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(DOCC) Mission Report to Jalalaqi, Hiraan Region of Hirshabelle State of Somalia 30 May 2018

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(DOCC) Mission Report to Jalalaqi, Hiraan Region of Hirshabelle State of Somalia 30 May 2018 Drought Operations and Coordination Centre (DOCC) Mission Report to Jalalaqi, Hiraan Region of Hirshabelle State of Somalia 30 May 2018 1.0 Introduction Members of the Drought Operations and Coordination Centre (DOCC) in Mogadishu travelled to Jalalaqsi on Wednesday the 30th of May 2018 to observe the impact of the flooding on people and institutions and to develop a response plan. The mission was organised together with World Food Programme (WFP) staff who planned to start-up the emergency response in Jalalaqsi. Mission participants comprised Cluster Coordinators and Co-Coordinators; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Humanitarian Affairs Officers for Hirshabelle based in Beletweyn; Officers of the World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Mission to Somalia (UNSOM) and United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) based in Beletweyn, Galcaakyo and Mogadishu. The Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) supported the security aspects of the mission. While in Jalalaqsi, mission members carried out the following tasks; − Flew over flood affected area of Jalalaqsi town and surrounding villages located north and South of Jalalaqsi town. − Met with local authorities represented by the District Commissioner (DC), Mayor, senior commanders of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), clan elders, MERCY-USA and other non- governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in Jalalaqsi. − Visited Dirgoys, a village located three kilometres south of Jalalaqsi town, to meet communities affected by the flooding. − Visited Jalalaqsi town to observe how the submerged bridge affected communication and access and how the rising water damaged homes located near the river bank. 2.0 General Findings The aerial view from the UNHAS operated helicopter indicates that approximately 20 per cent of homes in Jalalaqsi town were submerged by floods.1 It was clear that most farms and villages lying along river Shabelle between Jalalaqsi and Jowhar town were inundated by water. The rising river water forced residents to move to higher grounds close to their original villages. For instance, residents of Dirgoys moved to a higher ground away from their original village. They now live in makeshift temporary shelters built from local materials. Observations indicate that few households had purchased plastic sheet from Jalalaqsi town at a cost of US$ 20 For 12 square meter plastic sheet material to cover their houses. Women in Dirqoys Village collect and sell firewood in order to buy 2 to 3 US dollars’ worth of food. On the whole, the living conditions for displaced persons are very poor and temporary shelters provide little protection from extreme weather. According to the local authorities in Jalalaqsi, flooding affected 4,800 households in Jalalaqsi town as well as 52 villages in Jalalaqsi district. At the time of the visit, 17 of these 52 villages were cut off from the rest of the district. Similarly, the bridge that straddles river Shabelle and connects east and west Jalalaqsi suburbs was partially submerged forcing residents to travel by boat. In addition, local authorities reported three children to have died in crocodile attacks. 1/4 In general, very few NGOs have physical or operational capacity in Jalalaqsi District and the absence of implementing partner agencies could continue to affect efforts to scale up a response to the flood crisis. According to AMISOM, 80 per cent of Jalalaqsi District, including areas located within a distance of 20 kilometres radius around Jalalaqsi town are secure. While there is a road that links Jalalaqsi to other parts of Somalia located west of river Shabelle, parts of this road are either affected by flooding or pass through areas controlled by non-state actors. Likewise, access to Jalalaqsi from the east is cut off by fighting between non state actors and a local militia group allied to the Somali National Army (SNA). During the visit, compaction works on Jalalaqsi airstrip were being completed enabling WFP to fly in by means of a fixed winged aircraft, 5.8 metric tonnes of dates, three days after the DOCC mission to Jalalaqsi. In addition, AMISOM reported that a commercial fixed winged aircraft carrying 50 passengers had landed into Jalalaqsi airstrip in March 2018. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) measured at 15.1% indicating that 6,000 children are in need of nutrition support annually requiring a rapid assessment to confirm active case findings.2 While the Somali Organic Agriculture Development Organization (SOADO) reported operating mobile clinics and in Jalalaqsi district, the local authorities have indicated this was a false claim. Overall, the absence of functioning OTP and Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme (TSFP) to treat cases of acute malnutrition would greatly affect the graduation of children being treated at stabilization centers into OTP programmes. Health partner agencies have reported an upsurge in acute watery diarrhea (AWD) and malarial cases over the past week. While Jalalaqsi town has a referral hospital, its operational capacity is limited to providing negligible health care and immunization services. NGOs including WARDI and Mercy USA, implementing health interventions in Jalalaqsi District do not have adequate funds and human resource. Even though WARDI implements immunization programme in Bulo Burto town, it has no capacity to operate in Jalalaqsi. The two functioning schools3 in Jalalaqsi and Dirgoys have been affected by flooding thus disrupting the education of 358 pupils. As a result, the flood crisis has affected education services in areas already crippled by the effects of the drought. Besides, most parents cannot afford to pay school fees demanded by privately owned and community-based schools. 3.0 Summary of Response by Cluster Cluster / Response Agency/Instit Time frame Interventio ution n 2 A methodology for identifying malnutrition cases 3 Nasrudin primary and Dirqoys West, where 358 pupils (75 girls equivalent to 20 per cent) are enrolled 2/4 − Urgently airlift 1.85 metric tonnes of high energy WFP 30 May 2018 biscuits (HEB) to 3,500 beneficiaries and 5.3 metric tonnes of dates to 2,650 households FOOD (equivalent 15,900 beneficiaries). SECURITY − Provide unconditional food support to 2,650HHs WFP 3-5 June 2018 or 15,900 beneficiaries for a period of two months (June to July). This would involve in-kind food distribution for the first month and cash based transfer-commodity and Voucher on the second. − Implement a training programme on voucher and WFP and 3-5 June 2018 retailers training as well as to validate Mercy USA beneficiaries for a nutrition project intervention − Implement blanket supplementary feeding WFP/UNICEF programme and targeted supplementary feeding programme nutrition programmes, to ensure the provision of food and micronutrient supplement to Children under three and five years of age as well pregnant, and lactating women. These NUTRITION interventions would lead to the prevention and treatment of malnutrition as well excess mortality among persons at risk. − Verify the operational capacity of the partner agency, the Somali Organic Agriculture Development Organisation to determine availability of nutritional supplies. Identify a partner agency with adequate capacity to implement a multi-sectoral response in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health. 3/4 − UNICEF and WFP to improve the integrated food and nutrition programmme and WASH to ensure a timely response. − Liaise with Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit - Somalia (FSNAU) or Nutrition Cluster at subnational to gauge access to people affected by floods as well as availability of food. LOGISTICS − Support the Hirshabelle state government in completing the construction of airstrip to allow fix winged aircraft delivery emergency supplies. SHELTER − Provide US$ 85,000 to 3,000 allow households purchase plastic sheets and non-food items. EDUCATIO − Rehabilitate and construct classrooms, latrine N and water points besides recruiting teachers and provision of psychosocial support. HEALTH − Distribute treated long-lasting insecticidal net (LLINs). − Improve access to water, sanitation and hygiene through the construction of water systems, latrines, hygiene kits and training in hygiene promotion. − Improve primary health care services, establish mobile clinics and support the recruitment of health care workers and in mother and child health services. WASH − Support the construction of twenty-one (21) UNICEF latrines through local partner CASH − Donation of $50,000 to Jalalaqsi District Somalia Commissioner’s Office for affected people Federal government, Hirshabelle state and Hiran regional floods committee 4/4 5/4 .
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