There is a growing body of work on accountability in the accounting literature. However, most of the existing literature focusses on the concepts of accountability rather than its practice. Accounting literature suggests that understanding accountability is important and significant for public sector accounting, which is built around the notion of accountability. There are two major but inter-related influences on accountability thinking in accounting. The first is the new public management (NPM) literature, and the second has been the distinction between individualising and socialising forms of accountability. The NPM theories stress a struggle between multiple concepts of accountability, such as financial, managerial, legal, public, political and constitutional. This theoretical struggle in the literature has made accountability more confusing, complex, contradictory and different. To overcome this, some scholars point towards a need to go beyond the conceptual struggle and to focus more on the practice. Hence, the research problem focusses on the practice of accountability in the public sector and how this informs our academic understanding of accountability.

This study is motivated by several factors: (i) the importance and significance of accountability for public sector accounting; (ii) the struggles between multiple concepts of accountability in the literature; (iii) the scarcity of practice research on accountability; (iv) the paucity of empirical research of the role of accounting in those practices, and (v) the inability of existing theoretical frameworks to explain accountability comprehensively. Motivated by these factors, I examined the practices of accountability in the Australian Public Sector (APS) and explored the role of accounting in those practices. Drawing on Bourdieu’s practice theory, an analytical framework was developed. This framework allowed me to focus on: (i) the relational and differential character of accountability; (ii) the conceptualisation of the public sector as a network of multiple fields; (iii) the expectation of different practices of accountability in those fields; and (iv) the ways in which accounting came to be implicated in those practices. Based on Bourdieu’s sequential field study methods, data was collected from 103 interviews with public servants who were employed at different levels and professional or functional groups from 34 federal government organisations in Canberra, Australia.

vii

Overall data was collected from multiple sources, such as interviews, conversations, observations, focus group discussions and review of a wide range of documents. The major conclusions of this study are that: (i) there is little difference in the practices of accountability between different organisations, professional or functional groups, and hierarchical positions; (ii) accountability has become a compliance activity with accounting processes supported by accounting logic; (iii) while accounting became a form of symbolic capital in the public sector field the accountants or accounting profession lost cultural capital; and (iv) management accounting has the potential to improve accountability for performance in the public sector. I argue that accountability in the public sector should be more than just financial, and the current financial accounting and reporting based accountability practices have increased compliance acitivites, but failed to achieve the desired outcomes or impact to enhance public benefit. Therefore, how the public sector engages with the practices of accountability should be the focus of public sector accounting and reform studies, rather than the normative, descriptive and theoretical struggles of what accountability is and how it should be understood.

Keywords: Accounting, Accountability, Australian Public Sector, New Public Management, Performance Measurement, Financial and Non-Financial Information, Compliance Processes, Bourdieu, Habitus, Field, Social Spaces, Capital, Strategy, Doxa.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ORIGINALITY STATEMENT ...... ii DEDICATION ...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... v ABSTRACT ...... vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... ix LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS ...... xiii LIST OF TABLES ...... xv LIST OF FIGURES ...... xvi CHAPTER ONE ...... 1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION ...... 1 1.1 Introduction ...... 1 1.2 Motivation – The Research Problem ...... 2 1.3 Theoretical Framework ...... 6 1.4 Research Methodology/Design ...... 9 1.5 Research Aims, Objectives, and Contributions ...... 13 1.6 Organisation of the Thesis ...... 14 1.7 Conclusion ...... 15 CHAPTER TWO ...... 17 MAPPING ACCOUNTABILITY RESEARCH ...... 17 2.1 Introduction ...... 17 2.2 Current Perspectives on Accountability ...... 18 2.3 Accountability in the Public Sector Reform Context ...... 28 2.4 Accountability as Practice ...... 38 2.6 Conclusion ...... 39 CHAPTER THREE ...... 41 PRACTICE THEORY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU –THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 41 3.1 Introduction ...... 41 3.2 Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice in Perspective ...... 42 3.3 Bourdieu’s Key Theoretical Concepts ...... 49 3.3.1 Habitus ...... 49 3.3.2 Field ...... 50

3.3.3 Capital ...... 51 3.3.4 Strategy ...... 54 3.3.5 Doxa ...... 54 3.4 Theorising Accountability as Practice ...... 55 3.4.1 Theorising Practice in Different Organisations...... 57 3.4.2 Theorising Practice in Different Professional/Functional Roles ...... 58 3.4.3 Theorising Practice in Different Hierarchical Levels/Positions ...... 59 3.5 Conclusion ...... 60 CHAPTER FOUR ...... 61 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS ...... 61 4.1 Introduction ...... 61 4.2 Studying Accountability as Practice ...... 63 4.3 The Research Site ...... 66 4.4 Data Collection...... 70 4.4.1 Formal Interviews and Informal Discussions ...... 71 4.4.2 Focus Group Discussion ...... 73 4.4.3 Direct Observations ...... 73 4.4.4 Archival Reports and Records ...... 74 4.5 Data Analysis ...... 75 4.5.1 Phase One...... 75 4.5.2 Phase Two ...... 76 4.5.3 Phase Three ...... 81 4.6 Conclusion ...... 81 CHAPTER FIVE ...... 83 MAPPING THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR ...... 83 5.1 Introduction ...... 83 5.2 Mapping People, Positions, Professions and Organisations ...... 83 5.3 Conclusion ...... 96 CHAPTER SIX ...... 99 EXPLORING THE PRACTICES OF ACCOUNTABILITY ...... 99 6.1 Introduction ...... 99 6.2 Mapping Accountability Practices ...... 100

6.3 Conclusion ...... 116 CHAPTER SEVEN ...... 120 HOW ACCOUNTING HABITUS DOMINATES THE PUBLIC SECTOR FIELD .. 120 7.1 Introduction ...... 120 7.2 Practices of Accountability in the Public Sector Field ...... 121 7.3 Practices by Organisations ...... 125 7.4 Practices by Professional/Functional Groups...... 130 7.5 Practices by Hierarchical Positions/Levels ...... 134 7.6 Conclusion ...... 140 CHAPTER EIGHT ...... 145 WHY IS THERE LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN THE PRACTICES OF ACCOUNTABILITY? ...... 145 8.1 Introduction ...... 145 8.2 Accountability Relationships and Practices ...... 146 8.3 How accounting habitus becomes accountability doxa ...... 148 8.4 Conclusion ...... 155 CHAPTER NINE ...... 160 NPM, ACCOUNTINIZATION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PERFORMANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR ...... 160 9.1 Introduction ...... 160 9.2 Accountability, Accounting and NPM Reforms ...... 161 9.3 The Development of NPM reform (The PGPA Act) ...... 163 9.4 Accountability for Performance ...... 168 9.5 Accounting for Accountability ...... 170 9.6 Conclusion ...... 173 CHAPTER TEN ...... 178 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 178 10.1 Introduction ...... 178 10.2 Summary of the Study ...... 178 10.3 Summary of Major Findings ...... 182 10.3.1 Key finding from the analysis of the field and practices ...... 182 10.3.2 Key findings from the practices at the hierarchical level ...... 184

10.3.3 Key findings from the practices at the professional group level ...... 187 10.3.4 Key findings from the practices at the organisational level ...... 188 10.3.5 Key findings from the overall practices of accountability and the role of accounting in those practices ...... 189 10.3.6 Key findings from the relationship between NPM, accounting and accountability ... 191 10.4 Contributions and Implications ...... 192 10.4.1 The public sector field cannot be taken-for-granted ...... 192 10.4.2 Accounting logic dominates the public sector field ...... 193 10.4.3 Reducing accountability to accounting ...... 193 10.4.4 Accounting logic has moved beyond accountants ...... 194 10.4.5 Extending accounting, accounting logic and accountability ...... 195 10.4.6 Accountability: management control and financial accounting ...... 196 10.5 Directions for Future Research ...... 197 10.6 Concluding Remarks ...... 198 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 200 APPENDICES ...... 212 APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ...... 212 APPENDIX B: SELECTIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ...... 215 APPENDIX C: FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS ...... 216

xii

LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

AAS Australian Accounting Standards AASB Australian Accounting Standards Board ABC Activity-based Costing ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics AG Auditor-General ANAO Australian National Audit Office AO Audit Office APS Australian Public Service APSC Australian Public Service Commission BSC Balanced Scorecard CA Chartered Accountant CAC ACT Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 CBMS Central Budget Management System CEI Chief Executive Instructions CFAR Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review COAG Council of Australian Governments COBRA Commonwealth Budgeting, Reporting and Accounting CPA Certified Practicing Accountant CPAA Certified Practicing Accountant Australia CPF Commonwealth Performance Framework CRF Commonwealth Revenue Fund EEO Equal Employment Opportunity EXECUTIVE Secretary and Deputy/First Assistant/Assistant Secretary EL Executive Level (1 and 2) FMA ACT Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 GBE Government Business Enterprise ICAA Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia ICT Information and Communication Technology IMF International Monetary Fund JCPA Joint Committee of Public Accounts

xiii

JCPAA Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit MAB Management Advisory Board MAC Management Advisory Committee MP Member of Parliament NCA National Commission of Audit NGO Non-Government Organisation NPM New Public Management NPFM New Public Financial Management OH&S Occupational Health and Safety PAC Public Accounts Committee PGPA Act Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013 PM&C Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet PMRA Public Management Reform Agenda SEC Senate Estimates Committees SES Senior Executive Service VFM Value for Money WOG Whole of Government

xiv

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Distribution of Interviews ...... 72 Table 4.2: Interviewees and Position/Level ...... 72 Table 4.3 Summary of Documents Reviewed ...... 77 Table 4.4: The Public Management Reform Agenda Process ...... 77 Table 4.5: List of Submissions to the CFAR Examined ...... 78 Table 4.6: List of Submissions to the Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit Inquiry on PGPA Bill 2013 Reviewed ...... 79 Table 4.7: List of Audit Reports by Australian National Audit Office Reviewed ...... 80 Table 4.8: List of JCPAA Reports that Reviewed PGPA Bill and ANAO Audit Report ...... 81 Table 6.1: Accountability for What ...... 102 Table 6.2: Accountability to Whom ...... 105 Table 6.3: The Practices of Accountability ...... 107 Table 6.4: Dominating Factors Driving Accountability ...... 109 Table 6.5: External Influence on Accountability ...... 111 Table 6.6: Internal Influence on Accountability ...... 112 Table 6.7: Institutional Influence on Accountability ...... 113 Table 6.8: Challenges for Doing Accountability ...... 114 Table 6.9: How to Improve Accountability ...... 115

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: Types of Interviews ...... 71 Figure 6.1: Accountability for What ...... 101 Figure 6.2: Accountability to Whom ...... 103 Figure 6.3: The Practices of Accountability ...... 106 Figure 6.4: Dominating Factors Driving Accountability ...... 108 Figure 6.5: External Influence on Accountability ...... 110 Figure 6.6: Internal Influence on Accountability ...... 111 Figure 6.7: Institutional Influence on Accountability ...... 112 Figure 6.8: Challenges for Doing Accountability ...... 113 Figure 6.9: How to Improve Accountability ...... 115 Figure 7.1: Differential accountability claims by different organisations ...... 125 Figure 7.2: Differential accountability claims by different groups ...... 130 Figure 7.3 Differential accountability claims by different hierarchical positions ...... 135

xvi

LIST OF CHARTS

Chart 5.1: The Staffing Structure in APS ...... 85

xvii

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

1.1 Introduction In this study, I explore the practices of accountability in the public sector and the role of accounting in those practices. More specifically, I examine the role of accounting for the practices of accountability in the context of public sector reform. I aim to explore and analyse the practices of accountability in their context to inform the theoretical concepts of accountability in the literature. Therefore, I explore the practices of accountability, not the concepts of accountability. In doing so, I view practice as a function of interactions between individual actions and institutional forces, which simultaneously reproduce the relationship between accountability and accounting. Exploring and explaining how these individual actors and structural forces go about constructing and organising accountability requires a field mapping of people, position and practice. I chose field study methods for this research, and this study is located within the accounting literature that explores accountability in its organisational and social context (Hopwood, 1983; Burchell et al., 1985; Ahrens and Chapman, 2002; Ahrens and Chapman, 2005; Ahrens and Chapman, 2007).

This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 highlights the background issues that motivate the study. This section explores the concept of accountability, its importance and significance for public sector accounting, and the challenges it presents to accounting academics and practitioners alike. This section also explores why practice based research on accountability in the context of public sector reform is timely and relevant. It also presents the research questions of this study. Section 1.3 introduces the practice theory framework used to study the practices of accountability. Section 1.4 presents the research methodology, methods and approaches. Section 1.5 presents aims, objectives and potential contributions to the field. Following that, Section 1.6 shows how the rest of the chapters in this study are organised. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes the introductory chapter.

1.2 Motivation – The Research Problem There is a long history of academic interest in accountability. Although much of this history is in the broader public management and public policy literature (Stewart, 1984; Day and Klein, 1987), the body of work on accountability in the accounting literature is growing (Jacobs, 2015b). However, most of the existing literature focuses on the concepts of accountability rather than its practice. I argue that this perceptual focus has led to struggles over different concepts of accountability in the accounting literature, and as a result it is becoming confusing, complex, contradictory and different. One body of literature is normative, and focuses on the social and environmental contextual aspects of accounting (Gray, 1992; Gray et al., 1997). A second body of literature focuses on non-government organisations (NGO) (Unerman et al., 2006), and a third strand focuses on the ethical and moral causes and consequences of accountability (Kamuf, 2007; Joannides, 2012). The fourth and most significant focus is on public sector reform (Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Guthrie, 1998; Jacobs, 1998b; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Lapsley, 1999; Funnell, 2003; Lapsley et al., 2009).

This segment of the accounting literature suggests that understanding accountability is important and significant because the public sector accounting framework is built on the notion of accountability (Pallot, 1992; Guthrie, 1993; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Guthrie, 1998; Funnell et al., 2012; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Jacobs, 2015b). However, the literature displays continuous and consistent struggles over many conceptual forms, types and styles of accountability. From the public sector reform perspective, there are two major but inter-related influences on thinking about accountability. The first has been the new public management (NPM) literature (Hood, 1991, 1995; Power and Laughlin, 1992; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995) and the second has been the distinction between individualising and socialising forms of accountability (Roberts, 1991, 1996). The accounting literature in the context of NPM reform suggests that there are also struggles between multiple concepts of accountability such as financial, managerial, public, political, legal, and constitutional (Stewart, 1984; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Funnell, 2003).

The accounting literature shows that elements of NPM are evident in many public sector papers (Laughlin, 1990; Pallot, 1992; Sinclair, 1995; Power, 1997; Funnell, 1998, 2003;

Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Gendron et al., 2001; Gendron et al., 2007). Moreover, some scholars suggest that the relationships of accountability are multiple and complex in the public sector reform context (Guthrie, 1998; Sinclair, 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1999). This is because the public sector is making complex policies and delivering social programs at multiple levels for a variety of different purposes which is different than private sector business models (Funnell et al., 2012). As well a range of institutions, organisations, professions and hierarchical positions from different levels of government are involved. Therefore, account giving and taking can take different shapes and forms in different contexts in the public sector. Moreover, studies such as Gray and Jenkins (1993) and Broadbent et al. (1999) identify accountability relationships in the public sector as a form of management control of performance.

The notion that there are two types of accountability is also evident in the differentiation of the financial/managerial and public/political accountability conceptualisations (Day and Klein, 1987; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). Accounting control and controlling accountability through public sector reforms were the major focus of these studies (Lapsley, 2008; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). Taken together, these studies show that institutions and governments use accountability as a technology for managerial and political control through controlling accounting. The notions of “financial managerialism” (Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Parker and Guthrie, 1998) “accountinization” (Power and Laughlin, 1992; Hood, 1995) and “accountability for accounting logic” (Broadbent, 1998; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013) have highlighted the strong relationship between accounting, auditing and public sector reforms.

The significant growth of accrual accounting, with market-based economy, efficiency and effectiveness measures in the public sector, highlights the relationship between auditing and performance measurement activities (Power, 1997; Funnell, 1998, 2003; Guthrie, 1998; Olson et al., 1998; Lapsley, 1999; Gendron et al., 2001; Gendron et al., 2007; Lapsley et al., 2009). Authors such as Power (2007) and (Hood, 1995, 2010) demonstrated an increase in financial accounting, performance auditing, feedback, and evaluation activities due to the prominence of accounting based control through reforms. Therefore, some researchers believe that public sector reforms in the past

3 several decades have increased the influence of accounting technologies on compliance activity (Hood, 1995; Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998). For example, the introduction of accrual accounting to the public sector increased compliance activities with new accounting processes (Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Guthrie, 1998; Olson et al., 1998; Guthrie et al., 2005; Lapsley et al., 2009). Lapsley et al. (2009) and Ahn et al. (2014) identify the adoption of accrual accounting and subsequent increase in the compliance activities in the public sector as a self-evident and problematic reform. Therefore, the notion of accountability has become more complex because of the introduction and implementation of accrual accounting, which has increased self-evident or taken-for- granted claims in the public sector. Lapsley et al. (2009) suggest going beyond the struggles between technical and managerial claims to explore practical issues in the context of the public sector’s unique mix of power and politics.

The review of 25 years of performance auditing in the APS by Guthrie and Parker (1999) sets out the organisational and political context, and suggests that managerialism and NPM oriented policies drive performance and audit activities. Moreover, Guthrie and Parker (1999, p.303) argue that auditing in public sector institutional and political settings is a ‘malleable social construct’ which is distinct from its simple definition as a technical practice. As a result, the investigation of the effects of NPM driven managerialism and compliance activities on the relationship between accountability and accounting resulted in ‘rhetorical’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ claims (Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009). This area of work also demonstrates the rhetorical claims about the relationship between accountability and accounting control (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Lapsley, 2008, 2009; Pollitt, 2000). Furthermore, Jacobs (2015b) highlights the importance of practice research to unpack the rhetorical claims about accountability and the role of accounting in the context of public sector reform.

Despite there being extensive work, empirical evidence to understand accountability as a contextual practice has largely been missing. Although there have been calls to explore the practices of accountability (Pallot, 1992; Broadbent et al., 1999; Lapsley, 1999; Jacobs, 2012; Jacobs, 2015b), relatively little effort has been made in bridging the gap between the concepts and the practices of accountability. Therefore, I argue that

4 there is a need to cut through the debate about concepts and explore the practices of accountability. In doing so, I aim to make sense of how accountability is practiced in the public sector context, and how this practice informs our academic understanding of struggles over accountability in the public sector. Therefore, the nature of this inquiry requires going beyond simple conceptual definitions towards a deeper exploration, in order to understand the logic of accountability practice.

This study is motivated by five factors. First is the importance of accountability for public sector accounting. The second is the struggle between multiple theoretical elements of accountability in the literature. The third is the scarcity of practice research on accountability in its context. The fourth is the paucity of accountability research that adequately examines the role of accounting in those practices. Finally, the inability of existing theoretical frameworks to explain comprehensively accountability as practice. Motivated by these factors, I seek to answer two questions: how accountability is practiced in different social contexts within the public sector and the role of accounting in those practices. To address these central questions, I also aim to answer three interrelated questions:

• How is accountability practiced in the public sector field1?

o How do people in different departments/agencies practice accountability in the public sector field?

o How do people in different professional/functional roles practice accountability in the public sector field?

o How do people in different hierarchical levels/positions practice accountability in the public sector field? • To what extent, and in what ways, are accounting technologies of both financial and management accounting involve in the process of practicing accountability in the public sector field?

1 Throughout the study, I use social space(s) and field(s) interchangeably as they have similar meanings according to Bourdieu (1984, 1985, 1989). 5

1.3 Theoretical Framework The research questions of this study are driven by two main issues: (a) I want to understand the practice not just the concept of accountability; (b) I want to understand practice in its context. In this study I have adopted a practice theory framework drawing on Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977, 1985, 1990, 1998). Prior accountability research in accounting focuses mostly on the concept and description of accountability rather than its practice. This conceptual development reflects a set of dominant theoretical perspective adopted by those studies. Some key authors suggest that accountability studies in the public sector context construct their theoretical position by drawing from the agency, system, and public choice theories that are implicit in NPM (Hood, 1995; Broadbent et al., 1996; Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2012; Jacobs, 2015b). These theoretical perspectives are mainly concerned with the agency costs, contracting costs, market economy, efficiency and effectiveness of government organisations and services. Moreover, these perspectives mostly privilege micro (human agency) explanations to understand macro (structural forces) processes. Therefore, we need a theoretical frame that can capture both aspects and bridge the gap between them.

Agency theory portrays public servants as managers who are self-serving utility maximisers (Funnell et al., 2012). The principal-agent model based on agency theory does not fit the definition of the ‘principal’ commonly understood through property rights. The notion of property rights is complex and contested in the public sector context (Mautz, 1988; Pallot, 1992, 1997; Newberry and Pallot, 2005). Public choice- theory has been transferred from neo-classical economic theory to political science, and on to public sector management, which is implicit in NPM. It has elements of both agency theory’s notion of self-interest and a market economic notion of resource allocation (Funnell et al., 2012). Therefore, the theoretical elements implicit in NPM have borrowed ideas from the private sector to change the conceptualisation of the public sector field from ‘public administration’ to ‘public management’ by promoting excessive managerialism and accounting practices (Hood, 1991, 1995; Power and Laughlin, 1992; Olson et al., 1998; Guthrie et al., 2005; Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009; Funnell et al., 2012). The system theory notion of input, output, and process are also evident in NPM. However, the public sector and the social issues it deals with are not adaptive problems as assumed by systems theory. For those reasons, the central

6 focus of these theoretical perspectives has been on process, input/output, compliance and accounting practices.

Despite the popular use of agency theory, systems theory, and public choice theory, these perspectives have been challenged in the accounting literature for their taken-for- granted, predefined and ‘black box’ assumptions about accountability, and the lack of ability to explore both individual actions and structural forces comprehensively (Lapsley et al., 2009; Ahn et al., 2014). In response, calls have been made to explore accountability by investigating both individual actions (agency) and insitutional forces (strcutures) in the public sector field (Lapsley et al., 2009; Jacobs, 2015b; Ahn et al., 2014). Therefore, Bourdieu’s practice theory provides useful theoretical tools to address the appearant limitations of the existing theoretical frameworks by extending our understanding of accountability as practice from both micro and macro perspectives. In addition, Bourdieu’s theoretical tools help to explore and explain both the functional and symbolic features of social practice in a given social and insitutional setting. Thus, practice theory helps to explain how habitus (micro) and institutional forces (macro) shape practice in a field.

Practice theory (frame of field, habitus, capital, strategy, and doxa) provides useful tools to move beyond concepts to practices. To achieve this, Bourdieu’s practice theory helps to explore the relationships between individual actions (habitus) and institutional forces (field) that influence each other in practice. In Bourdieu’s practice theory parlance, it is expected that individuals, professional or functional groups and organisations will mobilise habitus, resources (capitals) and deploy strategies to gain or maintain access to power, influence and scarce resources in the field. Bourdieu (1985) argues that when field participants do not question or challenge these habitus then they become symbolic capitals. It becomes symbolic practice or capital because other field participants misrecognise them as real practice. Therefore, this practice theory frame is able to explain how symbolic practice or symbolic capital becomes taken-for-granted or accountability doxa in the field.

The accounting literature suggests that key concepts, descriptions and definitions of accountability are related to powerful public sector groups (Abbott, 1988; Power, 1997;

Guthrie, 1998; Gendron et al., 2001; Gendron et al., 2007; Walker, 2004). The powerful professional or social groups such as accountants and auditors dominate the discourse of public sector accountability. However, often accountants and auditors have been identified as the “change agent”, “modernizer” or “consultants” of accountability in the public sector (Power, 1997; Pollitt et al., 1999; Radcliffe, 2008; Skærbæk, 2009; Lonsdale and Bechberger, 2011) and their domination has been taken-for-granted by others. Because of its diverse stakeholders, who have divergent interests and influence, the relational and differential aspect of accountability within the public sector cannot be taken-for-granted. Consequently, I expect that some actors will advocate for particular ways of performing accountability, and other actors will struggle againt those prescriptions. Therefore, Bourdieu helps to explore whether differences in organisational structures, professional backgrounds, and hierarchical positions lead to differential accountability practices in the field.

From this vantage point, Bourdieu’s work suggests that individuals, professionals and organisations are all located in different social spaces, and these social spaces have their own structures that influence their practices. Moreover, this might suggest that there are differences in the practices of accountability, in terms of which practice is seen to be more legitimate or which logic is more practical (Bourdieu, 1985; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu’s theoretical framework thus leads me to expect that there would be tension between different practices of accountability in the public sector field. For example, individuals in different hierarchical positions would perform accountability in practice differently because of their different habitus. Likewise, professional or functional groups would practice accountability differently because of their different group habitus, and consequently, there would be a clash of accountabilities between accountants, auditors, lawyers, public administrators, and scientists. Similarly, I expect that there would be conflict between different types of organisations (such as central/policy, line/service agency, GBE/statutory/prescribed) not only over the accountability doxa, but also to exert a dominant influence over the public sector field, because some departments would have better access to resources and power than other departments. Even though Bourdieu provides the necessary tools to theorise accountability as practice, and leads me to expect to find different ways of doing accountability, exploring the practices on the ground require an empirical field study.

1.4 Research Methodology/Design The context for this research is a particular public sector reform2 in Australia, and the research site is the Australian Public Sector (APS)3 at Federal or Commonwealth level. The reform has mandated the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) as the new public resource management framework in the APS. I selected this particular public sector reform as the context, and the APS as the research site, for several reasons. First, in the accounting literature there is a strong nexus between the notions of accountability and the public sector. Second, public sector accounting is seen to be based on the theoretical notions of accountability. Third, there is a strong link between accounting and public sector reforms. Fourth, the dynamics between accounting and the public sector field is most visible when there is an act of reform being implemented. Fifth, there is a call for more research to investigate the public sector field specific changes caused by public sector reforms, such as accrual accounting (Guthrie, 1993; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Guthrie, 1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Jacobs, 2015b).

The features of the Australian Public Sector field are important because they provide important elements derived from Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, which will help to understand how accountability is practiced. These characteristics are implicit in the NPM studies, and explicitly evident in previous studies in the context of the Australian Public Sector (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Guthrie, 1993; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Guthrie, 1998; Parker and Gould, 1999; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2012; Jacobs, 2015b). Prior NPM studies highlight the importance of accountability for the public sector. Some authors argue for further work on the theoretical development of accountability in the public sector context (Lapsley, 1988; Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Pallot, 1992; Lapsley, 1999). Funnell et al. (2012) highlights the importance of understanding the institutional arrangements for

2 Instead of referring to the research context as New Public Management (NPM) or New Public Financial Management (NPFM), I refer to the recent public resource management reforms in Australia as the public sector reform throughout the study. 3Instead of referring to the research site as the Australian Federal Public Sector or Australian Commonwealth Public Sector, I refer it as the Australian Public Sector (APS) throughout the study. 9 accountability in the public sector field. Jacobs (2015b) also suggests that accountability and NPM need to be further explored in the public sector context.

Previous work has focused on specific practices (Goddard, 2004), specific positions (Sinclair, 1995), specific organisations (Jacobs, 1998b; Pallot, 2003), and specific profession (Gendron et al., 2001; Gendron et al., 2007; Kurunmäki, 2004; Jacobs, 2005). These studies highlight the struggles between different positions, professions and organisations in the public sector context. The literature review illustrates that NPM and Roberts (1991, 1996) individualising and socialising forms of accountability have been two key themes in most of the accountability work in public sector accounting research. The accounting literature on NPM highlights that there have been many forms of accountability in the accounting research, namely financial/managerial and public/political. The NPM studies lead to a public sector field and the particular way of understanding the struggles of accountability in that field. For that reason, I select the APS as the research site for this study because NPM elements tend to present accountability struggle in the public sector field. It is expected that public sector reforms will highlight the struggle between accountability doxa of the public sector field. Therefore, I expect that I will find the differences in the practices of accountability between different positions, professions and organisations in the public sector field.

For that reason, exploration of practices across individuals, professions or organisations in the public sector will shed further light on the relationship between accountability, accounting and NPM. Therefore, I argue that exploring accountability in different organisations, professional or functional groups and hierarchical levels will shed light on the relationship between accountability and accounting in the public sector field. Moreover, the public sector field will provide a ground to explore the intersection and interaction of agents (people) and structures (institutions) to capture the key issues of this study. Literature shows that NPM not only changes the conceptualisation of accountability but also the institutional, social and political structure of the public sector field. For example, due to NPM type reforms accountants are expected to be dominant in the public sector field. The introduction and implementation of accrual accounting is believed to have increase accountants’ numbers and influence in the public sector fields (Abbott, 1988; Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Gendron et al., 2007; Lapsley et al., 2009).

This growth in numbers and influence leads to a clash between accountants’ way of doing accountability with the general public servants’ way of being accountable (Jacobs, 1998a, 2005; Kurunmäki, 1999, 2004; Goddard, 2004). Similarly, the Department of Finance (Finance) is known to be the accounts or finance division of the APS. Therefore, it is expected that NPM type reforms have increased the resources and power of Finance in the public sector field. This leads to the expectation that I would find differences in the practices of accountability between Finance and the other governmental organisations. Moreover, there would be a clash of accountability doxa between Finance and other departments, as others in the field might recognise Finance as the accountants. The level of hierarchical positions would create differences in the practices of accountability, because each position has different types and nature of jobs and access to different types of capital.

Bourdieu’s sequential methodological approach is appropriate to capture the struggles between accountants and non-accountants. Exploring and explaining the practices of accountability in different social spaces require a processual analysis, hence a qualitative field study design is relevant for this study (Hopwood, 1983; Burchell et al., 1985; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). The field study’s sequential research methods are informed by Bourdieu’s (1977, 1998) practice theory. Bourdieu suggests (1977, 1998) that to understand practice, it is important to understand the social, institutional and political context in which practice takes place. Therefore, to understand the practice and the logics behind the practice, Bourdieu’s practice theory offers appropriate tools to do so. To follow Bourdieu’s sequential methods, the study needs to proceed with mapping the field in order to unpack the individual actions (habitus) and configurations of the social space (field structures), before exploring the practices of accountability.

The sequential approach is a two phase design where field mapping is done to identify the actors and structures before exploring the practices. This is a reflexive research design to reduce the researcher’s bias when collecting the field data. This design is appropriate because of my expectation that accountability practice might vary according to the institutions, professional backgrounds, and hierarchical positions, and only a field study can provide this sort of empirical evidence. This expectation is also consistent with Bourdieu’s practice theory and sequential research approach (1977, 1984). It is

11 also important because exploring the constitutive role of accounting in action requires qualitative data to contribute to theory building, and the field study can overcome the divide between the micro and macro levels of analysis. From this perspective, this study needs a particular way of knowing the field, which is its Bourdieuian mapping.

The field study covered seven months of continuous engagement with the field from July 2014 to January 2015. From Bourdieu’s field mapping perspective, the data collection from the field has not been restricted to a particular or single approach. To capture a complete map of the organisational, professional or functional, and positional activities, the primary focus of the study was aimed at all functional areas, units and levels of the APS. In total 103 interviews and conversations were conducted. Of these 99 interviews were with public servants, 2 with private consultants who provide consulting services to the APS, and 2 interviews were with Members of Parliament from each of the two major political parties. The interviews fall in to two types - semi- structured interviews (formal) and conversations (informal). All formal interviews have been audiotaped and professionally transcribed. The informal interviews and conversations were documented by field notes, memos and the researcher’s reflections. Other sources of data were focus group discussions, observations of meetings, workshops, seminars, presentations and examination of archival documents.

I also adopted a sequential approach to data analysis, which involves a method of two level of data analysis applied to the same data set. The objective is to examine both the public servants’ account of the practices and also the actual practices of accountability. At first, a method of thematic analysis was used to understand what public servants said about their experiences of the practices of accountability. Second, a method of narrative analysis was used to cross-examine the practices with what public servants’ claimed about accountability. In that sense, two reasoning were derived from the iterative and sequential methods of analysis of the empirical data. That is, the inductive reasoning was derived from the field data, and the deductive reasoning from the theoretical framework. These sequential methods of analysis revealed complexity in constructing and organising the practices of accountability in the public sector field. The data analysis was started during the data collection process, which continued until the write up of the results. The data gathered from various sources have been analysed at three

12 levels: by positions and cross positions, by profession and cross-professions and by organisation and cross-organisation. This comprised analysing the data on an individual-by-individual basis (by individual positions/levels), then combining the analysis at a group level (by professions/social groups) and then merging the analysis at an aggregate level (by organisation/social spaces). Therefore, the Bourdieuian field study methods are expected to provide deeper insights into the practices of accountability, and the role of accounting in those practices, in the public sector context to achieve the aims and objectives of this study.

1.5 Research Aims, Objectives, and Contributions I aim to explore the practices of accountability in different positional, professional and organisational contexts in the public sector field and explain the role of accounting in those practices. These research aims require a series of interrelated research objectives to guide the field study design outlined earlier. The objectives of this study are: (i) to extend the literature by developing an analytical framework that explores accountability as practice by integrating the “human agency (micro)” and “structural forces (macro)” dimensions of accountability; (ii) to present a field map of the various social spaces in the public sector field; (iii) to explore the practices of accountability in different social spaces in the public sector; (iv) to investigate the impact of public sector reforms on the accountability practices and the role of accounting for performance management in the public sector; and (v) to examine the extent and manner in which accounting is implicated in the construction and on-going organisation of accountability practices.

The most important contribution of this study is to the accounting literature by explaining the role of accounting for the practices of accountability in the public sector context. There is a division in the accounting literature on accountability between the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels, which is problematic. The literature has a tendency to use ‘micro’ perceptual or constructivist analysis to inform ‘macro’ or structuralist discussion. Therefore, the second contribution is to transcend this divide by exploring both the micro (individual actions) and the macro (institutional structures). The third contribution is the empirical evidence of the practices of accountability by public sector organisations, professions and hierarchical positions. Finally, the fourth contribution is

13 practical, which is to the practice of accounting technologies (of both financial and management accounting) for accountability for the performance in the public sector. It is hoped that these contributions would not only inform the ways in which accountability is understood, and the relationship of how accounting and accountability are theorised in the academic literature, and taught to accounting students and professional accountants in practice, but would also improve the way practitioners use public sector accounting.

1.6 Organisation of the Thesis In chapter two, I present a review of the accountability literature, with particular focus on public sector accounting. The literature review falls into three broad types: (a) perspectives on the concept of accountability; (b) key theoretical elements of the notion of accountability in public sector reform and key issues of accountability in the public sector context; and (c) the research on accountability as practice in its context. In chapter three, I discuss an analytical framework drawing on the practice theory of Pierre Bourdieu. In this chapter, I discuss and orient the theory, in particular its core elements (habitus, field, capital, strategy and doxa) towards the study of how accountability is practiced in different social spaces. In doing so, I draw on the nature of the concept- practice gap in the accounting literature.

Following this, in chapter four, I outline the field study approach, data collection strategies and data analysis techniques. To understand the practice, it is important to understand the social context in which accountability operates. Therefore, exploring and explaining the everyday practices of accountability in different social spaces requires a processual analysis. Hence qualitative field study methods have adopted. The relational frame (habitus, field, capital, strategy, and doxa) of Bourdieu’s practice theory and sequential research approaches inform the field study methods. This research design is appropriate to capture practice data about the relationships and struggles of accountability over habitus and doxa in the field. The findings of these analyses are then presented in chapters five, six, seven, eight, and nine.

In chapter five, I present a field map of the social spaces of the APS. Following the practice theory framework, I analyse field participants, backgrounds, positions, professions and experiences that then reveal the structure of the different social spaces. Furthermore, this chapter illustrates the organisation and stratification of the institutional, organisational, professional, hierarchical levels in which field participants are distributed, and where the practices of accountability take place. In chapter six, I analyse and summarise the practices of accountability in nine broad categories. Chapter seven then builds on the previous chapters to demonstrate the practices of accountability in different social spaces, such as in different organisations, different professions or functional groups and in the hierarchical positions. In chapter eight, I extend the analyses further by exploring why there is little difference in the practices to what I expected, and how accounting is implicated in those practices. In chapter nine, I explore the relationship between accounting and accountability in the context of an NPM type reform. Here, I analyse the role of both financial and management accounting for the practices of accountability for performance. In chapter ten, the final chapter, I summarise and conclude the study by tieing together the major themes emerging from the analysis, and hilightlighting the potential contributions of the findings to the literature. In the conclusion, I outline future research prospects that emerge from this study.

1.7 Conclusion In this chapter, I introduced the study by discussing the general overview of the current state of accountability research. In doing so, I provided background information and motivation by highlighting the importance and significance of the study for public sector accounting literature. The discussion aimed to emphasise the constitutive role of accounting in the practices of accountability and traced the extent to which accounting is involved in the process of managing accountability in different social spaces. Moreover, I showed how this study conceptualises the notion of accountability and institutional environment of the public sector through the idea of social space by highlighting the relationship between agency and structure. Drawing on these ideas, I presented the practice theory framework and outlined the research design. Following this, I summarized the aims, objectives and potential contributions that guide the study.

Finally, I presented the outlines of the remaining chapters. In the next chapter, I present and summarise the literature on accountability, with specific focus on public sector reform.

CHAPTER TWO

MAPPING ACCOUNTABILITY RESEARCH

2.1 Introduction In this chapter, I present a review of the literature on accountability with a particular focus on the public sector. The literature under review falls into three broad types: (a) perspectives on the concept of accountability; (b) key theoretical elements of the concepts of accountability in public sector reform and key issues of accountability in the public sector context; and (c) the thinking of accountability as practice in its context. These bodies of literature are reviewed with the aim of understanding current research trends, identifying limitations within the existing literature, identifying the research gap, developing an analytical framework for the present study to inform academic understanding of accountability and locating the current study within the public sector accounting literature.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 highlights the major research themes of accountability with a particular focus on the public sector. It identifies key theoretical elements and the development of the concept of accountability in the literature. Section 2.3 reviews the literature on accountability in the public sector reform context. This section shows changes in the issues and regime of accountability driven by new public management (NPM) inspired reforms. In doing so, it critically examines the role of accounting in those practices. Following this, section 2.4 highlights the limitations of current concepts, frameworks and theories of accountability. It presents the need for a research framework for the analysis of the practices of accountability in its context and the constitutive role of accounting in those practices. In this section, the research problem is articulated and the importance of the research questions of the present study discussed. At the end of this section, I propose a practice theory framework to address the research problem identified by, as well as the research issues raised in, the literature review. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.

2.2 Current Perspectives on Accountability There is a long tradition of research on accountability, particularly accountability in a public sector setting. Much of this work can be found in the public administration and policy literature (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011). Drawing upon this large corpus of research involves delving into historical notions of governmental, political, religious and moral ideals (see Day and Klein, 1987). Funnell et al. (2012) discuss accountability as the defining characteristic of democratic institutions, which were established based on the idea that government is accountable to the public through Parliament. Although legislatures have developed over several centuries, it is only since the 1980s that issues of accountability in this context have garnered significant practitioner and academic interest. During this period problems with regimes of accountability in the public sector went through several significant changes, driven in particular by market-based notions of ‘performance’ (see Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Funnell et al., 2012). These changes have had major implications for the understanding of ‘accountability’, and it is in this context that the New Public Management (NPM) movement has played a significant role (Funnell et al., 2012). Similarly, the relationship between ‘accounting’ and ‘accountability’ is not new, but rather finds itself deeply rooted in the history of public sector management.

Bovens (2005) suggests an historical connection between the idea of accountability and the practice of bookkeeping and the discipline of accounting. In doing so, Bovens (2005) highlights a dual meaning of accountability – counting important things and providing an account concerning this count. This historical foundation indicates that accountability has a dual role – both doing something in practice and also proposing a narrative to give a reason or account. In an historical analysis, (Dubnick, 2007) takes this link back to the Middle Ages and points to the Domesday books of William I in 1085. In this example, Dubnick (2007) shows that agents were obliged to answer to accountants on behalf of their master (Bovens et al., 2014). From this historical perspective, accountability has roots in practising accounting in such a way that it bridges the gap between a manager’s action and a master’s evaluation (agent-principal relationship).

As Degeling et al. (1996, p. 31) note, “accountability is usually discussed in terms of its centrality to principal/agent relationships”. Degeling et al. (1996) draw on both public accounting and public administration literature to show that accountability is understood in terms of the functions that it is claimed to perform and the benefits that are claimed for its existence. In the literature, a panoply of adjectives describes accountability variously as: a ‘modern buzzword’ (Day and Klein, 1987); a ‘contradictory and contrary concept’ (Roberts, 1991, 1996); a ‘chameleon-like thing’ (Sinclair, 1995); ‘enabling’ (Carnegie and Wolnizer, 1996); ‘ever-expanding’ (Mulgan, 2000); ‘multilevel’ (Funnell et al., 2012); a set of ‘technologies of government’ (Neu, 2006); a sort of ‘accounterability’ (Kamuf, 2007); ‘problematic’ (Joannides, 2012); and ‘limiting’ (Messner, 2009).

Normanton’s (1966) book on accountability and government audits is one of the early works in the literature. Normanton (1966) evaluates two competing concepts of accountability – public accountability and financial control (financial accountability) in the public sector context and the role audit plays in those processes. Normanton (1966, p. 3) argues, “the idea of accountability is perhaps as old as organised government. […] but accountability is not the same thing in all ages; it depends upon the nature of the state itself”. Normanton (1966, p. 3) shows that the concept of accountability shifts from a simple pattern to the most complex pattern in different types of government or Parliament. From this perspective, it is suggested that government services (such as structure and service delivery mechanisms) may not be linear but dynamic (Normanton, 1966).

Stewart (1984) presents accountability as a ladder or hierarchy. From this perspective, accountability proceeds from the reasonably simple issue of probity and legality, through intermediate concerns with process and performance, then onto complex problems of program and policy accountability. Stewart (1984) highlights accountability for relatively simple issues as being fundamental and necessary, making them more addressable at the beginning of the ladder or hierarchy than the more complex and amorphous problems of accountability that arise further along the ladder or hierarchy. In addition, Stewart (1984) presents an idealised archetype: more about what accountability should be, rather than what it is.

Day and Klein (1987) demonstrate two broad concepts of accountability – managerial and public/political/democratic forms of accountability, and attribute these concepts to historical differences of context and institution. They present a concept of public/political accountability where those who rule have an obligation to answer to those who elected them (the people). The tradition of the Greek city-state, they argue, underpins this notion of democratic accountability. The second accountability concept is derived from the steward’s (manager) obligation to be accountable to the owner (of capital/power) which arises from the tradition of estate management. This concept of accountability as stewardship is reflected in modern notions of financial accountability, audit and evaluation.

Within the accounting literature, there is a body of work that has considered issues of accountability. One stream of this literature has focused on the notion of accountability in social and environmental reporting. One aspect of this work adopts stakeholder and agency theory frames to discuss the rationale for, and the technique of, achieving greater corporate accountability through social responsibility accounting and reporting to stakeholders (Benston, 1982). However, this economic stakeholder perspective on accountability has been challenged and contested, as illustrated by Schreuder and Ramanathan (1984). Ongoing work continues in this area, for example Parker’s (2005) analysis of contemporary research in social and environmental accounting.

A second significant stream of work on accountability and the environment reflects a normative stance, and has been dominated by the work of Gray (see Gray 1992 and Gray et al., 1997). Gray (1992) introduces the notion of “deep-green” as an intersection of accounting and environmentalism to argue for gently accounting for accountability, transparency and sustainability. Gray (1992) argues that accountability is concerned with the right to receive information and the duty to supply it. Based on this argument, Gray (1992) discusses both formal (organisation) and informal (personal and groups) accountability as approaches and processes for achieving the potential of green accounting and participative democracy. Within this literature, accountability is defined as “the duty to provide an account (not only financial account) or reckoning of those

20 actions for which one is held accountable” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 38) and therefore reflects an ethical perspective.

Cooper and Owen (2007) argue that a more pluralistic form of corporate governance should be sought, that moves beyond the conventional financial reporting of stakeholder accountability, and puts the onus on corporations to explain, justify and take responsibility for their social and environmental actions (Cooper and Owen, 2007, p. 664). Similarly, Unerman and Bennett (2004) promote the idea of a consensus-based dialogue for governance and accountability in the context of social and environmental practices. They argue that managers should understand the stakeholder’s social, environmental, economic and ethical expectations for accountability. Adams and Mcnicholas (2007) argue that sustainability reporting will provide a better measure of accountability. Moreover, Adams and McNicholas (2007) adopt an action research approach to study forces that enable organisational change to create greater accountability.

There is another significant stream of literature on accountability in the non-government organisation (NGO) and not for profit (NFP) settings. In this body of work, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) discuss multiple aspects of accountability in the NGO setting. They argue that NGOs occupy a space between public and private sector organisations and face a struggle between the accountability duties of different forms of organisation. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) highlight a tension between public interest accountability and financial/legal accountability, and contrast stakeholder accountability and hierarchical accountability by drawing on theoretical constructs of these accountability practices. O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) argue that, whereas hierarchical accountability focuses on a much narrower range of powerful stakeholders, holistic accountability speaks to a much broader range of stakeholders. This idea has now been extended beyond accounting reporting practices to include social media websites and collaborative and interactive online technologies as vectors in the process of (re)production and (re)distribution of social accountability (see Scott and Orlikowski, 2012). However, this normative perspective on accountability is also problematic and has been criticised by some authors. Roberts (2009) and Messner (2009) argue that viewing accountability as a normative practice has inherent limits, because the demands

21 of accountability can cause ethical violence to the accountable self, who is expected to provide a convincing account under difficult or impossible circumstances.

There is also a strand of literature that builds on these ethical and moral perspectives of accountability. Schweiker (1993) proposes that the practice of accounting is basic to the practice of accountability, in that it opens the door for ethical and moral evaluation by others. Shearer (2002) has started a new conversation on accountability in the accounting literature. Shearer (2002) shows that free market capitalism has pushed the need for more economic accountability at the cost of social concerns in a market-driven world. Therefore, Shearer (2002) comments on neoclassical economic theories and argues that the economic construction of accountability is ethically inadequate to fulfil interpersonal accountability in practice, or at a broader level, “for-the-other”. From this perspective, there is an emerging development of the concept of the counter-practice of accountability coined by Kamuf (2007) as “accounterability”. This emphasises the importance of the narrative storytelling aspect of accountability to counter the excessive emphasis on calculative accountability. As Kamuf (2007, p. 253) argues, “accountability dominated by calculative technologies went too far, and there is a need to counter the irresistible logic of calculative accountability by “accounterability”. Kamuf (2007) further argues that there is a “need to make openings, space and time, within the processes of calculative accountability, to facilitate re-articulations of our accounts (narrative and calculative) and our abilities” (p. 253). From this perspective, there emerges a sense of tension between the logic of accountability dominated by accounting technology4 as opposed to the practice of accountability.

Roberts (2009) and Messner (2009) highlight the idea that accountability is not always a good thing. Roberts (2009) and Messner (2009) indicate that there is a possible tension between good (accounterability) and bad accountability (calculative logic). In doing so, Roberts (2009) argues that, even though transparency can provide confidence and certainty, an excessive focus could lead to the practices of ‘counter accountability’. Likewise, Messner (2009) discusses how excessive pressure on individuals to give accurate accounts to justify conduct can cross the limits of accountability, and create a detrimental opposition premised on notions of “the-self” and “the-other”. Mckernan

4 Accounting technology is referred to as largely financial accounting and management accounting techniques and reports. 22

(2012) builds on the original argument of Shearer (2002) about the ethics and moral accountability from the “for-itself to the for-the-other” perspective, and highlights the tension between responsibility (for-itself) and accountability (for-the-other). From this vantage point, it is clear that there is a tension between accounting for accountability (practice) versus the ethics of accountability (discourse). Recently, Joannides (2012, p. 244) relates to this by arguing that accounterability can appear as a response to the problematics of accountability in practice. From this perspective, accountability can be both a positive and a negative process.

There is also a significant literature that has focused on the way in which accounting has been used within the broader framework of public sector accountability. Jacobs (2012, 2015) reviews different theoretical approaches employed in the public sector accounting research and highlights two key theoretical elements to this work: the advent of New Public Management (NPM); and Roberts (1991, 1996) individualising and socialising forms of accountability. These theoretical elements have influenced subsequent public sector accountability work. After briefly reflecting on these theoretical elements, the following section will explore how these notions are mobilised, deployed, and developed as key theoretical tools for accountability in the public sector reform context.

First, the global approach, characterized mainly by regulation through public sector reforms, is known as NPM (Hood, 1991; 1995). There have been concerted attempts to change the values, norms, cultures, processes and practices of public sector organisations in the developed world since the 1970’s (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). Broadbent and Laughlin (2013, p. 2) argue that “accounting, in its different forms, is central to NPM or NPFM5 and is, therefore, centrally involved in the attempts made by those who have the position to do so, to implement control to achieve particular intended outcomes.” They highlight two key theoretical ideas for public sector accounting – “accounting logic” and “accountability”. The literature identifies the development of NPM as a crucial factor behind the emergence of performance audits as a method of ensuring accountability (Hood, 1991, 1995; Gendron et al., 2001, 2007; Lapsley, 2009). Power (1999, 2000) coined the term ‘the audit society’ to describe the

5 Olson, Guthrie and Humphrey (1998) relabelled NPM as new public financial management (NPFM). Although the NPFM is more closely associated with the link between accounting and accountability, this study refers to the notion of NPFM and all other forms of public sector reforms by the term NPM. 23 performance measurement and risk management of just about everything. However, the influence of NPM on public sector reform agendas reflects economic, social and political contexts.

Hood (1991), in one of the key papers on NPM, categorises the doctrinal contents of the group of ideas that constitute the core of NPM. These ideas originated in the public administration literature which highlighted new managerialism, a move away from the old public sector model (Hood and Schuppert, 1988; Dunleavy, 1989; Dunsire et al., 1989; Hood, 1990). Hood (1991, p. 3) highlights (a) attempts to slow down or reverse government growth in terms of public spending and staffing (Dunsire and Hood, 1989); (b) shifts from core government institutions toward privatisation or quasi-privatisation and away from core government institutions, with renewed emphasis on ‘subsidiarity’ in service provision (Hood and Schuppert, 1988); and (c) developments on the issues of public management, policy design, decision styles and inter-governmental cooperation.

Hood (1995) provides an account of the development of the concept of NPM, indeed a great deal of NPM theorisation in the public sector is informed by Hood’s (1991, 1996) work. Hood (1995) illustrates the development of NPM as a shift towards ‘accountinization’ (a term coined by Power and Laughlin, 1992) to describe the shift from historical public administration concepts to NPM driven by market-economics based business models, rather than the implied public service operating models. In doing so, Hood (1995) discusses the struggle of NPM with the traditional public accountability embodied in Progressive-era public administration ideas. Moreover, Hood (1995) argues that accounting reforms, followed by NPM inspired innovations form an important part of the assault on the Progressive-era models of public accountability. From this perspective, Hood (2005) demonstrates a tension between accounting/managerial accountability and public accountability due to NPM doctrines of public sector management.

Hood (1995) identifies a number of changes in the development of NPM: a change of emphasis from policy making to management skills, from process to output, from hierarchies to a competitive basis for public service provision, with salaries becoming variable rather than fixed, and a shift from an inclusive public service to contract

24 provision. Hood (1995) identifies seven doctrinal components of NPM in recognising distinct regional and national differences in the extent of the deployment of NPM inspired innovations. He then outlines a few factors, which explain the degree of variability in the NPM reform doctrines between different countries. The main issues are to what extent the public sector should be, in a normative sense, seen as distinct from the private sector in its methods of accountability. A series of papers contributed to this discussion on different forms of accountability, driven by various doctrinal positions in the accounting literature. However, there is relatively little research on the theorisation of public sector accounting in the NPM context (for exceptions see Lapsley, 1999, 2008, 2009).

Gregory (1995) touches on the idea of the limits of accountability in the context of contemporary public sector management and NPM reform. He argued that the managerial public administration model associated with notions of control requires a level of certainty and measurability that is not present in the public sector, and may end up doing more harm than good. From this perspective, Gregory’s (1995) criticism of contemporary public management reflects a concern that processes of managerial and financial accountability may supersede aspects of political accountability. It is this theme - that managerial accountability has undermined the process of political accountability - which can be found in the work of Funnell (2000) and Gray and Jenkins (1993).

Power and Laughlin’s (1992) idea of the accounting logic (accountinization) based on the input/output model embedded in the system of control gained some prominence in the accounting literature because of the managerial and market economic approaches privileged in the context of NPM (Hood, 1995; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). From this perspective, Laughlin (2007, p. 208) stresses that: “Accounting logic is often seen when monetary flows are the key content of the regulatory process and […] its main characteristic relies on traditional accounting assumption ‘that it is possible to evaluate each and every financial flow in terms of outputs, and preferably outcomes achieved’”.

Broadbent and Laughlin (2013, p. 2) argue that, “accounting, in its different forms, is central to NPM and is, therefore, centrally involved in the attempts made by those who have the position to do so, to implement control to achieve particular intended 25 outcomes”. This argument highlights the importance of the “accountinization” claim by Hood (1995) and the extent to which accounting is a management control system (Broadbent et al., 1999).

The concepts central to NPM are evident in the research focusing on public sector accounting and accountability (Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley, 1999; Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). Therefore, from the beginning, studies of the implementation of NPM reform build on the concept of accountability. The significant growth of accrual accounting and market-based efficiency and effectivenes measures in the public sector highlights this strong relationship (Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009; Funnell et al., 2012). Authors such as Power (2007) and Hood (1995, 2010) demonstrated an increase in the financial accounting, performance auditing, feedback, and evaluation activities due to the prominence of accounting based NPM reforms in the public sector, which has implications for the notion of accountability.

Second, another significant conceptualisation of accountability is the work of Roberts’s (1991, 1996) distinction of individualising and socialising forms of accountability. Roberts (1991) picks up and extends the notion of the relational nature of accountability raised in Roberts and Scapens (1985). Roberts and Scapens (1985) inform this body of work by defining accountability as “the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (p.447). In this conceptualisation, accountability is a relational matter where one gives, and another demands, reasons for conduct through accounting information in the production and reproduction of the system of accountability. Therefore, to be accountable for one’s activities is to both explicate the reasons and provide grounds on which activities can be justified. However, Roberts and Scapens (1985) highlight that the nature of accountability relationships and the process of rendering account are not the same for all, and will be different in different contexts, because of the character of the relationship. Following from this, Roberts (1991, 1996) highlights the nature of the power differential between the account giver and taker in practice. Roberts (1991) is a conceptual paper, and in later work Roberts (1996) attempts to theorise the dichotomy between individualising and socialising more clearly.

Roberts (1991, 1996) predicts a struggle between individualising and socialising forms of accountability, and stresses the tension between agency and structure, which in practice struggle with each other through power relations and the logic of accounting. The work of Roberts (1991, 1996) has become an important theoretical framework in the accounting literature. However, it has often been applied as a dualistic division of accountability between agency (micro and individual) and structure (macro and institutional). In his recent review of theorisation in public sector accounting, Jacobs (2015) highlights Roberts’ (1991) drawing on multiple theoretical ideas (such as those of Habermas and Marleau-Ponty) to develop the theoretical distinction between individualising (where accounting is central) and socialising accountability (where sense of self in relation to other is central). Most of the theorisation of the accounting literature focuses on either one or the other organisational level. Some accounting researchers have shown how people experience a more individualising sense of accountability (Broadbent et al., 1999), and others have shown how people experience more socialising form of accountability (Jacobs and Walker, 2004).

Lindkvist and Llewellyn (2003) modify Roberts’s (1991, 1996) individualising/hierarchical framework, arguing that it places a limit on the individual agency for making choice and taking responsibility in the context of a decentralized form of organisational structure. Therefore, authors such as Broadbent et al. (1999) argue that individualising and socialising forms of accountability need to be combined to engage with both micro and macro forces. Broadbent et al. (1999) use the individualising and socialising conceptual framework derived from Roberts (1991, 1996) in order to show the utility of a blended use of these accounting technologies for the practices of accountability in the public sector. Both Broadbent et al. (1999) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) argue that accountability could be enhanced through a greater use of ex-ante management accounting information (Broadbent et al., 1999).

In summary, previous research shows that accountability concepts and relationships cannot be taken-for-granted because there are other social, institutional and political forces that influence the accountability relationship (Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Cooper and Johnston, 2012; Jacobs, 2012). From this perspective, the nature of the relationship between accounting and accountability requires going beyond the simple distinction of

27 individualising and socialising forms of accountability and engaging more with the logic of practice pertaining to accountability. Therefore, there is a need for an analysis of the accountability literature in the context of public sector reform to explore how accountability concepts and relationships change.

2.3 Accountability in the Public Sector Reform Context There is an extensive body of work which highlights the importance of accountability for public sector accounting. Perrin (1981) calls on academics to engage with more accounting issues in the public sector context. Lapsley (1988), Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) and Pallott (1992) call for further work on the theoretical development of accountability as the cornerstone for many accounting activities in the public sector. Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) identify accountability as the central issue for the governance and performance of accountability in the public sector. Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) also show how the understanding of accountability is changing in the public sector context. Moreover, Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) argue that some public sector accounting research has excessively focused on the technical side of accountability rather than the social. Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) argue that accounting changes (such as accrual accounting) are transforming the notion of accountability in the public sector context. Van Helden (2005) and Goddard (2010) demonstrate a lack of theorisation and the dominance of descriptive studies in public sector accounting research. Lapsley (1999) explores the role of accounting within the public sector and connects it to rationalising the NPM notion of efficiency. Funnell et al. (2012) highlight the importance of the institutional arrangements for accountability in the context of public sector reforms in Australia, while Jacobs (2012, 2015) concludes that NPM and accountability are two key theoretical ideas used to theorise most of the public sector accounting and reform research.

Hoskin and Macve (1988) show the reproduction of an economic rationale for accounting and accountability through power-knowledge relations, and characterise those power relations as a struggle between economic and public accountability. In a similar vein, Laughlin et al. (1992) observe a range of financial and accountability changes, which were driven by general medical practice reforms in the UK. They argue

28 that the Government was trying to construct a hierarchical form of accountability framework based on the principal-agent relationship between regional health authorities and GPs. Laughlin et al. (1992) show how accounting was adopted by the key actors in their struggle for a dominant position in the field. They suggests the terms ‘contractual’ and ‘communal’ forms of accountability, which are quite similar to Roberts (1991, 1996) individualising and socialising forms of accountability.

Pallot (1992) identifies that most financial and compliance activities are taken-for- granted as accountability practices in the public sector. Moreover, Pallot (1992) contends that the development of the concept of accountability is required for the theoretical formation of public sector accounting. Pallot (1992) highlights a tension between individualistic and collective accountability of community assets as common property, which also reflects similar elements to Roberts (1991, 1996) individualising and socialising distinctions. Parker and Guthrie (1993) present a similar dualistic analysis of accountability changes in the Australian public sector. They show that because of NPM style reforms the Australian public sector has been going through significant changes, which reflect a struggle between public and financial accountability instigated by economic rationales of efficiency and effectiveness. In their analysis of NPM reform in the UK, Humphrey et al. (1993) present accountable management as a struggle between an individualising form of accountability and a public accountability.

In their ‘codes of accountability’ paper, Gray and Jenkins (1993) highlight the notion that accountability is a relationship rather than an institution or processes. This notion of accountability is an obligation to present an account of and/or answer for the execution of responsibilities to those who are entrusted with those responsibilities (Gray and Jenkins, 1993, p. 55). However, Gray and Jenkins (1993, p. 57) also see accountability as a form of stewardship and trusteeship, reflecting an agency relationship between principal (accountor) and agent (accountee), which is codified in financial, professional, and managerial codes. As such, Gray and Jenkins (1993) highlight a struggle between the dominant financial and other accountability codes. While this does not neatly fit the Roberts (1991, 1996) dichotomy, it does reflect the notion of a struggle between forms of accountability.

Arrington and Francis (1993) make a notable contribution to the accountability literature with this conceptual paper. From the outset, Arrington and Francis’ (1993) work is not conducted in the context of the public sector, but does have implications for public sector accounting, and describes accounting as a cultural practice to delink accountability from the logic of accounting. Arrington and Francis (1993) highlight the power of accounting as the language of accountability through discourse, which is embedded in cultural practices in organisations. Arrington and Francis (1993) show the cultural practice is constructed through everyday struggles. From this perspective, further work is required to explore and understand the link between accountability and practice.

Power (1994, 1997) draws a link between NPM reforms and performance audits by introducing the notion of ‘audit society’ in the context of trust and risk management. One aspect of the construction of the audit society is the function of greater demand for accountability in the public interest. This is how performance audits have entered the social space of accountability, and subsequently exert influence over the public sector field. The explosion of verification and feedback activities has contributed to the expansion of performance audits in this field. As a result, the performance audit emerges as a solution to the struggle between financial/managerial accountability and public/political accountability. This also highlights an important link between accountability and practice.

Sinclair (1995) discusses change in the concept of accountability according to the NPM context. Sinclair (1995) derives typologies of many forms of accountability and shows tensions between these forms of accountability in the public sector. Sinclair (1995) describes accountability as chameleon-like, elusive, multiple, fragmented and subject to continual reconstruction. To support this argument, Sinclair (1995) outlines five aspects of accountability: political, public, managerial, professional and personal. Sinclair’s (1995) typologies highlight the multiple aspects NPM conception of accountability in the public sector context. Likewise, Stone (1995) proposes additional typologies of accountability; for example, parliamentary control, managerial, judicial management, constitutional law, and the public - the literal public market. From these perspectives, it is clear that there are multiple aspects of accountability and they are confusing and

30 complex. These typologies are mainly portrayals of both individualising (vertical) and socialising (horizontal) accountability mechanisms for public sector institutions, which illustrate similar ideas to Roberts (1991, 1996) work.

Degeling et al. (1996) examine the relationship between the public accounts committees (PAC) and accountability in the historical context of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) for the period of 1914-1932 in the Australian public sector context. Degeling et al. (1996) illustrate how the original financial accountability focus shifted away from aspects of accounting towards political accountability issues. This illustrates that accountability can function as a social rather than a technical construct. The authors attribute this change to the struggles between multiple interests: [. . .] structuring and contest between multiple players each seeking to use the parliamentary platform offered by the JCPA as a medium for pursuing interests and concerns that were important to them (Degeling et al. 1996, p. 47).

Broadbent et al. (1996) criticise the development of the economic theory of principal- agent (PA) which changed the accountability relationships driven by public sector reforms, and highlight the changes NPM reforms brought to the trust relationship of caring professionals. Broadbent et al. (1996) indicate that there is a clash of accountability themes between the PA logic, based on an economic rationale, and the caring logic based on trust and relationships. These struggles are socially constructed, and organised by the powerful players in the field, according to this perspective. Jacobs (1998) shows how an NPM inspired conceptualising of accountability initiates struggle between financial/managerial and public accountability, and provides evidence to demonstrate how value for money (VFM) audits are the subject of a struggle between different public sector organisations i.e. the New Zealand Treasury and the Auditor- General of New Zealand.

In the similar vein, Radcliffe (1998) illustrates how social and political actors such as accountants, lawyers and auditors, construct the performance of VFM audit. By contrast, some authors argue that NPM type reforms limit the independence of public sector auditors (English, 2003; Funnell, 2003; Pallot, 2003). Maor (1999) discusses the possibilities of an ethical clash by pointing out the difference between the assignment of direct responsibility for public service provision of managers or contractors (a hallmark

31 of NPM type reform). Maor (1999) sees this shift as a way to depoliticise the public service in the hiring and firing of managers to retain control over policy implementation, and hints that the motivation behind this change is to create a tension between the appearances of apolitical action on one hand, while retaining clear political control on the other.

Broadbent et al. (1999) argue that management accounting has the potential to reconcile the tension between the individualising and socialising forms of accountability. They discuss financial information based on financial accounting can develop individualising accountability experience, whereas non-financial information or management accounting can develop socialising accountability experience. Broadbent et al. (1999) suggest that future research should highlight the complex interplay between management control systems and configuration of the contexts in which they are developed and constituted. From this perspective, Broadbent et al. (1999, p. 359) suggest developing a more socialised form or experience to achieve greater accountability: The possibilities of incorporating other qualitative elements into the pattern of accountability should be explored. Thus, research should consider if financial accounting may provide one element is a range of accountability that can develop a socialising and not individualising form of accountability.

Parker and Gould (1999) argue that public sector configurations and management have shifted the form of accountability driven by NPM style reforms. As a result, Parker and Gould (1999, p. 109) have highlighted how the nature and role of accountability are becoming potentially complex, contradictory, and confusing. Parker and Gould (1999) analyse different understandings of accountability and their relationships with NPM by drawing on structuralist and institutional theory. They argue that, in NPM inspired policy reform, there is a struggle between public accountability (custodian of resources) and financial accountability (financial manager of resources). From this perspective, accountability discourse becomes financial, with an excessive focus on managing spending and bottom-line measures. Parker and Gould (1999, p. 111) argue that, “such a change has induced significant structural, processual and cultural changes in the public sector field”. This argument shows that NPM is not only changing the public sector context but also the concept of accountability.

Mulgan (2000, p. 555) claims that the meaning of accountability in the public sector has been pushed away from the core concept of “being called to account for one’s actions”, and that there is a struggle between internal and external scrutiny for assessing accountability. Mulgan (2000) suggests that the notion of accountability is a management control tool intended to make public servants more responsive to their political masters. Likewise, Davies and Thomas (2002) highlight a similar struggle of restructuring control mechanisms for assessing political responsiveness and the associated economic and social costs. From this perspective, accountability is linked with organisational strategies and deployed as controlling tool in institutional struggles.

Gendron et al. (2001) show how the practices of auditing increase financial accountability by linking performance auditing with the development of NPM. They illustrate three forms of struggles over accountability. First is the struggle over different kinds of audit practices where auditors provide financial statement audit, performance audit and at the same time provide better practice guidance to both audit clients of the State government organisations in the province of Alberta, Canada. Second is the struggle over jurisdictional rights by the actors from different organisations over the performance audit practice in the name of accountability. Third is the struggle over the forms of accountability between financial accountability driven by NPM reforms and supported by audit practices and public accountability. In doing so, Gendron et al. (2001) highlight struggles of accountability in different forms, types and levels such as the professional level, organisational level and government level. Kloot and Martin (2000) and Martin and Kloot (2001) illustrate a struggle over accountability between perceptions of accountability in different States across Australia. Kloot and Martin (2001) argue that State and geographical differences can create differences in how public sector managers perceive accountability. Davies and Thomas (2002) document a struggle where NPM promotes financial/managerial accountability by focusing on the costs of academic service, and undermines the public accountability of the academic profession.

Funnell (2003) identifies a new albeit a significant form of struggle between two forms of accountability in the public sector – direct accountability to public through Parliament which is constitutional/political accountability and indirect accountability

33 for contracting out public services which by passes Ministers and the Parliament. Funnell (2003, p. 107) introduces the notion of ‘metricated’ forms of accountability which assumes “that the two forms of accountability are easily, rightly and necessarily substitutable for the other”. Funnell (2003, p. 107) identifies constitutional accountability as direct public accountability, whereby governments are answerable to the public through the fundamental principles and processes of a Westminster governmental system for “the well-being of the entire community”. Funnell (2003) highlights that metricated forms of accountability are market economy and efficiency notions driven attempts to replace the constitutional accountability with the contractual accountability. The metricated forms of accountability involve delivering government services by contracting out at less cost, interpreted as being efficient form of public accountability under the auspices of NPM style reforms. Funnell (2003) also highlights how NPM reforms not only change the context, but also the fundamentals, of accountability through the realignment of metricated accountability with constitutional accountability, which highlights how NPM proponents see these reforms. Funnell (1998) also shows the struggles between two forms of government audits – financial audit and performance audit – where the performance audit is assumed to provide greater accountability, as it provides a narrative about performance that goes beyond blunt financial figures.

Recent work by Hood and Peters (2004) highlights the contradictions associated with public service reforms related to institutional and cultural structures. Mitchell and Sikka (2004) highlight struggles in institutional accountability between the public legal system and the self-disciplinary system of professional accounting, the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), in the UK. They illustrate the role that power and politics plays in defining the concept of accountability, and show how professional accounting bodies mobilise valuable resources (social capital) to advocate a particular form of accountability.

Goddard (2004, 2005) analyses budgetary practices and accountability perceptions in the local government context in the UK, and illustrates the struggle between claims of accountability and practices using the concepts of habitus and field. Goddard (2005) finds that there is a struggle between budgetary practices and NPM practices, and shows

34 that the budget process supported by NPM reforms is the most important organisational process for performing accountability in its context. Goddard (2005) argues that the public sector is a hierarchical institutional field, and this provides a rich ground for the tension between individualising and hierarchical accountability. Bovens (2005) is one of the key public administration academics who talks about an essential tension between accountability as a virtue and a mechanism. This tension is also visible in the accountability literature in accounting that starts to disconnect this notion of accountability as a rhetorical device from accountability as practice. Bovens (2005) introduces two directions for accountability lines in the public sector context. On one level, it is vertical (top down/individualising) and on another level it is horizontal (sideways/socialising) accountability. According to this analysis, vertical accountability flows to the public through parliament, and horizontal accountability for the public is achieved via media, social activists and civil society. Bovens (2010) builds on Bovens (2005). Although this conceptualisation looks similar to Roberts (1991, 1996), this frame is more suitable for a wider context such as the public sector where organisational boundaries are not always clear.

Barton (2006) explores outsourcing contracts in the public sector in the NPM reform context, and highlights the struggle between managerial accountability for resource use, efficiency, and public accountability for transparency through clear accounting/financial information flow. From this perspective, an excessive managerial focus on efficiency crowded out the public accountability of performance information to undermine accountability. Alawattage et al. (2007) also show a struggle between accountability to political masters and accountability to the communities. Jones and Jacobs (2006) argue that through a continuous struggle between political and managerial accountability NPM reforms have changed the public sector context, strengthened managerial accountability and weakened public accountability. Jones and Jacobs (2006, p. 65) provide examples of the accountability struggle between external scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committees (PAC) and the loss of capacity of the committee members “to act as a countervailing power to the new public management and its result, the hollowed- out state.”. Jones and Jacobs (2006) find that PACs are a powerful source of accountability and legitimacy for parliamentary institutions. Moreover, Jacobs and Jones (2009) argue that this process of external scrutiny is susceptible to legitimising

35 accountability. This body of work shows how different accountability notions are contested, and how NPM style reforms privilege one form of accountability over the other.

Funnell et al. (2012) show how the APS has changed over the past few decades due to the adoption of private sector management models, which has made the meaning of accountability far less than clear. Funnell et al. (2012, p. 47) argue that NPM has changed the notion of accountability of public sector managers in terms of performance, and that, “the assault on public administration by management reforms over the last three decades have made the meaning and practice of accountability contestable and caused it to be in a continual state of flux”. They highlight a struggle between political form of accountability and financial forms of accountability driven by public sector reforms. Cooper and Johnston (2012) explore the notion of accountability through the practices of the Manchester United Football Club and highlight the struggle between financial and public accountability. Cooper and Johnston (2012) argue that the corporate (mis)recognition of accountability as transparency supported by accounting lacks power and requires politics to enforce accountability in the field of football. Smyth (2012) highlights the contested nature of accountability by showing struggles between market- based financial/managerial accountability and public accountability.

Ahrens and Ferry (2015) illustrate how the politics of accountability reconstitute political accountability as public accountability with legislation and accounting control measures, and show how accounting is used in the struggle between two forms of accountability. They further show that there is an accountability struggle between different levels of government (as in the case of this study) between local government and central government. Again, accounting plays a crucial role in this struggle between two levels of government over austerity and budget measures. This perspective highlights the constitutive role of accounting by showing that accounting creates tensions between not only two forms of accountability, but also two types of government institutions.

Bracci et al. (2015) highlight the changing patterns of accountability due to austerity in the public sector context, and show how patterns of accountability can shift between

36 accountability in good times and accountability in difficult times. Bracci et al. (2015) highlight how accountability is socially constructed at different levels within its context. Moreover, Bracci et al. (2015) shows that, in times of austerity, accountability shifts the notion of organisational boundary from the public sector to supranational organisations (entities that are beyond national boundaries). They go on to illustrate how the conceptualisation of accountability was transformed into a conceptualisation of accountability that was compatible with austerity policies.

The review of the literature on accountability shows that there is a variety of definitions and conceptualisations of accountability advocated by academics and practitioners alike. Some of the definitions are clustered around public sector contexts (Laughlin, 1990; Pallot, 1992; Sinclair, 1995). The literature review shows that Roberts’ (1991; 1996) distinction between individualising and socialising forms of accountability is often deployed to understand the development of the concept of accountability. A number of accounting scholars have contributed and elaborated to this body of work in exploring the relationship between accounting and accountability in different contexts (Broadbent et al., 1999; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003; Jacobs and Walker, 2004; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). However, the literature review so far shows that not all conceptual developments can be taken-for-granted in all contexts, because of the multiple accountability relationships that are illustrated by these studies from various contexts, particularly the NPM reform context in the public sector field.

The accounting literature also shows that accountability is confused, contested, manifold and a site for continuous struggle in the public sector field. Attempts to understand accountability by focusing on definitions lead to numerous typologies of accountability. However, these theoretical elements in the literature tend to present a constant struggle between different conceptualisation of accountability. In this body of work, NPM represents a prominent and significant theoretical concept of accountability in the public sector context (Hood, 1991, 1995, Power and Laughlin 1992; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs 2012, 2015). Consequently, that has created theoretical struggle in understanding the concept of accountability in the public sector accounting research (Parker and Guthrie, 1993, Broadbent et al., 1999; Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2012, 2015).

In summary, the review illustrates how NPM literature and Roberts (1991, 1996) individualising and socialising forms of accountability have become two key themes in most of the accountability work in public sector accounting research. It also shows that there have been struggles between two major forms of accountability in the NPM literature – financial/managerial and public/political forms of accountability. Relatively little efforts have been made by researchers to fully understand this struggle. Therefore, there is a need to move from the concept to the practice of accountability to recognise the ways in which the discourse of financial/managerial and public/poltical forms of accountablity technologies are mobilised by actors in practice. The following section will discuss the importance and significance of such practice focussed research in bridging the “theory-practice” gap by engaging with the practices of accountability in its context.

2.4 Accountability as Practice The literature review shows that there is a need to move beyond the normative conceptualisation of accountability and to engage more with practices of accountability in its social context (Pallott, 1992; Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992, 2008; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; Lapsley, 1999; Broadbent et al., 1999, Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2012, 2015). There is a strong need highlighted by Jacobs (2012, 2015) for the further development of the theorisation of public sector accounting research by focusing on the practices of accountability. As Jacobs (2015, p. 13) argues: Many of these papers have been focusing on typologising notions of accountability or exploring the struggle/clash between a financial/managerial and ‘other’ form of accountability. There is a rich tradition of combining the theoretical focus on accountability with other theoretical tools and perspectives. There is a need to build on this earlier work and to explore the nature of accountability as a practice and the role of accounting in these practices.

A number of studies indicate that the accountability relationships are not static but socially constructed through actors and structures (Degeling et al., 1996; Jacobs, 1998; Pallott, 2003; Jones and Jacobs, 2006; Jacobs and Jones, 2009). These studies offer practice perspectives on how to understand accountability through everyday practices and interaction between the actions of individuals and institutional forces. Ahrens (1996) research on the discourses and styles of accountability is a notable paper which

38 not only looks at the practice but also compares practices of accountability in the UK and Germany. The author explores management accounting practices to argue for wider rationales and social discourses of accountability practices. Ahrens (1996) suggests that different styles of accountability are influenced by professional and social discourses, which in turn shape the way actors hold each other accountable in their version of accountability. Ahrens (1996) demonstrates that agents’ orientations to wider discourses, informed by their prior knowledge and experience in the field, play a significant role in the practices of accountability. Therefore, the relationship between accountability and practice shape each other, where account giving and account taking take place in multiple but interconnected fields where actors participate from different organisational settings. The research problem then becomes: how to make sense of these continuous and consistent struggles between multiple forms of accountability throughout the literature; and how to inform academic understanding of accountability in the public sector context. To address these research problems, the following research questions are posed:

• How is accountability practiced in the public sector field?

o How do people in different departments/agencies practise accountability in the public sector field?

o How do people in different professional/functional roles practise accountability in the public sector field?

o How do people in different hierarchical levels/positions practise accountability in the public sector field? • To what extent, and in what ways, are accounting technologies of both financial and management accounting involved in the processes of practising accountability in the public sector field?

2.6 Conclusion In this chapter, I review prior research on accountability with a particular focus on the public sector. In an attempt to delineate the concepts of accountability, I focus on the development of the notion of accountability in the literature. In doing so, I illustrate that there is a long history of interest on accountability, much of which is in public 39 management and policy literature. I demonstrate that there is a growing body of work on accountability in the accounting literature. Much of the work concerns the public sector and public sector reform contexts. Public sector accounting and reform research highlights three major themes that have been developed in the accounting literature: (a) a strong conceptual theme focusing on public sector reform, (b) an emerging normative theme focusing on social and environmental accounting research, and (c) an emergent practice theme calling for practice research on accountability. I argue that the strong conceptual theme, which has been developed, albeit with diverse definitions, concepts and explanations, reflects the contexts and the theoretical lenses used by the researchers. I identify two key theoretical conceptualisations on accountability as being – the NPM literature (Hood, 1991, 1995) and Roberts (1991, 1996) distinction between individualising and socialising forms of accountability. However, because of the theoretical orientation implicit in NPM literature, it tends to present a struggle between different forms of accountability, such as financial, managerial, political, public and constitutional. There has been a call to move beyond normative and descriptive conceptualisation, to engage more with accountability practices in its social, institutional and political contexts. There is, however, relatively little practice focus research have been conducted to address the concept-practice gap of accountability in the literature. Therefore, to explore the practice of accountability in the public sector context, and the role accounting plays in those practices, I propose using the practice theory perspective of Pierre Bourdieu. I develop and present this practice theory framework in the following chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

PRACTICE THEORY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU –THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction The research question of this study has two primary aims. I aim to understand the practice, not just the concept, of accountability. More specifically, I aim to understand the practice of accountability in its social, institutional and political contexts. Therefore, given the focus on practice, I draw upon a theoretical frame that has a rich practice focus - the practice theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1931-2001). In this chapter, I discuss and orient the theory, in particular its core elements (habitus, field, capital, strategy and doxa) towards the study of how accountability is practised in different social spaces. In doing so, I draw on the nature of the concept-practice gap in the literature, and problemetise the ‘micro’ (human agency through micro inter-actional event) and ‘macro’ (social systems through macro level strcutures) divide of the existing work in the literature.

The existing literature has a tendency to use ‘micro’ constructivist analysis to inform the ‘macro’ structuralist discussion. In this study, I attempt to integrate the micro (human agency) and the macro (structural forces) with two levels of analysis which are rarely brought together. I , therefore, make an attempt to analyse of both human agency (micro) and structural forces (macro) by exploring practices in social, insitutional and political contexts. In order to address the limitation of existing theoretical frameworks to address this gap, I believe that Bourdieu’s practice theory offers the theoretical tools to do so. I expect that social, institutional and political structures not only inform what people think about accountability, but also influence the ways in which they do accountability. The relational frame of habitus and field recognise both individual agency and structural forces as critical factors for practice. The practice theory frame will help to explore not only what people claim about accountability (symbolic claims) but also how they do accountability (symbolic practices). Moreover, it helps to focus on the symbolic recognition of expertise, skills and knowledge (symbolic capital), access to resources, power and hierarchy (social capital), and professional or functional

41 accounting knowledge (cultural capital). Therefore, I theorise the struggles (embedded in habitus and capital) over the rules of accountability (doxa), and the symbolic and functional role of accounting (symbolic or cultural capital) in those struggles, in public sector social spaces. Therefore, the expectation is that Bourdieu’s theoretical tools will be particularly useful in exploring the role of accounting in the practices of accountability.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 places Bourdieu’s theoretical framework into perspective by drawing on the application of Bourdieusian theory to the accounting literature. Section 3.3 discusses Bourdieu’s key theoretical concepts. This section presents core elements of Bourdieu’s practice theory such as field, habitus, capital, strategy, and doxa. Section 3.4 theorises accountability as practice. This section develops the expectations of the struggle of accountability in the different contexts of individuals, professions, and organisations within the public sector. It develops the idea of using social space as an analytical framework to examine relationality and multiplicity in accountability, particularly with respect to the role of accounting in those practices. Finally, section 3.5 concludes the chapter.

3.2 Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice in Perspective In the previous chapters, I argued that many accountability studies theorise accountability mostly from structuralism, agency theory, public choice theory, and system theory implicit in NPM perspectives, and in so doing reduce the emphasis on agency and contracting costs and increase the focus on economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Despite the popular use of these theoretical perspectives in the accounting literature, they have been challenged and critiqued for their taken-for-granted assumptions (Parker and Guthrie, 1990; Hood, 1991, 1995; Power and Laughlin, 1992; Olson et al., 1998; Guthrie et al., 2005; Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009; Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2012, 2015). One of the challenges is to move beyond the dualistic or dichotomist theorisation of agency (micro) or structure (macro). Therefore, a theorical perspective focussing on practice, and based on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, would provide a useful heuristic device to move beyond the dichotomies of these dualistic and taken for granted assumptions, thereby allowing the exploration of everyday

42 accountability practices through the relationship between individual actions and structural forces.

In chapter two, I reviewed existing studies on accountability in the context of public sector reform, and found that the relationship between accountability and accounting is more complex and dynamic than most of the theoretical frameworks suggest. Previous accounting studies suggest that there is a struggle over two major theoretical stances of accountability. A stream of accounting literature also suggests that accountants or accounting knowledge have ignited some struggles by becoming more powerful because of public sector accounting reforms (Hood, 1995; Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998). A second strand of thought suggests that public sector accounting reforms have not made accountants powerful, but have expanded the struggle around the boundaries of responsibility and authority for accountants and non-accountants (Kurunmaki, 2004; Jacobs 2005). This tendency in the literature suggests that the relationship between public sector reform and accounting cannot be taken-for-granted. In other words, the relationships between accounting, the accounting profession or the number of accountants is not simple, but dynamic and complex in the context of public sector reform.

Roberts’ (1991,1996) distinction between individualising and socialising forms of accountability focuses more on the agency (micro) aspect of accountability, for example the accountability experience of individuals. This body of work theorises accountability as moral or ethical human action capable of existing independently of institutional and structural mechanisms. For example, authors like Roberts (2009) and Messner (2009) equate giving an account to the ‘self’ as accountability. However, prior studies on accountability in accounting show that the relationship between accounting and accountability in its context is more complicated and dynamic than Roberts’ (1991, 1996) theoretical framework assumes. For that reasons, prior studies in public sector accounting and reform recognise the need for further investigation of the relationship between accountability, accounting and social contexts.

The studies informed by NPM theorisation focus on institutional or structural forces (macro) such as reforms, laws, regulations and policies. This theoretical stance

43 perceives accountability as a part of institutional and structural mechanisms, particularly for management control and performance management. For example, authors like Guthrie (1993) and Power (1999) equate compliance reporting and audits as institutional forces of accountability. Some accounting research focuses on the macro institutional and structural forces or the field (Kurunmaki, 2004) and some focuses on the micro individual actions or the habitus (Jacobs, 2005). However, some key researchers on accountability have established the need for understanding the practices of accountability from both perspectives (Power and Laughlin, 1992; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Ahrens, 1996; Guthrie, 1998, Broadbent et al., 1999, Modell, 2001; Hoque, 2005; Lapsley, 2008; Christensen and Parker, 2010; Funnell et al., 2012, Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Jacobs, 2015). To date, what has largely been missing from the literature was empirical evidence of accountability practices that explores both individual actions and structural forces. Therefore, there is a need to theorise both individual forces and structural forces in one theoretical frame, which will bridge the gap between the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ divide in the literature.

Prior research also suggests that public sector accounting reforms have led to rhetorical, symbolic and taken for granted claims about accountability in the public sector (Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009). The symbolic aspects of claims are evident in the public sector accounting literature, in the form of NPM/NPFM (Olson et al., 2001), accrual accounting (Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009), budgeting systems (Carlin and Guthrie, 2003; Goddard, 2004), accounting designation (Walker, 1991), accounting qualifications (Olson et al., 1998) and accounting codes of conduct fostering self- discipline (Mitchell and Sikka, 2004). However, public sector accounting research does not fully recognise the rhetorical, symbolic and taken-for-granted aspects of accountability associated with public sector reforms (Pallott, 1992; Broadbent et al., 1999; Parker and Gould, 1999; English, 2003; Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2012, 2015). Therefore, further work is required to explore and explain the symbolic aspects of public sector accountability as accounting changes in the reform context.

I argue that a practice focus for accountability research needs to go beyond this dualism (agent/structure or micro/macro) so often found in theoretical stances. I further argue that it is possible to explain the practices of accountability by showing how they result

44 from the interactions and struggles between individual actions (micro) and institutional and social structures (macro). Therefore, Bourdieu provides a relational analytical frame by breaking from subjective and objective dualism to account for both individual and institutional properties through an understanding of the relational properties of practice (Bourdieu, 1977). From this vantage point, I will pursue my interest in understanding the relational properties of these practices. This relational frame is conducive to the study of social reality relationally: At every moment of each society, one has to deal with a set of social positons, which is bound by a relation of homology to a set of activities (the practice of golf and piano), or of goods (send home or an old master painting) that are themselves characterised relationally. (Bourdieu, 1998: 5)

From this perspective, accountability is a socially constructed concept (Broadbent, 1998) or phenomenon that exists socially and it is relational specific to habitus and field structures (Bourdieu, 1977). Simply put, the individual actions are functions of the ability to act upon, and the constraints of, the institutional and structural forces. The concept of habitus is therefore capable of capturing these interactions, and through them the internalisations of structural forces in the everyday practices of individuals and groups (Bourdieu, 1977).

I will now present some perspectives from accounting research on the application of Bourdieu’s practice theory (1977, 1985, 1990, 1998), and this discussion will form the basis of an analytical framework for the rest of the thesis. It is well established in the accounting literature that the practice theory of Bourdieu provides appropriate tools to explore practice in its social, institutional and political context. The theory proves useful in overcoming the gap between the concept and practice of accountability, as was identified in chapter two. Moreover, Bourdieu’s relational frame (habitus and field) considers individual actors and the institutional field as critical factors. It posits the following: field is the social structure, habitus is the individual dispositions, capital is the power relation, strategy is the ‘feel for the game’, and doxa is a set of core values that represent fundamental principles of the field (Webb et al., 2002; Swartz, 2008; Jenkins, 2013). Examining these aspects requires an understanding of habitus as the connection between agency and structure, as well as strategy and doxa as analytical devices vis-à-vis the underlying logic beneath everyday practices. Therefore, when

45 viewed from a Bourdieusian perspective, understanding the practice of accountability sees it as a relational process rather than an idea, concept or typology.

Accounting research often treats the social context as particular locales within an organisational or institutional context. The complexity of public sector accountability, and the more complex nature of the public sector context, make the use of Bourdieu’s (1985, 1989) notion of social space particularly useful. The notion of social space is conceptualised as a differential heuristic advocated by Bourdieu (1985), and as how agents (people) and structures (institutions, organisations, professions, and hierarchical positions) are constantly organised and reorganised. For this study, social space is treated, according to Bourdieu (1985, p. 724), as: “a multi-dimensional space constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active in the social universe under consideration, that is, able to confer force or power on their possessor in that universe”.

Bourdieu’s practice theory is established in the accounting literature (Malsch et al., 2011), and there is a body of work that has used Bourdieu’s theoretical tools in interpretive and critical accounting and accountability research. In contrast, Malsch et al. (2011) note that relatively little research has applied Bourdieu’s practice theory holistically, by applying all of its key theoretical elements (such as habitus, field, capital, strategy, and doxa). Furthermore, Jacobs (2012) shows that only 3% of public sector accounting research was theorised using Bourdieu’s practice theory. In accounting research, researchers have used Bourdieu’s theoretical frame in exploring a range of social phenomenon, for example, accounting knowledge (Kurunmaki, 2004; Jacobs, 2005); accounting education (Everett, 2003; Cooper and Coulson, 2014), accountability (Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Cooper and Johnston, 2012), social and environmental reporting (Lodhia and Jacobs, 2013), popular culture (Smith and Jacobs, 2011; Jacobs and Evans, 2012), accounting practices (Kurunmaki, 1999), the accounting profession (Jacobs, 2003; Haynes, 2008), accounting networks (Gendron et al., 2007), and the sociology of accounting (Malsch et al. 2011). However, as illustrated by Jacobs (2012), no study has used all the theoretical elements of Bourdieu’s practice theory in studying the practices of accountability in public sector accounting research as yet. Therefore, there is a need to use Bourdieu’s interdependent theoretical tools as a

46 whole package in order to understand ‘accountability as practice’ and explore the relationship between accountability and accounting.

Oakes et al. (1998) provide an account of how accounting is introduced to a cultural field and how accounting transforms that field with accounting practices. This paper shows how the constitutive role of accounting not only changes the field’s configuration and power relations, but also the way in which field participants think, talk and act (habitus). Kurunmaki (1999) draws on Bourdieu's theoretical tools of field and capital to demonstrate the power and control relation, as well as the struggle between professional and financial capital in the field of health care. Kurunmaki (1999, p. 95) analyses the diverse roles and divergent objectives of the various institutions and individuals involved in the functioning and positioning of accounting in the production and consumption of health care services within the public sector.

Jacobs and Kemp (2002) theorise the notion of social capital to study accounting absence/presence in the daily life of three Bangladeshi small traders which is one of the notable contributions to accounting. Jacobs and Kemp (2002) show the link between the habitus and field and how it changes in different contexts. One of the seminal works in the accounting professionalisation research, Jacobs (2003) theorises class habitus and reproduction, created through discriminatory recruitment practices in the accounting profession. Jacobs (2003) shows how class habitus affords preference to certain graduates of the accounting profession. Everett (2003, p. 77) uses the concept of language, capital and symbolic violence to show that concepts of efficiency, effectiveness and program outcomes are problememtic and important sites of struggles over ‘resources, stakes and access’. Jacobs (2012, p. 16) extends this argument and posits that the concepts for accountability are themselves a site for struggle or manoeuvre over resources, reflecting and legitimising an unequal distribution of capital.

Goddard (2004) explores budgetary practices by drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Shenkin and Coulson (2007, p. 297) also use Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social practice, in terms of habitus and field relation, and use this relation as a framing mechanism to explore the possibilities of accountability in corporate stakeholder relations. Kurunmaki (2004) shows how the habitus of medical professionals struggles

47 with the intrusion of accounting habitus into the medical field, and accepts the increased dominance of financial accounting practices to become a hybrid profession. Jacobs (2005) response to Kurunmaki (2004) shows that the medical professions in Germany, Italy and the UK do not absorb the increased accounting practices to become hybrid professions. However, while Kurunmaki (2004) concentrates on field specefic instiutional forces, Jacobs (2005) looks more at habitus specific individual actions.

Haynes (2008) uses Bourdieu’s theory of social reproduction to study the process of learning. Furthermore, McPhail et al. (2010) use the concepts of habitus, field, and capital to explore class, social deprivation and accounting education in Scottish schools. Cooper and Johnston (2012) examine the role of accountability in reproducing the social world for the more powerful, and use Bourdieu’s concept of ‘illusio’6 to unpack struggles in the field of football. Taken together, these studies show that habitus is the connection between practice and field. Moreover, these studies illustrate how Bourdieu’s habitus, capital and field can enrich our understanding of the social practices of accounting in its context. Furthermore, they demonstrate how a particular field is structured, who the key players are, how they struggle over resources (capitals) and use strategy in those struggles.

Bourdieu’s use in the accounting research shows that this framework is useful in understanding the field-specific effects that accounting and accountability encourage. It illustrates and explains the struggles through which accountability is constructed and organised by different individuals, groups and organisations in the field. Furthermore, it assists us to see the role of accounting in these struggles, where field participants mobilise and deploy resources or capital, both real and symbolic, in the field. Bourdieu explains: The position occupied in social space, that is, in the structure of the distribution of different kinds of capital, which are also weapons, commands the representations of this space and the position-taking in the struggles to conserve or transform it. (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 12)

Essentially, Bourdieu’s practice theory is useful to study the social implication of individual actions and institutional structures. Bourdieu (1988) claims that his theory is

6 Bourdieu calls ‘illusio’ as the fact of being caught up in and by the game, of believing that this is the only game in town and it is worth playing the effort (1998, p. 76). 48 a particular model of action (articulated in his theoretical concepts – field, habitus, capital, strategy and doxa) and particular philosophy of science (articulated in his theoretical concepts – relational/differential in social space). With these theoretical tools, Bourdieu encourages the idea of a relational and differential analysis with the notion of social space. The notion of social space alerts us to (1) identify the key actors who influence the practice; (2) the nature and amount of capital that relate and differentiate actors’ position and practice; (3) the ways in which symbolic capital or power is acquired and exercised; and (4) the field-specific effect of this influence on the practice. Therefore, Bourdieu’s theoretical tools will help to understand the practices of accountability and the consitutive role of accounting in those practices. The following section explicates these key theoretical tools, which are central to this study.

3.3 Bourdieu’s Key Theoretical Concepts According to Bourdieu’s practice theory, accountability would be a social concept or phenomenon, unique to the relationship of habitus and field structures (Bourdieu, 1977). In Bourdieu’s theory of practice, it is important to understand practices through the notions of habitus, field, capital, strategy and doxa, which are the connection between individual practices and objective structures.

3.3.1 Habitus Habitus is the central concept in practice theory, and links agency and structure. Bourdieu defines habitus as the “systems of durable and transposable dispositions which are structured structures inclined to function as structuring structures” (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 72). Bourdieu refers to this structure as the internalised mental structure that people embodied and that functions as an organising principles for action. Therefore, habitus influences the way in which people think, talk and act, as described by Bourdieu: Agents are possessed by their habitus more than they possess it, this is because it acts within them as the organising principle of their actions and because this modus operandi informing all thought and action (including thought of action) reveals itself only in the opus operatum. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 18)

From this perspective, social agents act according to their habitus. More specifically, social agents function and operate based on an implicit logic of practice and a practical

49 sense of the field. Therefore, when agents internalise the practical logic and sense of the field, it then becomes habitus. However, habitus does not determine practice but organises or structures practice. In this case, the game is the field, feel is the habitus, and they are interrelated. Everett (2002, p. 60) explains habitus as “the mental and corporeal schemata that are inculcated in the body and influence actors perception, appreciation and action”. Jacobs (2003, p. 575) believes the mental schemata are “values and argues that this taken-for-granted set of pre-programmed orientations equip certain individuals”, and give them advantage to practice certain things better than others in a social space. For Bourdieu, on one level, habitus is part of people’s bodies, and people express it through mobilising and deploying instrumental strategy. Therefore, without strategy people will feel like ‘fish out of water’. The process of internalisation takes place at the very early stage of people’s lives. From experience and feel for the game, people learn that if he/she does ‘A’ then maybe ‘B’ will happen. For instance, if a student experiences in primary school that extracurricular activities improve grades, then that student will use the same strategy to become successful at the tertiary level.

The correspondence between the space of positions occupied in the social space, and the space of the dispositions (habitus) of their occupants, function together as a model for differentiation and distinction amongst actors (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 15). Therefore, habitus emerges and relates to the organisation of space and to the reorganisation of the capital within that space. Habitus is this space that influences how actors think, how actors speak, and how actors act in a way that is the most accepted and legitimised in that space. The strategy also emerges from actors’ habitus influenced by their education, knowledge and expertise, but also largely from the experiences of previous symbolic struggles in the field.

3.3.2 Field Bourdieu’s work shows that practices do not take place in a vacuum, but rather that practices take place in a social space. The social space, according to Bourdieu, is viewed as a network of relationships that imposes forces upon field participants (Wacquant, 1989). Moreover, according to Bourdieu, fields are not physical locations where practice takes place rather a spatial dimension of relationships and networks.

Therefore, as per Bourdieu (1985, 1989), this study has conceptualised field as a social space replete with spatial dimensions of relationships and interactions between people (agent) and institutions (structures, systems, rules, procedures, documents). Bourdieu defines: Fields refer to networks of social relations, structured systems of social positions within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over resources, stakes and access (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992)

The concept of the field leads to the notions of struggles over dominant understandings of the field (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, 1990). The field is defined by Bourdieu as a structured space for social forces and struggles (Bourdieu, 1992), such as over scarce resources like dominant understandings of accountability. The prevailing understanding is important because it legitimises certain actions, for example, particular ways of talking, accepted ways of thinking and acting seen as consistent within the rule of the game. The struggles take place over the dominant understanding because this determines who is powerful and who is not, who gets entry to a particular field and who does not. Therefore, in a social space what matters more is the hierarchy of space (Bourdieu, 1985). Struggles are the relational force that changes the positions of the field participants in a given social space.

From this vantage point, Bourdieu’s explanation of field, as interpreted by Everett (2002, p. 60), is that “fields are occupied by the dominants and dominated, two sets of agents who attempt to usurp, exclude, and establish monopoly over the mechanisms of the field’s reproduction and the type of power effective in it”. This concept provides conceptual tools for analysing the position of accounting in defining the practices of accountability within these social spaces. Therefore, mapping the field is important in order to identify the dominant actors, dominant understanding and dominant accountability relationships, such as what accountability is, accountability for what, who is accountable, accountable to whom, why accountable, and how accountable.

3.3.3 Capital A field is structured by different social positons and agents (people). The positons are determined by the relative volume and combination of capital. Bourdieu (1984) explains that the stratification in a social space is a consequence of field participants’ type and

51 amount of capital. Bourdieu further suggests that within a social field there are a variety of ‘capitals’, and they are sources of resources and power. Capitals play important roles in the struggles over dominant positions because field participants always struggle over them. Bourdieu (1983) also refers to economic capital (money and equivalent), cultural capital (education, training, experience), social capital (network, relationships, trust) and symbolic capital (something that is misrecognised as capital). Bourdieu (1983) suggests that the organisation and stratification of a particular field are both the cause and consequence of these capitals. Agents with a large amount of capital have greater ability to act instrumentally or deploy strategies to occupy a dominant positon in the field. For Bourdieu, capital refers to resources, either of a real or symbolic character, that specifically relate to that field. In other words, capital means the economic, cultural or social power that is used to control things (either real or symbolic), such as individuals, organisation and institutions. That is why the construction and organisation of social space of accountability are both the cause and consequence of these capitals (Neu, 2006).

I expect that dominant actors in the field (with cultural and social capital) tend to have more symbolic capital and influence in organising or reorganising the social space for the practice of accountability and its logics, in the manner by which they see fit for the best of their purposes. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate which capital differentiates the relative power and position of actors in that social space. Similarly, capital may lead to power differentials, which can be used to control or influence practice (either real or symbolic). Also, the ways in which actors try to achieve their aims are functions of possible strategies and instrumental actions (Oakes et al., 1998, p. 261). Therefore, understanding and unpacking the hierarchy of capital in the social space of accountability is important to understand practice.

Economic capital relates to financial or property rights, which can be converted to money quickly (Bourdieu, 1977; 1986). Economic capital can be converted to other forms of capital, such as social capital or symbolic capital, depending on the structures of the field in which it operates (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural capital is knowledge, skills and expertise. For this study, other field participants would see practising accounting logic as cultural capital. Understanding budgeting, appropriations, portfolio budget

52 statements7, ministerial briefs and policy advice are forms of cultural capital in the public sector field. Social capital is the accumulation of all actual and potential resources (Bourdieu, 1986) that pertain to a durable network, membership of a group, initutional relationship, access to power, money, influence, expertise, and recognition. In the case of the public sector, access to Ministers or Department Heads would be seen as social capital by other field participants. Similarly, accountants with CPA designation, scientists with a Ph.D., and business managers with MBAs would be able to claim social capital through their qualifications and professional networks.

Symbolic capital is any capital that is misrecognised and seen as an innate character of the agent (such as prestige and reputation) – it is usually cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1985). Symbolic capital emerges when other forms of capitals are recognised as legitimate (Bourdieu, 1986). This means that symbolic power does not exist when economic, cultural and social capitals are recognised by the field participants (Bourdieu, 1989). Therefore, symbolic capital has the power to make certain things (other capitals) invisible or misrecognised in an institutional field (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 23). In addition, it is important to identify and locate certain capitals as they influence the organisation and dimensions of the social space of accountability. This means that, to locate and positon symbolic capital, other capitals need to be identified and analysed. For this study, on one hand, it is expected that actors with political capital, such as those in central departments or close to ministers, would have more symbolic capital by way of having more influence and ability to organise the social space and its vocabularies in the manner that they desire. On the other hand, actors with more cultural capital, such as knowledge and expertise of financial information and technology, would have capital that is more symbolic, and would be in a position to write the rules of the game. Bourdieu explains: Symbolic capital is a credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition. In this way, the power of constitution, a power to make a new group, through mobilisation, or make it exist by proxy, by speaking on its behalf as an authorised spokesperson, can be obtained only as the outcome of a long process of institutionalisation. (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 23)

7 The purpose of the PBS is to inform Senators and Members of Parliament of the proposed allocation of resources to government outcomes by agencies within the relevant portfolio. Agencies receive resources from the annual appropriations acts, special appropriations (including standing appropriations and special accounts) and revenue from other sources. 53

Therefore, symbolic capital reproduces symbolic power through symbolic practice by deploying symbolic strategies.

3.3.4 Strategy The concept of strategy and instrumental action is dependent on habitus. The idea of strategy is embedded within the habitus in the way in which agents view the world, think about the world, and talk about the world. Bourdieu suggests strategy is an instrumental reaction of agents based on their habitus, and dismisses the claim that practice is a mechanical reaction: The habitus is the source of these series of moves, which are objectively organised as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention – which would presuppose at least that they are perceived as one strategy among other possible strategies (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 73)

From this vantage point, Bourdieu’s notion of strategy is useful because it moderates the argument of tangential actions in the economics based accounting literature. Contrary to that argument, according to Bourdieu, strategy is the understanding of what agents think the consequence of certain actions would be. In other words, strategy is a particular orientation to practice. According to Bourdieu (1993, p. 35) the manifestations of strategies are referred as position taking, which is inseparable from habitus. Therefore, the conceptualisation of strategy opens up space for thinking about agents’ strategies in the practices of accountability within social spaces.

3.3.5 Doxa Bourdieu (1977) denotes doxa as what is taken-for-granted in a particular field. Agents try to maximise their interests and pursue dominant positions in the field by taking advantage of doxa (Bourdieu, 1977). Doxa are unwritten, self-evident operating rules that everyone follows (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). Doxa is a “pre-reflexive, naïve, and native form of collective misrecognition” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 68, cf. Everett et al., 2015). It is so self-evident that agents do not question or challenge it in their everyday practices to the extent that it “goes without saying” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 167). In other words, Bourdieu defines:

The truth of doxa is only ever fully revealed when negatively constituted by the constitution of a field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses – whose political truth may be overtly declared or may remain hidden, even from the eyes of those engaged in it, under the guise of religious or philosophical oppositions. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 168)

The dominant agents struggle for doxa and the dominated agents struggle against the doxa, as Bourdieu explain: The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, orthodoxy. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 169)

That means doxa captures the meaning of both orthodoxy and heterodoxy. According to Bourdieu, doxa is not just a belief system but also orientation to a certain action (Eagleton and Bourdieu, 1992). Doxa elevates the potential struggle between field participants over the concept, nature and the role of accountability. The following sections theorise this clash of accountabilities over doxa in the field, which is a function of habitus, field, capital and strategy.

3.4 Theorising Accountability as Practice In chapter two, I demonstrated that there has been a struggle between two major concepts of accountability. The first has been in the clash between financial/managerial and public/political forms of accountability (Day and Klein, 1987; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Braodbent and Laughlin, 2003). By contrast, the second has considered individualising and socialising forms of accountability (Laughlin, 1990, 1996; Roberts, 1991; 1996; Broadbent et al., 1999). Jacobs (2012, 2015) illustrates the point that there is a need to move beyond the conceptual, normative and prescriptive work and towards more practice focused research. Therefore, I seek to respond to this particular call to make sense of the tension between approaches stressing the concepts rather than the practices of accountability. From this vantage point, Bourdieu’s habitus and field relational frame will help to identify and analyse relationships, actions and struggles (both real and symbolic) between field participants and structures.

Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) argue that accounting logic is a way of thinking which is not necessarily controlled by accountants or the accounting profession, rather this logic has permeated the mindset of public servants and politicians who are part of the wider public sector field. This study is a practice check for this argument: that accountants and the accounting profession are becoming dominant in the public sector field because of the rise of NPM reforms based on accounting logic or accountinization. Therefore, the exploration of what the practices of accounting, by both accountants and non-accountants are doing to accountability, and in turn, what everyday practices of accountability are doing to the fields of accounting and accountants, is significant. Therefore, an exploration of accountability as practice can inform the functioning and positioning of accounting or accountants in its context.

Professions or functional groups are important field participants in the social space of accountability, but the link between professional or group habitus and accountability is under-researched. Professions or professionals have enjoyed a high level of autonomy in their practices of accountability. The recent literature on this shows the diffusion of professional autonomy and an increase of professional accountability (Day and Klein, 1987; Broadbent et al., 1999). At one level, calls for more professional accountability have increased, but on the other level, professional autonomy has decreased. The stimulus for this movement or change is a shift towards hierarchical or managerial accountability. For example, the rise of NPM style reforms provided the stimulus for managerial accountability based on financial or accounting logics and technologies. Therefore, accountants as a profession received a significant advantage as a result.

Practice (both real and symbolic) is defined in this study as a dialectical relationship between people (agents) with dispositions and institutions with structures. In this sense, practice is also viewed as multiple and intertwined - for instance, preparing an accounting report might be for multiple purposes, such as hierarchical reporting, for compliance requirement, for performance assessment, for management control, for auditing or for accountability. Therefore, I argue that, to understand accounting and accountability as practice, it is important to understand their multiplicity, interconnectedness and actual processes. In the end, the understanding of the process

56 will help to understand the objective and outcome of actions, which will in turn contribute to differentiating the real from the symbolic in organisational practices.

Drawing on Bourdieu, I expect that the actions of individual actors are also influenced by the structure of the social space and the relative position of the actors in that social space. I also expect that the field participants such as individuals, professions and organisaitons, internalise or embody the structure of that social space where they are located. The internalisation of the structural forces means that the dominant understanding of acountability becomes embodied as the habitus of individuals or groups. This internalisation leads agents to think, talk and act accountability in a particular way, which is then expected to become the dominant way of doing accountability in that social space. Thus, I expect that habitus will influence actors’ perception of accountability, such as accountablity for what, accountability to whom, why accountability and how to do accountability within certain relations. In turn, through the everyday practices of accountability, the agents’ habitus will be translated into wider discourses of accountability, which then become the doxic understanding and way of doing accountability. Because of its diverse stakeholders, with diverse interests and influence, the relational and differential aspect of accountability within the public sector cannot be taken-for-granted. Theorisation of accountability as practice drawing on the work of Bourdieu (1985, 1992, 1997, 1989), allows me to expect that key practices of accountability will reflect the doxic perceptions of powerful public sector groups. Therefore, I expect that differences in organisational functions, professional backgrounds, and hierarchical positions would lead to different accountability practices and the use of accounting in those practices.

3.4.1 Theorising Practice in Different Organisations I expect that there will be struggles over the accountability doxa in different social spaces. For this study, I conceptualise government departments or agencies as social spaces. From this perspective, I expect that different government organisations would be competing for influence over the accountability doxa in the public sector field. From this vantage point, I expect that the practices of accountability of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) would be different from the practices of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Department of Finance (Finance), the Department of 57

Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) or the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC). For example, the doxa of Finance would normally reflect accounting habitus based accountability such as financial or managerial or economic. In the case of ANAO, I expect their doxa may be auditing, evaluation and feedback activities. In the case of the Treasury the doxa would reflect market-economy based calculative accountability; the doxa of the PM&C would reflect political accountability, and the doxa of the APSC would reflect public management accountability. Therefore, I expect to find differential practical logics of accountability operating in different departments within the public sector.

I also expect to find one department to be more powerful, and the others to be less powerful, in a given context. For instance, due to the re-introduction of NPM style reforms in the public sector. I expect Finance to be more powerful, because at first they prescribe these reforms, and then implement them through various enabling legislation, guidelines, policies and procedures. In other words, since employees of Finance possess accounting and finacial knowledge, when they write the codes or rules for accountability I expect to find accountability codes based on accounting logic and process. I also expect to find differential doxa among the groups of departments, such as the central departments, line/service departments, review departments, and GBE/statutory/prescribed departments. This expectation is reasonable because, due to their primary roles and functions, some departments are known as policy departments, some are program implementation departments and some are review departments. Therefore, I expect to see a clash of accountabily over policy, program and evaluaution accountability.

3.4.2 Theorising Practice in Different Professional/Functional Roles I expect that there would be struggles between different professional or functional groups over their group habitus. I also expect that actors from various professions or functional groups would think, talk and act differently because of their habitus. From this perspective, their accountability perceptions and ways of practising accountability would be different from each other. Therefore, I expect that accountants’ habitus would be different from non-accountants such as lawyers, administrators, scientists, policy advisors, and program managers. I also expect that different professions or functions

58 would give rise to power differentials between groups within an organisation or across the public sector. For example, some professions or functional groups might have greater access to resources, networks, and power relations than others might have. From this perspective, I expect that accountants would have more power that is professional nature in the public sector reform context because of their functional knowledge and skills of financial, resource and performance management. Therefore, due to the NPM style reforms, the accounting profession or accountants might gain more cultural capital, and other professions or groups might lose cultural capital in the field. I expect that the difference in the amount and recognition of various capitals would trigger struggles between groups. It is because other groups or non-accountants might see that accountants are not only changing the structure of the public sector field, but also gaining more resources and recognition due to their financial accountability over public accountability.

3.4.3 Theorising Practice in Different Hierarchical Levels/Positions I expect that there would be struggles between individuals in different hierarchical positions within an organisation or across the APS. The public sector is a hierarchical institutional field, and it is reasonable to expect that this would provide rich ground for struggles between individuals over accountability habitus and doxa. I also expect that a public servant might be part of different teams, sections, divisions, professions, intra- organisational committees, and inter-organisational committees at the same time. Therefore, it is possible for a public servant to be situated in multiple social spaces at the same time, which requires multiple habitus and doxa. Therefore, I expect that this multiplicity would trigger struggles due to different habitus, capital, responsibilities and level of experiences. Subsequently, I expect that people at different positons and levels would approach and practise accountability differently, and that this difference will trigger struggles in different social spaces. On another level, outside the organisational hierarchy, a public servant may be accountable to the public, parliament, ombudsman, royal commission, auditor general, or to the media or civil society groups. Therefore, I expect that multiple demands of accountability will also trigger struggles between different ways of approaching and doing accountability. This will then create differences in the understanding of ‘accountability for what’, ‘accountability to whom’, ‘accountability for why’, and ‘how to do accountability’.

3.5 Conclusion In summary, the research questions of this study drive two main theoretical aims – (a) to understand the practices of accountability and (b) to understand those practices in context. Therefore, I adopt Bourdieu’s practice theory as the theoretical and analytical frame for the study. I present five key elements of the theory of practice: field, habitus, capital, strategy, and doxa. In this chapter, I illustrate that Bourdieu’s practice theory would provide essential tools to address this study’s research questions. Moreover, I show that a body of work successfully applied this theoretical frame to investigate different social phenomenon in different social, institutional and political fields. Furthermore, in this chapter, I expect to find struggles of the accountability over doxa in the field, habitus and capitals. From this vantage point, I argue that Bourdieu’s theory offers conceptual tools to bridge the gap between the concepts and the practices of accountability. Furthermore, I argue that the practice theory framework comes with a methodological implication of how the social spaces and network of relations can be studied in context. This suggests the usefulness of the sequential or social praxeological research methods practised by Bourdieu for conducting fieldwork to unpack practice in different social, institutional and political fields. Therefore, Bourdieu’s practice theory has both theoretical and methodological implication for this study, which can help to follow accountability in action through fieldwork. In the next chapter, I elaborate on the research methodology and sequential research methods applied to this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

4.1 Introduction In this study, I explore the practices of accountability in the context of public sector reform and the role of accounting in those practices. In particular, the research context is selected because the link between accountability and accounting is mostly visible in the context of public sector reform (Guthrie and Parker, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Guthrie Broadbent et al., 1999; Lapsley, 2008; Funnell et al., 2012). In the previous chapter, I presented a theoretical framework drawing on Bourdieu’s practice theory. The important concepts derived from Bourdieu will help us understand how accountability is practised, and will be evident in studies of public sector accounting and the context of reform in the public sector field. First, in the accounting literature, there is a strong nexus between the notions of accountability and the public sector. Second, it has been argued that public sector accounting is based on the theoretical concepts of accountability. Third, there is a strong link between accounting and public sector reforms. Fourth, the dynamics between accounting and the public sector field are most visible when there is a reform initiative or implementation of policy reforms. Fifth, there is a call for more research to investigate the public sector field’s specific changes caused by public sector reforms, such as accrual accounting (Guthrie, 1993; Parker and Guthrie, 1993, Guthrie, 1998; Broadbent, 1999; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Jacobs, 2015). Therefore, I have selected a recent example of public sector reform as a context, and the Australian Public Sector (APS) as the research site, of this study.

It is also important because exploring the constitutive role of accounting in context requires qualitative data to contribute to theory building and the field study, so as to overcome the divide between the subjective and objective (Ahrens and Chapman, 2002; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). The public sector reform context was selected because of the established relationship between accountability, accounting and NPM reforms. Moreover, the discussion and

61 development of accountability is central to most of the NPM style reforms, which has been identified by some key accounting scholars (Hood, 1995; Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Pallott, 2003; Lapsley et al., 2009; Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2012, 2015). Consequently, an empirical investigation of the practices of accountability in the public sector in the context of an NPM type reform will capture key issues identified in developing Bourdieu’s theoretical framework in chapter three.

Exploring and explaining the everyday practices of accountability in different social spaces requires Bourdieu’s sequential or social praxeology research methods (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Oakes et al., 1998; Everett, 2002; Rahaman et al., 2010). The sequential research approaches are Bourdieu’s practice theory-directed approach (Everett, 2002; Rahaman et al., 2010; Neu et al., 2014), which are emerging research methods in qualitative accounting research (Rahaman et al., 2010; Neu et al., 2014). The sequential research approaches are multiple phase designs where identifying and mapping the social field is done in phase one to develop a list of systematic categories to identify the actors and structures, before exploring the practices (Everett, 2002; Neu et al., 2014). The following phases then explore how the field works and how field participants engage in practice. The categories identified in phase one, such as the key actors, their positions and structures of the field, then suggest research questions for the field participants and observers (Rahaman et al., 2010). The sequential research approaches not only help to collect data but also help to analyse them. For example, it helps to identify and analyse the difference between what people say about accountability and how they practise accountability in the social field. Therefore, the sequential research approaches are appropriate to capture key issues of practice and provide empirical data about the differential practices of accountability, until a saturation point is reached where further interviews are not providing novel insights.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the methodological approach that is suitable to capture research issues that were identified in chapter two (literature review) and the significant elements derived from Bourdieu in chapter three (theoretical framework). It also highlights how Bourdieu’s theoretical tools help to understand how accountability is practised and presents the field study methods as they applies to the present study. Section 4.3 presents descriptions of the research sites, the

62 purpose of selecting these sites, the unit of analysis, and the level of analysis. Following this, section 4.4 covers the data collection process while section 4.5 presents the approach of analysing the data. Finally, section 4.6 concludes the chapter.

4.2 Studying Accountability as Practice To understand the practice, it is important to understand the social context in which it operates. The accounting research suggests that NPM has established the link between public sector accounting change and different forms of accountability (Pollitt, 1995; Guthrie et al., 1999). The objective of this study is to investigate the practices of accountability (how people do accountability rather than what people think about accountability). Therefore, to understand the practical logic of accountability practice Bourdieu’s practice theory offers appropriate tools. To follow the practices of accountability in its context, the study needs to proceed with the sequential search methods by mapping the individual practices (habitus) and configurations of the social space (field structures). Therefore, the study requires spending extensive time in the field to make sense of the relationship between objective social structures (institutions, discourses, fields, ideologies) and the everyday practices of accountability (subjective reality).

Prior work has focused on specific practices (Goddard, 2004), specific positions (Sinclair, 1995), specific organisations (Jacobs, 1998, Pallott, 2003), and specific professions (Gendron et al., 2001; 2007; Kurunmaki, 2004; Jacobs, 2005). Taken together, these studies highlight the struggles between different positions, professions and organisations in the public sector refrom context and pubic sector accounting change. The literature review illustrates that NPM and Roberts’ (1991, 1996) distinction of the individualising and socialising forms of acocuntability have been two key themes in most of the accountability work in the public sector accounting and reform research. Moreover, prior work in the NPM literature also highlights that among many different forms of acocuntability concepts there have been two major forms of accountability, i.e. financial/managerial and public/political. The findings of these studies suggest that to explore the practices of accounting, and the role of accounting in those practices, the public sector reform context is particularly appropriate.

The public sector field provides the public sector reform context, which is a fertile ground to explore the practices of accountability and the role of accounting. Moreover, the theoretical concepts implicit in NPM tend to promote struggle between different forms of public sector accountability. A public sector reform context will highlight the struggle between different accountability doxa of the public sector field. Therefore, I would argue that exploring accountability in different organisations, professional groups and hierarchical levels will shed light on the relationship between accountability and accounting. Therefore, the public sector field will provide a ground to explore the intersection and interaction of agents (human agency) and structures (institutions) to capture the key issues central to this study. The literature shows that NPM not only changes the conceptualisation of accountability but also the institutional, social and political structure of the public sector field (Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Guthrie, 1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Parker and Gould, 1999; Parker et al., 2008; Lapsley et al., 2009).

Due to NPM type reforms, accountants are expected to be dominant, because the introduction of managerialism and the implementation of accrual accounting is believed to increase their numbers and influence in the public sector fields (Abbott, 1988; Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Gendron et al., 2007; Lapsley et al., 2009). This growth in influence leads to a clash between different ways of doing accountability between accountants and other professionals (Jacobs, 1998; 2005; Kurunmaki, 1999; 2004; Goddard, 2004). In Australia, the Department of Finance (Finance) can be classified as an accounts or finance division of the APS. Therefore, it is expected that the re- introduction of NPM type reforms have increased the resources and power of Finance (accountants) in recent years. This has led to an expectation that there would be differences in the practices of accountability between Finance and other central governmental organisations within the APS. Moreover, there would be a clash of accountability doxa between Finance and other departments, as other departments in the public setor field might consider that Finance has accountant’s habitus and promotes accounting doxa. Similarly, the level of hierarchical positions in the APS would create differences in the practices of accountability, because each position has different type and nature of jobs, and provide access to different types of capital.

I argue that it is important to bridge the knowledge gap between the concept and practice of accountability. This study aims to make a contribution to academic understanding of how accountability and accounting practice are being used in a contemporary Australian public sector. To explain the practices of accountability, I need to show how they result from the interactions and struggles over accountability between doxa in the field. From this vantage point, Bourdieu advocates a relational or differential methodological mode (to break the subjective and objective or micro and macro divide) to account for practical actions and logics through an understanding of the relational properties of accountability. Therefore, I adopt such a methodology to understand the relational properties of accountability in individual, organisational and social practices. According to Bourdieu, this relational method is conducive to the study of social reality: At every moment of each society, one has to deal with a set of social positions which is bound by a relation of homology to a set of activities (the practice of golf and piano) or of goods (send home or an old master painting) that are themselves characterised relationally […] (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 5)

This relational thinking extracts the practices of accountability in the organisational practices from the context of everyday assumptions and perceptions of individual actors. Bourdieu (1977, p. 18) refers to this as an informant’s discourse which is a function of “semi-theoretical” disposition. Therefore, an ethnographic form of the field study is suitable for extracting both the modus operandi (the styles of accountability practices) and opus operatum (the principles of accountability practices) to understand the logic of practice. While the prior studies on accountability are divided between “actors’ accountability” and “organisational accountability”, Bourdieu’s methodology of studying practical logics provides a field mapping approach to overcoming the unnecessary dichotomy or dualism between micro and macro. To overcome the dualism, it requires that the researcher come close to the field and agents’ everyday practices, which is consistent with this study’s ontological, epistemological, theoretical and methodological perspectives. From that vantage point, the Bourdieusian methodology provides the most appropriate approach to map people, position and practices in different social spaces.

To explore accountability as a social practice rather than a concept, I intend to identify and map people, positions and practices of accountability. To attain a more adequate integration between concepts and practices of accountability, the data collection strategies and mode of analysis follow the sequential research methods, or a social praxeology approach, from the institutional sociology of Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Oakes et al., 1998; Everett, 2002; Neu et al., 2014). The sequential research methods are appropriate because they capture rich practice data about the processes of everyday practices of accountability in social, institutional, and political context. The approach uses an ethnographic field study to map both agents’ practices and institutional forces, in order to bridge the gap between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ understandings of accountability.

4.3 The Research Site The research site for this study is the Australian Public Sector (APS), and the context is the re-introduction of NPM style reforms carried out through the Public Sector Governance, Performance and Accountability (PGPA) Act 20138. The PGPA Act replaced the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act)9 and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act)10 on 1 July 2014. The aim of this public sector reform is to establish a coherent system of accountability for public resources, with an emphasis on planning, performance and reporting. The Act applies to all Commonwealth or Federal entities and companies. The principles and requirements of the Commonwealth Resource Management Agenda (PMRA)11 in Australia, performance measurement for the economy, and efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector, had re-emerged in 2010 when the government of the day recommended a reform of the existing financial accounting and accountability framework. These public sector accounting and accountability reforms builds upon the findings of the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR)12 conducted between 2010 and 2012. The findings from the CFAR suggest that while the existing financial management framework has a strong focus on financial accountability, there is

8 See http://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/pgpa-legislation/ 9 See https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A05251 10 See https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A05250 11 See http://www.pmra.finance.gov.au/ 12 See http://www.pmra.finance.gov.au/discussion-paper/ 66 little consideration given to the achievement of the objectives of public sector programs, or the quality of performance monitoring and reporting at the whole-of-government (WoG) government level.

The current process is currently described as being at stage three in the implementation process, where stage one was the completion of the new framework, stage two involved improving the quality of planning, performance monitoring, evaluation, transparency and accountability of the public sector and stage three enhancing the interaction of the Government with external parties. With the development of the Commonwealth Performance Framework (CPF)13, stage two of the reform process is now being completed. Stages one and two both have the characteristics of NPM or NPFM style reforms (Olson et al., 1998; Olson et al., 2005, Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). The new reforms focus on the changes to financial reporting rules, introduction of private sector like corporate plans, annual reporting with performance information, commonwealth procurement rules, commonwealth grants rules and guidelines, performance measurement approaches, and risk management and reporting approaches in order to deal with public service provision and delivery in Australia.

To conduct the empirical investigation, the research site of the Australian Public Sector (APS) is selected because it provides characteristics of NPM (identified in chapter two) as well as the expected struggle of accountability at organisational, professional and individual levels (identified in chapter three). The features of the APS field are important because they provide the important elements derived from Bourdieu’s practice theoretical framework, which will help to understand how accountability is practised. These characteristics are evident in previous NPM studies in the context of the Australian Public Sector (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Guthrie, 1993: Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Guthrie, 1998; Parker and Gould, 1999; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Funnell et al., 2012; Jacobs, 2012; 2015). Prior NPM studies highlight the importance of accountability for the Australian Public Sector. Moreover, some scholars argue for further work on the theoretical development of accountability in the public sector accounting and reform context (Lapsley, 1988; Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992, Guthrie, 1992; Pallott, 1992; Lapsley, 1999). Furthermore, Funnell et al. (2012) highlight the

13 See http://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/performance/#framework 67 importance of understanding the institutional arrangements for accountability in the public sector field. In a recent call, Jacobs (2015) suggested further exploration of accountability and public sector accounting in the public sector reform context.

The contemporary APS is going through the re-introduction NPM style reforms, which makes this site the most appropriate for this study. The APS provides all theoretical elements identified both in the literature and in the theoretical framework. For example, different types of departments/agencies (theorised as a field), various types of professional groups (theorised as habitus), and different levels of employees in the hierarchy (theorised as capital). From this perspective, this study explores and analyses the practices of accountability at three interrelated levels (a) individual level: exploring how accountability is practised by individuals at different hierarchical and organisational positions; (b) professional level: exploring how accountability is practised by different professionals/groups/functional teams; (c) organisational level: exploring how accountability is understood and practised by different entities.

The factors that led me to select the APS site and the re-introduction of NPM style reforms as context are five. First, in the accounting literature there is a strong nexus between the notions of accountability and the public sector context. Most of the public sector studies use accountability as a theoretical frame, and most of the accountability studies explore public sector contexts. Second, there is a widely accepted position in the literature that public sector accounting depends on the theoretical concepts of accountability. Third, in the accounting literature there is a strong link between accounting, accountability and NPM style reforms in the public sector. Fourth, the new reform agenda in the APS mandates regulations for public sector entities for practicing accounting and accountability for performance. Fifth, one of the principles of the new reform is that performance is more than financial, which indicates that there is a strong association between accounting and performance management in the APS. These features of the APS research site are important elements, because they provide the intersection and interaction of agents (people) and structures (institutions) which is a central concern of this study. Therefore, the expansion of NPM type reform provides natural ground for examining the relationship between accountinisation and accountability for accounting in the public sector. Consequently, exploring how this

68 reform is constructed and organised would shed further light on the relationship between accountinisation and the practices of accountability.

The Australian Public Sector was selected as the empirical research site for this study because the APS was going through major accounting, accountability and cultural changes due to the re-introduction of NPM style reforms with the enactment of the PGPA Act 2013. This provided an opportunity to observe and analyse both wider discourses and everyday practices in the context of the new governance, performance, and accountability framework. This is consistent with the claims that, to study ‘accounting in context’, it is important to explore when it is in action to understand what it does to the field and what the field does to accounting (Hopwood, 1983; Burchell et al., 1985; Ahrens and Chapman, 2002). Access was also an important factor in the selection of research sites. Like any other fieldwork, in order to gain access to the research sites, some access points were required. Through personal and professional networks, access to key informants was managed. The key informants acted as an access point to many individuals, groups, organisations and institutions. The study’s research design required individuals from different organisations, professional/functional groups, and various hierarchical levels and positions. Confidentiality agreements were signed with the field participants as per ethics approval, to protect the information gathered and to maintain the anonymity of the individuals participating in this study. Therefore, for the purpose of maintaining their absolute confidentiality and protecting their anonymity (as agreed with field participants), all participants are referred to as public servants. The following sub- sections present background information of the APS and introduce a few key organisations in the public sector field.

In summary, the selection of the APS as a research site was appropriate because it offers an opportunity to study people, as well as the positions and practices of accountability. It provides an opportunity to explore habitus, field, capital, strategies and doxa for the practices of accountability, and analyse the role of financial and non-financial information in that processes. Qualitative field study methodological approach and Bourdieu’s sequential research methods will capture the struggles between accountants and non-accountants in the construction and organisation of the practices of

69 accountability. Therefore, the nature of the research question leads to the research site of the APS field, which in turn guides the sequential research methods for both data collection strategies and data analyses techniques adopted for the current study. The following section presents the data collection approach in detail.

4.4 Data Collection The field study covered seven months continious and iterative engagements with the different organisations, professions and individuals from July 2014 to January 2015. During that time I visited research sites more than 150 times for meetings, interviews, conversations, observations and document analysis. As discussed earlier, social praxeological or sequential research methods of data collection have been adopted in multiple phases. The sequential research methods have allowed for an examination of the field, people, positions and the temporal sequence through which configuration of social space for accountability relationships and practices develops, stabilises and changes. Data gathering involved two broad phases: the construction of accountability (claims and relationships) phase and the performance of accountability (practices and strategies) phase. However, the sequential methods for data collection and analysis are not a linear account of the processes of construction and performance of the practices, but are iterative processes where multiple phases overlap and merge until saturation point is reached. This approach is adopted in order to allow for the investigation of (a) identifying and mapping the field and its structure; (b) identifying and mapping people, positions and practices; (c) how field participants think, talk and perform accountability; and (d) the different and temporal emphases placed on financial (accounting) and non- financial information in those practices.

Adopting the sequential research methods allowed me to pursue emerging issues that were not identified prior to the study, but became relevant during the course of the fieldwork. The looseness of the data gathering process was bounded by the sequential research methods, based on the research questions, to maintain a more focused approach to the practice. Some issues were investigated in more detail when they began to have relevance to the questions being investigated in the study. The data on which this study is based on collected from multiple sources, and the following forms of evidence were used when collecting data on the practices being investigated.

4.4.1 Formal Interviews and Informal Discussions The primary sources of data were interviews and conversations. I conducted six pilot interviews with both central and line departments within the APS to get an initial map of the public sector field. The purpose of these pilot interviews was to get a feel for the game in the public sector field, prepare a suitable data collection strategies, determine the appropriate framework for interviews questions and issues across the APS. These pilot interviews have shaped what I saw as appropriate lines of questioning, and helped to change the earlier outline that I have already prepared and to establish a useful line of inquiry for further interviews and discussions with a broad range of public servants.

Figure 4.1: Types of Interviews

11% 18% Audio NFT 71% Con

There was a focus for the interview questions, but the design was loose, though there was always a prepared list of interview questions to help keep the interview from losing relevance. However, the loose design, which allowed follow up questions, contributed to gathering more information than I had anticipated. After every interview, I reflected on the conversation, read the memos and listened to the recordings to change the pattern, sequence, style and tone of the questions. This method has resulted, as shown in Figure 4.1, different types and forms of interviews and a very rich body of data such as audiotaped interviews (Audio - 71%), interviews without audio (NFT - 18%), and conversation (Con - 11%).

The Table 4.1 shows that in total 103 interviews were conducted, of which 99 interviews were with public servants in the APS, two from private consulting firms who

71 provide consulting services to APS, and two interviews were with Member of Parliament from the major political parties. Interviews were of two types - semi- structured interviews (formal) and conversations (informal). All formal interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed. All informal interviews or conversations were documented by field notes, memos and researcher’s reflections. Other sources of data were focus group discussions, observation of meetings, workshops, seminars, presentations and examination of archival documents. Interviews were conducted with public servants at all hierarchical levels of federal government organisations, from the head (Secretary) of the organisation to junior staff members. Interviews were conducted with different professional or functional groups, such as from accountants to scientists.

Table 4.1: Distribution of Interviews

Types of Organisations Number of Organisations No. of Interviews APS 34 99 Consultants 2 2 Politicians 2 2 Total 38 103

Public servants, holding various positions, from 18 out of 18 major government departments were interviewed. The remaining 16 agencies represent the whole-of-public service in terms of form, type, and size of organisations. The Table 4.2 illustrates the ways in which interviewees were sought to make sure that most of the APS population, in terms of positions, professions and types of organisations are covered for this research.

Table 4.2: Interviewees and Position/Level

Position/Level Number CEO/Head 6 SES 50 EL 26 APS 12 Retired CEO/SES 5 Politicians 2 Consultants 2 Total 103

4.4.2 Focus Group Discussion The focus group discussion allowed engagement with multiple participants simultaneously, and complemented the data from interviews and conversations (see Neu, 2006, p. 397), which allowed me to use both individual and collective forms of testimony. Moreover, this source of data provides not only new perspectives but also multi-vocal evidence regarding the nature of accountability practices in the context of the public sector. In late 2014, a focus group was conducted, with 25 participants in various positions from many government departments and agencies. In that focus group discussion, I asked each participant about their accounts and reflections about accountability practices in their current and previous roles. These reflections and experiences were then shared with the whole group, which provided grounds for further detailed conversations, at a general level, about the role and consequences of these understandings for the practices of accountability, at an individual level. Moreover, some participants provided brief written notes of their perceptions and practices of accountability.

4.4.3 Direct Observations Direct observations occurred when field visits were conducted during the seven-month long field study. The purpose of the site visits was to observe practices and to conduct both formal and informal face-to-face conversations in a natural and everyday setting. This helps to describe the setting, actors, their actions and interactions with others. In those kinds of encounters, researchers have collected many useful documents such as memos, minutes, training manuals, internal reports, unpublished records and documents. In addition to this, these types of encounters provided many opportunities to have follow-up conversations and meetings about the preparation of annual reports, portfolio budget statements, corporate plans, and internal control frameworks.

The site visits were useful in gathering additional information by observing participants in their everyday life and visualising the context surrounding them. This ethnographic type method provided some unusual and rare occasions for gathering financial and non- financial information. For example, during the field visits I observed how participants behave when a minister or secretary calls for information or requires clarification. The field visits have provided many rare opportunities where I observed the hierarchical and 73 ministerial accountability in context, and the lived behaviours of actors involved in the processes and practices. Therefore, ethnographic observation allowed the researcher to observe the accountability discourse and practice in context. On a few occasions, managers showed great interest in what I was doing in terms of my Ph.D. At times, managers criticised the researcher for observing everyday practices, which to them were not related to doing accountability. Some participants took this opportunity to show how things are done in practice.

4.4.4 Archival Reports and Records The archival documents consist of audit reports of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), committee reports by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA), independent commission reports by the Royal Commissions (i.e. Pink Batts Home Insulation Program), submissions on Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review, Commentaries on the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act (PGPA Act), submissions on the Commonwealth Performance Framework (CPF), evaluation reports by the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC). Also included government-commissioned independent reports by the National Commission of Audit 2013 (NCA)14 on the performance, functions and roles of the public sector, and an independent review of Government processes for the development and implementation of large public programs and projects, including the role of Ministers and civil servants by Professor Peter Shergold AC. Other documents include letters, agendas, administrative documents, newspaper articles or any documents that are germane to the study. In the interest of the triangulation of evidence, documents serve to corroborate the testimony from the other sources such as interviews, conversations, observations, focus group sessions, and workshops/seminars. The other documents consist of the budget, parliamentary budget statements (PBS), annual reports, financial statements and corporate plans.

NVivo helped not only to assist with the data analysis but worked as project management tool for the study. NVivo increased efficiency and effectiveness of managing this study, particularly with constructing and organising an electronic database and storage system for the field data and analyses. NVivo’s capacity for

14 See http://www.ncoa.gov.au/ 74 recording, sorting, matching and linking help in identifying and mapping the field, people, positions, and practices to answer research questions from the field data, without losing access to the original data or context from which they came from. NVivo helped the conduct of this study in several ways: managing data, managing ideas, querying data, and visualising data, which is presented in chapters five, six, seven, eight and nine.

4.5 Data Analysis The sequential research methods adopted for the data analyses are not linear but iterative. The sequential research methods help to achieve the fit between data, theory and methodology (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), which fits nicely with the study’s objective of examining both the public servants’ claims about the practices of accountability and the actual practices. The following sub-sections briefly summarise these processes, along with the sources of information involved in the conduct of the fieldwork. In that sense, two forms of reasoning were derived from the iterative but sequential methods of analysis of the empirical data. That is, the inductive reasoning was derived from the field data, and the deductive reasoning from the theoretical framework. These sequential methods of analysis revealed the complexity involved with constructing and organising the practices of accountability in the public sector field. The data analysis started during the data collection process, which continued until the write up of the results. The data gathered from various sources have been analysed at three levels: by positions and cross-positions, by profession and cross-professions and by organisation and cross-organisations. This involved analysing the data on an individual level (by individual positions/levels), then combining the analysis at a group level (by professions/functional groups) and then merging the analysis at an aggregate level (by organisations/departments).

4.5.1 Phase One In the first phase, an attempt is made to map out the social space of study (the practices of accountability) in order to understand the boundaries of the space and its objective relations (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 104-105) with other spaces. A method of thematic analysis is used to understand what public servants’ said about their

75 experiences of the practices of accountability. From this vantage point, an initial mapping of space started from identifying the spaces that are connected to each other, which constitute the wider social space. It commenced with the existing research on accountability in the accounting literature, and focused on the nature of the accounting field, the role of academics, dominant positions of the key actors, and the idea of orthodoxy and heterodoxy (doxa) in relation to these rules and positions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 89-126). Because of this field mapping, key actors and their discourses of accountability are identified and presented, as well as their relative influence and their struggles over the scarce resources of defining accountability.

4.5.2 Phase Two In the second phase, the available public materials the accountability are reviewed. In this stage, as shown in the Table 4.3, different forms of archival data are used, which were produced in the context of the latest round of public sector reform in Australia. In doing so, I identified some key actors and institutions in the field, and then located and analysed these actors’ positions and capitals in the field. Archival data for this phase of research come from multiple sources. First, were discourses surrounding the Commonwealth Performance Framework (CPF) in light of the Public Sector Governance, Performance and Accountability (PGPA) Act 2013 under the ongoing Public Resource Management Agenda (PRMA). Then, over 50 written submissions from individuals, organisations within and external to the APS have also been analysed. These submissions and commentaries were received on both the CPF and the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR) discussion paper as a backdrop of the PGPA Act 2013. Submissions came from Commonwealth government entities, though submissions were also received from the private sector, professional bodies, not-for-profit organisations, academics and the public. Second, reports from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), the Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA), and the National Commission of Audit (NCA) were reviewed. Finally, media and websites produced by various government agencies were studied.

Relationships and structures in an institutional field are particularly visible at the time of reorganisation and institutional change. When this study was being designed, the APS was going through a new wave of new public management (NPM) type reforms, which 76 were termed as the Public Management Reform Agenda (PMRA). The most important and significant development of the PMRA, which started in 2010, is the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act (PGPA Act) which was enacted in 2013. The construction of the PGPA Act began in March, 2012. The Table 4.3 highlights the important documents which were reviewed to analyse the new development of public governance, performance and accountability in Australia.

Table 4.3 Summary of Documents Reviewed

No. Document Name Period No. of No. of Reports Reports Available Selected 1 The PGPA Act 2013 2010- 2013 1 1 2 Submissions on CFAR Discussion Paper 2010- 2011 58 50 3 The National Audit Commission Report 2013-2014 1 1 4 Submissions to the Commission 2013-2013 210 120 5 JCPAA Reports 2010-2014 1 1 6 Submission to JCPAA 2013-2013 16 16 7 ANAO Audit Reports 2010-2014 1 1 8 Websites 2013-2015 N/A N/A

First, for this study, the PGPA Act 2013 presents a particularly relevant scenario to investigate the contested space of accountability in the context of NPM reform. This is the most recent legislation to ensure public sector governance, performance and accountability under new reform initiative in Australia. The Table 4.4 documents the public management development process from inception to Royal Assent in time order.

Table 4.4: The Public Management Reform Agenda Process

Date Event 8/12/2010 The Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR) commenced 27/03/2012 Discussion Paper: Is Less More? Towards Better Commonwealth Performance released 29/06/2012 67 Submissions received on the CFAR Discussion Paper 23/11/2012 Position Paper: ‘Sharpening The Focus – A Framework For Improving Commonwealth Performance’ released 18/02/2013 Feedback on the matters raised in the position paper is closed 16/05/2013 The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Bill 2013 (PGPA Bill)

introduced into the Parliament of Australia 4/06/2013 The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) conducted an inquiry into the PGPA Bill and tabled a report 28/06/2013 The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) passed by the Parliament 29/06/2013 The PGPA Act 2013 received the Royal Assent

The Table 4.4 shows that Department of Finance released an associated discussion paper in March 2012: Is Less More? Towards Better Commonwealth Performance. A position paper was consequently released, in November 2012: Sharpening the Focus, A Framework for Improving Commonwealth Performance, which recommended greater transparency and accountability in the Commonwealth financial framework, but with a greater focus on government efficiency and effectiveness. The objective of the CFAR was to replace two key accountability legislations in Australia, the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997. In doing so, it sought public submission for due consultation and some of them were reviewed for this study as shown in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: List of Submissions to the CFAR Examined

No. Date Submission Represented By 1 29/06/2012 Attorney-General’s Department Elizabeth Kelly, Acting Secretary

2 29/06/2012 Australian National Audit Office Ian McPhee, Auditor-General 3 12/08/2012 Department of Finance Phillip Prior, Chief Financial Officer 4 9/07/2012 Department of Health & Ageing Professor Jane Halton 5 9/07/2012 Australian Taxation Office Not Specified 6 6/12/2012 Department of Human Services Kathryn Campbell, Secretary 7 9/07/2012 Department of Education, Employment Justine Potter, Chief Finance Officer and Workplace Relations 8 29/06/2012 Deloitte William Eggers, Research Director 9 28/06/2012 CPA Australia Alex Malley, Chief Executive Officer 10 29/06/2012 The Institute of Chartered Accountants Yasser El-Ansary, General Manager

Second, public sector governance is predicated in many jurisdictions on the view that legislation, similar to PGPA Act 2013, has the power to make the executive accountable, and that an independent auditor, on behalf of the legislature, should

78 examine executive’s activities and then report on them (Funnell, 1994). This is how auditors play an essential role within public administration, as argued by Normanton (1966), via the published reports of national audit bodies and of legislative committees (public accounts committee), and it is through them that informed criticism is brought to light about the way the executive manages public resources. In effect, this was an attempt to strengthen processes of democratic accountability as a form of resistance to the growing power of the executive. Many reforms that were proposed in the 1970s were completed in the 1980s in Australia. These general accountability arrangements, which were established in the nineteenth century, are still effective today.

Third, the recent report produced by the National Audit Commission presents a unique opportunity to look at the social and political processes through which accountability is socially constructed. However, the Commission has been established by the government of the day, and must place the government’s political agenda at the centre of its concerns. It is almost 20 years since there has been a thorough review of public sector performance and accountability in Australia. The Commission was appointed by the current conservative ‘Liberal/National Party Coalition’ government who took office in 2013. The Commission has received some submissions, as shown in Table 4.6, by key public sector departments, agencies, professional bodies and individuals, such as the Audit Office, Treasury and Finance, as well as from CPA Australia and academics. This report builds on the theme of responsible government and focuses mainly on public sector performance and accountability.

Table 4.6: List of Submissions to the Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit Inquiry on PGPA Bill 2013 Reviewed

Date Submission By 22/05/2013 Australian National Audit Office 29/05/2013 Australian Public Service Commission 24/05/2013 Australian Public Service Commissioner 20/05/2013 Australian War Memorial 23/05/2013 CPA Australia 23/05/2013 Department of Finance and Deregulation 22/05/2013 Department of the House of Representatives 22/05/2013 Mr Peter Coon 22/05/2013 Mr Michael Wunderlich

23/05/2013 Mr Stephen Bartos 28/05/2013 National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples 23/05/2013 Professor Kerry Jacobs 24/05/2013 Professorial Fellow Bill Burmester 28/05/2013 Senator The Hon Penny Wong 24/05/2013 Special Broadcasting Service 22/05/2013 UnitingCare Australia

More specifically, the Commission examines government accountability through the notions of efficiency, effectiveness and outcomes, similar to the PGPA Act 2013. Therefore, this report and associated submissions listed in Table 4.6 provide an opportunity to examine the entire social and political process of constructing and organising accountability in the public interest. Finally, to understand how accounting and auditing technologies are mobilised in the space of accountability, I have analysed reports produced by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) and reports produced by the ANAO (as presented in Table 4.7). The inquiry report by JCPAA on the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Bill 2013 offers an excellent opportunity to study the democratic and parliamentary review processes, and interactions of the key institutional networks which constitute accountability in the public sector.

Table 4.7: List of Audit Reports by Australian National Audit Office Reviewed

Year ANAO Report Title 2014 No. 21 (2013-14) Pilot Project to Audit Key Performance Indicators 2013 No. 28 (2012-13) Australian Government Performance Measurement and Reporting Framework 2013 No. 53 (2012-13) Agencies’ Implementation of Performance Audit Recommendations 2012 No. 5 (2011-12) Development and Implementation of Key Performance Indicators to Support the Outcomes and Program Framework

In particular, the JCPAA report listed in Table 4.8 offers an opportunity to study Parliamentary oversight and scrutiny in the implementation of the Audit Office reports. This the higher end of the accountability cycle, involving the Audit Office, audited organisations, and Parliament through the JCPAA reviews. The review process by the JCPAA is the final institutional and constitutional relationship between the Audit Office and public sector accountability. 80

Table 4.8: List of JCPAA Reports that Reviewed PGPA Bill and ANAO Audit Report

Date JCPAA ANAO Report Title Tabled Report 27/06/2013 439 No. 28 (2012- Review of Auditor-General’s Report on Australian 13) Government Performance Measurement and Reporting Framework 13/05/2014 438 Inquiry into Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 Rules Development

4.5.3 Phase Three In the third stage, I use a method of narrative analysis to cross-examine the practices with what public servants claimed about accountability. Interview data were collected from various interviewees located in different positions and professions from various Commonwealth public sector entities. During the fieldwork, institutional, social and political processes surrounding the practice of accountability were gathered and examined. In this stage, data were gathered from multiple sources, such as semi- structured interviews, informal conversations, focus group discussions, public forums, and current media reporting on accountability.

4.6 Conclusion In this chapter, I describe why I chose a particular example of NPM style public sector reform (Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013) as a research context, and the Australian Public Sector (APS) as the research site. The qualitative field study methodology, sequential research methods, research site and research context are integral parts of this study and have provided all the elements identified in NPM literature and Bourdieu’s practice theory. The combination of these elements will help us to understand the practice of accountability. I then present the field study research methodology employed for the inquiry. Consistent with some qualitative accounting literature, the sequencial research methods of Bourdieu have been adopted to identify and map the strcutures of the field, people, positions and practices in different

81 social, insititutional and political contexts of the public sector. The sequential research methods help to study the construction and organisation of the practices of accountability, and struggles over accountability doxa, between different organisations, professions and hierarchical levels in the public sector. I also provide an account of the data collection, analysis and presentation strategies and processes. Multiple sources of evidence were gathered during the data collection process, which include interviews, conversations, observations, focus group discussions, public debates and forums, and reviews of documents and websites. The data gathered have been analysed using a three-stage framework developed from Bourdieu’s practice theory. The data have been organised, stored, managed, coded and analysed electronically in NVivo. The following five chapters report the findings from the data analyses of the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

MAPPING THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR

5.1 Introduction In this chapter, I present a map of the Australian Public Sector (APS) field. The aim of this analysis is to identify and describe the APS field. In doing so, I analyse and categorise the demographic and descriptive data from the field study. This is the first phase of the sequential research methods adopted in this study. Moreover, I identify the structure and configuration of the social spaces by mapping people, positions, backgrounds and experiences, in order to identify and present the key actors and their relational and differential locations in the social spaces. Furthermore, I illustrate the organisation and stratification of the institutional, organisational, professional and hierarchical levels by which field participants are distributed, and where the practices of accountability take place on daily basis.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Applying the research framework developed in chapter four, this chapter presents the results of mapping the social spaces of the APS. Section 5.2 introduces a map of people and positions in the social spaces for the practices of accountability. It also provides a map of the relationships between people, positions, backgrounds, professions, and organisations. In doing so, it shows how multiple institutional spaces come together to form a social space for the practices of accountability. Following this, section 5.3 concludes the chapter.

5.2 Mapping People, Positions, Professions and Organisations There are three levels of government in Australia – Commonwealth, State and Local. The Commonwealth Public Service (also known as the Australian Federal Public Service) comprises both APS and non-APS staff. The APS refers to Australian Government departments and agencies that employ staff members under the Public Service Act 199915. The APS is part of the executive support of the Australian Government. It has authority to act on behalf of the Government, providing the support

15 See https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A00538 83 the Government needs to undertake its roles and responsibilities in the name of the Australian people. It does this by providing policy advice, managing and facilitating the delivery of programs, regulations and services agreed by the government. The APS consists of a large number of organisations that provide information, services, and support to almost every part of Australia.

The focus of this research has been on the ways in which field participants practise accountability, and use accounting information (financial and managerial) in that processes. This implies studying the interactions of participants on the ground in the construction and organisation of the social space for accountability, not only from a single organisation’s point of view, but also from the perspective of both agents and institutions. The unit of analysis has therefore been the practices of accountability by individuals, professional or functional groups and organisations and the accountability relationships between them. To gain access to these relationships and practices, some organisations were required as access points. Through various public sector contacts, I negotiated access to 34 organisations, which resulted in 99 interviews in the APS.

This study draws on sources from the federal level of the government. Australia has a federal system of government, with a national Australian Government and state governments in each state and territory. Under the Constitution, the federal government has responsibility for the Australian Public Sector (APS) whose employee numbers are around 160,000 and work in different departments and agencies. On 30 June 2014 there were 159,126 people employed in the APS under the Public Service Act (PS Act) 1999. The number of ongoing employees changed from 152, 189 in June 2013 to 145,891 in June 2014, a decrease of 6,298 or 4.1% employees16; however, in the decade to December 2012, the APS grew in numbers17. As shown in Chart 5.1 the 2014 National Commission of Audit reports about 167,000 employees (permanent, temporary and casual) in APS including Graduates (1,263) and Trainees (301).

16 These changes in employees and sizes are result of machinery-of-government changes. 17 Available at: http://www.apsc.gov.au/about-the-apsc/parliamentary/aps-statistical-bulletin/aps- statistical-bulletin-2013-14/main-features 84

Chart 5.1: The Staffing Structure in APS

Source: The National Commission of Audit Report 201418.

For the purposes of this study, the hierarchy presented in Chart 5.1 is conceptualised, analysed and presented at two levels - Senior to Top Management Level: Secretaries and Senior Executive Service (1, 2 & 3) and; Junior to Middle Level: Australian Public Service (1-6) and Executive Level (1 & 2). Overall, interviews and conversations were conducted with 99 public servants from 34 organisations. These 34 organisations were classified into four groups based on the APSC’s classifications – central agencies (policy and research), service delivery (line/portfolio agencies (operations), review agencies (regulation and compliance), and statutory/prescribed (other support including special and government business enterprises).

The activities undertaken by staff in the APS can be categorised into four broad functions: law making; policymaking; tax collection and managing government

18 Available at: http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/phase-two/part-b/3-2-improve-org-structures.html 85 finances; and enforcing policies by program or service delivery (Gallop, 2007). However, these four categories can be grouped differently as presented in Figure 5.1, such as central or policy agency, provision of services or line agency, review agency and statutory agency or other. Although some agencies have multiple functions, this classification of categories in Figure 5.1 provides a basis for analysis within and across agency levels. The distributions of 34 agencies in these four categories are as follows:

Figure 5.1: Number of Organisation Where Field Studies Conducted

4 11

Central Line/Service 2 Review 17 Statutory/Other

There are four central agencies with particular APS-wide responsibilities for setting the policy, research, legislative, financial and employment frameworks within which each agency operates. The central agencies are the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), the Treasury (Treasury), the Department of Finance (Finance), and the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC).

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) is categorised as review agency which is responsible, under the Auditor-General Act 199719 , for providing assurance services to the Parliament about the public sector entities. The ANAO supports the Auditor- General (AG) who is an independent officer of the Parliament. Therefore, the ANAO is not an agency of APS like others. The ANAO provides the Parliament with an independent assessment of selected areas of public administration and assurance about public sector financial reporting, administration, performance and accountability.

19 See https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A05248 86

ANAO does this primarily by conducting performance and financial statement audits and assurance reviews. The ANAO does not exercise management functions, or have an executive role in other organisations. These are the responsibility of the relevant entity’s management.

The Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) handles the provision of policy advice and the promotion of good practice in human resource management in the APS. The APSC provides advice in areas such as ethical behaviour, diversity and leadership, and fulfils an evaluation role in ensuring that the APS is performing consistently in terms of the APS Values. The Commission takes a lead role in implementing reform in the APS, and as well as providing strategic policy advice to the Minister, agency heads and APS managers on a range of workplace relations issues. On the other hand, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) handles the management of government administration. It provides assistance to the Cabinet and its various committees, policy advice and administrative support to the Prime Minister. PM&C also looks after the intergovernmental relations and communications with State and Territory governments.

The Department of Finance (Finance) handles advising on and implementation of many key Government priorities. The role of Finance is to help the Australian Government achieve its policy objectives by contributing to four key outcomes. These include sustainable Government finances, efficiency in Government operations, and the use of information and communication technology in Government. The Treasury, on the other hand, handles monitoring and assessing economic conditions and prospects. The Treasury provides economic policy advice to the Treasurer and the Australian people through Parliament. The Treasury is engaged in a range of issues from macroeconomic policy setting to reform, climate change to social policy, as well as tax policy and international agreements between governments. The distributions of the remaining 30 agencies are 17 (service/line), 2 (reviews), and 11 (Statutory/other). Taken together, as shown in Table 5.1 these agencies represents 95% of the staffing of the APS.

Table 5.1: Number of employees of organisations where field studies were conducted

No. Name No. of % of No. Name Employee % of APS Employee APS 1 Human Services 34,757 21.84 19 ATO 23,259 14.67% 2 Defence 21,163 13.30 20 DMO 6,600* 4.15% 3 Immigration 13,930 8.75 21 CSIRO 6,500* 4.10% 4 Industry 5,154 3.24 22 ABS 2,871 1.80% 5 Foreign Affairs 4,958 3.12 23 DHA 680 0.43% 6 Agriculture 4,644 2.92 24 Geoscience 633 0.39% 7 Social Services 3,652 2.30 25 ANAO 372 0.23% 8 Health 3,487 2.19 26 FWC 303 0.19% 9 Environment 2,602 1.64 27 MDB 300 0.19% 10 PM&C 2,544 1.60 28 APSC 267 0.17% 11 Veterans Affairs 2,011 1.26 29 NFSA 220 0.14% 12 Education 1,869 1.17 30 ARC 118 0.07% 13 Employment 1,839 1.16 31 ATSB 101 0.06% 14 Finance 1,812 1.14 32 ILC 100 .06% 15 Attorney- 1,714 1.08 33 Ministry for 100 0.06% General’s the Arts 16 Treasury 1,319 0.83 34 NBA 56 0.03% 17 Infrastructure 1,210 0.76 18 Communication 504 0.32 Total 109,169 68.61 Total 42,480 26.70 * These numbers are tentative, as these organisations have merged with other entities.

While the interviews and conversations were anonymous, I collected demographic information by conducting semi-structured interviews, discussions, focus group sessions, and observations across multiple field sites. Observed patterns across 103 individual cases allow this chapter to map the social spaces. It further allows exploring conditional and situational effects in the accountability practices in the APS. In particular, participants were asked questions about gender, level of education, areas of education, work background, membership, length of experience in the public sector, previous experience in the private sector, type of organisation they work for, their profession, current position, and most recent experience. The Figure 5.2 shows that 75 % of total interviewees were male and 25% female.

Figure 5.2: Gender of Participants

25%

Male

75% Female

Of 103 interviews, 99 interviews were with public servants from the APS, and two interviews were with private sector consultants with close working relationships with many public sector organisations. The remaining 2 interviews were with federal members of Parliament from the major political parties. I conducted interviews with public servants in various positions, professions and organisations across the APS. The Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of participants in different hierarchical positions from many Commonwealth organisations.

Figure 5.3: Hierarchical Positons of Field Participants

60.00% 50.49% 50.00%

40.00%

30.00% 27.18%

20.00% 11.65% 10.00% 6.80% 1.94% 1.94% 0.00% Agency Head SES EL APS Consultants Member of Parliament

The Figure 5.4 illustrates the diverse educational levels of interviewees. It shows that almost 95% of the participants have a bachelor’s degree, and only 5% have educational levels below an undergraduate degree. Only 1% of interviewees have just the school certificate, and 4% have diploma level educational and vocational qualifications.

Figure 5.4: Educational Level of Participants

13% 4% School Cert

17% Diploma

Bachelor 65% Masters

PhD

The Figure 5.5 demonstrates that educational backgrounds of the field participants are diverse in the APS. Almost 28% (27.18%) of public servants interviewed have an educational background in an Arts discipline, making it the dominant educational background for my respondents. The rest come from a range of different educational backgrounds, with 15 (14.56%) interviewees having accounting degrees, and 18 (17.48%) having degrees in general business/commerce. Fourteen (13.59%) and 11 (10.68%) held degrees in science/engineering and human resource/public administration/management degrees respectively. Only one (0.97%) participant had an educational background finishing at the school certificate.

Figure 5.5: Educational Background of Participants

30% 27% Accounting

25% Arts Business/Commerce 20% 17% Economics 15% 15% 14% Law 11% HR/Admin/Management 10% Science/Engineering 6% 5% 5% 5% IT 1% Other 0%

The Figure 5.6 shows that seventy-one (68.93%) interviewees have worked in the public sector only, with no experience in the private sector, whereas, 32 (31.07%) of interviewees have prior work experience in the private sector.

Figure 5.6: Work Experience of Participants

80% 69% 70%

60%

50%

40% 31% 30%

20%

10%

0% Public Sector Only Mixed/Hybrid

The Figure 5.7 displays the diverse professional memberships of the interviewees in the APS. As shown in the Figure 5.7, public servants are from diverse backgrounds and belong to a variety of professions/groups. Of particular interest, 22 (20.39%) interviewees have professional accounting memberships, either Certified Practicing Accountants (CPA) or Chartered Accountants (CA). Out of the 22 qualified accountants 7 are management accountants, 7 are auditors/reviewer, and 6 are financial accountants. Twelve qualified accountants are working in senior to top management positions, whereas ten accountants are in junior to middle manager positions. The second highest memberships are with the Institute of Public Administration in Australia (IPAA), which represents 19 (18.45%) of the total participants. However, 39 (37.86%) out of 103 participants do not have any professional membership. Another 5 (4.85%) participants are members of the Australian Institute of Management (AIM) and 3 (2.91) belong to the Australian Computer Society (ACS). The remaining 5 (4.85%) belong to the Law Society, while 3 (2.91%) participants are member of other professional bodies and groups.

Figure 5.7: Professions of Participants

40% 38% CA/CPA

35% AIM/HR

30% ACS

25% Economics Society 20% 20% 18% Law Society

15% IPAA Science Society 10% 5% 5% 6% No Membership 5% 3% 2% 3% Other 0%

The Figure 5.8 illustrates that approximately 80% of participants have 6 to 30 years of work experience in the Australian Public Service, indicating a great deal of understandings of their jobs, duties, public sector culture, and accountability demands. Only 4 (3.88%) participants are relatively new to this field, having less than five years work experience. As shown in the Figure 5.8, ten (9.71%) and seven (6.8%) participants have more than 35 years and 31 years of public service experience respectively. 92

Figure 5.8: Public Sector Experience of Participants

25% Less than 5 20% 20% 18% 6-10 Years 17% 11-15 Years 15% 15% 16-20 Years

10% 21-25 Years 10% 9% 7% 26-30 Years

5% 4% 31-35 years

35-40 Years 0%

The Figure 5.9 demonstrages that sixty-seven (65%) of the participants have no work experience outside the APS, and they have worked only in the public sector for their entire career, whereas thirty-four (33%) of participants have prior work experience in the private sector and two (2%) of participants work with APS but never worked in the APS. This analysis indicates that the public sector has a very low turnover of employees, which is one of the important factors in this institutional field.

Figure 5.9: Private Sector Experience of Participants

70% 65% 0 Years 60% Less than 5

50% 6-10 Years

40% 11-15 Years

30% 16-20 Years

20% 21-25 Years 11% 9% 7% 26-30 Years 10% 4% 5% 0% 0% More than 30 0%

The Figure 5.10 shows that in terms of the type of organization, line/service agency dominates, with 51 (49.51%) of participants working in this particular type of public sector organization. Another half of the participants are from a central agency (21 or 20.39%), review agency 10 (9.71%) or GBE/Statutory/Prescribed agency 17 (16.5%) 93 respectively. Out of 103 participants, two (1.94%) are from private consulting firms, and a further two (1.94%) are from political parties, and are current Members of Parliament from the major political parties in Australia. The participants from consulting companies and politics were selected purposefully to get external views on the practices of accountability in the public sector context. These participants are familiar with the APS and its services, because they engage with the APS almost on a daily basis in their organizational and professional capacities.

Figure 5.10: Type of Organisation of Participants

60% Central Agency 50% 50% Line/Service Agency

40% Review Agency

30% GBE/Statutory/Prescribed 20% Agency 20% 17% Consulting 10% 10% Political Party 2% 2% 0%

It is of particular interest, as the Figure 5.11 illustrates, that 15.53% interviewees have accounting/finance as their primary profession. The dominant group are the policy officer/advisor/analysts which represents 24 (23.3%) participants in the field, followed by 19 (18.45%) who identified their profession as program officer/manager. Fifteen (14.56%) and 9 (8.74) work in the professional areas of manager/administrator and auditor/reviewer respectively.

Figure 5.11: Primary Profession of Participants

25% 23% Accountant/Finance Auditor/Reviewer 20% 18% Economist 16% 15% IT/HR/Corporate 15% Lawyer Manager/Administrator/Officer 10% 9% Scientist/Researcher

5% 5% Policy Officer/Advisor/Analyst 5% 4% 4% 2% Program Officer/Manager Other 0%

The Figure 5.12 presents that majority of our interviewees, 69 (66.99%) of the participants interviewed, hold senior to higher level management positions in the APS. Interviewees who are currently working at junior to middle-level positions comprise 30 (29.13%) of the sample of this study. As discussed earlier, two (1.94%) consultants and two (1.94%) politicians are not APS employees.

Figure 5.12: Hierarchical Levels/Positions of Participants

80% 70% 67% 60% 50% 40% 29% 30% 20%

10% 2% 2% 0% Senior to Top Junior to Middle Consultant Politician

The Figure 5.13 shows that most of the participants have recent work experience in the area of policy advice, which represents 21 (20.39%) of my sample. The rest of the participants’ recent work areas are: program implementation 21 (20.39%), governance/operations 19 (18.45%) and financial management and reporting 16 (15.53%), audit and review 6 (5.83%), Secretary or Head of the Departments 6 (5.83%), consulting 2 (1.94%) and politics 2 (1.94%).

Figure 5.13: Recent Experience of Participants

25% Financial Management and Reporting 20% 20% Audit/Review 20% 18% Corporate Services 16% Economics 15%

Governance/Operations

Policy Advice 10% 9%

Program Implementation 6% 6% 5% Head/Secretary

2% 2% 1% Consulting

5.3 Conclusion In this chapter, I provide a map of the Australian Public Sector (APS). From the field data, gathered from multiple sources, such as interviews, conversations, observations, focus groups, and document analysis, I produced the map of the field. In doing so, I present the configurations and structures of the public sector field. I constructed the field map according to the sequential analysis practices by Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989). I identified and documented the different social, institutional, organisational, professional and hierarchical levels where the practice of accountability 96 takes place. For example, I categorised positions, levels, education, background and professional associations of the field participants in the public sector field. I also present the organisational, professional, and hierarchical levels in which field participants are located and how they are distributed. Moreover, it identifies and presents the relational and differential positions of field participants in respect to their practices of accountability. This is important for the research questions of this study, because in order to understand processes and practices one needs to understand the configuration and structure of the place in terms of individual, organisational, and institutional contexts where everyday practices of accountability take place. In doing so, I problematize the way institutional fields can be for granted as something given, fixed, immobile or a priori.

The analyses show that the practices of accountability in various social spaces cannot be taken-for-granted, but rather need to be understood through a systematic examination. Furthermore, the analysis shows that not all government organisations are the same. Therefore, they can be categorised in to different groups based on their types, functions, roles and positions in the public sector field. These organisations have different social, institutional and political positions and different functions in the machinery of government. Provision of public service constructions, organisations, and delivery are also different. Accordingly, their nature of work varies substantially from one organisation to the other. Therefore, it challenges the one-size-fits-all, taken for granted assumption about the public sector, which is evident in most of the public sector reform initiates and implementations. As a result, the public sector organisations are then categorised into four broad types such as central agencies, line/services agencies, review agencies, and GBE/statutory/prescribed agencies. Moreover, I divide the public sector hierarchical level in two broad groups: senior to top (SES to Secretary) and junior to middle (APS to EL). Furthermore, I then split respondents in to professional or functional groups such as accountants, auditors, administrators, lawyers, scientists, policy advisors and program managers.

From the field mapping analyses, I find that in the public sector field the practices of accountability take place in different social spaces which are multiple and interconnected (Funnell et al., 2012). Moreover, the public sector field interacts with

97 other social fields such as the legal field, political field, and public field. Therefore, in the public sector field the practice of accountability is not only by public servants or accountants, but also by politicians, the public, non-accountants such as economists, lawyers, scientists and various other professionals. Moreover, the field mapping provided a relational frame or structure to locate practices of accountability in the field of the APS as a whole. The map of the public sector illustrates the organisational and social fabric of the field in which accountability practices take place. The multiple fields are constantly intersecting and interacting with each other to shape the structure of the wider social space, and at the same time reorganising their structures and configurations of the APS. Therefore, the positions these social spaces occupy in the APS are in a state of constant interaction, so that the boundaries of these social spaces are not static, but constantly redrawn by the people, their backgrounds and current positions in the APS.

In summary, in this chapter I identify multiple social spaces in the APS. I also present multiple actors, professions, backgrounds, experiences, functions, and responsibilities in the social spaces. I address the concern relating to how the social space of the public sector is structured. In doing so, I show that the structure of the public sector field is hierarchical. For example, the four central agencies (such as the Finance, the Treasury, the ANAO, and the APSC) are at the top of the APS hierarchy because of their organisational type, size, functions, roles and connection with powerful Ministers. The APS is also hierarchical due to the organisational structures such as Secretary, SES, EL, and APS, in terms of positions/levels. I argue that to understand the nature of the APS, it is necessary to map it in the ways suggested by Bourdieu. This map laid the foundation for identifying the practices of accountability by different individuals within the structural forces of the public sector field. The structure or configuration of the public sector field will help to frame individual agency or choices regarding the practices of accountability. In the next chapter, I explore how these field participants’ practices of accountability in the field of the APS, and in doing so present an analysis of the processes through which field participants put accountability in to practice.

CHAPTER SIX

EXPLORING THE PRACTICES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

6.1 Introduction In this chapter, I extend the analyses from the mapping of the structural forces of the public sector field to the practices of accountability. In the previous chapter, I produced a map of the structures of the public sector field and identified key people and positions, and their locations in the field. In this chapter, I present a map of the practices of accountability in the Australian Public Sector (APS). The aim of this analysis is to identify and describe key practices, key relationships, and key processes of doing accountability. Specifically, I document the ways by which field participants practise accountability in the public sector field. I explore the relationship between the people, positions and practices. More specifically, the chapter identifies the ways in which accounting functions in those practices. I also illustrate how multiple social spaces, such as institutions, organisations, professions, and positions come together as constitutive forces behind the practices of accountability. In doing so, I identify and explore the key accountability practices and the processes by which they are carried out.

I also cross-analyse the relationships between the practices of accountability and the participants’ education, background, profession, expertise and current work experience, as identified in chapter five. Therefore, this chapter explores the relationships between people (agents’ habitus) and institutions (structural forces). This analysis will help to understand the structure of this social space, how this structure is constructed, how agents do accountability and the role of accounting in those practices. This will extend current understanding of the relationship between the individual or groups habitus and the public sector field for the practices of accountability.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2, applies the research framework developed in chapter four and maps the practices of accountability. In doing so, it provides a map of the relationships between people, position, organisation and their everyday practices of accountability. It also shows the interplay between

99 accounting and accountability. In doing so, it highlights how accounting functions in those practices of accountability. This section also cross-analyses the findings of the previous chapter with the conclusions from this chapter. Following this, section 6.3 concludes the chapter.

6.2 Mapping Accountability Practices The previous analysis shows the location of the fields’ participants and their positions in the public sector field, and the analysis in this chapter explores the relationship between those people, their positions and the practices of accountability. Therefore, in this chapter I analyse and present summary of all interviews, conversations, observations, focus groups, and document analyses.

In this chapter, I grouped analyses in nine broad categories: accountability for what, accountability to whom, how accountability is practiced, factors driving accountability practice, factors within the organisation shaping accountability practice, factors external to organisations influencing accountability practice, institutional factors affecting accountability, challenges for accountability practice and how to address those challenges. Following Bourdieu’s practice theory and methodology in this chapter, I ‘cross-analyse’ field participant’ practices of accountability with the findings of chapter five. It is expected that these nine elements would reflect field participants’ educational background, professional background, professional expertise, length of prior work experience in the private sector, duration of current work experience in the public sector, current position, recent professional expertise and the type of organization they work for.

During the fieldwork, I asked public servants about their ‘accountability for what’ to understand their perception of accountability. I received a range of responses and the majority of them, as shown in the Figure 6.1, were compliance based, focussing on their current task, job, duties, responsibility and performance against key performance indicators (KPIs). The most common responses were around responsibility, answerability, obligation, culpability and transparency, through the existing compliance frameworks and KPI requirements. Some KPI requirements are for efficient and

100 effective spending of public money and resources, some are for explaining the lawfulness and processes, and some are about public sector (PS) values and codes of conduct.

Figure 6.1: Accountability for What

30%

Compliance/Frameworks 26%

25% Resposibility/Roles

Public Money/Resources 20% 20% Public Good/Benefit/Interest

16% Obligation to explain/justify current and future actions 15% Transperancy/Openness

Performance 10% 10% 9% 9% Service delivery process

Policy implementation 5% 4% 3% 3% PS Values/Code of Conducts 1%

The Figure 6.1 shows that compliance with both financial and legal frameworks (20.39%) and demonstraetion of meeting job responsibility/roles (26.21%) account for more than 46% of the responses, meaning that about 50% of field participants said they are accountable for job resposiblities, frameworks and other aspects of legislation. The other accountabilties were such things as obligation to explain (16%), transparancy through documentation (3%) and performance measurement through KPIs (10%), which together account for 29% of responses. That means that 71% of responses to ‘accountability for what’ come down to compliance activities and bureaucratic approahces. Therefore, this analysis also shows that the dominant understanding of accountability revolve around compliance for financial and legal frameworks and job responsibility/roles. 101

The analysis also illustrates that the field participants’ understanding of ‘accountability for what’ is strongly related to their recent work experience, particularly the professional or functional area in which they are working. For example, accountants ‘accountability for what’ is related to financial management frameworks and preparing financial accounts and reporting. The lawyers’ responses reveal that their ‘accountability for what’ is related to legal frameworks, constitutional arrangements and justifying or explaining current actions and future consequences. Therefore, the analysis shows that the accountability practices are centered on and around compliance and risk management activities required by the financial and legal frameworks. More information on the frequency and percentage of responses is provided in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Accountability for What

Accountability For Frequency Percent (%) Responsibility/Roles 27 26.21 Compliance/Frameworks 21 20.39 Obligation to explain/justify current a 16 15.53 Performance 10 9.71 Public Money/Resources 9 8.74 Public Good/Benefit/Interest 9 8.74 P.S. Values/Code of Conducts 4 3.88 Transparency/Openness 3 2.91 Service delivery process 3 2.91 Policy implementation 1 0.97 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

Moreover, the Table 6.1 illustrates that the dominant understanding of accountability is task or job related. For example, public servants said that getting the job done within the compliance guidelines and legal frameworks is the priority. The 1% of responses concerning obligation to explain or justify current and future actions, together with 4% of responses being about transparency and openness, are also through task and compliance approaches. Therefore, the logic of ‘accountability for what’ is based on the compliance requirements and risk management approaches of the public sector field.

102

Figure 6.2: Accountability to Whom

30%

Public 24% 25% 22% Parliament Govt. of the day 20% Ministers 15% 15% Head/CEO/Secretary 15% Manager 10% Hierarchy 10% Stakeholders/Consumers 6% 5% Self/Ethics/Moral 5% 4% Profession

The Figure 6.2 shows that the understanding of ‘accountability to whom’ is not universal or consistent for all field participants; rather it varies according to the individual, professional and organisational factors such as social and cultural forces. The dominant understanding of ‘accountability to whom’ by the field participants, who work for central agencies, is to the Ministers through the Secretaries. On the other hand, the field participants who work for line/service agency their dominant understanding of ‘accountability to whom’ is to the public through the Secretaries and the Parliament. The auditors in the ANAO view their ‘accountability to whom’ as being to the Public through the Parliament and the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA). In turn, JCPAA holds APS entities accountable for the spending of public money and resources. Therefore, the analysis shows that there are many social spaces that are interacting and overlapping with each other in constructing and organising multiple layers of ‘accountability to whom’. For example, the public servants in the central agencies often deal with the public sector and political field through their interactions with the Ministers. Therefore, the power and influence of the political field dominates the understanding of accountability in the public sector field. Moreover, the public servants in line/service agencies interact with the fields of the Ministers, the general public or the public they serve through government programs and interventions. Their constant interactions are between ‘political’ field, ‘public sector’ field and the ‘public’ or ‘social’ field. Therefore, their views of ‘accountability to whom’ is

103 dominated by the hybrid notion of public and political accountability. The auditors in the ANAO interact with the field of the ‘public sector’ through audit activities and field of the ‘public’ through the Parliament and the JCPAA. Therefore, their dominant understanding of ‘accountability to whom’ is shaped by the public trust, the Parliament, their audit clients and the notion of public benefit.

The relationship among multiple fields wherein public servants render accountability is not linear but a web of a complex network. In other words, they are inter-connected or over lapping with each other in the public sector field. That means the social spaces are not fully separated from each other, because public service provision or service delivery requires multiple agencies from multiple fields. For example, at one level, participants are giving accounts to multiple social spaces such as managers, Secretary or head of the department, Ministers, government of the day, Parliament and the public. At another level, these spaces are connected to each other through the structure of the public sector field. For example, managers are then accountable to their seniors, senior managers are then accountable to the Secretaries, then Secretaries are accountable to Ministers, then Ministers are accountable to the Government of the day which claims to be accountable to the public through the parliament.

A public servant claims to be accountable to not only managers but also to Secretaries, Ministers, Parliament, and the Public. In that sense, accountability not only connects different spaces through network of relationships, but also creates a hierarchy of those spaces such as different positions/levels, professions/groups, organisaitons/agencies or powerful/less powerful. However, these relationships are not the same. For example, public servants’ accountability to managers is not the same as accountability to the Secretary or the Minister or the Parliament or the Public. That means accountability is not only relational but also differential; that is, the relationships change according to the structures and hierarchies of the public sector social spaces. The relationality and differential structure or configuration shapes accountability in the public sector field. In those processes, the notion of accountability creates functions or structures in social spaces, and at the same time these functions, hierarchies and structures create multiple accountability relationships. For example, during the field work in different organisations, I observed on many occasions that the ways in which people give account

104 is related to the power differential relationship between the account taker and giver. More information on the frequency and percentage of responses is provided in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Accountability to Whom

Accountability To Frequency Percent (%) Hierarchy 25 24.27 Manager 23 22.33 Ministers 15 14.56 Head/CEO/Secretary 15 14.56 Parliament 10 9.71 Govt. of the day 6 5.83 Stakeholders/Consumers 5 4.85 Public 4 3.88 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

The Table 6.2 shows that accountability is to their managers (22.33%), hierarchy (24.27%), Ministers and Secretary/Head of the Organisation (14.56%), Government of the day (5.83%), parliament (9.71%), and the public (3.88%). However, this study also finds that field participants’ approach of “accountability to whom” is different, based on their profession, prior work experience, recent experience, current position, and type of organization they are working for. The primary investigation was to understand ‘how people do accountability’ not just ‘how people feel accountability’. In doing so, I highlight the practical logic behind these practices of accountability. For example, what is accountability or accountability to whom? Many reasons were provided by the public servants in response to these questions. For instance, it is for public benefit or interest; it is for spending public money and resources; it is democratic or parliamentary requirements; it is the public sector’s culture, values, and norms; it is in public servants acts and codes; and in some cases, whatever public servant do is taken-for-granted as accountability. When I asked, ‘what is the role of accounting or financial information in discharging your accountability?’ the dominant answer given was “not so much”. A senior public servant commented, “we are not running a little accounting shop in the public sector. Therefore, we do not need to do accounting for doing our accountabilities.” However, the analyses show a very different picture which is presented in summary in Figure 6.3.

105

Figure 6.3: The Practices of Accountability

25% Compliance 21% Reporting/Documentation Professional 20% Judgement/Communication KPIs assessment/reporting 17%

Value for money 15% 14% Demonstrating Systems/Processes/Tools 11% Accounting/Financial Reporting 10% 10% 9% Senate Estimates 8% Hearings/JCPAA Outcome/Impact Achieved

5% 4% 4% Financial/Budget Mgt & 3% Reporting Reporting to Manager/Hierarchy 0%

As shown in Figure 6.3, when asked how do you do your accountability, different stories about various processes and practices are given, and most of them are compliance activities, which shows the practical logic of doing accountability is compliance based documentation and reporting . For example, reporting and documentation (compliance requirement), reporting to a manager or hierarchy, KPIs assessment and reporting, value for money, demonstrating spending, through budgets, PBS, annual reports and other accounting processes and tools. The analysis of what people say, and what people, do reveal the rhetorical nature of accountability and the way it can act as a smokescreen over claims that participants made earlier, such as ‘accountability to public’ or ‘accountability for performance’. The ‘how’ question reveals the processes by which accountability is practised, which is different from the ‘what, to whom and why accountability’ questions. More information on the frequency and percentage of responses is provided in Table 6.3.

106

Table 6.3: The Practices of Accountability

Accountability Process Frequency Percent (%) Demonstrating Systems/Processes/Tools 22 21.36 Compliance Reporting/Documentation 18 17.48 KPIs assessment/reporting 14 13.59 Accounting/Financial Reporting 11 10.68 Reporting to Manager/Hierarchy 10 9.71 Value for money 9 8.74 Professional Judgment/Communication 8 7.77 Outcome/Impact Achieved 4 3.88 Financial/Budget Management/Reporting 4 3.88 Senate Estimates Hearings/JCPAA 3 2.91 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

The Table 6.3 shows that compliance reporting/documentation (17.48%) and demonstrating systems/processes/tools (21.36%) are the most frequent answers to this question. However, the responses depend on professional memberships, current positions and type of organizations for which interviewees are working. This analysis shows that the ways in which field participants do their accountability is quite different, and dependent on their professional background, the level of their hierarchical positions and the type of the organisation they are currently working for. However, the ways actors’ approach accountability is different but the focus is same, which are emphasis on compliance for the purposes of financial control and risk management activities.

This study finds that there is a large gap between what people say about accountability and what people do in practice with real action. It is like a smoke screen or set of rhetorical claims, based on perceptions about accountability found in the wider discourse. This study finds that this gap is an important aspect of accountability, as there is so much scope for normative claims to be made. The dominant ways of doing accountability for accountants are accounting and financial reporting, budgeting and KPIs assessing and reporting. The dominant means of doing accountability for lawyers are professional judgment, demonstrating systems/processes/tools, and compliance reporting and documentation. The dominant ways of doing accountability for participants from science and engineering backgrounds are KPIs assessment, compliance reporting to manager/hierarchy and Senate estimates hearings. This

107 illustrates difference in the ways in which they approach accountability, but the practices of accountability are not different after all.

Figure 6.4: Dominating Factors Driving Accountability

25% 23% Compliance with Financial 21% Reporting Framework Hierarchy 20%

Evaluation/Feedback 17% Compliance with Legislation 15% 15% Mgt Control/Blamegame

Audit and Feedback Activities

10% Input/Output

Outcome/Impact 6% Budget Mgt/Financial Control 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% Govt. Policy/Priority

The most dominant factor, as the Figure 6.4 illustrates, for practising accountability is through management control mechanisms for mitigating risk by compliance with financial management legislation and framework. In those processes, the importance of accounting (financial information) based on calculative technology and economic rationality became dominant and forceful. These forces increase compliance activities based on financial and non-financial performance reporting, feedback and audit activities in the practices of accountability (Power, 2007; Hood, 2010). Therefore, the impetus or practical logic behind these activities becomes compliance with financial management frameworks. In this way, quantitative metrics and KPIs become fundamental way of measuring governance, performance and accountability of government programs. Similarly, management control and unbound inspection of the spending of public money become essential to manage trust and transparency through 108 managing financial and reputational risk. For management control purposes, it is good to have these processes in place for checks and balances, which can be used for learning and strategizing. However, what is observed in practice, and what field participants actually spoke about, suggests that these management controls are part of a ‘blame game’ which encourage compliance and bureaucratic approach of managing results rather than managing objectives or public benefits. These management control systems are supported by financial management, compliance reporting, and risk management approaches based on accounting logic, calculative technology and economic rationality.

When participants were asked about the dominant factors that affect doing their accountability, the most frequent answers given were the compliance reporting framework (21.36%) and excessive emphasis on budget management/control (23.30%). This analysis finds that experiences are different for people who belong to different professions, people who have different hierarchical positions, people who have different recent work experience and people who work in different types of organization. More information on the frequency and percentage of responses are provided in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4: Dominating Factors Driving Accountability

Accountability Drivers Frequency Percent (%) Budget Management/Financial Control 24 23.30 Compliance Reporting Framework 22 21.36 Legislation 17 16.50 Government Policy/Priority 15 14.56 Hierarchy 6 5.83 Audit 4 3.88 Management Control/Blame game 4 3.88 Input/output 4 3.88 Outcome/Impact 4 3.88 Evaluation/Feedback 3 2.91 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

This analysis finds that Government is a complex system full of interdependencies and there are a very few things that APS does that do not interact or affect other activities of government. There are differentiated demands of accountability, at multiple levels, forms and dimensions. One of the things that most of the interviewees recognised

109 through the previous performance assessing and reporting requirements in the APS was the way inadequacy of a calculative system that required quantitative KPIs for each government program. That means, coming up with adequate and meaningful performance measures and indicators across APS and within an organisation is complex.

The complexity was mostly visible when interviewees mentioned that calculative systems based on accounting logic treated government as a simple system, and valued both financial and non-financial reporting in isolation. The APS had an input/output focus on performance and by linking it to individual program it was stuck with a financial or managerial accountability framework. The stress on a reductionist or financial accountability framework forced public servants to internalise economic rationality, calculative technology and accounting logic in their bodies and minds in order to comply with them. These internalised embodiments become bodily dispositions, which are unique to the public service field or social space.

Figure 6.5: External Influence on Accountability

40% 37% Public/Constituents 35% Parliament 30% Ministers 25% Stakeholders 20% Economic Austerity/Less is 14% 15% 13% More Marketisation/Consumer 10% 9% Choice 6% 6% 5% ANAO 5% 4% 4% 4% Legislations, Rules, Guidelines 0%

The Figure 6.5 shows that participants’ experience that legislations, rules and guidelines (36.89%) are the most important external factors affecting their practices of accountability. This analysis finds the answer to this question is different in relation to

110 the participants’ recent work experience, professions and the type of organization they are working for. More information on the frequency and percentage of responses is provided in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5: External Influence on Accountability

External Factors Frequency Percent (%) Legislations, Rules, Guidelines 38 36.89 Ministers 14 13.59 ANAO 13 12.62 Economic Austerity/Less is More 9 8.74 Public/Constituents 6 5.83 Stakeholders 6 5.83 Political Power/Influence 5 4.85 Parliament 4 3.88 Marketisation/Consumer Choice 4 3.88 Media/Social Media 4 3.88 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

The Figure 6.6 demonstrates that participants experience organizational function (19%), compliance process/matrices (18%), and leadership/management (16%) as the three most important factors internal to organisaitons which are affecting their practice of accountability.

Figure 6.6: Internal Influence on Accountability

25%

19% Organisational structure 20% 18% Leadership/Management 16% Type of operations/projects 15% Budget & resource allocation

11% Compliance processes/matrics 10% 10% Performance matrics 8% 8% Organisational culture 6% 5% Organisational function 5% Professional standards

111

This analysis finds the answers are consistent across the different educational background, prior work experience, current position, recent experience and professional membership.More information on the frequency and percentage of responses is provided in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6: Internal Influence on Accountability

Internal Factors Frequency Percent (%) Organisational function 20 19.42 Compliance processes/metrics 19 18.45 Leadership/Management 16 15.53 Organisational culture 11 10.68 Performance metrics 10 9.71 Budget & Resource allocation 8 7.77 Professional standards 8 7.77 Type of operations/projects 6 5.83 Organisational structure 5 4.85 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

The Figure 6.7 shows that participants gave a diverse range of answers in terms of influence of structural forces on their practices of accountability. Of all participants, 17.48% experienced annual reports/ PBS, and 16.50% experience task/compliance mechanisms, as an institutional influence on the ways in which accountability is practised in the public sector.

Figure 6.7: Institutional Influence on Accountability

20% Royal Commission/Ombudsman 18% 17% 17% PGPA/FMA/CAC/PS Act/FOI 16% 16% 16% Courts/Judicial Scrutiny 14% 14% Private Sector/Consultants 12% Political Account/Influence 10% Cross-agency program/project 8% Task/Compliance mechanisms 6% 6% 5% 5% Senate Estimates/Question on 4% 4% Notice 2% Auditing/Reviews 2% Annual Reports/PBS 0%

112

Following this Table 6.7 illustrates that Senate estimates/questions on notice, frameworks (PGPA/FMA/CAC/PS/ACT/FOI), and auditing/reviews are the other three most frequent answers with 15.53%, 15.53% and 13.59% of the sample respectively. This analysis finds that the level of the current position of the field participants affects their answers to this question. More information on the frequency and percentage of all responses is provided in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7: Institutional Influence on Accountability

Contextual Drivers Frequency Percent (%) Annual Reports/PBS 18 17.48 Task/Compliance mechanisms 17 16.5 PGPA/FMA/CAC/PS Act/FOI 16 15.53 Senate Estimates/Question on Notice 16 15.53 Auditing/Reviews 14 13.59 Courts/Judicial Scrutiny 6 5.83 Political Account/Influence 5 4.85 Cross-agency program/project 5 4.85 Private Sector/Consultants 4 3.88 Royal Commission/Ombudsman 2 1.94 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

Figure 6.8: Challenges for Doing Accountability

16% Too much Task/Compliance oriented (input/output) 14% 14% Excessive focus on financial/expense 13% 13% 13% reporting in isolation 12% 12% Complex network systems full of interdependencies 10% 10% No link of operational performance & 10% accountability 9% Uncertain/Changing Environment (political cycle/reforms) 8% Feedback and evaluation for control/blamegame/correction 6% 6% Risk averse culture (reduces innovation/entrepreneurship) Less contextual understanding of 4% accountability processes/relationships 3% Unrealistic 12 months perfromance assessment & reporting cycle 2% Multiple demands from multiple levels (multifaceted) 0%

113

The Figure 6.8 presents a diverse range of experiences in terms of the current challenge for doing accountability. Of all participants, 13.59% choose multiple demands of accountability from multiple levels of hierarchy and 12.62% choose risk adverse culture in the public sector field. More information on the frequency and percentage of responses is provided in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8: Challenges for Doing Accountability

Accountability Problems Frequency Percent (%) Multiple demands from multiple levels (interdependencies) 14 13.59 No link of operational performance & accountability 13 12.62 Risk averse culture (reduces innovation/entrepreneurship) 13 12.62 Less contextual understanding of accountability 13 12.62 Excessive focus on financial/expense reporting 12 11.65 Uncertain/Changing Environment (short political cycle) 10 9.71 Feedback and evaluation for control/blame game 10 9.71 Too much Task/Compliance-oriented (inputs) 9 8.74 Complex network systems full of interdependencies 6 5.83 Unrealistic 12 months performance assessment cycle 3 2.91 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

Among others, the Table 6.8 illustrates, the ‘less contextual’ understanding of accountability, no link of accountability with operational performance, and excessive focus on financial accountability are 12.62%, 12.62% and 11.65% of the sample respectively. This analysis finds participants' professional membership affects their experience of challenges for doing accountability.

The participants presented, as shown in Figure 6.9, a range of ways by which the existing challenges to their practices of accountability can be improved. Of the responses, the 15.53% indicating setting clear and unambiguous goals, and the 15.53% practising accountability for performance, are the solutions to some of the accountability challenges. On another level risk management culture, social, political and cultural understanding, and cross-agency collaboration are the three most popular solutions, with 13.59%, 11.65% and 11.65% respectively of participants from the sample.

114

Figure 6.9: How to Improve Accountability

18% Clear goals/objectives/priorities 16% 16% 16% Relationships/Trust through transperency 14% Accountability for perfromance/public 14% benefits or impact 12% 12% Social, political and cultural 12% understanding of accountability 10% Not treating APS as simple and static 10% system/metric Feedback on casue-effect for 8% 7% 7% learning/strategy making Joint policy and program 6% accountability 5% Risk management culture & capability 4% 4% Cross-agency collaboration and performance 2% Differential/Non-financial/mid-term perfromance informaiton 0%

This analysis finds that the current hierarchical level or position of the field participants strongly affects their understanding and solution to accountability challenges. More information on the frequency and percentage of responses is provided in Table 6.9.

Table 6.9: How to Improve Accountability

Improving Accountability Practice Frequency Percent (%) Clear goals/objectives/priorities 16 15.53 Accountability for performance 16 15.53 Risk management culture & capability 14 13.59 Social, political and cultural understanding 12 11.65 Cross-agency collaboration 12 11.65 Feedback on cause-effect for learning/s 10 9.71 Not treating APS as simple context 7 6.8 Differential/Non-financial/mid-term per 7 6.8 Joint policy and program accountability 5 4.85 Relationships/Trust through transparency 4 3.88 Total 103 100 Responses tabulated here are from the interview transcripts.

In the conclusion of this section, this study finds that people tend to have similar understandings of “accountability for what” and “internal factors” that affect

115 accountability practices in different organizational contexts. However, field participants have different understandings and perceptions of other accountability processes and practices. Moreover, this study finds that field participants’ answers are mostly affected by their recent experience, profession, the level of position and the type of organization they are working for.

The analysis of this chapter illustartes that there is an interesting group dynamics opening up in terms of organisations (central, line/service, review, GBE/statutory), professions (accountants, auditors, lawyers, scientists, etc.), positions (senior, middle, junior levels), experience (policy, program, corporate, etc.) which requires further analysis. Therefore, these group relationships and dynamics will be explored further in the following chapters. The idea is to understand the dynamic processes that allow accounting to function in those group activities and interactions, and then link these processes to the practices of accountability.

6.3 Conclusion In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the practices of accountability are the function of differential social and institutional levels and positions. I also put forward an argument that accountability practices are a function of the combination of agents’ choices and structural forces. However, analyses of the practices show that compliance reporting, KPIs assessment and reporting, demonstrating input/output/processes, financial accounting and reporting and reporting to manager or hierarchy are the key ways of doing accountability. There is ample support for Ahrens’ (1996) claim that social spaces construct and organise the practices of accountability by creating conditions and possibilities for a particular style of accountability. However, the styles are reflections of individual or group habitus, which does not mean that accountability, has different forms or types. As evidenced in the analysis, accountability practices are the same and they are all following compliance doxa in the field. The ways or process of doing compliance is different, but the output is the same compliance activities.

On the basis of the evidence provided in this analysis, it seems fair to suggest that differential practices of accountability do not occur in different social spaces, but the ways by which accountability is approached are different because of differential

116 backgrounds, jobs, tasks, and functions. However, the compliance practices in the name of accountability are not entirely disconnected from the wider institutional and structural arrangements. In practice, multiple fields are connected and interlinked; they come together and influence each other on how accountability needs to be practised. Even though these fields have their own ways of doing accountability, they are not entirely autonomous or independent from the compliance doxa. The structural arrangements facilitate the ways in which social spaces interact with each other through a network of relationships, and the relationships influence the ways in which compliance doxa are taken-for-granted. The data gathered from the fieldwork suggest that people reconcile the objective structure of the field and subjective structure of minds and develop particular way of doing things which is compliance, and which is suitable for the public sector field.

This study illustrates that the dominant process of doing compliance is through accounting. Moreover, I provide evidence of the processes by which accounting has been supporting the growth of compliance in the name of accountability. However, I find that in the APS the accountants or the accounting profession are not as dominant as the accounting logic or habitus. As a result, they do not have the same amount of symbolic or cultural capital as policy advisers or program managers, when these professionals have acquired accounting logic and habitus. This finding supports the claim of “accountingnization of accountability” by Power and Laughlin (1992) and challenges the claims that accountants became dominant (Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 1999) and the accounting profession became powerful (Walker, 2004; Gendron et al., 2007). As this study shows, field participants do not claim that they are doing accounting, but when asked to demonstrate how they perform their accountabilities, what they illustrated are largely accounting processes such as budget, appropriation, cost-benefit, annual report, portfolio budget statements, financial audit, performance audit and other compliance activities.

I also provide evidence as to how accounting logic became the dominant practical logic for the practices of accountability in the public sector field. This study shows how accounting has become accountability itself. A body of work by Broadbent, (1998), Broadbent et al. (1999), Davies and Thomas (2002), and Broadbent and Laughlin

117

(2013) elaborated on the notion and dominance of accounting logic for accountability. In contrast to this well-established claim, Roberts (2010) and Cooper and Johnston (2012) argued that doing accounting is not accountability, or accountability is not all about accounting. However, I provide empirical evidence to suggest that accounting has become accountability in the public sector field, and the dominant practical logic of accountability.

I demonstrate the processes by which accounting logic has become a dominant discourse in the public sector field. One of the processes is through excessive managerial and political focus, which leads to disproportionate compliance activities. It is well established in the accounting literature that accounting is an activity of mostly ex-post conformity (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). However, how accounting logic increases compliance activities in the public sector has not been documented. I argue that people take accounting as a way of constructing accountability as an objective reality (Morgan, 1988; Hines, 1991) and do not challenge this way of thinking, talking and doing things (Guthrie, 1998; Oakes et al., 1998). This is because by nature accounting is a compliance process. Therefore, public servants perform a range of activities to comply with accounting and auditing requirements. I also argue that the compliance habitus of accounting makes accounting logic a taken-for-granted as the only legitimate rule of the game. That is how ‘accounting logic’ become the dominant understanding for the practice of accountability in the public sector.

Moreover, there are differences between what people claim as accountability (actual or symbolic claims) and how they put it into practice (real or symbolic practice). Both the symbolic claims and symbolic practice reflect dominant understandings and distributions of capitals within the public sector field. I find that when public servants think or talk about accountability it is one thing and it is altogether another thing than what they actually practice in the name of accountability. However, the practice of accountability does not happen in a vacuum, or in one single space, that is remote or disconnected from other social spaces. Subsequently, the practices of accountability reflect the social, institutional and political structures of the public sector field and the connection between habitus and field. The connection between individual practices and structure of field is accounting logic. I also show that actors’ simultaneous actual or

118 virtual membership of multiple social groups and domains. The differences in accountability claims are a function of multiple understandings from multiple social groups/fields, but the practices are function of habitus and field. Therefore, people can have membership of multiple groups or fields at the same time, but also practise compliance in the name of accountability.

In summary, in this chapter, I identify and present the practices of accountability in the APS field. I identify that there is little difference in the practices of accountability by analysing dominant understanding and practices of accountability into nine broad categories: accountability for what, accountability to whom, how accountability is practiced, factors driving accountability practice, internal factors shaping accountability practice, external factors influencing accountability practice, institutional factors affecting accountability, issues of accountability practice and ways to address accountability practice. I illustrate that the practices of accountability are mostly driven by compliance activities supported by accounting process. For example, accounting/financial reporting, KPIs assessment and reporting, compliance reporting/documentation, demonstrating processes and performance assessment and reporting. I also identify the tension between perception of accountability and its practices in the field. Therefore, I argue that to understand the practices of accountability in the APS field, it is necessary to show how accounting becomes accountability doxa or taken-for-granted in the public sector field. The Bourdieusian field mapping laid the foundation for identifying differential practices of accountability in various social spaces and the struggle of accountability over doxa in those social spaces. Therefore, the next chapter explores how people practise accountability in various organisations, professional or functional groups and hierarchical positions in the APS field.

119

CHAPTER SEVEN

HOW ACCOUNTING HABITUS DOMINATES THE PUBLIC SECTOR FIELD

7.1 Introduction This study seeks to understand the practices of accountability in the context of organisations, professions or functional groups and hierarchical positions in the APS. In particular, this chapter presents an analysis of the struggles over accountability and different ways of doing it in the various social spaces. In doing so, it analyses processes through which the practices of accountability are constructed and organised in the public sector field. It will extend our understanding of what public sector field is doing to accountability and what accountability is doing to public sector field. The previous two chapters have identified what the key social spaces are, who are the key actors and what people say about accountability. This chapter builds on the preceding chapters to cross-analyse what people say about accountability and how people do accountability in different social spaces in the public sector field. Therefore, the aim is to shift the understanding of accountability from the perceptual and normative discussion of ‘what accountability is’, to the ‘how is accountability’, by exploring everyday practices in different organisational, professional and hierarchical spaces. A particular interest of this chapter is to answer the research question of whether people from various organisations, professions and hierarchical positions practise accountability differently. This exploration will extend our understanding of accountability to a practical, relational, processual and contextual phenomenon.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the practices of accountability in the public sector. Section 7.3 presents the practices of accountability by different public sector organisations. Section 7.4 illustrates the practices of accountability by various professional or functional groups. Section 7.5 presents the practices of accountability by various hierarchical levels or positions. Section 7.6 concludes the chapter by discussing the themes emerging from this analysis.

120

7.2 Practices of Accountability in the Public Sector Field In the previous chapters, I suggest that accountability practices take place in various organisational, professional and hierarchical spaces in the public sector. The prior analyses demonstrated that Government is a complex system full of interrelationships and interdependencies. I argue that APS is still grappling with this new imperative that there are very few things that public service does that do not cross organisational, professional, and hierarchical boundaries. These social spaces constantly interact and affect each other activities of providing public service. I also argue that APS needs to broaden this understanding of interdependencies and collaboration which are essential for constructing and organising accountability for whole-of-government. To unpack the interdependencies, this chapter approaches the practices of accountability as socially constructed, enacted and re-organised spatial dimensions of interaction between human actions, and institutional, social, and political forces.

With this perspective in mind, an examination of the practices of public servants located in different professional or functional groups within various government organisations at different hierarchical levels is carried out. This particular analysis shows that public servants are not a homogenous group, but heterogeneous groups. The key groups identified are accountants, auditors, lawyers, policy advisors, program managers, economists, information technologists, human resource managers, and scientists. These functional groups are made up of individuals from diverse educational, professional and institutional backgrounds. Rather than taking for granted what people claim or how people represent themselves, this chapter cross-analyses what people say about accountability and what people do about accountability (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu’s theoretical frame of habitus and field explain the doxic perception of accountability in the public sector social spaces.

From this analysis, this chapter finds that the practices of accountability are influenced and shaped by the dominant understanding of the social spaces. Public servants internalise the dominant understanding of the social space and the rules of the game that then reflect on their practices of accountability. The processes and procedures they used in their everyday practices of accountability are a reflection of the habitus and structural forces of the social spaces. One of the issues that came up from the analyses so far,

121 particularly the existing performance reporting requirements in the Commonwealth, is that the calculative systems required quantitative indicators for each government program. The practices are embedded in the written and unwritten rules or procedures, which treated government as a simple system, and focused on financial reporting for achieving compliance tick for transparency and accountability. The most exciting theme that emerges from this chapter’s analysis is the difference between plan or objectives and real actions.

The following discussion extends our understanding of the struggle over the concepts of accountability and the practices of accountability. It also extends our understanding of the interaction between people (agents) and the institutions (organisations, professions, positions, processes, and policies.) for costrcuting, organising and re-organising the practices of accountability in the public sector field. The symbiotic and interweaving relationship between habitus and field helps to explain these complex and dynamic interactions and interdependencies. A public servant, having worked in the APS for 25 years in both central agencies and line agencies, experienced the relational, processual and contextual interaction between different social spaces and what those differential interactions do to the practices of accountability: There are a whole lot of skill sets that you need, and often you only really get to understand them if you have worked in them. You cannot go to the university or private sector to have it all explained to you. You have to work in the particular public service area for a while. […] an important strategy for doing better accountability in the APS is to encourage people to work in areas where they are actually doing the formal accountability, whether it is the Audit Office or Finance or PM&C or Treasury. Therefore, they have a better understanding of the whole picture of public service and not just a policy advisor in a central department or program manager in a service department.

Another public servant added to highlight the differences not only in the different type of work but also in the different cultures of these organisations, which vary significantly from one organisation to another: Recently they just split up Department of Health and Ageing. As a result, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) emerged as three different organisations. I hear from people who work in them that there are different cultures at war in the same agency now, particularly Department of Health and FaHCSIA. Health was made up of health professionals, and FaHCSIA was made up of social welfare people. They have different attitudes toward accountability.

122

In response to the cultural and governance mechanism changes between Department of Health (Health) and FaHCSIA, the Secretary of PM&C Mr. Ian Watt commented: The government should not be tinkering with the machinery of the government (MoG). Well, the nature of the work tends to attract different people, different types of people to a particular agency. Like FaHCSIA, the former FaHCSIA tended to attract a lot of the social welfare people with degrees in psychology and sociology and those sorts of soft disciplines whereas people who worked in Health were largely people that worked on health-related things where that is much more rigorous.

From this perspective, the dynamics of social spaces within the public sector cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, it shows that the public sector cannot be analysed as a unitary entity. Most of the participants have this view of differential accountability because of the different enabling legislations they work under in their separate departments. Although public sector governance, performance and accountability frameworks are almost the same, they have their enabling legislations that govern their everyday functions. For that matter, some field participants observed that while the overarching frameworks are the same for most of the agencies, the practices of accountability would be different for all. The changing nature of the APS’s social spaces due to the recent NPM type reforms highlights the differences between organisational practices. Recent changes to organisational structures by the government elicited some relevant comments from interviewees: Every agency is different. Every agency has its culture. One of the problems of the APS is that the Ministers keep changing the structure of the agency or machinery of government at every stage. Just recently, the current government amalgamated the Department Foreign Affairs and Trade with AusAid - two entirely different cultures.

The following comment also suggests that the internal process of doing accountability is perceived to be different in different organisations: Internally from one department to another you do get different approaches to how accountability arrangements are designed and processed. Therefore, each departmental Secretary will have their own take on what is the appropriate set of internal governance arrangements for their department. They are probably broadly similar, but there will be different emphases and different structures from one place to another. So some people have their audit committee connected with their fraud committee, others might have a separate fraud control arrangement or separate internal control mechanisms. However, there is various committee structures internally that help provide the governance of the organisation, and they vary somewhat from one place to another. In this place we have an Executive Committee that the Secretary chairs and all the Deputy 123

Secretaries sit on and then there is a series of sub-committees that deal with them - one deals with the financial arrangements of the department, one deals with capital investments, one deals with the IT developments one deals with the people issues, and then there’s an audit committee and on it goes.

Different practices are also expected from the perspective of the organisational structure of each department. For example, the ways in which public sector departments are structured vary significantly. Some are quite large, some are quite small, and the rest are in the middle. Therefore, the size of an organisation may influence how people practice accountability:

I had a role very much focussed around internal accountability because they did not pay people or provide services. We were putting police offshore for capacity building, community development. For accountability, a different type of lens is how I would see it. It changes the way that you do your business. Therefore, DHS has 37,000 people and provides face-to-face client delivery. They have a very different role from say Prime Minister and Cabinet, who are primarily a policy hub and drive much more strategic agendas. Accountability is there about the role that they have.

The smaller departments enjoy more flexibility in terms of practising their accountability. One of the reasons is that they have a very specific task, and sometimes they are a very specialist type of organisation with very specific skills and knowledge sets. Superficially it gives greater scope to do things according to their organisational cultures, which is to manage organisational processes and practices in a way that is consistent with the scale and activities of the organisation. A public servant from a small department described similar issues: Our agency is a small agency, so we get a bit more multifaceted compare to other organisations. As we are an organisation of 250 people, we have many people performing the same roles. Therefore, we get more a holistic view of accountability. Whereas in a larger organisation like Department of Finance it is a bit complex... which they have to be a bit more, rigorous in how they implement accountability and segregation of roles/duties and that kind of things. So they have to reduce the flexibility of how people do things... what people are allowed to do... whereas in a smaller agency like ours, is intuitively easy to manage, we can be a bit more flexible, innovative and relaxed about how we do it and I guess we're talking about the control framework.

From this perspective, data have been analysed for different organisations, professions or functional groups, and hierarchical levels or positions. The public sector organisations have been categorised in four analytical groups (for example, central 124 agency, line/service agency, review agency, and GBE/statutory/prescribed agency). The professional or functional groups have been categorised into a few major groups (for example, accountants, auditors, lawyers, policy advisors, program managers, information technologist, human resource managers, and scientists). The hierarchical levels or positions have been categorised into two broader groups (for example, junior to middle managers and senior managers to top executives such as Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries).

7.3 Practices by Organisations In response to the question of whether different departments practise accountability differently, and whether a public servant has practised accountability differently in different organisations, 76% out of 103 participants responded with yes, whereas 20% said no and 4% were indifferent because of their lack of experience in multiple organisations.

Figure 7.1: Differential accountability claims by different organisations

80% 76%

70%

60%

50% Yes 40% No N/A 30% 20% 20%

10% 4% 0%

Surprisingly, when field participants were asked to provide examples of their everyday practices of accountability, a different but interesting theme emerged. The narratives of the actual practices of accountability showed little difference between organisations in terms of their practices of accountability. This finding highlights the complexity of

125 accountability in practice. Based on the findings, this study argues that accountability can be taken-for-granted, as the claims of accountability are not the same as the practices of accountability. This study argues that people in the public sector are subject to a certain type of habitus, which does not allow them to see what they are doing. Therefore, it is a good starting point to present some evidence as to what people say about accountability and what they do to put them into practice in different organisational contexts. A public servant described his accountability practice as: When it comes to external practices such as financial management framework such as financial accounting and reporting, the processes tend to be broadly same or similar to all organisations. We are subject to the mechanisms, external accountability mechanism, and they apply to all APS agencies more or less equally.

Although it was expected that all departments would practise accountability differently, it actually turned out to be a set of quite similar practices. Most of the activities in all types of organisations are task and compliance driven. The level of conformity differs to some degree, as exemplified in the following quote from public servants who worked in two central departments, and they vary significantly in terms of their size. However, the practices are all compliance based: In a large organisation you may have to go past many hurdles, get many sign- offs to do certain things. In the APSC we have less hurdles for compliance. In the Department of Finance, if you raise a request to procure you have to get that signed off by a procurement area. Therefore, you have more management controls in place because there is a lot more things involved. I guess because of the larger nature of the organisation they have to put more controls in to reduce risk but it also reduces the flexibility. Therefore, the accountabilities are process based.

For central agencies, accountability is a dual compliance procedure. First, setting up a framework of conformity for all other organisations. Second, making sure that other departments are following that compliance framework as intended. A senior public servant from a central agency described their practices of accountability:

We have that two things or dual accountability thing - it is the assistant/adviser and the cop/police at the same time. We will help other agencies to do something but we have to make sure what you are doing is within the government’s agreed frameworks, and our internal frameworks as well which is our accountability. Therefore, we do have an enabling role in this space. We will give guidance to say that other agencies can do things within these boundaries. Therefore, we set boundaries for others. 126

From this perspectives, the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) also creates dual compliance accountability for the Department of Finance, because they constructed the legislation and now help other departments to implement their compliance processes and procedures in line with the legislation. However, the legislation is also a compliance framework for managing money and performance. The following comment is from a public servant who worked for both the APSC and Finance, which highlights the elements compliance activates for the practices of accountability: Well, the organisation we work in, we are like a Human Resources support for the whole of Australian public service. Therefore, we have a lot of people who are oriented to that compliance activity. Whereas when I was in the Finance, which is accounting, I was still on compliance for accountability field, but it was more of numbers.

A common practice of doing accountability is to holding APS accountable to public through Parliament. This process is supported by various activities and scrutiny of Senate Estimates Committees (SEC), Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) and Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). Almost all of the organisations said that senate committee hearings are important accountability practices in the APS. A line/service delivery department commented: We are as responsive to Parliament as any other government agency in terms of Senate Estimates Committees and Questions on Notice. I mean we are called up just like any other government agency, you know we respond to Questions on Notice, we do all of the same accountability tasks that any agency has in this place.

The interviewees said the most effective way of holding APS accountable is scrutiny and reporting by ANAO. It is effective because ANAO provide assurance to the public and feedback to the government organisations that their spending of public money is legal, efficient and effective. ANAO’s accountability is to make sure that other departments are accountable in terms meeting their compliance with financials and legal requirements and meeting performance. A senior executive from ANAO described their practices of accountability: Fundamentally it’s very much about that, accountability is at multiple levels, but primarily if you look at all of the material that we release, doing accountability is about the Auditor-General discharging his functions with the assistance of the Office, and providing services that our key clients, the Parliament, the JCPAA, 127

in particular value, because it is giving them the information they are after on how well...the Public Service is going really. And I think alongside that there’s certainly a performance audit focus in terms of that relationship, and sometimes the other clear part of that is every... the annual report process, so you’ve got your portfolio budget statements, then you have an annual report which includes the audited financial statements, so doing accountability is very much about us making sure that we provide those audited financial statements for an entity to do its own accountability.

Feedback and evaluation are also identified as common ways of practising accountability. A line/service delivery agency describes the practices of accountability as follows: We have many mechanisms for feedback. So we have email and telephone lines for implementing our services, using that as an example, we contract with other companies, non-government organisations, to deliver employment services and so we have feedback and customer complaint processes where they can try and resolve an issue with their provider. If they do not resolve that or they have some feedback to give back to the Department and to the government, they come through a different line, either a telephone line or an email line.

In terms of delivering services on the ground, policy departments are different from the line or service delivery departments. This is mostly because of their level of engagements with real people to whom they deliver accountability. However, when it comes to doing accountability, a service department’s representative comments: Certainly, the provision of the Financial Statements is the core part of our accountability. Therefore, we do that monthly and at the end of financial year. We do all of the end of month accounting which contributes to the Financial Statements, which are obviously a key external reporting mechanism to the Department of Finance, and form part of whole of government consolidated reporting. So we rather tend to split it here in corporate finance and budgets, which is a different branch, and actuals, which is kind of this branch.

At the organisational level, ideas of accountability are different because departments have a range of functions and roles to play. They require different skills, cultures, resource allocations and priority settings. Therefore, organisational function and culture play a crucial role in terms of the struggles between various departments over the concepts of accountability. For example, the APSC’s function is more like a human resource management section of the public sector, Finance’s function is like a chief finance officer of the public sector, the ANAO’s function is the auditor of the public sector, and the Treasury’s function is the chief information officer of the public sector. Therefore, each department requires people with different skills, experience, and 128 orientation. The resource allocation and management are also different across different departments. However, in the end the way in which they practise accountability is similar across these departments. In explaining these differences in organisational factors, a senior public servant commented: Some of the language in the PGPA Act around performance is easily cast as being financial issues. Now we keep saying to the Department of Finance that, remember the performance of an organisation is more than dollars, it is about systems, governance, culture, the resource allocation and priority setting. If you look at the cases where organisations have failed, they have typically failed because there were failures at one or usually more points of that system of accountability, governance and personal management.

This analysis illustrates that there are diverse ways of approaching accountability in different organisations but they all lead to ticking compliance boxes with risk minimising approach. The forces of compliance and risk management are the two sides of the same coin and reinforcing each other supported by accounting rationalism. Therefore, the dominant approach of doing accountability remains the same for all government organisations despite the apparent differences in cultures and silos, i.e. compliance with accounting and legal activities. Overall, I find that, organisational culture had the greatest impact on the processes of approaching accountability, but has no impact on the practices of accountability. The organisational culture of compliance and reputational risk management are the centre of these practices.

Instead of accountability for the actual outcomes or public benefits, most of the resources were devoted to compliance activities through input/output processes, accounting functions and risk management of reputation. There was ample evidence to suggest that there are no rewards for being efficient for public benefit rather there are rewards for being efficient for compliance. Therefore, cultural differences in different organisations lead to different concepts of accountability, but not in meaningful practice. For example, central agencies have similar kinds of approaches and similar processes of doing governance, performance and management control activities, and these are similar to the line agencies, review agencies and GBE/Statutory agencies. These processes are similar in terms of the ways in which resources and strategies are mobilised, juxtaposed and deployed in the practices of accountability despite appearant silos.

129

7.4 Practices by Professional/Functional Groups In response to the question of whether people from different professional or functional group practice accountability differently, 82% of 103 participants responded with yes, whereas 15% participants said no and 4% were indifferent because of their lack of experience with professional or functional groups.

Figure 7.2: Differential accountability claims by different groups

90% 82% 80%

70%

60% Yes 50% No 40% N/A 30%

20% 15%

10% 4% 0%

The professional groups show evidence of struggles over the meaning of accountability concepts, and their relationship to professional and functional norms. The participants have argued that their specialist education and training exert the greatest influence on the way accountabilities are perceived by different professional or functional groups. Yet, people who have trained as accountants, auditors, lawyers, policy advisers and program managers have told of doing accountability differently in their functional context. As described by an accountant:

We are the finance; we set up the financial statements, we do the budgets, we do the forecasts, all that sort of accounting stuff. That is what we are primarily accountable for because we are accountants.

However, based on the evidence gathered in this study, it seems that various professional groups such as accountants, auditors, finance specialists, scientists or lawyers, do not practise accountability differently. The above description of doing accountability is consistent across all professional or functional groups. Accountants thought their practices of accountability were about financial accountability, compliance 130 and reporting activities. However, in practice, accountants do all these forms of reporting, and make sure that others in their department also comply with those financial rules and procedures: I mean in the finance area it is mainly about the financial accountability that we make sure people spend within their allocated budgets; we make sure they only spend within their allocated financial delegation level. Each position or level has limits of how much they are allowed to spend and other limitations as well. So we have, within our organisation – we have limitations and control on who can approve entertainment, who can approve travel, and who can approve training.

Accounting, in terms of preparing annual reports or producing financial figures, takes much of the space of practising accountability in the social spaces. This is seen as doing overall accountability within the financial management framework. Therefore, accounting plays a significant role in demonstrating how budgets and funds were managed during the year, how year-end accounting balances are constructed, and how an organisation has performed over the year, which is crucial for the overall process of accountability. For example, Well, there is often you know people within an organisation who might want to treat expenses in a certain way, and the most you know frequent and obvious example would be prepayments. The old kind of budget cash cycle, “Oh, I better spend my budget by 30 June otherwise I won’t get it next year if you know it looks like I haven’t needed it this year.” People might make a large spend by 30 June; the accountant comes along and says, “Oh right, well that service is not going to be delivered until next year, which is a prepayment”.

A senior accountant further explained the practices of accountability for the accounting department: Each month I report on the financial position to the executive board. Prior to having to report that we have pulled together a group called the Resource Forum and the Resource Forum are made up of six Band 2s and in essence what we do is manage the funds for the organisation all year, so we make sure we land budget every year, year on year… Moreover, we land it – late last year we landed it within 600,000. We have a 3.2 billion dollar budget and we have a small surplus of $600,000. Trying to land that much money down to that drop is hard work and it takes a lot of work across the organisation so we know that we are undertaking our accountabilities by allocating the budgets every year. We allocate those budgets and then we track those... that expenditure every month, month on month. Therefore, the budget is sent out to the business lines and then we work with them and we account for it to the executive. When we do procurements, my accountability is to ensure all of the procurements are done inside the guidelines. We have a range of assurance checks; we have a range of feedback through the executive, through local management committees, to 131

ensure that they are undertaking it in a professional way. It is the same with contract management; we have a whole assurance program to ensure that what is happening for those contracts is appropriate in the guidelines.

A program manager from a line/service delivery agency described the following accountability practices. This manager, like many others, has become comfortable with the financial management procedures and financial systems because they perform these tasks regularly. They realised that it is very useful to pick and use accounting and financial processes, which help to perform their accountability functions on an everyday basis. The following comment is representative of many similar comments made by program managers: I think that our accountability in terms of financial management reporting and reporting against quantitative performance measures is important. It’s really easy to do, it’s not difficult, you just need to understand how it works, and you need to make sure that you do it so you as a program manager don’t get caught out, that you’ve always got your financial reporting in place and it’s timely and it’s useful. I think of the words ‘process-oriented’ about these activities.

A policy advisor explained the processes through which he/she discharges accountability is not much different from other professional or functional groups because it is all about compliance with financial reporting: Our accountability to the Parliament as being able to explain ourselves. So the key document for explaining what we intend to do with the resources appropriated to us is our portfolio budget statement. Then we do the annual reports that say this is what we've done in accordance with our plan, and this is where we have varied from the plan, this is how we've met our key performers objectives, and here is the explanation for those areas where we have not succeeded. Therefore, it seems to be a good picture of what we are doing, it is also available online to post.

To be seen as similar to others in the social spaces, auditors build trust and relationships strategically. They do not wish to be seen as a big brother with a ‘gotcha’ stick. Rather, auditors want to be seen as collaborative colleagues with common virtues and mechanisms for practising accountability. A senior auditor described their position in this space in relation with other organisations. Auditors are creating symbolic capital by not only strengthening networks of relationships of trust, but also mobilising compliance and accounting based practices of accountability through its capitals (cultural and social, which then becomes symbolic capitals). In the last few decades, auditors have been preparing and promoting Better Practice Guides for other agencies to

132 help them to discharge their accountabilities by mobilising their ‘special knowledge’. A senior government audit described it by saying: Well, sometimes it’s quite hard to find people who are accountable and… but sometimes it’s… we’ve had issues with accountability which we’ve identified recently, having a rule that means that if you’re spending money you have to be able to show that it’s… that you demonstrate value for the taxpayer, that you do actually consider that in spending relevant money, so having Audit Committees is important as well, so that decisions are reviewable by other people

The lawyers are also no different to others when it come to practising accountability. The lawyers who work for the public sector are expected to comply with these legal and financial rules, and at the same time listen to the Minister who says, “I want you to do this”. A lawyer recounted: I would say, in terms of Attorney-General's as a Department, there are a lot of Lawyers and they are very risk averse. They love... the love compliance process. Therefore, it’s very hierarchical, there is a lot of process, and there is a lot more forms and fillings. Therefore, no email is allowed to get approval, but actually fill in...a physical form for the approval… there is more of that, where you are required to fill in a form and get it signed by my boss and my boss' boss and as a record of accountability. Some of the processes is very prescriptive, very repetative... inflexible…it recognises every risk... and they are very risk averse.

Another lawyer commented: Minimise the risk and particularly, as, in the Commonwealth, you know, there is a policy that you cannot do anything that puts a contingent liability on the Commonwealth. So it's important to, yeah, just to ensure that you maintain... our contracts have pre-drafted clauses, so it's about ensuring that we do not... in the negotiation with the recipient, none of the protective clauses get taken out of the contract and ensuring that we draft it so that we put into the contract clauses that will enable us down the track to be able to demonstrate, that the money was used for the intended purpose that the recipient did deliver on what they've got their contract for, and the other element of it is accountability to ensure that I... part of my role is ensuring that my... the boss that I get to sign the contract has the appropriate delegation to be able to enter into the spending proposal.

As for Internal Auditors practices of accountability: We have a range of controls – and I am talking about the financial management because it is useful descriptor of what goes across the all organisation generally – we have a range of controls, which usually manifest themselves in Chief Executive Officer Instructions or frameworks. I focus on the budget management. We have a budget management chief executive instructions and those talks about the roles of the different players in the financial structure and the responsibilities of all of those areas. Therefore, that is a guiding framework for us. We have regular systems-generated reports that talk about our 133

expenditure rates, so we keep very close monitoring of that on a monthly basis. That is kind of management accounting controls. We also have a sampling program to ensure that expenditures are approved by the right delegations so, you know, we don’t check every one but we have a random sampling process to do that.

A scientist commented that legislation is everywhere in the public sector, and in the end legislations govern their accountability. The scientist told me that: For a Commonwealth public servant there is legislation at the base level, the Public Service Act. You have obligations under the Finance Act in terms of delegations for financial purposes. We’ve got the new PGPA Act, we’ve got instructions that are provided from either Prime Minister and Cabinet or directions from Department of Finance on what you can do and what you can’t do, instructions that are provided from the Australian Public Service Commission, instructions that are provided by the Secretary of Department, there’s a lot of formal mechanisms

A statistician explains the ways in which he/she practise accountability is more financial than non-financial accountability: It is more financial and quantitative. I do more of the sort of 5.1 delegation reports and 6.1 delegation reports and Reg 9 and Reg 10, all that sort of stuff, in terms of the formal tick the box stuff. In the SES you need to understand financial accountabilities, and how those systems work. I think you also need to understand, the OH&S. stuff as well, with the new Workplace Health and Safety Act. Where senior officers have personal responsibility and on a bad day could be individually responsible for a whole range of things that could happen. Therefore, there are a few different other accountabilities. On the non-financial side, as I say it's probably mostly through performance agreements and executive reviews

At the professional or functional group level, accountability practices are not different at all. However, ideas, concepts and ways of approaching accountability are different because the skills requirements are different for each profession. Each professional group has different functions, and therefore require different skill set. Therefore, group habitus plays a crucial role in the struggles between different ideas and concepts.

7.5 Practices by Hierarchical Positions/Levels When the question was asked to all field participants, whether people from different hierarchical positions practise accountability differently, 62% field participants said

134 they have differential experience of doing accountability at various positions. On the other hand, 34% of participants have experienced no difference in the practices of accountability between junior to senior public servants, and 4% participants have no experience working in multiple positions to be able to reflect on this.

Figure 7.3 Differential accountability claims by different hierarchical positions

70% 62% 60%

50%

40% Yes 34% No 30% N/A 20%

10% 4%

The most common answer from the senior public servants to the questions of accountability has been the public or the government of the day. A senior public servant commanded: I think accountability is… ultimately people engaged in the public sector have a responsibility to the Australian public, to the citizenry of the nation, so that’s the ultimate responsibility. I think there’s a more immediate responsibility to the elected government of the day and when I think about accountability I suppose I think of it as upwards to the government and ultimately the people but also I see a need for particularly senior managers to be accountable to the direct constituents or stakeholders of their Department. Now, they’re different sorts of accountabilities but…I don’t see that so much as a legal accountability as a stewardship.

Although most of the participants speak about accountability to the public, they did not have a clear answer as to how they do public accountability. What they talk about is task, responsibilities, compliance reporting and documentation of processes, reporting to the Minister, reporting to hierarchy, accounting and financial reporting, compliance with legislation and legal frameworks. For example, one senior public servant described how he/she practises accountability in his role:

135

I think accountability is taking responsibility for those functions for which you are accountable and you have the functional control for them. It is a couple of issues, ensuring that we have compliance with our legislative and statutory obligations, and that we are supporting and looking after our people. Therefore, it is an accountability perspective from a human being, as in an employee, perspective and them being safe and healthy. You then have responsibility and this is about accountable to the government of the day in terms of delivering, some of the government’s priority platform areas.

A public servant claimed that everything he does was accountability. When everything is accountability, then accountability has been taken-for-granted as everyday tasks and responsibilities. A public servant explains: My whole job is about being accountable for one thing or another. It is being accountable for processes and then being accountable under legislation, under Acts, and processes, It is being accountable to the organisation to ensure that governance standards and practices and policies are upheld and that I can demonstrate on any particular day that we have made decisions based on all the information available and that sort of thing. Well there is accountability, again under legislations, under the Acts that we have such as commonwealth procurement roles, which outline how government should purchase services. I would say everything we do is our accountability.

Another public servant explained the practices of accountability as follows: If you were going to draw a diagram of our jobs then I think accountability is either right at the bottom and supports everything else or it’s at the top that overarches and looks down but it is also across everything, as you say it’s across laws, processes, systems, procedures, people and decisions. Therefore, for the APS, I think it is our greatest lens on the way we do just about everything we do within those. It is all about being accountable to the average person or the taxpayer.

Accounting for taxpayers’ money proves to be symbolic accountability and driven by habitus and doxa in the field. Most of the participants mentioned accountability for public funds, but when asked how often provide answers like the one below:

If taxpayer are paying taxes out of their income to support the government expenditure then we as public servants need to ensure that we are accountable for that expenditure and that if we were questioned by the person on the street that we can put hand on heart and say, “We’ve done everything possible to make sure that your taxpayer’s dollar goes to the right place and we can tell you how that is been spent because we have the processes and arrangements in place to ensure that it is followed”.

Senior managers feel that they carry the burden of accountability for junior and middle- level members on their shoulders. It shows that some people at the top of the

136 organisational hierarchy understand their responsibility as accountability. They feel that they are ultimately accountable to the Secretary or Head of Department if something goes wrong. This illustrates that taking responsibility for accountability varies according to a person’s position in an organisation. For example, as public servants illustrated: Well, the senior executive is accountable at the end of the day. So for me it would be funny for me to say – it would be really funny – if something went wrong in my branch it would be the Commissioner talking to me and I would wear it. You know, if procurement goes wrong that’s my issue. I will deal with it down the line but my CEO would hold me accountable. I would have to be absolutely clear, and so I wouldn’t be a senior executive saying ‘Oh, I think it’s really hard to find out who’s and is not accountable’ because I am. The buck stops with me.

Particularly at senior levels, public servants feel that the objective set for a senior manager is always ill defined. Senior level public servants are trying to assist the government to work through competing objectives and balance the interests of different constituencies across the country. From this perspective, it is a struggle between managerial accountability and public accountability to constituents. Moreover, it is a balancing act, and striking a right balance is a struggle in itself. In describing the balancing act, a top-level public servant explained: I mean the world of senior policy makers is very complex and politically sensitive. If your job is to make payments of the old age pension to pensioners in Centrelink, your world is a lot clearer. You have a framework; there is metrics around all the time that you will spend, the error rates you will have and all that, and it is simple, it is relatively simple. Alternatively, if you are doing a big project, you are building a building or something, it's quite simple. There's a linear relationship between your tasking and outcomes being achieved and in that environment accountability is as straightforward as it is in other places and what's at risk there is the nature of our culture and how we go about the accountability task. However, the ‘accountable for what’ piece is easy to answer. In some of the environments or levels in which senior managers operate the 'accountable for what' piece is a lot harder to define because the nature of the duties if you like, the duty statement is just fluid and ambiguous.

Many junior public servants explained, during the interviews or field observations, that at their levels all the accountability steps are almost process-driven, task driven or pro forma driven. Therefore, each year or each quarter, they have to fill out numerous forms against the key performance indicators (KPIs). They have to fill out all the financial reports about spending. They need to report on various financial management systems, and then they have to explain variations, shortfalls, or over-expenditure. These

137 processes are compliance-focused and financial in nature. The organisational pressure is on not to think of those steps as pro forma, but to be more genuine and precise in the way they were going through all the steps in place for financial management reporting and performance indicator reporting. Often this compliance becomes excessive due to senior managers’ mentality of conformity. Some rules for accountability practices are taken-for-granted or doxic rules that are unstated, because the people in positions of power try to keep the goalposts secret, so they can control accountability if they need to lay blame on their juniors: The last place I worked in 2008 I was doing a simple compliance audit and I was not allowed to do an opening review. I had to prepare a minute and use as an example the E.L.2 approved the year before. It was just a simple one-page document, and I had to prepare the first one, submit it to him for approval. It took him four days to review – he never touched anything in it until the fourth morning after he received it, to show his staff that he had the power. Moreover, it is quite common. Moreover, then it came back. He had made changes to it. It listed all the Act and the regulations and you could find in the Chief Administrative Instructions and Commonwealth Purchasing Guidelines, and then he had some dot points, and he’d changed all the titles of all the framework documents to acronyms, and he’d changed the dot point from the default to the unshaded arrow head, and he’d changed the no semi-colon at the end of the dot point that is in compliance with the Style Guide to a semi-colon, and he’d shoved in some random commas. Two months later, I started another audit using a different sample and submitted it back to him. Four days later it came back, and he has changed them all back to the way it had been original. Why? To exercise his power. To show me that I was just a peasant who could not do anything right. moreover, it’s quite a common vagary in the APS not only from my own experience but from what other people tell me, but which comes back to this: how can you provide accountability if the goalposts keep moving? It also on the productivity of course. Unless you have gone into work at the lower levels you just do not know what is going on there.

The following examples of doing accountability are from junior-middle level public servants: APS Act and Codes, so that always sits on top and all... that's a known fact, so even right when you start and every year and you know, you're told to make sure that you're familiar with what's expected of you and things like that. Many of the CEIs are based on that as well, in terms of how you deal with people in the workplace and things like that

I do financials reporting regularly. So financial reporting is a set or pro-forma format, which we are expected to do monthly. Non-financial reporting is on project based, so if they are, you know, there's milestone reporting, if there's anything going wrong, there's an Exception Report and things like that. Therefore, that is done on ad hoc basis as part of the project 138

I am in the performance section, which produces two key documents. The Annual Report, which again is a key document on accountability. And it produces the portfolio budgets statements, which the Minister is accountable to Parliament. So yes, the P.B.S. sets out how the money is going to be allocated from the budget and annual report sets out how money is spend.

The claims about multiple accountabilities and public accountability are consistent through the field studies. However, most of the participants identify compliance with the financial requirements as the major ways of practising accountability. For most of the public servants interviewed, being transparent is their way of doing public accountability. In the end, it is about what someone is asked to do and how well he/or she can demonstrate that the job is done. However, at junior levels a public servant’s sense of accountability is about showing the ways in which the job was carried out according to the guidelines. The following quotes are examples of what many junior- middle level public servants commented in terms of their practices: There are always multiple accountabilities; first, you are always accountable to the public because they are the people who employ you in public service. Then, I suppose… there are legal accountability… you are accountable for legal requirements and frameworks, then you are accountable for financial type of requirements and frameworks.

There is also having that element of transparency, so I meet my obligations under the various statutes. In addition, moral and ethical sort of standards and expectations of people in the public service, but then being held to account through the Parliamentary process, through Senate estimates, through my obligations to report to the senior management of the department are same.

I mean public service is accountable in all different dimensions. So most often the sort of things that we spend money on. For example, here are contracting professional services. The accountability is value for money, the steps require a testing of the market place, and you have to be satisfied that you have getting value for money.

I have a job, I've got to be accountable to a lot of things in public service and one of those is the public accountability and that's, I suppose, just being ultimately transparent in what I do so that if any questions were raised that they can see the simple steps, see that everything was done by the rules, I suppose, so I didn't cut corners and didn't cheat, didn't lie. It's funny, I suppose, the public is always there and the biggest thing is being transparent so that, you know, things can be assessed and seen that I have been abiding by all the other rules and regulations as well.

139

At the individual level the difficulty for public servants is, they have to be able to do policy, deliver programs, manage finances, and understand risk and reporting. For example, there are a whole lot of skill sets that an individual public servant needs, and often they only really get to understand them if they have worked in those areas. They need to develop dispositions in these areas (habitus). For that, they have to work in a different public service area for a while. The analyses from this study suggest that a significant strategy for getting better accountability at the individual level is to encourage people to work in different areas where formal accountability is based. In terms of naming these areas, field participants suggested ANAO, Finance, Treasury or PM&C in order to have a better picture of the whole public service. Adopting Bourdieu’s theoretical vocabulary allows me to show that central agencies are primary sources of capitals in this space. It is evident from the data that those who have worked in different departments in particular spend some time with one of these central agencies, which gets their career moving faster than others who have spent most of their time in a single position or department.

7.6 Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to explore whether the practices of accountability are different in different government organisations, professional or functional groups, and hierarchical positions in the APS. The analyses show that the key practices of accountability in the public sector field are excessive compliance approaches. These approaches are supported by calculative logic and technologies of financial accounting, performance reporting, audits, and reputational risk management processes. The management of expenditure, budget, appropriation, annual reports, and portfolio budget statements dominate the practices of accountability. The strengthening of the compliance activities around the accounting process is the main contributing factor to this focus. I find that most of the public servants at all levels identify preparing the annual report and the portfolio budget statements (PBS) as the two key documents of accountability. The big focus on financial accounting and compliance activities are the dominant phenomena in this field. The focus on compliance through accounting processes has increased substantially with the introduction of accrual accounting, and subsequent private sector practices based on private sector business models through the NPM type reforms, for example budget, devolution, decentralisation and contracting

140 out. The NPM type reforms have changed the entire space, and accounting has become the dominant practice for accountability because of this.

I find that accounting logic become the guiding principle of most of the compliance practices in the name of accountability in the public sector field. In that process, financial accounting and reporting activities become dominant, and drive the entire process of performing compliance activities to achieve accountability. Moreover, the financial accounting and compliance activities are supported by broader structural and institutional forces, such as legislation, frameworks, rules, guidelines and instructions. Furthermore, the finance people (accountants) or legal people (lawyers) write the rules of these frameworks, pieces of legislation and frameworks. Therefore, there is a connection between their compliance habitus and accounting and compliance logic of these regulations for accountability. Therefore, accounting logic and compliance activities go hand in hand, reinforcing each other through the increased compliance activities, which in turn shapes the practices of accountability in the public sector field.

I find that there are different struggles of accountability in various individual, professional and organisational contexts, but the ways in which they are practised are no different to each other. In the end, the practices are similar, because the dominant logic and process of doing accountability is the same, as it is through compliance activities with accounting processes. Therefore, it is all about giving account of public money, budget and expenses in the as best possible ways. Therefore, I document that compliance functions based on accounting activities have the greatest impact on the processes of doing accountability. The issues of culture, size, governance practices of top management and internal control mechanisms are identified as varying across organisations. However, when it comes to practising and reporting accountability, it is no different for all those officers documenting compliance with accounting process. This finding lends support to the conclusion that different organisations, professional groups and individuals at various hierarchical levels think that accountability is different, but in practice, they all perform the same compliance activities.

I also find that different departments’ struggle over competing ideas of accountability. For example, central agencies have a distinct set of approaches and processes for doing

141 governance, performance and management control activities. The line agencies, review agencies and GBE/Statutory agencies have their particular methods in terms of the ways in which resources and strategies were mobilised, juxtaposed and deployed in the organisation. From this perspective, the central agencies function like finance areas, corporate areas, human resource management areas and policy enablers for all other organisations. In doing so, they create legislation and enable others to comply with those legislations in the name of accountability, and at the same time, they claim their accountability. They have dual accountability, one as the adviser and the other as the police at the same time. However, both have heavy stress on compliance and bureaucratic approach to managing performance and risk. Moreover, the central agencies make sure that other departments are operating within the compliance frameworks for improving performance assessment and reporting. Therefore, central agencies do have an enabling role in promoting compliance activities. In doing so, the central departments give guidance to other organizations so that others can comply within these set boundaries. Therefore, they set boundaries for others, and this creates the power differentials because they own some social of the capital of the accountability practices in this space.

I provide evidence of how the accounting habitus could become the habitus of the field (doxa). In those process, other field participants, particularly non-accountants, have strategically picked up and started using accounting knowledge and skills (accounting habitus). Since accounting is now embedded in social and organisational practices, people do not see it as an external accounting way of doing things because it has become internal. That is why field participants do not challenge, but rather take accounting habitus for granted, as the rules of the accountability game. This finding is consistent with Bourdieu’s theoretical tools, which provides explanations of the processes of internalisation. This analysis shows the processes of how accounting habitus becoming habitus of the field (doxa). The findings suggest that Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) is entirely different from other departments or agencies. It is not only because of their enabling legislation, which make them independent in this space. The JCPAA relies on ANAO’s audit reports to hold commonwealth entities accountable for financial management, legal compliance, efficiency, and effectiveness for spending public money. This line of accountability is essential for information flow

142 to public through the JCPAA. This is to improve parliamentary oversight and to minimise Ministerial intervention in the contested field of power and politics. In the public sector, Ministers cannot directly influence some statutory departments, for example, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). In effect, ABS’s accountability is practiced through the accuracy of published statistics and the confidence public has in them. ABS, by comparison, is far more accountable to the public through the Act of Parliament rather than to Minister.

One way of describing these findings is concentric circles within the government of how close someone is to Ministers. There is another layer of organisations, such as Government Businesses Enterprises (GBE), which are accountable to their shareholders in the same way as private corporations. They have their boards, management committees, and their head of agency is seen as a Chief Executive Officer (CEO). With many government businesses, standard corporate accountability is through the Corporations Act. As a result, thinking about those entities via concentric circles shows political and power differentials in the accountability relationship.

The practices of accountability in the public sector are not separated from each other, but entangled, multiple and interrelated with each other and the relationships are embedded in the institutional, social and political context. At times, it is mostly visible at the intersection of financial/managerial accountability and public/political accountability because these are the dominant features of the public sector field. This analysis shows that Roberts (1991, 196) distinction of individualising and socialising forms of accountability is not helpful in understanding the dynamics and interdependencies of human agency and strcutural forces which consitutes practice in the field. This is because in practice accountability relationships are not linear, and the distinction and distances between these relationships are not always static but dynamic and complex. Therefore, actors socially construct and organise practices of accountability through patterns of language, vocabularies and ideologies based on their positions, professions and backgrounds. However, as this study finds, the key definitions and vocabularies of accountability are related to powerful and dominant public sectors departments, professions and positions.

143

In summary, this chapter identifies that accountability approaches and practices are not black and white as most of the interviewees portray them. As central agencies play an advisory role because all other agencies are seeking guidance despite having enabling legislation to address their own accountability for performance in reflect of their particular commitments. Because of the tendency of getting prescription from central agencies much of the accountability practices become compliance activities in the public sector field. The practices of accountability take place in various social, institutional, organisational, professional and hierarchical levels, and most of them are dominated by the compliance activities. This means that practicing accountability involves providing accounting information for compliance purposes. The analysis of this chapter shows the differences between the claims about and actual practices of accountability. Despite the difference in contexts, size, resources, the processes, and ways of doing them, much of the practices of accountability appear as compliance. Therefore, in Bourdieu’s practice theory terminology, it can be argued that the relationships between compliance, accounting and accountability are becoming inseparable and interweaving. Since habitus is the set of dispositions that make agents think, talk and act in certain ways, agent’s accounting habitus or dispositions generate the practices of accountability in the public sector field. In these processes, accounting habitus then predisposes public servants or non-accountants to think, talk and act in ways that are consistent with the dominant perception, forms, and definitions of accountability in the public sector field. It is the institutional forces that people internalise or incorporate in their actions. This is how accounting habitus became accountability doxa in the public sector field. In the next chapter, I will extend this analysis to understand why much of the practices of accountability resulted into compliance activities.

144

CHAPTER EIGHT

WHY IS THERE LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN THE PRACTICES OF ACCOUNTABILITY?

8.1 Introduction In this chapter, I analyse how accounting mediates ways of thinking, talking and performing the practices of accountability in the APS. It builds on the preceding chapters to highlight how accountability is enacted and performed by various organisations, professional groups and hierarchical positions through compliance activities oriented towards accounting. This study expected to find differential practices of accountability across those organisations, professions and hierarchical positions. However, counter-intuitively and much to my surprise, the data revealed that the practices were not much different at all. Therefore, this chapter explores why there were little differential practices across the social spaces. In doing so, this chapter focuses on the role of accounting habitus in creating compliance doxa for accountability. In analysing the constitutive power of accounting, this study illustrates how accounting mediates perceptions, forms of appreciation and actions, so that people internalise accounting activities and misrecognise them as accountability practice. I then present accounting’s role in producing and sustaining the accounting habitus. In particular, it highlights the precarious nature of accounting practices and the efforts of actors to maintain stable relationships between themselves and powerful others. These narratives are then brought together to determine the role of accounting in creating the practical logics of accountability practice.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 presents the accountability relationships and practices. This section illustrates how different social groups think, talk and act for accountability and highlights the role of accounting in that processes. Following this, section 8.3 discusses why there is little difference in the practices of accountability across different social spaces. In doing so, it shows in what circumstances, and in which ways, accounting became symbolic capital and people internalised accounting as accountability. Section 8.4 concludes the chapter by discussing the themes emerging from the analysis.

145

8.2 Accountability Relationships and Practices The literature review and Bourdieu’s theoretical frame assisted in developing the expectation that the practice of accountability would be different in different social spaces. This study’s understanding of accountability is multifaceted and complex (Sinclair, 1995). Similarly, Ahrens (1996) informed us that there are different styles of accountability and Roberts (1996) discussion of individualising and socialising forms of accountability was central to this study’s expectation. Moreover, Day and Klein (1997) showed that public servants experience a tension between two ways of doing accountability. Bovens (2005, 2010) also described multiple aspects of accountabilities by discussing vertical and horizontal accountability in the public sector context.

Motivated by this body of work, this study documented the practices of accountability in the preceding chapters. However, different practices were not evident, which was contrary to my expectations. The only difference that this study found is the difference between what people say about accountability and what people do about accountability, in everyday practices. Therefore, this chapter will extend our understanding of why the practices of accountability are very similar contrary to what I was expected. In doing so, this chapter argues that practices would be different unless the practical logic behind those practices is not same. The practical logic is accounting and its technologies, so that many people are performing compliance and feedback activities with accounting logic. For the same reason, the analysis suggests that the multiple ideas and aspects of accountability co-exist in the practices because they are following the same advice and prescription from central agencies. Therefore, no one challenges the taken for granted nature of accountability practices as they conforms to the guidance of central agencies. Even though all agencies have their own enabling legislations they look up to comply with central agencies template. That is why, doing conformity with compliance is misrecognised as doing accountability and according to Bourdieu, and this is how accounting becomes symbolic capital in those practices as much of the compliance is done through accounting processes.

For the practices of accountability, there are multiple frameworks, forms of legislation and compliance activities. The field participants identified the financial management framework as the most important and significant of all frameworks. In terms of the

146 financial framework, there is the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act (PGPA Act) 2013 (which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter), which replaced both the Financial Management Accountability Act 1997 and Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997. These two Acts were the accountability framework in the APS for the last 16 years. The previous two Acts provided the basis for government organisations accounts, records, annual financial reports, and audits of annual reports by the Auditor-General. Based on these Acts, the Department of Finance then formulated a range of policies and procedures implementing those acts, to make them uniform across the APS. They became in turn very prescriptive ways of telling people how to do their accounting and accountability. In the process, everyone had to conform with the legislation and instructions from the central agencies, particularly Finance, and as a result, accounting and accountability became intertwined to became the same thing. In the end, accountability practice became following accounting processes, and in a similar way, accounting ways of doing accountability became accountability doxa in the social spaces.

The majority of the public servants interviewed from different departments, professions and hierarchical levels have acknowledged that there are multiple internal and external forces that drive accountability in the APS. These forces have been identified and discussed in chapter one of this study. The analysis of this chapter suggests that these forces put accounting into motion for the practices of accountability. The field participants have identified the most influential and dominant force being the role of accounting and accounting technologies in the practices of accountability. One of the forces is the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI)20, which makes information available on demand to achieve transparency. In this process, accounting plays a greater role in order to provide transparency by documenting things to the extreme, and by presenting more information in the annual reports. Consequently, accounting activities increase and the technologies of accounting are taken for granted as ways of making information transparent, particularly through financial accounting and reporting. However, the FOI became an accountability smokescreen for compliance activities with accounting. It is not because of the wording of the Act, or the ways in which public or interested groups can access information under this law, but the effects it has on the

20 See https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A02562 147 ways in which public servants are constantly aware of this Act. The Act is designed to encouraged accountability through a system of transparency across APS entities. However, in action it creates symbolic accountability through compliance based risk management and bureaucratic practice. Due to the excessive focus on compliance, there is an increased tendency of risk aversion by documenting less. It is because the consequences of loss of face or reputation outweigh the benefit of free flow of information. Another example is the Senate Estimates Committees hearings, which also put more emphasis on compliance activities than doing things efficiently for the public good or benefit. For many public servants, this parliamentary practice of accountability has become a smokescreen for conformity and compliance activities, and has become a deeply institutionalised and bureaucratized practice of public accountability. Many public servants have highlighted this as a highly political process which diverts or distracts the primary focus from accountability to compliance and accounting activities. Many participants have told me that before turning up to the Senate Estimate Committees hearings they put countless hours of work in to documenting things in pedantic detail.

8.3 How accounting habitus becomes accountability doxa The field participants do not see their activities as accounting activities because they have internalised these practices as accountability practices. When asked about the role of accounting in their practices of accountability, many public servants said they do not do accounting, because they are program managers or policy advisers or scientists. The following quote shows how deeply accounting and its technologies are embedded in the everyday practice of accountability, yet are not noted by field participants. This quote is representative of many similar quotes from many public servants across different organisations, professions and hierarchical levels: I am accountable for money... it is about the expenditure of public funds, but also the reporting on the use of funds. Therefore, in terms of accountability, there is accountability about ensuring that the person with the right authority signs the funding agreement or signs for the payment of services. Then there is accountability; we are required under grants reporting requirements in the Commonwealth Government. These are our normal practices.

148

When talking about their practices of doing accountability many public servants made frequent references to accounting and its close nexus with the practices of accountability. A public servant explained: Certainly, the provision of the Financial Statements is the core part of our accountability. Therefore, we do that monthly and at the end of financial year and they are not hard. I mean other than that we do all of the end of month accounting which contributes to the Financial Statements, which are obviously a key external reporting mechanism to the Department of Finance, and form part of whole of government consolidated reporting and our regular practices of accountability.

The view that accountability and accounting are the same is prevalent across the APS. Public servants talk about many forms and aspects of accountability, but in describing the ways in which they do them always return to financial accounting and reporting. The following quote is an example of how many public servants linked accounting as a means of performing accountability to management. This is comment from a program manager in line/service department: Accountability to Management, I suppose the main process is financial accounting and reporting because we have funding grants with recipients, and we have a tax offset program that we administer. Therefore, there are financial implications with those grants and that program, and the main accountability is with grants because we enter into contractual arrangements with the recipients.

The above references on the role of accounting for the practices of accountability show a consistent pattern in everyday processes. Public servants prepare a series of reports, and most of them are financial in nature. A senior manager claimed the importance of these processes in their everyday organisational practices: That is the way I have visibility on activities. Therefore, we have a range of financial reports, and we are continually reviewing those reports. Therefore, we have at the highest level to the Board we have an Executive Dashboard, which has some key metrics for the health of the organisation that we must continually report on a quarterly basis. We have management reports at the next layer down, which shows how they are performing against their budgets primarily, but also against their stated objectives and their KPIs for their services, and those sorts of things, and also there’s management accounting reporting. Moreover, then each of my senior officers has a set of performance agreements and review points where we agree what it is they need to achieve and then we monitor and track that throughout the year through these reports. Moreover, then there is a series of major reports that go across the Department, it is our budget reports on our key projects and how they are tracking against budget and deliverables.

149

The analyses suggest that there is a range of accounting controls and compliance tools that are perceived to be accountability practice. These are mostly financial management and risk management tools, but this is also a relatively useful descriptor of what happens across the organisations within the APS. These tools are not just about use of resources but importantly about performance which is a major imperative and becomes more so under the recent reforms. For example, other forms of management control usually manifest in the Accountable Authority Instructions (AAI) what were the Chief Executive’s Instructions (CEIs) and other guidelines that mainly focus on budget and financial management processes. The budget management instructions usually talk about the roles of the different players in the financial structure, and the accountability of all of those areas. Therefore, AAIs/CEIs were financial management guidelines for some of the processes of practices of accountability. One public servant observed: We have regular systems-generated financial reports that talk about our expenditure rate against our revenue rates, so we keep very close monitoring of that on a monthly basis. That is a kind of management accounting controls. We also have a sampling program to ensure that expenditures are approved by the right delegations so, you know, we do not check everyone but we have a random sampling process to do that.

An accountant not only does finance or reporting, but also acts as the financial management rules and guidelines implementer for others members within the organisation. This is partly because the rules and frameworks are financial, accounting, reporting focused comprised of technical jargons, and partly because accountants want to control the ways in which is it interpreted. For example, an accountant manages the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) of an organisation, which must be prepared with reference to Regulation 9 of the former Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act). This shows how some organisations meet their compliance obligations for financial legislation with accounting. The following comment from a senior finance manager described the social capital that he/she has because of her accounting knowledge, which provides him/her with tools to manage finance within the organisation: As an accountant, I run reporting requirement for the organisation. Therefore, I routinely tell people that they are effectively not doing the right thing in terms of this compliance with finance rules. You know there is certainly a tension. However, my personal advantage as an accountant is that I have some credibility in understanding the translation of that business requirement into our business processes. What we try and do from finance area focus is that we translate the

150

financial management legislation for others. So, for example, we do not want everyone reading the PGPA Act and making different interpretations. Therefore, we translate it for them, and we interpret it into our accountable authority instructions and our policy frameworks, and the people who work in the S.P.O's should be able to read that and know what they have to do, and know that they are completely within the legislation, if they follow the process that we've put in place. Because the PGPA Act obviously is very technical for others... It is focusing on the devolution of accountability and more engagement with risk, OK. Therefore, the interpretation of that can be strategic and as an accountant, I can do that.

To describe the process for doing the accountability of the department, public servants always provided a couple of key documents. One of them is the annual report. Now, a senior manager from a large line/service agency claimed to do accountability through the annual report: Through the annual report, we are accountable. I just picked this one [annual report] at random, “transactions by channel”, this is about our child support operation. Online service transactions last year were 107, now 162. Customer registrations by channel online 27, now 158, phone service. Moreover, you get these sorts of statistics throughout this document in which we report to Parliament about the operations of the Department in a financial way. The front part of this report is the non-financial, so this is what we do include here a list of all the senior executives of the organisation and then in the back of the report, and this is just a standard annual report, you get accountability through the financial reporting.

The other document mostly referred to by participants is the Portfolio Budget Statement (PBS). Many public servants showed this document during the field visits as evidence of doing accountability. You will see in here we have the planned performance… there is a section in here about the proposed key performance indicators for the Department, which I’m sure is Outcomes and Performance Information. The KPIs for the Department are set out here in this document if you can see, on page 37, and these are the performances of the Department that are expected. So what we have here is we have the 13/14, this was the way we performed in respect of last year’s budget against these KPIs. This is our target for 14/15, and these are our forward estimates targets, so you can see our targets against these criteria going forward to 2017/18. Now, these will be reported in more detail in the annual report. Now this one is 14/15 so this material will be reported against in the annual report that will be tabled in the Parliament in October next year. Material – this is the 13/14 – the stuff that is in here will go into the next annual report that is the 13/14 annual report…, which will be tabled in Parliament in October.

151

The analysis also reveals that that there is a propensity to favour accounting based quantitative measurements and methodologies, and privilege them over qualitative methodologies for assessing and reporting accountability for performance. The ‘financials’ are good way to get a big green tick of approval from the Auditor-General, which will confirm the accuracy of accounting for money that was spent during the year. As a result, this has created a financial resource management ‘vicious cycle’ through accounting and compliance activities, from planning to measuring, and then from accounting to reporting. Many resources have been devoted to preparing and analysing these financial reports, which creates a taken for granted or doxic financial accounting cycle.

The focus on financial accountability and audit accountability is excessive. The strengthening of the compliance activities around finance is the main contributing factor to this focus as we as the focus by the Parliament and its Committees. The evidence provided in this chapter suggests that most of the public servants interviewed identify the Annual Report and the portfolio budget statements (PBS) as the two key documents for illustrating accountability. The practice of various public servants in undertaking their accountability involved frequent references to resource accounting and its role in accountability.

Although accounting has significant symbolic capital for the practices of accountability, the accountants do not have a similar level of capital in the field. This chapter argues that accounting and accountants are not the same, and they have their own social spaces, which is why non-accountants can pick up and use accounting as well as accountants. The analysis shows that, other field participants are using accounting as well as accountants for their everyday practices of accountability. Therefore, as non- accountants, they do not recognise the value of accountants as the sole source of accounting skills. Since everyone internalises the accounting logic and its practices, they do not see extra value in accountants who seem to be the organisers of accounting. A senior finance manager commented:

There is a demand for business skills in this space. Senior accountants are functioning and positioning themselves as a businessperson rather than an accountant. It seems the demand for technical accounting knowledge is going down but there is demand for a strategic accountant who is also an expert in 152

business management and operations. Those executives who know how a large organisation operates in dynamic environment are better equipped and positioned than a financial or management accountant.

These strategic business skills are highly valued, not only in the private sector but also in the public sector. In a changing regime, accountants must engage with the organisation’s CEO, Board and top management team, and contribute not only to the financial management but also to strategy development and implementation. This analysis finds that the public sector has a new set of expectations from senior accountants. This space is changing, and no longer looking for CFOs with formal and technical accounting qualification and professional backgrounds. To fill the gap in the business and strategic knowledge, the public sector is recruiting senior finance executives from private corporations with a broad range of experiences. For example, a CFO in a large agency described the changing rules of the game:

I am essentially from a business background, and I have always worked, all of my history has been in large operational work, with big machines, big business lines and those sorts of big things. I think that was some of the idea of the CFO role was to bring a business, sort of mindset to it. I have many accountants that work for me, so all the technical expertise is there, so they did not see it was necessity that I was an accountant. Moreover, I was bringing business disciplines to a very technical area.

This can be seen as an apparent shift from technical accounting expertise to business expertise in the accounting professional field, as the senior finance manager explained:

I think CFO role has moved from a technical expertise to a business role but there is a lot of value, I think, you can add around that. So to me coming in here, I started to look at what are the functions we did and one of the things that seems to me that we were very technical. We were really good policy people, so we were good ‘people policemen’ who said no to a lot of things but, in fact, your role [as an accountant] is not to say no. Your role is to be a strategic enabler to the business. The business should come to you to seek expert advice and guidance. You should be helping them grow their business sustainably. You should be adding value to them so that if you say no they will understand that it is not YOU saying no. They will understand because you are actually providing them a way through a very complex legal environment.

The above example shows how certain forces can take accountants out of their original field. These forces are changing accountants and their function, position and thus profession, for the practices of accountability. One of the forces is the introduction of a

153 risk-based approach on the agenda through the PGPA framework. However, the State of the Service Report for 2013-1421 has identified some institutional forces as barriers to effective risk management practice such as organisational culture, capability and intellectual capital. When resources are limited, particularly after the global financial crisis, public sector organisations find it more urgent to make intelligent choices based on risk and performance to improve accountability. Therefore, the role of accountants is to help others to make these intelligent choices by balancing between risk and accountability. This new approach to accountability is changing accountants’ roles and the ways in which they are perceived to be doing their accountability. However, improving the balance between risk management and compliance box ticking cannot be achieved by adding new checks and balance. It requires a change in objectives, goals, culture, capability and real practical action. For example, the senior finance manager continued: I think that the challenge is people understanding the balance, the balance between performance and conformance. I think that the CFO role to a large degree is to help the organisation balance performance and conformance and create space for innovation. Therefore, I do think there has been a change in this area. The government clearly wants to change it. They want to make it more streamlined, more effective and more efficient.

The CFO/Senior financial management functions and position are changing in this space. For that matter, senior accountants are losing their capital in the social spaces. Organisations are changing focus from professional accountants to strategic partners. Organisations still want professional accountants, but they want someone who is not only technically sound in accounting, budgeting or managing finance, but who can also be a strategic partner with the top management team in running the organisation. Highlighting the changes for accountants’ function and position, a CFO commented: One of the things that can happen when you think about the role of the CFO in the industry since, for instance, the 1990’s it was essentially based around budget management, tax advice and expenditure reporting. Since the G.F.C. in 2008 more and more C.E.Os started to look to their CFOs as their strategic partner who can provide advice about growth, about opportunity in industry, not so much anymore necessarily just about budgets and financial accuracy, So I think [our organisation] took a view too… that said… they wanted it to move from a very narrow field. Once upon a time this role really only ever did finance. Now it does finance, it does procurement, it does contracts, it does accounts, it does property, you see, so more and more all those high-risk high-

21 See http://www.apsc.gov.au/about-the-apsc/parliamentary/state-of-the-service/state-of-the-service- 2013-14 154

integrity areas are starting to come under the CFO role for thinking about business strategies that you need to deploy and run it as a business not as an accounting shop.

From this perspective, accounting has moved beyond its original space of accountants and the accounting profession and permeated other social spaces. In these processes, accounting became part of economic rationality (doxa) in the public sector field (Pusey, 1991), and thus people do not see it as economic accounting logic. Other field participants now think, talk and act as an accountant, and it became part of their body hexis and thus, both mental and physical dispositions (Bourdieu, 1977, 2004). That is why, when asked about the role of accounting, non-accountants could not see much of accounting and calculative rationality in their everyday practices of accountability. When asked how you do your accountability, people used accounting vocabularies in describing their daily practices of accountability, terms such as annual reports, budgets, PBS, balance, surplus, and bottom-line.

8.4 Conclusion In this chapter, I analyse why the accounting habitus became the accountability doxa in the public sector field. In doing so, I identify the configurations and distributions of capitals (social and symbolic capital) in the field through analysing field participants’ practices of accountability. From this analysis, I show the ways in which different capitals compete with each other in the contested field of power and politics. I also show that accounting has become symbolic capital, but accountants and the accounting profession are not in the public sector field. While accounting ideas accumulated a substantial amount of symbolic capital, the accountants and accounting profession lost capital. The chapter also reveals that accountability has become compliance with accounting. The processes through which accounting knowledge and expertise become capitals have showed that non-accountants have picked up and used accounting as well as accountants use it. Field participants have internalised the accounting habitus, which thus became the doxa of the social spaces. Therefore, according to Broadbent and Laughlin (2013), accounting ideas or logics do not exclusively belong to accountants.

I have found that the practices of accountability in the public sector field are all about financial management, management control and financial information. The management

155 control system is set up to get financial information to the central agencies, particularly Finance, so that they can analyse what is going on in the field and give timely advice to the government of the day. Because accounting logic and its technologies can provide this kind of financial information, and management control for that information, of the kind required by Finance or other central agencies, they kept introducing management control systems supported by accounting systems and compliance mechanisms. The literature review (chapter 2) identified that there was an increase in the usage of the accounting technologies of financial accounting for compliance and management control purposes. Moreover, the use of accounting technologies has substantially increased due to NPM type reforms. However, there has not been empirical evidence that shows how powerful actors introduced those reforms to instil management controls for more financial information.

The requirements for information, to be able to prepare advice for central government agencies, have introduced legislation and frameworks that require more and more compliance activities based accounting logic and systems. There is ample evidence to suggest that, every time there was a reform, there was a new set of reporting and compliance requirements introduced for public sector organisations. That is both the cause and consequence of financial accountability, which has squeezed out other forms of accountability from this social space. The central agencies are accountable to the government of the day to provide quality advice based on evidence. In turn, the central agencies are making other agencies accountable for information that they need to discharge their accountability to the government. The whole of government advice depends on the information from lower levels of the organisations. Accounting information fits the criteria because it can be controlled from a distance though individualising/hierarchical accountability. This is because it is taken for granted that accounting and its technologies provide objective information about the space where organisations operate. In this way, accounting becomes valuable, and in turn becomes the symbolic capital in the social spaces.

With the proliferation of the financial control systems based on an accounting logic and its technologies, financial or managerial accountability becomes the habitus of this place by pushing out public accountability because everybody needs to do accounting in order

156 to report accountability. Accounting satisfies the information needs of the machinery of government, and everyone takes it for granted as a way of doing accountability in the public sector. Accounting becomes more powerful, and accumulates further symbolic capital, because it provides symbolic transparency, and people misrecognise transparency as accountability. In this process, accounting became a vehicle for transparency, and these two notions reinforce each other in the social spaces, while they create a new accountability space dominated by accounting logic and technologies. This is because accountability is driven through transparency and transparency is driven through accounting. This is an example of how habitus reinforces doxa, and in turn, how doxa reinforces habitus in the public sector field.

Bourdieu’s theoretical tools help to understand the field specific relationships and its effect on the field, habitus and capital. Moreover, it shows how accounting not only constructs and organises social spaces, but also creates hierarchy, functions and institutions, and the process of doing accountability in those social spaces. It also shows what forces put accounting into motion and how accounting put accountability into motion in this space. It also shows how accounting functions to connect different social spaces by working as a relationship between accountability and the public sector. However, accounting’s constitutive role does not always make things visible, but sometimes makes things invisible, such as the relationship between accountability, management control and power. However, we need to move beyond the taken-for- granted transparency processes and move towards the intelligent transparency advocated by Roberts (2009). This study argues that the PGPA Act is a step in that direction, in order to provide intelligent information through transparency, rather than symbolic information by causing symbolic and ethical violence to public servants (Bourdieu, 1990).

Accountability should always be about cost vs. benefit, not just one side of the equation, which is the cost. The recent “less is more” austerity, particularly in the public sector, takes this view for granted by over emphasising economics in the cost cutting in public sector services. In the name of accountability, this excessive focus on the cost side of the equation recently became political imperatives from both sides of politics based on economic rationality and public choice theories. In this process, cutting costs could be

157 cutting the public value/benefit of something that is more significant than the short-term costs saving. The entire practical logic is becoming cost driven in the public sector. Therefore, this analysis shows that the challenge for the public sector in the near future is how to better measure accountability for performance in terms public benefits in a more meaningful way so that they can properly compare public costs with public benefits. Generally in the private sector it is opposite where they look at the bottom line, so it is all about how much profit their businesses are making at the end of the day in dollars terms. However, in the public sector, this equation does not fit the business model, as the whole idea of creating public benefit for government is not based on a profit model.

The analysis of this chapter finds that accountability has become an annual ritual because the accounting reporting cycle is annual. The thing we seem to take for granted is that people only have to be accountable once a year and so people are focused on the accountability mechanisms, through either the annual budget or the annual report. The idea that public servants are accountable once a year seems to be strongly embodied in the Public Service habitus. The continuous disclosure requirement does not apply to Public Service Departments, which appears to be taken-for-granted. The analysis also shows that the practices of accountability have become something that they are not, as accounting is not accountability and accountability is not accounting (Roberts, 2010; Cooper and Johnston, 2012). This analysis shows that accountability has mostly become compliance.

Following on from this, I suggest that accountability measures have to be built into everyday work processes and practices of an organisation to achieve its goals for the public benefit or impact. Therefore, accountability cannot be taken-for-granted as something separate from the organisation or the context in which it operates. However, since accountability has become accounting with a management control focus, management is using it as a tool to control and manage organisations and the interests of powerful actors. As a consequence, management demands large financial reports in the name of accountability, and in changing the goal posts in the name of accountability, management imposes enormous burdens on the actual operational staff, which can be seen as Bourdieu’s (1990) symbolic violence, Roberts (2009) ethical burden, and

158

Hood's (2010) blame game. Therefore, accountability is weakened and made a part of the management control psychology or ethos. The danger of accountability becoming a management control tool is that, once management decides that something is a ‘good idea’, it becomes accountability, and it becomes an end in itself.

In summary, in this chapter, I show accountability not as an absolute concept, but a function of individual actions and institutional forces, where accounting were deployed and used as a strategic resource in these practises. This study finds that accountability has multiple aspects, multiple levels, and multiple ways of being practiced. However, the dominant way of doing accountability is through the accounting habitus. This chapter shows how accounting becomes symbolic capital and how the key players use this symbolic capital to manage the social spaces. In particular, this study illustrates how those compliance activities for feedback, financial reporting, and audit dominate the accountability processes. In documenting these processes, it reveals that accounting plays a significant role in the competition or struggle between social spaces in defining accountability. Despite considering different aspects of accountability in various social spaces, this chapter finds that accounting logic and accounting technologies are operating and dominating in all social spaces. These processes have revealed that accounting logic and calculative technologies are used to legitimise symbolic claims over accountability and, in turn, accountability reinforces symbolic practices of accounting. The next chapter ties the themes emerging from this and earlier chapters together to explore the role of accounting logic (accountinization of accountability) in the context an NPM type reform in the APS.

159

CHAPTER NINE

NPM, ACCOUNTINIZATION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PERFORMANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

9.1 Introduction This chapter analyses the relationship between accountability and accounting in the context of NPM type public sector reform. In particular, this chapter examines the latest NPM type reform: the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) in the Australian Public Sector (APS). This chapter builds on the preceding chapters to highlight how accounting became symbolic capital and doxa in the practices of accountability. In doing so, it provides evidence of the “accountinization” or “accountability for accounting logic” claim in the NPM theorisation literature in the public sector accounting research. This chapter explores the construction of the PGPA Act as the primary accounting and accountability framework for the public sector organisations. The PGPA Act is analysed in terms of governance, performance measurement and risk management. In particular, the role of accounting technologies of both financial and management accounting are explored for the practices of accountability. This analysis shows how accounting can change the regimes of accountability and configuration of the social space, and how simultaneously structural forces can change the accounting technologies for the practices of accountability.

Existing compliance focused input/output and outcome/programme models have failed to produce quality performance information for good governance in practice. These input/output models overemphasized a compliance approach to risk and were ineffectively integrated with the risk management concerning goal ambiguity and understandings of public benefits. New developments emphasise that performance is more than financial, and addresses the inadequacy of a system that required quantitative key performance indicators for each government programme. This is a move beyond treating government as a simple system, which valued financial reporting in isolation and added a financial accountability framework. There needs to be a system to measure what government entities are contributing to improving accountability for performance

160 in achieving the public benefit. The current changes have the potential to drive a new integration of risk, performance and accountability. However, the implementation details remain unclear.

This chapter examines the development of the Public Sector Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 and the role of accounting (financial and management) in that process. In the literature, a claim has been made that NPM type reforms drive and at the same time are driven by accounting based notions of outcomes, efficiency, effectiveness for measuring government performance and accountability (Power and Laughlin, 1992; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Hood, 1995; Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al. 2009; Funnell et al., 2012). Moreover, accountability is widely viewed as significant for public sector governance and performance measurement (Broadbent et al., 1999; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). Moreover, one of the arguments is that the practices of governance and performance in the public sector have been built on the notion of accountability (Pallot, 1992; Lapsley, 2008; Jacobs, 2015). This study seeks to join these two conversations, by arguing that existing compliance focused financial accounting models have failed to produce quality performance information to inform the practice of good governance.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 9.2 presents the relationships between accountability, accounting and NPM reforms. Section 9.3 presents an analysis of the development of the NPM reform – the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013. Following this, section 9.4 discusses accountability for performance. Section 9.5 presents accounting technologies for both financial and management accounting, and their influence on accountability in the public sector. Following this, section 9.6 concludes the chapter by discussing the themes that emerged from the analysis.

9.2 Accountability, Accounting and NPM Reforms In the literature, performance assessment, reporting and auditing have been emphasised as being essential for increasing confidence in public sector governance and accountability (Parker and Guthire, 1993; Guthire and Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Parker and Gould, 1999; Parker et al., 2008). Not surprisingly, most of the research and

161 discussions of performance in the public sector have been built around the notion of good governance and accountability (Barrett, 2014a). However, there has been a growing criticism of compliance and audit focused performance management practices within the public sector globally (Guthire and English, 1997; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Power, 2007; Hood, 2010). Moreover, there is a call to improve accountability through greater use of performance assessment, for feed-forward purposes supported by risk management processes (Kloot and Martin, 2000; Lapsley, 2008; Jacobs, 2015). Therefore, these issues need to be addressed if the Australian developments are to drive real value and performance improvements. Insight into these developments therefore provides value, both to practitioners reflecting on the challenges of public sector performance measurement and academics interested in the practice and development of performance measurement as part of contemporary public sector reform.

Furthermore, there is growing criticism of compliance focused accountability practices, and the argument about the need for a greater role for effective governance and performance measurement practices within the public sector setting, which is not yet well understood. Therefore, to be able to comprehend the quality of governance and performance measurement practices that are now built in to the public sector business models, it is important to understand the practices of accountability ‘on the ground’. In doing so, this study of the practices of accountability within the public sector is valuable to both academics and practitioners.

While considerable resources have been devoted to the development of public sector performance frameworks, both in Australia and globally, most of the existing approaches have failed to deliver meaningful performance assessment. Moreover, these attempts have increased compliance activities through reporting, evaluation, and audit motivated by feedback and blame shifting (Power, 2007; Hood, 2010). However, these compliance-focused models have failed to deliver public benefit and interest. A senior public servant commented: We are moving now towards a more principles-based framework and that principle includes accountability so rather than being told to undertake particular tasks now, it is behavioural based and based on principles to achieve accountability. I think the new framework still has prescriptive elements but largely it is a hangover from the old framework, and I think they will be addressed over time.

162

These models have overemphasized the compliance approach over risk management, and been ineffectively integrated the risk management of goal ambiguity with a cause- effect understanding. The analyses show that the reform in the APS emphasises that performance is more than just financial, and addresses the inadequacy of an accountability system that required quantitative key performance indicators (KPIs) for each government program. The analyses find that this is a move beyond treating government as a simple system, which valued financial reporting in isolation but remained stuck in a reductionist financial accountability framework. However, this study argues that there needs to be a system to measure what government entities are contributing in achieving public benefit and interest. The analysis of this chapter shows that the current changes have the potential to drive accountability through the integration of good governance, risk, performance and accounting technologies of both financial and management accounting.

9.3 The Development of NPM reform (The PGPA Act) In Australia, performance measurement for efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector re-emerged as an issue in 2010, when the government recommended reform of the current financial accountability framework. This reform built upon the findings of the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR). The CFAR found that while the existing financial framework had a strong focus on financial accountability, there was little consideration given to achieving the objectives of government programs or the quality of performance monitoring and reporting. When initiating this reform Finance Department claimed that the policy and principles underlying the new framework will increase accountability. Finance further argues that the reform requires extending current reporting mechanisms across budget appropriations, portfolio budget statements and the performance accountabilities provided in agencies’ annual reports. In promoting this perspective, Finance suggests that published information in annual reports should make the flow of financial information simple and easy to compare against planned versus actual performance when it comes to government spending.

The legislative basis for this new framework in contained in the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) and the associated Public

163

Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 201422, while the current process is currently described as being at stage 3 in the implementation process (stage 1 being the completion of the framework, stage 2 improving the quality of planning, performance monitoring, evaluation, transparency and accountability of the public service and stage 3 enhancing the interaction of the Government with external parties). From this perspective, the implementation of the internal process is now substantially complete.

In practice, measuring accountability for performance in achieving public benefit is a complicated and challenging exercise in much of the public sector field. In Australia, this development has almost 40 years of history, with to the many models of performance management reforms initiated and tested in other countries. For example, the UK National Health Service (NHS) has introduced a performance assessment framework and deployed a range of instruments. In Australia, there were some reforms in the 1980s attempting to improve accountability of government entities, based on reporting business and policy goals, and the performance assessment focus shifted from input to outcome measures. In 1999-2000, a new outcomes and outputs framework required government entities to report intended results and actual performance in the Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS). Subsequent to that, in 2008, Operation Sunlight and the Murray Review sought to reconstruct and re-organise the outcomes/outputs framework by improving the openness and transparency of public sector performance and financial management.

In 2009-2010, this outcomes/outputs framework was re-developed towards outcomes/programs framework, by bringing together pre-emptive program objectives and actual program outcomes in order to compare, assess and report program level performance (A.N.A.O., 2011). As a result, program level performances were measured by 3,500 key performance indicators (KPIs), which are neither efficient nor effective in reporting the result from program level to government level outcomes (A.N.A.O., 2013). Moreover, there was no single overarching framework for coherent performance management across government entities. Consequently, performance information across entities and whole-of-government levels are not consistent, and there was no clear ‘line of sight’ between appropriation, actions and results. In 2010-2012, the Commonwealth

22 See https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014L00911 164

Financial Accountability Review (CFAR) identified areas of reform to improve performance information by developing a mandatory and uniform framework to address the existing criticisms: Some methodological, conceptual and operational criticisms of the existing performance framework have been identified. These criticisms have been highlighted over time by the ANAO and the Parliament’s JCPAA. The National Commission of Audit was also critical of the existing performance framework. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, p. 11)

From that perspective, existing performance management processes failed to produce the desired results in practice, particularly when activities involve multiple periods and entities. KPIs were at too high a level and poorly defined, with a disproportionate focus on input/output rather than outcomes. Therefore, the new framework is timely and relevant: No reforms have yet succeeded in embedding a performance focus in the workings of the Commonwealth public sector as a whole. While there are individual Commonwealth entities that do provide examples of better practice that others could aspire to, there is scope for improvement at a whole-of- government level. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, p. 10)

Review and restructure of the Australian system can be seen as a response to this growing complexity, and the desire to simplify and streamline an existing compliance focused approach. While the proposals were presented as a development and evolution of existing performance frameworks, they also signalled change that would integrate, streamline and rationalise existing approaches. In particular, the intention was to integrate the corporate plan, the budget statement and the annual report, and to align KPIs more clearly within that framework. One of the ideas to develop from this discussion was the notion of earned autonomy, where monitoring and oversight arrangements could be adjusted to reflect the risks associated with particular government agencies. A senior public servant highlighted the inadequacy of the previous framework: I think under the FMA Act, because of the rules based accountability mechanisms, its accountability was highly prescribed. Therefore, public servants just did what they were told to do and one of the things that are an interesting difference between the implementation for those under the F.M.A Act versus those under the CAC Act. Those under the CAC Act, the new framework has changed a lot less for them but culturally the CAC bodies were used to making decisions, used to making judgement calls on things. The F.M.A's were more used to being told what to do and how to do things, so not

165

thinking for themselves necessarily. That is a result of the highly prescribed environment in which they operated. So they are finding it a lot more difficult in this new world of actually saying, "No, hang on. You have to make a call. Many people are saying in the F.M.A, ‘No, you just tell me what I need to do, and I'll do it’.

Due to diverse stakeholders, multiple portfolios and their interdependencies for generating performance information, current practices have resulted in high-level quantitative information being taken-for-granted as the most important indicators. In turn, the existing performance reporting has led to compliance and financial reporting activities. The new framework encourages going beyond this orthodoxy, by challenging the taken-for-granted assumptions, to enhance quality by allowing entities to tell a performance story, as a senior public servant described: Performance was never measured under the CAC Act or FMA Acts. Both the CAC and the F.M.A Acts were entirely focused on accounting for expenditure, they were never accountability for performance. There were things in your annual report, which had the KPIs, but there has been huge amount of research in how effective the KPIs have been over years, which found no positive a result.

The performance story, under the new framework, will entail entities’ goals, resources, environment and risk management processes as part of their four-year corporate plans. However, a cultural shift like this will take time to embed in the practices of performance reporting. The APS is a complex system full of interdependencies in its public policy implementation and program delivery, where multiple agencies are involved at different levels of government. It is hard to come up with a simple and coherent performance narrative that will reflect everyone’s performance.

Commonwealth entities are now required to report KPIs in their corporate plans and annual performance statements at the end of each year, in addition to the Annual Reports and Portfolio Budget Statement (PBS). The framework requires government entities to specify the performance measurement tools and/or approaches that they would use to assess each of their programs (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, p. 73). The main objectives of these elements are to improve performance planning for outcomes through non-financial performance reporting. A public servant described how: One of the things that are one of the major between two major changes, that have come in to the P.G.P.A Act other than those duties is a focus on performance and a focus on risk. Therefore, they were very deliberate changes. 166

So in the context of this prescription that previously was there what we're saying now, is that it is up to the accountable authority to run their entities, it is up to them to look at the risk associated with certain activities and allocate resourcing according to that risk rather than us prescribing a one size fits all for all entities. Really what you do, as soon as you prescribe, a one size fits all, you actually move the ability for individual entities to drive efficiencies within their organisations, you remove the ability for them to - to a certain extent - operate innovatively and be able to innovate. So really what we're trying to do is say to them that yes, there are these underlying principles but you need to make a judgement based on the risks and it might be that certain things that you do, for example, will reduce the risk.

To create the line of sight across different performance measurement tools and reporting documents, what is proposed are as follows (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, p. 13): (a) corporate plan as the principal planning and operational document would closely align to the governance and accountability information in the annual reports; (b) annual reports would be the principal performance-reporting document which would include annual performance statements with non-financial information; (c) PBS as the principal resource management and accountability document would focus on KPIs.

It is clear that issues of risk management are more clearly recognised in the framework. Entities are required to follow the Commonwealth Risk Management Policy to support the entity-specific risk management system and controls (section 16 of the PGPA Act)23. However, the concept of earned autonomy remains ambiguous. There has been a reduction in required business processes and greater flexibility around how government entities are managed. However, the link between risk and earned autonomy is unclear. In practice, this seems to focus on differential control rather than differential reporting and the existing ‘compliance orientated’ approaches to financial reporting and external stakeholders still dominate. Further work is needed to elaborate the notion of earned autonomy and what it means by accountability for performance (Newberry, 2015). Therefore, the issue of risk needs to be more fully considered in the context of performance measurement, outcomes and control, if the framework is to drive performance rather than increase reporting of risk information for compliance purposes.

23 See https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013A00123 167

9.4 Accountability for Performance While the ANAO supported KPIs in mandatory corporate plans, it strongly argued for performance information to remain in the PBS according to its best practice guide. However, some Commonwealth entities criticised the duplication of performance reporting in PBS and corporate plans (J.C.P.A.A., 2015). The argument was that the proposed emphasis on performance reporting in corporate plans, annual performance reports, and PBS puts greater emphasis on further compliance activities. This may result in an excessive emphasis on performance activities dominated by compliance reporting. Moreover, performance information should articulate planned objectives and the impact on public benefit and interest, based on entity-specific risk management processes. Only then is it possible to develop a clear view of performance information that fits the complex public sector environment and its multiple relationships. However, the new framework is not clear on how to integrate performance reporting with risk reporting.

The following analysis shows that due to diverse stakeholders, multiple portfolios and their interdependencies for generating performance information, the practices of accountability for performance have resulted in high-level quantitative information being taken-for-granted. In turn, the existing performance reporting has led to compliance and financial reporting activities. The new framework encourages going beyond this orthodoxy, by challenging taken-for-granted assumptions, to enhance quality by allowing entities to tell a performance story.

A story of accountability for performance in achieving public benefit, under the PGPA framework, will entail entities’ goals, resources, environment and risk management processes as part of their four-year corporate and strategic plans. However, a cultural and procedural shift like this will take time to embed in the practices of performance measuring and reporting. The Commonwealth is a multifaceted structure full of interdependencies in its public policy implementation and program delivery, where multiple agencies are involved at different levels of government. It is hard to come up with a simple and coherent performance story that will reflect everyone’s performance. Therefore, the new model needs to strike the correct balance between the emphasis placed on financial and non-financial information.

168

In developing this framework, performance reporting should address a realistic time/periods. There is a need to break the cycle of 12-month performance reporting to move beyond the input/output model. It may take many years for a government program to deliver its impact. Therefore, the practices of performance reporting need to be ongoing and continuous rather than either short-term or fixed-term in focus. The new framework recognises these issues and allows differential performance measurements to be undertaken during the lifecycle of government activities. For that matter, four-year performance plans and associated performance reporting are move beyond annual reporting orthodoxy. For instance, the first year may only have simple initial measurement, the fourth or fifth year will have solid information about take-up rates, and the tenth or fifteenth year will have reliable data on outcomes and impact measurements. This means any single year’s results need to be looking back over multiple years. This shift will help to bridge the time gap between short-term and long- term, and move to progressive performance assessment practices rather than regressive measures. To do so, there is a need for intermediate impact/outcome assessment and reporting practices (Barrett, 2014b).

During 2015, the Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit conducted a hearing into the Commonwealth Performance Framework as reflected by the PGPA Act. Jacobs’ (2015a) submission was critical of the historical approach, suggesting that the Commonwealth Performance Framework inadequately integrated issues of risk and uncertainty and tended to overemphasise a compliance approach to risk, focusing on likely events of relative low significance and ignoring events which, while being less likely, might be of greater importance. Jacobs (2015a) also argued that many of the historical approaches to public sector performance measurement represent an over-simplified application of private sector techniques to the public setting. While the mission objective for the private sector is relatively clear (profit), the mission for public sector entities is multifaceted and rather complex. Therefore, before addressing performance measurement, there needs to be clarity and agreement on the nature of the mission objective. This is particularly true when the outcome objective involves the work of multiple entities. Therefore, the first and critical risk is mission ambiguity.

169

The relationship between inputs, process and outputs is rarely clear or fully understood. Therefore, any implementation process needs to recognise a degree of uncertainty and a need for learning. Concerns over reputational risk (Power, 2007) and tendencies towards blame shifting rather than performance improvement (Hood, 2010) substantially undermine the potential value of existing performance management processes. From this perspective, Jacobs (2015a) recommends: (a) shift towards entity- specific performance reporting based on risk management perspectives; (b) shift towards program specific performance reporting which aligns with the objectives at entity or cross-entity level; (c) move to progressive measures rather than regressive measures; (d) move to operationally focused management accounting from compliance focus financial reporting. Therefore, as described by a senior public servant, core elements of the output/outcome model need to be revisited if the objective is to enhance accountability for performance: PGPA Act is new changes in public service... I guess Department of Finance is trying to widening their 'span of control' from just being around pure financial management; they are now looking at and including 'performance management' as well. Moreover, they are also entering into other areas of 'resource management' and 'risk management'. However, they've put it off for a year because they do not have the 'performance frameworks' in place yet to implement it. So I guess they're trying to drive new thinking and behaviours... this had been going on since 1992 when they did their 'National Commission of Audit' back in 1996, so its nothing new but just trying to repackage. But the 'performance management for policy' or 'risk management for policy based areas' is always tricky. Therefore, it's, like that, how do you know if a policy area is doing well or not? It's a difficult and complex area.

9.5 Accounting for Accountability

While the changes in the PGPA legislation have the potential to improve accountability for performance, there is a need to look for information beyond financial and quantitative perspectives, and shift to performance stories or narratives. However, there needs to be a balance between financial and non-financial performance information because of the compound nature of the public sector activities and performance assessment practices. To move forward, a shift from compliance focused financial accounting to operation-focused management accounting is necessary, as described by most of the public servants as captured by the following three quotes: In terms of accountability, If I am accountable for making sure I spend the dollars right then I need very objective data on that, but if I’m accountable for an 170

outcome, an outcome that might be more informed decisions, then I think you need to have some subjective measures in that.

Department of Finance is trying, but they are just struggling to get the balance right between financial and non-financial information together. However, this is probably a step in the right direction to try to get the balance right, because that is what you want in APS.

Department of Finance is no longer just looking at finances and numbers; they are looking at finance in the specific context of performance. Therefore, that is a challenge but trying to get the balance to how they approach things now, which may be good in the end.

The above quotes provide convincing evidence that accounting measures for performance assessment and reporting dominated in the public sector. The qualitative performance assessments such as KPIs were based on accounting logic and its financial accounting technologies. This is an example of how accounting can change the practical logic of accountability. However, the discussion shows that accountants need to adopt a new habitus to be able to tell narrative or qualitative stories alongside the numbers. Therefore, qualitative information is something that accountants need to work on. Consistent with Broadbent et al. (1999) and Roberts (1991, 1996), individualising and socialising forms of accountability can be adopted as a framework for accountability for performance information. For example, such a framework would be able to provide quality information on whether a program is providing an appropriate level of support for aged care, number of complaints and instances of abuse of the elderly. One of the areas that needs to develop in the organisation is setting up a new data exchange process between financial accounting and management accounting. That model will be able to extract service providers data from different parts of the service sector, and then correlate and benchmark it so that it will promote better qualitative analysis for strategic decision making. Therefore, management accounting has the potential to fill the gap between financial and non-financial information. A public servant told me that otherwise this reform will revert to the previous forms of compliance based financial accounting and reporting activities, which will undermine accountability in the public sector: A corporate plan that we must account to, and K.P.Is. In some agencies it might be duplicating their corporate plans, or their annual reports or whatever, but that’s why it’s called the Performance and Accountability Act. This will be the principal document by which agencies need to report their performance and 171

show their accountability against the money they were given to spend. This will be the primary document. So I think over time the other documents that have maybe...develop at the agency level might need to change a little bit, so you don’t duplicate, because it should be one document that has public accountability primarily. And then the others are really just additional information and evidence.

It is all about changing the doxa in the field, that is the PGPA Act changes thinking from being just about bottomline numbers. In other words, it is that accountability for performance in the public sector is not just about the financial numbers. The nature and role of the public sector suggests that there are also qualitative arguments that need to be put forward to make strategic decisions for future government programs and interventions. This is an entirely new shift to focus on non-financial information aspects of performance, which challenges the accountability doxa in the field and requires a change of habitus of participants on the ground through education, training and wider discourse. Therefore, Ahrens (1996) claims of how wider discourses can change the practice on the ground, which is what I believe applies in this case. That is, if the wider academic and practice discourse can be modified, about the notion of accountability, then the practices of accountability will follow. The new model will provide a holistic form of accountability for public servants and will change what it means to be accountable in this space (Oakes et al., 1998). This is succinctly captured by the following quote by a public servant: Let’s look at asylum seekers, you know is it a right thing to squash them all onto Christmas Island and spend less money, or do you spend a bit more and bring them to mainland? Now that is a value-laden debate. I linked it to the accountants; I think when we moved to accrual accounting the accountants took over too much and it became very much about dollars. I think it trend is stopping slowly. I think what people are seeing now is that government is about more than just dollars. So, and for better or worse, the current debates in the Senate around the budget, I think are largely around let’s understand the dollars, and let’s understand the financial implications better before we just do silly little dollar things, because we want to balance the budget. But who is going to balance the costs vs. benefits? You know, sometimes it is OK to go beyond just the bottom-line or financial numbers.

The above quote is very provocative. It suggests a move from expense/cost centric and accounting dominated accountability habitus to values/benefits centric accountability habitus. These changes are important, because some developments through wider discourse like that are very helpful for the practices of accountability.

172

9.6 Conclusion In summary, I argue in this chapter that the PGPA Act is bringing new ideas to the practices of accountability, with a new focus on performance and risk management. Therefore, they have been very deliberate and positive changes to the processes in which accountability is practised in public sector organisations. The previous frameworks have taken ‘one size fits all for all’ approaches for granted in public sector organisations. As soon as it was prescribed that one size fitted all, it removed the ability for individual organisations to drive efficiencies within their organisational practices. However the PGPA is trying to say to the organisations that, these are these underlying principles, but they need to make a judgement call based on the performance goal they want to achieve and the risk they want to bear. It is bringing the basic management accounting relationship between risk and return into the everyday practices of accountability for performance. A senior public servant explained: I think risk and risk management have always been an element of the Public Service. The PGPA Act is just putting a clean public face on it so that it is much more transparent, and that is the big accountability side of this. This Act saying that as an agency spending public money you are not only responsible for your budget, but you must be accountable for how you perform, and the public needs to be able to see that, and the risks that you are managing. Therefore, we are now referred to as ‘accountable authorities’ for that reason. They are setting the principles with some guidance, so there are some mandatory reporting fields that we will have to incorporate.

I argue that control is required over the availability of quality information and its flows, as to make strategic decisions people need quality and forward looking information. Therefore, information intensive organisations set up management control processes, because without proper information flow, management cannot analyse what is happening, and people resort to controlling things. I argue that there is a disconnection, or broken link, between accountability theory and practice.

The PGPA Act is a move in the right direction. It is moving from excessive financial accounting to management accounting through the discussions of performance and risk management. Financial accounting cannot contribute a lot to understanding the performance of the public sector, as bottom-line measures are not helpful. At the same time, financial accounting cannot help much with the risk management practices because it cannot provide strategic information about the organisational business

173 models and operations. It is time to move beyond taken-for-granted and compliance focused financial accounting to an operationally focused management accounting. For accounting and accountability for performance, public sector organisations need to understand their better operations. To do that, they need to break things down into core activities and organise performance reporting against those activities.

This new public sector reform or the financial management framework has created space for both public sectors and private sector organisations in terms of practising accountability by improving governance and performance (Barrett, 2014a). However, at the same time it is important to understand the self-evident claims of such reforms, and recognise that stakeholders in the public sector are diverse, with varied and often competing interests, which is why the public sector requires a field-specific governance, performance and accountability framework (Broadbent, 2013). Moreover, it was argued, drawing from the experiences of many NPM type reforms based on accounting and auditing technologies, that the technical difficulties of performance measurement in the public sector makes the implementation of any financial management reform challenging in practice (Lapsley, 2008). Therefore, the timeliness and value of this research for both public servants and academics are important for understanding public sector accountability, governance, and performance.

Consistent with Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin (1999), the evidence presented in this study suggests that financial accounting provides individualising accountability experience and management accounting has the potential to provide socialising accountability experience. This research also found that the role financial accounting plays is compliance-focused and backward looking and the role management accounting plays is forward-looking. On one level, financial accounting is limited to assessing and managing accountability for performance, which is complex and ambiguous in the public sector context. On another level, even though management accounting works as a tool for management control, it has potential to provide the opportunity for socialising accountability. This study argues that management accounting needs to turn to processes and practices to focus more on outputs and impact rather than inputs (Modell et al., 2007).

174

The existing input/output models of management accounting have failed to take the process turn as suggested by Modell et al. (2007) because of an excessive compliance focus supported by financial accounting. Existing financial accounting frameworks have taken-for-granted governmental system under a single simple metric, and encouraged “accountability for processes through excessive compliance” rather than “accountability for performance through impact”. Therefore, accounting practices for performance measurement have focused on compliance logic and financial accountability, rather than linking it to the impact of public benefit and interest through management accounting.

By contrast, management accounting and non-financial information played a marginal and supported role. Instead of becoming a practice of supporting strategy formulation, management accounting became reactive and seen as back office operations. During 2015, the Australian Commonwealth Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit conducted a hearing into the Commonwealth Performance Framework as reflected by the PGPA Act 2013. Therefore, before addressing issues of performance measurement, work needs to be done to clarify and agree on the nature of the mission objective. This is particularly true when the outcome objective involves the work of several organisations from multiple levels of government.

While the Australian changes have the potential to improve public sector accountability for performance, there is a need to look for information beyond financial and quantitative perspectives and shift to performance stories or narrative perspectives. However, there needs to be a balance between financial and non-financial performance information because of the political and contested nature of the public sector field. To move forward, a shift from compliance focused financial accounting to operation- focused management accounting is necessary.

The academics and practitioners struggle of which this study has established, is over the definitions and typologies of accountability, because accountability has been mobilised based on the habitus and structures of the social spaces. In other words, the doxic view of accountability is the function of habitus and the social spaces, which allows actors to form a particular view or accept something taken-for-granted as the rule of the game. The doxic adoption of the notions of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the name

175 of accountability is clear evidence of the manifestation of economic and managerial practices due to accounting habitus. The new framework encourages this move with mandatory corporate plans and annual performance statements. However, ongoing work is essential to develop a risk-based culture, which will align with earned autonomy model to improve risk management, cause-effect understanding, and more clearly integrate risk and performance perspectives. Further reflection is required to elaborate and integrate the relationships between earned autonomy, risk management, and accountability for performance. Otherwise, a potential for a pivot move to a strong operational, strategic, and risk-based performance and accountability will be lost.

If this is done, it will change the conversation from feedback to feed-forward information. The new framework encourages this move with mandatory corporate plans and annual performance statements. The discussion on the framework is still open and there is a chance to address practical issues, such as how to learn to deal with risks, which are not clear, such as goal ambiguity and cause-effect understanding. Therefore, ongoing work is essential to develop a risk-based culture, which will align with the earned autonomy model to improve risk management; cause-effect understanding and more clearly integrate risk and performance perspectives. Further reflection is required to elaborate and integrate the relationships between earned autonomy, risk management, and accountability for performance. Otherwise, the potential for a pivot move to a strong operational, strategic, and risk based performance and accountability regime will be lost.

The analysis of this chapter extends the understanding that the notion of “accountinization” has reached its peak, and now public sector accounting needs to develop a new habitus, which will lead to a framework based on accountability. However, on the other side, accountants have expanded their space into performance management and risk management. Previously in the public sector, accountants drove compliance activities with accounting; now they are driving new regimes of performance management and risk management. This chapter has shown how the constitutive role of accounting can change doxa in the social space, and in turn, how structural forces of social space can change accounting habitus. The next chapter ties the themes emerging from this chapter to those developed in earlier chapters, so that

176 conclusions may be drawn about the practices of accountability and the role of accounting in those processes in the public sector.

In summary, this chapter analysed the new NPM type reform in Australian – the PGPA Act. In doing so, it highlighted the major elements of the framework and illustrated the potential limitations and implications for accountability. It highlighted that in the public sector, accountability for performance is complex and multifaceted, and efficiency and effectiveness measures are not always clear. The existing input/output models have failed to improve accountability for performance because of an excessive compliance focus supported by quantitative and financial information. Moreover, the existing accounting frameworks have a taken-for-granted public sector using a single simple metric, which is too simplistic and has encouraged “accountability for processes through excessive compliance” rather than “accountability for performance through impact”. Therefore, existing practices of accountability for performance have mostly focused on compliance and financial accountability, rather than linking it to the accountability for the public benefit.

177

CHAPTER TEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

10.1 Introduction In this chapter, I draw together the major themes of the thesis about the practices of accountability and the role of accounting in those practices in the context of the public sector. In doing so, I also identify the theoretical and empirical contributions of the study to the literature. I then outline limitations of this study and map out the potential directions for future research at the intersection of accountability, accounting and the public sector. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 10.2 summarises the study. Following this, section 10.3 summarises the major findings of this study. Section 10.4 discusses the major contributions to theories and practices of accountability and accounting. In doing so, it draws together the major findings of the study and unpacks the processes in which this research extends our understanding of accountability and the role of accounting. Section 10.5 highlights the study’s limitations and maps out potential directions for future research. The final section 10.6 offers some remarks to conclude the study.

10.2 Summary of the Study In this study, I explore and analyse the practices of accountability in different social, institutional and political contexts of the public sector. More specifically, I examine the practices of accountability in different organisations, professional or functional roles and hierarchical levels and the role of accounting in those practices. The research context I selected is an NPM type example of public sector reform and the research site is the Australian Public Sector (APS). The literature review suggests that the public sector accounting framework is at least partially built on the notion of accountability (Pallot, 1992; Guthrie et al., 1993; Guthrie and Parker, 1993; Guthrie, 1998; Funnell, 2012; Jacobs, 2012, 2015; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). Moreover, the public sector accounting literature, in the context of public sector reform, suggests that there are always struggles between multiple conceptualisations of accountability (Stewart, 1984; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995). Furthermore, the accounting literature also suggests that there are struggles over the different aspects, forms and styles of 178 accountability in different organisational, professional, and individual contexts (Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Sinclair, 1995). Therefore, in the accounting literature, accountability is developing as a contested, complex and to some extent ambiguous concept. This conceptual development is making accountability rhetorical and taken- for-granted in both the literature and practice (Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009). However, one of the main limitations associated with this development is that there is a relatively limited understanding of ‘accountability as practice’. Accordingly, the accounting literature has called for research on the practice of accountability in the public sector accounting and reform context (Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009; Jacobs, 2012, 2015). Therefore, what has been largely missing from the literature was empirical evidence detailing the practices of accountability in social, institutional and political contexts of the public sector. I contend that the understanding of accountability needs to be moved beyond concepts to explore practices.

From that perspective, I argue that the existing literature, to varying degrees, has a number of limitations. First, there are streams of normative and perceptive research, but a lack of research that adequately explores the practices of accountability. Second, there is a paucity of research that adequately explores the role of public sector accounting in the practices of accountability. Third, there is a lack of research that examines the relationship of accounting technologies of both financial and management accounting, as well accountability and public sector reform. Fourth, the existing theoretical frameworks (e.g. agency theory, public choice theory, systems theory) do not comprehensively explain the practices of accountability in the public sector. As well, the dichotomous treatment of the “individual” or the “micro” and the “institutions” or the “macro”, prevalent in the existing theoretical frameworks, limit the analytical power of these frameworks to explain the practices of accountability in different fields. Consequently, I raise questions about the theoretical elements of these concepts of accountability, because they tend to present a struggle between concepts of accountability. In doing so, I aim to make sense of these continuous and consistent struggles to inform academic understanding of accountability in the public sector context. Accordingly, I examine the research problem in different social spaces by analysing individual actions and institutional forces.

179

In chapter one, I give a general overview of the accountability research. In doing so, I provide background information on the study. In doing so, I highlight the growing significance of practice research on accountability in the public sector reform context, and the challenges it poses to both accounting theory and practice. I also summarise research aims, objectives and potential contributions of this study. In chapter two, I analyse the literature on accountability, with a particular focus on public sector reform informed by a range of theoretical perspectives. By discussing the struggles between different aspects, forms, types and styles of accountability, I raised questions about the struggles between different conceptualisation of accountability and the theoretical elements implicit in them. In addition, I discuss the gap between the concepts and the practices of accountability. I conclude the chapter with a proposal for informing academic literature on the practices of accountability by using a practice theory framework.

In chapter three, I developed the framework by drawing on the institutional sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1998). Bourdieu’s work provides the means with which to study accountability as a set of practices within structures and power differentials in the field. Following this, I regard accountability as a social object (i.e. socially constructed concept) and a function of social interactions between individuals, groups and organisations with diverse, self-motivated and often ambiguous interests. One of the important aspects of Bourdieu’s theoretical approach to social phenomenon is that it helps to understand accountability as practice, which is a function of the close intersection of objective and subjective factors, or of structure and agency.

It is important because, in the literature, the existing split between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ oriented work is problematic for understanding accountability as a practice. The literature tends to use ‘micro’ constructivist analysis to inform ‘macro’ structuralist discussion of accountability. Therefore, I draw on Bourdieu’s practice theory elements of habitus, field, capital, strategy, and doxa, which holistically provide the tools to analyse and explain the process of interaction between individual actions (agent) and institutional forces (structures) to bridge the gap between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’. Bourdieu’s theoretical tools recognise both the possibility of individual agency and the structural forces through which accountability practices are constructed in different

180 organisations, professions and hierarchical positions. The literature and practise theory framework lead me to expect that there would be different accountability practices found in different types of government organisations, professional or functional groups and hierarchical positions. I also expect that there would be a struggle between accountants’ habitus and non-accountants’ habitus over the accountability doxa in the field, and because of these struggles, accountants would gain more capital and power in the public sector. Moreover, I expect that the recent public sector reform would reemphasise the strong role of accounting and financial numeracy, and it would drive the struggle between different organisations, professional or functional groups and hierarchical levels. Following on from this, because of their functional accounting knowledge and skills, accountants dominate in all social spaces in the public sector field as previous research suggests.

In chapter four, I explain why I selected the Australian Public Sector (APS) as the research site and public sector reform as the context. The APS embodies the significant elements identified in the literature on accountability. The features of the APS field are important, because they provide the important elements derived from Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, which will help to identify and explore the practised of accountability. I introduced the field study design that informs the sequential research methods, which are consistent with Bourdieu’s social praxeological research approach. The sequential research methods help to carry out a multi phased field study. The first phase involved mapping the field, people and positions, and in the second phase mapping the practice. This helps to compare and contrast what people say about accountability and how people do accountability in practice. I explore and analyse the practices of accountability at three interrelated levels: (a) different types of departments/agencies; (b) different types of professional or functional groups; and (c) different hierarchal positions. I conducted 150 field visits for seven months from July 2004 to January 2015. The field study includes interviews, conversations, observations, focus groups, workshops, seminars, public forums and the collection of archival documents. Altogether 99 public servants from different hierarchical positions and professions or functional groups from 34 organisations across the APS participated in this study, as well as two private sector consultants and two Members of Parliament. The results of the field study are then analysed based on the research questions and

181 analytical framework explicated in chapter three. Five empirical chapters (five, six, seven, eight and nine) resulted from the analysis.

10.3 Summary of Major Findings In this study, the main objective was to explore the practices of accountability and the role of accounting in those practices. To achieve this central objective, I aimed to answer two interrelated questions: how is accountability practiced in the field of the public sector; and what is the role of accounting in those practices in the context of public sector reform. To explain the practices of accountability, I analyse and cross- analyse practices at three levels such as hierarchical positions, professional or functional groups and organisational types. In this section, I address the research questions and summarise the major empirical findings. In other words, in the following I answer the research questions based on the findings of this study. The following discussion is structured around the five analytical chapters.

10.3.1 Key finding from the analysis of the field and practices I constructed a map of the social spaces of the APS. From this field mapping analysis, I identify and present the configurations and structures of the social spaces within the public sector field. In doing so, I followed Bourdieu’s notion of sequential analysis by field mapping (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989). For example, in the field the mapping categorises and presents people, positions, backgrounds and experiences to identify key actors and the key relationships in the public sector field. Moreover, I present the organisational, professional, and hierarchical levels in which field participants are distributed, and locate what type of accountability practice take place, by whom and in what fashion. The data to construct and organise the field map was drawn from 103 interviews with 99 public servants, two private sector consultants and two Members of Parliament. The interviews, conversations, focus groups, observations and documents were analysed to map hierarchical positions, professional or functional groups, education level, work experience in the public sector, work experience in the private sector, recent experience and type of organisation. As a result, I split the public sector hierarchical level in to two broad groups: senior to top (SES to Secretary) and junior to middle (APS to EL). The professional or functional groups are categorised into

182 a few major groups such as accountants, auditors, administrators, lawyers, scientists, policy advisors and program managers. The public sector organisations are then categorised into four broad types; central agencies, line/services agencies, review agencies, and GBE/statutory/prescribed agencies. I found that in the public sector field the practices of accountability take place in different social spaces, which are multiple and interconnected (Funnell et al., 2012). Therefore, the practices in these social spaces cannot be taken for granted, but require further systematic examination. Moreover, the field mapping provided a relational frame or structure to locate practices of accountability in the field of the APS as a whole.

I extend the analysis to the next level, and discuss the ways in which people from different positions, professions and organisations approach and practise accountability. I categorize the practices in nine broad categories: accountability for what, accountability to whom, how accountability is practiced, factors driving accountability practice, internal factors shaping accountability practice, external factors influencing accountability practice, institutional factors affecting accountability, issues of accountability practice and ways to address accountability practice. I provided an account of the practices of accountability in the public sector at the aggregate level and cross-analysed these practices with the people, positions and the social spaces identified in the preceding chapter. For example, I cross-analysed the practices of accountability in relation to the education, background, profession, expertise, current work experience that were identified in chapter five. However, analyses of the practices show that compliance reporting, KPIs assessment and reporting, demonstrating input/output/processes, financial accounting and reporting and reporting to manager or hierarchy are key ways of doing accountability.

While answering the central question of how accountability is practiced in the public sector field, I expected to find that the perceptions and practices of accountability would reflect field participants’ educational background, professional background, professional expertise, length of prior work experience in the private sector, duration of current work experience in the public sector, current position, recent professional expertise and the type of organization they work for. However, I found the relationships between practices and the people and their positions are not homogenous and cannot be

183 taken for granted. For example, the results show that public servants’ dominant understanding of ‘accountability for what’ is strongly associated with their recent work experience and professional background. Moreover, the dominant understanding of ‘accountability to whom’ is strongly associated with the public servants’ prior work experience, recent work experience, current hierarchical positions and the type of organisations they are working in. Furthermore, the dominant understanding of the ‘practices of accountability’ differs between positions, professional or functional roles and type of organisations. The findings suggest that the dominant understanding of accountability is related to field participant’s individual and group habitus, such as recent work experience and professional background. From this perspective, in chapter seven and eight, I extend the investigation to the next level and cross-analyse the practices in different social spaces, such as different hierarchical positions, professional groups and organisations.

10.3.2 Key findings from the practices at the hierarchical level I attempt to answer the question of whether people from different hierarchical positions practice accountability differently. In doing so, I cross-analyse the data at two hierarchical levels: senior and top (SES to Secretary) and junior and middle (APS to EL). The data analyses show that 62% of interviewees experience differences in the practices of accountability in different hierarchal positions, whereas 34% experience no differences and 4% have no background of working in different hierarchical positions. At this vantage point, I thought, I would find differential accountability practices in hierarchical levels as expected from the literature review and theoretical framework. In contrast, what I found is that, at different hierarchical levels, the dominant ways of doing accountability are compliance activities, and there is little difference in the compliance practices across hierarchical levels. However, the evidence further suggests that there is a difference between how senior public servants and junior public servants do their compliance activities. The little difference in the practice correlates with the distance between public servants’ hierarchical positions and the Minister, which demonstrate a relationship between accountability and power differential. The effect of this relationship on the accountability practice is that the Minister likes to over blow its accountability narrative and the assertions of what government of the day can achieve. My view is that, if we think about government’s impact in terms of accountability for

184 outcome mapping and the spheres’ of control, influence and concern; it could be argued that the majority of government activities lie in the sphere of influence. Therefore, the practices of accountability should be calibrated accordingly.

The evidence shows that accountability practices between hierarchical levels are different because junior to middle level public servants’ accountabilities are more task oriented and relatively clearly defined. The guidelines and instructions are clearer on what their targets are and how they can reach their key performance indicators (KPIs). For example, the junior public servants who are processing pension or social benefit claims have frameworks, metrics, guidelines and instructions, which are relatively clear. To some extent, there is a linear relationship between their jobs, tasks and the outcomes being sought, and the operational and political risks are relatively low. I found that the accountability practices of junior to middle level public servants are less fluid and ambiguous because of the nature of the duty statements and the distance between them and the power and politics of the Ministers. Therefore, in practice, the accountability for what is relatively easy for junior to middle level public servants because they do not deal with policies, politics and the power of the government of the day. The findings suggest that accountability is clear at the bottom, because junior to middle level public servants operate in their own public sector field or in an autonomous field, and do not engage with other field such as the field of politics.

On the other hand, accountability practices are ambiguous, complex and multifarious at the senior public servants level because they operate in multiple and across fields. The findings suggest that the senior public servants are in a constant struggle in managing their accountabilities to different fields. The senior public servants’ duties are complex and ambiguous and their objective sets are ‘ill-defined’. The senior public servants are located in multiple fields particularly, the public sector field and the political field. They are also interacting with multiple agencies across jurisdiction for collaboration in terms of provisioning and delivering public service and good. They are also in multiple social spaces such as organisational space, managerial space, professional space and hierarchical space, and each of these spaces have their own silos, culture, structure and leadership. For example, senior public servants work closely with one or more Ministers to assist the government to work through the multiple and competing objectives

185 between the public service and political imperatives. In doing so, senior public servants struggle to manage the power, politics, and bureaucracy of diverse interest groups across the country to get the political, cultural and social balance right. These persistent balancing acts may not necessarily lead to the same conclusion or achieve the same objectives, which in turn creates tensions and struggles in the field. Among all these struggles, there are deliberate ambiguities around what the government of the day wants to achieve for the public and in politics. I find that some of the ambiguities are deliberate and strategic, to serve the purposes of the democratic political process and to manage multiple interests and power differentials.

I find that the public sector field reflects the political process of the democratic Westminster system of government and the influence of Ministers. As a result, there is always a lack of clarity about the hierarchy of objectives and priorities of the multiple fields. Subsequently, because of the nature of the political and bureaucratic fields, the senior public servants’ objectives and priorities of accountability change very quickly, making their practices of accountability more ambiguous and complex. For example, a senior public servant described the Ministers’ priorities focussing on politically high priority programs being implemented well and on time according to the election cycle.

The field of politics where the Ministers are located focuses on the task, but not on how the public servants deliver it to provide public benefits. Therefore, the Ministers’ focus is outward, to deliver things that will get them more capital in their field, and get them elected in the next election. The accountability structure in the political field is all about public servants delivering the advice, delivering the task, and delivering the project on budget and on time. Therefore, since the Ministers want the jobs done, the senior public servants accountability practices are around getting the compliance and risk (reputation) management tasks completed efficiently and effectively. The findings suggest that senior public servants accountability is not fixed, but flexible, agile and responsive, which reflects the influence, power and politics of Minister (political capital). It means that what senior public servants may be held accountable for today might be quite different to what they are held accountable for tomorrow. Therefore, what I found is that the senior public servants’ accountability is related to the nature and interactions of multiple fields, such as the political, the APS and the public, which reflect the contested

186 environment in which they operate on a daily basis. Therefore, I argue that the closer a public servant is to the centre of power (i.e. the relevant Minister), the more malleable, vague and elusive the accountability practice becomes.

10.3.3 Key findings from the practices at the professional group level I also provided a cross-analysis of the practices of accountability by different professional or functional groups. In chapter five, I identified a few major groups from the interview data, and the ways in which the interviewees described their professional background and current functional roles, such as accountants, auditors, lawyers, economists, scientists, policy advisors and program managers. I expected that due to differences in their backgrounds and functional roles the professional groups would practice accountability differently. However, despite my expectation of different accountability practices, I found little difference in the professional or functional groups. I thought that I had found some support to this expectation when 82% of 99 public servants mentioned that they have observed differences in the ways people from different professional or functional groups approach accountability. On the other hand, 15% of public servants experienced no differences and the remaining 4% could not decisively comment on this. This evidence indicates that the difference between the practices of professional or functional groups is in different type of compliance, such as legal, professional or functional. In the end, all types of frameworks, rules and enabling legislations involve compliance activities. The ways in which different professional groups do compliance vary but they perform the same types of compliance. I find that the different professional groups struggle with the ideas and concepts of accountability and the ways in which they do compliance. This is because of their different habitus, which reflects different professional skills and functions. That is, accountability doxa in the public sector field is same but the ways by which different professional or functional groups do it is slightly different. In other word, all professional or functional groups play orthodoxy with the accountability doxa in the public sector field which of compliance and reputational risk management.

The findings suggest that public servants’ specialist education, training, background and current work experience had the greatest influence on the ways in which accountability is understood and approached, but no effect on the compliance activities. For example, 187 non-accountants perceive finance to be all about budget, numbers, statements, procedures and guidelines. However, accountants view them as frameworks, legislations, instructions and processes. Program managers described their accountability practices as being program delivery frameworks, financial budgets and operational deadlines. The policy advisors claimed that they deliver policy advice to Ministers on time, provide Ministerial briefings for question on notice or without notice in Parliament. The lawyers said they do accountability through legal, professional and financial frameworks, rules and guidelines. Therefore, the analyses suggest that these are the differences from their professional or functional perspectives. In terms of accountability, there is a very little difference between the practices. Each professional group has different functions, and therefore require different skill sets, which lead them to approach accountability in each field differently. Therefore, the relationship between their habitus and the structure of the field influences the ways in which accountability is practiced, which is through compliance activities with financial, legal and professional frameworks.

10.3.4 Key findings from the practices at the organisational level The data suggested that the functions and types of organisations are different, which lead to four categories of departments or agencies. As a result, I categorised them as central agencies, line/service agencies, review agencies and GBE/statutory/prescribed agencies. Therefore, I expected to find different accountability practices in different types of government organisations. However, I found little difference in practices across different types of organisations. Despite my expectation of finding differential practices of accountability because of the difference in their proximity to Ministers, duties, contexts, size, resources, and organisational processes, what I found was that the practices of accountability are compliance activities with frameworks, legislation and financial management. The practices were little different because all public sector organisations have been following the same compliance activities, procedures and processes.

When there was a reference to accountability practice, there was always a reference to compliance with accounting processes such as budget, allocations, costs, resources, accrual accounting and legal frameworks. However, different types of organisations

188 have different social spaces within the public sector field. Central agencies are policy agencies, as they are close to the Ministers, and central to the executive government’s operation. On the other hand, although line/service departments make policies, they are closer to provisioning and delivering public services, and not very close to the powerful Ministers. The GBE/statutory/prescribed agencies are specialist groups with very specific duties and skills, which make them more professional or functional type of organisations. Moreover, their internal organisational structure, culture and leadership teams are different, which lead to different ways of doing compliance. For example, each type of department is different in constructing and organising the terms of the ways in which their organisational resources and strategies were mobilised, juxtaposed and deployed within the organisation. For example, the central agencies function like finance areas, corporate areas and human resource management areas for all other APS organisations. In doing so, they create legislation and enabling legislation for others to comply with in the name of accountability. The central agencies make sure that other departments are operating within the compliance frameworks. Therefore, the accountability practices of different organisations are essentially the same compliance activities.

10.3.5 Key findings from the overall practices of accountability and the role of accounting in those practices With the proliferation of NPM type public sector accounting reforms, I expected to find accountants dominating the public sector field. I also expected to find different accountability practices between accountants and non-accountants, and between Finance and other departments, because of their functional accounting knowledge and skills. Instead, what I found is the proliferation of compliance activities based on accounting processes and its technologies of both financial and management accounting. I also found that accounting has become part of the habitus of the non- accountants, as the field participants need to do accounting in order to comply with accountability requirements. Once non-accountants internalised accounting and started thinking, talking and acting like accountants, there was no distinction between accountants’ way of doing accountability and non-accountants’ way of doing accountability. There was no longer special recognition for the accountants’ cultural capital (functional accounting knowledge and skills) as the arbiter or reservoir of 189 accounting habitus. For example, a non-accountant without formal accounting education or professional designation is the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in one of the largest government organisations, which indicates a change in the field in terms of the accountants’ capital and position. It shows that accounting has connected multiple fields by moving beyond the accountants’ field to invade non-accountants’ fields. In this way, accountants lost capital, power and influence but accounting gained more capital than anything else did in the public sector field. Accounting was able to increase the amount of capital, transform into symbolic capital and became practical logic of the practices of accountability.

Once the compliance activities have taken-for-granted as undertaking accountability, the rules that support those activities becomes doxa of the field. In the practices of accountability, field participants play orthodoxy in favour of the dominant rules of the field, by ‘supporting it’ rather than ‘struggle against it’. The field participants could not play heterodoxy because of the fear of alienation from the socially constructed, albeit dominant, rules of the game. In these processes, field participants’ illusio have caught them in the game, and actors believe that the accounting game is the ‘only game in town’, which is worth playing (Webb et al., 2002). This belief, in the end, became official or the status quo, which alienates the differences in the practices. That is why there was little difference in accountability practices across the social spaces because all practices lead to compliance activities with financial frameworks, legislations, instructions and processes. Because accounting process supports and makes visible compliance activity, accounting has been transformed from cultural capital to symbolic capital and moved beyond the accountants’ field to invade other fields. Once accounting became symbolic capital and non-accountants skilfully deal with accounting, then accounting become taken-for-granted in the public sector field. Once accounting became taken-for-granted, everyone has started following accounting processes for compliance activities in the name of accountability practice, and that is why there was little difference between accountability practices across the public sector social spaces.

190

10.3.6 Key findings from the relationship between NPM, accounting and accountability The notion of accountinisation and the relationship between NPM type reforms and claims of accountability, lead me to expect that recent public sector reform in the APS would put more emphasis on accounting for accountability. This would apply, in particular, to accounting for accountability for performance measurement and reporting. I also expected to find different practices because of the use of different accounting technologies of financial and management accounting. The comparisons of accountability practices in different social spaces found two major elements of accounting technologies for the practices of accountability – management control and financial reporting. I expected to find, consistent with Broadbent et al. (1999), differences between financial and management accounting for accountability. I find that the role financial accounting plays is ‘feedback and backward looking’, and the role management accounting plays is ‘control and blame game’, but promotes and supports compliance activities. The benefit of financial accounting, on one level, is limited in assessing and managing accountability for performance of the public service. Even though management accounting practices turned out to be a tool of management control, it has the potential to provide feedforward or strategic information for accountability by facilitating both financial and non-financial information. I argue, as per Broadbent et al. (1999), that financial accounting serves individualising form of accountability and management accounting serves socialising form of accountability (Roberts, 1991, 1996). However, both technologies increase compliance activities, and from this perspective, there is not any difference in their effect on the practices of accountability.

Interestingly, the new public sector reforms have not made accountants powerful. The claims of the PGPA Act appear to be symbolic when it states that accountability for performance is more than financial (or accounting). Given the ways in which non- financial information is, discussed mean there is potential that the new reform would increase compliance activities with the changes, and the introduction of new accounting and non-accounting processes, performance measurement frameworks, risk management frameworks, rules, instructions and interpretations. The increased compliance activities were visible when the APSC accused Finance of duplicating some of the provisions in the PGPA Act with the PS Act. Moreover, many departments have

191 criticised the additional requirement for disclosing performance information in three separate documents, such as corporate plans, portfolio budget statements and in the annual report. The ANAO has endorsed the majority view and requested JCPAA to make sure that there is not any duplication of compliance requirements. Therefore, it is evident that even though the new reform is not promoting accountants and promoting non-financial information, they are all adding to the list of existing compliance requirements.

10.4 Contributions and Implications While the analyses detailed in the preceding chapters and sections have contributed to answering the research questions and addressing the gaps in the literature, this section summarises some of the major conclusions and their implications for theory, practice and further research. Five of these conclusions are presented below.

10.4.1 The public sector field cannot be taken-for-granted I found that the structure and configuration of the public sector field is multiple, dynamic and complex, in the same way as Funnell et al. (2012). What this means is that accountability does not have multiple forms, types, or aspects but is socially constructed by individual agency choices and structural forces (Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Sinclair, 1995). Therefore, the accountability relationship is not just between account givers and takers, but it is a combination of people’s actions (agents) and institutions (structural forces). Therefore, the theoretical understanding of accountability needs to move beyond the relationship between account giver and taker to explore the practice through the relationships between habitus, field, capital, strategy and doxa. From this perspective, Lapsley et al.’s (2009) possibilities of problematic aspects of social, cultural and political contexts need to be understood by exploring the relationship between individual/group habitus and structures of the social spaces. Therefore, the question of how the practices of accountability emerge or are socially constructed needs to be recognised as a function of the individual/group habitus and the structural forces in the multiple fields. The potential implication here is that, rather than concentrating on the dichotomies, forms, typologies and styles of accountability, more attention should be focused on the role of individual/group habitus and institutional structures in

192 explaining the practices of accountability. In order to achieve this, there is a need for a practice theory framework, which does not separate agency and structure but merges them.

10.4.2 Accounting logic dominates the public sector field I found that accounting logic (habitus) has merged with the institutional requirements (structural forces) such as constitution, financial frameworks, legislations, interpretations and instructions. Accounting logic has facilitated all the compliance activities in the public sector field. From these compliance driven practices, accounting logic and accounting habitus have emerged as accountability doxa in the field. Therefore, the financial accounting and reporting practices have been taken-for-granted as the practices of accountability. This understanding is an extension of Power and Laughlin’s (1992) accountinisation of accountability or the ‘accounting logic’ (Broadbent, 1998; Laughlin, 1990, 2007). I argue, along with Broadbent (1998), that the field participants’ socially construct and organise the practices of accountability through accounting logic (habitus) such as patterns of language, vocabularies and ideologies that supports the institutional structure of the field. Therefore, the existing theories or dichotomies of accountability in the literature cannot be taken-for-granted and used as black boxes of accountability. Moreover, I also argue, as do Degeling et al. (1996), Guthrie (1998) and Guthrie and Parker (1999), that accountability is a ‘malleable masque’, because some accountability claims are rhetorical, some practices are taken- for-granted, and much of them are socially constructed by the interaction between human agency and structural forces. The potential implication here is that we need to move beyond these rhetorical claims of accountability and taken-for-granted ‘black boxes’ of accountability to unveil the real practice underneath the ‘malleable masque’ (Guthrie and Parker, 1999). It is only then that we can fill the knowledge gap between the theories and the practices of accountability in the public sector accounting research.

10.4.3 Reducing accountability to accounting I found little difference in the practices of accountability, which is in contrast with the accounting literature, where a range of conceptualisations and theorisations of accountability dominate (Stuart, 1984; Roberts, 1991, 1996; Sinclair, 1995, Ahrens

193

1996). I contrast this with Goddard’s (2004) findings of the differential practices in different social spaces due to the differential accounting habitus. In doing so, I extend the literature by explaining why the practices of accountability differ little in the public sector field. The reason, I argue, is that accountability has been reduced to accounting. Goddard (2004) argues that habitus is the reason and explanation for the differential practices of accountability. Conversely, I argue that when accounting habitus becomes symbolic capital, the difference disappears because everyone adopts that habitus to play the game by the same rules, which then becomes the dominant logic and accountability doxa in the field. Due to the dominant practical logic, field participants renegotiate their positons and actions based on their individual or group habitus, and accept the compliance doxa in the public sector field. As a result, accountability doxa reproduce and reinforce compliance activities through accounting logic and processes in the field. Therefore, at the level of individual and group habitus, the ways of doing practices are different, but in the end, due to the doxa, the practices become indifferent compliance activities. The implication here is that the practice needs to understand, as a function, individual habitus and doxa in the field.

10.4.4 Accounting logic has moved beyond accountants In the literature, everyone agrees that accountability is a chameleon-like and contextual concept (Sinclair, 1995), but what was missing from the literature was that the context is not just an organisational field but also a combination of social, institutional and political fields. What I found is that the context consists of multiple fields, which are influenced by the habitus of the dominant groups and structure of the fields. The public sector context consists of the fields of public servants, accountants, politics and the public. From this perspective, I extend the understanding of the public sector context. I also contribute by documenting how and why accounting habitus becomes the dominant logic for the practices of accountability in the public sector.

Consequently, I demonstrate that accounting logic has introduced and sustained new ways of thinking, talking and acting in the social spaces, and reproduced compliance activities in the field. In those processes, other fields, particularly non-accountants, have strategically adopted accounting logic. For that reason, accounting became the currency of symbolic capital for the practices of accountability, not only in the field of 194 accountants, but also in other fields which led to the increased trading of accounting routines and rituals, such as accounting processes, procedures, reports, offices and functions. Moreover, I have concluded that the rituals and practices created by accounting process outlasted the original field where it originated (i.e. accountants or the accounting profession) and spanned other fields. Therefore, while the symbolic capitals of non-accountants have increased by internalising accounting logic, the accountants have lost symbolic capital in the fields. Therefore, I argue that accounting logic has become more powerful than the actual accountants have. That is why field participants do not challenge, but rather take accounting logic for granted, as the only rule of the game. The potential implication here is that, consistent with Broadbent and Laughing (2013), accounting logic is alienating public accountability by the taken-for- granted financial accountability.

10.4.5 Extending accounting, accounting logic and accountability I found that the financial management frameworks, regulations, rules and processes had the greatest influence on the practices of accountability. Instead of the characteristics of the different organizations, professional or functional roles and hierarchical positions, compliance with financial management activities through accounting logic exerted the ultimate influence on the practices of accountability. For example, the top five accountability practices were identified as the demonstrating processes, compliance documentation and reporting, quantitative KPIs calculation and reporting, financial accounting and reporting, and reporting to a manager or hierarchy. The emphasis on compliance with accounting activities reduced the practices of accountability to being job or task focused. For example, Government policy and priority, budget management and financial control, compliance with legislation, compliance with accounting frameworks and audit activities were found to be driving most of the practices of accountability. Therefore, I extend the approach developed by Power and Laughlin (1992), Laughlin (1992, 2007), Hood (1995), Broadbent (1998), Broadbent et al. (1999), and Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) who elaborated the relationship between accounting, accounting logic and accountability in the public sector context. I highlighted the problems of developing accountability systems based on accounting logic, and showed how accounting logic can reduce accountability to accounting. The potential implication here is that the ways in which the relationship between 195 accountability and accounting is theorised in the accounting literature needs to be revisited.

10.4.6 Accountability: management control and financial accounting I found that the existing input/output and financial reporting oriented models have failed to improve the practices of accountability. Moreover, they have strengthened the excessive focus on compliance activities through quantitative KPIs and financial information. Furthermore, the accounting technologies of both financial and management accounting have taken-for-granted the public sector in a single simple metric, which is too simplistic for the complex and multiple fields of the public sector. Consequently, this understanding has encouraged “accountability for processes through excessive compliance” rather than “accountability for performance through impact”, which I documented throughout this study. From this vantage point, I argue that there is a need to move beyond the dichotomies or ‘black boxes’ of accountability and to develop a framework for public sector accounting based on ‘accountability as practice’. It is also important to recognise the rhetorical and self-evident claims of both management and financial accounting in the public sector field, particularly in the public sector reform context, and I am in agreement with Guthrie (1998) and Lapsley et al. (2009) on this.

While the new public governance, performance and accountability reform in the APS offers an opportunity to improve public sector performance measurement and reporting, there is a need to look for information beyond financial and quantitative perspectives, and shift to a performance story or narrative perspective. However, there needs to be a balance between financial and non-financial performance information, because of the political and contested nature of the public sector field. To realise that agenda, not only do we need to move beyond the dichotomies or typologies of accountability, but also move beyond the doxic dichotomy of financial and management accounting. For example, both accounting technologies need to complement each other and provide a sense of comprehensive accountability, rather than segmented or doxic accountability. In doing so, management accounting needs to move beyond the current passive and reactive role, which has an excessive focus on the input/output process, by focusing more on the outputs and impacts (Guthrie, 1998; Broadbent et al., 1999; Modell et al., 196

2007). Both accounting technologies need to incorporate financial and non-financial information.

To this end, I argue that that “accountinization” has gone too far and achieved too little, and it is time that accountants (both academics and practitioners) develop a new accounting model or framework for public sector accounting. To move forward, a shift from compliance focused accounting to operation-focused accounting is necessary. This may potentially lead to the development of a public sector accounting framework based on accountability (Pallot, 1992; Lapsley, 1999; Pallot, 2003; Jacobs, 2015). The potential implication here is that this move has the potential to develop a public sector accounting theoretical framework based on accountability.

10.5 Directions for Future Research The study is somewhat limited in its scope, as it focuses only on the context of the Australian Public Sector. I selected this Federal level because of the public sector reform initiative that was taking place during the field study. It was important because the connection between accounting and accountability is more visible at times of public sector reform. It also needs to be recognised that the limitations and challenges caused by my geographical location in Canberra, which is the home of most of the Australian Federal Public Service. However, one could argue that these constraints and biases are implicit in all field studies.

While the theoretical and empirical analyses of this study provide insights into the practices of accountability and the role of accounting in those practices, there are issues that I do not fully explore in this study. For example, I provide insight into the role of non-financial information, management control, trust, social capital, culture and strategy. There are further opportunities to conduct research to elaborate these ideas. I identify many forms of accountability relationships in the public sector context. For example, joint projects, shared services, whole-of-government services, and services across three levels of governments (such as Commonwealth, State and Local). Although I touch on some of these forms of accountability, in my discussion I do not analyse them in depth. Therefore, future research may apply the practice theory framework that

197

I develop here for exploring accountability practices in those different relationships, and the ways in which accounting may be implicated in their practices.

The practice theory analytical framework may also be applied to the relationships between the APS and private sector institutions. For examples, public-private partnerships (PPPs), contracting out and outsourcing arrangements, where it is hard to theorise from agency theory or system theory perspectives. Instead of the dichotomist conception of such accountability relationships (with principal-agent models), the relationships could be theorised as ‘social spaces’ or ‘social practices’. Moreover, the analytical framework may also be applied to structures of organisations or institutions as social spaces. The way organisations are structured, such as business units, divisions, work groups or project teams, the social space theoretical frame can be applied to them. By doing so, researchers may be able to account for economic, social and political dynamics of accountability relationships at group levels within the same organisations.

10.6 Concluding Remarks In this study, I explore and explain the practices of accountability in the Australian Public Sector (APS) and the role accounting plays in those practices. More specifically, I examined the relationship between accountability and accounting in the context of a public sector reform. The primary purpose of the study is to move beyond the concept of accountability to focus on practice in its institutional, social and political context by analysing the human agency and structural forces together. The accounting literature and Bourdieu’s practice theory suggest that there would be differential accountability practices by different organisations, professional groups and hierarchical levels. However, by relying on a qualitative field study design and a sequential research method, I found little differences in the practices of accountability. The central reason I identify is that accountability has become compliance with accounting process, and in turn, accounting has become accountability doxa. In this study, I identify a number of themes that make both theoretical and empirical contributions to this body of knowledge. Based on these emerging themes, I conclude that the compliance processes supported by accounting logic is the dominant practical logic of the practices of accountability in the Australian public sector field. Moreover, I conclude that the current compliance focused accounting processes have not achieved the desired

198 outcomes for public sector accountability for performance. Therefore, I suggest that how the public sector engages in managing, assessing and reporting accountability for performance in achiceving public benefit should be the focus of future public sector accounting and reform studies, more so than the normative and descriptive struggles of what accountability is and how it is understood. In this way, we will be one step closer to developing a public sector accounting framework based on the notion of accountability.

199

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A.N.A.O. 2011. Development and implementation of Key Performance Indicators to Support the Outcomes and Programs Framework. Canberra: Australian National Audit Office.

A.N.A.O. 2013. The Australian Government Performance Measurement and Reporting Framework – Pilot Project to Audit Key Performance Indicators. Canberra: Australian National Audit Office.

Abbott, A. 1988. The system of profession. An Essay On The Division Of Expert Labour. Chicago.

Adams, C. A. & Mcnicholas, P. 2007. Making a difference: Sustainability reporting, accountability and organisational change. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 20, 382-402.

Ahn, P. D., Jacobs, K., Lim, D. W. & Moon, K. 2014. Beyond Self‐Evident: Recognising the Problematic Political Context of Accrual Accounting Adoption in South Korea. Financial Accountability & Management, 30, 25-48.

Ahrens, T. 1996. Styles of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 21, 139-173.

Ahrens, T. & Chapman, C. 2002. The structuration of legitimate performance measures and management: day-to-day contests of accountability in a UK restaurant chain. Management Accounting Research, 13, 151-171.

Ahrens, T. & Chapman, C. S. 2005. Management control systems and the crafting of strategy: a practice-based view. Controlling strategy, 106-124.

Ahrens, T. & Chapman, C. S. 2006. Doing qualitative field research in management accounting: Positioning data to contribute to theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31, 819-841.

Ahrens, T. & Chapman, C. S. 2007. Management accounting as practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32, 1-27.

Ahrens, T. & Ferry, L. 2015. Newcastle City Council and the grassroots: accountability and budgeting under austerity. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 28, 909-933.

Alawattage, C., Hopper, T., Wickramasinghe, D., Awio, G., Lawrence, S. & Northcott, D. 2007. Community-led initiatives: reforms for better accountability? Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 3, 209-226.

Arrington, C. E. & Francis, J. R. 1993. Giving economic accounts: accounting as cultural practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 18, 107-124.

200

Barrett, P. 2014a. New development: Financial reform and good governance. Public Money & Management, 34, 59-66.

Barrett, P. 2014b. New development: Risk management—how to regain trust and confidence in government. Public Money & Management, 34, 459-464.

Barton, A. D. 2006. Public sector accountability and commercial-in-confidence outsourcing contracts. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19, 256- 271.

Benston, G. J. 1982. Accounting and corporate accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 7, 87-105.

Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1983. Forms of capital'in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. JC Richards. Greenwood Press, New York.

Bourdieu, P. 1984. Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste, Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1985. The social space and the genesis of groups. Theory and society, 14, 723-744.

Bourdieu, P. 1988. Homo academicus, Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1989. Social space and symbolic power. Sociological theory, 7, 14-25.

Bourdieu, P. 1990. The logic of practice, Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1992. The practice of reflexive sociology (The Paris workshop). An invitation to reflexive sociology, 216-260.

Bourdieu, P. 1993. Sociology in question, London, Sage Publications.

Bourdieu, P. 1998. Practical reason: On the theory of action, Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 2004. The peasant and his body. Ethnography, 5, 579-599.

Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.-C. 1977. Education, society and culture. Trans. Richard Nice. London: SAGE Publications.

Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.-C. 1990. Reproduction in education, society and culture, Sage.

Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L. 1992. An invitation to reﬂexive sociology. Cambridge: Polity.

Bovens, M. 2005. Public accountability. The Oxford Handbook of Public Management. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

201

Bovens, M. 2010. Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism. West European Politics, 33, 946-967.

Bovens, M., Schillemans, T. & Goodin, R. 2014. Public Accountability. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Bracci, E., Humphrey, C., Moll, J. & Steccolini, I. 2015. Public sector accounting, accountability and austerity: more than balancing the books? Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 28, 878-908.

Broadbent, J. 1998. The gendered nature of “accounting logic”: pointers to an accounting that encompasses multiple values. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 9, 267-297.

Broadbent, J., Dietrich, M. & Laughlin, R. 1996. The Development of Principle–Agent, Contracting and Accountability Relationships in the Public Sector: Conceptual and Cultural Problems. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 7, 259-284.

Broadbent, J. & Guthrie, J. 1992. Changes in the public sector: A review of recent “alternative” accounting research. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 5.

Broadbent, J. & Guthrie, J. 2008. Public sector to public services: 20 years of “contextual” accounting research. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 21, 129-169.

Broadbent, J., Jacobs, K. & Laughlin, R. 1999. Comparing schools in the UK and New Zealand: individualizing and socializing accountabilities and some implications for management control. Management Accounting Research, 10, 339-361.

Broadbent, J. & Laughlin, R. 1997. Evaluating the ‘New public management’reforms in the UK: A constitutional possibility. Public Administration, 75, 487-507.

Broadbent, J. & Laughlin, R. 2013. Accounting control and controlling accounting: interdisciplinary and critical perspectives, Emerald Group Publishing.

Burchell, S., Clubb, C. & Hopwood, A. G. 1985. Accounting in its social context: Towards a history of value added in the United Kingdom. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10, 381-413.

Carlin, T. & Guthrie, J. 2003. Accrual output based budgeting systems in Australia The rhetoric-reality gap. Public Management Review, 5, 145-162.

Carnegie, G. D. & Wolnizer, P. W. 1996. Enabling accountability in museums. Accounting, auditing & accountability journal, 9, 84-99.

Christensen, T. & Lægreid, P. 2011. The Ashgate research companion to new public management, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Commonwealth of Australia 2014. Enhanced Commonwealth Performance Framework: Discussion Paper. Canberra.

202

Cooper, C. & Coulson, A. B. 2014. Accounting activism and Bourdieu's ‘collective intellectual’–Reflections on the ICL Case. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 25, 237-254.

Cooper, C. & Johnston, J. 2012. Vulgate accountability: insights from the field of football. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 25, 602-634.

Cooper, S. M. & Owen, D. L. 2007. Corporate social reporting and stakeholder accountability: The missing link. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32, 649-667.

Davies, A. & Thomas, R. 2002. Managerialism and Accountability in Higher Education: the Gendered Nature of Restructuring and the Costs to Academic Service. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 13, 179-193.

Day, P. & Klein, R. 1987. Accountabilities: five public services, Taylor & Francis.

Degeling, P., Anderson, J. & Guthrie, J. 1996. Accounting for public accounts committees. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 9, 30-49.

Dubnick, M. J. 2007. Situating Accountability: Seeking Salvation for the Core Concept of Modern Governance. Manuscript, University of New Hampshire.

Dunleavy, P. 1989. The architecture of the British central state, part I: framework for analysis. Public Administration, 67, 249-275.

Dunsire, A., Hood, C. & Huby, M. 1989. Cutback management in public bureaucracies: Popular theories and observed outcomes in Whitehall, Cambridge University Press.

Eagleton, T. & Bourdieu, P. 1992. Doxa and Common Life. New Left Review, 191, 111- 121.

English, L. 2003. Emasculating Public Accountability in the Name of Competition: Transformation of State Audit in Victoria. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 14, 51-76.

Everett, J. 2002. Organizational research and the praxeology of Pierre Bourdieu. Organizational Research Methods, 5, 56-80.

Everett, J. 2003. The politics of comprehensive auditing in fields of high outcome and cause uncertainty. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 14, 77-104.

Funnell, W. 1998. The narrative and its place in the new accounting history: the rise of the counternarrative. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 11, 142- 162.

Funnell, W. 2000. Government by fiat: the retreat from responsibility, Sydney, UNSW Press.

Funnell, W. 2003. Enduring fundamentals: constitutional accountability and auditors- general in the reluctant state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 14, 107-132. 203

Funnell, W., Cooper, K. & Lee, J. 2012. Public Sector Accounting and Accountability in Australia, Australia, UNSW Press Ltd.

Gallop, G. 2007. Strategic planning: Is it the new model. Public Administration Today, 10, 28-33.

Gendron, Y., Cooper, D. J. & Townley, B. 2001. In the name of accountability-state auditing, independence and new public management. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 14, 278-310.

Gendron, Y., Cooper, D. J. & Townley, B. 2007. The construction of auditing expertise in measuring government performance. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32, 101-129.

Goddard, A. 2004. Budgetary practices and accountability habitus: a grounded theory. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 17, 543-577.

Goddard, A. 2005. Accounting and NPM in UK local government-contributions towards governance and accountability. Financial Accountability & Management, 21, 191-218.

Goddard, A. 2010. Contemporary public sector accounting research–An international comparison of journal papers. The British Accounting Review, 42, 75-87.

Gray, A. & Jenkins, B. 1993. Codes of accountability in the new public sector. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 6, 0-0.

Gray, R. 1992. Accounting and environmentalism: An exploration of the challenge of gently accounting for accountability, transparency and sustainability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17, 399-425.

Gray, R., Dey, C., Owen, D., Evans, R. & Zadek, S. 1997. Struggling with the praxis of social accounting: Stakeholders, accountability, audits and procedures. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 10, 325-364.

Gray, R., Owen, D. & Adams, C. 1996. Accounting & accountability: changes and challenges in corporate social and environmental reporting, Prentice Hall.

Gregory, R. 1995. Accountability, responsibility and corruption: Managing the 'public production process'. In: Boston, J. (ed.) The State Under Contract. Bridget Willians Books.

Guthrie, J. 1993. Australian public business enterprises: analysis of changing accounting, auditing and accountability regimes. Financial Accountability & Management, 9, 101-114.

Guthrie, J. 1998. Application of accrual accounting in the Australian public sector– rhetoric or reality. Financial Accountability & Management, 14, 1-19.

Guthrie, J., Humphrey, C., Jones, L. & Olson, O. 2005. International Public Financial Management Reform: Progress. Contradictions and Challenges, Information Age, Greenwich, CT. 204

Guthrie, J. & Parker, L. D. 1990. Corporate social disclosure practice: a comparative international analysis. Advances in Public Interest Accounting, 3, 159-176.

Guthrie, J. E. & Parker, L. D. 1999. A quarter of a century of performance auditing in the Australian federal public sector: A malleable masque. Abacus, 35, 302-332.

Haynes, K. 2008. (Re) figuring accounting and maternal bodies: The gendered embodiment of accounting professionals. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33, 328-348.

Hines, R. D. 1991. The FASB's conceptual framework, financial accounting and the maintenance of the social world. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16, 313-331.

Hood, C. 1990. De‐Sir Humphreyfying the Westminster model of bureaucracy: a new style of governance? Governance, 3, 205-214.

Hood, C. 1991. A public management for all seasons. Public administration, 69, 3-19.

Hood, C. 1995. The “new public management” in the 1980s: Variations on a theme. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20, 93-109.

Hood, C. 2010. The blame game: Spin, bureaucracy, and self-preservation in government, Princeton University Press.

Hood, C. & Peters, G. 2004. The middle aging of new public management: into the age of paradox? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 267-282.

Hood, C. & Schuppert, G. F. 1988. Delivering public services in Western Europe: sharing Western European experience of para-government organization, Sage Pubns.

Hopwood, A. G. 1983. On trying to study accounting in the contexts in which it operates. Accounting, organizations and society, 8, 287-305.

Hoskin, K. W. & Macve, R. H. 1988. The genesis of accountability: The west point connections. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 13, 37-73.

Humphrey, C., Miller, P. & Scapens, R. W. 1993. Accountability and accountable management in the UK public sector. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 6, 7-29.

J.C.P.A.A. 2015. Inquiry into Development of Commonwealth Performance Framework. JCPAA. Canberra.

Jacobs, K. 1998a. Costing health care: a study of the introduction of cost and budget reports into a GP association. Management Accounting Research, 9, 55-70.

Jacobs, K. 1998b. Value for money auditing in New Zealand: competing for control in the public sector. The British accounting review, 30, 343-360.

205

Jacobs, K. 2003. Class reproduction in professional recruitment: examining the accounting profession. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 14, 569-596.

Jacobs, K. 2005. Hybridisation or polarisation: doctors and accounting in the UK, Germany and Italy. Financial Accountability & Management, 21, 135-162.

Jacobs, K. 2012. Making sense of social practice: theoretical pluralism in public sector accounting research. Financial Accountability & Management, 28, 1-25.

Jacobs, K. 2015a. The JCPAA hearing into the Development of Commonwealth Performance Framework. Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. Canberra.

Jacobs, K. 2015b. Theorising Interdisciplinary Public Sector Accounting Research. Working Paper. Australia: UNSW.

Jacobs, K. & Evans, S. 2012. Constructing accounting in the mirror of popular music. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 25, 673-702.

Jacobs, K. & Jones, K. 2009. Legitimacy and parliamentary oversight in Australia: The rise and fall of two public accounts committees. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 22, 13-34.

Jacobs, K. & Kemp, J. 2002. Exploring accounting presence and absence: case studies from Bangladesh. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15, 143-161.

Jacobs, K. & Walker, S. P. 2004. Accounting and accountability in the Iona Community. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 17, 361-381.

Jenkins, R. 2013. Pierre Bourdieu, London, Routledge.

Joannides, V. 2012. Accounterability and the problematics of accountability. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23, 244-257.

Jones, K. & Jacobs, K. 2006. Governing the government: the paradoxical place of the public accounts committee. Australasian Parliamentary Review, 21, 63-79.

Kamuf, P. 2007. Accounterability. Textual Practice, 21, 251-266.

Kloot, L. & Martin, J. 2000. Strategic performance management: A balanced approach to performance management issues in local government. Management Accounting Research, 11, 231-251.

Kurunmäki, L. 1999. Professional vs financial capital in the field of health care— struggles for the redistribution of power and control. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 24, 95-124.

Kurunmäki, L. 2004. A hybrid profession—the acquisition of management accounting expertise by medical professionals. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29, 327-347.

206

Lapsley, I. 1988. Research in public sector accounting: an appraisal. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 1, 21-33.

Lapsley, I. 1999. Accounting and the new public management: instruments of substantive efficiency or a rationalising modernity? Financial Accountability & Management, 15, 201-207.

Lapsley, I. 2008. The NPM agenda: back to the future. Financial Accountability & Management, 24, 77-96.

Lapsley, I. 2009. New Public Management: The Cruellest Invention of the Human Spirit? 1. Abacus, 45, 1-21.

Lapsley, I., Mussari, R. & Paulsson, G. 2009. On the Adoption of Accrual Accounting in the Public Sector: A Self-Evident and Problematic Reform. European Accounting Review, 18, 719-723.

Laughlin, R. 2007. Critical reflections on research approaches, accounting regulation and the regulation of accounting. The British Accounting Review, 39, 271-289.

Laughlin, R., Broadbent, J. & Shearn, D. 1992. Recent Financial and Accountability Changes in General Practice: An Unhealthy Intrusion into Medical Autonomy? Financial Accountability & Management, 8, 129-148.

Laughlin, R. C. 1990. A model of financial accountability and the Church of England. Financial Accountability & Management, 6, 93-114.

Lindkvist, L. & Llewellyn, S. 2003. Accountability, responsibility and organization. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 19, 251-273.

Lodhia, S. & Jacobs, K. 2013. The practice turn in environmental reporting: A study into current practices in two Australian commonwealth departments. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 26, 595-615.

Lonsdale, J. & Bechberger, E. 2011. Learning in an accountability setting. Performance Auditing: Contributing to Accountability in Democratic Government. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Malsch, B., Gendron, Y. & Grazzini, F. 2011. Investigating interdisciplinary translations: The influence of Pierre Bourdieu on accounting literature. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 24, 194-228.

Maor, M. 1999. The paradox of managerialism. Public Administration Review, 5-18.

Martin, J. & Kloot, L. 2001. Local government accountability: explaining differences. Accounting, Accountability & Performance, 7, 51.

Mautz, R. K. 1988. Monuments, mistakes and opportunities. Accounting Horizons, 2, 123-8.

Mckernan, J. F. 2012. Accountability as aporia, testimony, and gift. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23, 258-278. 207

Mcphail, K., Paisey, C. & Paisey, N. J. 2010. Class, social deprivation and accounting education in Scottish schools: Implications for the reproduction of the accounting profession and practice. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 21, 31- 50.

Messner, M. 2009. The limits of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34, 918-938.

Modell, S., Jacobs, K. & Wiesel, F. 2007. A process (re) turn?: Path dependencies, institutions and performance management in Swedish central government. Management Accounting Research, 18, 453-475.

Morgan, G. 1988. Accounting as reality construction: towards a new epistemology for accounting practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 13, 477-485.

Mulgan, R. 2000. ‘Accountability’: An Ever‐Expanding Concept? Public administration, 78, 555-573.

Neu, D. 2006. Accounting for public space. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31, 391-414.

Neu, D., Rahaman, A. S. & Everett, J. 2014. Accounting and Sweatshops: Enabling Coordination and Control in Low‐Price Apparel Production Chains. Contemporary Accounting Research, 31, 322-346.

Newberry, S. 2015. Public sector accounting: shifting concepts of accountability. Public Money & Management, 35, 371-376.

Newberry, S. & Pallot, J. 2005. A wolf in sheep's clothing? Wider consequences of the financial management system of the New Zealand central government. Financial Accountability & Management, 21, 263-277.

Normanton, E. L. 1966. The accountability and audit of governments: A comparative study, Manchester University Press.

Oakes, L. S., Townley, B. & Cooper, D. J. 1998. Business planning as pedagogy: Language and control in a changing institutional field. Administrative Science Quarterly, 257-292.

Olson, O., Guthrie, J. & Humphrey, C. 1998. Global warning: Debating international developments in new public financial management, Cappelen Akademisk Folag.

Olson, O., Humphrey, C. & Guthrie, J. 2001. Caught in an evaluatory trap: a dilemma for public services under NPFM. European Accounting Review, 10, 505-522.

Pallot, J. 1992. Elements of a Theoretical Framework for Public Sector Accounting. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 5, 38-59.

Pallot, J. 1997. Infrastructure accounting for local authorities: technical management and political context. Financial Accountability & Management, 13, 225-242.

208

Pallot, J. 2003. A Wider Accountability? The Audit Office and New Zealand’s Bureaucratic Revolution. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 14, 133-155.

Parker, L. & Gould, G. Changing public sector accountability: critiquing new directions. Accounting forum, 1999. Wiley Online Library, 109-135.

Parker, L. D. 2005. Social and environmental accountability research: a view from the commentary box. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 18, 842-860.

Parker, L. D. & Guthrie, J. 1993. The Australian public sector in the 1990s: new accountability regimes in motion. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2, 59-81.

Parker, L. D. & Guthrie, J. 1998. Managerialism and Marketisation In: Olson, O., Guthrie, J. & Humphries, C. (eds.) Financial Management Change in Australia. Oslo: Cappelen Akademsik Forlag.

Perrin, J. R. 1981. Accounting Research in the Public Sector. In: M. Bromwich & Hopwood, A. G. (eds.) Essays in British Accounting Research. London: Pitman.

Pollitt, C. 2000. Is the emperor in his underwear? An analysis of the impacts of public management reform. Public Management an International Journal of Research and Theory, 2, 181-200.

Pollitt, C., Girre, X., Lonsdale, J., Mul, R., Summa, H. & Waerness, M. 1999. Performance or compliance?: performance audit and public management in five countries. OUP Catalogue.

Power, M. 1994. The Audit Explosion, London, Demos.

Power, M. 1997. Expertise and the construction of relevance: Accountants and environmental audit. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22, 123-146.

Power, M. 1999. The audit society: Rituals of verification, OUP Oxford.

Power, M. 2000. The audit society—Second thoughts. International Journal of Auditing, 4, 111-119.

Power, M. 2007. Organised Uncertainty: Designing a world of risk management, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Power, M. & Laughlin, R. 1992. Critical theory and accounting. Critical management studies, 113-135.

Pusey, M. 1991. Economic rationalism in Canberra: A nation-building state changes its mind, Cambridge University Press.

Radcliffe, V. S. 2008. Public secrecy in auditing: What government auditors cannot know. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 19, 99-126.

209

Rahaman, A., Neu, D. & Everett, J. 2010. Accounting for Social‐Purpose Alliances: Confronting the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Africa*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27, 1093-1129.

Roberts, J. 1991. The possibilities of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16, 355-368.

Roberts, J. 1996. From Discipline to Dialogue: Individualizing and Socializing Forms of Accountability. In: Mouritsen, R. M. a. J. (ed.) Accountability: Power, Ethos and the technologies of managing. London: Chapman Hall.

Roberts, J. 2009. No one is perfect: The limits of transparency and an ethic for ‘intelligent’ accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34, 957-970.

Roberts, J. 2010. Why Accounting is not Accountability [Online]. Syndey. Available: http://apira2010.econ.usyd.edu.au/plenary_speakers/APIRA_Plenary_John_Rob erts.pdf.

Roberts, J. & Scapens, R. 1985. Accounting systems and systems of accountability — understanding accounting practices in their organisational contexts. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10, 443-456.

Schreuder, H. & Ramanathan, K. V. 1984. Accounting and corporate accountability: an extended comment. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 9, 409-415.

Schweiker, W. 1993. Accounting for ourselves: Accounting practice and the discourse of ethics. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 18, 231-252.

Scott, S. V. & Orlikowski, W. J. 2012. Reconfiguring relations of accountability: Materialization of social media in the travel sector. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 37, 26-40.

Shearer, T. 2002. Ethics and accountability: from the for-itself to the for-the-other. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27, 541-573.

Shenkin, M. & Coulson, A. B. 2007. Accountability through activism: learning from Bourdieu. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 20, 297-317.

Sinclair, A. 1995. The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20, 219-237.

Skærbæk, P. 2009. Public sector auditor identities in making efficiency auditable: The National Audit Office of Denmark as independent auditor and modernizer. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34, 971-987.

Smith, D. & Jacobs, K. 2011. “Breaking up the sky” The characterisation of accounting and accountants in popular music. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 24, 904-931.

Smyth, S. 2012. Contesting public accountability: a dialogical exploration of accountability and social housing. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23, 230- 243. 210

Stewart, J. D. 1984. The role of information in public accountability. Issues in public sector accounting, 17, 13-34.

Stone, B. 1995. Administrative accountability in the ‘Westminster’democracies: Towards a new conceptual framework. Governance, 8, 505-526.

Swartz, D. L. 2008. Bringing Bourdieu’s master concepts into organizational analysis. Theory and Society, 37, 45-52.

Unerman, J. & Bennett, M. 2004. Increased stakeholder dialogue and the internet: towards greater corporate accountability or reinforcing capitalist hegemony? Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29, 685-707.

Unerman, J. & O'dwyer, B. 2006. Theorising accountability for NGO advocacy. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19, 349-376.

Unerman, J., O'dwyer, B., Unerman, J. & O'dwyer, B. 2006. Theorising accountability for NGO advocacy. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19, 349- 376.

Van Helden, G. J. 2005. Researching Public Sector Transformation: The Role of Management Accounting. Financial Accountability & Management, 21, 99-133.

Wacquant, L. J. D. 1989. For a Socio-Analysis of Intellectuals: On "Homo Academicus". Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 34, 1-29.

Walker, S. P. 1991. The defence of professional monopoly: Scottish chartered accountants and “satellites in the accountancy firmament” 1854–1914. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16, 257-283.

Walker, S. P. 2004. The genesis of professional organisation in English accountancy. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29, 127-156.

Webb, J., Schirato, T. & Danaher, G. 2002. Understanding Bourdieu, London, Sage.

211

APPENDICES APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

No. Profession Organisation Position Date P1 CA ANAO Senior Director 17/07/2014 P2 No ANAO Director 17/07/2014 P3 IPAA Environment Senior Manager 22/07/2014 P4 IPAA Finance Manager 24/07/2014 P5 Science Society ATSB Senior Executive 28/07/2014 P6 IPAA Health Assistant Director 1/08/2014 P7 CPA Geoscience General Manager 4/08/2014 P8 CPA ANAO Senior Executive 11/08/2014 P9 CPA ANAO Senior Executive 11/08/2014 P10 IPAA APSC Senior Executive 12/08/2014 P11 CPA APSC Accountant 12/08/2014 P12 No APSC Contract Manager 12/08/2014 P13 Other Health PGPA Implementation Team 12/08/2014 P14 No Social Services Health Policy 13/08/2014 P15 CPA DMO Director General 14/08/2014 P16 No Social Services IT Manager 17/08/2014 P17 No APSC Accountant 17/08/2014 P18 No Infrastructure Operations 19/08/2014 P19 No PM&C Assistant Secretary 19/08/2014 P20 AIM/PMI Health Assistant Secretary 19/08/2014 P21 No DFAT Policy Advisor 19/08/2014 P22 No Industry Policy Advisor 19/08/2014 P23 Law Society DFAT Policy Advisor 19/08/2014 P24 CA Communications Assistant Manager 21/08/2014 P25 No ANAO Senior Manager 22/08/2014 P26 CMA/CIMA Defence Audit Manager 22/08/2014 P27 IPAA Finance Director 25/08/2014 P28 CA Finance CFO 25/08/2014 P29 Economic Society Finance Economic Policy 25/08/2014 P30 Science Society Geoscience Chief Scientist 25/08/2014 P31 Science Society Geoscience Scientist 25/08/2014 P32 No Arts Policy Officer 26/08/2014 P33 No ANAO Executive Director 26/08/2014 P34 No Finance Deputy Secretary 27/08/2014 P35 No Industry IT Analysts 27/08/2014 P36 Other ARC Policy Officer 29/08/2014 P37 No Immigration Field Officer 31/08/2014 P38 IPAA Finance Assistant Secretary 1/09/2014 P39 No FWC Client Service Officer 1/09/2014 212

P40 No Finance Assistant Secretary 2/09/2014 P41 IPAA Health Assistant Secretary 5/09/2014 P42 No NFSA IT Analysts 8/09/2014 P43 No DFAT Program Manager 8/09/2014 P44 IPAA Education Assistant Secretary 9/09/2014 P45 IPAA Education Assistant Secretary 9/09/2014 P46 AMI/PMI Agriculture Policy Advisor 9/09/2014 P47 IPAA Finance Assistant Secretary 10/10/2014 P48 CPA Defence Finance Officer 11/09/2014 P49 IPAA Education Senior Manager 12/09/2014 P50 No MDBA Engineer Modeller 14/09/2014 P51 ACS PM&C Program Officer 14/09/2014 P52 IPAA Consulting Consultant 15/09/2014 P53 IPAA Consulting Consultant 16/09/2014 P54 ACS ATO IT 16/09/2014 P55 No Defence Senior Manager 17/09/2014 P56 CPA ATO Chief Internal Auditor 18/09/2014 P57 No Industry First Assistant Secretary 19/09/2014 P58 No Employment Assistant Secretary 22/09/2014 P59 IPAA Environment Assistant Secretary 23/09/2014 P60 IPAA Human Services Deputy Secretary 24/09/2014 P61 Science Society House of Reps Member of Parliament 24/09/2014 P62 CPA Agriculture Assistant Director 24/09/2014 P63 AIM/PMI Immigration Assistant Secretary 24/09/2014 P64 IPAA ILC Senior Executive 25/09/2014 P65 IPAA PM&C Deputy Secretary 25/09/2014 P66 Science Society Senator Chair of the JCPAA 26/09/2014 P67 No Environment Assistant Secretary 25/09/2014 P68 Science Society CSIRO Senior Scientist 25/09/2014 P69 Law Society AG Assistant Secretary 26/09/2014 P70 No DVA Assistant Secretary 26/09/2014 P71 AIM ABS First Assistant Secretary 26/09/2014 P72 Law Society DHA Senior Executive 3/10/2014 P73 No CSIRO General Manager 7/10/2014 P74 No Treasury Deputy Secretary 8/10/2014 P75 Economic Society ABS First Assistant Secretary 8/10/2014 P76 No Immigration First Assistant Secretary 8/10/2014 P77 CPA ANAO Executive Director 9/10/2014 P78 CPA Employment Assistant Secretary 10/10/2014 P79 No Immigration First Assistant Secretary 10/10/2014 P80 CPA ANAO Senior Manager 13/10/2014 P81 No DFAT Assistant Secretary 13/10/2014 P82 Law Society AG First Assistant Secretary 14/10/2014 P83 AHRI Defence Deputy Secretary 14/10/2014

213

P84 No Environment Assistant Secretary 14/10/2014 P85 No Social Services Deputy Secretary 17/10/2014 P86 No Social Services First Assistant Secretary 17/10/2014 P87 Law Society Federal MP Member of Parliament 17/10/2014 P88 No Immigration Deputy Secretary 21/10/2014 P89 No ABS Assistant Secretary 21/10/2014 P90 CPA ATO Assistant Commissioner 24/10/2014 P91 ACS Immigration Deputy Secretary 27/10/2014 P92 No ATO CFO 29/10/2014 P93 No CSIRO Executive Manager 30/10/2014 P94 No NBA Senior Executive 31/10/2014 P95 No DFAT Assistant Secretary 10/11/2014 P96 Other ATO Assistant Secretary 11/11/2014 P97 CPA APSC Financial Accountant 27/01/2015 P98 CPA Health Accountant 28/01/2015 P99 CPA Health Accountant 29/01/2015 P100 CPA Treasury Accountant 29/01/2015 P101 CPA Defence Accountant 30/01/2015 P102 No Defence Accountant 30/01/2015 P103 CA Air Services Business Manager 31/01/2015 P=103 Total Dept. = 34

214

APPENDIX B: SELECTIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What are your current designation, position and employer in Australian Public Service? How long you have been working for this department/agency?

2. Have you worked in other departments/agencies within APS? If yes, please briefly describe your previous roles?

3. What is your professional background (e.g. Admin, Audit, Finance, HR, Legal, IT)? Do you have any professional membership or association?

4. What are the multiple demands of accountability in your current role?

5. How do you do them? Please describe the actual processes.

6. Have you done accountability differently in your previous roles in different departments/agencies?

7. Do different professional groups and/or departments/agencies in APS have different attitudes/approaches to doing accountability?

8. Has this changed over time? Please describe.

9. Have you been involved in any ‘joint-up’ or ‘whole-of-government’ project with different groups in your organisation or from others departments/agencies? If yes, how did you do accountability in that situation?

10. Please give me an example of doing accountability that excites you. Please also give me an example of accountability which frustrates you most and if you are given the freedom to do this in your own way what would you do differently?

215

APPENDIX C: FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS

1. What are your current designation, position and employer in Australian Public Service? How long you have been working for this department/agency?

2. Have you worked in other departments/agencies within APS? If yes, please briefly describe your previous roles?

3. What is your professional background (e.g. Admin, Audit, Finance, HR, Legal, IT)? Do you have any professional membership?

4. What are the multiple demands of accountability in your current role?

5. How do you do them? Please describe the processes.

6. Have you done accountability differently in your previous roles in different departments/agencies?

7. Do others within APS have different approaches/attitudes to doing accountability?

8. Has this changed over time? Please describe.

9. Would you give permission to use this survey for a PhD? Yes. Your email address:………………………………………………… No

10. Would you like to participate in a brief interview for a PhD? Yes. Your email address:………………………………………………… No

216