Cultural Mapping Series (Pilot)

2019

Training and Doctrine Command, ACE Operational Environment Integration Global Cultural Knowledge Network

Nigeria

14 January 2019

Overall Classification: Unclassified

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Cultural Mapping Series (Pilot) Nigeria

14 January 2019

Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN) Operational Environment Integration Directorate (OEI) Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 801 Harrison Dr., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 Website: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/

Table of Contents Foreword ...... ii Executive Summary ...... iii Introduction ...... 1 Nigeria: A Complex Operational Environment ...... 2 Cultural Mapping Analysis: Layer Composites ...... 5 Representing and Replicating Conditions in Realistic Training ...... 16 Appendix A: Individual Layers...... 19 Appendix B: Interactive Layered Map...... 36 Appendix C: SCAF Framework ...... 38 Endnotes ...... 39

Foreword

The Cultural Mapping Series (CMS), created by the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command G2’s (TRADOC G2) Operational Environment Integration Directorate (OEI) and the Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN), fuses geospatial analysis with socio-cultural considerations to facilitate understanding of the operational environment (OE) and enable the creation of more realistic conditions and depth in training environments.

To facilitate training reflective of real-world OE conditions, CMS products include a discussion of how socio-cultural phenomena might be replicated in notional OEs, such as those developed for the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). Additionally, CMS products incorporate a number of social theories and principles to enable a better understanding of the phenomena occurring within the specific OE covered. A brief catalogue of these concepts is included in the section on training in order to provide more depth for future discussions on improving how socio-cultural factors can be realistically replicated within training environments. Achieving realistic training environments requires the initial environment be reflective of real world situations, and be capable of adapting and reacting in a realistic manner to the actions taken by those individuals conducting the training.

The CMS has been designed using guidance presented within the US Army Learning Concept for Training and Education (ALC-TE)1 to ensure that realistic OE complexities are depicted within the training environment:

(1) “Portray the complex environment to develop leaders, Soldiers, Army civilians, and teams that understand the situation, apply appropriate judgment, adapt to changing conditions, and transition effectively between operations.”2 (2) “Create situations allowing individuals and teams to master fundamentals and hone skills.” 3 (3) “Present complex dilemmas forcing leaders to think clearly about war to match tactical actions with operational and strategic objectives.”4 (4) “Create situations allowing individuals and teams to experience, become comfortable, and eventually thrive in ambiguity and chaos and then provide meaningful feedback on their performance.”5

CMS Nigeria represents the first iteration of an innovative new process that is still in development. Each subsequent CMS product will benefit from the lessons learned and feedback associated with this product. OEI and GCKN invite you to ask questions and provide constructive feedback concerning the process involved in the creation of CMS products, as well as the findings specific to the OE presented within this document.

Penny Mellies Director Operational Environment Integration Directorate TRADOC G2

Executive Summary

The Cultural Mapping Series (CMS) tells a story about an operational environment (OE) through the combination of multiple map layers and an examination of the spatial patterns that emerge in the resulting composite. Presented here is a narrative about Nigeria based on are four such composites, created from a bank of 16 map layers covering the Nigerian OE and with topics spanning five general categories: physical, socio-cultural, events, perceptions, and temporal.

The purpose of the CMS is twofold; first, it serves to inform. The story told through the analysis of the composites can give a healthy snapshot of the socio-cultural issues and challenges of the OE. The composites can also be altered or new composites can be created altogether in order to help answer a specific question. Second, it serves to facilitate training by illuminating the geospatial component of the OE and utilizing social theories that may explain various socio-cultural phenomena. Composites and layers such as presented here can also be used to flesh out notional OEs in an exercise environment.

In the case of Nigeria, each composite led to the development of a particular judgment about the socio- cultural issues and challenges in the OE:

1. Ethno-linguistic divisions within Nigeria are shaped by geographic features, and exacerbated by the availability of economic opportunity and the codification of ethnocentric/religiously based systems of law. 2. Areas in which a majority of the population are Muslim, and that have adopted Sharia Law at the state level, correspond with regions that are economically hindered by insufficient infrastructure and economic opportunity relative to the rest of the country. 3. The 2015 Election results are reflective of the increased politicization of identity, which is a result of uneven economic development and opportunity and is reflected in both perceptions of trust concerning leaders with different social-identities and voter participation. 4. Violence across Nigeria is occurring as a result of social and economic tensions aggravated by increased interactions between highly mobile populations. While the violence is linked to broader social and economic trends, it remains relatively localized. While the judgments above are specific to the Nigerian OE, the underlying thematic conditions (push/pull factors, resource scarcity, demographic shifts, etc.) can be applied in other OEs, both actual and notional, that have similar conditions. Understanding how these socio-cultural conditions exhibit themselves in one OE will aid in understanding their presentation elsewhere.

iii

Introduction

CMS products are designed to address two distinct yet overlapping audiences by conducting OE analysis and providing the foundation for the accurate replication of complex real world socio-cultural phenomena in a training environment. CMS Nigeria is designed to not only tell the reader about Nigeria, but also to show them how socio-cultural information can be displayed geospatially in a way that allows correlations, patterns, and themes to be identified. This unique blend of geospatial information with a socio-cultural emphasis is intended to have utility for several audiences.

The first intended audience for CMS Nigeria consists of those individuals and organizations who are specifically focused on Nigeria, and who are seeking an analytic product focused on the socio-cultural aspects of an OE. By conducting analysis on geospatial data, GCKN has identified correlations and developed the following four judgments concerning socio-cultural phenomena within Nigeria:

1. Ethno-linguistic divisions within Nigeria are shaped by geographic features, and exacerbated by the availability of economic opportunity and the codification of ethnocentric/religiously based systems of law. 2. Areas in which a majority of the population are Muslim, and that have adopted Sharia Law at the state level, correspond with regions that are economically hindered by insufficient infrastructure and economic opportunity relative to the rest of the country. 3. The 2015 Election results are reflective of the increased politicization of identity, which is a result of uneven economic development and opportunity and is reflected in both perceptions of trust concerning leaders with different social-identities and voter participation. 4. Violence across Nigeria is occurring as a result of social and economic tensions aggravated by increased interactions between highly mobile populations. While the violence is linked to broader social and economic trends, it remains relatively localized. The second intended audience for CMS Nigeria is training specific, particularly those individuals and organizations tasked with the development, implementation, and adaptation of training OEs and scenarios. In line with the guidance provided by the Army Learning Concept for Training and Education, CMS Nigeria seeks to provide greater depth and complexity to how the Army replicates real world conditions into training OEs. Using Nigeria as an example, GCKN has identified the following thematic conditions that can be replicated through training.

Thematic Conditions  Push/Pull factors of population movements  Resource scarcity and resource competition  Ideological opportunity for extremism  Impact of demographic shifts upon existing political environment

CMS Nigeria is structured in a manner that first presents the reader with a narrative description of the OE based upon judgments made as a result of the CMS process. Following the narrative, CMS Nigeria presents analytic judgments based upon analysis of four multiple-layer GIS map composites. These composites, judgments, and the subsequent discussion form the basis for the next section, which is focused upon generalizing the findings in a manner that will have utility for both Nigeria specific training and also non-OE specific training focused on preparing Soldiers for encountering specific socio-cultural issues. While CMS Nigeria is presented in a linear manner, there may be some repetition between each section due to an effort to ensure that each section also be capable of being standalone.

Nigeria: A Complex Operational Environment

Nigeria is a relatively young nation that is still in the process of creating a collective identity within its socially, ethnically, and linguistically diverse population. Despite efforts to coalesce around a unifying national identity, social divisions and economic stratification continue to impede progress. As the largest economy in Africa, and one of the US’s largest trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria’s economic development and growth is critical to US interests in the region. It is a critical economic hub for the region, through which many sub-Saharan economies connect to the global economy. Given the US military’s current efforts to combat violent extremism around the globe and the development of regionally aligned forces, the ability to develop an understanding of the variety of different OEs that exist within Nigeria, and the factors that shape them, is important for members of the US Army concerned with this OE.

Difficulties Facing the Nigerian People in the New Democracy While Nigeria has seen rapid economic growth since its democratization in 1999, the country still “faces formidable challenges in consolidating democratic order, including terrorist activities, sectarian conflicts, and public mistrust of the government.”6 Nigeria’s struggles with violent extremism—in particular, the Boko Haram threat—have been identified as a priority concern by US Africa Command. In addition, Nigeria is experiencing increasing levels of urbanization, poverty, ineffective and corrupt systems, and unmitigated violence in both heavily populated urban centers and rural regions.7 With over half of its entire population under 25 years old, and an economy that has begun to rapidly retract after experiencing tremendous growth over the last 20 years (see Figure 1), Nigeria’s stability is in a precarious situation.8

Many of the issues facing Nigeria today are interconnected. Environmental concerns, stemming from climate change and aggravated by human actions, are rooted in the intensifying rate of desertification across much of the African Sahel region. Environmental issues, in turn, create economic uncertainty and can lead to ecological marginalization.9 Where populations have migrated from areas of relative scarcity toward areas with more resource availability, there is Figure 1. (Top) Nigeria's population pyramid increased resource competition and conflict between from 2016 showing the youth bulge. (Bottom) the 10 annual GDP of Nigeria over nearly 60 years, “natives and newcomers.” showing a period of exponential growth followed by a swift down turn beginning in 2014. Multiple Drivers of Internal Migration While individuals in Nigeria may become migrants for a myriad of reasons, these reasons are commonly rooted in issues like food scarcity and a lack of economic opportunity that are commonly associated with climate change.11 Large-scale migration is a complex issue in and of itself, and the question of whether or not migrants are able to blend into existing communities and economies or whether they meet resistance from existing populations will likely be one of the biggest challenges facing Nigeria. Concerns stemming from environmental change such as resource competition, ethnic tension, and intergroup distrust increase

2 the likelihood of socio-cultural and economic friction, and will likely continue to impact Nigeria over the next several decades.

These interrelated issues have led to the ecological marginalization of different communities as a result of increased migration and urbanization challenging and exceeding the capacity of existing infrastructure within Nigeria. Ecological marginalization is the descriptive term for when powerful individuals or groups seek control of resources, to the detriment of the less powerful. As resource scarcity continues to influence internal migration patterns and existing infrastructure fails to meet the increased demands of a growing populace, it is likely that localized competition and conflict over resources and space will become increasingly common.

The internal migrations in Nigeria and emigration into neighboring countries (see Figure 2), are occurring as a result of a variety of different push and pull factors (push factors include poverty, fear, and disasters; pull factors include both perceived and real economic opportunity, safety, and stability).12 Generally, Nigeria’s internal migrations occur as a result of challenges associated with climate change (e.g., drought, desertification) and a “society that is transitioning from an agricultural to an industrial economy.”13

The Push of Scarcity and Pull of Greener Pastures The ability of the average rural Nigerian to sustain a livelihood through traditional agricultural activities has been negatively impacted by a significant decrease in the availability of arable land. The decreasing amount of arable land is impacting the availability of work for agricultural laborers, who are also finding themselves being forced out of work as technological advances continue to reduce the manpower required in agricultural endeavors. Nigeria has sought to transform its agricultural sector through programs like The Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL), which aims to reduce the risk involved with lending in the agricultural sector.14 While NIRSAL and other similar programs are taking steps to stabilize and improve the sector, small-scale and subsistence farmers who lack exposure and access to valuable resources may be negatively impacted by larger-scale agricultural businesses seeking to expand operations.

The movement of pastoral populations toward the central and southeastern regions of the country as they seek more fertile lands to raise their livestock is another driver of internal migration. This movement has been driven by resource scarcity in areas impacted by climate change and the increasing rate of desertification across the north (i.e., push factors). As a result, the pastureland across the southeast portion of the country has become more enticing than the existing pastureland in the north. (i.e., pull factors). Migration toward these areas has led to the increased occurrence of ecological marginalization.15 Figure 2. A generalized depiction of patterns in population movements within and from Nigeria. The Push of Conflict and Despondency Internal migration also occurs as the result of continued instability caused by conflict.16 In order to escape the violence, refugees are forced from their homes to areas that offer economic opportunity, or traverse international borders into Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Populations that remain in place or travel only a

3 short distance during conflict are often exposed to food shortages, disease, and the limited availability of clean water.17

The Pull of Urbanization and Potential Economic Opportunity The lack of rural opportunities has led to an increased rate of urbanization, as people seek to establish themselves in a work force and earn a livelihood.18 Urbanization tends to occur when people are either experiencing or are at risk for economic hardship (i.e., push factors) and seek out the perceived economic opportunities (i.e., pull factors) offered by urban areas.19 Notably, it has been shown that “migrants tend to remain in cities once they have arrived at their destination country.”20

While most urban areas in Nigeria are experiencing population growth, Abuja, in the centrally located Federal Capital Territory, and the Lagos metropolitan area in the southwest, are growing at such a rate that their infrastructures are unable to cope with the rapid population growth. The Lagos metropolis, classified as a megacity and one of the fastest growing urban areas in the world, has been identified by the US Army as a place of concern due to its massive population, strained infrastructure, and economic disparity.21 Despite the perception among migrants that Lagos may provide opportunity, the physical and economic infrastructure has been unable to maintain pace with the rapid population growth over the last half century.22 While Lagos will likely continue to be one of the fastest growing urban areas in the world, Nigeria is also projected to see the largest increase in rural population over the next thirty years.23 The continued growth in both rural and urban areas could present challenges for how Nigeria chooses to direct investment in its infrastructure.

Dangerous Blend: An Insufficient Infrastructure and Identity-Based Friction Large-scale migration has potential to create friction between the migrating populations and the populations that inhabit the locations to which they are moving.24 This friction is compounded by the increased strain on urban infrastructure caused by the rapidly rising population, leading to effects where resource scarcity and instability in one region can lead to scarcity and instability in another region.25 This in turn, can create conflict and force inhabitants to seek out a new location.

While Nigeria as a whole has trended toward economic development and modernization, it is also a nation that is plagued by economic stratification rooted in social prejudices. Nigerian politics over the last decade have become increasingly tied to social identities, and the central part of Nigeria—in which much of the social friction is occurring—has become both a political and physical battleground for some of its population. The issues surrounding resource competition and internal migration are made even more complex by the role that social identity plays in shaping economic opportunity, development, and politics. Identity based divisions are being harnessed and exploited to galvanize segments of the population, blurring the lines between political and social identity and leading to an increase in ethno-linguistic tensions and conflict. While many of the issues facing Nigeria today are relatively localized in nature, they can be connected to identity-based tensions and create a risk that local issues could potentially be generalized to a broader population and rapidly engulf the nation. The Biafran War, from 1967-1970, provides an example of how ethnic tensions and nationalist aspirations have previously led to open conflict. If the localized violence occurring in Nigeria today were to place enough strain on the government’s ability to provide security, there is potential for ethnic nationalist groups to exploit perceived weaknesses and challenge the Nigerian government for control.

In the next section, we will examine four multiple-layer map composites that enabled these understandings of the complexities and dynamics of the Nigerian OE.

Cultural Mapping Analysis: Layer Composites

This section includes four composites of GIS layers, each selected because they tell a particular story about the OE through the specific phenomena observed. The composite layers chosen and depicted within this product represent a selection of the findings based upon analysis conducted by GCKN. The findings and subsequent judgements are based upon identified correlations. When appropriate, causation is shown through the inclusion of external empirical research, however the emphasis within this product is to highlight geospatial correlations. The reader is invited to utilize the interactive map provided in Appendix B, to develop additional composites, and to develop additional layers based upon further research.

Each composite will include:

List of Layers: A list of each layer utilized within the composite. Each individual layer is described in further detail in Appendix A.

SCAF Domain[s]: Identification of the relevant socio-cultural taxonomic categories found within GCKN’s Socio- Cultural Analytic Framework (SCAF). The SCAF can be utilized to help categorize information and drive follow-on questions and future collections efforts. For more information on the SCAF, please refer to Appendix C.

Judgment: The overarching theme that has been identified through composite layers.

Layer Observations (with Discussion): Description of patterns found within the composite layer. This discussion will also incorporate additional contextual information related to the layers.

Broader Discussion: Expanded discussion of the observations and assumptions based upon the information found within the composite of layers.

Composite 1: Ethno-Linguistic Divisions

Primary Layer Supporting Layers

Terrain & Natural Boundaries Climate Desertification

Ethno-Linguistic Groups

Land Cover Sharia Law GDP per Capita (PPP)

Judgment Ethno-Linguistic divisions within Nigeria are shaped by geographic features, and exacerbated by the availability of economic opportunity and the codification of ethnocentric/religiously based systems of law. Layer Observations (with Discussion) This composite depicts different ethno-linguistic groups within Nigeria situated within the physical constraints of the environment (i.e., terrain, climate, desertification and land cover). Examination of the Terrain and Natural Boundaries, Climate, Desertification, and Land Cover layers, reveals a pattern concerning the encroachment of desert land upon viable cropland and pasture in the north. By adding the GDP per Capita (PPP) layer a correlation becomes apparent, showing that those regions most impacted by desertification are inhabited by some of the most economically disadvantaged populations in Nigeria. These environmental realities may impact the ability of ethno-linguistic groups to maintain a preferred lifestyle or to increase their quality of life through the establishment and maintenance of a productive local economy.

The Ethno-Linguistic Groups layer identifies the populations within these regions as being primarily made up of the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri peoples. Both the Hausa and Fulani peoples have a tradition of pastoralism, although the majority of both the Hausa and Fulani in Nigeria have begun transitioning to more sedentary, or even urban, lifestyles. Despite this fact, pastoralism and the ability to have open access to resources such as pastureland and water remain significant issues. As the availability of resources required for both pastoral and agricultural livelihoods continues to decrease, many people across northern Nigeria are forced to choose between urbanization or pastoral migration toward the south and other areas with more resource availability. 26

Broader Discussion The physical environment has an impact on its inhabitants, increasing competition over limited resources and forcing individuals and groups to displace in search of better opportunity. This phenomena, described as ecological marginalization, results in increased resource competition throughout the regions and locations that are chosen as destinations by the migrating peoples.27 As a reaction, the elites and power brokers within a native population will often turn to an activity called resource capture, in which they utilize their power in order to grab resources they anticipate will become scarce in the near future.”28 Though it is perhaps too early to truly understand the intentions or ramifications of any resource capture occurring as a result of the Farmer-Herder conflict (see Composite 4), the state level governments in southeast Nigeria have begun codifying protections for the native farming communities through anti- grazing laws that seek to limit free-range grazing.29

Ethno-Linguistic divisions in Nigeria are indicators for how populations might behave in a given situation, particularly as related to internal migration. Both urbanization and pastoral migration have the potential to lead to increased friction and conflict between the migrating populations and those populations that are already established in the destination areas. As social groups encounter new populations, and experience increased uncertainty, they are likely to conform to the behaviors of individuals and groups that they identify with (i.e. social proofi). This can lead to non-rational decision making (as described by the Affect Theory of Social Exchangeii,30), and result in increased tensions due to perceptions of social identity threat.iii, 31 This increased potential for friction and conflict is being realized through both the Native-Settler conflict in and around the city of Jos, and through the Farmer-Herder conflict occurring across the rural portions of central and southeastern Nigeria. These two conflicts will be discussed in more detail in Composite 4: Internal Conflict, Resource Competition, and Identity.

i See Table 3 on page 16 for more information on the concept of Social Proof. ii See Table 3 on page 16 for more information on the Affect Theory of Social Exchange. iii See Table 3 on page 17 for more information on Social Identity Threat.

Composite 2: Social Identities and Economic Development Primary Layer Supporting Layers

Terrain & Natural Boundaries Natural Resources Transportation Infrastructure

Sharia Law

Population Density Ethno-Linguistic Groups GDP per Capita

Judgment Areas in which a majority of the population are Muslim, and that have adopted Sharia Law at the state level, correspond with regions that are economically hindered by insufficient infrastructure and economic opportunity relative to the rest of the country. Layer Observations (with Discussion) The primary layer of Composite 2 shows Nigerian States that have established Sharia Law as part of their plural legal system under the Nigerian Constitution. Formalization of Sharia Law by the states through democratic processes is an indicator that the majority of the populations in those areas may be Muslim, however, there are still minority populations that adhere to either Christianity or traditional indigenous faiths. This layer, when paired with the other layers in Composite 2, provides an indication of not only why certain ideas and faiths were able to take hold in different portions of Nigeria, but also how the modern economy and infrastructure of Nigeria correlates with both the location of natural resources and the linguistic and religious identities of the populations.

Natural Geography Shaping Social Interactions and Traditions By combining these map layers, we can begin to develop a rough understanding of how Islam spread into Nigeria from the north over the course of a millennia and likewise, how Christianity spread from the coastal regions in the south during the century and a half of British colonial control. The natural barriers formed by the Niger and Benue Rivers in central Nigeria may have restricted contact between populations of different faiths, creating situations where the existing social preferences for religion were able to withstand the pressures of expanding religions (Islam from the north and Christianity from the south).

When the Sharia Law layer is paired with the languages layer, it becomes evident that the spread of Islam within the region may have been initially helped by the relatively linguistically homogenous regions in

8 the north, while the linguistically heterogeneous regions in the southern portion of Nigeria may have hindered the spread of ideas across cultural and social barriers.

Economic Stratification The layers within this composite also highlight the correlation between an individual’s geographic location, the majority faith within that area, and the potential for economic disparity. This composite layer identifies a strong correlation concerning economic disparity. However, further research would be required to positively identify and confirm causation.

The petroleum industry clearly enables, and is likely the entire cause of, the higher GDP per capita in the Niger Delta region. Conversely, the relatively underdeveloped regions of northern Nigeria that are inhabited by the predominantly Muslim Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri ethno-linguistic groups have significantly lower GDP per capita than the rest of the country.

Identifying causation for this phenomena of economic disparity would require an in-depth historical study on the Nigerian Government’s development efforts over the last half century, as well as the economic foundations laid during the era of British Colonial Rule.

Broader Discussion The inclusion of Sharia Law into Nigeria’s official legal system is an extremely contentious issue. Many within the north, particularly Muslims, view the inclusion of Sharia Law as a positive result of democracy in action and a potential reaffirmation of the constitution adopted in 1999. Conversely, individuals and groups living in predominantly Muslim areas who are not of the Islamic faith argue that the inclusion of Sharia Law into the legal system is unconstitutional, as the constitution enshrines freedom of religion. The crux of the issue lies in how the each side, along with the government, interprets the difference between customary laws and religious law.32 The disagreement is not simply based in the interpretation of what the constitution intended, but also in the unique and distinct perspectives that accompany each party, with one side viewing “religion [as] a system of beliefs” and the other side viewing religion as “both a system of beliefs and a way of life.”33 The Nigerian constitution protects the usage of customary laws (i.e., those laws related to ethnic or tribal heritage), while outlawing the use of religious laws that would inhibit religious freedom. Currently the issue remains open, and is likely to remain undecided, as any ruling would likely lead to unrest among those populations who oppose it, creating further friction between groups with differing social identities.

Ethno-linguistic and religious identities are critical drivers of perception throughout Nigeria. In the case of this composite layer, ethno-linguistic and religious identities have strong correlations with economic well-being. The politicization of identity can lead to an increase in perceived identity threat, which in turn can exacerbate how individuals and groups interact with each other, make decisions, and maintain social resources across ethno-linguistic and religious divides.iv,34

iv See Table 3 on page 17 for more information on Social Identity Threat.

Composite 3: Social Identities and Political Power

Primary Layer Supporting Layers

Ethno-Linguistic Groups Sharia Law GDP per Capita

Election Results (2015)

Voter Turnout (2015) Presidential Trust (2014-2015)

Judgment The 2015 Election results are reflective of the increased politicization of identity, which is a result of uneven economic development and opportunity and is reflected in both perceptions of trust concerning leaders with different social-identities and voter participation. Layer Observations (with Discussion) Composite 3 is focused upon the results of the 2015 Presidential and Parliamentary elections. While there are likely many more factors that influenced the results, there are five supporting layers within this composite that provide indicators and potential explanations for the outcomes depicted in the Election Results layer.

The regions that voted overwhelmingly for Muhammadu Buhari—an ethnic Fulani and Muslim—were those states that share either his ethnic or religious identity. The states won by incumbent Goodluck Jonathan—an ethnic Ijaw and a Christian—also shared his ethnic, regional, or religious identity.

In areas where identity politics might not be as strong, the election was decided by narrower margins than in the north or far south. Many of these states have populations that are ethno-linguistically mixed and religiously mixed. Looking at both the GDP per Capita and Presidential Trust layers, the regions where the status quo was either not benefiting the population, or where there was a lack of trust concerning Goodluck Jonathan, the opposition candidate was more likely to succeed. Curiously, the percentage of registered voters that actually voted in these contested states (shown in the Voter Turnout layer) seems to have been lower than in areas where a candidate had a decisive identity related advantage (excluding Borno State, which was in the midst of combating Boko Haram).

Broader Discussion Relationships built on social identity remain a powerful aspect of the Nigerian political landscape. Nigeria’s history of exploitation through colonialism, military dictatorships, and inequality regarding economic development, has reinforced and solidified social perspectives along ethno-linguistic and religious divisions.

While the 2015 elections saw groups that were long associated with the political minority—and considered the opposition party—take power, the generations of political alienation and economic stratification will likely continue to shape political agendas for the near future. Nigeria’s next General Election in 2019 may once again be decided along ethno-linguistic and religious lines. The results of the next election may likely be viewed as either reinforcing the north’s recent political gains or as a rebuke of the Buhari administration and the APC, which could lead to a return to PDP and possibly southern control. As the political parties prepare for the election in 2019, there has already been a significant amount of posturing among members, with a number of APC members in the National Assembly defecting to opposition parties.

Regardless of which party takes control of the National Assembly and wins the Presidential election in 2019, if the election breaks down along identity based divisions, the results could cause further political alienation among the defeated social groups. This could lead to an increase in domestic frustrations and tension throughout Nigeria, as a result of perceived identity threat levels. If a group is defeated politically, and feels that they lack a path forward within the political system, they may be more likely to perceive an existential threat to their collective identity. Relatively isolated occurrences of discontent or violence could quickly spiral out of control if social identity is a major factor.

While identity has played an increasing role in political divisions within the country, there is growing evidence that politicians are increasingly willing to cross political lines. President Buhari’s APC experienced large scale, and prominent, defections during the run-up to the 2019 election.35

Composite 4: Internal Conflict, Resource Competition, and Identity

Primary Layer Supporting Layers

Terrain & Natural Boundaries Land Cover Population Density

Violence against Civilians (Fatalities)

Ethno-Linguistic Groups Sharia Law GDP per Capita

Male to Female Ratio Temporal Violence against Civilians

Judgment Violence across Nigeria is occurring as a result of social and economic tensions that result from increased interactions between mobile populations. While the violence is linked to broader social and economic trends, it remains relatively localized. Layer Observations (with Discussion) Through the examination of both the Violence against Civilians (Fatalities) layer and the Population Density layer, a unique pattern emerges. Generally speaking, one might assume that the frequency with which a human interaction occurs would be correlated to the population density of the area in which the integration occurs (i.e., denser populations likely have more interactions between members). However, by looking at both the fatalities layer and the population density layer, we can observe there are clearly events or phenomena occurring in the sparsely populated areas. Specifically, there are two distinct clusters around which the violence is centered (depicted in the Violence against Civilians (Fatalities) Layer found in Appendix A). Cluster 1: Boko Haram Insurgency Background and Discussion The first cluster, depicted with red circles in the map layer, can all be related back to the Boko Haram insurgency. While Borno State has a relatively low population density, the continued conflicts between

Boko Haram, the Islamic State of Western Africa (ISWA), and the Nigerian Government have caused significant violence.

The recent violence in northeastern Nigeria can be traced to a single group, and its splinter groups created as a result of infighting. The initial group, which self-identifies as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) and is known colloquially as Boko Haram (Western Education is Sin), was founded by a Salafist Cleric named Mohammad Yusuf in 2002.36 Boko Haram’s unique form of jihadism is founded in a firm sense of anti- colonial (anti-western) sentiment and a rejection of the traditional forms of Islam found within West Africa. While its goals have become more radicalized over time, Boko Haram originally sought a withdrawal from Nigerian society rather than an overthrow of the Nigerian Government.37 Table 1 provides an overview and timeline of the major events related to Boko Haram over the last decade.

Table 1. Timeline of Boko Haram related events. September: Boko Haram frees over 700 prisoners in a single event in northern Nigeria, 105 of whom are 2010 suspected as having previous connections to the group.38 August: Boko Haram claims responsibility for the bombing of the United Nations Headquarters building in 2011 Abuja, Nigeria. Boko Haram steps up attacks throughout northeastern Nigeria, targeting Christians, ethnic Igbo, and other 2012 Nigerians from the southern half of the country.39 2013 August: the US Department of State officially designates Boko Haram as a terrorist organization.40 April: Boko Haram kidnaps 276 girls from a school in Chibok, Nigeria. 2014 August-December: Boko Haram begins to rapidly expand the territory that it controls. January: Boko Haram attacks a multinational military installation and the surrounding towns near Baga, Nigeria. Estimates of casualties range from 150 dead to over 2,000. 2015 January: Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger form a military coalition against Boko Haram. March: Abubaker Shekau pledges the allegiance of Boko Haram to the Islamic State.41 August: Muhammad Yusuf’s son, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, was appointed by ISIL to be the leader for Boko 2016 Haram and its affiliated groups throughout West Africa.42 This marks the initial rift between Shekau’s Boko Haram and Barnawi’s splinter group, now called the Islamic State of Western Africa (ISWA). May: Over 80 schoolgirls kidnapped from Chibok, Nigeria, are returned during a prisoner exchange with the 2017 Nigerian Government.43 February: The ISWA faction of Boko Haram kidnaps 110 schoolgirls in Dapchi, Yobe State, Nigeria. 2018 March: The ISWA faction of Boko Haram releases the majority of the schoolgirls abducted in February.44

Following the death of Mohammad Yusuf in 2009, Abubaker Shekau took control of the group and began making preparations for ushering in a new era of violence. Table 1 lists a few of the higher profile events and occurrences related to Boko Haram since Abubaker Shekau’ rise in influence and control.

Since 2009, Boko Haram has grown in prominence, aligned itself with the Islamic State in 2015,45 and gained international recognition as a terror group. While the expansion of their presence has enabled and likely emboldened them as a group, it has also led to challenges as different ideological perspectives and priorities have taken hold within the group. The appointment of Mohammad Yusuf’s son Abu Musab al- Barnawi as the Islamic State’s West African branch leader represented a challenge to Abubaker Shekau’s control over Boko Haram and has resulted in internal fracturing of the group.46 The two rival factions, with al-Barnawi’s operating near Lake Chad and Shekau’s focused within Borno State, have taken different approaches to their operations. Though Shekau’s elements of Boko Haram have continued their tactics using extreme violence, Barnawi’s ISWA faction has spurned the use of indiscriminate attacks against civilians.47

The civilian casualties resulting from the conflict between the various religious separatist movements and the Nigerian Government reached a crescendo in 2015 and has since quieted down significantly in terms of the overall number of civilian casualties. Despite this significant reduction in civilian casualties, the threat posed by these groups as a terrorist organizations remains. Boko Haram’s emphasis has shifted

13 from gaining and holding territory toward conducting more high profile and indiscriminate terrorist attacks.48 ISWA, on the other hand, has sought to gain legitimacy among the population by taking on more traditional governance and administration activities.49

Cluster 2: Farmer-Herder & Native-Settler Conflict Background and Discussion The second cluster, depicted as yellow circles in the map layer, can be linked to two localized ethno- religious conflicts commonly known as the Farmer-Herder and the Native-Settler conflicts. While these two conflicts are geographically different, they are both offshoots of an underlying ethno-religious conflict occurring throughout central and southeastern Nigeria.50 As discussed within earlier composite layers, ethno-linguistic identities in Nigeria often align with religious identities.

The Farmer-Herder and Native-Settler conflicts are both localized and rooted in ethno-linguistic and religious tension, but they are exacerbated by economic competition and resource scarcity. The ethnic Fulani that have slowly migrated into the area are connected to pastoralism, and often find themselves in competition with the established population over issues such as water use, grazing, and land rights. These localized conflicts, though relatively unorganized in comparison to the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, tend to occur along ethnic and religious lines, with the belligerents publically denying overt organization while “insisting on the right to self-defense.”51 While this conflict has been taking an immediate toll upon those who find themselves involved, it is also having an indirect impact stemming from intermediation and fear, with both herders and farmers being more hesitant to ply their trade. This hesitation, in turn, leads to more poverty and food scarcity within the region.52

In the first six months of 2018, estimates indicate that over 1,300 people have been killed as a result of the Farmer-Herder conflict, roughly six times the number of people that have been killed as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency during the same period.53 Over the period of one weekend in late June 2018, over 200 people were killed in Plateau State alone.54 In response to the uptick in violence during the first half of 2018, several state governments have implemented anti-grazing laws that seek to limit free-range grazing.55 These laws have proven to be controversial and are viewed by pastoralists as being unfairly biased toward the native farming communities. Perceptions of inequality and injustice based upon not only how an individual earns a living, but also upon ethno-linguistic and religious differences, are likely to exacerbate the tensions within the region.56

The Native-Settler conflict, so called since the participants are the peoples who are traditionally from the conflict area and those groups of people who have recently migrated into the area is centered in and near the city of Jos. 57 Once the home of a robust mining industry (primarily focused on the extraction of tin ore),58 Jos was a destination for economic migrants seeking work throughout the 20th century. As a result of this economic migration, and more recently urbanization, Jos has seen significant increases in its population. The rapid contraction of the tin industry in the latter portion of the 20th century led to a reduction of investment and available jobs in the region. This increase of population and reduction of investment has been accompanied by struggles concerning “indigenous rights59, distributable resources, and political power.”60 The migration of populations to Jos has occurred for a number of reasons, in some cases it has been due to a general movement toward urbanization across Nigeria. In other cases the migrants are fleeing conflict in the surrounding states.61 Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, Jos was known for its “peaceful disposition,” and the lack of ethnic unrest seemed to contrast sharply with the levels of violence in surrounding areas. 62 This stability took a deadly turn in September of 2001 when violence broke out along ethnic lines, leaving over 1,000 people dead in under two weeks.63

Broader Discussion When studying violence in Nigeria it can be easy to focus on the regions that garner the most media attention. However, the data utilized to create the Violence against Civilians (Fatalities) layer revealed

14 the underreported conflict in southeastern Nigeria. The high levels of violence within the city of Jos are a result of cultural friction occurring between disparate groups with different socio-cultural traditions, ethno-linguistic lines, and religious backgrounds, and are exacerbated by formalized and informal prejudicial practices.64

When looking at the yellow cluster of fatalities, it is important to consider how elevated terrain features, dense land-cover, and obstacles such as rivers might impact the movement of humans, especially pastoral herders. Rivers, in particular, may play a large role in shaping the Farmer-Herder conflict, as pastoral herder mobility is likely to be channelized into areas with prominent river crossings. When overlaying the Terrain and Natural Boundaries layer with the Violence against Civilians (Fatalities) layer, a pattern begins to emerge showing that the Jama’are and Gongola Rivers, both of which are east of Jos, may limit pastoral mobility and thus may limit the number of pastoralists who migrate into that area. Additionally, violence seems to be geographically linked to with crossing points of the Benue River that are also associated with highways and railways, roughly 400km south of Jos.

Figure 3 illustrates the total number of fatalities within Nigeria between January 2013 and June 2018. One of the first aspects of the bar graph that is immediately noticeable is the spike in civilian fatalities related to Boko Haram from 2014 to 2015. While Boko Haram has been in existence since the early 2000’s, this spike is likely related to a change in tactics by the group toward occupying territory and a renewed Figure 3. A segmented bar graph depicting the total number of fatalities within push by the Nigerian Government to Nigeria, in six month periods, from January 2013 through June 2018. Each six counter their expansion. Of month period is divided by the same categories used within the “Violence against Civilians (Fatalities).” particular note is the spike in the first half of 2015, the bulk of which is related to a single event occurring in Baga, Nigeria, in which up to 2,000 people were killed (estimates vary from the Nigerian Ministry of Defense claiming only 150 casualties to media reports claiming over 2,000).65 The spike also includes the military offensive conducted against Boko Haram by four West African nations (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger), that began several weeks after the Baga massacre. A second point of interest shown in Figure 3 is the rise of fatalities related to the Farmer-Herder conflict in central and southeastern Nigeria in the first half of 2018 (the 2018 data is not included in the georeferenced map layer). The spike in fatalities associated with the Farmer-Herder conflict in the first half of 2018 shows a drastic shift from the established pattern associated with that region.

While Boko Haram and ISWA’s activities in Borno State remains an issue of importance both internally and regionally, the rapid uptick in violence associated with both the Native-Settler and the Farmer-Herder conflicts in central and southeastern Nigeria could further destabilize the national government’s legitimacy and place even more burden on the already strained security services of the nation.

Representing and Replicating Conditions in Realistic Training

The analytic study of Nigeria as an exemplar for potential socio-cultural characteristics of an OE can inform the replication of real world conditions in a realistic and complex training environment. The identification of geospatial patterns, accompanied by explanations from a socio-cultural perspective, can serve as a prototype for the development of training environments and scenarios seeking to replicate conditions that may be indicators or accelerators of instability within the Human Domain of an OE. As a tool for enabling realistic representations of OEs in training, the Composite Layers described within the CMS Nigeria product highlight a number of socio-cultural themes (shown in Table 2) that can inform scenario development and execution of training focused on Nigeria as an OE, on a notional OE (such as those found within DATE), or on training focused in real-world OEs that share similar characteristics and issues with Nigeria.

Table 2. Underlying Socio-Cultural Themes Identified within CMS Nigeria. Themes As demonstrated by geospatial patterns that are implicative of […]

[…] the various push/pull factors that may influence large scale population movements, Population and how those populations are either integrated or isolated by the environment to which Movements they moved.

Resource Scarcity […] the impact of the availability or scarcity of resources, both economic and social, on and Competition the Human Domain.

Ideological […] the manifestation of economic deprivation and political/social alienation that enable Opportunity extremist ideologies to encroach upon and displace traditional beliefs.

[…] how demographic shifts and the expansion of political franchise may unsettle the Political Balance existing status quo concerning the distribution of power and control.

In order to foster a training environment that maintains a high degree of realism as a scenario evolves, conditions change, and trainees react to and have an impact upon the OE, the underlying foundations of the training environment OE should be rooted in empirical principles in order to accurately reflect the real world. Social theories, frameworks, and principles can provide a guide for how scenario developers might introduce realistic complexity into training events following the initial and follow on actions taken by the participants.

Table 3, on the following page, represents just a small selection of the potential theories, principles, and frameworks from across the array of the social sciences that are applicable in providing potential explanations for some of the issues identified in CMS Nigeria. Each concept can be utilized to inform scenario injects and alterations, thus enabling the further depth of complexity that the Army Learning Concept for Training and Education (ALC-TE) calls for to enable Soldiers, Leaders, and Civilians to be able to “understand the situation, apply appropriate judgment, adapt to changing conditions, and transition effectively between operations.”66

Table 3. Catalogue of applicable social theories, frameworks, and principles.

Building on the economic principles of social exchange, the Affect Theory of Social Exchange Affect Theory incorporates the influence of individual and group emotions in order to account for seemingly of Social Exchange non-rational decisions made during interactions involving exchange. This theory seeks to (Sociology) explain why seemingly non-rational decisions are made during exchanges when a rational decision may have led to better results.67

Environmental The principle that human activities are shaped and influenced by the physical context in which Determinism they occur.68 (Human Geography)

The limited supply of a resource, coupled with a high demand for that resource, results in a mismatch between the desired equilibrium between supply and demand. Described as a scarcity Scarcity Principle bias, this effect can are often times lead to a higher value being given to resources that are (Economics and Social viewed as being scarce in comparison to resources that are perceived as being readily available Psychology) or abundant.69 This creates a degree of instability within an economy, which in turn can lead to competition over control of the valued commodity.70

The combination of two theories concerning how individuals identify with and categorize themselves into larger groups, and how those categorizations then can lead to comparisons. The Social Identity approach seeks to explain intergroup behaviors. Social Identity Theory seeks to explain how Approach individual’s develop and perceive their self-identity as being derived from their perceived (Social Psychology) membership and/or participation in social groups, which in turn, can explain intergroup interactions.71 Self-Categorization Theory describes how and why an individual begins to view a collection of individuals as a cohesive, or semi-cohesive group entity.72

Social Identity Threat posits that perceived threats that originate from both in-groups and out- groups can be grouped into four distinct categories. How an individual perceives an identity threat is influenced by the degree to which that individual identifies with the particular social group (high-low). The existence of a real or perceived threat can lead to a variety of responses and be a precursor to intergroup conflict.73

(1) Categorization Threat occurs as a result of an individual being categorized into a social group that they perceive as being negative, stigmatized, or otherwise undesirable.74 Social Identity Threat (2) Distinctiveness Threat is associated with the potential loss of a distinct social (Social Psychology) identity through comparison and generalization with other social groups.75

(3) Value Threat are those threats that erode the social value of a group, and can originate from both external and internal sources. Whereas threats from an out-group may be more easily identifiable, the misalignment of in-group behaviors with in- group values can lead to challenges concerning both group membership and group identity.76

(4) Acceptance Threat arises when an individual’s position, or potential position, within a valued group is undermined by a lack of acceptance by the group.77

Social Proof is a psychological concept of conformity that asserts that individuals and groups Social Proof will replicate the actions of others when faced with uncertainty or ambiguity. Conformity (Social Psychology) through social proof is often linked to individuals perceiving similarities between themselves (or their situations) and those whose actions they are replicating.78

Social Resources are those resources that foster social capital79 and are grounded in the social linkages and networks that can be traced within a community and between communities. As Social Resources networks expand beyond their immediate context or are displaced as a result of population (Economics and movement, their social resources can increase or decrease based upon the strength of their Psychology) network ties. Disparity in social resources between different groups can lead to increased intergroup competition and even conflict.80

Territoriality “The specific attachment of individual’s or peoples to a specific location or territory.” 81 (Human Geography)

Transhumance A form of seasonal human migration related to pastoralism and nomadism. Transhumance is (Human Geography) “the movement of herds according to seasonal rhythms: warmer, lowland areas in the winter; cooler, highland areas in the summer.” 82

Appendix A: Individual Layers

Prior to considering multi-layer composites, single layers of data must be identified and their general implications understood in relative isolation of the other layers. Conducting the initial analysis on a single layer not only provides an initial starting point for understanding, it also enables the development of assumptions and questions which, in turn, can drive research and collection efforts and inform the more holistic perspective that is gained by combining multiple layers.

The naming convention applied to each individual layer indicates the general category that the layer resides in (i.e., Physical, Socio-Cultural, Events, Perceptions, and Temporal), and the specific phenomena that is being displayed.

Each single layer has the internal state boundaries added for context, as well as a legend that describes the data shown in the layer, the sources of the data on the layer, and any explanations on how the layer was generated if applicable. In addition, the upper left part of each map will have highlighted in green any of GCKN’s Socio-Cultural Analytic Framework (SCAF) domains that are relevant to the layer. See Appendix D for more information on the SCAF (see Figure 4 below).

Figure 4. Example of the layout of information within each individual map layer presented in the following section.

Beneath the map itself, each individual map layer includes the following information:

Layer Description: A short description of the information depicted within the layer.

Implications of Phenomena: A short description of the general implications of the phenomena being depicted (these implications are not OE specific).

Observations: Specific observations made based upon the information displayed within the layer, as well as additional analysis and observations that may extend beyond the geographic area of the OE.

Physical: Terrain and Natural Boundaries

Layer Description Natural terrain features within Nigeria that might restrict or facilitate human movement or form natural boundaries.

Implications of Phenomena Terrain and natural barriers shape human behavior. In some cases terrain and geographic phenomena can enable access to an area or between areas, thus allowing populations to interact, expand and blend. In other cases, terrain and natural barriers can inhibit the movement of groups and limit interactions between different populations who might find themselves separated by terrain features.

Observations Nigeria’s physical terrain is dominated by four primary features:  The Jos Plateau, located within Plateau State, impacts all of the surrounding terrain features, forcing rivers to flow away from higher elevation.  The Niger River enters the country from the west, and flows east toward the center of the nation.  The Benue River enters Nigeria from Cameroon to the east, and flows west toward the center of the nation.  Both rivers converge in the south central portion of the nation, and flow south toward the Niger River Delta, which empties into the Gulf of Guinea.

Physical: Climate

Layer Description Different climate types found within Nigeria, based upon the Köppen Climate Classification system.

Implications of Phenomena The Köppen system is a classification system that divides climates into five primary climate groups and then further categorizes them by sub-group according to seasonal precipitation levels and temperature. This facilitates an understanding of what type of terrain and weather conditions mostly likely to be encountered in an OE.

Observations Nigeria’s geographic location between the Equator and the Tropic of Cancer, along with its proximity to the Saharan Desert places it in a unique situation in which the southern half of the country has a tropical climate, while the northern half of the country has an arid climate. The tropical portion of Nigeria is divided into two different zones: the tropical savanna (Aw) zone and the tropical monsoon (Am) zone. Both zones typically receive significant precipitation throughout the year, although the Am zone will typically see more rainfall than the Aw zone. In the north, a band of semi-arid/steppe (BSh) zone stretches all the way across northern Nigeria, while in northeast Nigeria the semi-arid zone gives way to a warm desert (BWh) zone. The BSh zone is an intermediary zone that separates the BWh of the Sahara desert from the Aw of the sub-Saharan region. The BSh zone within Nigeria is fairly typical of the larger Sahel Region, characterized by low precipitation rates, high temperatures, and the vegetation consisting of primarily grasslands, small woodland areas and shrub-land.

Physical: Desertification

Layer Description Extent of desertification impacting northern Nigeria.

Implications of Phenomena Desertification is characterized by “the impoverishment of vegetative [land] cover;” a reduction in the quality and availability of soil moisture; the deterioration of soil quality; reduced biodiversity; and an “increase in soil erosion.”83 The loss of viable land not only impacts the environment, but also has socio-cultural and economic ramifications. Drought, over-cultivation, and overgrazing combine with other factors to contribute to desertification, which in turn drives the population to engage in additional desertification contributing activities to meet growing demands.84

Observations Nigeria is a prime example of how over-cultivation and overgrazing can negatively impact an area. These two human-driven activities, paired with reoccurring periods of drought and global climate change, have set the conditions for the dramatic and relatively rapid desertification of wide swaths of northern Nigeria. The desertification occurring throughout the Sahel Region (the transition zone between sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahara Desert), has created a regional competition over available resources. In Niger, for example, drought and resource insecurity, paired with continued population growth, have created a situation characterized by heightened competition for available resources that spills across the Niger-Nigerian border. 85

Physical: Land Cover

Layer Description The physical material covering the land in Nigeria based upon the classification and mapping of multi-spectral satellite imagery.

Implications of Phenomena Land cover is shaped by, and also shapes, how humans interact with their surroundings. This in turn can influence how humans interact with each other depending upon resource availability/scarcity. In regions with limited access to certain desirable types of land cover, populations can find themselves in competition for limited resources (i.e., nomadic pastoral populations in competition with sedentary agricultural populations).

Observations Nigeria can be divided into three distinct zones, or belts, based upon land cover, the northern mixed vegetation and cropland belt, the central savanna intermixed with areas of cropland, and the southern forests and wetlands in the Niger Delta region. Much of Nigeria’s internal economy is driven by agriculture and pastoral activities.86 How the land cover is utilized is dependent upon many factors, starting with terrain features, soil quality, and the availability of water. It is possible that land identified as potential cropland is actually unusable in that manner due to rough terrain or poor soil quality. Additionally, the type of land cover present in an area can shape and canalize the human activity and movement. As an example, pastoral communities might prefer to avoid woody savannas in order to maintain the integrity of their herds.

Physical: Natural Resources (Minerals and Fossil Fuels)

Layer Description A selection of natural resources found within Nigeria. It is important to note that this layer shows only known resource deposits, and not where there may be active attempts to exploit resources.

Implications of Phenomena Abiotic resources (i.e., minerals) and fossil fuels are non-renewable resources that are extracted through mining and drilling, processes that can have a lasting effect on the environment. The successful extraction of these resources provides raw materials either for direct export or for use in manufacturing and other industries.

Observations The Niger River Delta has long been known for its abundance of fossil fuels. While this map layer is not inclusive of all abiotic natural resources and fossil fuels found within Nigeria, it provides a good indicator of where various resources are located, as well as which geographic regions of the population might benefit the most from each particular resource were it to be harvested through mining or drilling. This map layer does not incorporate the degree to which the infrastructure in each region has been developed in order to best exploit each of the different resources, or the impact of each industry on local economies. Nigeria is one of the largest producers of petroleum products in the world, and its economy has historically been built upon the petroleum industry.

Physical: Transportation Infrastructure

Layer Description Major lines of communication and mobility (highways, roads, and rail) within Nigeria.

Implications of Phenomena A nation’s transportation infrastructure enables populations to move more easily and facilitates commerce. This allows different communities to interact and engage with each other at a higher frequency than they would be able to otherwise. Ease of movement enabled by extensive transportation infrastructure can increase a population’s access to benefits like health and veterinary care. Access to the transportation infrastructure can become a source of communal competition, and could potentially lead to conflict.

Observations While much of Nigeria is connected by railway and minor highways, the lack of major highways providing ease of access throughout Nigeria may mean that rural communities are relatively isolated from the rest of the nation. One major consequence of the limited infrastructure within Nigeria is the availability of quality healthcare and veterinary care to rural populations, in particular the pastoral Fulani populations located across northern Nigeria.87 This lack of quality care increases the likelihood that nomadic communities might relocate to gain better access and could lead to increased competition over resources between the nomadic communities and the existing communities they are encroaching upon.

Socio-Cultural: Population Density in Nigeria

Layer Description Estimated population density per square kilometer within Nigeria in 2014.

Implications of Phenomena Population density is a measure of the number of inhabitants living within a prescribed geographic area. The density of a population can have many different implications; for instance, an overpopulated area can stress resource availability (jobs, food, water, shelter, etc.), creating competition for resources and decreasing the average quality of life for much of the population within that area. Likewise, extremely underpopulated areas may also have a lack of resource availability due to underdevelopment, which can also lead to a reduction in quality of life and an increase in poverty.

Observations Nigeria has a number of cities with densities over 5,000 persons per sq. kilometer. The coastal city of Lagos in southwestern Nigeria, in particular, is one of the world’s fastest growing cities and has some of the highest population densities within Nigeria. Most of Nigeria’s population is focused in large cities either near the coast/Niger Delta region or through the central north-south corridor (connecting the cities of Abuja, Kaduna, and Kano). Outside of urban centers, Nigeria’s rural areas tend to have a population density of under 100 inhabitants per sq. kilometer, with higher densities being clustered around villages and small towns along transportation routes.

Socio-Cultural: Ethno-Linguistic Groups

Layer Description Primary indigenous ethno-linguistic groups within Nigeria.

Implications of Phenomena Language shapes how individuals think about and perceive the world (this concept is known as Linguistic Relativity). The language, or languages, utilized in a particular region can be a strong indicator of ethnic, religious, geographic, and social ties that exist in that location. Languages, in turn, inform and shape cultures which frame how individuals and groups behave.88 Individual and group experiences are transmitted through language.89 Migrations of populations can bring different linguistic groups into contact with each other. The intermingling of distinct languages and cultures can lead to a novel cultural fusion, or, given negative circumstances, can lead to increased instability and identity based conflict.90

Observations While English is the lingua franca, Nigeria is home to over 500 different languages.91 This layer only depicts the 11 most prominent languages (excluding English) that are also tied to an ethnic identity, as well as the regions where there is not a single predominant language (labeled as mixed). The northern half of Nigeria is much more linguistically homogenous in comparison to the variety of different languages that are spoken in the southern half of the country.

Socio-Cultural: Sharia Law in Nigeria

Layer Description Nigerian States that have adopted Sharia Law since the adoption of the Constitution of the Federal Republic in 1999.

Implications of Phenomena Sharia Law is the religious law that has been formed within Islamic traditions. While Sharia Law forms a foundation of all Islamic religious practice, there are different interpretations that exist based upon the Fiqh (school of jurisprudence) that is prevalent among various Muslim populations, and upon various regional and cultural traditions from around the world.

Observations While this layer depicts the official and democratic institutionalization of Sharia Law by various states within Nigeria, it should not be misconstrued as depicting the presence or lack of presence of Muslim Nigerians throughout the country, or conversely a lack of non-Muslims in areas with Sharia Law. This layer suggests that the states in the northern half of Nigeria have majority Muslim populations based upon the results of democratic elections and subsequent legislation enacted by those officials. It does not, however, provide an indication of the population ratios that exist in the non-Sharia affiliated states, or imply that states that have implemented Sharia are religiously homogenous. While Nigeria’s constitution allows for multiple legal constructs to coexist under the same appellate system, the institutionalization of Sharia Law for civil and criminal purposes in the northern states, creates a unique challenge to the central government and the constitution of Nigeria.

Socio-Cultural: GDP per Capita

Layer Description Nigerian GDP per capita by state.

Implications of Phenomena GDP per capita looks at the total output of a region (in this case the state) and divides it by the population of that region. GDP per capita is generally considered as an extremely effective measurement of a country or region’s standard of living.

Observations Based upon this layer, it can be observed that Nigeria is extremely economically stratified by geographic region (and potentially along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines based on comparisons with other layers).  The Federal Capital Territory and the various states along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea and the Niger Delta have a significantly higher GDP per capita than the rest of the country.  In contrast to the relatively high GDP per capita in the south, the northern most states are much poorer.

Socio-Cultural: Male to Female Ratio

Layer Description Male-female ratio within Nigeria per a census conducted in 2006.

Implications of Phenomena The ratio/distribution of the sexes within a population has long been an indicator and precursor of other phenomena, and potential instability.  Predominantly female populations typically have a higher birthrate than predominantly male populations.92  In predominantly male populations, women are able to be more selective in choosing a spouse, often marrying- up in socio-economic status and leaving less desirable men marginalized and without marriage prospects.93 The marginalization of male populations with lower socio-economic status has been shown to threaten the stability of communities by causing an increase in levels of antisocial behavior and violence.94 Observations Nigeria, as a whole, seems to have fairly stable patterns concerning male-to-female ratios. However, there are vast areas of the nation that have higher rates of women than men, which could lead to higher birthrates in those areas. Conversely, there are two pockets in northeastern Nigeria where the male population significantly outnumbers the female population. Based upon the implications discussed above and looking only at the information provided by this layer, we can predict that these two pockets, and their surrounding areas, might have a higher likelihood of experiencing instability based upon the male-to-female ratio.

Events: Violence against Civilians (Fatalities)

Layer Description Violence against civilians that resulted in fatalities within Nigeria between 2013 and 2017.

Implications of Phenomena Civilian fatalities can be the result of falling victim to collateral damage during an ongoing conflict, or directly targeted by actors as part of a terrorism campaign. Both of these examples are likely tied to geographic areas and circumstances related to poverty in dense urban areas, or to militarily important objectives during conflict. Macro level economic conditions have been identified as showing correlations with increases in violent death rates.95

Observations There are two distinct clusters; the first cluster (in red) is directly related to the Boko Haram insurgency (encompassing both Shekau’s group and Barnawi’s ISWA) in the northeast of the country and focused in Borno State. The second cluster (in yellow) is found in the central and southeastern portion of the country, primarily in the states of Plateau, Benue, and Taraba. There are two geographically distinct, yet conceptually related conflicts occurring within this cluster. The conflict that is occurring in rural areas of southeastern Nigeria has been termed the Farmer-Herder conflict and is centered on ongoing rural land-use disputes between Ethnic Fulani pastoralists and the native farmers who own and work the land. The second conflict is occurring in and around the urban areas near the city of Jos, the administrative capital Plateau State. This conflict has been referred to as the Native-Settler conflict, which, like the Farmer-Herder conflict has its roots in ethnic and religious tension. However, the Native- Settler conflict is rooted in urban and suburban property rights rather than rural land use.

Events: 2015 General Election Voter Registration and Turnout

Layer Description Voter turnout as a percentage of voter registration for the 2015 Nigerian General Election, combined with a bar graphs depicting: total population/registered voters/ballots cast.

Implications of Phenomena Voter registration is a part of any healthy democracy, and is a demonstration on the part of the citizen, showing that they intend to exercise their civic rights as a member of a democracy. Actual voter turnout is an implication of the willingness of the individual to partake in the electoral process. Turnout can be negatively impacted by violence, trust in the government, trust in the process, belief in individual impact, and for a number of other causes.

Observations It appears that on average, registered voters (orange bars) number from a about a third to two-thirds of the total population (yellow bars), however, it is estimated that roughly half of Nigeria’s population is under the age of 18, and thus unable to vote.96 Overall voter turnout was estimated to be 43% of all registered voters, with 29.4 million votes being cast. The darker green areas illustrate that voter turnout was weaker in a band stretching across the southwest of the country, as well as a low turnout in Borno state. The General Election was delayed six weeks due to administrative delays and in order to allow Nigerian Security Forces more time to regain areas controlled by Boko Haram.97 Of particular note, Lagos State had a relatively low voter turnout despite having one of the highest populations and a relatively high percentage of voter registration.

Perceptions: Presidential Trust (Dec 2014-Jan 2015)

Layer Description Responses to a survey conducted between December 2014 and January 2015 concerning trust in Nigeria’s president at the time, Goodluck Jonathan. The specific survey question used to create this layer asked respondents “Do you trust in the President?”

Implications of Phenomena The geospatial representation of survey data can be extremely useful to gauge perceptions. However, the survey must have been conducted properly and the analyst must have full documentation of the methodology. In addition, the analyst must be careful with the analysis, fully understanding the questions that are asked and not making undue inferences. In the above example, the question refers specifically to the person occupying the presidential office; no inferences to the office or worse, the government should be made here.

Observations This layer must be considered as a snapshot in time that occurred prior to the 2015 General Election. According to the data utilized in this layer, the population in the southeastern portion of the nation felt more trust toward the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, than did any other part of the nation. This survey, conducted just months before the 2015 general election, proved to be a fairly accurate predictor of how different geographic regions within Nigeria would vote. After this survey was conducted, Muhammadu Buhari was elected president, and the Nigerian opposition party took control of the legislative body following the 2015 General Elections.

Perceptions: 2015 Presidential Election Results

Layer Description Election results of the 2015 Presidential Election between the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC) party candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, and the incumbent and People’s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan. Buhari won the Presidential election and his party, the APC, gained control of both legislative houses.

Implications of Phenomena Election results mapped geospatially can give an indicator of the general political mindset of the voters in a given area. Areas with high margins can be expected to be a much more homogenous political culture than areas with low margins.

Observations The results of the 2015 General Election represent a dramatic shift of power from the southern parts of Nigeria to the Northern portion.98 The shift of political power is a sign that the opposition party was willing and able to mobilize the population to participate in the established political processes rather than reject it. The election appears to have broken down along fairly rigid lines, with the regions of the south voting for the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, and the regions in the north voting for Muhammadu Buhari. There was, however, a nearly unbroken strip of states across central Nigeria in which the election was decided by less than 20% of the state’s overall vote.

Temporal: Violence against Civilians (Fatalities)

Layer Description Utilizing the same data set found within the Violence against Civilians: Fatalities layer, this layer isolates the data by year, and graphically depicts the results as aggregates at the Local Government Areas (LGA) level instead of point data (specific coordinates for each event).

Implications of Phenomena By visualizing these data at the LGA level and by year, changes in violence levels become immediately apparent. This type of visualization can show where, when, and how many events (in this case fatalities) occurred. What this visualization lacks is information on why, when, and where an event occurred, as well as its frequency (i.e., was it a single event or evenly distributed over a period of time). In order to understand why, more research is required to understand the specific nature of events and the role played by specific actors (i.e., violence attributed to insurgent forces versus that attributed to government or international forces).

Observations There are several patterns that emerge over the five year period covered by this temporal layer.  The first, and likely most obvious pattern is the sharp increase in violence within the northeastern portion of Nigeria occurring between 2013 and 2015. This violence is directly related to the rise in prominence of the Boko Haram insurgency and the subsequent response by the Nigerian government and a multinational coalition. While there are still significant levels of violence that occurred in this region through 2016 and 2017, there is a clear decrease in violence following the government’s response and the splintering of ISWA compared to 2014 and 2015.  The second pattern that emerges is the steady expansion of violence in the central and southeastern portions of the country. This pattern can be attributed to the Native-Settler conflict occurring within an around the city of Jos in northern Plateau State and the Farmer-Herder conflict occurring throughout the states of Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, and Taraba.  The third pattern that emerges from this temporal layer are the relatively steady, yet lower levels of violence that occurred within the Niger Delta region in southern Nigeria and around the Lagos Metropolis in southwestern Nigeria.

Appendix B: Interactive Layered Map

The map shown on the following page is an interactive digital map, containing each of the layers discussed within this product, as well as a few additional contextual layers for orientation. As a printed page, the map is of little use; however, when viewed online, or with a program like Adobe Reader or Adobe Acrobat, the map becomes interactive, giving the reader the ability to toggle layers on and off.

On the left panel of Adobe Reader/Acrobat should be a small icon shaped like three stacked diamonds (see Figure 5). Clicking this will open a layer window on the left-hand side which will allow the reader to toggle layers and generate composites.

GCKN encourages readers to experiment with new composites and to expand upon the analysis presented here.

Upon request, GCKN will provide each of the layers in an ESRI Map-package (MPK) file or a ZIP archive of the layers in shapefile (SHP) and GeoTIFF formats.

Figure 5. Guide to the location of the Visible Layers Button in Adobe Acrobat.

36 Nigeria Layered Map

Sokoto Katsina Nguru Gashua Use the SOKOTO

layers Birnin Kebbi KATSINA panel to JIGAWA Gusau YOBE toggle Kano ZAMFARA Maiduguri visibility Dutse Damaturu KEBBI Azare Potiskum Funtua KANO BORNO Bama of layers. Koko

Zaria

Biu Kaduna GOMBE Kontagora BAUCHI KADUNA Bauchi Gombe Mubi Kumo NIGER Jos

Minna Numan

Yola Bida Abuja PLATEAU ADAMAWA KWARA FEDERAL Keffi Jalingo Voter Turnout CAPITAL TERRITORY Ilorin Lafia 2015 General Election NASSARAWA Percentage of registered OYO Ogbomosho Iseyin voters casting ballots Wukari TARABA Oyo Lokoja Oshogbo EKITI Makurdi Iwo Ado Ekiti KOGI Less than 30% Ife Ikare Ibadan BENUE OSUN Akure Abeokuta Owo Oturkpo 31 - 40% Ondo Idah OGUN ONDO Ijebu Ode Nsukka 41 - 45% EDO ENUGU 46 - 55% Lagos LAGOS Enugu Benin City ANAMBRA Awka Onitsha EBONYI More than 55% Sapele Desertification Orlu CROSS Total population RIVER Registered voters Warri Owerri Umuahia Climate Classification Severe DELTA ABIA Ballots cast IMO Hot desert (BWh) Aba Moderate RIVERS Uyo Calabar Port HarcourtAKWA Hot semi-arid (BSh) IBOM 2015 Election Margins Opobo Civilian fatality events BAYELSA Tropical savanna (Aw) Buhari Jonathan (APC) (PDP) Tropical monsoon (Am) 6 - 10 Less than 20% Boko Haram Civilian fatalities by year 11 - 25 Transportation 21 - 40% / ISWA Per 100,000 people 26 - 50 Major highway 41 - 60% 1 - 25 Highway 51 - 100 Farmer-herder/ Terrain 61 - 80% native-settler 26 - 50 Road Elevation in feet More than 80% 51 - 200 101 - 500 Rail High : 7,936 All actors 201 - 400 Urban area Population density Low : -150 More than 500 More than 400 Persons per sq. km. Natural resources Under 100 Sharia law Oil 101 - 250 Land cover States with Sharia law Gold 251 - 500 Barren Diamonds 501 - 1,000 Savanna Per capita GDP (PPP) Gemstones 1,001 - 5,000 Woody savanna In USD Tin 5,001 - 10,000 Grassland Under $1,000 Over 10,000 Mixed vegetation $1,001 - $1,200 Male to female ratio Cropland $1,201 - $1,400 2006 census Presidential trust Forest $1,401 - $1,600 More females than males Not at all Wetland $1,601 - $2,500 Nearly equal numbers Not at all - Just a little Water $2,501 - $3,000 More males than females Just a little - Somewhat Urban Over $3,000 Many more males than females Somewhat - A lot 37 Appendix C: SCAF Framework

The Socio-Cultural Analytic Framework (SCAF) is a taxonomic framework developed by the Global Cultural Knowledge Network to assist military practitioners as they develop an operationally relevant understanding of the socio-cultural aspects of the Human Domain within an operational environment.

Political Domain The Political Domain is the totality of a society’s power and authority structures, institutions, and actors. The Political Domain includes the processes used to operate the government and maintain civil order.

Security Domain The Security Domain involves coercive groups within a society. Those groups may be armed (i.e., national militaries, militias, etc.) or unarmed (i.e., religious institutions, unions, etc.). They may be governmental (i.e., law enforcement agencies), anti-governmental (e.g.: criminal, insurrectionist, etc.), or nongovernmental (i.e., NGOs).

Economic Domain The Economic Domain examines the socio-cultural aspects of the economies of an OE. It includes descriptions of a society’s formal and informal (including traditional) economic systems and networks.

Population Domain The Population Domain is refers to the inhabitants of a particular town, area, or country. Population demography is used to develop an understanding of the age, sex, and racial composition of a population and how it has changed over time through the basic demographic processes of birth, death, and migration.

Society Domain The Society Domain is grounded in FM 3-24.2, which defines society as, “…a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity.” The term society can apply to a nation, a region, an organization, a community, or other social grouping.

Cultural Domain The Cultural Domain is derived from the definition of culture found within Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. This definition defines culture as “[a] system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society use to cope with their world and with one another.”

Infrastructure Domain The Infrastructure Domain consists of the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g., buildings, roads, and power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or enterprise.

Communications Domain The Communications Domain consists of how information is produced, distributed, and consumed by a population.

Geographic Domain The Geographic Domain consists of “…the physical features of the earth and its atmosphere, and of human activity as it affects and is affected by these, including the distribution of populations and resources, land use, and industries.”

Endnotes

1 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, “TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2: The Army Learning Concept for Training and Education: 2020-2040,” 2017. 2 Ibid., 11. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), “Area of Responsibility: West Africa: Federal Republic of Nigeria.” Accessed on July 18, 2018, http://www.africom.mil/area-of-responsibility/west-africa/nigeria. 7 Ibid. 8 International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce, “Exporting to Nigeria: Market Overview,” Accessed on July 19, 2018, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Nigeria-Market-Overview.; United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), World Factbook: Nigeria. Accessed on 17 July 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html. 9 Ecological Marginalization is the process through which individuals and groups in positions of power seek to take control of natural resources, and begin to deconstruct the existing environment through the removal or alteration of resources. In this case, ecological marginalization is occurring as resources are accumulated in order to deny their use by migrants. 10 Ole Magnus Theisen, “Blood and Soil,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 6 (2008): 803. 11 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. “Climate Change is A Key Driver of Migration and Food Insecurity,” 16 October, 2017. Accessed on 28 November, 2018, https://unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-a-key-driver-of- migration-and-food-insecurity.; World Bank Group, “Climate Change Could Force Over 140 Million to Migrate within Countries by 2050: World Bank Report,” March 19, 2018. Accessed on 28 November 2018, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- release/2018/03/19/climate-change-could-force-over-140-million-to-migrate-within-countries-by-2050-world-bank-report.; Clionadh Raleigh, Lisa Jordan, and Idean Salehyan, “Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict,” Social Dimensions of Climate Change, the Social Development Department of the World Bank Group (2008): 19-27.; Jumoke Beyioku, “Climate Change in Nigeria: A bierf review of causes, effects, and solution,” The Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 19 September 2016, https://fmic.gov.ng/climate-change-nigeria-brief-review-causes-effects- solution/. Accessed on 4 January 2019. 12 The World Economic Forum, Migration and its Impact on Cities, (2017): 15. 13 Bukola Adeyemi Oyeniyi, Internal Migration in Nigeria: A Positive Contribution to Human Development, The ACP Observatory on Migration (funded by the European Union), 2013, 28. 14 The Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending, “About NIRSAL,” 2018. Accessed on 15 November, 2018. https://nirsal.com/about. 15 Theisen, “Blood and Soil,” 803. 16 The International Organization for Migration, “World Migration Report 2018: Chapter 3 - Migration and Migrants: Regional Dimensions and Developments,” The United Nations Migration Agency (2018): 51. 17 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Nigeria: Conflict and prolonged displacement continue to affect millions of people, 27 October 2017, Accessed on 18 July 2018, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nigeria-conflict-and-prolonged- displacement-continue-affect-millions-people. 18 The World Economic Forum, Migration and its Impact on Cities, 24. 19 The International Organization for Migration, “Migration: Making the Move from Rural to Urban by Choice, a Statement by UN Migration Director General William Lacy on World Food Day,” 16 October, 2017. Accessed on 15 November, 2018. https://www.iom.int/news/migration-making-move-rural-urban-choice.; United Nations, “World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 Revision,” UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015): 1. 20 The World Economic Forum, Migration and its Impact on Cities, 26. 21 United States Army, “Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future,” The Chief of Staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group, (2014): 19. 22 Paul Knox and Sallie Marston, editors, Human Geography: Places and Regions in Global Context (4th Edition), (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 446-447. 23 United Nations, “World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 Revision,” 14. 24 Daniel Jordan Smith, “Internal Migration and the Escalation of Ethnic and Religious Violence in Urban Nigeria,” in Cities in Contemporary Africa, edited by Martin Murray and Garth Myers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 53-69. 25 United States Marine Corps Special Operations Command, “MARSOF 2030: A Strategic Vision for the Future,” (Camp Lejeune, NC: March 2018), 5. 26 Rafael Reuveny, “Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict,” Political Geography 26 (2007): 658.; Theisen, “Blood and Soil,” 814-815. 27 Ibid., 803. 28 Ibid. 29 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), “Growing impact of the Pastoral Conflict,” 4 July 2018, Accessed on 3 August 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/growing-impact-pastoral-conflict.

30 Edward Lawler, “An Affect Theory of Social Exchange,” American Journal of Sociology 107, no. 2 (2001): 321-352. 31 Nyla Branscombe, Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and E.J. Bertjan Doosje, “The Context and Content of Social Identity Threat,” in Social Identity: Context, Commitment, Content, (Oxford: Blackwell 1999): 35-58. 32 Abdulmumini A. Oba, “Religious and Customary Laws in Nigeria,” Emory International Law Review 25, no 2 (2012): 884. 33 Ibid., 881-895. 34 Nan Lin, “Building a Network Theory of Social Capital,” Connections: The Journal of the International Network for Social Network Analysis 22, no. 1 (1999): 46-48.; Nan Lin, “Inequality in Social Capital,” Contemporary Sociology29, no. 6 (2000): 785-795. 35 Paul Carsten and Camillus Eboh, “Defections hit Nigeria ruling party in blow to Buhari ahead of election,” Reuters, 24 July, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-politics/defections-hit-nigeria-ruling-party-in-blow-to-buhari-ahead-of-election- idUSKBN1KE18Q. Accessed on 12 December 2018.; Samson Ezea, “2019 and Fractured Opposition,” The Guardian, 28 June 2018, https://guardian.ng/politics/2019-and-fractured-opposition/. Accessed on 12 December 2018.; John Owen Nwachukwu, “Defection: APC officials declare support for Gov. Emmanuel, blast Akpabio,” Daily Post Nigeria, 10 December 2018, http://dailypost.ng/2018/12/10/defection-apc-officials-declare-support-gov-emmanuel-blast-akpabio/. Accessed on 12 December 2018.; Chioma Onuegbu, “APC members’ defection indicates PDP’s wide acceptance in A-Ibom,” Vanguard, 11 December 2018, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/12/apc-members-defection-indicates-pdps-wide-acceptance-in-a-ibom/. Accessed on 12 December 2018.; Chioma Onuegbu, “mass defection hits A-Ibom APC, as over 20,000 join PDP,” Vanguard, 11 December 2018. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/12/mass-defection-hits-a-ibom-apc-as-over-20000-join-pdp/. Accessed on 12 December 2018. 36 TRADOC G-2, Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration (TI), “Threat Tactics Report: Boko Haram,” (2015): 2- 3.; Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram Backgrounder,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5 March 2015, Accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/boko-haram.; Counter Extremism Project, “Boko Haram Threat Report,” 2018, accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/boko-haram.; John Campbell, “ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Boko Haram: Faces of Terrorism,” Council on Foreign Relations, 23 November, 2015, accessed on 6 August, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/isis-al-qaeda-and-boko-haram-faces-terrorism. 37 Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, “Mapping Militant Organizations: Boko Haram,” Stanford University, 2018, accessed on 6 August 2018, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553?highlight=boko+haram. 38 The Guardian, “Boko Haram Attacks – Timeline,” The Guardian, 25 September 2012, accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/boko-haram-timeline-nigeria. 39 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Boko Haram Widens Terror Campaign,” 23 January 2012, Accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/nigeria-boko-haram-widens-terror-campaign. 40 United States Department of State, “Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru,” Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 13 November 2013, Accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/266565.htm. 41 Al Jazeera News, “ISIL ‘accepts Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance,” 12 March 2015, accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/isil-accepts-boko-haram-pledge-allegiance-150312201038730.html. 42 Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, “Mapping Militant Organizations: Boko Haram.” 43 BBC News, “Nigeria Profile: Timeline,” 26 February 2018, accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- africa-13951696. 44 Ruth Maclean and Isaac Abrak, “Boko Haram returns more than 100 schoolgirls kidnapped last month,” The Guardian, 21 March 2018, accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/boko-haram-returns-some-of-the- girls-it-kidnapped-last-month.; “Dapchi Girls: Freed Nigerian Girls tell of Kidnap Ordeal,” BBC World News, 22 March 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/43489217. Accessed on 08 March 2019. 45 TRADOC G-2, ACE TI, “Threat Tactics Report: Boko Haram,” 4. 46 Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, “Mapping Militant Organizations: Boko Haram.” 47 Gillian Parker, “Boko Haram Continues to Drive Terrorism Threat in Northern Nigeria,” Forbes, 11 July 2018, Accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2018/07/11/boko-haram-continues-to-drive-terrorism-threat-in-northern- nigeria/#60af5a515d8d.; Phil Stewart, “Boko Haram fracturing over Islamic State ties, U.S. General warns,” Reuters, 21 June 2016, accessed on 8 August, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-boko-haram/boko-haram-fracturing-over- islamic-state-ties-u-s-general-warns-idUSKCN0Z72WT. 48 Parker, “Boko Haram Continues to Drive Terrorism Threat in Northern Nigeria.” 49 Paul Carston, and Ahmed Kingimi, “Islamic State Ally Stakes out Territory around Lake Chad,” Reuters World News, 29 April, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/islamic-state-ally-stakes-out-territory-around-lake-chad- idUSKBN1I0063. Accessed on 08 March 2019. 50 Makodi Biereenu-Nnabugwu and Andrew O. Obiajulu, “Communication Effect and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria’s Jos Metropolis: A study in Identity Politics,” International Journal of Advanced Research 3, no. 10 (2015): 286-297.; Joshua Segun and Ajibade Ebenezer Jegede, “Ethnicisation of Violent Conflicts in Jos?” Global Journal of Human Social Science: Political Science 13, no. 7, August 2013, Accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306065654_Ethnicisation_of_Violent_Conflicts_in_Jos. 51 Segun and Jegede, “Ethnicisation of Violent Conflicts in Jos?” 52 Ibid.

53 International Crisis Group, “Stopping Nigeria’s Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence,” Report no. 262, Africa, 26 July, 2018. Accessed on 2 August, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer- herder-violence. 54 Joshua Inauwa, “More than 200 people killed in weekend violence in central Nigeria,” Reuters: World News, 27 June, 2018. Accessed on 3 August 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/more-than-200-people-killed-in-weekend- violence-in-central-nigeria-idUSKBN1JN158. 55 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), “Growing impact of the Pastoral Conflict,” 4 July 2018, Accessed on 3 August 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/growing-impact-pastoral-conflict. 56 UN-OCHA, “Growing impact of the Pastoral Conflict.” 57 Ibid. 58 B.W. Hodder, “Tin Mining on the Jos Plateau of Nigeria,” Economic Geography 35, no. 3 (1959): 190-122. 59 The classification of individuals as either indigenous or migrant is codified through registries by local governments across Nigeria. This registration system has been credited with inflaming ethnic conflict and patrimonialism. 60 Kingsley L. Madueke, “Ethnicity, politics, land, religion and deadly clashes in Jos, Nigeria,” Observatoire International du Religieux, April 2018, Accessed on 3 August 2018, https://www.sciencespo.fr/enjeumondial/en/odr/ethnicity-politics-land- religion-and-deadly-clashes-jos-nigeria. 61 Kingsley L. Madueke, “From neighbors to deadly enemies: excavating landscapes of territoriality and ethnic violence in Jos, Nigeria,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 36, no. 1 (2018): 87-102. Accessed on 3 August 2018, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2017.1410529. 62 Ibid. 63 Madueke, “Ethnicity, politics, land, religion and deadly clashes in Jos, Nigeria.” 64 Ibid. 65 Mausi Segun, “Dispatches: What Really Happened in Baga, Nigeria?” Human Rights Watch, 14 January, 2015. Accessed on 6 August 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/14/dispatches-what-really-happened-baga-nigeria. 66 “TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2: The Army Learning Concept for Training and Education: 2020-2040,” 11. 67 Lawler, “An Affect Theory of Social Exchange,” 321-352. 68 Knox and Marston, Human Geography: Places and Regions in Global Context, 57. 69 Luigi Mittone and Lucia Savadori, “The Scarcity Bias,” Applied Psychology 58, no. 3 (2009): 453-468. 70 Stephen Worchel, Jerry Lee, and Akanbi Adewole, “Effects of Supply and Demand on Ratings of Object Value,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32, no. 3 (1975): 906-908. 71 Henri Tafjel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. by William Austin and Stephen Worchel (Ann Arbor, MI: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1979): 33-47. 72 Dominic Abrams and Michael Hogg, “An Introduction to the Social Identity Approach,” in Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances, eds. Dominic Abrams and Michael Hogg (London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1990): 1-9.; John Turner and Katherine Reynolds, “Self-Categorization Theory,” in The Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, Volume 2, eds. Paul Van Lange, Arie Kruglanksi, and Tory Higgins (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 2011): 399-410. 73 Branscombe et. al., “The Context and Content of Social Identity Threat,” 35-58. 74 Ibid., 37-41. 75 Ibid., 41-46. 76 Ibid., 46-50. 77 Ibid., 50-55. 78 Robert Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice, Fifth Edition, (Boston, MA, Pearson, 2009): 99. 79 Lin, “Inequality in Social Capital,” 786.; In her work, Lin defines social capital as “the investment and use of embedded resources in social relations for expected returns.” 80 Lin, “Building a Network Theory of Social Capital,” 46-48.; Lin, “Inequality in Social Capital,” 785-795. 81 Knox and Marston, Human Geography: Places and Regions in Global Context, 512. 82 Ibid. 83 Temidayo Ebenezer Olagunju, “Drought, desertification, and the Nigerian environment: A review,” Journal of Ecology and the Natural Environment 7, no. 7 (2015): 198. 84 Ibid., 200-201. 85 Mansour Moutari and Su Fei Tan, “Securing Pastoralism in East and West Africa: Protecting and Promoting Livestock Mobility: Niger/Nigeria Desk Review,” The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), (2008): 5, accessed on 15 August 2018, http://pubs.iied.org/G03034/. 86 United States Geological Survey Land Cover Institute, 0.5 km MODIS-Based Global Land Cover Climatology, November, 2016, Accessed on 14 November, 2018. https://landcover.usgs.gov/landcoverdata.php. 87 M. O. Awogbade, “Fulani Pastoralism and the Problems of the Nigerian Veterinary Service,” African Affairs 78, no. 3 (1979): 493-506. 88 Ifeyinwa Obiegbu, “Language and Culture: Nigerian Perspective,” African Research Review: An International Multi- disciplinary Journal, Ethiopia 10, no. 43 (2016): 69-82. 89 M.O. Ayeomoni, “Language, Food and Culture: Implications for Language Development and Expansion in Nigeria,” International Journal of Educational Research and Technology 2 no. 2 (2011): 50-55.

90 M.O. Ayeomoni, “Migration and culture: Implications on Nigerian languages,” Internal Journal of English and Literature 2, no. 9 (2011): 195-199. 91 CIA, “World Factbook: Nigeria.” 92 Stewart Johnson, “Sex Ratio and Population Stability,” Oikos 69, no. 1 (1994): 172. 93 Lisa Stolzenberg,"The sex ratio and male-on-female intimate partner violence,” Journal of Criminal Justice 38 no. 4 (2010): 555. 94 Ibid. 95 Bandy Lee, Phillip Marotta, Mokeh Blay-Tofey, Winnie Wang and Shalila de Bourmont, “Economic correlates of violent death rates in forty countries, 1962-2008: a cross-typological analysis,” Aggressive Violent Behavior 19, no. 6 (2014): 729-737. 96 CIA, World Factbook: Nigeria. 97 Alexis Okeowo, “An Election Postponed in Nigeria,” The New Yorker, 9 February 2015, Accessed on 20 August 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/election-postponed-nigeria.; Rose Troup Buchanan, “Nigeria delays elections over Boko Haram threat,” The Independent, 7 February 2015, accessed on 14 August 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nigeria-delays-elections-over-boko-haram-threat-10030696.html. 98 The Commonwealth Observer Group, “Nigeria Presidential and National Assembly Elections,” (28 March 2015): 8. Accessed on 10 August 2018, http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/Nigeria%2BCOG%2BReport%2BMarch%2B2015.pdf.