Transatlantic Security and Defense Links at Risk? NATO, the United States and the European Union at a Crossroads

By Elena Kemmerzell

Abstract

This paper deals with the coexistence of NATO and the EU’s security and defense policy. It analyzes if transatlantic relations are threatened, e.g. by European security policy-related solo efforts like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The research questions are ‘What are the security interests of NATO Allies within the Alliance?’ and ‘In what way do the EU’s efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy influence the transatlantic relationship?’. The analysis shows that American isolationism is not present currently and that strengthening European security and defense is an asset and not a threat to NATO. Hence, neither NATO nor the US should worry about European endeavors as they have advantages for NATO’s military strength, although its development proceeds slowly. Potential progress will show if the EU can implement its security and defense undertakings.

Key words: NATO, security and defense policy, EU, PESCO, transatlantic relations

Die vorliegende Studie behandelt die Koexistenz der NATO und der Sicherheits- und Vertei- digungspolitik der EU. Es wird analysiert, ob die transatlantischen Beziehungen gefährdet sind, beispielsweise durch europäische sicherheitspolitische Alleingänge wie die Permanente Strukturierte Zusammenarbeit (PECSO). Die Forschungsfragen sind „Was sind die Sicher- heitsinteressen der NATO-Alliierten innerhalb der Allianz?“ und „Inwiefern beeinflussen die Anstrengungen der EU, ihre Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik zu stärken, die transatlantischen Beziehungen?“. Die Analyse zeigt, dass derzeit kein amerikanischer Isolationismus präsent ist und dass die Stärkung europäischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsmechanismen ein Asset und kein Konkurrenzverhalten für die NATO darstellt. Aufgrund dessen sollten sich weder die NATO noch die USA um europäische Vorhaben sorgen, da diese Vorteile für die militärische Stärke der NATO haben, diese Entwicklung jedoch nur langsam voranschreitet. Potentielle Fortschritte dieser Vorhaben werden zeigen, ob die EU ihre Sicherheits- und Ver- teidigungsvorhaben umsetzen kann.

Schlagwörter: NATO, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, EU, PESCO, transatlantische Beziehungen

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 1 2. Theoretical Approach to Neorealism ...... 3 3. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ...... 8 3.1. The Founding of NATO, Its Development and Command Structure ...... 8 3.2. NATO’s Strategic Concepts ...... 13 3.3. Outstanding NATO Operations ...... 15 3.4. Current Challenges of NATO ...... 20 4. Exemplary Actors within NATO and Their Security Interests in the Light of Current Internal Challenges ...... 25 4.1. The United States within NATO ...... 27 4.2. Germany within NATO ...... 33 4.3. Poland within NATO ...... 38 5. The European Union’s Own Security and Defense Efforts and Its Relationship to NATO ...... 42 5.1. The History of the European Union’s Security and Defense Efforts ...... 42 5.2. Permanent Structured Cooperation ...... 45 5.3. The European Union’s Strengthening of Its Own Security and Defense Policy in Relationship to NATO ...... 49 6. Conclusion ...... 56 7. Bibliography ...... 59 7.1. Primary Sources ...... 59 7.2. Secondary Sources ...... 64 8. Appendix: Self-Conducted Interviews ...... 71 8.1. Self-Conducted, Personal Interview with James D. Bindenagel ...... 71 8.2. Self-Conducted, Personal Telephone Interview with Elisabeth Braw ...... 79

III

List of Abbreviations ACO Allied Command Operations (Strategic Level) ACT Allied Command Transformation (Strategic Level) AIRCOM Air Command AU African Union AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System BC Before Christ CARD Coordinated Annual Review on Defence CDU Christian Democratic Union of Germany CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CIA Central Intelligence Agency CISG Center for International Security and Governance CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy DGAP Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V. (German Council on Foreign Relations) DSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe EAEC European Atomic Energy Community EC European Communities ECSC European Coal and Steal Community EDA European Defence Agency EDC European Defence Community EDF European Defence Fund EEAS European External Action Service EEC European Economic Community ESDI European Security and Defence Identity ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EU European Union EUFOR European Union Force EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission EUPOL European Union Police Mission FNC Framework Nations Concept GDP Gross Domestic Product HR/VP High Representative/ Vice President IFOR Implementation Force

IR International Relations ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria JFC Joint Force Command (Operational Level) JISR Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance KFOR Kosovo Force LANDCOM Land Command MAPE Multinational Advisory Police Element MARCOM Maritime Command MoD Minister of Defense (oftentimes also used for Ministry of Defense) NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCS NATO Command Structure NFS NATO Force Structure NIP National Implementation Plan NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NRC NATO-Russia Council NRF NATO Response Force NTCB-I NATO Training and Capacity Building Activity in Iraq (as of December 2017, now called NMI: NATO Mission in Iraq) OPCOM Operational Command PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation PfP Partnership for Peace PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team PSC Political and Security Committee RAP Readiness Action Plan SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACT Supreme Allied Commander Transformation SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SFOR Stabilisation Force SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SSC Single Service Command (Tactical Level) TEU Treaty on European Union TFEU Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force US(A) United States (of America) USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force WEU Western European Union

1. Introduction

“As Europeans look at the best way to organise their foreign and security policy cooperation, the key is to make sure that any institutional change is consistent with basic principles that have served the Atlantic partnership well for 50 years. This means avoiding what I would call the Three Ds: decoupling, duplication, and discrimination.”1

Former Secretary of State of the United States of America (USA), Madeleine Albright, was skeptical about a strengthened European security and defense policy that should exist next to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which the United States (US) is part of. She already voiced her concern about the European Union’s (EU) project in the late 1990s but the topic is by no means outdated. Rather, it is still present today and relevant more than ever. As most NATO Nations are also members of the EU2, the US constantly fears that the EU’s plans to strengthen its own security and defense will lead to the following: a decoupling on the Eu- ropean side from the United States, leading to a weakening of NATO which usually represented strong transatlantic ties; duplications concerning defense capabilities which would be a waste of resources; and discrimination, meaning that those NATO members who are not part of the EU will suffer from disadvantages and exclusion within the transatlantic Alliance.3 In the past 20 years, the European Union’s attempts to become a more independent security and defense actor have shown results, although the projects only made progress slowly. Nevertheless, the EU has started to focus on the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017 to intensify its Member States’ cooperation within the security and defense domain. The United States is again concerned about the future of NATO, the impact of PESCO and further European steps.4 This paper will focus on the relationship between NATO and the EU in security and defense matters. Are their transatlantic security and defense links at risk? Are NATO, the United States and the European Union at a crossroads? As will become evident in this analysis, the United States and some members of the European Union sometimes have different perceptions about security and defense issues. The EU has come to a point where it has to redefine and restate its future expectations within NATO and its relationship to the United States. As this thesis is written in the academic field of International Relations (IR), the theory of neorealism according to Kenneth N. Waltz is consulted in the first chapter. In this regard, the term ‘security’ will be used frequently and will only refer to a state or organization’s external

1 Albright 1998, p. 11. 2 Cf. Rosecrance 2013, p. 158. 3 Cf. Albright 1998, p. 11. 4 Cf. chapter 5 of this paper.

security. The second chapter deals with the development of NATO, shortly tracing its creation and parts of its history, but mainly focusing on today’s structures, its current Strategic Con- cept, outstanding NATO operations as well as current challenges of the transatlantic Alliance. Subsequently, three representative NATO partners and their national security interests are focused on, namely the United States as NATO’s lead nation and on the opposite side of the Atlantic Ocean, Germany as a European long-time member of NATO and Poland who has joined NATO as a former Warsaw Pact5 country. The last chapter before the conclusion deals with the history of the Common Security and Defence Policy6 (CSDP), the newly established Permanent Structured Cooperation and the relations between NATO and the European Un- ion’s efforts in strengthening their own security and defense policy, including the United States’ point of view. Thus, the question will be answered if the EU’s projects are a supplement or an alternative to NATO. In this regard, the research question is two-fold: In order to emphasize the theory of neorealism, the first question will be ‘What are the security interests of NATO Allies within the Alliance?’ The second part is ‘In what way do the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy influence the transatlantic relationship?’, which will be focused on afterwards. Hence, three hypotheses have been developed, which show the possible paths both sides – the US and the EU – could take in regard to NATO. First, due to a perceived American isolationism and new spheres of US interest, the United States slowly withdraws from Europe in its own interest. Second, it is asserted that while strengthening its own security and defense policy, the European Union will become a competitor to NATO and will diminish the United States’ influence in Europe. Third and in contrast to the second hypothesis, NATO profits from the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy because this way, the EU contributes more to its own security and thus, the Unit- ed States as a major provider of the Alliance gets relieved of the greatest financial burden and other responsibilities. These three hypotheses should be kept in mind during this analysis and will show the tensions between the Allies and particularly the current situation between the US and the EU. The analysis in this paper will show that American isolationism does not re- flect the current reality (hypothesis 1) and that the EU’s attempts to strengthen its own security and defense are meant to be an asset to NATO (hypothesis 3) and not a contender (hypothesis 2). Thus, the first two hypotheses will be refuted whereas the third one will be verified.

5 The Warsaw Pact was a Soviet treaty of collective defense, mainly consisting of satellite states of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 6 The EU and NATO officially use British English. Therefore, original terms and names will be written in British English although this thesis is using American English.

Sources and literature on NATO and the EU as well as on their relations are broad as both organizations reach back to the middle of the 20th century. Therefore, the references for this thesis vary and include excellent source material, such as official documents and statements that have been made available by NATO, the EU and governments. Additionally, opinions of scholars of International Relations and of experts in defense and security policy have been referred to, such as Bastian Giegerich, Johannes Varwick and Stanley R. Sloan, among others, who all contributed much to research about NATO and its relationship to the EU. Special emphasis should be placed on former US diplomat in Germany, Professor James D. Bindenagel, and Swedish senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Elisabeth Braw, with whom the author of this thesis conducted personal interviews.

2. Theoretical Approach to Neorealism

This chapter mainly deals with one of the most influential and relevant theories in Interna- tional Relations, namely the theoretical approach of neorealism according to the US American political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz. Many researchers after him have tried to extend or even challenge his assumptions. Yet, Waltz’ ideas will be focused on here because he developed the theory of neorealism. His theory is also referred to as defensive neorealism7 or as structural realism8. Neorealism, which has been developed in the 1970s9, is part of the research domain of In- ternational Relations and originates in the theory of classical realism. Hence, in order to understand neorealism according to Waltz, the model of classical realism needs to be explained beforehand. Pioneers of classical realism, which is mostly referred to as realism, and famous thinkers who are associated with this theory are older than this school of thought itself. Ex- amples include the ancient Athenian historian Thucydides, Italian diplomat Niccolò Machia- velli, English philosopher Thomas Hobbes and German sociologist Max Weber.10 Particularly notable among these prominent personalities is Thucydides as he is often regarded as “the father (...) of realism”11. He witnessed the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) on which he analyzed the balance of power among states. According to him, the war between the Greek Poleis Athens and Sparta happened due to uneven power positions, as Sparta felt inferior to and

7 Cf. Masala 2010, p. 61. 8 Cf. Gu 2010, p. 69. 9 Cf. Masala 2005, p. 23. 10 Cf. Gu 2010, p. 55. 11 Lee 2016, p. 98.

threatened by the rising power Athens and thus started a war.12 Two aspects that classical realism assumes have been voiced by Thucydides: First, he described human nature as being egoistic, meaning that human beings will only act according to their own interests, striving to achieve power and security. Thucydides has allegedly been the first one who developed a concept of hegemonic war, which arises due to different scopes of power accumulation between nations. Second, the Athenian historian claims that there is no power authority super- vising countries, which means that states live in a system of anarchy.13 These assumptions are also part of classical realism as it is known today. In regard to the discipline of International Relations, US American political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau formulated the theory of classical realism in the 1940s, which he introduced in his work Politics Among Nations (1948). Morgenthau observed the American tendency to idealism and thus published his book in order to draw attention to the importance of the concept of power in international politics.14 At the center of Morgenthau’s realism is the “struggle for power”15. This notion claims that nations accumulate power for the purpose of reaching their goals. In this sense, actors seek to influence the behavior of their opponents.16 Besides stating that every country pursues power politics, Morgenthau asserts – just as Thucydides long before him – that the world is anarchic, which indicates that states are responsible for themselves, not following the rules of any authority. Thus, they try to influence one another but they act differently according to their status: they either try to “keep power”, “increase power” or “demonstrate power”17.18 Like Thucydides, Morgenthau insists that human nature is selfish in terms of pursuing self-interests as a priority. This idea correlates to the struggle for power in that human beings, just as states, want to be in a position of power as they see others as potential threats and thus want to ensure their self-preservation and power position.19 However, realism is by no means in favor of an unethical practice of power politics but simply regards the accumulation of power as a reality. This is evident as Morgenthau urges politicians to consider ethical behavior in international politics.20 There are several assumptions classical realism and neorealism share as the latter is a theory deriving from realism. Both realistic threads have a negative image of the world, assume an anarchic world order and thus a system of self-help in which states have to take care of them-

12 Cf. Gu 2010, p. 55. 13 Cf. Lee 2016, p. 98. 14 Cf. Gu 2010, pp. 53f. 15 Ibid, p. 54. 16 Cf. ibid, pp. 58f. 17 All: ibid., p. 60. 18 Cf. ibid. 19 Cf. ibid., pp. 62f. 20 Cf. ibid., p. 67.

selves for survival. Yet, power is central to realism whereas security is at the core of neorealism.21 There are more differences between both theories. Neorealism has been developed by US American political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz. In Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis (1959), he first outlined some of his ideas that can be found in neorealism later like the assumption that states are located in a system of anarchy.22 His work mainly focuses on three potential causes, referred to as images of International Relations, which can be responsible for starting a war. The first image deals with the evil nature of human beings23, the second image holds a state’s bad internal structure responsible for the outbreak of a war24 and the third image contains that the international anarchic system can cause war as nations always strive to achieve their goals by their own means including force and the acceptance of conflict. Hence, states try to secure their own safety.25 In line with the third image, two other aspects of neorealism are addressed: First, states are the actors within the international system, not individuals.26 Second, every state’s ultimate goal is to achieve security because it wants to survive and thus continue to exist, no matter what other aims it pursues. This results in a balance of power system in which weaker states increase their capabilities in order to keep pace on the international stage.27 It is important to note that neorealism is not in line with the first two images. This is evident by regarding the fact that neorealism does not assert that human beings are inherently bad and that it regards states as ‘black boxes’, which implies that a state’s internal structure does not influence its actions within international politics.28 Waltz developed the concept of neorealism due to his criticism of classical realism. Ac- cording to Waltz, Morgenthau’s classical realism contains many argumentative deficits and lacks coherence. Additionally, Waltz has different views on the premises realism describes. Instead of claiming that human beings are inherently bad, Waltz supports the notion of the rational-thinking, well-informed and self-interest-driven economic man who is a “single- minded maximizer”29. All these characteristics can be transferred to the state as a sovereign political entity who can decide by itself how to act on the international stage, for instance by cooperating with other states.30 States as the main actors in neorealism also pursue their self-

21 Cf. ibid., pp. 70f. 22 Cf. Waltz 1959, p. 11. 23 Cf. ibid., p. 16, p. 39. 24 Cf. ibid., p. 81. 25 Cf. ibid., pp. 159f. 26 Cf. ibid., p. 180. This assumption is inherent to neorealism. 27 Cf. ibid., pp. 204f. 28 Cf. Gu 2010, pp. 72-74. 29 Ibid., p. 72. 30 Cf. Masala 2010, p. 57.

interest and want to reach their goals with the help of the resources they own in order to uphold their individual security.31 In addition, a state is seen as a ‘black box’ whereby a state’s domestic policy does not interfere within its international politics. In this respect, neorealism solely deals with a state’s external security and does not observe its interior security.32 As survival is essential to states, they all pursue it. Although countries face the same tasks and are therefore “like units”33, they differ in their capabilities such as “size, wealth, power, and form”34, which represent a country’s power and thus their skill to accomplish these tasks varies. States with many or high capabilities are the ones who exert the most influence and shape the international system.35 In the anarchic system of self-help, states are competing for scarce resources, which help them to guarantee their survival also with respect to the fact that they do not know the plans of other states. This leads to the accumulation of power so that a state’s position can be upheld or improved.36 In this sense, power is only a functional instrument in neorealism but not the ultimate goal as in classical realism.37 The accumulation of power, however, can result in other states feeling threatened, which can lead to conflict. But according to Waltz, the likelihood of conflict gets reduced by other existing powers who are striving for a balance of power, which is an essential element to neorealism. The less big powers exist – such as in a bipolar system – the smaller is the potential of conflict.38 Another new aspect of neorealism is its structuralism. According to Waltz, the international system is a combination of structure (the organization of units) and interacting units (states).39 Neorealism does not solely orient itself on philosopher Adam Smith’s micro theory when it comes to the economic man but also asserts that the international structure can be compared to the mode of operation of a market: The market is an unintended construct, which arises because of the individual actions of units that simply pursue their own interests. How- ever, the structure that emerges through all these activities influences all units and forces them to interact.40 This structure limits states in their activities and countries get conditioned by the anarchic system.41 Waltz addresses this issue accurately: “(…) the freedom of choice of any

31 Cf. Gu 2010, pp. 71f. and cf. Masala 2010, p. 54. The idea of the economic man is taken from Adam Smith’s micro theory. 32 Cf. Gu 2010, p. 74. 33 Masala 2010, p. 58. 34 Waltz 1979, p. 96. 35 Cf. Gu 2010, p. 77. 36 Cf. Masala 2010, pp. 59f. 37 Cf. Gu 2010, p. 73. 38 Cf. Masala 2010, pp. 59f. 39 Cf. Waltz 1979, pp. 79f. 40 Cf. ibid., pp. 89f. 41 Cf. Masala 2010, p. 54.

one state is limited by the actions of all others”42. In this sense, a state underlies structural constraints to which it needs to adapt. An assumption central to this analysis concerns the formation of alliances as NATO is an alliance that has been created due to security reasons of the participating members. Neoreal- ists claim that states cooperate as soon as it has become clear who benefits from it, mainly in terms of security and balance of power.43 This shows that coalitions are interest-led. Addi- tionally, Waltz claims that states within a cooperation have an advantage over those who are not part of one because of mutual support.44 The next chapter will focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is the transatlantic Alliance. However, neorealism regards such international organizations solely as instruments in order to realize national interests.45 All in all, neorealism mainly asserts the following points: States are seen as the main actors in neorealism and they interact as units of an anarchic international system in which they want to ensure their survival. Different to realism, neorealists state that units do not seek power in the first place. For them, security is the highest asset. As states want to ensure their survival, they might seek power in order to achieve security, which means that power functions only as an instrument for neorealists. The balance of power theory is important in regard to the formation of coalitions as weak states do not necessarily approach stronger states (bandwagoning) but they coalesce with weaker entities to achieve balancing to survive and thus profit from one another. Hence, states want to assure their position within the system. Moreover, these units do not differ in function but in their capabilities.46 Since the beginnings of neorealism, many scholars such as John J. Mearsheimer or Randall L. Schweller extended and adjusted this theory. These two represent the version of offensive neorealism, which varies from Waltz’ defensive neorealism. Both theories are part of structural realism and share common beliefs but the primary claim of offensive neorealism is that states seek to maximize their power to get into a superior position.47 In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), Mearsheimer challenges Waltz’ assumptions, saying that great powers aim for being a hegemon and thus the most powerful state.48 This argument contradicts Waltz’ suppositions as he indicates that too much as well as too little power carries potential danger for states as weak states are easier to attack and powerful states cause other states to feel threatened, resulting in a situation known as the ‘security dilemma’. This term has been

42 Waltz 1959, p. 204. 43 Cf. Gu 2010, p. 46. 44 Cf. Waltz 1959, p. 204. 45 Cf. ibid. 2000, p. 18. 46 Cf. Vogt 1999, pp. 44-46. 47 Cf. Masala 2010, pp. 61f. 48 Cf. Mearsheimer 2001, p. 2.

coined by the German-American scholar John J. Herz in his book Political Realism and Polit- ical Idealism (1951). Herz’ notion describes that states compete for power in order to gain the highest possible degree of security and be prepared for conflict, resulting in a “struggle for survival”49.50 Hence, offensive realism contradicts an aspect that is central to Waltz’ defensive neorealism, namely that power is not the highest goal of states. Security is at the core of Waltz’ neorealism, which is also central to NATO.

3. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

This chapter will focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the transatlantic Alliance linking the defense and security of North America and Europe. Both continents share the same values and common interests, which strengthens Euro-Atlantic relations.51 The founding of NATO can be explained by means of the theory of neorealism. Although neorealist theorists expected the dissolution of NATO after the Cold War, they find explanations for its enduring existence as will be shown subsequently.

3.1. The Founding of NATO, Its Development and Command Structure

NATO was founded in 1949 in order “to protect the people and territory of its members”52. Today, NATO contains 29 Member States from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.53 The core idea of the transatlantic Alliance is the principle of collective defense, meaning that in case of an attack on any NATO Nation, the other members come to its defense as outlined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them (…) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (…)”54

49 Herz 1951, p. 4. 50 Cf. Waltz 2008, pp. 56-59 and cf. Herz 1951, pp. 3f. 51 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 4. 52 NATO 2018a. 53 Cf. ibid. 54 NATO 1949.

Originally, NATO’s first twelve members55 were concerned with the expanding power of the Soviet Union (USSR) and its Communism as well as with a potential rise of Germany after the horrors of World War II. Many European countries, the United Kingdom (UK) in particular, feared isolationist tendencies of the US and ultimately its withdrawal from Europe whereas they were eager to include the powerful United States into the European defense structure after the war. Secret consultations between the UK, the US and Canada led to the North At- lantic Treaty, which was signed on April 4, 1949 in Washington D.C., and entered into force on 24 August of the same year. Besides collective defense, NATO focused on deterring the USSR.56 Neorealists like Waltz and Mearsheimer did not foresee NATO’s endurance after the Cold War as it contradicts their theory. According to them, national interests and competition should have reemerged and states should have continued to pursue their usual balance of power politics.57 As Mearsheimer puts it, “cooperation takes place in a world that is competitive at its core”58. However, after the competitive period of the Cold War ended, NATO remained in place, other than its counterpart, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Yet, Mearsheimer insists that states always strive for a balance of power especially because they still live in an anarchic system.59 In this regard, it needs to be mentioned that although the United Nations (UN) exerts a certain influence on the international stage, its impact is limited and it does barely pose a universal and binding authority to all countries.60 The 21st century offers new threats, which lead countries to uphold transatlantic security and defense links within the cooperation of NATO. Thus, states follow their security interests, some of which all NATO members share. Nowadays, NATO is not only defined by a common enemy as during Cold War times but by shared interests, institutions and a common identity.61 These factors are in line with the suppositions of neorealism. Notwithstanding, Waltz claims that smaller Europe- an states will challenge the United States’ power sooner or later as there is no balance of power, which is essential to neorealism.62 Now that Russia has reemerged as a major threat, NATO Allies share increased security interests. What will happen after a possible conflict resolution one day remains open, but it is likely that NATO will be maintained as it was after

55 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US are NATO’s twelve founding members. 56 Cf. Giegerich 2012, p. 10-17. 57 Cf. Rees 2011, p. 5. 58 Mearsheimer 2001, p. 53. 59 Cf. ibid., pp. 360f. 60 Cf. Masala 2005, p. 13. 61 Cf. Thimm 2014, pp. 3f. 62 Cf. Waltz 1993, p. 75.

the Cold War. For now, NATO has not lost its “raison d’être”63 but found new tasks such as conflict management, out-of-area operations and peace missions.64 Former US diplomat in Germany and Professor at the Center for International Security and Governance (CISG) at the University of Bonn, James D. Bindenagel, agrees that NATO is still relevant today. In this respect, he emphasizes NATO’s defense aspect and the collective perception of a threat as this is the key element, which connects parties. Additionally, Bindenagel stresses that NATO is a political organization as well and thus functions as a forum for debates, which increases its relevance.65 Throughout the years, NATO membership expanded. From the twelve founding Nations, 17 more have joined NATO later on, adding up to 29 Member States today, thus pursuing an “Open Door Policy”66. The US, the UK, Canada and France belonged to the founders of the transatlantic Alliance. Soon after, Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty paved the way for the membership of Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955) and Spain (1982).67 Although Germany’s entry into NATO already was a milestone for the Alliance, the first Eastern enlargement of NATO changed its face. In 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became part of NATO, which aroused many debates beforehand. Proponents of this round of enlargement claimed that NATO would carry stability to Eastern Europe and thus secure Eu- ropean borders. Moreover, the Euro-Atlantic space would be amplified and unite all of Eu- rope. Opponents of enlargement mainly argued with Russia’s perceptions, fearing that Russia would reverse its reforms and show more anti-democratic tendencies if NATO would approach its borders. Further, the opposition of NATO enlargement doubted that NATO members would be able or willing to fulfill their NATO commitments to a bigger pool of Member States. In the mid-1990s, NATO established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program as a compromise and as an outlook and collaboration program for countries interested in a future NATO membership. Just as important to the discussion were the reasons of Eastern European states to join NATO as they regarded NATO as the guarantor for security after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.68 This debate shows that NATO and its (prospective) members engage in politics of self-interest, particularly when it comes to its security, which is in line with neorealism. The last country that joined NATO after passing the requirements of NATO’s Mem-

63 Meier-Walser 1997, p. 17. 64 Cf. ibid. 65 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 1. 66 NATO 2018a. With this policy, any country in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a NATO member if it meets the standards NATO asks for and pursues the same values. 67 Cf. ibid. 2018b. 68 Cf. Kamp 2001, pp. 208-210, p. 218.

bership Action Plan was Montenegro (2017)69, which is situated in the Western Balkan region. Its admission into NATO is significant as the Balkans have been an unstable and civil war-torn region in the 1990s. Yet, Montenegro was able to join the Alliance recently due to its development and stability as a Western Balkan state.70 It is important to note that NATO consists of sovereign states. Hence, all decisions are taken in unanimity and cooperation remains voluntary. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision making body within NATO. Norwegian politician Jens Stoltenberg is the current Secretary General who acts as head of several NATO bodies such as the NAC and represents the organization as a whole.71 NATO’s Command Structure (NCS) includes “permanent multinational headquarters at the strategic, operational and component levels of command, distributed geographically and commonly funded”72. In order to be able to tackle existing threats, the NCS is regularly reviewed and adapted to the current security environment. The highest military authority within NATO comprises all Member States’ Chiefs of Defense who serve under the Military Committee.73 Moreover, NATO consists of two strategic headquarters at the top level, namely the Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the Al- lied Command Transformation (ACT). In order to understand the interoperability within NATO on several levels and within transatlantic relations, the roles of both strategic headquarters will be explained. ACO is located in Europe with its Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and other Commands such as the Joint Force Commands (JFC) in Naples, Italy, and Brunssum in the Netherlands. ACO is responsible for planning and executing military operations conducted by NATO. The Supreme Allied Com- mander Europe (SACEUR) has Operational Command (OPCOM) over all forces forming under ACO. ACT is stationed on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, more precisely in Nor- folk, Virginia, but also has locations in Europe. On the one hand, ACT tasks include “education, training and exercises, and promoting interoperability”74 and on the other hand, it serves as a body for strengthening transatlantic relations. ACT is under the command of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).75 The NCS gets support from the NATO Force Structure (NFS), which is composed of national and multinational forces of NATO Member States.76 All in all, ACO and ACT are Commands at the strategic level, the JFCs are on the

69 Cf. NATO 2018b. 70 Cf. ibid. 2017a. 71 Cf. Giegerich 2012, pp. 21-24. 72 NATO 2018c. 73 Cf. ibid. 74 Ibid. 2018a. 75 Cf. ibid. 76 Cf. ibid. 2018c.

operational level of command and the Single Service Commands (SSC) like Air/ Land/ Mari- time Command (AIRCOM/LANDCOM/MARCOM) are at the tactical level with their functional focus.77 The mantra of former Secretary General Lord Robertson was “capabilities, capabilities, capabilities”78. NATO itself does not own many capabilities. Rather, NATO Member States contribute capabilities, which usually consist of a country’s overall power, including factors such as size, economy, demography, technology and military.79 Airborne Warning and Con- trol Systems (AWACS) are aircraft, which monitor activities in the sky and control the airspace. They are mainly used for detecting aerial based activities while being able to spot other aircraft several hundred kilometers away. As of June 2017, NATO owned an AWACS fleet consisting of 16 aircraft for “air surveillance, command and control, battle space management and communications”80, which is based at the NATO Airbase Geilenkirchen in Germany. These AWACS fly in international airspace and over Turkey, from where the Syrian and Iraqi airspace can be monitored. AWACS are currently the only chief military resources NATO owns by itself.81 All in all, NATO’s development can mainly be divided into four periods. NATO I (1949- 1989) describes the Alliance as a security coalition against external threats during the Cold War, NATO II (1990-1999) defines the immediate post-Cold War era in which NATO expanded to the East and NATO III (1999-2014) includes the period where NATO became active in out-of-area missions. NATO IV (2014-today) deals with NATO’s new challenges, particularly caused by the Russian aggression towards Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.82 NATO’s almost 70 year old history suggests its resilience. For example, no Soviet threat, not France’s temporary departure from NATO’s military structure, not the termination of the East-West conflict nor the disputes over the war in Iraq (US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003) have caused the dissolution of the Alliance.83 As already implied above, neorealists have difficulties to explain why NATO continued to exist after the end of the Cold War as the common enemy and biggest threat – the USSR – has vanished. Nonetheless, new threats have emerged in the 1990s until today, leading NATO members to maintain the Alliance for security reasons, which is in compliance with the theory of neorealism.

77 Cf. SHAPE 2018. 78 Quoted in Hendrickson 2006, p. 121. 79 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 28. 80 NATO 2017b. 81 Cf. ibid. 82 Cf. ibid., pp. 41f., p. 50. 83 Cf. Sloan 2006, p. 16.

3.2. NATO’s Strategic Concepts

NATO’s most important official document is its Strategic Concept, which defines NATO’s purpose and lists its basic duties in the domain of cooperative security. As the security environment changes rapidly and constantly, NATO adapts its Strategic Concept accordingly. Its first Strategic Concept was called ‘The Strategic Concept for Defence of the North Atlantic Area’ and was published early in 1950. At that time, the Alliance mainly focused on deterrence towards the USSR’s aggression and the document also determined the circumstances of when to launch a counter attack. Similar to today, NATO already put emphasis on its members’ contribution to the Alliance in terms of military, geographic, economic or industrial capabilities and their overall cooperation. So far, seven Strategic Concepts have been adopted by the North Atlantic Council after discussions and negotiations among Member States. In the past, the preparations and drafting processes of the concepts have been strictly secret. Only the last three Strategic Concepts from 1991, 1999 and 2010 received an unclassified status, which made them accessible to the public immediately.84 Besides the Strategic Concepts, further and more detailed documents exist, for instance on NATO’s military planning.85 Before addressing the most current Strategic Concept from 2010, the two previous papers should shortly be introduced as well. As being the first Strategic Concept after the Cold War, the document from 1991 had three main prospects. First, it looked for a more intensified cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries in order to approach security more broadly. Second, NATO planned on reducing its military forces in terms of nuclear weapons and re- structuring its forces to deal with the new tasks that arose after the Cold War, such as crisis management. Third, European Allies formally agreed to take on more responsibility for their own security.86 The drafting of the following Strategic Concept in 1999 was more difficult as the decade had been shaped by severe conflicts in the Balkans and NATO Allies disagreed on many aspects.87 The document is the outcome of the Member States’ individual interests but also stresses the importance of NATO’s future, concerning security in the Euro-Atlantic area and the European pillar within NATO.88 Between 1999 and 2010, the international security environment changed severely. In 2001, the terrorist attacks of 9/1189 happened on American soil and in 2003, the Bush administration

84 Cf. NATO 2017c. 85 Cf. Giegerich 2012, p. 31. 86 Cf. Sloan 2003, p. 89. 87 Cf. Teutmeyer 2012, pp. 305-310. 88 Cf. Wittmann 2001, p. 237 and cf. Giegerich 2012, p. 37. 89 September 11, 2001. On this day, four hijacked planes attacked important US buildings and killed almost 3,000 people.

decided on waging a war against terror in Iraq that divided NATO Allies. Yet, it took eleven years until a new Strategic Concept was agreed upon and released. German Chancellor Ange- la Merkel proposed the current Strategic Concept in 200890, which was introduced in 2010 with the name ‘Active Engagement. Modern Defence’. In its preface, essentials of NATO are summarized such as shared values, collective defense principles, crisis management, NATO’s open door policy and a goal statement.91 Subsequently, the document contains NATO’s core tasks and principles, which include “to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members”92 and highlights the importance of the Transatlantic Link and its uniqueness in terms of sharing values such as human rights and democracy93, which is essential to the Euro-Atlantic relationship. Special emphasis is put on NATO’s following three important core tasks, namely collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Collective defense received a broader scope within this Strategic Concept. Article 5 remains important but collective defense is defined in an extended manner along with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, meaning that NATO does regard a threat not only in terms of a conventional armed attack anymore but also within different domains such as cyberspace. For instance, Allies can support other members if they have been the victim of a cyber attack.94 Additionally, NATO wants to enhance its crisis management with both political and military measures to address crises in a proper manner and at all stages. Moreover, the document underscores the importance of cooperative security. To reach the best possible degree of security, NATO must act beyond its borders and cooperate with partners.95 In addition, the Strategic Concept of 2010 recalls the international security environment as well as NATO’s capabilities, its goal to make the world a safer place and NATO’s future.96 In 2010, creating the Strategic Concept was easier than in 1999 as the consultations within the NAC proceeded rather smoothly and consensus could be found eventually. This might have been the case because NATO used another method while developing the document. After expert groups had already reflected on many aspects and traveled to Member States in order to receive as many different perspectives as possible, these experts proposed their ideas and findings to former NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen who overviewed the drafting of the Strategic Concept, which was negotiated in the NAC afterwards and accepted at the Lisbon Summit.97

90 Cf. Teutmeyer 2012, pp. 313-315. 91 Cf. NATO 2010a, pp. 4f. 92 Ibid, p. 6. 93 Cf. ibid., pp. 6f. 94 Cf. Sloan 2016, pp. 263f. 95 Cf. NATO 2010a, pp. 7f. 96 Cf. ibid., pp. 10-35. 97 Cf. Sloan 2016, p. 262 and cf. Giegerich 2012, pp. 38f.

NATO’s last Strategic Concept has been published eight years ago, which raises the question of its actuality, given the immense alterations within the security environment due to the reemergence of the Russian threat, terrorism and large migration flows from the South and the East. Yet, it is doubted that NATO will soon release a new Strategic Concept because of disagreements between the Trump administration in the United States and diverging European opinions, particularly concerning European contributions to NATO, which the US regards as too low.98 In 2010, a group of experts already worked on recommendations for a new Strate- gic Concept, which should be released in 2020 under the name ‘Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement’.99 If a new Strategic Concept will emerge in 2020 will have to be seen within the next two years. Overall, it needs to be considered that a Strategic Concept should express the current security environment and lay out actions states need to pursue in order to reach security as an entity. While looking at the newest Strategic Concept, part of the first research question can be answered, namely ‘What are the security interests of NATO Allies within the Alliance?’ Most importantly, the 2010 Strategic Concept focuses on collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security as common endeavors, which are designed to meet the Allies’ security interests that are always connected to tackling current threats together and receiving protection from NATO.

3.3. Outstanding NATO Operations

Today, NATO mainly functions as an organization for crisis management, currently being actively engaged in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean and supporting other institutions such as the African Union (AU).100 To get an idea of NATO’s out-of-area missions, this chapter will shortly outline several of NATO’s outstanding operations in the Balkans (1990s), in Afghanistan and its issues with the United States over the intervention in Iraq. One of NATO’s main tasks is to secure the Euro-Atlantic region from possible threats and attacks. After the end of the East-West conflict, new troubles arose within Europe, this time in the Balkans, following the collapse of Yugoslavia. In the 1990s, NATO intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, trying to stop violent conflicts among different ethnic and reli- gious groups.101 The conflict in Yugoslavia began in mid-1991 with Slovenia gaining its in-

98 Cf. Sloan 2017. The disagreements within NATO among the US and many EU members will be focused on in chapter 4. 99 Cf. NATO 2010b. 100 Cf. NATO 2016a. 101 Cf. ibid. 2018a.

dependence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia102 in a three week war. In consequence, other republics like Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to gain their independence too. During this period, Yugoslavia used violent practices such as war camps, rapes and other human rights violations and the Bosnian Serbs violated UN mandates.103 In Bosnia, the war lasted from 1992 to 1995. During that time, NATO supported the United Nations Pro- tection Force (UNPROFOR) and launched several operations such as ‘Operation Deny Flight’104 (1993) to prevent Serbia from conducting air strikes against Bosnia and ‘Operation Deliberate Force’ (1995) where NATO attacked positions of Bosnian Serbs105 in a twelve day campaign.106 Before ‘Operation Deliberate Force’ had been launched, NATO acted rather cautiously in the area as most states wanted the UN to take leadership in Bosnia while NATO should merely support UNPROFOR. Yet, the massacre of several thousand Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serb militias in the summer of 1995 in the vicinity of the town Srebrenica marked a turning point at which NATO and the UN stopped their hesitant actions and ‘Operation De- liberate Force’ was implemented.107 In December 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were achieved but only with the help of the US. In the beginning, the US viewed the conflicts in the Balkan region as a European problem and Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister at that time, Jacques Poos, claimed that “[t]his is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Ameri- cans.”108 This statement implies the European’s willingness to become more independent in the spheres of security and defense. However, the Americans needed to take on leadership to keep NATO credible as there were many political discrepancies among the European parties.109 After the war, NATO deployed an ‘Implementation Force’ (IFOR) with 60,000 troops, which developed into a ‘Stabilisation Force’ (SFOR) with 32,000 soldiers engaged over time. In 2004, the EU mission ‘Althea’ replaced the former UN-mandated SFOR, leaving 7,000 soldiers in the area.110 However, another major conflict broke out in the region in 1998: the crisis in Kosovo. The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia111, Slobodan Milošević, showed brutality towards Kosovo Albanians and was regarded as a threat by both the US and the EU for NATO members. This time, the Alliance reacted quickly as they agreed on Milošević posing

102 Dissolution in 1992. 103 Cf. Hendrickson 2006, p. 47, p. 60. 104 ‘Operation Deny Flight’ monitored the flight ban over Bosnia and Herzegovina, cf. Giegerich 2012, p. 59. 105 The Bosnian Serbs were supported by Yugoslavia. 106 Cf. Giegerich 2012, p. 59. 107 Cf. Hendrickson 2006, pp. 69-86. 108 Quoted in Riding 1991. 109 Cf. Hendrickson 2006, pp. 48f. 110 Cf. Giegerich 2012, pp. 59f. 111 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprised Serbia and Montenegro and dissolved in 2003.

a threat, although their ideas on how to respond to his aggressions differed. As NATO and the US had both gained more influence in the region, they were active in responding to this crisis. ‘Operation Allied Force’ was launched in March 1999. This NATO operation was supported by the EU, also meaning that the European side was able to voice its ideas on how the operation should be conducted and American power could be controlled as this conflict took place on the European continent.112 The Yugoslavian regime acted violently against the Albanian population, which resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe that caused refugee flows. As dip- lomatic negotiations did not show any results, air operations were conducted against targets in Yugoslavia and lasted for 78 days – ‘Operation Allied Force’. Although NATO acted in an emergency situation, its actions were highly controversial as the operation was conducted without a specific UN mandate. Also, NATO had expected an earlier termination of the combat operations and again, NATO had to face disagreements among its members, although there was a fundamental consensus. In June 1999, Milošević finally pulled out his troops and agreed to a treaty, ending the war in Kosovo.113 NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established to protect Kosovo and guarantee peace in the area.114 Although ‘Operation Allied Force’ was successful, the European’s lessons learned included that they needed to extend their own capabilities in order to be less dependent on the Unit- ed States, as the American side provided most of the operation’s equipment and took on leadership.115 Both examples of the Balkan conflict accentuate the importance of American leadership within NATO and that the United States was indispensable for the European security during the Balkan crises, as EU states were not able to handle the conflicts at their borders on their own and even the UN reached its limits without the support of NATO. EU states have common security interests but ensuring security by militarily intervening together in their neighborhood has proven difficult in the past due to many differing opinions. Another military intervention that needs to be emphasized is the one in Iraq. The decisive aspects that started the war were the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States. In consequence, NATO’s Article 5 was invoked where Allies emphasized their support for the US.116 However, the United States’ ideas on how to address terrorism, resulting in an invasion in Iraq, were not supported by all NATO Allies. Although the Iraq War (2003) was not initiated by NATO, the Alliance played a certain role as its Allies were deeply divided over the issue. A few NATO states including Germany and France were against it whereas

112 Cf. Hendrickson 2006, pp. 94-106. 113 Cf. Giegerich 2012, pp. 61-65. 114 Cf. NATO JFC Naples 2018. 115 Cf. Sloan 2006, p. 11. 116 Cf. Hendrickson 2006, pp. 120f.

more NATO partners, among them the UK and Poland, supported the Iraq War.117 The Bush administration did not value transatlantic relations within NATO as much as previous administrations and tried to solve problems single-handedly or bilaterally. The US’ goal was to bring regime change in Iraq that should remove Saddam Hussein and thus established a ‘coalition of the willing’ that supported the US in its endeavor. Former US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld noticed the divide between Western and Eastern Europe. He labeled countries like France and Germany that tried to undermine the US coalition118 as the ‘Old Europe’, clearly offending them, while he called willing countries that supported the US coalition in Eastern Europe ‘New Europe’, allegedly representing Europe’s future.119 NATO as an organization solely supported the intervention in Iraq not by combat but by assisting training of Iraqi security staff as asked for by the Iraqi government.120 In line with neorealism, many NATO countries pursued their security interests while supporting the US in Iraq, as they wanted the US to guarantee their security within NATO in the future since many of them are constantly concerned about their safety. Germany was one of the countries that openly opposed the intervention in Iraq, which is in line with its population’s predominant opinion, which includes pacifistic tendencies.121 The country in which NATO forces have stayed the longest and conducted their biggest operation so far is Afghanistan. NATO started its operations there in order “to ensure that Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for international terrorist groups”122. After 9/11, the Taliban regime was overthrown in Afghanistan. In December 2001, the UN gave a mandate to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was responsible to support the Af- ghan interim government and to help rebuild Kabul and its surrounding region. At first, the US did not want NATO to get involved as the Bush administration regarded NATO as being obstructive.123 Yet, ISAF was taken over by NATO in 2003. The operation’s area and its tasks were extended over time. ISAF aimed for the protection of the Afghan population, a training mission in order for Afghanistan to regain its full sovereignty, military support to combat in- surgents and support of the Afghan government with the help of Provincial Reconstruction

117 Cf. Mihalka 2005, p. 292. Some other NATO Allies mainly remained neutral. 118 More precisely, this was a US-UK-led coalition as the UK supported the US from the beginning in the war against terror, cf. Cohen 2006, p. 78. 119 Cf. Sloan 2006, pp. 12f and cf. Lansford 2005, pp. xvii-xxii. 120 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 149. The mission in Iraq was called NATO Training and Capacity Building Activity in Iraq (NTCB-I) as of December 2017, cf. NATO 2017d. 121 Cf. Mihalka 2005, pp. 293-300. 122 NATO 2018a. 123 The US launched its own operation in the region (Operation Enduring Freedom), which was supported by other nations but in which NATO was involved only marginally, cf. Hendrickson 2006, p. 125.

Teams (PRTs) all over the country.124 ISAF’s mandate terminated with the end of 2014. Hence, the still active ‘Operation Resolute Support’ was established in 2015 as ISAF’s successor whose core task is to support Afghan security personnel.125 Current US President Don- ald Trump, who had promised to pull out a significant number of troops from Afghanistan, increased the number of US troops instead because of the still unstable situation at the Hindu Kush. In addition, al-Qaeda and its terrorist branches are active in the region as a division of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has emerged as a rather new threat in the Middle East. All these developments are dangerous to Western countries who tried to ensure their own security by intervening in Afghanistan through NATO.126 Even Germany, a country that is usually reluctant towards any kind of military action, found it important to support NATO in Afghanistan, as former Minister of Defense (MoD) Peter Struck said: “Die Sicher- heit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt.”127 After all, countries pursue their security interests and NATO’s out-of-area operations made it possible to do so in the countries from which the threats emerge. In the case of the conflicts in the Balkans, NATO intervened because Europe was concerned about the situation within its immediate neighborhood. In the end, the United States had to take the lead in these operations as the Europeans did not manage to solve these conflicts on their own. Nonetheless, it needs to be emphasized that the EU has become more autonomous over the years. EU forces are active in crisis areas and have cooperated with NATO in different countries. For instance, NATO operations ISAF and ‘Resolute Support’ collaborate(d) with EUPOL Afghanistan, the EU’s mission, which supports police building, and the European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina is commanded by the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) at SHAPE.128 Concerning the Middle East, the operations and missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown some suc- cesses but they have not reached their goal of ensuring security within the countries and for the West, nor have they managed to eradicate the threat of terrorism, one of NATO’s main challenges.

124 Cf. Giegerich 2012, pp. 67-70. 125 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 150. 126 Cf. McChrystal/ Sadat 2017, pp. 2-4. 127 Quoted in Spiegel Online 2012. German for: “The security of the German Federal Republic is also defended at the Hindu Kush.” 128 Cf. NATO 2018d.

3.4. Current Challenges of NATO

NATO has to face multiple threats at once. At present, the transatlantic Alliance is exposed to developments such as nuclear proliferation, mass migration flows, environmental challenges including resource scarcity, organized crime, fragile or failed states and thus destabilization as well as war and conflicts around the globe.129 Three main challenges are protruding when it comes to NATO. These most immediate and current threats are NATO’s long-time rival Rus- sia, transnational terrorism and challenges in cyberspace.

Russia The Russian Federation is seen as NATO’s “peer competitor”130, which means that Russia is perceived as a rival but it also implies that Russia is able to compete with NATO on the same level. However, Russia’s status as a major threat has enhanced within the last few years due to Russia’s destabilization of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which was contrary to international law. In this respect, NATO tries to deter any Russian aggressions and focuses on reassuring countries in Eastern Europe that are most concerned with recent Russian activities.131 NATO-Russia relations have been complicated ever since the end of the Cold War, although NATO made efforts to improve its relations with Russia in the early 1990s. The Rus- sian Federation became the first country to enter the Partnership for Peace program in June 1994 in order to establish bilateral relations between NATO and Russia. To achieve enduring peace in the Euro-Atlantic region and to ensure collaborations in domains of mutual interest, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed by both parties on May 27, 1997. In 2002, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established, showing the importance of NATO’s relations with Russia as no other country shares such a forum with NATO. However, the relationship was put to a test in 2008 due to Russia’s military intervention in Georgia whereas consultations within the council were stopped temporarily. After Russia intervened in Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO Allies decided “to keep channels of communication open”132. The NRC still exists today and remains a forum for negotiations, consultations, consensus-building, joint decision and action.133 Tensions remain between NATO and Russia. For instance, the Russian side classifies NATO as a threat too and is therefore suspicious of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in

129 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 9. 130 Snow 2018. 131 Cf. Keller 2014, p. 37. 132 NATO 2017e. 133 Cf. ibid. 2018e and cf. ibid. 2017e.

the Baltics and Poland since 2016.134 This is related to the fact that Russia has never approved of NATO’s enlargement eastward, which had caused Russia’s anger and fear for its own security.135 Additionally, Russia accuses NATO of violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and claims that NATO would threaten the security of the Russian people through its missile defense systems. Yet, NATO stated all its actions are fully in accordance with the NPT and that its missile defense is not targeted at Russia but merely serves as a defensive system. In the past, NATO tried to cooperate with Russia in missile defense but so far, Russia did not want to collaborate in this field.136 As already mentioned, the point that turned the East-West relations icy again was when Russia started to intervene in Ukraine in 2014. After Ukraine entered into negotiations with the EU to establish an Association Agreement between both sides in 2013, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the treaty because of political and economic pressure Russia put on Ukraine. However, many Western oriented Ukrainians protested against Yanukovych’s decision, some protests proceeding violently. As the opposition had become the majority, President Yanukovych fled from Kiev. Due to its own security interests and its decreasing influence in Ukraine, Russia sent troops to Crimea and annexed the territory, which was regarded an illegal act by Ukraine and the West.137 Additionally, Eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region is at war for five years now. The area suffers from civil-warlike conditions where the Ukrainian military fights against ethnic Rus- sian separatist forces who are supported by Russia.138 In consequence, the West sanctioned Russia and thereby hurt its economy. Yet, the Russian government continued its actions, even leading to collaborations with the autocratic Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and stationing more Russian military in the Artic.139 Also, NATO implemented the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) as a factor of protection for Eastern European states.140 Another area of tension between Russia and NATO was the recent nerve agent attack in Salisbury (UK) in March 2018. NATO’s Secretary General Stoltenberg announced to withdraw the accreditation of several staff members of the Russian Mission to NATO141, acting in loyalty to the UK. Although NATO defends its Alliance, it also remains open to dialogue with Russia.142

134 Cf. ibid. 2018f. 135 Cf. Mearsheimer 2001, p. 378. 136 Cf. NATO 2018f. 137 Cf. Sloan 2016, pp. 278-280. 138 Cf. Buckley et al. 2018. 139 Cf. Breedlove 2016, p. 98. 140 Cf. Keller 2014, p. 39. The RAP contains measures to deter Russia and improve NATO’s ability to act, e.g. by enhancing its presence closer to Russian borders (in the Baltic region and Poland). 141 At the Salisbury attack, former Russian-British double agent Sergei Skripal, who was on the side of the UK, and his daughter were poisoned with a nerve agent. It has been assumed that Russia is responsible for the attack, leading to Russian diplomats being expelled from many countries. 142 Cf. NATO 2018e.

All these aspects show that both NATO and Russia prioritize their security, which is the ultimate goal in the theory of neorealism. Yet, their security interests are clashing. In the Cold War, this situation led to the accumulation of power on both sides, resulting in a security dilemma. Nowadays, concerns have been voiced that the two sides are moving towards a new or second Cold War, which is different in nature but equally hazardous.143 Theorists claim that these conflicts with Russia have helped NATO to regain relevance as the fears of Eastern Eu- ropean states of a dangerous, reemerging Russia have become reality144 and because the range of the Russian threat as well as the two upcoming major threats to NATO “are of a breadth and complexity that the continent has not seen since the end of World War II”145.

Challenges in Cyberspace Russia is a country that is often associated with conducting cyber attacks and information warfare. For example, the Russian group CyberBerkut tried to influence Ukrainian elections in 2014 and Russia interfered in the 2016 US elections by aiming its attacks at non- governmental networks.146 Russia is also suspected of spreading disinformation to target certain population groups like Russian speaking minorities in the Baltic States in order to exert influence.147 A mixture of conventional (e.g. military means) and unconventional warfare are called hybrid threats. This combination of means is not new, yet its intensity has increased, for instance through the new possibilities cyberspace offers. In order to face hybrid threats appro- priately, NATO and its partners need to develop resilience, early-warning mechanisms, in- tense exchange of information and enhanced cooperation in this domain. NATO established a Cyber Defence Concept in 2011, which outlines NATO’s plans on how to meet challenges in cyberspace. Even the 2010 Strategic Concept covers cyber threats as a subject of discussion. In June 2011, NATO decided on the NATO Policy on Cyber Defence that lists specific tasks to counter cyber threats. There, it has been laid down that an Ally who has suffered from a cyber attack can ask for consultation as outlined in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty but also states that a cyber attack does not necessarily lead to the application of NATO’s mutual defense clause (Article 5). This Cyber Policy has mainly been implemented to secure NATO’s communication and information systems.148

143 Cf. Rumer et al. 2017, p. 14. 144 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 11. 145 Cf. Breedlove 2016, p. 96. 146 Cf. Hennessey 2017, p. 43. 147 Cf. Sloan 2016, p. 317. 148 Cf. Varwick 2017, pp. 51-55.

Cyber threats are dangerous to NATO but the Alliance prepares itself against attacks. The domain of cyber defense has emerged to one of NATO’s top priorities, recognizing cyberspace as a new operational domain along with space, sea, land and air. In order to achieve cyber security, NATO Allies share capacities and information about threats, jointly invest in training and education, conduct exercises together to practice for the case of an emergency and engage cyber defense experts.149 At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO Allies acknowl- edged that international law is valid in cyberspace as well. Due to the fact that NATO has been the target of many cyber attacks in the past – mainly conducted by state actors, with approximately 500 attacks a month in 2016 and observing a growth in targeting personal devices and the like, which are not as well secured as NATO devices – the Alliance set up its own cyber defense capabilities. To name just a few, NATO has already established a range of institutions that are working in cyber defense such as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Cen- tre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, or the NATO Communications and Information Agency in Brussels, Mons and The Hague. Most importantly, NATO stresses research and cooperation with its partners as well as with the cyber industry. Special emphasis is put on EU-NATO cooperation in the domain of cyber security as they work together in countering hybrid threats.150 The high number of agencies, partnerships and capabilities shows the intensity of cyber threats and the importance to counter them.

Transnational Terrorism The cyberspace is also a domain were terrorist activities take place. In this case, the Internet serves as a weapon and is exploited to circulate propaganda and attack critical infrastructures of a state.151 A prominent example is ISIS, which abuses the Internet and social media to dis- seminate its own propaganda for recruiting new members. Additionally, ISIS seeks to spread fear by promulgating brutal images in order to disrupt populations and governments or to use them as a measure to control populaces.152 The term terrorism often leads to confusion and misunderstandings and should therefore be defined first. Terrorism has a political dimension and refers to acts of violence that are regarded as illegitimate. Terrorist action intends to communicate a certain message in a violent way and thus forces the attacked subject – usually a government or population – to apply the will of the one conducting the attacks. Terror is also used as a means of psychological pres-

149 Cf. NATO 2018a. 150 Cf. ibid. 2018g. 151 Cf. Dickow/ Bashir, p. 19. Critical infrastructure comprises all essential assets of a state for its economy and society to work properly, for example the public health system, electricity or water supply. 152 Cf. Sloan 2016, pp. 317f.

sure to terrify populations, making them feel insecure. Oftentimes, ideologies play a certain role and the goal of terrorism is to gain attention and power to enforce own interests. NATO’s main focus is on countering transnational terrorism that crosses borders.153 A current form of transnational terrorism is Islamist terrorism, which is prominent since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Ever since, many Islamist terrorist attacks have been conducted all over the world, many of them happening in the domestic countries of terrorist groups like in Iraq or Afghanistan. On Western territory, some of the first major attacks happened in Ma- drid (2004), followed by London (e.g. 2005), Paris (e.g. 2015), Nice (2016)154 and many more such as Brussels (2016) or Berlin (2016). Different individuals or groups are responsible for these attacks. The most-known Islamist terrorist groups are al-Qaeda, which was led by Osa- ma bin Laden and allegedly is responsible for the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, the Tali- ban, which is mostly based in Afghanistan and allegedly hosted al-Qaeda members for their protection after 9/11155 and ISIS, which has become a great danger to NATO since its 2015 attacks in Paris, posing a direct threat to NATO Allies and their value system.156 The Alliance puts a special focus on fighting terrorism. For instance, NATO supports the training of local Afghan and Iraqi forces to contain terrorist groups and is part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to which it contributes its AWACS, established an Intelligence Divi- sion and the focus on the Strategic Direction South as one of JFC Naples’ main tasks is its specialization in countering terrorism.157 NATO has increased the cooperation with its Allies and partners in this domain. In 2004, NATO established a terrorism defense program and later opened a Centre of Excellence De- fence Against Terrorism in Turkey. In the case of ISIS, NATO uses its AWACS surveillance aircraft to support the fight against terrorism although NATO is not a member of the US-led coalition against terrorism. In 2012, the establishment of the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) network led to an ameliorated exchange among intelligence services that share information about terrorist groups. In accordance with JISR, one of the JFC Naples’ core tasks is to evaluate intelligence information from countries like Syria and Iraq.158 There are different levels of threat perception among NATO Allies. The behavior of a state such as a country’s foreign and security policy, as well as Western ideals like democracy and secularization increase the likelihood for a state being targeted by an Islamist terrorist group.

153 Cf. Teutmeyer 2012, pp. 59-64. 154 Cf. Wendekamm 2016, p. 30. 155 Cf. Sloan 2003, p. 185. 156 Cf. ibid. 2016, p. 259, p. 295. ISIS is also known by the names Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh (Arabic acronym). 157 Cf. NATO 2018a. 158 Cf. Varwick 2017, pp. 57-59.

Potentially, all NATO members have a rather high probability of being attacked due to their internal political organization and their affiliation to the United States. NATO Allies emphasize to eliminate the root causes of terrorism by means such as more economic and development cooperation in countries where terrorist groups are active, strengthening the peaceful interpretation of Islam and the prevention of the oppression of Muslim groups. States that have suffered from domestic terrorist groups need to be supported by NATO and the international community as well. In this sense, NATO can also be seen as a security organization with the potential to provide a forum for dialogue. Yet, NATO’s involvement holds a certain risk for participating Allies in out-of-area operations, known as the abandonment-entrapment problem. This notion states that a country can come to the fore of terrorist groups solely by joining a NATO operation in areas where such groups are active.159 Nonetheless, NATO members oppose terrorism with military operations and internal security measures160 as well as with the establishment of institutions as mentioned above.

4. Exemplary Actors within NATO and Their Security Interests in the Light of Current Internal Challenges

“RIP the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, 1945-2018”161 is the title of a recent Foreign Policy article, forecasting a dark future for transatlantic relations. To a large extent, current US President Donald Trump is blamed for dividing the Alliance as he made controversial decisions in foreign affairs during his first one and a half years in office. According to the contributing editor of Foreign Policy, James Traub, the only reason which held the transatlantic Alliance together after the Cold War was its shared liberal values. He now sees these values ceasing as the US government turns its back to them.162 Within NATO, there are many disagreements among and thus challenges for the Allies, particularly when it comes to military spending and contributions to NATO. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty obliges Allies to contribute and increase capabilities, although they stay sovereign states:

„In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”163

159 Cf. Teutmeyer 2012, pp. 71-83. NATO already supports affected governments in Afghanistan and Iraq where Allies train local security services in order for them to become able to counter terrorist threats on their own. 160 Cf. Sloan 2016, p. 315. 161 Traub 2018. 162 Cf. ibid. 163 NATO 1949.

Yet, the realization of Article 3 remains uneven. The disproportionate contribution of capabilities has been an issue within NATO for a long time. Many European members have not followed the guidelines of NATO membership, which made the United States dissatisfied and urged Europe to deliver its part to the Alliance.164 The issue is prevalent today as many Allies are still underperforming and not meeting the US’ expectations when it comes to military expenditure.165 NATO members have repeatedly agreed to contribute 2 % of their gross domestic product (GDP) on their defense but most Allies do not fulfill this goal.166 In 2017, only seven NATO Allies spent 2 % or more of their GDP on defense, namely the United States, Greece, France, Turkey, Estonia, Poland and Romania.167 However, this number is already an improvement to the previous years. According to scholar Stanley R. Sloan, just four countries – the US, Greece, Estonia and the UK – spent 2 % or more of their GDP on defense in 2016.168 At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO Allies also agreed on spending 20 % of their military budget for research, development and new procurement.169 However, external circumstances impeded proportional military spending in the past, such as the financial crisis that impacted Europe deleteriously for a long time whereas many countries decreased their military budgets.170 Other internal challenges within NATO include the divergences between the Allies’ “values, well-being and political coherence”171, which negatively affect NATO’s ability to act.172 Aside from these challenges, the Alliance remains an essential organization and a symbol that represents the transatlantic relationship, which is evident by NATO’s long existence despite many disagreements along the way. No country has ever left NATO. NATO’s essentiali- ty lies within the fact that it is at the core of national strategies and security interests.173 In 2017, military expenditure grew in Europe and in total, all Allies spent $ 900 billion on their defense, which is 52 % of global defense spending. Yet, other big powers emerge on the hori- zon coming from Asia, Oceania and the Middle East.174 European countries regard NATO with its US military power and capabilities as a security guarantor in a world where they have to face multiple threats at once. To examine different viewpoints on these issues, three exemplary NATO members have been picked for analysis.

164 Cf. Schmidt 2001, p. 2. 165 Cf. Webber et. al. 2014, pp. 781f. 166 Cf. Teutmeyer 2012, p. 153. 167 Cf. SIPRI 2018a. 168 Cf. Sloan 2016, p. 290. 169 Cf. Keller 2014, p. 41. 170 Cf. Sestanovich 2016. 171 Sloan 2016, p. 318. 172 Cf. ibid. 173 Cf. Webber et al. 2014, pp. 781-784. 174 Cf. SIPRI 2018b.

First, the United States is of utmost importance as it is by far the most powerful state within NATO when it comes to military capabilities and influence in the world. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Germany has been selected as it is a long-time member of the Alliance since 1955 and will be analyzed for its role as the most influential European NATO member besides the UK and France.175 Finally, Poland has been chosen as a contrast to Germany as Poland belonged to the former Warsaw Pact and entered the Alliance in 1999 along with NATO’s first Eastern enlargement.176 Since Russia’s involvement in Ukraine from 2014 onwards and due to Poland’s proximity to Russia, the Polish population fears that the Russian Federation will harm it as the USSR did at the time of World War II177 and therefore regards Russia as a major threat. Today, the relationship between Russia and Poland remains tense.178 Poland represents the security interests and the prevalent Eastern European image of NATO. Germany and Poland have different threat perceptions and security interests, which is due to their diverse history. In this context, former US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld’s comparison comes into play, as he labeled Germany and other Western European states as countries of ‘Old Europe’ and praised countries like Poland to be progressive and belonging to the ‘New Europe’.179

4.1. The United States within NATO

Within NATO, the United States is the country that owns the highest capabilities overall. The US has the biggest population, comprising more than 326.6 million inhabitants, and the second largest total area after Canada. In addition, the US economy has a good standing and is leading in the field of technology, with a GDP of $ 59,500 per capita that has grown in the past few years. Nowadays, the US has the second biggest economy in the world after Chi- na.180 The United States has a powerful military and the highest military budget worldwide. In 2017, US military expenditure amounted to $ 610 billion. Hence, the US spent more than the next seven countries in rank with the biggest military expenditure after the US altogether. It is estimated that the US military budget will rise in the following years.181 Also in 2017, the United States spent 3.1 % of its GDP on defense. Although this is the highest number among all NATO Allies, it is a rather low percentage for the United States. The lowest US military

175 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 55. 176 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 5. 177 The Soviet Army invaded Poland in 1939 and tried to transform the population by means of terror and deportations. 178 Cf. Pettai 2017, pp. 32f. 179 Cf. Sloan 2006, pp. 12f. 180 Cf. CIA 2018a. 181 Cf. SIPRI 2018b.

expenditure between 1988 and 2017 was 2.9 % of GDP between 1999 and 2001. Its highest military expenditure was 5.8 % of GDP in 1988.182 The high percentage in 1988 is justified by the fact that the Cold War was still ongoing and that the US upgraded it arms extensively during that time with its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The United States regards itself and its military power as less dominant currently as other powers like China and Russia are on the rise. Therefore, the 2018 National Defense Strategy is more aggressive in its tone and deter- mines to upgrade US armament once again. Also, the United States shows less interest in pro- tecting Europe and urges the EU to contribute more to its own defense.183 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a higher budget deficit and public debt in the US. Through the fiscal year 2018, the US will have spent a total amount of $ 1.9 trillion on these wars.184 Notwith- standing, it is a fact that the US is the biggest military power in the world and it does not seem that it will decrease its military budget to a large extent in the future, although the percentage of the GDP slightly sank in the last couple of years.185 This is bound up with the fact that the major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq require less US engagement and have mainly developed into training missions as it is the case with NATO’s ‘Operation Resolute Support’ that has replaced ISAF. Although European defense spending is increasing overall, these growths do not suffice President Trump. He wants his NATO Allies to contribute at least 2 % of their GDP on defense until 2024.186 Former US President Barack Obama already claimed that the Europeans are ‘free riders’ when it comes to security and defense issues, as they are the profiteers of NATO without contributing their equivalent part. President Trump even called NATO ‘obsolete’ during the electoral campaign in 2016, before backpedaling and relativizing his statement after his inauguration. This shows the US’ annoyance with its EU partners when it comes to the topic of burden sharing.187 Political scientist Andrew Denison contends that Al- lies from the EU rely too much on the United States concerning security and defense matters, which leads to tensions within transatlantic relations. Yet, the US still has its own security interests within keeping its influence on the European continent. As Americans aim for “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”188, achieving this goal is facilitated if the US secures global peace as well. Thus, external threats to the Ameri- can way of life and values can be minimized. Although the interest in keeping its influence in

182 Cf. ibid. 2018a. 183 Cf. Marguier 2018. 184 Cf. CIA 2018a. 185 Cf. SIPRI 2018a. 186 Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2018. 187 Cf. Sestanovich 2016. 188 Denison 2017, p. 36.

Europe is also of economic nature, there are many security interests the US still pursues in Europe today. Europe and the United States are likewise threatened by the changes in the security environment that have been identified above, like nuclear proliferation, mass migration flows, cyber-attacks and more. The US government is aware that it can handle these threats more easily with a wealthy and globally engaged EU on its side. The EU borders Russia and several conflict zones. If any EU state is attacked, this poses a direct threat to the United States too, as both the EU and the US share common values and interests and some of the US’ closest Allies within the EU would be weakened. Denison underlines this by saying that Eu- ropean peace is also an American one whereas the US’ geostrategic interest remains in keeping Europe secure, peaceful and prosperous.189 Additionally, NATO as an organization is part of the US’ security interest as NATO conducts many operations in areas where the US is also active as a global player, like in Iraq and Afghanistan.190 Bindenagel similarly claims that the US wants to make sure that NATO’s deterrence remains credible. He insists that credible deterrence is given through Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. So far, the US was the only country who ever needed and received assistance of its NATO Allies after 9/11 and all NATO members supported the US back then. There, NATO has proved its importance and efficiency to the US. Nonetheless, one should not be too optimistic as there has been a change in office of the US president.191 Bindenagel asserts that President Trump does not only criticize the Allies for their low contributions to NATO but also questions the mutual assistance clause of the treaty. Accord- ing to Bindenagel, President Trump’s behavior is potentially damaging the political relations within the transatlantic Alliance as well as the credibility of NATO and Article 5.192 President Trump ranks as inexperienced concerning politics and foreign affairs, which is seen as prob- lematic within international relations and NATO. As indicated above, the president expressed himself negatively about NATO during the electoral campaign. For instance, he called NATO ‘obsolete’ and incapable of solving major issues like dealing with terrorism in 2016. In contrast to these statements, he asserted that NATO was still important.193 Here, it is evident that the Trump administration and particularly Trump himself do not show the reliability one could expect of US administrations. Trump already gave the Europeans an outlook that they will have to act more independently in the future in terms of defense matters.194 In an earlier

189 Cf. ibid., pp. 35-37. 190 Cf. Kupferschmidt 2006, p. 7. 191 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 3. 192 Cf. ibid. 193 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 59. 194 Cf. ibid., p. 137.

essay, Bindenagel stated that Trump’s election as US president “has become a stress test for the US international role in that he has questioned the international institutions, including NATO, which provides security to the US and Europe”195, although the US is an indispensable nation in the anarchic international system where it oftentimes constitutes the ‘global cop’.196 President Trump focuses on US national interests and values, stating “that countries that are immensely wealthy should reimburse the United States for the cost of defending them”197. He clearly asserts this and admits that the US is following realistic policies, which is also outlined in the new National Security Strategy.198 Trump’s statements and actions illus- trate that although the US is still pursuing neorealist goals like security and a strong NATO, which corresponds to the US’ security interests, Trump has also returned to classical realist policies where power is of utmost importance. To be more precise, by regarding Trump’s politics of demonstration of power, it is evident that classical realism also exhibits great explana- tory power for the actions of the Trump administration.199 Yet, Trump is not the first US president who is dissatisfied with his Allies’ NATO contributions. Elisabeth Braw, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, points out that almost every US administration complained about the EU states’ low NATO contributions. Still, President Trump is very direct and persistent about this topic.200 Hence, Trump treats his NATO Allies in a different manner than his predecessors in office and attempts to follow a strategy of intimidation to reach his goal. The first hypothesis of this analysis is that the United States withdraws from Europe in its own interest to pursue a more isolationist policy. The US’ dissatisfaction with the EU’s low NATO contributions as well as other factors such as a shift in priorities like Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’201 might lead the United States to a new form of isolationism. Before World War I and in-between both world wars, the US followed a more isolationist policy.202 In contrast, the United States functioned as a protector of Europe after World War II, which has oftentimes been interpreted as a kind of imperialism – the direct opposite of isolationism. During this time, the US allegedly tried to influence Europe by enforcing American interests. Nonethe- less, the Europeans welcomed the US’ activities in Europe and profited from them as America

195 Bindenagel 2017, p. 254. 196 Cf. ibid. 197 Trump 2017. 198 Cf. ibid. 199 The fact that the Trump administration also acts according to classical realism can be seen by Trump’s frequent display of US power and the importance he asserts to it. Slogans like ‘America First’ and his disassociation and growing estrangement from Western Allies (e.g. at the G7 Summit in Montreal in June 2018) underline this assumption. 200 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 8. 201 Cf. ibid. 202 Cf. Menzel 2016, p. 6.

is responsible for rebuilding European economies after the Second World War. For this time, the bandwagoning theory203 of International Relations holds true, as Europe aligned with its powerful and wealthy Ally, the US, during the Cold War. Yet, the US has faltered with its international orientation in the past, meaning between isolationism and interventionism.204 Examining the international orientation of the last four US presidents, major differences in their global politics can be exposed. Bill Clinton and Barack Obama pursued Wilsonianism, following the liberal principles of former US President Woodrow Wilson205. In this sense, international organizations are valued and the democratic system is globally promoted. George W. Bush and Donald Trump both indicated their intentions to be less active on the international stage, especially in Europe. Notwithstanding, Bush pursued interventionist policies in the Middle East and conducted many military deployments.206 President Trump’s rhetoric rarely reflects reality when it comes to American isolationist tendencies. On the one hand, he is known for the slogans ‘America First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’, which indicate a deeper focus on the United States’ domestic affairs and its national interests. Presi- dent Trump argues that globalization harms the United States, for example by losing jobs for American citizens. In line with this, he claims to oppose what in his view are unnecessary armed conflicts.207 On the other hand, Trump has made several non-isolationist moves during his time in office. Opposed to his rhetoric that if European NATO members do not contribute their “fair share”208 to the Alliance, the US would not continue to support European countries to the extent it has in the past, the president has not yet withdrawn troops from European soil. On the contrary, the Americans have increased their number of permanently rotating troops in Europe since Trump took office. The Trump administration has taken concrete steps in favor of defense for Europe, which can be seen by the US’ increase in military funding for its own troops stationed in Europe as well as amplified capabilities in Eastern Europe and participation in NATO drills and training. Overall, the United States has planned to spend $ 4.8 billion on defense in 2018, which is $ 1.4 billion more than in 2017. According to Braw, the US’ shift away from Europe was more present during Obama’s time as president as he directed his view towards Asia. Thus, she believes that the American military presence in Europe will

203 Bandwagoning occurs when weaker countries align with more powerful states. This theory is opposed to balancing. 204 Cf. Rees 2011, pp. 2-4 and cf. Braml 2017, p. 30. 205 Woodrow Wilson was in office from 1913-1921 and is known for his Fourteen Points for peace, which propose the establishment of the League of Nations among other statements. 206 Cf. Rees 2011, pp. 20f. 207 Cf. Bacevich 2017, pp. 58-60. 208 Donald Trump quoted in Mandelbaum 2017, p. 108.

remain high in the future under President Trump.209 There are more examples that show Trump’s non-isolationist policy, such as his intervention in Syria, the increase in troop de- ployment in Afghanistan or Trump’s involvement in the Korea conflict as well as the Israeli- Palestinian conflict.210 Therefore, one of the European’s biggest concerns, namely that the US under Trump will withdraw from the international stage and especially from Europe in its own interest, which would mean that many European NATO members would lose their most reliable security guarantee, can be refuted at this time. But the relationship between the US and the EU is tense and President Trump is suspicious of the EU’s actions concerning strengthening its own security and defense policy.211 In contrast, different surveys clearly speak in favor of transatlantic relations within NATO. Accord- ing to the Pew Research Center212, NATO’s reputation has ameliorated on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, which includes that NATO Allies still rely on Article 5 and the US’ commitment to it, despite Trump’s rhetoric. All in all, 78 % of Democrats and 47 % of Republicans would support NATO.213 These numbers vary from what the Gallup Organization214 found out. As stated in their poll, 97 % of Democrats advocate for NATO while only 69 % of the Republicans want to maintain the transatlantic Alliance. These numbers are much higher, although both polls have been conducted in 2017. These differences might be due to the surveys’ basic population and the different wording of their questions. The Pew Research Center directly asks if Americans support NATO, while the Gallup Organization focuses on the fact if Americans want to maintain the Alliance. Still, both polling institutes notice a major difference between Democrats and Republicans with regard to their support for NATO. The Gallup Organization adds that today, NATO enjoys the best reputation since 1989, with an endorse- ment of 80 % in the United States. This percentage can be compared with 64 % in 1995, where NATO had much less support.215 One reason for this might have been the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s where the US needed to assist other European countries within NATO to reach a peace agreement, as Europe was not able to do so by its own means and ways. All in all, the US still pursues security interests in Europe and maintains an interventionist policy without attempting to decrease military deployments or withdrawing from Europe in contrast to President Trump’s announcements. Although the US government is not satisfied

209 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 8 and cf. De Luce et al. 2018. 210 Cf. Bacevich 2017, pp. 60f. 211 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 5. 212 The Pew Research Center is an American non-governmental polling institute. 213 Cf. Stokes 2017. 214 The Gallup Organization is an American market and public opinion research institute. 215 Cf. Smith 2017a.

with the EU Allies’ contributions to the Alliance, especially with Germany, NATO is regarded as important within the American population.

4.2. Germany within NATO

Germany is in the center of Europe and thus plays an essential geostrategic role within the Alliance. According to Braw, Germany can be called the “junior partner”216 of the US in regard to Europe’s territorial defense since the days of the Cold War, as up to 250,000 Ameri- can soldiers were stationed in former West Germany. Collaboration between US and German armed forces worked well. During that time, Germany had higher numbers of troops itself due to the Soviet threat along the intra-German border. Although Germany contributes less soldiers to NATO than during the East-West conflict, Germany’s manpower is still significant in comparison to other NATO Allies. Braw claims that Germany is a “good Ally”217, also because of its contributions in Afghanistan or Mali, among others.218 Concerning German capabilities, the Federal Republic is the most populated country in Europe with almost 80.6 million inhabitants as of July 2017. Although Germany has a relatively small area, it is the fifth largest economy in the world, had a GDP of around $ 50,200 per capita in 2017 and is Europe’s largest economy, which is due to its high export quota.219 Because of its economic power, its number of inhabitants and the fact that it provides 15 % of all NATO employees, Germany is the second biggest NATO member. Yet, Germany only ranks fifth concerning the number of troops.220 Due to its good economic standing, Germany is one of Europe’s top military spenders behind Russia, France and the UK.221 Notwithstand- ing, this image is sobering by regarding the fact that Germany owns one of the biggest economies worldwide and thus it is only plausible that it has a comparatively high overall military budget. But Germany’s military expenditure is not in compliance with NATO guidelines, most notably for the United States. Recently, Germany has been criticized for only spending 1.2 % of its GDP on defense, which is far below the 2 % benchmark as agreed among NATO Allies. Like the United States, Germany spent the highest percentage of GDP on defense during the Cold War. In 1988, West Germany’s military expenditure was 2.8 % of GDP.222 The German government has a different perception of the 2 % goal than the Americans. To a large

216 Braw 2018, answer 1. 217 Ibid., answer 1. 218 Cf. ibid. 219 Cf. CIA 2018b. 220 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 167. 221 Cf. SIPRI 2018d. 222 Cf. ibid. 2018a.

extent, German politicians want to approach 2 % whereas the US wants all Allies to contribute at least 2 % of their GDP.223 Although the 2 % goal has been agreed upon by NATO Al- lies, Bindenagel claims that 2 % is “an arbitrary number”224. He asserts that 2 % as a benchmark was specified in the 1950s/60s – the early years of the Cold War – when most Allies spent between 4 to 6 % of their GDP on defense. Hence, he claims that the number is not important. Instead, what matters is what can be achieved with the percentage. This has to be determined according to the intensity of the current threats.225 In line with these statements, Braw and several German generals indicate that it only makes sense to spend 2 % of GDP on defense if it is clear for which causes the money will be used. Currently, they contend that 1.5 to 1.6 % of GDP would suffice the Bundeswehr’s goals due to Germany’s strong economy. Braw points out the high degree of difficulty for the German Federal Armed Forces to spend 2%, which would only make sense if the Bundeswehr’s manpower would increase.226 As mentioned above, it needs to be considered that Germany is one among many Allies to contribute less than 2 % of its GDP on defense. Braw and many others have stated that the Bundeswehr suffers from a “lack of readiness”227. It has many shortfalls in basic equipment, for instance they lack winter clothing or protective vests. Several aircraft of the Bundeswehr are unable to fly and its fighter jets are in such a bad shape that they frequently need to be repaired. In 2019, Germany will take on the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force’s (VJTF) command where it promised to deploy 10,000 troops but was only able to recruit 2,500 soldiers so far. The list could go on. Accord- ing to Carnegie Europe’s228 senior fellow Judy Dempsey, the major problem is the wrong al- location of Germany’s military expenditure. So far, much money has been used for mainte- nance and non-priority issues. Additionally, the German government is usually restrictive about military operations.229 Bindenagel makes the same point. He claims that Germany tends to avoid security debates. In his opinion, Germany needs to develop a national security strategy to fulfill its “sovereign obligation”230, which it is not yet ready to fully comply with.231 The German government is optimistic concerning its defense. In the coalition agreement of 2018, it points out that the country is aware that Germany and Europe need to take on more

223 Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2018. 224 Bindenagel 2018, answer 10. 225 Cf. ibid. 226 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 2. 227 Ibid. 228 Carnegie Europe is a global center belonging to the foreign policy think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 229 Cf. Dempsey 2018. 230 Bindenagel 2018, answer 9. 231 Cf. ibid.

responsibility in international affairs to face global challenges and the rapidly changing security environment. Germany is therefore in favor of strengthening the European Union’s security and defense capabilities, PESCO in particular. Still, this Central European country regards itself as a peace power.232 NATO’s importance and Germany’s commitment and loyalty to the Alliance are highlighted in this document. There, the German government outlines its will to contribute more to security, mainly in the areas of “civil crisis management, humanitarian aid, defense and the Bundeswehr”233, while stating that the military budget needs to be increased. In this respect, the German government announces so-called “Trendwenden”234 to eliminate the Bundeswehr’s shortfalls on defense capabilities in Germany’s national security interest.235 In addition, Germany also insists on strengthening transatlantic relations to consolidate the European ties to the US and keep the US as a security guarantor in Europe. In this regard, the coalition agreement emphasizes that NATO remains important even though Europe is enhancing its own defense capabilities and is initiating PESCO.236 These statements show Germany’s will to do more for its own as well as for European security and defense. To become both more European and more transatlantic, Germany needs to start a conversation with its EU partners and the US to find compromises both sides can live with when it comes to defense matters. The question if Germany is able to implement its endeavors, however, remains open. In comparison, the 2013 coalition agreement differs from the current one in terms of the significance of security and defense policies. In 2013, this issue was not as thoroughly discussed as today, which is due to the changes in the security environment. Between 2013 and 2018, Russia, cyber attacks and terrorism have either reemerged or expanded their scope as imminent security threats to NATO Allies. Also, Donald Trump, who persistently urges Eu- rope to contribute more to its own defense, has become US president in early 2017. Yet, security and defense have already been a subject of discussion in Germany’s 2013 coalition agreement. Vital in this context is the document’s emphasis on an essential complementarity of NATO and EU capabilities and Germany expresses the significance of NATO and transatlantic relations overall.237 Concerning the Bundeswehr and its procurement, it was already planned in 2013 to modernize the German armed forces and create standards within NATO and the EU in military equipment.238 The few differences in the wording of both coalition agreements concerning this topic show that not much has been achieved within the last five

232 Cf. Die Bundesregierung 2018, pp. 4-8. 233 Ibid., p. 17, own translation. 234 Ibid., p. 156. German for: trend reversal. 235 Cf. ibid. and p. 17. 236 Cf. ibid., pp. 144 f., p. 148. 237 Cf. ibid. 2013, pp. 166-168. 238 Cf. ibid., pp. 176-178.

years. Internationally, Germany is criticized for being too restrained and not participating enough in NATO-led missions such as in Libya (2011), although Germany has been a crucial Ally in most NATO operations, for example in Afghanistan as the third biggest troop suppli- er.239 The current German MoD Ursula von der Leyen frequently emphasizes Germany’s need to take on more responsibility in security matters, as she did at the Munich Security Confer- ence in 2018. There, she also underscored Germany’s engagement within NATO since 2014. It is true that Germany is very active in NATO missions, which is evident by von der Leyen’s statements. She indicates that Germany has enhanced its engagement in Afghanistan, supports the fight against ISIS and has increased its military support in Eastern Europe, such as being a leading member of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania as well as contributing to VJTF in the Baltics.240 To be more precise about Germany’s current activities within NATO, the Federal Republic is involved in the Readiness Action Plan where it sends parts of the navy to the Baltic Sea or provides more soldiers for NATO exercises, among others. Ger- many has also been a rotational lead nation for the NATO Response Force (NRF).241 Moreo- ver, the German MoD repeated the statements that have been made in Germany’s 2018 coalition agreement in her speech.242 Former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, who also held a speech in Munich, made similar points as the MoD, but he put more emphasis on the need for Europe to become more independent.243 All these goals have to be accomplished in the future. By looking at Germany’s current defense expenses, it is evident that there is still a long way ahead. But the political will seems to exist. Despite Germany’s relatively low financial contributions to defense with regard to its GDP, it has increased its military role within NATO during the last couple of years. Another substantial step is Germany’s service as a framework nation within NATO’s Framework Na- tions Concept (FNC) where it coordinates capabilities and activities of smaller states. Germa- ny’s function as a framework nation suggests that Germany prefers partnership and shared leadership and thus wants to avoid the leadership debate.244 In line with this, it needs to be mentioned that the Germans developed a certain degree of pacifism, which is due to the Ger- man collective memory of the two world wars, leading to the fact that the majority of the population tends to be against any military deployments that include combat. Also, German political parties have diverse views on NATO and German military engagement, which makes

239 Cf. Varwick 2017, pp. 168f. 240 Cf. Leyen 2018, p. 2. 241 Cf. Major 2015, p. 2. The NRF is a NATO force designed to operate quickly whenever and wherever needed. 242 Cf. Leyen 2018, pp. 2-4. 243 Cf. Gabriel 2018. 244 Cf. Allers 2016, pp. 1167f. Germany often is unwilling to take on leadership, especially in defense issues.

agreements more difficult to reach.245 Hence, Germany rather engages in ‘checkbook diplomacy’246 than sending its military off to wars. Yet, no other nation has benefited from NATO and the US’ security guarantees as much as Germany. For instance, Germany can be seen as a US product in terms of its democratic system and liberal orders in regard to US support after World War II, which is why the US urges Germany even more to make fair contributions.247 Germany also pursues security interests within NATO. One of them has already been mentioned, namely the geopolitical aspect. As described in the White Paper of 2016248, the Ger- man government lines out that German security interests are connected with alliances and interdependences within coalitions. Being located in the heart of Europe, Germany needs its Allies for its security and thereby underlines the substantial role of the United States. In return, it also needs to be a reliable Ally within NATO and the EU. Germany is also dependent on international trade, which makes security indispensable. With its partners’ help, Germany is able to protect its population and scarce resources.249 As indicated above, Germany has to face multiple security threats. Thus, Germany is aware that NATO remains highly important for its own security and emphasizes that both sides, the US and Europe, profit from reciprocal support.250 To sum it up, Germany has increased its engagement within NATO in the last few years and is aware of NATO’s necessity. Germany advocates for a stronger independent European security and defense, while at the same time emphasizes the importance of transatlantic relations, stating that the US is indispensable for Europe. Although the German government asserts that its armed forces need to be modernized and better equipped as well as that Germany wants to approach NATO’s 2 % benchmark, not much of these outlooks have been implemented so far. However, it is important to say that there is a strong political will to direct Germany’s focus more towards security and defense issues. This in turn might please Germa- ny’s NATO Allies, as former Polish Foreign Minister Radosɬaw Sikorski said “I fear German power less than German inaction”251.

245 Cf. Brunstetter 2005, p. 22. For instance, more conservative parties like the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) tend to support NATO whereas left-wing parties like ‘Die Linke’ oppose military action and demand less or no engagement within NATO. 246 This term is used when states negotiate through economic remedies within foreign affairs. 247 Cf. Theil 2017, pp. 9f., p. 13. 248 The German White Paper 2016 lists German values, security-related interests and goals in connection with its own security and defense policy as well as within NATO and the EU. 249 Cf. Die Bundesregierung 2016, pp. 23-25. 250 Cf. ibid., pp. 48f. 251 Radosɬaw Sikorski quoted by the German Council on Foreign Relations: DGAP 2011.

4.3. Poland within NATO

Poland differs from the US and Germany insofar that it only joined the Alliance in 1999 as a result of NATO’s Eastern enlargement. What is special about Poland is that it belonged to the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, NATO’s competitor coalition. After the East- West conflict, Western Allies struggled to accept former satellite states of the USSR into NATO because they feared a divide in the value system and military standards. Hence, Poland first entered the Partnership for Peace program.252 The Polish government made strong efforts in the 1990s to become a NATO member. To leave an impression on NATO, Poland enhanced its defense spending and bought capabilities, oftentimes for low prices or even received them as a gift from Western European states as a buffer against Russia and because quite contrary to East Europe, West Europe decreased its defense. As of today, Poland has developed into a key player within the Alliance.253 Poland’s current capabilities are as follows: This parliamentary republic has around 38.5 million inhabitants, which is much lower than in the US and Germany but a total size that is only slightly smaller than Germany’s. Poland’s GDP per capita has increased in the last years and was at approximately $ 29,300 as of 2017, which is far below the other two countries. Yet, Poland has the sixth-largest economy in the EU.254 In 2017, Poland spent 4.6 % of its total government expenditure on defense. Two years before, it reached its peak in the timeline between 1995 to 2017 by spending 5.1 % of its government expenditure on defense255, which can be explained by the previously starting Ukraine crisis and the Polish change of government in 2015 where the national conservative PiS256 party took the lead. Since then, the country has gone through a lot of changes, including its international orientation. Poland shows itself less fond of the EU but participates more within NATO.257 The Ukraine crisis was the most important trigger for Poland to spend even more on defense than before, as Russia is regarded as Poland’s biggest threat.258 Currently, the Polish government spends 2 % of its GDP on defense. Poland is one of the few NATO Allies that contribute enough money on defense as of the Alliance’s guidelines. Its lowest defense contributions were 1.8 % of GDP during its first years within NATO and between 2008 and 2013.259 Poland’s contributions increased with the reemergence of Russia as an imminent threat in 2014. Poland takes a lot of

252 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 5. 253 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 3. 254 Cf. CIA 2018c and cf. ibid. 2018d. 255 Cf. SIPRI 2018c. 256 PiS stands for ‘Prawo i Sprawiedliwość’ and translates into ‘Law and Justice’. 257 Cf. Matthes et al. 2017, pp. 2f. 258 Cf. Lang 2018, p. 41. 259 Cf. SIPRI 2018a.

care of its security, which is evident by regarding its number of troops. The country has around 100,000 soldiers in addition to volunteer home guard troops, which is a major amount compared to Germany’s 170,000 troops as measured by the population. Poland is even planning to expand its troop strength. What makes Poland likewise important for NATO is the fact that it takes part in many NATO operations and for example hosts the NATO Multinational Corps North-East Headquarters in Szczecin. It looks like Poland will increase its importance to NATO in the future as it is willing to invest high amounts on defense due to its own security interests. According to Braw, Poland’s role within NATO is equally important to its West- ern European Allies as Poland functions as a buffer between Russia and the West.260 For most people in Poland and other Eastern European countries, NATO symbolizes protection, mainly from Russia. The Polish collective memory is characterized by the Russian and Soviet threat, especially due to events that happened during World War II and the Cold War.261 This fact holds specifically true now that the US and other Allies have deployed more troops as a protection for these countries and the Alliance as a whole from Russia. NATO members generally view Russia as a threat, yet is this threat perception much more pro- nounced in Poland and the Baltic States. In line with this, a Gallup poll of 2017 discovered that 62 % of Poles regard NATO as protection.262 The majority of Poles perceive NATO as a safeguard corresponding to Poland’s security interests. Most prominently, Poland and the Bal- tic States consider Russia as a reemerging threat as mentioned above. Although this threat perception is not new, it is different in nature. On the report of Braw, there is no immediate threat of a land invasion into Poland or any other country on the side of Russia. Yet, there are other means of aggressive action Russia already takes, like hybrid warfare or the disturbance of national airspace.263 Bindenagel adds that Poland is especially sensitive when it comes to its neighbors, as it is encircled by two big powers, namely Russia and Germany, which was mostly in Poland’s disadvantage in the past as Poland has been divided multiple times and brutally occupied by both states. Today, Germany and Poland are partner nations within NATO and the EU. Yet, the Polish-Russian relationship is still tense.264 Here, it can be seen that Poland’s geostrategic position as a line between Central and Eastern Europe is one of the reasons for strongly pursuing its security interests within NATO on the side of strong Allies like the US. Thus, Poland aims to strengthen NATO’s presence in the area.

260 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 3. 261 For instance, during World War II, many Poles were systematically murdered by the Soviets (Katyn) and during the Cold War, Poland became an occupied satellite state of the USSR against its will. 262 Cf. Smith 2017b. 263 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 3. 264 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 5.

The Polish government is convinced that NATO with the United States as a leading nation contributes much more to Poland’s security than the European Union. In the past, Poland oftentimes aligned with the United States to show its loyalty and in return gain the US’ security guarantee. For instance, Poland joined the ‘coalition of the willing’ to fight in the Iraq War in 2003, supported the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and functions as a relatively strong contributor to the Alliance. Also, the US has stationed its missile defense system in Poland. The only major mission Poland did not take part in was Libya in 2011, where it took a neutral position for many reasons, two of them being Poland’s lack of interest in the area and its attempt to function as a mediator nation. Yet, the Polish government is usually supportive of the US, mainly because of the vital interest for Polish security that the United States remain present in Europe and especially in the Eastern European region due to the Russian threat.265 In other words, Poland regards the United States as a “Sicherheitsanker”266. As already analyzed, Poland emphasizes its territorial defense. Since 2014, NATO reinforced its response to Poland by taking measures to protect Poland and its surrounding area more actively. NATO also took action to support and secure its Eastern members by launching several initiatives in the region. The Readiness Action Plan as a package of measures to respond to current security challenges includes assurance as well as adaption measures. With these actions, NATO augmented its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Turkey. Additionally, they highlight adaptions of the Alliance’s military capabilities as well as its durable military posture in order to enable quick emergency responses in the region.267 In 2015, NATO conducted around 300 exercises in line with the Readiness Action Plan. One major Polish maneuver was Anakonda-16 in collaboration with NATO and partner states in 2016, which turned out to be the largest exercise in the region with more than 31,000 partici- pants.268 As part of its Enhanced Forward Presence, NATO deployed multinational combat troops in Poland and the Baltic States. As of February 1, 2018, 1,117 troops were stationed in Poland. The battlegroups are led by the US and collaborate with the Polish military in Orzysz. Its contributor nations are the US, Croatia, Romania and the UK.269 All these deployments and increased activities in the region show NATO’s concern for the area and its preparedness to implement the collective defense article if necessary.

265 Cf. Dylla 2011. In contrast, the Polish population is not always in line with the Polish government, for example the majority has been against Poland’s participation in the Iraq War, cf. Ziȩba 2011, p. 33. 266 Lang 2018, p. 40. German for: security anchor. 267 Cf. NATO 2016b. 268 Cf. Sestanovich 2016. 269 Cf. NATO 2018h.

In contrast to Poland’s strong alignment with the US and NATO, it is slowly alienating itself from the European Union and its plans to strengthen the EU’s security and defense policy. Poland has been skeptical towards the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)270 and its precursors because of the fear that a strengthened European security and defense architecture would mean a decoupling from the United States, Poland’s perceived security guarantor. Nowadays, Poland has accepted European attempts to become more independent with its own security and defense plans but with the firm condition that NATO is put first. In addition, the PiS party has a more nationalistic and anti-European orientation than its predecessor while trying to strengthen its relationship with the US. Poland is concerned that Germany will slowly turn its back to transatlantic relations and focus exclusively on European defense.271 A concern Poland frequently voices is that there possibly emerges a rivalry between Western Europe and the US, manifested in any differing security and defense institutions. Poland shares this preoccupation with the United States.272 As has become evident, Poland is a country that is highly concerned about its security and puts much effort into strengthening its defense. For the Polish government, it is important to have close bilateral ties to the US as well as within NATO, as the Alliance is most capable of ensuring European security in the predominant Polish opinion.

By looking at all three examined countries above, it becomes obvious that the US, Germany and Poland clearly act as described by the theory of neorealism: they put their security interests first – although with different motivations and actions. The Alliance helps all states to ensure their security to a larger extent. None of these nations factually tries to distance itself from the Alliance as they are all aware of its beneficial value. Yet, the threat perceptions are different and Poland is by far the country that puts most effort in keeping the Alliance alive and secure itself a good standing by frequently enhancing its defense spending and capability building. Germany also emphasizes the importance of NATO membership, transatlantic security and defense links as well as good relations to the United States. Yet, the German government also thinks it is important to become less dependent on the US when it comes to defense and security, as it supports the strengthening of the EU’s own security and defense policy. The United States does as well have security interests within NATO, yet President Trump’s rhetoric diminishes the organization’s importance. Also, the US is concerned that the EU will

270 The CSDP comprises EU defense and crisis management bodies. The EEAS, EDA and PESCO belong to the CSDP among others and Federica Mogherini is the CSDPs current High Representative (HR/VR). 271 Cf. Lang 2018, pp. 43-45. 272 Cf. Ziȩba 2011, p. 31.

decouple itself and thus challenge NATO in the future by becoming a stronger security and defense actor. If this fear can be justified, will be subject of discussion in the following chapter.

5. The European Union’s Own Security and Defense Efforts and Its Rela- tionship to NATO

NATO and the EU both function as political forums to a certain degree. What differentiates them is that NATO is mainly a military organization in contrast to the European Union, which is mostly active on the economic level and makes slow progress in the military domain. In 2001, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson called Europe “an economic giant, but a military pygmy”273. Lord Robertson claimed back then that NATO, the EU and their members are at a crossroads, regarding the transatlantic and the European security structure. Yet, Robertson optimistically assumed that Europe will take away some of NATO’s burden and give new responsibilities to the new security player Europe.274 The United States, which is often seen as the leading nation within NATO, would like its EU Allies to contribute more to NATO. Yet, the US is also suspicious of the EU’s solo efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy independently from the US. The EU’s newest addition to defense is its Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO in short. Nevertheless, the European Union’s determination to become an autonomous security and defense actor reaches back to its beginnings in the early 1950s.

5.1. The History of the European Union’s Security and Defense Efforts

In order to understand the complex history of the European Union’s security and defense policy, one has to address the EU and its predecessors’ efforts in the domain of security and defense as well as the Western European Union (WEU). Although the WEU was no integral part of the European Communities (EC)275 and its successor EU, it played an important role for Europe’s defense. First, the Treaty of Dunkirk with its mutual defense clause was established by France and the UK in 1947 to allegedly guard themselves from further German attacks but mainly to be secured against the Soviet threat. In 1948, it expanded into the Treaty of Brus-

273 Robertson 2001. 274 Cf. ibid. 275 The EC comprised the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and the European Economic Community. The EC transformed into the EU in 1993.

sels, which was signed by France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg.276 France proposed the treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) to the Eu- ropean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 with the goal to watch Germany within a common defense institution. Two years later, the French National Assembly rejected the project.277 Instead, the WEU was founded in 1954 as a result of the Treaty of Brussels. Between 1954 and 1984, the WEU was not solely about defense matters but incorporated economic and political integration issues as well and functioned as a consultation forum. Yet, as the Europe- an integration proceeded, the WEU more and more became a pure military organization. Over the years, the WEU decided to extend its task spectrum, by acknowledging threats outside EU territory as well. In the course of time, the WEU launched several operations, such as ‘Opera- tion Sharp Guard’ in cooperation with NATO in the Adriatic Sea (1993-1996) or MAPE, a Multinational Advisory Police Element in Albania (1997-2001). In the 2000s, the WEU started transferring parts of its capabilities to the EU. The work within the WEU was terminated in 2011 as all its previous elements had successfully been implemented into the EU framework with the Treaty of Lisbon.278 After the creation of the EDC failed, French President Charles de Gaulle proposed the Fouchet Plan to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961 to reach more European integration in the areas of security, defense and foreign policy. The plan was declined by several states because it was perceived as anti-American. NATO was the main defense organization that was already perceived as a security guarantee against the Soviet Union. Most Euro- pean states found that NATO would suffice as a defense organization and already feared a US withdrawal from Europe back then. In this respect, the WEU played a subordinate role and put its focus on watching Germany. These previous unsuccessful European initiatives indicate disagreements among EC Member States. Two strong positions were represented by France and the UK as France wanted to become independent from the US whereas the UK wanted to uphold NATO as the only security and defense organization. Germany took the role of a mediator, advocating for a European pillar within NATO.279 The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) comprises the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the framework with an integral part called the European Securi- ty and Defence Policy (ESDP).280 However, the wording within the treaty was very imprecise and often referred to the WEU in security matters. The conflicts in the Balkan region showed

276 Cf. Varwick 2017, p. 33. 277 Cf. Hoyer 2011, p. 68. 278 Cf. EEAS 2016. 279 Cf. Hoyer 2011, pp. 69-71. 280 Cf. Federal Foreign Office/ Federal Ministry of Defence 2009, p. 17.

that Europe was not able to be an independent security and defense actor. Yet, the EU did not give up trying to take on this role. In 1996, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was initiated by NATO. The ESDI allowed the WEU to receive NATO capabilities in case of military crisis management and gave the EU more security responsibility. In the Trea- ty of Amsterdam (1999), EU states agreed on the importance of having their own security and defense policy.281 Additionally, this treaty comprised the ‘Petersberg tasks’282 and the office of a High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was created who thence- forward represented the EU in the area of foreign affairs.283 In 1998, the French and British initiated the St. Malo summit to create defense structures within the EU, as even the British were in favor of it due to their disenchantment of the American approach in the Balkan conflict.284 As a result, the Cologne European Council made further advances as EU members reapproved their readiness to work towards a more autonomous EU while developing defense capabilities and cooperating in 1999. Soon after, the Helsinki/ EU Headline Goals (1999, 2004, 2010) were established to determine the development of EU military capabilities.285 In line with this, the Berlin Plus Agreement (2003) helped the EU to reach this goal, as NATO agreed to provide the EU with necessary assets and capabilities in case they would need them. In the same year, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was developed. This document outlined challenges the EU was facing at that time and provided a thorough analysis of the security environment. It was revised in 2008.286 Another important step that has been taken in 2003 was the adaption of the Nice Treaty in which the Political and Security Committee (PSC)287 as well as further institutional fundamentals for activities in crisis management were created.288 In 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established to improve Euro- pean defense capabilities in crisis management and promote a common defense industry among others and in 2005, the EU Battlegroups were created.289 Major steps within the CFSP were taken with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Several changes and additions were made to the former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)290, which is now called Common Security and Defence Policy. Besides the establishment of the

281 Cf. Hoyer 2011, pp. 71f. 282 The ‘Petersberg tasks’ had been decided by the WEU in 1992 and included humanitarian tasks, peace missions, rescue missions and crisis management. 283 Cf. EEAS 2016. 284 Cf. Menon 2006, p. 51. 285 Cf. Federal Foreign Office/ Federal Ministry of Defence 2009, pp. 18-22. 286 Cf. EEAS 2016. 287 The PSC “exercises political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations and can draft decisions for the Council in this context”, Federal Foreign Office/ Federal Ministry of Defence 2009, p. 16. 288 Cf. ibid. 289 Cf. ibid., pp. 18-22. 290 The ESDP was an integral part of the CFSP, cf. ibid., p. 17.

European External Action Service (EEAS) and the enlargement of the office of the High Rep- resentative, which has been renamed into ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Af- fairs and Security Policy’, who also is the Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), the treaty includes a mutual defense clause (Article 42(7) TEU) as well as a solidarity statement (Article 222 TFEU). In 2016, current HR/VP Mogherini published the ‘Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’291 and a European Defence Action Plan was created with a set of defense and security measures that EU states seek to tackle together.292 As can be seen by all measures taken and advances since the EU’s beginnings, the Member States seem to be more open-minded about common action in the spheres of security and defense today. More integration in these areas are also supported by high-level EU politicians like HR/VP Federica Mogherini. The EU sets itself the condition that these measures have to be compatible with NATO and the promise to not decouple itself from the Alliance or duplicate capabilities.293 So far, the EU has conducted several autonomous security and defense missions such as EULEX in Kosovo or EUPOL Afghanistan.294 Yet, EU members have to put more effort into creating standardized procurement that leads to a European defense industry in order to be an effective defense union. For instance, endeavors like multinational European armed forces need to have uniform equipment to be coordinated properly.295 It is therefore necessary for the CSDP to ensure the EU’s security interests and those of its members along with optimizing and adapting its policies continuously.296 The newest addition to European security and defense is the Permanent Structured Coopera- tion.

5.2. Permanent Structured Cooperation

“We have activated a Permanent Structured Cooperation on Defence – ambitious and inclusive. 25 Member States have committed to join forces on a regular basis, to do things together, spend together, invest together, buy together, act together. The possibilities of the Permanent Struc- tured Cooperation are immense.”297

291 The Global Strategy is a plan of European joint action and future prospects, cf. EEAS 2017. 292 Cf. ibid. 2016. 293 Cf. Bendiek 2017, p. 1. 294 Cf. Wogau 2011, pp. 39f. 295 Cf. Mermet 1997, pp. 194f. 296 Cf. Hoyer 2011, p. 81. 297 Federica Mogherini, December 2017, quoted in EU 2018.

HR/VP Mogherini is convinced of the EU’s new efforts to strengthen its own security and defense with the help of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO has its con- tractual basis within the Lisbon Treaty but has not emerged until 2017 because of which Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker referred to PESCO as the “sleeping beauty of the Lisbon Treaty”298. To be more precise, PESCO is subject of Article 42(6) and Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Protocol 10. These frameworks form the basis for willing EU Member States to voluntarily deepen their cooperation in defense and security issues.299 PESCO provides a frame for these countries to develop joint military capacities, invest in common projects and ameliorate their operational readiness. The Council of the Eu- ropean Union officially adopted PESCO on December 11, 2017.300 The EU’s aims to become a more reliable international security partner, gain access to more capabilities and raise the EU states’ defense expenditure. Once a country has joined PESCO, its commitments are binding. PESCO consists of a two-layer structure. On the Council level, the European Council holds responsibility over PESCO’s policy direction as well as its decision-making process and will check if all member states pursue their commitments. Just as within NATO, all decisions are taken by unanimity. On the projects level, it will be measured if PESCO’s projects are effective. The projects will be led by different members. PESCO’s secretariat comprises EDA, EEAS and the EU Military Staff. Every state that participates in PESCO has to publish a National Implementation Plan (NIP) annually in which it outlines its advances or lack of success in fulfilling PESCO’s goals. Hence, the High Representative will write a yearly report about PESCO, which will be presented to the Council. Currently, 25 Member States participate in PESCO, with only the UK, Denmark and Malta missing. PESCO aims to reach more European integration in the area of security and defense. To achieve these goals and to examine if their commitment is still sustainable, countries frequently reassess their contribution plans for PESCO within the NIPs. Further, PESCO should make the EU’s contribution to security and defense more effective and meaningful. As already mentioned, the EU struggles in this domain due to no standardization in weaponry and solely national defense industries. One of PESCO’s objectives is to enhance its cooperation in the area of interoperability. An important factor for the EU’s autonomy within security and defense affairs is that PESCO is a major step into the direction of being able to operate separately and as a reliable security partner. In line with this, PESCO can temporarily transfer its capabilities to partner organizations like NATO. Although PESCO promises more cooperation, national sovereignty stays unaf-

298 Jean-Claude Juncker quoted in Vöpel 2017. Own translation. 299 Cf. EU 2018. 300 Cf. Council of the EU 2017a.

fected and capabilities remain national property.301 The official document of the Council of the EU on its decision to establish PESCO and determine the participating states also puts emphasis on the fact that actions within PESCO must be consistent with those of the CFSP.302 In addition, every PESCO member needs to participate within EDA and the EU Battle- groups.303 So far, 17 projects within the three areas of “Common Training and Exercises”, “Opera- tional Domains” and “Joint and Enabling Capabilities”304 have been established. To name a few examples, a European Medical Command, a European Union Training Mission Compe- tence Centre and an Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance belong to PESCO’s projects.305 The High Representative is authorized to propose ventures. Also, participating Member States can suggest new projects to others to gain their support. Hence, these countries should collectively submit their ideas and if accepted, they will also participate in these projects and be responsible for the agenda-setting.306 Projects are financed by participating Member States. If the EU Treaties allow it, money can be taken from the Union’s budget, especially concerning admin- istrative spending.307 PESCO is part of the EU’s new comprehensive defense package along with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). These measures have been established to improve the EU states’ defense capabilities.308 According to Jörg Fleischer, parliamentary correspondent of the Bundeswehr’s editorial department, PESCO is of high value to participating EU members because altogether, EU states waste approximately € 230 billion annually for defense due to insufficient cooperation. Already existing resources such as EDA can be efficiently used to create synergies and the work of military personnel can be facilitated through the harmonization of material, structures and techniques.309 In this context, pooling and task sharing among EU members comes into play as well.310 PESCO is a venture that evokes much enthusiasm among involved politicians such as HR/VP Federica Mogherini, German MoD Ursula von der Leyen and former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel. They regard PESCO’s future optimistically in hopes it will bring

301 Cf. EU 2018. 302 Cf. Council of the EU 2017b, p. 4. 303 Cf. Die Bundesregierung 2017. 304 All: EEAS 2018a. 305 Cf. Council of the EU 2018. 306 Cf. ibid. 2017b, pp. 9f. 307 Cf. ibid., p. 13. 308 Cf. EEAS 2018a. CARD monitors national defense expenses and the EDF offers monetary incentives for EU members to deepen cooperation in the area of defense. 309 Cf. Fleischer 2017. 310 Cf. Lang/ Schmidt 2011, p. 320.

change to the EU’s security and defense endeavors, which for so long have remained rather meaningless. Gabriel called PESCO a ‘milestone’ and praised that due to PESCO, the EU’s military budget will not have a national focus anymore. On the day of PESCO’s ratification, von der Leyen said it was a ‘big day’ for Europe and its independence in defense matters.311 Besides Germany, France is a major PESCO advocate.312 According to Braw, several PESCO projects like the European Medical Command are very meaningful because of an efficient usage of resources. However, she asserts that it will be more difficult to agree on other projects as 25 states are a lot to convince of one opinion. As already implied, Poland, among others, attaches great importance to remain close ties with the US who might feel threatened by PESCO. Thus, Braw claims that PESCO will have difficulties in deepening the cooperation in other domains.313 Bindenagel is more optimistic about PESCO, saying that he believes in its seriousness if addressed properly by the European community.314 Yet, there are further opposing voices, as setting up PESCO already was a challenge on which EU partners disagreed. Germany wanted to include as many EU members as possible, whereas France wanted to set stricter conditions for participation within PESCO to be more effective. Eventually, a compromise was agreed upon but left PESCO with a relatively vague wording, which raises the question if PESCO will be successful and powerful enough to make a difference. Just as Braw claims, skeptical countries like Poland joined PESCO although the Polish MoD already voiced his dislike for PESCO and stated that Poland will raise conditions during its cooperation within PESCO. This statement is not a good prerequisite for the newly established venture. Additionally, PESCO consists of complicated procedures that include many EU institutions and complex voting processes. German parliamentarian Dirk Vöpel claims that a smaller group of countries would have been an advantage regarding these circumstances as PESCO’s decisions are based on the principle of unanimity. However, he also acknowledges the oppor- tunities PESCO provides. The European defense capacity can be strengthened, participating countries could save much money due to synergy effects and the interlinkage of European armies would facilitate European operations.315 Only time and experience will prove if PESCO will be a successful endeavor. So far, most EU Nations that are also members of NATO did not manage to reach the financial goals re- quired by NATO. It remains questionable if these states will extend their military budgets under the umbrella of PESCO and if they can agree on new projects in the future.

311 Cf. Die Bundesregierung 2017. 312 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 5. 313 Cf. ibid., answer 6. 314 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 7. 315 Cf. Vöpel 2017.

5.3. The European Union’s Strengthening of Its Own Security and Defense Policy in Relationship to NATO

Currently, the transatlantic relationship is disrupted. Bindenagel emphasizes that EU-US relations are strong due to many common values and undertakings. Yet, he argues that although Chancellor Merkel underlines common ideals, the Trump administration has made clear that it views their relationship as an “arena of interests”316. Therefore, the opinions of both sides are clashing.317 An example for this disturbed relationship are the US’ punitive tariffs on the EU’s steel and aluminum, which have been announced at the end of May 2018. The EU has already declared to take countermeasures against the US’ decision.318 According to Braw, Trump is generally suspicious of the EU, which in his opinion is a successful trader but does not do enough for its own security.319 On the one hand, the US is concerned about all the steps the EU takes to enable its own security and defense policy. As the second hypothesis asserts, the United States believes that while the EU is strengthening its own security and defense policy, it will become a competitor to NATO and will diminish the United States’ influence in Europe. Thus, the Trump administration perceives PESCO as a potential threat.320 Relations between NATO and the EU’s security structure – particularly in the shape of PESCO – are described with the metaphor that there is an “elephant in the room”321, meaning that the issue of an independent European security and defense architecture is not one of consensus between NATO, the United States and EU members.322 This is due to a certain rivalry among the United States and the EU as both powers are strong and influential globally. Ac- cording to International Relations Professor Wyn Rees, the EU tends to be jealous of the US’ power and thus often criticizes US politics. In return, the US is keen to watch the EU’s mal- function in portraying a global power and its confession to its failure. Hence, it is evident that transatlantic relations are not solely friendly.323 In this sense, although the US and the EU are often declared to share common values and interests, their viewpoints oftentimes differ, for instance due to different backgrounds.324

316 Bindenagel 2018, answer 4. 317 Cf. ibid. 318 Cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung 2018. 319 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 5. 320 Cf. ibid., answers 5 and 6. 321 European Parliament 2017, p. 31. 322 Cf. ibid., p. 32. 323 Cf. Rees 2011, p. 2. 324 Cf. ibid., p. 17.

The relationship between NATO and European defense institutions, such as the CSDP, maintains ambiguous.325 Currently, the United States – which is seen as NATO’s lead nation – and EU members face many disagreements when it comes to security and defense policy. There are even several disparities among EU Allies on how they view NATO. For instance, France and the UK mostly had opposing opinions in the past, as France wanted the EU to develop a more competitive body to NATO, whereas the UK mostly supported NATO. The UK usually took its distance from European attempts to create more independent security and defense institutions.326 In chapter 4., it became clear that Poland and Germany also have different views on NATO. Although both countries regard NATO as important, Poland is far more oriented towards Atlanticism, whereas Germany tries to protect US-EU relations as well as to support strengthening the EU security and defense architecture. Security expert Bastian Giegerich states that there is a certain competition between NATO and the EU concerning their tasks and areas of operation. Before the ESDP was established, NATO was the only security and defense institution that operated in certain areas for defense and security reasons to protect the US and Europe. With the CSDP and PESCO, the EU tries to become a more autonomous actor and thus intervenes in areas specifically attributed to NATO. Since 2003, the EU already conducted numerous missions and it can be observed that a big amount of these operations is congruent to NATO missions. As a result, both organizations have to compete for resources and capabilities. Solutions between both institutions are not easy to be agreed upon.327 Finally, PESCO might be the project that will oust the United States from Europe. Bindenagel claims that there are many open questions concerning PESCO and its relationship to NATO and the US in particular. One problem he addresses is that some NATO Allies understand PESCO as an endeavor that was set up against NATO. He also asserts that EU politicians in support of PESCO often emphasize that PESCO merely functions as an addition to NATO. Yet, these statements need to be highlighted even more in order to avoid any misunderstandings.328 The Trump administration currently views PESCO as an attempt by the EU to detach from the US.329 Therefore, the US wants the EU to formally confirm that collective defense remains solely one of NATO’s tasks. US Secretary of Defense James Mattis discussed this issue with NATO officials in Brussels. These worries arise as the EU has established its own mutual assistance clause in the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, it has only come into force

325 Cf. Croci/ Verdun 2006, p. 2. 326 Cf. Menon 2006, p. 52. 327 Cf. Giegerich 2012, p. 100. 328 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 6. 329 Cf. ibid., answer 8.

once after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Secretary General Stoltenberg understands the US’ concerns and emphasizes that PESCO, which should lead to a European Defence Union, can only exist if it is complementary to NATO.330 Braw adds that the EU is still dependent on the US’ role as a security guarantor. In this regard, she suggests that the EU should not alienate the United States from Europe as the EU relies on the US’ security and defense capabilities.331 It can be seen that the United States has similar concerns today with regard to the EU’s security and defense efforts as Madeleine Albright has voiced in 1998, namely that Europe might decouple itself from the US, duplicate capabilities and exclude the United States from its policies if the EU becomes more autonomous in the spheres of security and defense. On the other hand, the Trump administration wants the EU to do more for its own security and defense by increasing military expenditure and develop more capabilities. The last hypothesis – which is also opposing the former one – is that NATO profits from the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy because this way, the EU contributes more to its own security and defense and thus, the United States as the major provider of the Alliance gets relieved of the greatest financial burden and other responsibilities. One argument in favor of this hypothesis is that NATO and the EU share a longstanding partnership. The St. Malo summit in 1998 can be seen as the beginning of EU-NATO cooperation. It is expressed that the ESDP – now called CSDP – has not been established to weaken or compete with NATO but to properly face European security challenges at the time.332 Ac- cording to NATO, both organizations share common interests and values, which leads them to collaborate in many areas such as crisis management and capability development. The formal institutionalization of their partnership was in 2001 within the NATO-Western European Un- ion cooperation. In 2002, NATO and the EU published a Declaration on ESDP in which the EU-NATO relationship is outlined and which is the beginning of their strategic partnership.333 With the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2003, NATO deepened its partnership with the EU and showed that it wants the EU to become more proficient in the area of security and defense by providing assets and capabilities.334 According to Giegerich, there are steady interchanges between NATO and EU Military Staff for which the EU has offices at SHAPE and NATO has offices in EU institutions in Brussels. Further, several EU and NATO bodies and personnel meet frequently such as the

330 Cf. Zeit Online 2018. 331 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 7. 332 Cf. Raik/ Järvenpää 2017, p. 3. 333 Cf. NATO 2018i. 334 Cf. EU Foreign Policy 2018.

PSC with the NAC or the EU’s High Representative with NATO’s Secretary General.335 These meetings are important as a close and multilayered cooperation of both institutions contributes to a solidified relationship. The Ukraine crisis that started in 2014 was another occa- sion to deepen EU-NATO relations.336 In 2016, NATO and the EU signed a Joint Declaration to strengthen their ties. Subsequently, both sides published a common set of 42 measures that they seek to implement together to handle common threats like hybrid threats and to conduct joint exercises. One year into this strengthened cooperation, they agreed to expand their collaboration with new measures, for example in the domain of counter-terrorism. NATO and the EU are frequently exchanging their progress in cyber policy and update one another. Also, both organizations cooperate in the field as in Afghanistan or on maritime missions.337 The EEAS is convinced that EU-NATO cooperation reinforces transatlantic burden sharing. All in all, their collaboration is a mixture of “information sharing”, “coordinated planning” and “concrete cooperation”338. In this regard, their relationship is characterized by the principles of frankness, lucency, inclusivity and mutuality.339 All these collaborations show that the EU- NATO partnership is firm and a serious long-time project that will not be easily torn down by currently tight transatlantic relations. The manifested relationship between both organizations also suggests that a conflict between the EU and NATO would “not [be] the right fight”340. Further, the EU should use its potential as it is beneficial to NATO and the US as well. The United States and NATO profit from the EU’s higher focus on security and defense. For instance, the EU buys much of its procurement from the United States because the US sells high standard weaponry and the EU is aware that these bargains consolidate their security relationship, meaning that the US is more likely to act as a security guarantee for the EU this way. Another aspect NATO and the EU would both benefit from is the fact that the EU decided to contribute 20 % to the entire price from EU funds in case EU states pool their purchases, which would contribute to a harmonization of weaponry, also within NATO.341 Here, it can be seen that EU security and defense structures are advantageous for both sides. Thus, the EU security architecture is complementary to NATO, not competitive. The Trump administration frequently addresses other Allies to increase their defense spending, especially EU members like Germany that are wealthy but do not contribute 2 % of

335 Cf. Giegerich 2012, pp. 98f. 336 Cf. Raik/ Järvenpää 2017, p. 8. 337 Cf. NATO 2018d. 338 All: EEAS 2018b. 339 Cf. ibid. 340 Valášek 2018. 341 Cf. ibid.

their GDP on defense.342 The US made clear that it is not willing to be the burdened state while EU countries profit from the US’ commitment to Europe’s security as it was the case with Libya in 2011.343 The US saw this conflict within the domain of the EU, yet it had to take on the role of a lead nation once again in order for this operation to have chances of success.344 In contrast to President Trump’s statements that other Allies need to make higher contributions, he has shown a lack of interest in NATO, whereas the EU seeks to focus more on its own and independent defense policy.345 For the EU, these contradictions make the US a less reliable security partner and EU members thus try to establish own security and defense bodies to be prepared for threats. However, this does not mean the EU does not want the US to remain a strong power within Europe but merely asserts that the EU cannot rely on another country for its whole security. Political scientist Johannes Varwick claims that this is part of the ‘transatlantic bargain’, which implies that since the end of World War II, the US ensures European security and hence gains a special position within the transatlantic relationship, whereas European states ameliorate their own defense capabilities.346 The Europeans want to support NATO structures by establishing more defense capabilities on their own, which the US has often asked for. But according to speculations, the US’ major concern is that its access to the European defense market could be restricted. This fear arises as the EU wants to expand its own defense market, which consequently means that they would order less material from the US.347 Braw affirms that PESCO is a useful project as it is an asset for European logistics. Yet, she also warns that the EU might alienate the United States from Europe if PESCO became more ambitious, whereas the US might take the path of isolationism and would leave European security on its own. This would be fatal for the EU as its members are incapable of ensuring Europe’s security. Yet, this case is unlikely to occur in her opinion.348 Basically, the EU is in the position to decide which way to pursue with PESCO and other defense bodies at the crossroads it finds itself with the US and NATO. To express the situation in Varwick’s words: “Der Ball liegt also, um es in der Fußballersprache auszudrücken, in der Spielhälfte der Europäer.“349 The EU has to decide which way it wants to follow. By looking at the line of argument above, it becomes clear that the EU wants the US and NATO to

342 Cf. subchapters 4.1. and 4.2 of this paper. 343 The NATO operation ‘Unified Protector’ (2011) sought to protect the Libyan population from the Gaddafi regime by monitoring a no-fly zone and an arms embargo. 344 Cf. Giegerich 2012, p. 118. 345 Cf. De Luce et al. 2018. 346 Cf. Varwick 2017, pp. 123-125. 347 Cf. Zeit Online 2018. 348 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 7. 349 Varwick 2011, p. 134. German for: “The ball is, to put it in the words of soccer players, in the European half of the playing field.”

continue its important security role on the European continent. The fact that most EU Allies put much emphasis on transatlantic relations and are in need of NATO and the US is frequently highlighted. For instance, the German White Book of 2016 underlines that EU-NATO relations are unique and essential.350 The German government emphasizes that PESCO will serve as an addition to the European pillar within NATO and is not meant to be a contender to the Alliance.351 Germany openly professes itself to NATO as can be seen in its last two coalition agreements. Poland strongly supports NATO and the US’ presence in Europe. In this sense, the US and NATO are still seen as insurers of European security. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept also puts emphasis on strong transatlantic relations, as common security and solidarity play an essential role between North America and Europe.352 Lastly, the EU is not likely to become a security actor on equal footing with the United States, which is another reason for the US not to worry about PESCO as a potential threat. The EU needs NATO, which is evident due to gaps within the CSDP’s structure. The CSDP is only directed to the exterior and does not ensure territorial defense nor does it allow interior military action within the EU.353 Additionally, Braw asserts that PESCO is not as aspiring as anticipated so far, which is why the US can be less concerned. Another evidence that the US still retains a high standing in Europe is the fact that President Trump has increased US troop presence in EU countries despite PESCO.354 In the past, many EU efforts were unsuccessful or at least less substantial than planned and Americans have witnessed this process over the years. Still, Bindenagel claims that the situation is different with PESCO as this time, the EU faces immediate threats like cyber attacks.355 But these are threats that NATO and the EU share. Moreover, the EU does not have a coherent defense industry at its disposal, which complicates the standardization of capabilities. Although there were several multinational projects like the Tornado aircraft, these collaborations are often accompanied by complica- tions.356 PESCO requires its members to contribute more to Europe’s defense.357 However, many EU members do not even increase their military budgets when NATO, the military organization many EU members trust the most, is asking for it.358 It remains questionable if EU states will expand their defense expenditure under the umbrella of PESCO. For example, the

350 Cf. Die Bundesregierung 2016, p. 69. 351 Cf. ibid., p. 73. 352 Cf. NATO 2010, pp. 6f. 353 Cf. Bendiek 2017, p. 5. 354 Cf. Braw 2018, answer 5. 355 Cf. Bindenagel 2018, answer 7. 356 Cf. Taylor 2001, p. 4. 357 Cf. EU 2018. 358 Cf. chapter 4 of this paper.

Europeans were not able to manage challenging missions like in Kosovo or Afghanistan on their own in the past and were dependent on the US.359 All arguments supporting the third hypothesis assume that PESCO and further EU measures in the area of security and defense are rather a relief than a potential threat to the United States or NATO. Both hypotheses discussed in this chapter show that the United States and the European Union are in a conflicting situation that resembles a vicious circle as on the one hand, the US perceives European efforts in security and defense issues as a threat and is worried that PESCO will serve as an alternative to NATO. On the other hand, the United States is an advocate of burden sharing and wants the EU to be more independent within the spheres of security and defense, which would relieve the US from many responsibilities concerning Euro- pean security. However, the arguments in favor of the last hypothesis, namely that EU efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy function as a supplement to NATO, out- weigh the argument that the EU security and defense architecture would be an alternative to NATO. This statement asserts that the US should not worry about the EU’s efforts as the EU anticipates to be a more reliable security partner for the United States within NATO and its own defense bodies. Also, PESCO is still in its development phase and could, if successful, be useful to NATO and thus the US by contributing to burden sharing and offering more capabilities. So far, the EU is still dependent on the United States and NATO in safety-related issues and due to common interests, shared values and an institutionalized strategic partnership, it is unlikely that the EU would turn against the United States or NATO. There are many common threats the EU and the US have to handle. Tackling these dangers in concert increases the chances of success, which both sides are aware of. It is a fact that most EU members put much value on strong transatlantic relations and prefer having the US as a security guarantee on their continent. Insofar, PESCO and other EU efforts can be seen as supplements to NATO and not as its competitors. After this analysis, the second part of the research question can be answered, namely in what way the EU’s efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy influence the transatlantic relationship. It has to be said that currently, PESCO and other EU defense institutions contribute to frictions within transatlantic relations due to the Trump administration’s dissatisfaction with and suspiciousness of them. However, the Trump administration has to recognize that PESCO and other EU security and defense bodies are in NATO’s and the Unit-

359 Cf. Varwick 2011, p. 131.

ed States’ benefit too, as the EU seeks to take on more responsibility for its own security, which is something many US administrations have long asked for.

6. Conclusion

After the thorough examination of the transatlantic relationship within NATO, it can be asserted that transatlantic security and defense links are at risk. The current US administration has become a less reliable security guarantor for Europe. On the one hand, President Trump urges NATO Allies to increase their military spending and contribute more to their own defense, while threatening consequences if they do not follow these guidelines. On the other hand, as the EU tries to strengthen its own security and defense policy to meet the United States’ demands and to become more self-reliant, it is criticized by the United States for potentially posing a threat to already existing defense structures within NATO by possibly du- plicating capabilities and discriminating the United States in the domain of security. Never- theless, the EU continues to deepen its internal cooperation in the area of defense, for example by establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation. Although the analysis above has shown that the United States has no reason to be alarmed by the EU’s efforts to create a more independent European security architecture, the Trump administration remains suspicious. This situation shows that the EU’s efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy have the potential to influence the transatlantic relationship in a positive and a negative way. Currently, there is friction between the US and the EU concerning this topic. Whereas the European Union tries to comply with the US’ demands, the US government is rather dis- missive towards the EU’s efforts. NATO officials call for caution toward a possible duplication of NATO capabilities, yet they also see the advantages of a strong EU security partner. This is not the first time that NATO, the United States and the European Union are at a crossroads. The Alliance had to prove its legitimacy to exist after the end of the Cold War. The conflicts in the Balkans put the Alliance on a severe test but also showed the need for its existence. Although the United States did not want to get involved too deeply, it had no choice other than intervening as the EU was not able to act coherently as a union. Additional- ly, NATO was in danger of losing its credibility if it had not acted to stop the violent practices in the Balkan region. NATO remains an important defense body that protects its territory and also aims to support countries in need, as the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq show. Also, NATO members face several threats such as Russia, terrorism and challenges in cyberspace. Yet, NATO is well prepared for these challenges as it is evident by looking at its long history,

its international cooperation inside as well as outside NATO and the documents as well as strategic papers that refer to NATO’s work focus. Besides these external threats, NATO also faces internal challenges. There is the United States, which always used to be NATO’s lead nation and is now governed by an administration that is much less reliable than its predecessors. President Trump makes contradictory statements when it comes to the EU’s strengthening of its defense structures. Sometimes he claims that EU Allies need to make more contributions and increase their NATO commitments, at other times he indicates that the EU’s efforts in security and defense issues are a threat to NATO. Even though President Trump makes these statements, the US is aware that strong EU-US relations are essential for the US’ security interests as a secure Europe is a condition for American security. Germany takes a mediator position. While having security interests as well, which are mainly due to its geographical position, the German government tries to satisfy the demands of those oriented towards Atlanticism and those oriented towards Europeanism. Germany perceives transatlantic relations as crucial while at the same time, it regards it as essential to expand the EU’s security and defense capacities. Poland, on the other hand, considers the United States and NATO as its biggest security guarantee and thus advocates for the Alliance. Poland is part of the EU’s security structure, yet it prefers NATO as the Polish government trusts NATO and the US to be able to deter Poland’s biggest perceived security threat: Russia. Although the US, Germany and Poland are situated in an area of tension due to their differing aspirations within NATO, the EU and transatlantic relations overall, all three of them have specific security interests and prioritize their own security, making them neorealist actors. Yet, the US under Trump also exhibits certain characteristics of classical realism, which is evident by President Trump’s strive for power. His motivation to station more American troops in Europe can therefore be questioned, as they might be a sign for ensuring Europe’s and thus the United States’ security but also for the US’ power display. Two of three hypotheses were refuted in this thesis. First, the hypothesis of American isolationism can be debunked as this analysis states that the United States does not isolate itself from Europe, although President Trump’s rhetoric frequently announces the contrary. Second, the European Union is neither capable of competing with NATO nor does it aim to establish alternative security structures to NATO whereby the second hypothesis is disproved as well. Rather, the EU tries to become more autonomous in the domain of security and defense for justifiable reasons, like ensuring its own security in case the US decides to support the EU less within NATO and to comply with the US’ demand to contribute more to its own defense. Therefore, the third hypothesis can be verified, namely that NATO and the US profit from the

EU’s efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy because the EU thus contributes more to its own defense as asked for by the United States. Hence, the US will get relieved from its immense financial burden and other responsibilities concerning European security. Current endeavors like PESCO indicate that the European Union stays optimistic in raising its defense spending and taking on more responsibility for its own security, although many of such projects have failed in the past or were less successful than anticipated. PESCO still has to unfold its potential but it is an addition to the EU’s security and defense policy, which should serve as an advantage for the EU and NATO at once, thus comprising the US’ benefit as well. In the past, the EU has made many efforts to create a credible security and defense architecture but only made slow progress. PESCO is a new try with chances of success. It is the attempt to reconcile NATO and a possible stronger EU security and defense policy without European decoupling, duplication or discrimination towards NATO. NATO, the United States and the European Union are at a crossroads once again. The Eu- ropean Union has the biggest responsibility in this case, as it can decide in what way it will develop PESCO and how to present its ideas concerning new security and defense endeavors to NATO and the US in the future. The US government has to decide on how to perceive EU actions in this domain. It can either accept the EU’s efforts as a relief to their financial burden or it continues to interpret them as contenders to NATO, which would impair the transatlantic relationship and might still lead to American isolationism. NATO is able to take action by deepening its cooperation with the European Union. For further collaborations, it needs to be clear that the EU and NATO are partner organizations and complement one another. Current- ly, the Trump administration and the European Union have a strained relationship in many policy areas to which the domain of security and defense belongs. It remains uncertain when and where the next problems within the transatlantic community will arise and what will cause these issues. The NATO summit on 11 and 12 July 2018 in Brussels might give an outlook on what to expect in the upcoming months and will display the current mood among NATO members and within the Alliance.360

360 Cf. NATO 2018j.

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8. Appendix: Self-Conducted Interviews

8.1. Self-Conducted, Personal Interview with James D. Bindenagel

Self-Conducted Interview with James D. Bindenagel361 US American Political Scientist and Former Diplomat Bonn, 25 April 2018

Kemmerzell: Dear Professor Bindenagel, thank you for taking your time to answer some of my questions for my Bachelor’s thesis. My thesis will be about the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization, important players within NATO who represent different points of view and situations – namely the United States, Germany and Poland – as well as the European Union’s previous and current attempts to organize its own security and defense policy. These aspects will be analyzed through the lens of a theory in International Relations: Neorealism. As someone who knows the United States, Germany and NATO and who has engaged in security and defense policies, I would like to ask you several questions for my thesis.

Kemmerzell (1): So NATO is an institution that has a long history and has changed its agenda over time due to an altering global political and security environment. What would you say makes NATO still relevant today? Bindenagel (1): You know, NATO is relevant in two respects: one is the defense aspect and that’s a question of what a threat is. A threat holds the parties together to deal with that and it’s also a political organization, political place where political views can be brought together and common policies can be made. And that supports the European Union and that supports peace and security across the Atlantic, which is very important to the United States. You can argue that the United States is also a European power in that sense. And you can argue that [it] comes from the history of the 20th century where the United States intervened in two world wars and frankly doesn’t want to intervene in a third.

K. (2): Thank you. And how has the security environment changed since your times as an ambassador in Germany (1996/1997) in contrast to today, also with regard to the European opinion towards the United States as well as NATO?

361 James D. Bindenagel was interviewed in person and his interview was audio-recorded with a smart phone.

B. (2): So I have a much longer perspective. I came here in 1972 as a lieutenant in a third in- fantry division during the Cold War. During that period of time through 1990, it was a serious threat that would lead to nuclear confrontation between the two. That period was one really of confrontation, really of military exercises. In my case, I was one of 360,000 soldiers of the millions of soldiers that were on the West side and about the same number on the East side. And that was a very strong confrontation between the two. But, because of the nature of the balance that came between the two, it was a very stable confrontation. And it never led to war. So your story really begins in 1989 during the revolution, led in part by the solidarity move- ment in Poland and then in a national uprising and of national self-determination in East Ger- many. That led of course to the unification of Germany and the Charter of Paris. The Charter of Paris brought all those parties together that had been at confrontation before, together in Paris in November 1990 to commit themselves to a system of democracy and peace. They had included all of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, well no longer the So- viet Union or the last months of the Soviet Union if you will, and the commitment was made. So we then had a different political system that was being introduced to all of Europe and the unification of Germany in Europe. And the confrontation was seen as over. And that has tre- mendous impact on what you are trying to address. So if you believe that there is no threat, is there a reason for NATO? Huge debate that we had. Is there a reason for NATO? Well there’s still the political side of NATO and that political side becomes entangled in the discussion about what happens to the other countries of the Warsaw Pact that are no longer in a security organization but would like to come to a NATO which is both security and political.

K. (3): Thank you. And as an American political scientist who has spent much time in Ger- many, what would you say are the main interests the United States and Germany pursue within NATO or what do these countries expect from NATO, especially in the light of having Donald Trump as a relatively new US president? B. (3): So fundamentally, NATO is there to provide the deterrence for any military confrontation in Europe. What we saw was the invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, was actually a cross-border military engagement in Europe but not in NATO. So in a sense the driving force is still to end or prevent those kinds of military actions. And it really is very important. The key to making sure that it’s a credible deterrence is Article 5 of the Alliance’s treaty that commits all of the countries to react together if any one of them is attacked. And so you have that very effective agreement, actually pursued only once after the attacks by al- Qaeda in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania in 2001 at the 9/11 account. So it does

work, it works well and then Mr. Trump is the elected president of the United States and not just talking about the contributions of what countries made to the budget but also then question the need or the willingness of the United States to live up to the commitment of Article 5. A very damaging effort in political terms to the credibility and therefore the trust in Article 5, unleashing another debate.

K. (4): How would you describe the current relationship between the United States and the European Union? B. (4): The United States and the European Union are really bound together by so many activities, so many values, both in interest terms and in value terms, the United States and Europe are one. There is no question about that. Now the question we have and the politics has had is who wins and who loses in individual interests. We now have a debate, are the interests the same, are the values the same? Chancellor Merkel, in response to Mr. Trump’s election, said that Europe is based on the rule of law, democracy, freedom and respect for human dignity and on that basis we would have a very good relationship. Mr. Trump didn’t directly reply but his national security advisor at the time and his economic advisor at that time, Mr. McMaster and Mr. Cohn, outline what it is that the administration of the United States government sees as the driving force in the United States is not a community of values as the Chancellor mentioned but rather an arena of interests where one would fight between and argue and win and lose. And that bases on what the administration wants so you have a conflict right now on interests and values that we haven’t seen in this order for a very long time. We have of course over the history of NATO, had many debates and many arguments but none of the fundamental nature that we have today.

K. (5): The third country I will examine in my thesis is Poland because it is a state that has joined NATO only in 1999 and also belonged to the former satellite states of the Soviet Un- ion. In the words of former US Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, Poland would be a representative of the so-called ‘New Europe’. What does Poland or other ‘New European’ states expect from NATO and what are their interests in comparison to countries from the so-called ‘Old Europe’ like Germany or France? B. (5): So actually Old Europe and New Europe are sharing the same goal as to keep peace on the European continent. It is very very strong in the case of Poland because of the history of Poland being caught between Germany and Russia. Particularly [unintelligible] France and Germany and Russia. And so you have a very strong component on the Polish side on what it

is to have an alliance that can defend and deter any military action. On the other hand, from the United States’ point of view, the effort to maintain deterrence, to maintain the coherence of NATO requires the commitments to those very values we were talking about: democracy and rule of law and the respect for human dignity. So those are the values, the glue that holds together the organization. So the emphasis that the United States had on expanding NATO, that is taking on new members, is a very important narrative – that we chatted about – and that begins with the revolution in East Germany when Mr. Gorbachev made the comment first about the Poles and then about East Germans that those countries could now make decisions on their own. They could have sovereignty back that the Brezhnev doctrine prohibited them. The Brezhnev doctrine made decisions for the so-called satellite countries. Gorbachev freed that and said no, you can make your own choices. Germany has self-decided to stay in NATO and then in 1992 or so, the Polish government asked to join NATO. And at that time it was very difficult for the Western Allies in NATO to accept Warsaw Pact countries into NATO because of not only the differences in military side but also in the philosophy, not knowing whether they really committed to the same democratic values. An in-between station was created, it was called Partnership for Peace – we started actually here in negotiations between Frank Wisner from the United States’ Pentagon and Minister Rühe in 1993, I was there – and we came up with this idea. Partnership for Peace is a way to partner in the case of Poland and the Illinois National Guard together to make sure that the military side would work but also that the political side would work. That was in 1993. By 1997 – a rather long time for a debate – the decision was taken that Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic would come into NATO. And at that point the Russians began to have more concerns because they were not willing to join although they were part of Partnership for Peace themselves. There is more of course, but we can talk about the way you wanna pursue that.

K. (6): Yes, there is a lot going on, definitely. The next questions are more focused on the European security and defense policies. As an American, how do you interpret and feel about European efforts to develop a stronger and more integrated common security and defense policy? B. (6): Well, first I think you have to go back to when unification of Germany and Europe took place and the idea there was no longer a threat. The outcome of that was – in the case of Germany - was to cut the budget. To cut the defense budget over these 25, 30 years means you cut the capacity to have that military equipment and military training and to have what you need at some point is an effective deterrent. So as a result, you have NATO’s European

partners paying somewhere around half of the budget and having something like 10 % of the capabilities. Basically a budgetary issue based on the idea that there is no threat. Now there is a threat. And the threat is clear. It comes not only in terms of military deployments but it comes in terms of cyber attacks and propaganda and other kinds of efforts to disrupt and to divide the Europeans themselves and the Americans from the Europeans. So you have a different process. So the answer to your question is ‘What are the policies of the Europeans?’ and how do they address the fundamental issue, which is having capabilities. So PESCO, what is PESCO’s design and how does it work? So permanent cooperation is absolutely necessary. But on what basis, what kinds of procurement are you going to have, what kind of equipment? Can you then move from 17 different tanks to 202 kinds of tanks. That’s the kind of consolidation and issue that is very important not only for Europe but also for NATO itself and for the United States who see this kind of cooperation among them. You have on the other hand, the French proposal for an intervention force, which is open to other countries or individual armies to join [unintelligible] in Mali or somewhere that the French want. That’s more independent from NATO and then begins the debate are the Europeans becoming more autonomous. What does autonomy mean? Or more extreme whether Europe is becoming more interested in decoupling from the United States, becoming independent from the United States. They are all open questions and very very important questions that need to be answered. Some in NATO see PESCO and the intervention forces against NATO. At the Mu- nich Security Conference, as you look and find the statements that came there it was quite the opposite. The Europeans made very strong arguments that are strengthening Europe to be stronger with NATO, not against NATO. That debate is an open debate.

K. (7): And the next question is related to the former question, again about PESCO, you already mentioned it. What do you think about PESCO? Do you think it might be successful or is it just ‘empty talk’? B. (7): So traditionally, we – the Americans – have found ourselves very skeptical of Europe- an initiatives because they haven’t effected anything, they haven’t done anything and they were put together and there were apparently discussions. The question that you ask is actually deeper though. The question is ‘Is there something different this time than before?’ And I would argue yes, there is. There are several things that have changed and then PESCO is a possibility for a strengthening for the European pillar of NATO. First you had the invasion, or first you had the war, the Georgia war with the Russians, and you had the invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, then you had the Maidan, then you had cyber attacks in Esto-

nia. So my point is, there is a real threat. Now what you do with it and how big the threat is, is all debatable. But it is a threat. That changes the nature of the debate around PESCO and around what the Europeans want to do. Then, of course, you have to ask ‘Can they actually do something?’ Well, that is probably not enough, the threat is probably not enough but Mr. Trump has made it clear that he is not going to step back from calling NATO obsolete, that some days it is obsolete, some days it’s not obsolete, it creates uncertainty. And uncertainty means that the reliability of that commitment is questioned. And those two things don’t act as a catalyst to make PESCO do what they, what the European said they’ll do, then you’ll have a very different question. In my view, yes I think PESCO is serious. I think it can be done cor- rectly, I think it can be motivated, there is something missing and I assume you’ll get to that.

K. (8): What are possible advantages and disadvantages for the United States and NATO if Europe successfully strengthens its own security and defense policy and what are their options in working together? B. (8): Well the first thing is if the Europeans develop capabilities, then the United States doesn’t have to bring military equipment back to Europe and they can operate together as we have for the last 70 years, so it’s possible. The downside is that the more autonomy, the more ability of the Europeans to develop their own military operations and their own military equipment, the more independence they demonstrate and the more influence they’ll have on the decisions that are made, that may be a good thing, or certainly not always viewed as a good thing for the United States [as it] has made most of the fundamental decisions. But the bottom line is that neither the United States nor Europe can be effective without each other. It takes both and both of us have to make that accommodation to what it is we actually can do, what capabilities we need and how to make them work together.

K. (9): So do you think the European Security and Defence Identity would be some kind of compromise within NATO because there were debates about that in the past. B. (9): Right. So then you have to step back for a moment. You are German, and you have to ask yourself how do you get to a European global strategy? Then I would argue politically, you can’t get there without the Germans. Germany has a bit of a problem with this debate about security and military deployments and strategy. So until the debate in Germany resolves the issue of where Germany stands, the Europeans will not be able to be effective. In other words, and I said this in other places, in the Süddeutsche Zeitung in February is a nice little op-ed in which I argue that in order for Europe to have a European strategy, Germany has to

have a German national security strategy. It’s not very popular, but it is I think in my view what is necessary for the Europeans to be successful. Germany has to be ready to take on the responsibilities that [former] President Gauck and minister[s] von der Leyen and [former minister] Steinmeier called for in 2014 at the Munich Security Conference. That debate has now been on for nearly four years and it’s coming to the point where (…) operation is to come up with a national security strategy. Won’t happen in the next year, but maybe in the next few years as Germany debates its history, its sovereignty. After all, Germany received, regained its sovereignty in 1990. It was legitimate as we deal with political science, it was a legitimate, it was a popular uprising or national self-determination that brought the peaceful revolution and the parliamentary system of East Germany together with the constitution of West Germa- ny that makes a founding myth of the republic, Berlin Republic if you will. And then allows Germany (…) to operate as you will see in what you’re doing. Germany has what we call a ‘sovereign obligation’ – eine souveränische Pflicht – to work in the EU, pool sovereignty we call that or imbed security in NATO, and work with other countries and then what I call ‘in- nerpartnerschaftliches Führen’ – leaders in partnership – so that Germany is always with somebody. Those things, the way Germany has operated for the last 30 plus years shows that Germany can make these decisions, it just isn’t ready to do that.

K. (10): And in the long run Germany also would probably have to contribute its 2 % of their share… B. (10): So 2 % is an interesting number. It’s an arbitrary number. It came from the 50s and 60s when NATO’s countries’ contributions of their GDP to NATO were 4-6 %. And they decided in NATO that they would have a goal that they could all reach, so barely 2 %. Okay, it isn’t – I mean it’s an artificial number in a sense – but it’s based on the history that it was actually something doable. The problem of course is not the 2 %. The problem is what’s the threat and how do you deal with the threat. If it can be dealt with 1 %, then I’m sure NATO would say 1 %. If it can be dealt with 4 %, then you would have to pay 4 %. It’s not 2 % itself, it is what does it do. And if you increase your defense spending in pensions as one country did, doesn’t help you get any capabilities to be effective as a military organization that then gives you the power to act as a political organization.

K. (11): The following question would be the last question. With respect to the BREXIT, how do you evaluate the future role of the United States in Europe after Great Britain leaves the European Union? This question refers to the fact that Great Britain plays a major role in the

cooperation within the European Union’s military structure but also emphasizes its ‘special relationship’ with the United States. B. (11): Well, I find the BREXIT decision a very troubling decision because it disrupts the structures that were there. However, Britain has decided to stay in NATO and so therefore it has a role that has to be redefined in the context of not being a EU member. So the EU structures with Britain have to change but they need not change the NATO structure. And very important in that is the European Reassurance Initiative where four battalions have been deployed to deal with the military threat from Russia and they’ve been deployed in the Baltics and in Poland. By what countries? There were four countries: the United States, Canada, Brit- ain and Germany. So as long as these four countries – and you would add France actually – these (…) countries are there to deal with the Brits, I don’t think there is a problem at this point in working these issues through. It isn’t easy, it will take time but I think as long as the British remain in NATO, they will find structural difference. I don’t think there is any competition between the United States and Britain in NATO. We’ve been partners with the British particularly since the Second World War [unintelligible]. So we’ve been there for a long time so I don’t think that it fundamentally would change. Operations will certainly change.

K.: Thank you very much for taking your time and answering my questions, I very much ap- preciate it. B.: My pleasure, good luck!

8.2. Self-Conducted, Personal Telephone Interview with Elisabeth Braw

Self-Conducted Telephone Interview with Elisabeth Braw362 Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Cologne and London, 28 May 2018

Kemmerzell: Dear Mrs. Braw, thank you for taking your time to answer some of my questions for my Bachelor’s thesis. My thesis will be about the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion, important players within NATO who represent different points of view and situations – namely the United States, Germany and Poland – as well as the European Union’s previous and current attempts to organize its own security and defense policy. These aspects will be analyzed through the lens of a theory in International Relations: neorealism. As someone who is an expert of NATO and its partners and has focused on regions such as Germany and Po- land, I would like to ask you several questions for my thesis.

Kemmerzell (1): At first, I would like to ask you a question about Germany and its role within NATO. Which goals would you say does Germany have within the transatlantic Alliance and what is Germany’s self-interest in NATO? Which role does Germany fulfill? Braw (1): From the very beginning, Germany had been a key member of NATO and it has played a hugely significant role in the territorial defense of Europe within NATO. But you might say [it] has been always a junior partner to the US within the territorial defense of Eu- rope. During the Cold War, the US had a large amount of soldiers stationed in Europe including, at the height of the Cold War, some 250,000 soldiers in Germany. And the Bundeswehr always worked very closely with those US forces. And they also worked closely with British and French forces stationed in Germany. That shows how well NATO collaboration on the operational troop level has worked over decades. As you know, there has been a lot of discussion about the readiness of the Bundeswehr. But Germany still plays a similar role within NATO in providing a substantial number of troops although much fewer troops than during the Cold War. Nevertheless, it has these troops, who are available for the defense of Germany and for NATO as a whole and have also participated in Afghanistan and in various other out- of-area missions, such as Mali. So Germany has been a good Ally to its NATO partners. Germany is the center of Europe – geographically speaking – so any organization dealing

362 Elisabeth Braw was interviewed via Skype and the interview was audio-recorded with a smart phone.

with European defense would have to include Germany and of course it was a fortuitous situation although not entirely a surprising one when German leaders back in the day decided that they wanted Germany to join NATO, not least because it was in Germany’s interest. It would be completely ridiculous for Germany to try to stay out of NATO while all the countries around it were members and now of course those countries include the former East Germany and Poland as well. So, almost everybody in continental Europe and certainly every important country in continental Europe belongs to NATO. And there is power in collective action. Germany gets a lot more for its defense budget by being part of an international alliance.

K. (2): Burden sharing is a key concept of NATO. There is an ongoing debate about the contribution of European states to NATO, may it be of financial or any other nature. Especially Germany has been criticized for not contributing its part to NATO and currently, the German Bundeswehr suffers from insufficient military capabilities. What could be a possible solution to this problem or rather what needs to be changed? B. (2): Yes, that is a debate that’s raging as we speak. And it’s something that pundits all over Europe as well as Donald Trump likes to mention in no uncertain terms. And yes, since the end of the Cold War, German defense spending has dropped from more than 2 % to currently slightly more than 1.2 %. The UK spends around 2 % and recent additions to the 2 % club include Poland and Estonia. So yes, Germany is far below the 2 % benchmark but it has to be mentioned that it’s by far not the only country that spends less than 2 %. But most significantly, because I think what matters is not spending as you see with Greece. It spends more than 2 % but its contributions to NATO are virtually zero. But more significant than that is the Bun- deswehr’s lack of readiness and one should point out that has nothing to do with the Bun- deswehr itself because the Bundeswehr has been pointing out now for years that it needs more money in order to maintain readiness and keep its equipment in working order. So what needs to happen is that defense spending has to increase so that the Bundeswehr can (…) repair its currently non-working equipment and also have a system where it can continuously be repaired. What is less certain is whether Germany actually needs to spend 2 %. I would argue and a number of German generals argue that 1.5 or 1.6 % would be a sufficient funding for the Bundeswehr and that’s because Germany’s economy, as you know, is the largest in Eu- rope and is very large and you get a lot of material and manpower for 2 % of GDP. So unless the Bundeswehr expands its manpower significantly, which would be pretty hard because it’s hard to recruit people to the armed forces anyway simply because when the economy is going well, the armed forces tend to be a less attractive destination as a workplace. So unless the

Bundeswehr significantly expands the number of troops, it would be hard to spend 2 %. But 1.5 to 1.6 % is a very workable level of spending. And that would allow the Bundeswehr to have equipment in working order, to get new equipment that it needs and also have a high level of readiness that it can for example be a trustworthy participant in NATO’s spearhead force, which it is about to take the lead on next year. Now, of course, critics will say that you can always find ways of spending 2 % but I would argue that there is no point in spending just for the sake of spending. As you know in Germany, there is the additional rule that if the MoD doesn’t spend the money allocated within the budget, (…) they have to return it. So it would be a futile exercise anyway.

K. (3): Another country I will examine in my thesis is Poland because it is a state that has joined NATO only in 1999 and also belonged to the former satellite states of the Soviet Un- ion. In the words of former US Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, Poland would be a representative of the so-called ‘New Europe’. What does Poland or other ‘New European’ states expect from NATO and what are their security interests in comparison to countries from the so-called ‘Old Europe’ like Germany or France? B. (3): Yes, Poland and the Baltic States in particular essentially started immediately after independence, started pushing very hard, lobbying very hard, working very hard for NATO membership. So by working very hard, I mean they took their national defense seriously, they increased defense spending from obviously non-existent levels because in the case of the Bal- tic States, they have been part of the Soviet Union but all these four countries took national defense very seriously and bought new equipment. By the way, that was often equipment that was sold to them very cheaply by Western European countries or given to them for free simply because Western Europe believed in this idea of the end of history. But the Baltic States and Poland took national defense very seriously and made it a goal from a very early point onwards to join NATO and they succeeded. Now, Poland specifically has in recent years emerged as a key player within NATO. As I mentioned earlier, it has just recently entered the 2 % club of spending and it has made very significant investments in new equipment even though it still has some equipment that dates back to Cold War days. But it also has about 100,000 troops plus volunteer home guard troops and that compares to around 170,000 troops in the Bundeswehr so it’s a significant number. (…) It makes it one of the largest forces within continental Europe and the Polish MoD has planned to expand the number of troops significantly. And what’s more, Poland is a key participant in NATO, for example contributing troops to NATO missions. I would argue that Poland is the country to watch within NATO,

simply because it has been so serious about increasing its military capabilities. Now, the only caveat I would add is that because of the current government, other European countries are a bit suspicious of Poland but I would argue that’s mostly a problem within the EU. NATO is purely a military defense alliance, so it doesn’t really deal with domestic politics at all. It even survived the Portuguese coup back in the 70s. So I think Poland is a country that is already playing an important role within NATO and will be playing an even more important role as NATO strengthens the Eastern flank. Because Poland is so serious about national defense, it is of course also an incredibly string buffer for the rest of Europe including Germany, because any – if we talk about Russia – any Russian aggression would first hit Poland and then Ger- many and the rest of Western Europe.

K. (4): How would you describe the Russian threat today, if we are talking about this right now? Is it very serious for Poland and the Baltics? B. (4): Yes, that is the question that’s always discussed. I would say that the consensus along military analysts and practitioners is that there is no imminent threat for an invasion of the Baltic States or Poland or another NATO Member State. But – so that means there is a very small risk of Russia rolling into the Baltic States or Poland with a land invasion in the near future. But of course today, we live in an era of hybrid warfare where an adversary can attack a country by means other than a land invasion. When we talk about a Russian threat, we shouldn’t just stare ourselves blind at the risk of an invasion of the Baltic States or Poland because Russia is already acting aggressively against the Baltic States in particular. So for example through disinformation campaigns, through air incursions, through almost air incursions and – if I could add Sweden and Finland – through various threats so for example Rus- sian representatives, ambassadors and so forth have a number of times pointed out that it would not be in Sweden and Finland’s interest to join NATO. So I would argue that we should be talking about these threats as well as the threat of a land invasion when we talk about Russian aggression in the Baltic Sea region. If I can bring Germany back into the conversation, as you know there have been Russian disinformation campaigns in effect in Ger- many as well. Most notably, the fake story of this girl Lisa in Berlin who had supposedly been raped by Arabs – that was a completely invented story but it went all the way up to [Russian] Prime Minister Lavrov who criticized Germany for (…) being so dangerous that a girl – in this case a German girl of Russian origin – could be raped by Arabs. And it didn’t matter that the story was false, it was blown up by the Russian media to essentially paint Germany as a country that’s dangerous to live in. And so we have one of these issues that these information

campaigns, threats and constant harassment of national airspace and these actions are designed to weaken the countries that are affected by them and potentially make them say, you know, what’s the point, let’s just be nice to Russia because it will just be easier if they didn’t feel the need to harass us. And I would argue that is a threat or actually an activity in fact that should be taken seriously and then of course we should also think about the risk of a land invasion as any country should anyway but it’s not the only threat we face.

K. (5): Turning to a different aspect, how would you describe the current relationship between the United States and the European Union? B. (5): Well, it’s a troubled relationship and as we speak, President Trump will announce if he will impose tariffs on European steel and aluminum and that is a very concerning step because the US has, as you know, ever since the end of World War II been a very close ally of us Eu- ropeans and of the European Union as well as it took shape and changed from the European Coal and Steel Community all the way up to what it’s now which is the European Union. (…) So just going back to Trump, Trump doesn’t like multilateralism and he clearly views the European Union with suspicion and he also views it as a European bloc that likes to trade but doesn’t do enough for its own security at expense of the Americans. And that leads me to my second point, if the EU would do more within defense and security, the US would view this as a threat and in fact the Americans were concerned a few months ago when PESCO was announced, specifically they were concerned that that the Europeans would want to shut Ameri- ca out or limit the role of America in European defense. So it’s a strange situation where Trump is asking us Europeans to do more but any European attempt essentially conducting its security on its own is met with concern in Washington. Now, PESCO turned out to be much less ambitious than what France, which was the main country lobbying for it, had hoped. So I don’t think that the Americans have to be worried yet. It also means that American forces will remain as active in Europe as they have been up to now and under Trump, we have seen increases in American troop activity in Europe.

K. (6): So my next question would also be about what you’ve just talked about and what you’ve mentioned. What is your opinion on the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its own security and defense policy, for example PESCO? (…) B. (6): (…) So if you look at the first projects that have been decided within PESCO, the most significant step is the creation of the European Medical Command, which is a very good step. (…) It makes sense to pool resources and it is efficient use of everybody’s money and it’s just

a very pragmatic solution. Now when it comes to other potential projects, there is a reason that the European Medical Command is the most significant project that has been agreed on within PESCO and that is that anything more significant than that would be very hard to agree on and the reason for that is there are very different views on PESCO within the group of 25 that agreed to join PESCO. And a number of those countries, including Poland and other Cen- tral and Eastern European states are very keen to maintain in strong links with the US so they would not want to see a PESCO that takes Europe or the EU down the path of strategic autonomy, meaning that Europe would handle defense on its own. These countries see the US as a security guarantee. And so I think PESCO is a useful addition to European security because it just makes complete sense to have a European Medical Command as opposed to in this case 25 countries doing their own thing. But I doubt that it will gain much more clouts than that, simply because a number of European countries wants the US to remain involved in European defense.

K. (7): What are the advantages and disadvantages in regard to the transatlantic relationship, considering the influential roles of the United States and NATO in Europe, if we look at these European efforts? B. (7): Well, as I said, there are advantages within the pragmatic area of logistical solutions. So, the European Medical Command and the Military Mobility plan. The disadvantage would be if PESCO members tried to become much more ambitious with what they want to do within PESCO. As I mentioned, I don’t think that will happen, but the disadvantage if that would happen would essentially cause the Americans to say ‘Well, you know, you guys, you are doing very well on your own (…) we’re out of here’ and unfortunately, the reality is that even with PESCO, defense and security abilities are such that we still need the US as a security guarantee. France and the UK are the strongest military powers within Europe. France is busy in many parts of the world. The UK is busy in various parts of the world as well because it maintains a worldwide presence. So neither France nor the UK are 100 % focused on Europe when it comes to defense so (…) as we’ve talked about, Germany is not yet in the position to take charge or play the first fiddle in European defense. So we need the Americans for some time to come and it would be unfortunate if we alienated them through PESCO.

K. (8): The last question in this regard would be if you think that the United States might withdraw from Europe in its own interest because as you said, Trump might pursue a more isolationist policy or less multilateral policy?

B. (8): Well, so that’s been the fear ever since the election campaign, when he kept saying that if you (…) Europeans don’t spend 2 % on defense or any European country that doesn’t spend 2 %, can’t expect America’s support. (…) American complaints about European defense spending are not new. Virtually every US administration has gently pointed out to Eu- ropean countries that they really should be spending more because it’s really not fair that the US should spend more than 3 % on defense and spend part of that on defending Europe when European countries themselves don’t spend enough. But Trump has been making that point extremely clear. But in reality, he hasn’t cut US involvement to European defense. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, we now have more American troops on permanent rotation here in Europe, in addition to the ones that are permanently stationed here. So it’s interesting that when it comes to European defense as concerns the number of troops on the ground has been no Trump effect. And in fact, Obama – with his ‘pivot to Asia’ – was leaning more in the direction of a limiting US involvement in Europe than Trump is, despite Trump’s rhetoric. So we shouldn’t confuse his rhetoric with his actions even though we should of course pay attention to his rhetoric. (…) I think we will see a continued strong US presence in Europe, continuing in the tradition of a US engagement in European security and defense since the Cold War.

K.: Thank you very much for taking your time and answering my questions, I very much ap- preciate it. B.: You’re welcome.