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Know Your NATO 1949-1959

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Know Your NATO 1949-1959 KNOW YOUR NATO N o rth A t lantic Treaty Organization 1949-1959 “KNOW YOUR NATO” INDEX 1. WHAT DOES NATO MEAN? 2. WHICH COUNTRIES BELONG TO NATO ? 3. WHY WAS NATO NEEDED? 4. WHAT STEPS WERE TAKEN? 5. WHICH COUNTRIES SIGNED THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY APRIL 4, 1949? 6. CAN OTHER COUNTRIES JOIN? 7. HOW DOES NATO RELATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS? 8. IS NATO THE ONLY SUCH REGIONAL PACT IN EXISTENCE? 9. WHAT ARE THE TERMS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY? 10. WHAT ARE THE GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS OF NATO? 11. IS NATO ONLY MILITARY IN SCOPE? 12. WHAT IS NATO’S ATTITUDE TOWARD DISARMAMENT? 13. NOW DOES NATO OPERATE? 14. HOW DOES NATO SETTLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ITS MEMBERS? 15. WHAT IS THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO? 16. WHAT HAS NATO ACCOMPLISHED SO FAR? 17. IS THERE A TIME LIMITATION UPON NATO? 18. WHAT IS THE CITIZENS’ ROLE IN NATO? 1. WHAT DOES NATO MEAN? NATO stands for North Atlantic Treaty Org ani­ zation. It is the prot ective shield for West ern civili­ zation which was called into being in 1949 by the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. It is a mutual assistance and self-defense association entered into by fifteen separate, sovereign and freedom-loving countries, to preserve peace and to promote stability and well-being in the Atlantic Community. 2. WHICH COUNTRIES BELONG TO NATO ? Belgium, Canada, France, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxem­ bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 3. WHY WAS NATO NEEDED? Due to the attitude of the Soviet Union it became necessary for the Atlantic Community to seek new and closer forms of association for collective security and the maintenance of peace. In 1944, after the defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan, Britain and France, together with the United States and Canada, had rapidly demobilized and disarmed. No democratic government, responsive to the will of the people, could have done otherwise in face of the universal longing for lasting peace which animated men of good will everywhere. The only standing forces of any consequence which the West maintained on the Continent of Europe were a handful of units for occupation purposes in Ger­ many. In contrast to this deep-rooted desire for peace and international cooperation, clearly expressed in deeds as well as words, what was the situation on the other side of the Iron Curtain? Certainly the will for peace of the peoples of Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe was just as strong as in the West, but they were powerless to influence the policy of the Kremlin. The stark fact was that the Soviet Union had not demobilized or disarmed. In 1945, it still had some four and a half million men on a war footing, while its armament industries were working at high pressure. In addition, it was actively re-organizing the forces of its satellite states on Soviet lines, in spite of the fact that the re-armament of Bulgaria, Hungary and R u m an ia was a direct violation of the peace treaties signed with those ex-enemy countries in 1947. 1 Nor should it be forgotten th at the Soviet Union had tried with varying success to extend its influence in other parts of the world by direct or indirect a ction: in Greece, Malaya, and Indo-China, through civil war started by guerillas based in neighbouring Communist states, and in Manchuria and North Korea through occupation forces. These were the grim facts of Soviet expansionism, to which freedom-loving peoples could not in the long run close their eyes. In the diplomatic field the situation was just as ominous. The high hopes for the continuance of war-time collaboration between East and West ente r­ tained at the foundation of the United Nations in 1945 had quickly been dashed by consistent Soviet obstruc­ tion and abuse of the veto. Finally, the coup d’état in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin made it clear that democratic, peace-loving countries could not count on the United Nations Security Council alone to ensure their protection. 4. WHAT STEPS WERE TAKEN? (a) TH E D U N K IR K TREATY (1947) The first step was taken in March 1947, when the United Kingdom and France signed a 50-year “TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND M U TU A L ASSISTANCE” in full conformity with their obligations under the United Nations charter. This treaty, known as the DUNKIRK TREATY because it was signed there, was a step in the right direction, but it did not go far enough. So the United Kingdom took the initiative the following year by proposing that the Treaty of Dunkirk be extended to include the BENELUX countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg). This re­ sulted in the (b) BRUSSELS TREATY OF 1948 The idea was quickly taken up, and on March 4, 1948, representatives of Belgium, France, Luxem­ bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to work out the details of a treaty of mutual assistance. The BRUSSELS T REATY which was signed about two weeks later was more than a mere military pact. Described as a “Treaty of Eco­ nomic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense”, it provided for a joint military planning organization for common de­ fense, whose headquarters were set up later that year at Fontainebleau. 2 (c) O TH ER CO U N TR IES DECIDE TO JOIN THEM Even while this Treaty was in process of nego­ tiation its sponsors recognized that, just as in the case of European economic recovery, the defense of Western E urope would never be fully effective without American assist ance. From the American side there was no lack of good will, but there were certain difficulties, both psychological and constitutional: the feeling that Europe should itself first show what it was prepared to do and the fact that the United States had never previously undertaken military commitments outside the American continent in time of peace. Once the Brussels Treaty was in existence, however, the first difficulty was removed. The second problem was resolved within three months, when a bi-partisan motion, affirming American determination “to exercise die right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”, was adopted by the United States Senate. This resolution recom­ mended "the Association of the United States by constitutional process with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its nation al security.” It further urged the United States to contribute "to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its nation al security”. So the Brussels Treaty had paved the way for a broader and more effective Atlantic Alliance. In April 1948, Canada came out in favor of the larger alliance and by July 1948, formal meetings began in Washington. From die outset it was agreed that the proposed treaty must be compat­ ible with the Charter of the United Nations. While the Treaty was still being drafted, Den­ mark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal came in too. Early in September, the negotiators were able to recommend to their governments that it should conform to the following broad aims: to prom ote peace and security; to express the deter­ m ination of the parties to resist aggression within a well-defined area; to be based on the principles of self-help and mutual aid; to be more than a military pact in that it should promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic peoples; and to provide 3 effective machinery for implementation . Agreement was quickly reached on these objec­ tives, and on 10 December 1948, the drafting of the actual treaty began in Washington. 6. WHICH COUNTRIES SIGNED THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON APRIL 4, 1949? The Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C., by the following 12 countries: B e l g iu m , C anada , D e n m a r k , F ra n c e , I c el a n d , I t a l y , L ux e m b o u r g , N e t h e r l a n d s , N o r w a y , P o r tu g a l , U n it e d Kin g d o m , U n it e d S ta tes . 6. CAN OTHER COUNTRIES JOIN? Yes. A rticle 10 of the Treaty says: Any European country may be invited to join NATO if all the partners agree that it is in a position to farther the Treaty’s aims and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Possession of territory bordering on the North Adantic Ocean is not a prerequisite for membership. So were added: (A) GREECE and TURKEY ( 1952) The accession of Greece and Turkey (In February 1952) enlarged the NATO area and the Treaty was accordingly modified by the “Greece-Turkey” Protocol. Then (B) W ESTERN GERMANY (1955) The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany (in May 1955) caused no change in the Treaty since Western Germany was part of the NATO area (as defined in Article 6 below). 7. HOW DOES NATO RELATE TO THE UNI­ TED NATIONS ? The United Nations Charter specifically states in Article 51: -Nothing in this present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. NATO is an organization for collective self-defense.
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