The Constitutional Morality of Abortion, 33 B.C.L
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Boston College Law Review Volume 33 Article 1 Issue 4 Number 4 7-1-1992 The onsC titutional Morality of Abortion Alan Brownstein Paul Dau Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons Recommended Citation Alan Brownstein & Paul Dau, The Constitutional Morality of Abortion, 33 B.C.L. Rev. 689 (1992), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ bclr/vol33/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW VOLUME XXXIII JULY 1992 NUMBER 4 THE CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY OF ABORTION ALAN BROWNSTEIN * PAUL DAU ** INTRODUCTION 690 I. THE MORAL DEBATE 700 A. The Extreme Positions 700 B. Abortion as Murder 703 1. Moral Standing 704 a. The Actuality Argument 704 i. The Species Argument 706 ii. The Personhood Argument 708 b. The Potentiality Argument 710 c. Common Problems • 714 2. The Wrongfulness of Killing 716 a. A Life Worth Living 718 b. Autonomy 720 3. The Morality of Killing and Abortion 721 a. The Value of Potential Life 723 b. The Conservative Rejoinder 728 * Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A., 1969, Antioch College; J.D.. 1977, Harvard University. The authors wish to thank Leslie . Jacobs, Richard Wydick, Kevin Johnson and Rex Perschbacher for reading drafts of this article and for providing helpful criticism. We also wish to acknowledge the help we received from research assistants, Suzanne Price and Natasha Moiseyev. ** B.A., 1973, McGill University; Doctorate in Philosophy, 1980, University of Pitts- burgh; J.D., 1992, University of California, Davis. 689 690 BOSTON COI LEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:689 II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING A WOM- AN'S DECISION TO HAVE AN ABORTION 743 A. The Failure of Roe v. Wade 745 B. The Varying Nature of the Woman's Interest 749 1. The Right to Sexual Autonomy and the Right to Bodily Integrity 750 2. The Right to Psychological Independence and Integrity 756 C. The Intersection of Moral Interests and Fundamental Rights 759 INTRODUCTION For the last two decades, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade has dominated and controlled any discussion of the legality of abortion in the United States. Today, given the changes in the Court's composition, the protection provided abortion rights by the Roe holding is clearly in jeopardy. That does not mean, however, that the issue of a woman's right to an abortion no longer remains one of vital constitutional significance. The question of abortion rights will not simply or easily go away. Even if the Supreme Court sharply distinguishes or overrules the Roe opinion, questions would remain, for example, as to whether an alternative foundation for protecting abortion rights exists in the Federal Constitution. As long as the Court recognizes some right of privacy and personal autonomy relating to sexual autonomy, bodily integrity and procreational decisions, it cannot easily isolate the decision to have an abortion) For certain Supreme Court Jus- tices who reject the Roe trimester framework, the problem is not whether women have some constitutional right to procreational choice, it is whether and to what extent the state's interest in pro- tecting potential life may override the woman's right to an abortion. 2 I This issue is itself open to debate. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 2 1n her dissents in Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1982), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), Justice O'Connor suggested that strict scrutiny should be used to review laws that "unduly burden" the right to an abortion. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814-33; Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-75. Given the state's compelling interest "in protecting potential human life" during the entire pregnancy, however, justice O'Connor explicitly recognized that such burdensome regulations may "withstand" even heightened review. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828. July 1992] THE CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY OF ABORTION 691 Moreover, several state constitutions explicitly or implicitly protect a right of privacy that is interpreted to include the right to an abortions Thus, the resolution of the abortion issue at the federal constitutional level would still leave complex constitutional issues open for state resolution. This article is grounded on the continued existence of a con- stitutional right on the part of women to make procreational choices, including, to at least some extent, abortion. Given that foundation, the purpose of the article is to examine the issue of abortion from a perspective that is typically ignored or misapplied in constitutional analysis, the morality of abortion. Indeed, in the debate over the legality of abortion, both proponents and opponents of abortion rights often seem to struggle unsuccessfully to fit their arguments concerning the morality of abortion into an appropriate constitutional context. Thus, the anti-abortion (or "pro-life") side condemns its op- ponents for avoiding the issue of right and wrong. Abortion op- ponents argue that all that proponents of abortion rights talk about is the right of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy without even discussing the morality of that choice. 4 The implica- 3 For examples of state constitutions that explicitly protect a right of privacy, see At.AsKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law,"); CAL. CoNsT. art, I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."); FLA. CoNts-r. art. I, 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life, except as otherwise provided herein."); HAW. Cops'r. art. 1, § 6 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."); Mow". CoNs-r. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the wellbeing of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."). These state constitutional provisions may be interpreted to protect the right to an abortion. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 172 Cal, Rptr. 866, 870-71 (Cal. 1981). See Jason DeParle, Beyond the Legal Right, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1989, at 28 ("The problem with much prochoice thinking is suggested by the movement's chief slogan, 'a woman's right to control her body,' which fails to acknowledge that the great moral and biological conundrum is precisely that another body is involved."); John Leo, The Moral Complexity of Choice, U.S. NEWS Sc WORLD REP., Dec. 11, 1989, at 64 ("The problem is not feminists' pro-choice stance but that the stance has no moral context. All the emphasis is on rights. None is on the morality of using those rights."). Even some feminist writers raise this criticism of proponents of abortion rights. Thus, Kathleen McDonnell argues: Some pro-choice advocates deny that abortion is a moral issue at all. A favorite slogan for a time in the pro-choice movement was 'Abortion is a health issue, 692 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:689 tion, of course, is that any such discussion of the morality of abortion would inevitably conclude that abortions should be prohibited. Advocates of legal abortion respond to this contention by dis- missing it as an irrelevant half-truth. "Pro-choice" supporters con- tend that even if having an abortion is immoral in certain circum- stances, it should not be illegals The fundamental right of privacy protected by the Constitution guarantees women the freedom to make procreative decisions.6 Women may not always exercise the right to determine whether or not to have children in a moral or responsible fashion,' but that is the nature of constitutional rights. 8 The speech of American Nazis may be cruel, insensitive, bigoted and wrong, but it nevertheless remains protected speech. 9 The Fed- eral Constitution reserves the decision to have an abortion, like the decision to preach intolerance rather than brotherhood, for the individual, not the state. not a moral issue.' [Under this view] abortion should be treated in the same way as any other medical procedure and should not be controlled by criminal law. Kathleen McDonnell, Pro-Choice Feminists Must Open up the Abortion Debate, U'I'NE READER, Mar.–Apr. 1987, at 109, 111. ' See, e.g., L.W. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 13-14 (1981) (noting the often imperfect fit between law and morality and concluding that demonstrations of the wrong- fulness or evil of abortion do not necessarily justify strict abortion regulations); see also H YMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CantuNAL jusricE 16 (1979) (describing acts that are not crimes although they "have the status of moral atrocity"); Daniel Callahan, An Ethical Challenge to Prochoice Advocates—Abortion & the Pluralistic Proposition, COMMONWEAL, Nov. 23, 1990, at 681 ("Those who call themselves 'pro choice' argue that the abortion choice is private and personal to women and should thus be left to them without the interference of the law.").